Sample pages Power Report – 2020/21

www.africa-energy.com About African Energy Reports

About African Energy Reports

South Africa Power Report 2020/21 is the fourth in a series of easy to digest studies on key energy industry segments presented by African Energy ’s consultancy group.

The reports are intended to provide executives, South Africa Power Report – 2020/21 financiers, investors, policy-makers and other Published April 2020 stakeholders with a concise but authoritative document that provides an overview of a country’s politics and risk profile, and of the major macroeconomic and business trends that impact DRaevpido Srltaste rEditor [email protected] on projects. The reports provide data to illustrate, and analysis to aid, understanding of critical

ACjoayn Utrbibhiutors questions for the energy industry. Daniel Westbury-Haines About African Energy

DLiavne M Darakts a Editor African Energy is a UK-based market [email protected] intelligence provider that has been helping businesses navigate the challenges of the African JEodn iMtoarrikas l Director continent’s complex industries for over two [email protected] decades.

Sales and Service Managed and owned by Cross-border Direct:+44 (0) 1424 721 667 Information, African Energy has 16 full-time staff Fax: +44 (0) 1424 721 721 Email: [email protected] in the UK, and a network of correspondents and associates active in over 40 African countries.

African Energy’s services include: www.africa-energy.com • Newsletter – A respected source of independent analysis since 1998, covering emerging energy trends and the political and governance issues that concern established operators, new entrants and the finance sector.

• Live Data – Live-updated online data platform featuring more than 6,500 power plants in Africa. 2020 Cross-border Information. All rights reserved. Data and information published in African Energy is provided to Cross- • Consultancy – Bespoke consultancy and border Information (CbI) by its staff and network of correspondents through extensive surveys of sources and published with the intention of advisory services ranging from market entry being accurate. CbI cannot insure against or be held responsible for inaccuracies and assumes no liability for any loss whatsoever arising studies for developers and financiers to large from use of such data. public sector-tendered monitoring and evaluation No portion of this publication may be photocopied, reproduced, retransmitted, put into a computer system or otherwise redistributed studies. without prior authorisation from Cross-border Information. Registered office: 4 Bank Buildings, Station Road, Hastings, East Sussex TN34 1NG, United Kingdom. • Reports – Instant access to essential market Directors: JJ Marks, JM Ford, JD Hamilton, NJ Carn, E intelligence on Africa’s power, renewables, oil and Gillespie gas sectors.

2 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 13

COUNTRY SNAPSHOT ...... 18

2. RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT ...... 19

3. POLITICAL OVERVIEW ...... 22 3.1 Structure of government ...... 22 3.1.1 Political system ...... 22 3.1.2 Three tiers of government ...... 22 3.1.3 Executive authority ...... 23 3.1.4 Legislative authority ...... 23 Box 1: : a multi-faceted career ...... 24 3.1.5 An independent judiciary under heavy stress ...... 25 3.2 Stability of political system ...... 25 3.2.1 A social contract under pressure ...... 26 3.2.2 Divisions within the African National Congress ...... 26 3.2.3 ‘’ and other governance concerns ...... 27 3.3 The main political parties ...... 27 3.3.1 Governing party: the African National Congress ...... 27 Box 2: Profiles of leading ANC actors ...... 28 3.3.1.i Factional divisions ...... 29 3.3.2 The official opposition party: Democratic Alliance ...... 29 Box 3: Profiles of leading Democratic Alliance figures ...... 29 3.3.2.i Democratic Alliance splits: Good ...... 30 3.3.3 Radical opposition: Economic Freedom Fighters ...... 30 Box 4: Julius ‘Juju’ Malema and the EFF ...... 31 3.4 Elections ...... 31 3.4.1 Electoral system ...... 31 3.4.2 Most recent election ...... 31 3.4.3 Voter disenchantment ...... 33 3.4.4 Next elections ...... 33 3.5 Corruption ...... 33 3.5.1 Resistance to change ...... 34 3.5.2 Foreign courts and ‘state capture ...... 34 3.5.3 Transparency International rating ...... 34 3.6 Security risk ...... 35

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3.6.1 Personal security and criminality ...... 35 3.6.2 Risks of political violence ...... 35 3.6.3 Risk of terrorism ...... 36 3.6.4 Risk of ethnic/tribal conflict ...... 36 3.7 Political economy and major policy initiatives ...... 36 3.7.1 Downgrades and gridlock in the political system ...... 37 3.7.2 Economic policy ...... 38 3.7.3 National Development Plan 2013-30 ...... 38 3.7.4 Economic stimulus, recovery plans and social uplift ...... 39 3.8 and the ESI crisis ...... 40 3.8.1 The politics of private energy investment ...... 41 Box 5: Minister of mineral resources and energy ...... 42 Box 6: The 2019 Integrated Resource Plan ...... 43 3.8.2 Climate change ...... 43

4. MACROECONOMICS ...... 45 4.1 Overview ...... 45 4.1.1 Reform and missed targets ...... 46 4.1.2 A very difficult outlook ...... 47 4.2 Economic structure and stunted growth ...... 47 4.2.1 Trends/projections ...... 47 4.1.2 Breakdown of economy by sector ...... 48 4.3 Inflation and the central bank ...... 48 4.4 Fiscal deficit and debt: rising fast under SOE burden ...... 49 4.4.1 State-owned enterprises ...... 50 – Eskom ...... 50 – South African Airways ...... 50 – Denel ...... 50 4.4.2 The 2020 budget ...... 51 4.4.3 Risk of debt distress ...... 51 – Debt-to-GDP ...... 52 – Debt service-to-revenue ...... 52 4.4.4 Major creditors and future borrowing ...... 52 4.4.5 Potential IMF deal ...... 53 4.5 Balance of payments ...... 53 4.6 Foreign reserves and the rand ...... 53 4.7 Credit ratings ...... 54

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4.8 Key lending rates ...... 55 4.9 WBG Ease of Doing Business ...... 55 4.10 Major recent developments ...... 56

MAP: SOUTH AFRICA’S ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE ...... 57

5. POWER SECTOR OVERVIEW ...... 60 5.1 Overview ...... 60 5.2 Market structure ...... 60 5.2.1 Future developments ...... 61 5.3 Profiles of institutions ...... 61 5.3.1 Utilities ...... 61 – Eskom Holdings ...... 61 5.3.2 Regulators ...... 62 – National Energy Regulator of South Africa ...... 62 5.2.3 Ministries ...... 62 – Department of Mineral Resources and Energy ...... 62 – Department of Public Enterprises ...... 62 – National Treasury ...... 62 – IPP Office ...... 63 5.4 Market operation ...... 63 5.5 Sector history ...... 63 5.5.1 Ownership and organisation history ...... 63 5.5.2 Role of independent power producers ...... 66 5.6 Regional electricity trade ...... 66 5.7 Financial challenges ...... 67 5.8 Main consumers of electricity ...... 68

6. POWER SECTOR POLICY AND REGULATION ...... 69 6.1 Overview ...... 69 6.2 Major legislation ...... 69 – National Energy Act, 2008 ...... 69 – National Energy Regulator Act, 2004 ...... 70 – Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 ...... 70 – Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 ...... 70 – Grid Code ...... 70 – National Environmental Management Act, 1998 ...... 70 – Public Finance Management Act, 1999 ...... 70

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– Draft Public Procurement Act, 2020 ...... 70 – Carbon Tax, 2019 ...... 70 – Independent Market Operator Bill, 2019 ...... 71 6.3 Sector plans and policies ...... 71 – White Paper on Energy Policy, 1998 ...... 71 – Renewable Energy Policy White Paper, 2003 ...... 71 – Integrated Energy Plan, 2016 ...... 71 – Integrated Resouce Plan, 2019 ...... 72 – Gas Utilisation Master Plan ...... 74 – Eskom Transmission Plan, 2020-2029 ...... 74 – Roadmap for Eskom in a Reformed Electricity Supply Industry ...... 74 Box 7: Key aspects of the Eskom Roadmap ...... 77 6.4 Legal requirements ...... 78 6.4.1 Generation ...... 78 6.4.2 Transmission ...... 79 6.4.3 Distribution ...... 79 6.4.5 Economic empowerment ...... 79 6.5 Procurement ...... 80 6.5.1 Competitive bidding ...... 80 – Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement (REIPPP) programme ...... 80 – Small Projects Independent Power Producer Procurement (SPIPPP) programme ...... 82 – Coal Baseload IPP procurement programme ...... 82 – Battery energy storage systems ...... 83 – LNG-to-power IPP procurement programme ...... 83 – Risk Mitigation Power Purchase Programme ...... 84 6.5.2 Municipality procurement ...... 85 6.6 Tariffs ...... 85 6.6.1 Regulatory clearing account ...... 85 6.6.2 Wholesale ...... 86 6.6.3 Retail ...... 86 6.6.4 Differences between Nersa and Eskom tariffs ...... 86 6.7 Currency risk ...... 86 6.8 Major adverse incidents affecting IPPs ...... 86 – Eskom refusing to approve REIPPP projects ...... 86 – Budget quote and transmission delays for REIPPPs ...... 87 – Sacking of Karén Breytenbach ...... 87

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6.9 Guarantees and mounting government liabilities ...... 88 Box 8: Eskom – a failing giant ...... 89

7. FROM THE NEWSLETTER ...... 90

8. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY ...... 91 8.1 Overview ...... 91 8.2 Hydrocarbons market ...... 91 8.2.1 Overview ...... 91 8.2.2 Key agencies ...... 91 – PetroSA ...... 91 – Petroleum Agency of South Africa ...... 91 – iGas ...... 92 – Transnet ...... 92 8.2.3 Legislation ...... 92 – The draft Upstream Petroleum Resources Development Bill ...... 92 8.2.4 Licensing ...... 93 8.3 Coal ...... 93 8.4 Crude oil ...... 94 8.5 Natural gas ...... 94 8.6 Liquified natural gas ...... 94 8.7 Geothermal ...... 95 8.8 Solar ...... 95 8.9 Wind ...... 95 8.10 Hydroelectricity ...... 96 8.11 Shale gas ...... 96 8.12 Regional gas ...... 96 8.12.1 SADC master plan ...... 97 8.12.2 Mozambique: from ‘modest producer’ to global player ...... 97 – Export LNG projects ...... 97 – Potential pipeline projects ...... 98 8.12.3 Sasol’s Mozambique play and gas transition strategy ...... 98 8.12.4 Potentials for indigenous gas production coupled with LNG imports ...... 99 – Other sources of gas ...... 100

MAP: SOUTH AFRICA’S OIL AND GAS INFRASTRUCTURE ...... 101

9. COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE ...... 102 9.1 Overview ...... 102

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9.2 Landmark power projects ...... 102 – Largest power plant: Medupi Coal ...... 102 – Kusile Coal ...... 103 – Largest nuclear: Koeberg Nuclear ...... 103 – First IPP: Rand Central Electric Works Coal ...... 104 – Largest operating IPP: Avon Diesel ...... 105 – First REIPPP: Kalkbuit Solar ...... 105 – Largest state-owned project: Kendal Coal ...... 105 9.3 First renewable IPP procurement round: REIPPP round 1 ...... 106 9.4 Under construction generation projects ...... 106 – Aggeneys Solar PV ...... 106 – Bokamoso Solar PV ...... 107 – Copperton Wind ...... 107 – Droogfontein Solar PV II ...... 108 – Dyason’s Klip Solar PV I ...... 108 – Dyason’s Klip Solar PV II ...... 108 – Garob Wind ...... 109 – Greefspan Solar PV II ...... 109 – Kangnas Wind ...... 110 – Karusa Wind ...... 110 – Konkoonsies Solar PV II ...... 111 – Ngodwana Mill Lignin Expansion ...... 111 – Nxuba Wind ...... 112 – Oyster Bay Wind ...... 112 – Perdekraal East Wind ...... 113 – Roggeveld Wind ...... 113 – Sirius Project One Solar PV ...... 114 – Soetwater Wind ...... 114 – Waterloo Solar PV ...... 115 9.5 Selected key developers ...... 115 – Actis ...... 115 – Biotherm Energy ...... 115 – Acwa Power ...... 115 – Juwi Renewable Energies ...... 116 – Mulilo Renewable Energy ...... 116 – Sasol ...... 116

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– SolarReserve South Africa ...... 116 9.6 Selected key financiers ...... 116 – Absa Bank Ltd ...... 116 – Nedbank and Nedbank New Energy Finance ...... 116 – Phakwe Group ...... 116 – Old Mutual Investment Group South Africa Ltd ...... 116

10. TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION ...... 117 10.1 Overview ...... 117 10.2 T&D losses ...... 118 10.3 Critical issues facing the network ...... 118 10.4 Sector reforms ...... 118 10.5 Planned grid improvements ...... 118 10.5.1 Strategic Grid Plan 2040 ...... 118 10.5.2 Transmission Development Plan (2020-2029) ...... 119 10.6 Regional trade ...... 120 10.6.1 Southern African Power Pool ...... 120 – Bilateral contracts ...... 121 – Competitive market ...... 121 10.6.2 Existing interconnections ...... 123 10.6.3 Planned interconnections ...... 123 – Botswana-South Africa (BoSa) ...... 123 – Mozambique-Zimbabwe –South Africa (MoZiSa) ...... 123 10.7 Electricity imports/exports ...... 124 10.7.1 Imports ...... 124 10.7.2 Exports ...... 124

11. OFF-GRID ...... 125 11.1 Overview ...... 125 11.2 Off-grid legislation and strategies ...... 125 10.2.1 Integrated National Electrification Programme ...... 125 10.2.2 New Household Electrification Strategy ...... 126 11.3 Electrification and access rates ...... 126 – National ...... 126 – Urban ...... 126 – Rural ...... 126 11.4 Initiatives and programmes ...... 126 11.4.1 Off-grid Solar Home System Programme South Africa ...... 126

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11.5 Off-grid regulation ...... 127 11.5.1 Electricity Regulation Act of 2006 ...... 127 11.5.2 Solar Home Systems ...... 127 11.6 Selected off-grid players ...... 127 11.6 Embedded generation ...... 128 11.6.1 Mines ...... 128

12. DEMAND AND SUPPLY OUTLOOK ...... 129 12.1 Overview ...... 129 12.2 Demand ...... 130 12.2.1 Projections ...... 130 12.2.2 Factors influencing growth ...... 130 12.3 Generation ...... 130 12.3.1 Government projections ...... 131 – Medium-term system adequacy (2019-2024) ...... 131 – Integrated Resource Plan 2019 (2019-2030) ...... 132 12.3.2 African Energy pipeline 2020-2024 ...... 133 12.4 Demand and supply outlook, 2020-2030 ...... 134 12.5 The cost of cleaner coal ...... 135

13. DATA TABLES ...... 137 – Methodology ...... 137 – Installed capacity, RE vs non-RE, 2010-2024 (MW & %) ...... 137 – Installed capacity by fuel type, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 138 – Installed capacity by fuel type, 2010-2024 (%) ...... 138 – Installed capacity, liquid fuels breakdown, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 139 – Installed capacity, liquid fuels breakdown, 2010-2024 (%) ...... 139 – Installed capacity by technology type, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 140 – Installed capacity by technology type, 2010-2024 (%) ...... 141 – Installed capacity by ownership type, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 142 – Installed capacity by ownership type, 2010-2024 (%) ...... 142 – Installed capacity by provinces, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 143 – Installed capacity by provinces, 2010-2024 (%) ...... 144 – Installed capacity by fuel, Eastern Cape, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145 – Installed capacity by fuel, Free State, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145 – Installed capacity by fuel, Gauteng, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145 – Installed capacity by fuel, KwaZulu Natal, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145 – Installed capacity by fuel, , 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145

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– Installed capacity by fuel, , 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145 – Installed capacity by fuel, North West, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 145 – Installed capacity by fuel, Northern Cape, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 146 – Installed capacity by fuel, Western Cape, 2010-2024 (MW) ...... 146 Project listings ...... 147 – Operating ...... 147 – Under construction ...... 150 – In development ...... 151

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1. Executive summary

In some contexts, the South African electricity supply industry (ESI) has been viewed as an attractive destination for investment due to its stable government, economy and policy direction. This was especially the case as the government rolled out its ground-breaking Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement (REIPPP) programme in 2011.

However, for all South Africa’s strengths – which include a robust judiciary and banking sector – a number of underlying tensions and challenges mean that long-term investments are far from being risk- free. The South Africa Power Report 2020/21 outlines the market’s attractions and downsides for power developers, financiers and other industry stakeholders.

A changing of the political guard The South African political landscape appears, in many ways, a picture of stability. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) has been victorious in every election of the post-apartheid era, which began with the abolition of white rule in 1994. This masks a more unpredictable reality, however. While the ANC won 57.7% of the popular vote in the 2019 election, it is torn by rampant factionalism. Meanwhile, the recent rise of opposition parties – such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), led by political firebrand , and the rebranded Democratic Alliance – points to a shifting political landscape, providing plenty of political intrigue and fuelling crony relationships that have had a significantly negative impact on business.

Within the ANC, battle lines have been drawn across ideological and pragmatic lines. Those loyal to ex-president , who resigned in disgrace in 2018, rally around a cry for “radical economic transformation”. New leader President Cyril Ramaphosa promises to deliver foreign investment, revive the economy and restore the South African government’s domestic and international reputation by rooting out corruption.

The impact and consequences of apartheid-era politics are deeply felt to this day, as high levels of inequality and unemployment remain embedded in society. Broader anti-government frustrations have brewed since the ANC to power in 1994, caused by sometimes alarmingly poor levels of governance, widespread corruption and statist politics. While the legacy of apartheid looms over these issues, history will likely judge that many of these abuses were eminently avoidable.

The jury is out on whether he will succeed, but Ramaphosa seems almost uniquely placed to begin repairing the social contract. The president, a close ally of national icon Nelson Mandela, was the first general secretary of the influential National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Ramaphosa remade himself as a leading entrepreneur – and has thus been promoted as a financially sensible and trustworthy candidate, in stark contrast to Zuma – and enjoys broad support among the general populace.

Ramaphosa scored an approval rating of 62% in a February 2020 poll, which outstrips the approval of the party he represents by around seven percentage points. However, balancing much-needed reform with the support of key policy-makers is a political tightrope, and there is a palpable impatience resulting from the government’s sluggishness in addressing key issues.

12 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Executive suSmecmtaiorny

Tackling corruption and state capture Since Ramaphosa assumed office, there have been some tangible improvements in pushing back the frontiers of kleptocracy that were normalised under Zuma. Under the previous administration over R500bn ($34bn) is alleged to have been stolen from state companies and government departments. Milestones include the arrest in November 2019 of Zuma ally, former minister Bongani Bongo. Zuma and his cronies have been put on trial in a system where the courts proved sufficiently robust to withstand ‘state capture’ even if some judges and police bodies were caught (and literally bought) in the Zuma web.

While this represents progress, critics argue that the pace of reform – reviving both the public’s and international partners’ confidence in the South Africa state – has been far too slow. Zuma’s protracted trial, a steady drip of revelations and crises in institutions crippled by poor governance, led by state utility Eskom, mean the crisis of governance has not strayed far from the forefront of public consciousness.

Overly cautious economic policies have proven too little, too late The long-held hope of a post-apartheid transformation, which would blend social equity with economic opportunity (and accelerated growth), has been undermined by a decade of disappointing growth. As South Africa Power Report 2020/21 went to press, South Africa was alarmingly close to losing its last remaining investment-grade credit rating (assigned by Moody’s Investors Service, which was widely seen by markets as being too understanding towards the South African sovereign, unlike Standard & Poor’s and other agencies).

Promises of reform by the incoming president have been welcomed by international investors but have often seemed too sluggish or half-hearted in delivery to overcome the legacy issues that went unchecked by previous administrations. South Africa remains confronted by unsustainably high unemployment, a moribund economy (which in late 2019/early 2020 was reflected in successive quarters of negative growth) and flailing state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

SOEs continue to siphon money from public coffers, rather than contributing positively to the national economy. These shortfalls are exemplified by Eskom, which has become symbolic of national economic malaise, as the state power utility struggles with over-employment, dependency on coal for power generation and responsibility for the ever unpopular need for load-shedding. Prescriptions for reversing Eskom’s decline go to the heart of many of country’s most pressing debates.

While South Africa has a vibrant financial services sector, and its market is sufficiently large and open to attract entrepreneurs and innovators, opportunities for private investors may be constrained by the continued dominance of the state and ‘statist’ perceptions; these perceptions continue to play a major role in ANC, EFF and other policy prescriptions offered to a majority of voters who have hardly benefitted from the fruits of a globalised, liberal economy. It could be argued these benefits would have been much greater if South Africa had been truly liberalised and liberated. But that is a matter of great debate within the ‘rainbow nation’, with consequences for those investing in the country potentially for decades to come.

A power sector in crisis The electricity supply industry’s struggles are well documented, and the government’s broken promise to prevent load shedding has developed into a serious political and economic issue. The sector’s

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 13 Executive summary

institutions have been seriously undermined, as highlighted by the resignation of Eskom chair Jabu Mabuza in January 2020. Reliable power supply is critical to economic activity; its absence is particularly ruinous to the mining sector, a key source of income and jobs. The problems are well-known and their resolution is urgent, but such is the depth of South Africa’s crisis that deeply unpopular and value- destructive load-shedding looks certain to be an unfortunate reality for the foreseeable future, as the government itself admitted in early 2020.

Despite once being heralded as a world-leading model for state-led power management, years of financial mismanagement have resulted in chronic failures of state utility Eskom, which now requires significant structural reform. The government published the Roadmap for Eskom in a Reformed Electricity Supply Industry in late-2019; this outlined plans to legally separate generation, transmission and distribution (in structures reminiscent of the forward looking, but not properly implemented Energy White Paper of 1998). Despite promising ‘bold actions’ to put Eskom on a track to financial sustainability, many of the more difficult decisions were shirked on distribution, private participation and labour issues in particular.

A decade of renewables, but coal remains the dominant fuel Despite the power sector’s struggles in recent years, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement (REIPPP) programme has had a profound impact on the energy mix and investor landscape. Remarkably, between 2011 and end-2020, both renewable energy and IPP capacity as percentages of the energy mix will have increased by more than threefold. The programme has been implemented via four rounds of bidding, plus an additional concentrated solar power round. A fifth REIPPP round is planned.

The on-grid energy mix remains dominated by coal, which accounts for 73% of total capacity and has been prioritised in energy planning. Coal remains of real political significance as a source of employment – suggesting that projects driven by ‘clean coal’ will remain an important element in the energy mix despite efforts for South Africa to accelerate its carbon transition.

In 2019, following a highly protracted and politicised process, which exposed competing interests from within the coal and nuclear lobby, a new Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) was published; this key document for energy sector planning had not been updated since 2010. The latest version included priority procurement of 2GW-3GW to help minimise load-shedding and expenditure on diesel, including a substantially increased capacity for renewable energies but also, controversially, maintaining a commitment to coal.

Bold reform plans face many challenges However, the successful implementation of the new IRP is already being called into question. While African Energy Live Data ’s pipeline of in-development generation projects suggest that installed capacity will reach the IRP’s medium-term target of 63,914MW in 2024, longer-term aspirations will hinge on the ability to reform the debt-laden and loss-making Eskom. The ‘junking’ of South Africa’s credit rating is expected to result in slower economic and electricity demand growth. The consequences may be a reduction in Eskom’s ability to both cover its operating costs and to administer the necessary reforms that will make the sector competitive; this is likely to make meeting the IRP’s long-term supply targets more challenging. Beyond new capacity additions, improving availability levels at existing power plants will be crucial in ending rolling blackouts. Even with lower demand growth, the current availability levels of 60% will result in the supply deficit growing from -4.4% in 2019 to -6.3% in 2024.

14 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Country snapshot

Republic of South Africa

Pretoria (executive), Bloemfontein Capital (judicial), Cape Town (legislative)

Population 58.78m (est. 2019)

Area 1,221,037km 2

English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, Official languages Northern Sotho, Tswana, Southern Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, Southern Ndebele

Head of government President Cyril Ramaphosa

Economy

South African rand Currency (subunit: 1/100 cents) $1=R16.6 as of 17 March 2020

GDP (nominal) $368.135bn (2018)

GDP growth rate 0.78% (2018)

Inflation (y-o-y) 4.9% (2018)

Power sector

Installed generation capacity 56,392MW (December 2019)

Installed IPP capacity 5,492MW ( December 2019)

Peak load 34,256MW (2018/19)

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 15 Section

2. Risk Management Report

Overview Political risk rating • For all of the problems that emerged during B Jacob Zuma’s failed presidency, which at times Risk grade seemed to have submerge the economy and 31/100 political system, African Energy has maintained Republic of South Africa ’s political risk rating of Democratic accountability A ‘B’. This classifies South Africa as still having Stability and violence B among the most investment-positive rankings for Governance C any sub-Saharan African (SSA) nation. Investment risk C

• Arguments can be made that this rating is over- Methodology optimistic, but African Energy ’s judgement is African Energy’s political risk rating is based on an underpinned by South Africa’s strong scores in analysis of four categories relating to risk: 1. Democratic the fields of ‘democratic accountability’ and accountability; 2. Stability and violence; 3. Governance; ‘stability and violence’, when judged over more and 4. Investment risk. than two and a half decades of democratic rule. For each category, a country is awarded a grade of A-F, with A being lowest risk (most positive) and F the • Following the Zuma years and the apparent highest risk (the most negative). Any trends are displayed in an upwards ( h) or downwards ( i) arrow. limits on President Cyril Ramaphosa’s ability to Each of the four categories are weighted equally, with a reverse negative trends after two years in office, country being given an overall grade of A-F and a score South Africa scores lower in ‘governance’ and of 1-100 (with 1 being lowest risk and 100 the highest ‘investment risk’. However, even these indices risk). These ratings are based on global standards. may still be considered relatively positive when The four categories are scored based on the following criteria: compared to its SSA peers. 1. Democratic accountability • The strength of the judiciary and other South a. Threat of military intervention in government African institutions ensure that continuity and b. Press and other freedom of expression contract sanctity are still generally well respected, c. Electoral fairness at national and local level despite the presence of worrying negative trends 2. Stability and violence a. Threats to government stability through civil over the past decade, as Zuma and his cronies unrest or political violence sought to degrade the separation of powers. b. Presence of internal conflicts • While recent efforts to improve governance c. Threat of terrorism have been noted, many of the issues confronting 3. Governance a. Corruption the South African polity, its business environment b. Independence of the judiciary and society are systemic. In tackling this huge c. Government effectiveness range of issues, Ramaphosa is limited by factional 4. Investment risk politics within the ruling ANC and the party’s a. Expropriation/breach of contract risk historic governing ‘tripartite coalition’ with the b. Transfer and convertibility risk South African Communist Party (SACP) and the c. Commercial risk Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu).

16 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Section

3. Political overview

3.1 Structure of government 3.1.1 Political system: A complex constitutional democratic republic

The Republic of South Africa (RSA) is a constitutional democracy, which from the end of apartheid in 1994 was structured with what was supposed to be a clear separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. While the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa has a sometimes vibrant opposition – led by the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) and the populist firebrand Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – the African National Congress (ANC) controls the executive and has a majority in the legislature. A critical long-term question for South Africa is whether its political system can evolve beyond quasi-automatic ANC domination at a national level (and, indeed, whether the ANC itself can evolve).

During the last decade the polity’s tripartite structures have come under especially heavy pressure, after the system reached near breaking point under President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, who was elected in 2009 and finally resigned on 14 February 2018 following a long standoff over governance abuses involving his inner circle. It is notable that the system survived what came to be called ‘state capture’. This says much for the influences of a robust judiciary, and also of the media and other civil society elements. However, these pressures have left the political system in recovery mode. Zuma’s successor, Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa (head of state since 2018 and before that an uneasy deputy president from 2014), has marked a welcome change from the worst ‘state capture’ years. This is very good news when it comes to preserving the legitimacy of the political system, but the ruling ANC remains riven by factional divisions which have undermined Cyril Ramaphosa’s authority.

• The current constitution is South Africa’s fifth. It came into effect on 4 February 1997 during the term of the late president (1994-1999) Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (‘Madiba’ – 18 July 1918-5 December 2013), the nation’s first leader to be elected via representative democracy. It replaced an interim constitution, which was introduced as the apartheid system was phased out in 1993.

3.1.2 Three tiers of government: national, provincial and local structure

RSA’s is a very complex political structure in which the government operates through three tiers: national, provincial and local. This accentuates geographical differences. For example, Zuma and his faction remain a force to be reckoned with in the ex-president’s native KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), while despite rebranding itself, the opposition DA remains identified with its white liberal core based in Cape Town. In both cases their support is greater than one heartland: Zuma’s persistently resilient power base rests on ANC grandees in several provinces while the DA is undoubtedly a national party – as is Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters.

Officially, the central government’s Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) is “responsible for supporting provinces and local government in fulfilling their constitutional and legal obligations”. In practise, provincial and local government can have a high degree of autonomy – often depending on the degree of political control from the centre.

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 17 SPeoclittiiocns

Neither at provincial nor local levels is there consistency in structures and policy creation or implementation. The eight urban metropolitan municipalities, 44 first tier district municipalities and 226 second-tier local municipalities may not be co-ordinated, even within the same province. This has had a marked impact on the electricity supply industry (ESI), where there may be very different structures dealing with, say, power distribution within the same region. This reality has undermined several past attempts by national government at ESI reform.

• Chapter 12 of the 1997 Constitution recognises the status and authority of traditional leaders and customary law; it allows for the creation of provincial houses and a national council of traditional leaders. Depending on the situation and personal politics, these leaders may exert real influence. Even such apparently ‘technocratic’ leaders as Thabo Mbeki (president from June 1999 to September 2008) have been known to consult sangomas (traditional healers) and other pre-colonial influencers.

3.1.3 Executive authority

The executive branch is made up of the president (currently Cyril Ramaphosa), deputy president (David Dabede Mabuza) and ministers. As this report was compiled, there were 28 ministers in total – of whom 24 were sourced from the ANC – and 33 deputy ministers. The official list of ‘government leaders’ also includes nine provincial premiers.

3.1.4 Legislative authority

Legislative authority rests within the Parliament of United Democratic Movement (UDM) 2 National Assembly African T ransformation Movement (A TM) 2 the Republic of South Africa, a bicameral of South Africa Good 2 Number of seats National Fr eedom Party (NFP) 2 legislature comprising a 400-seat National African Independent Congr ess (AIC) 2 African Christian Democratic Party Congr ess of the People (COPE) 2 Assembly (lower house) and the National Council (ACDP) 4 Pan Africanist Congr ess (P AC) 1 Al Jama-ah 1 of Provinces (NCOP), an upper house which seats Fr eedom Fr ont Plus (FF+) 10 Inkatha Fr eedom Party 90 representatives consisting of ten for each of the (IFP) 14 nine provinces and another ten ‘national’ seats. Economic Fr eedom Fighters (EFF) 44 • National Assembly members are elected under a complex system, from national party lists and African National Congr ess (ANC) provincial party lists via a closed list system of 230 proportional representation. Seats are first Democratic Alliance allocated according to a Droop quota (as used in (DA) 84 most single transferable vote systems) and then up to five seats are allocated using the largest © African Energy 2020 (www.africa-energy.com) Sour ce: South African parliament website remainder method and then any additional seats are allocated via the highest average method among those parties who by then already have seats. Half of the 400 National Assembly members are assigned from national lists and the rest from regional lists.

• Overseeing the electoral process is the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). One of its roles is to allocate the 200 regional list seats to each province by population.

• Each of the nine provincial governments consist of 30-80 members who are elected via proportional representation. They have jurisdiction over a range of issues, including planning, trade and health services.

• Women are well represented in parliament, holding around 46% of seats in the National Assembly. The constitution is also protective of LGBT rights.

18 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Section

4. Macroeconomics

4.1 Overview Table 2: Macroeconomic indicators An under-performing economy replete with contradictions GDP growth 0.79% (2018) The South African economy is highly developed; it possesses advanced economic infrastructure Inflation (y-on-y) 4.9% (2018) and has been, in some sectors, the trailblazer for development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Around 75% of the largest African companies are based Current account balance in RSA. However, the distribution of wealth is extremely unequal – a legacy of apartheid and Current account (% of GDP) -3.5% (2019) subsequent governments’ inability to level up inequalities. Critical to RSA’s failure to achieve Current account ($bn) -$13bn (2019) accelerated ‘trickle-down’ has been the underwhelming economic growth recorded since Balance of payments the end of apartheid in 1994 and especially in the -3% (2019) (% of GDP) last decade. This reality has largely disappointed predictions that new prosperity would come with Debt majority rule to inspire Southern Africa’s economic transformation. Stable, but Risk of debt distress vulnerable These problems are equally pressing today as they were when Nelson Mandela entered Debt-to-GDP 53% (2017/18) government. The International Monetary Fund

(IMF) in its latest Article IV report, published on 30 Debt service as % of 15% est. (2019/20) January 2020, observed that “South Africa revenue remains an extremely unequal society, with high and rising unemployment (29%), particularly Other indicators among the youth”. Failures to tackle deep economic and social cleavages have had a Non-investment sapping effect of massive inequality and high Credit rating grade speculative levels of joblessness; structures inherited from (junk) apartheid-era politics have been resistant to $1=R16.6 Exchange rate radical change, despite the changing racial (Mar 2020) balance of management and decision-making. Interest rate 6.25% (Jan 2020) Persistently poor levels of growth, discussed below, have caught RSA in a vicious cycle of economic under-performance and raised social Foreign reserves $55.1bn (2019) pressures. The official unemployment level rose to 29.1% in Q3 2019, which was the highest rate WBG Doing Business rating 84/190 (2020) in decades, with further rises projected even

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 19 Section

5. Power sector overview

5.1 Overview Key sector statistics • At present, South Africa’s electricity supply industry (ESI) is vertically integrated with utility Installed capacity: 56,392MW (December Eskom having a role in generation, transmission 2019) and distribution. While the utility is solely of which IPPs : 5,492MW (December 2019) responsible for transmission, distribution is conducted by Eskom as well as municipal Peak load : 34,256MW (2018/19) governments. Electricity generation is provided by Supply : 234,407GWh (est. 2019/20) Eskom and independent power producers (IPPs). No. of customers : 6.5m (Eskom – March • The ESI has suffered from extensive load 2019) shedding, growing costs, chronic financial Network losses : 9.7% (2019) mismanagement and operational ineffectiveness that has led to huge debt in the sector. Market structure : Public-private structure with vertically integrated utility • Eskom finds itself trapped in a financial vicious circle as it seeks to service its debt through higher Average cost of production : $0.06- electricity tariffs. This threatens to drive down $0.066/kWh (Eskom baseload coal) and demand, and Eskom’s income with it, leading to $0.035/kWh (solar PV and wind) (2016) greater losses and higher debts. Average consumer tariff : 10.6¢/kWh (2019) • A major reform programme is in place to unbundle Eskom into separate generation, Power sector structur e transmission and distribution subsidiary entities. Department of Minerals and Ener gy It is expected that the process will not be Department of completed until at least the end of 2022. Public Enterprises National Ener gy Regulator of • South Africa’s national electrification rate has IPP of fice South Africa steadily increased from 80.7% in 2006 to 84.4% Generation in 2016. However, rural electrification rates have Eskom IPPs Imports dropped from 69.4% in 2006 to 66.8% in 2016, generation according to the World Bank. Off-grid solar electrification has yet to take off in the country. Tr ansmission Eskom PowerX 5.2 Market Structure transmission • The ESI is vertically integrated with Eskom having a role in generation, transmission and Distribution /of ftaker Eskom Municipal distribution. Eskom is responsible for transmission distribution gover nments and is the single buyer except in the case of small trader PowerX. The utility is also the system Consumers operator. IPPs can bid in procurement rounds run Lar ge Residential and Exports by the country’s IPP Office following a ministerial power users commer cial

20 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Section

6. Power sector policy & regulation

6.1 Overview South Africa has a clear regulatory framework and relatively strong economy that makes the power sector an attractive prospect for international power developers. However, entrenched domestic politics has failed to deliver the reform necessary for the sector to be financially sustainable and has contributed to the mismanagement of Eskom and the wider sector. Policy indecision coupled with Eskom’s financial situation, governance challenges, and frequent hostility to IPPs have caused significant frustration and delay for investors.

Key aspects of South Africa’s policy and regulatory approach are:

• The National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 forms the basis for South Africa’s long-term vision. For the power sector, the focus is a ‘just transition’ to a low carbon economy, whilst ensuring jobs and livelihoods are retained.

• From the NDP, the Integrated Resource Plan 2019 was published to set out the investment plan for generation. It sets out the generation mix up to 2030 with a priority procurement of 2,000-3,000MW.

• Renewable energy procurement is set to continue with regular additions up to 2030, comprising 14.4GW of wind and 5GW of solar.

• In 2019, the Roadmap for Eskom in a Reformed Electricity Supply Industry was published and proposed an unbundling of Eskom and wider reform of the power sector to improve competitiveness, financial management and accountability.

• Black economic empowerment is a key component of private power procurement and receives strong political backing.

6.2 Major Legislation National Energy Act, 2008 Devised by the Department of Energy and enacted in 2008, the National Energy Act sets out the provisions which govern electricity generation. The act outlines the roles of private participation and renewable energy in the sector, as well as rules surrounding energy efficiency. It prioritises the environmental impact of such actions and aims to promote sustainable development within the economy.

n t t o n n n le n i n e e io b y o s io t a c r ti is t m m a id y n a a u n re r r w y g e e s l m ib o u Legislation e s g e rg r i l ff u s tr ir c n P f- n e e ic c ri g n s v o e f e n n ff u a e ra i n r G IP O R e E e N T R T D E P

National Environmental Management Act 1998 Public Finance Management Act 1999 Nuclear Energy Act 1999 Grid Code National Energy Regulator Act 2004 Electricity Regulation Act 2006 National Energy Act 2008 Carbon Tax 2019 Draft Energy Procurement Act 2020

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 21 Section

8. Resource availability

Key resources statistics

Oil: 136,000b/d (production) , 15m bbl (reserves) Hydro potential: 14,000GWh/yr

Gas: 32 bcf (production, 2016) Wind potential: 7.73m/s (100 metres)

Geothermal potential: unknown Solar potential: 2,500kWh/m2/yr

8.1 Overview South Africa is well positioned to harness energy from a variety of natural resources. It is a continent- leader in the production and consumption of coal – which is the primary source of energy in the country – and has healthy reserves of untapped oil and gas. In addition to hydrocarbons, South Africa also possesses huge potential for renewable energy, which has increased dramatically in recent years through the world-leading REIPPP programme and, under the Integrated Resource Plan, is expected to rise to almost 25% of total energy production by 2030. In the 1.8GW Koeberg facility, South Africa boasts the only commercially operating nuclear plant in sub-Saharan Africa.

8.2 Hydrocarbons 8.2.1 Overview • Upstream oil and gas production is in decline having fallen by over half since 2010, largely due to a lower oil price and lack of exploration. However, a new major discovery in 2019 has brought new hope for a recovery within the sector.

• With vast reserves, coal looks certain to remain South Africa’s primary energy source for the foreseeable future – as outlined in the 2019 Integrated Resource Plan. 8.2.2 Key Agencies PetroSA

The government-owned oil and gas company has been given the mandate by cabinet to lead developments in gas infrastructure in the Western Cape.

Petroleum Agency of South Africa

Has the responsibility to promote the exploration and exploitation of natural oil and gas, both onshore and offshore, in South Africa and to undertake the necessary marketing, promotion and monitoring of operations. Widely respected within the industry, the Petroleum Agency was at one stage threatened with closure under proposals to treat oil and gas the same as mining under controversial proposed amendments to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). Mineral resources and energy minister Gwede Mantashe said in November 2019 that the new petroleum bill established oil and gas “as a sector of the economy standing alone, not as an appendage of mining”

22 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Section

9. Competitive landscape

9.1 Overview Although the vast majority of national power generation comes from state utility Eskom, the transformational REIPPP programme has seen private participation in South Africa’s energy space expand dramatically: in the years 2010 to end-2020, the contribution from IPPs to total installed capacity is expected to have increased by over threefold, from 4.6% to 14.7%, (a change from 2.1GW to 8.9GW). In line with the progress of the REIPPP, renewable energy also made significant gains during this period, and by end-2020 is expected to have risen to 9.5GW from 2.3GW in 2010.

9.2 Landmark power projects Largest power plant: Medupi Coal

Lephalale Location: 4,764MW Capacity: Coal Fuel: Pulverised coal Technology: State-owned Connection type: On-grid Ownership: Unit VI online 23 August 2015, unit V online 3 April 2017, unit IV online Commercial operations date: 28 November 2017, unit III online 28 June 2019, unit II online 26 November 2019, Unit I expected June 2020.

Long delayed project comprising six dry-cooled supercritical 794MW boilers with turbo-generators covering a 700ha site, with a further 1,000ha required for ancillary services. Units II-VI are currently operating, although performance has been well below expectations. Medupi was designed to produce around 3,200GWh/yr of electricity but it is uncertain whether this will be achieved.

The project has suffered major delays due to technical errors and industrial action. A combined $5.6bn contract to supply 12 boilers to Medupi and Kusile was won by Hitachi following a controversial tender in 2007, before being transferred to Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems Africa Ltd, a joint venture with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. GE’s Steam Power Systems provided EPC services for turbine islands and air-cooled condensers. Coal is supplied by Exxaro Coal’s Grootegeluk coal mine, which also supplies Eskom’s Matimba power plant, through agreements signed in 2008.

The plant was expected to achieve thermal efficiencies of up to 37.5%, however, technical design flaws have been blamed for chronic under-performance. The New Development Bank approved a $480m loan in April 2019 to support a $2.75bn project to retrofit the plant with flue gas desulphurisation units to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions from 3,500 mg/m 3 to 500 mg/m 3.

Several incidents of coal conveyor-belt malfunctions have resulted in Eskom looking to redesign the coal-handling system. Design modifications at the power plant have already faced significant delay due to the poor performance of the fleet as a whole. Eskom chief operating officer Jan Oberholzer said on

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 23 Section

10. Transmission and distribution

10.1 Overview Transmission and distribution infrastructure statistics • South Africa’s transmission and distribution infrastructure is well developed by sub-Saharan Network length: 387,633km African standards, with the overall network covering the vast majority of the country. It boasts Network voltage: Transmission: the largest power line system on the continent 765kV (2,784km) and has over 23,000km of transmission lines with 533kV (1,035km) a voltage of 400kV or above. 400kV (19,421km) • Eskom accounts for about 40% of electricity 275kV (7,218km) distribution throughout South Africa, while 220kV (1,351km) municipalities account for the balance, some 132kV (889km) 80% of which is distributed by 12 metros and the Distribution: largest municipalities. >132kV (24,666km) • Electricity access rates are high at around 44-88kV (20,735km) 85%, although access rate growth has stagnated since 2011. Substation capacity: 297,521MVA • There are around 2.2m South African Existing households lacking electricity. Electricity access interconnections: Botswana: (3x132kV is substantially lower in rural areas, which have an & 1x400kV) average rate of approximately 66%, compared to Namibia: (2x220kV an urban access rate of 93%. & 1x400kV) • Network losses of 9.7% in 2019 are relatively Mozambique: low compared to South Africa’s regional peers.

(1x110kV, 1x275kV, • A key member of the Southern African Power 1x400kV & 1x533kV Pool (SAPP), there are cross-border DC) interconnections running to eSwatini and eSwatini: (2x132kV Lesotho, as well as neighbouring Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique. & 2x400kV) Lesotho: (1x132kV) • Two key cross-border projects are in development: the Mozambique-Zimbabwe-South Planned Africa (MoZiSa) and Botswana-South Africa interconnections: Botswana (BoSa): (BoSa) projects. Once completed – planned for (400kV) 2022 – these will allow greater trading within the SAPP. Zimbabwe/ • Despite suffering from load-shedding and a Mozambique supply deficit, South Africa exports more (MoZiSa): (400kV) electricity within Southern Africa than it imports.

24 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Section

12. Demand and supply outlook

12.1 Overview According to African Energy Live Data , South Africa had an on-grid installed capacity of 56,392MW as of end-2019.

However, the performance of Eskom’s fleet of coal power plants has deteriorated due to poor maintenance, accidents and fuel supply challenges. In 2019, the availability levels of the fleet stood at just 69%, far below the 80% target. This has resulted in widespread load shedding. Eskom’s grid system evaluation report – the Medium-term System Adequacy Outlook (MSAO) – recommends that the current generation output must stay above 73% availability to adequately service peak demand. Any significant increase in demand, continued fuel supply issues or plant deterioration will result in peak demand being unmet.

South Africa’s on-grid energy mix is heavily reliant towards coal (73%) given the country’s wealth of the resource and its prioritisation in energy policy. Renewable generation has grown in recent years through the REIPPP, with solar (3.6%), wind (3.8%) and hydro (6.4%) all becoming more established. Nuclear power (3.2%) has had significant backing from Eskom and the government in recent years and new nuclear capacity remains on the agenda despite the sector’s parlous financial situation. Liquid fuels such as diesel (6.1%) are utilised as peaking plants, available to balance the grid in times of high demand.

Private participation in South Africa has been slow to materialise, with the first IPPs, Avon and Dedisa diesel plants, procured in 2010. Government policy around private involvement in the power sector has been ambiguous post-apartheid, with ambitious plans frustrated by limited implementation, hesitant decision making and resistance from Eskom and other interest groups, notably the unions and coal miners. The government has initiated numerous IPP procurement rounds for renewables and coal since 2011. However, as of end-2019, IPPs only account for 9.6% of total on-grid generation.

Demand has stagnated in recent years with poor economic growth, the threat of load shedding, the flight of customers off the grid to distributed generation – which is likely to grow – and the lack of energy intensive industries particularly in the mining sector.

According to the 2019 Integrated Resource Plan, South Africa’s short-term energy mix is unlikely to change dramatically. Coal will continue to dominate generation up to 2024. Renewables are expected to play a larger role in the sector as the country prepares the fifth REIPPP round. Nuclear energy generation has been extended beyond 2024 and diesel is to be replaced by natural gas.

The government’s immediate focus will be to procure an additional 2-3GW of power through the risk mitigation procurement programme to reduce load-shedding and diesel expenditure. A government request for information about the programme in December 2019 stated power should be procured from projects with short lead-in times of between 3-6 months or 6-12 months. Priority will be given to projects that are currently under development and are baseload, mid-merit or peaking.

Supply side performance will hinge on the current reform efforts at Eskom and timely and effective IPP procurement. An unbundled utility will help to facilitate competition and provide the sector with a more

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 25 Section

13. Data tables

Methodology

The following data tables show historical and forward-looking data on installed, on-grid capacity from 2010 through to 2024. The figures are produced using data sourced from African Energy Live Data , a platform containing over 6,500 operating, under construction and planned generation projects across the continent.

The pipeline (2020-2024) displays installed on- grid capacity at years-end, and only includes those generation projects which are in development and are considered to have a realistic prospect of reaching commercial operations within the announced timeframe. A full listing of projects on which these aggregated figures are based is also included.

Renewables vs non-renewables

(MW) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Hybrid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Non-renewable 43,116 43,116 43,116 43,116 42,816 43,945 44,615 47,003 47,003 48,591 51,785 52,585 54,285 54,285 54,285

Renewable 2,268 2,268 2,271 2,353 3,835 4,444 6,338 7,542 7,661 7,801 9,290 10,065 10,165 10,165 10,165

(%) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Hybrid 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Non-renewable 95.0 95.0 95.0 94.8 91.8 90.8 87.6 86.2 86.0 86.2 84.8 83.9 84.2 84.2 84.2

Renewable 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.2 8.2 9.2 12.4 13.8 14.0 13.8 15.2 16.1 15.8 15.8 15.8

Non-renewable Renewable

2010 2018 2024

26 AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 Power plants: Operating (as of MarchS e2c0t2io0n )

Installed Commercial Project name capacity Fuels Technologies operations (MW) date

Acacia Diesel 171.00 Diesel Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 1976

Adams Solar PV II 75.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2017

Amakhala Emoyeni Wind Phase I 134.40 Wind Wind 2016

Ankerlig Diesel 1,338.30 Diesel Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 2007, 2009

Aries Solar PV 10.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

Arnot Coal 2,100.00 Coal Pulverised coal (PCF) 1971-1975

Athlone Jet Fuel 36.00 Other fuel oils Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 1973

Atlantic Centre and Park-a-Lot Rooftop Solar PV 0.49 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2015

Aurora Rietvlei Solar PV 10.35 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

Avon Diesel 670.00 Diesel Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 2016

Bethlehem Hydro 7.00 Hydro Conventional hydro 2007-2010

Bokpoort CSP 50.00 Solar Parabolic trough 2016

Boshof Solar PV 60.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

1967-1969, Camden Coal 1,561.00 Coal Pulverised coal (PCF) 2005-2007

Chaba Wind 21.53 Wind Wind 2015

Clanwilliam Hydro 1.50 Hydro Conventional hydro 2014

Coega IDZ Wind 1.80 Wind Wind 2010

Collywobbles Hydro 42.00 Hydro Conventional hydro 1985

Cookhouse Wind 138.60 Wind Wind 2014

Darling Wind 5.20 Wind Wind 2008

Dassiesklip-Klipheuwel Wind 27.00 Wind Wind 2014

De Aar Solar PV 50.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

Dedisa Diesel 335.00 Diesel Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 2015

Diepsloot Wastewater Methane 1.10 Methane Undecided or unknown 2012

Dorper Wind 100.00 Wind Wind 2014

Drakensberg Pumped Storage 1,000.00 Hydro Pumped storage 1981-1982

Dreunberg Solar PV 75.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

Droogfontein Solar PV 50.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

Durban eThekwini Landfill Gas 8.00 Biomass Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 2006-2009

Duvha Coal 3,600.00 Coal Pulverised coal (PCF) 1980-1984

Dyason's Klip Solar PV I 75.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2020

First Falls Hydro 6.00 Hydro Conventional hydro 1990

Gariep Hydro 360.00 Hydro Conventional hydro 1971, 1976

Gibson Bay Wind 111.00 Wind Wind 2017

Gouda Wind 135.10 Wind Wind 2015

Gourikwa Diesel 746.00 Diesel Open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 2007-2008

Grassridge Wind 60.00 Wind Wind 2015

Greefspan Solar PV 10.00 Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 2014

1969, 1977, Grootvlei Coal 1,180.00 Coal Pulverised coal (PCF) 2007-2011

Hendrina Coal 1,893.00 Coal Pulverised coal (PCF) 1970-1976

AFRICAN ENERGY • SOUTH AFRICA POWER REPORT • 2020/21 27 Section

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