The War Against Trucks Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos 1968-1972

The War against Trucks Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos 1968-1972 The War against Trucks Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos 1968-1972 Bernard C. Nalty Air Force History and Museums Program United States Air Force Washington, D.C. 2005 Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data Nalty, Bernard C. The war against trucks : aerial interdiction in southern Laos, 1968-1972 / Bernard C. Nalty. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Air Force--History--Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. 3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Campaigns--Laos. 4. Ho Chi Minh Trail. I. Title. DS558.8.N37 2005 959.704'348'09594--dc22 2004026960 Foreword The Air Force History and Museums Program has prepared accounts of the United States Air Force and the war in Southeast Asia according to a design that reflects the compartmentalized nature of the conflict itself. Besides the special studies like the illustrated history (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An Illustrated Account) and the monographs, some of them quite lengthy, on topics like rescue or tactical airlift, the Air Force history program has published volumes on the air wars over South Vietnam and Cambodia, North Vietnam, and Laos. This book is the last of three recounting operations in Laos, one of them dealing with the war in the northern part of that kingdom and the other two with aerial interdiction in the south. This history covers the critical years from 1968 through 1972, when the Air Force carried out the Commando Hunt series of aerial interdiction campaigns against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, trying, in conjunction with ground actions, to use air power and electronics to impede the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam. Conducted during the time the United States was withdrawing ground forces and turning the war over to the greatly strengthened armed forces of South Vietnam, Commando Hunt sought to prevent a North Vietnamese offensive that would take advantage of the declining U. S. presence. That attack did not come until March 1972 and not only stopped short of overrunning South Vietnam, but also was a setback for the Hanoi government and a cease-fire agreement. The invasion, however, signaled the end of Commando Hunt, for the South Vietnamese did not take over the electronic surveillance network—with its computer, sensors, and communications equipment—that made the series of aerial interdiction operations possible. “The real war,” said Walt Whitman, “will never get in the books.” Yet, even though they cannot conjure up the realities of death and suffering, heroism and sacrifice, books like this have a purpose, offering the counsel of the past to help today’s policy makers. What useful principle can they derive from an account of the events of a few years in a unique part of the world? Stripped of all that links it to a particular time, place, and strategy, this narrative warns them that a deter- mined enemy may be able to use geography, climate, and ingenuity to blunt the cutting edge of technology. Against such a foe, what seems flawless in theory or has succeeded brilliantly in tests may fail in actual combat, but what fails on one battlefield may succeed years later on another. In the last analysis, military v The War against Trucks genius does not reside in compiling lists of lessons learned, but in analyzing the past and applying its distilled wisdom in new, perhaps unique, circumstances. vi Preface This history recounts an ambitious attempt by the Air Force to interdict traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail of southern Laos, as part of a plan to support the war in South Vietnam by impeding the flow of North Vietnamese troops and military supplies into South Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara intended initially to establish a manned barrier guarding the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams, while using electronic sensors and computers to detect and analyze movement on the Ho Chi Minh Trail so that aircraft could attack the troops and cargo bound for the battlefields of South Vietnam. Only the electronic portion went into service, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail became the object of seven successive Commando Hunt operations, beginning in the fall of 1968 and lasting until the spring of 1972, when a North Vietnamese invasion of the South changed the nature of the war. Although aircraft of the other services participated in this extended campaign of aerial interdiction, the Air Force assumed the greatest responsibility for both equipment and execution. The book begins by summarizing Secretary McNamara’s reasons for substi- tuting an interdiction campaign for the bombing of North Vietnam and then describes the early efforts at aerial interdiction, which were delayed by the need to shift resources for the defense of the Marine Corps outpost at Khe Sanh in northwestern South Vietnam, just south of the demilitarized zone. Because technology held the key to attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the aircraft and other equipment used in the Commando Hunt series receive extensive treatment early in the narrative. Next come the air campaigns themselves, supplemented by ground operations from Laos and South Vietnam, that over the years, with vary- ing success, engaged every component of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through southern Laos and in Cambodia—roads and trails, bivouacs and storage areas, water- ways and pipelines, truck traffic, and for a brief time, troop movements. In addi- tion to discussing this activity, the narrative addresses the unsuccessful attempt to Vietnamize interdiction without transferring the entire array of special equipment created or modified for that purpose. The volume also deals with the appli- cation of the technology that maintained surveillance over the trail and covers the problem of locating North Vietnamese artillery after the invasion of South Vietnam in 1972. A final chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the air-supported electronic barrier and concludes that the concealment readily afforded by the jungle, the resilience of the North Vietnamese and their control of the tempo of military operations, the limitations of the available technology, and the lack of vii The War against Trucks adequate information about the trail complex combined to prevent the Commando Hunt operations from doing more than inconveniencing the enemy. In writing this second of two volumes dealing with aerial interdiction in southern Laos, my research benefited from the assistance of several individuals. Mr. Jacob Van Staaveren, the author of the companion volume on southern Laos, suggested the use of certain records collections with which he was already famil- iar. Lt. Col. Richard R. Sexton, USAF, and Maj. Victor B. Anthony, USAF, the coauthors of a volume dealing with the air war in northern Laos, provided helpful guidance. (Military ranks listed, incidentally, are the highest held by individuals while serving in the Office of Air Force History and its successors.) Capt. William A. Buckingham, Jr., USAF, an intelligence specialist in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, unearthed a number of hard-to-locate reports of prison- er of war interrogations; and Capt. Ashby D. Elmore, USAF, assembled a series of maps showing the known North Vietnamese infiltration routes that composed the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Research for the book required extensive use of material not found in Air Force collections, and I am grateful to all who helped me obtain access to sources of this kind. I owe special thanks to Dr. Jeanne Mintz, Lt. Col. Robert W. Oliver, USMC (Ret.), and Ms. Mary C. Remmy, all of whom served in the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering; to Mr. Frank Tapparo and Mr. Charles Pugh, members of what was then the Directorate of Planning and Evaluation in the Office of Secretary of Defense; and to Mr. S. A. Tucker, then the Deputy Historian, Office of Secretary of Defense, who succeeded in explain- ing why an outsider like me should have access to files maintained in that orga- nization. Dr. Oscar P. Fitzgerald arranged for the loan of Navy records, Mr. Vincent Demma made Army materials available, and Dr. Robert J. Watson coop- erated fully, both as a member of the Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as its head. Dr. Watson’s successor in charge of the Historical Division, Mr. Willard J. Webb, proved equally helpful, and Dr. Ronald H. Cole, a member of Mr. Webb’s staff, provided perceptive comments and useful suggestions. Much of the assistance rendered by these individuals resulted directly or indirectly from the extensive contacts among military historians cultivated by Mr. Max Rosenberg, the senior historian at that time in the Office of Air Force History. Along with Mr. Rosenberg, almost the entire staff of the Office of Air Force History and its successors contributed in one way or another to the completion of this volume, including Maj. Gen. John W. Huston, USAFR, Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Col. David A. Tretler, USAF, Dr. Richard P. Hallion, Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Mr. Warren Trest, Mr. Herman Wolk, Mr. Jacob Neufeld, Col. Ray L. Bowers, USAF, Col. John Schlight, USAF, Lt. Col. Drue L. DeBerry, USAF, Dr. B. Franklin Cooling, III, Dr. Alfred M. Beck, Lieutenant Colonel Sexton, Lt. Col. Vance O. Mitchell, USAF, Major Anthony, Capt. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., USAF, Captain Buckingham, Mr. Carl Berger, Mr. Van Staaveren, Dr. Wayne W. Thompson, Dr. Elizabeth H. Hartsook, Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek, Mr. Eugene P. viii The War Against Trucks Sagstetter, Mr. David Schoem, Mrs. Gail Guido, Mr. William C. Heimdahl, MSgt James R.

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