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459 TAJIKISTAN History

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EARLY HISTORY The Samanids (‘’ in Tajik) were the first Islamic ‘There is no man without a hat and no Turk without a Tat.’ This Persian Central Asian dynasty to rise up in the region and rule is a still undeciphered quote from Mahmud al-Kashgari, the for just under two centuries (819–999). According to Frye, the 11th century lexicographer of the Turkic languages. Paul Samanids were also ‘the last Iranian dynasty to rule in Central Bergne, the first British Ambassador to Tajikistan, believed Asia’. Having already been weakened, as Bosworth wrote, ‘as a that ‘Tat’ in al-Kashgari’s quote was used to define the Iranian result of internal tensions and financial crisis,’ the Samanids’ peoples of the era (of which ethnic are considered a part), reign was succeeded by the TurkicReserved. Qarakhanids and the although ‘Tat’ may also have been a word used for the nomads Ghaznavids. In the ensuing centuries, much of what is now Tajikistan was conquered by various other Turkic rulers, of to describe the non-nomads or the settled including the Manghit dynasty which ruled the Emirate of peoples, many of whom spoke a variant of Persian. Bergne (1785–1920). wrote that while many Tajiks today would like to link their Despite the demise of the Samanids over a millennium ago, titular name to ‘taj’ (‘crown’ in Persian), it is most likely that as Bergne wrote, ‘it is to the Samanids that today’s Tajik ‘Tajik’ stems from the Persian word ‘Tazi’, implying ‘Arab’ nationalists look back when seeking historic inspiration for the invader, a word used by Central Asians who were invaded by non-Turkic legitimacy of their contemporary state’. The cur- the Islamic Arab armies and their ‘Persian-speaking allies’ in rent Government of Tajikistan has recreated a whole histor- the seventh and eighth centuries CE, the invaders bringing iography of TajikistanRights surrounding the Sominid dynasty. The with them both the religion of Islam and the spoken Persian main square in , for example, contained a large language used in Iran. statue of Soviet leader Lenin (Vladimir Ulyanov) until it was Al-Kashgari’s quote may be alluding to the close relationship beheaded in May 1992, and later replaced with the statue of of Turks (Turkic peoples) and Tajiks of Central Asia a millen- Firdavsi,All (‘Ferdowsi’, an Iranian poet, 940–1020), and by 1999 nium ago. Bergne also cited an old man in Bukhara (Buxoro) with a statue of King Ismoil Somoni (Abu Ibrahim Ismail bin who told a Russian sociologist, in response to the question as to Ahmad, 849–907, the great grandson of the founder of the what he considered his ethnicity to be, that ‘before 1926 no one Sominid dynasty). Unfortunately for contemporary Tajik ever asked us whether we were Tajiks or Uzbeks’, presumably nationalists, Ismoil Somoni’s tomb is not in Tajikistan, but implying that it did not really matter. Despite the largely in the former capital of the Samanids, Bukhara, now in peaceful co-existence of the Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups, . many of whom have long spoken each other’s language, with intermarriage among them also having been common,2018. the THE SOVIET ERA history of politico-military conquest in the region has also caused periods of serious strife among ethnic groups. Bergne Soon after the 1917 October Revolution, the Bolsheviks sought wrote that Tajiks were over a period of around 1,000 years to incorporate the tsarist territories of Central Asia into their displaced via ‘successive waves of invading Turkic nomads new socialist state. By 1918 they had created the greater [who] gradually ousted them, first from the best grazing pas- Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), tures and then, as the invaders adapted to the conditions of which included most, but not all, of present day Central settled agriculture, from the best arable land also’. Those who Asia. It was only in September 1920 that the Red Army was fell into the hands of the conquerors were enslaved, some able to capture the capital of the Emirate of Bukhara (Buxoro), becoming ‘totally Turkicised and [adopting] the language of which included much of present-day Tajikistan and Uzbeki- stan, to overthrow the emir, and to establish the Bukharan their conquerors, while the rest, although they kept their People’s Soviet Republic—an entity that lasted only until 1925. language, took refuge in the mountainous and semi- According to Lemon, the ‘fate of Tajikistan became entangled mountainous regions’. with conflicts among Central Asian elites’ and ‘the dominant Historian Clifford BosworthRoutledge wrote that the first encounter influence of Bukharan revolutionaries’, which by 1924 led to with the Arab Muslim forces in Central Asia was in 673–74 CE the formation of the Tajik ASSR within the larger Uzbek Soviet when the Muawia Caliphate’s army crossed the Oxus (Amu Socialist Republic (SSR, Union Republic). Soon afterwards, Dar’ya) river to occupy Bukhara, which at the time was ruled however, on 16 October 1929, the northern viloyat (region) of by a woman, Katun, ‘as regent for her infant son’, Bikar-kodat (later Leninabod, now Sughd), which had been part of Togsada. She was forced to ‘submit and pay the Arabs a tribute the Uzbek SSR, was awarded to Tajikistan when it was granted of a million dirhams and 4,000 slaves’. Permanent Arab rule the status of SSR. According to a country expert, all such would, however, only come in a few decades. Historian Richard delimitations were largely due to ‘Stalin’s cartographic whim’ Frye wrote that: ‘Muslim conquest of Central Asia began with and by leaving out what can be described as its ‘two sacred Qotayba [ibn] Moslem, who became the Umayyad Caliphate’s cultural centers’ of Samarqand and Bukhara, ‘Tajikistan has governor of Khorasan in 705, and. . .established Arab rule been compared to a France without Paris’. firmly in lands to the north of the Oxus.’ The Umayyads also According to Bergne: ‘The West has long been inclined to attacked Khorezm (Xorazm), in what could be considered the dismiss the status of ‘‘Union Republic’’ in the USSR as a bogus Copyrightheart of Central Asia, in 712. However, as Bosworth wrote, it form of independence, a Russian bear-hug from which none was only after 751 that Muslim Arab rule in Transoxiana was had any genuine right to extricate themselves.’ He continued ‘finally free from challenge’, following the ‘battle of Talas’ that for the Tajiks, the ‘qualified autonomy’ status received (around the borders between present-day and from the -dominated Soviets ‘was no less real than what ) where the forces of a new Arab Muslim Caliphate, was being offered to many of the colonial empires to which the the Abbasids, were able to defeat the Chinese General, Gao Soviets saw their own solution as being vastly superior’. The Xianzhi of the Tang dynasty, thus halting China’s attempted Soviet ‘solution’ to nationalism, however, soon took a brutal expansion westward. turn. According to scholar Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, www.europaworld.com 463 TAJIKISTAN History

purges during the 1930s, under leader Stalin (Iosif Dzhugash- between pro- and anti-Government supporters soon led to a vili), of individuals with ‘bourgeois nationalist deviation’ violent outbreak in May 1992 and the start of a civil war which removed over one-half of the members of the ruling Communist continued until its official conclusion in June 1997 with the Party for suspected ‘anti-party’ and ‘anti-Soviet’ politics. Many signing of a peace agreement and power-sharing arrangement. of the thousands purged ‘were replaced by newly arrived The most devastating fighting happened in the Vakhsh Valley, Russian Party activists’. The ‘deviation’ committed by those south of Dushanbe, and in the capital itself, throughout 1992, purged were their real or perceived ‘desire for greater auton- with lower intensity fighting spreading later to the eastern omy and in support for the embattled intellectuals’. and the Kuhistoni Badakhshon (Gornyi Badakh- According to historian Kamoludin Abdullaev, the Soviets shan) Autonomous Viloyat (previously the Special Pamir endeavoured ‘to isolate and get rid of the prerevolutionary Region). By the end of the war, according to reports, between Jadid [reformist Muslim] intellectuals, who were viewed by the 40,000 and 100,000 people were dead, and hundreds of thou- Bolsheviks as professionally competent but politically unreli- sands had been displaced or fled the country as refugees. able’. Many were imprisoned, some eventually executed. Academic Brent Hierman claims that the way to view the Abdurahim Khojibaev, the Chairman of the Soviet (Council) civil war in Tajikistan, in brief, was ‘as a war fought between of the People’s Commissars, and Shirinsho Shotemur, the regional elites; specifically, following the collapse of the centre, Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Presidium of the networks of elites, organized according to region, mobilized (Supreme Council) of Tajikistan during the their supporters against one another in an effort to gain control late 1920s, were both executed as part of the Great Purge of of the existing state institutions’. During the first year the civil 1937. The purges in the 1930s, according to Rakowska- war expanded beyond Tajiks fighting each other, as the Harmstone, ‘virtually denuded the Tadzhik (sic.) [Communist] Gharmi Tajiks, who formed the bulk of the opposition , Party and government of the local cadres, and the republic was had allied themselves with ethnic Pamiri forces, while the in effect placed under direct Russian tutelage’. Some of those Khujandi Tajiks, who had dominated the Tajik Government executed and purged were eventually rehabilitated in the since the post-Second World War era, hadReserved. allied with not just 1960s. their Kulobi Tajik junior partners, but also with Uzbeks. Of After the Second World War, efforts were once again made to course, the sides to the violent conflict were not purely mono- increase the number of ethnic Tajiks in the local and national lithic blocs based on ethnicity and regional family origin. administration. Given the higher level of education found in However, it is undeniable that as the conflict gained momen- the northern regions, ‘Tajikistan’s leadership came to be dom- tum from mid-1992, the regional identity of Tajiks and their inated by representatives of the northern Leninobod’, wrote ethnic identity were the main criteria according to which Lemon, ‘a development that fostered resentment in other parts opposing militias targeted each other and the other’s civilians. of the country’ and which would have negative consequences in This ethno-regionalRights divide was aided and largely superim- the post-Soviet era as well. As part of their anti-religious posed by an ideological cleavage between a formerly ‘commun- activities, the Soviet leadership engaged in the ‘mass closure ist’ Government and an Islamist-dominated opposition. of religious institutions [that] left fewer than 20 officially Historical and Social Background of the War registered mosques’ in Tajikistan. It soon became well known, All however, ‘that every village and district had a functioning The area that experienced the worst of the civil war was the place of worship, while thousands of self-appointed imams southern Vakhsh Valley, in and around the multi-ethnic operated with the acquiescence of local officials’. By the 1980s, regional city of (now Bokhtar). This river valley following the Soviet invasion of and inspiration had been mostly settled in the early to mid-Soviet times when from Iran’s Islamic Revolution, there were ‘repeated reports of dykes and canals were built to irrigate its fertile lands, as a growing popular Islamic sentiment’ in Tajikistan. This coin- massive economic and social project to grow cotton for the rest cided with the accession in 1985 of as the of the USSR. The large population resettlement needed for the last General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party, ‘who2018.intensive labour of cotton agriculture was drawn from other sought to bring Central Asia under much closer central con- regions throughout Tajikistan, mainly the central district of trol’. Among other changes, the First Secretary of the Hizbi and the southern Viloyat. Tajiks from these Komunistii Tojikiston (HKT—Communist Party of Tajiki- regions, now thrown together in collective farms and towns stan), , was removed, ‘accused of corruption throughout the Vakhsh Valley, emphasized their own unique and nepotism’, and replaced by Qahhor Mahkamov. At the regional identities. The differences in custom, dialect and same time, Gorbachev’s policy of (openness and trans- descent soon became relevant economically and politically, parency) led to ‘relaxation of censorship [and] permitted as appointments to political and collective farm positions, as greater discussion of Tajik cultural heritage, in particular of well as access to resources, were often made based on region of its Iranian and Islamic connections’. The cultural organization origin, due to nepotism and favouritism. This matched the (Rebirth), which was created at this time in Tajiki- regional aspect of politics in Dushanbe, as the Soviet author- stan ‘took the lead in agitating for the language law enacted at ities used region of origin as a major criteria when deciding who the end of 1989, which established Tajik as the primary was entitled to certain positions and benefits within state medium of communication in state and educational establish- structures. The Soviet leadership also understood that the ments’. In March 1990 Soviet-styleRoutledge elections to the Supreme Khujand region had far higher levels of literacy and industry. Soviet ‘produced a parliamentary body in which 94% of the By the late Soviet period competition between patronage net- deputies were communists’. Following the example of other works based on region of origin was a widely acknowledged SSRs, in August of that year Tajikistan declared its sover- phenomenon in Tajikistan. These regional patronage net- eignty and by the end of 1990 the Supreme Soviet had elected works connected the rural collective farms to the capital Mahkamov as the Republic’s first executive President. city, giving populations in the regions an incentive to support patrons in the capital. Under the controlled political environ- ment of the USSR, this was an almost entirely peaceful INDEPENDENCE AND CIVIL WAR struggle. After independence, however, the competition spiralled into a violent and deadly conflict. Precursors to Tajikistan’s civil war can be traced to the last few years of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), when Independence socioeconomic and political discontent began to tear at the Leading up to independence, the Tajik SSR experienced pol- seams of the generally stable but poorest republic of the USSR. itical turmoil and instability at the top levels of leadership as a CopyrightProtests in February 1990 in the capital city, Dushanbe, which lingering effect of Gorbachev’s reforms. In other Soviet repub- combined both nationalistic fervour with demands for better lics of Central Asia, the newly appointed Communist Party housing and living conditions (arising following rumours of First Secretaries had been able to consolidate their positions housing being allocated to Armenian refugees from the Nagor- and control over their bureaucracies and law enforcement nyi Karabakh conflict), resulted in violent repression in which structures. In Tajikistan, however, the turmoil at the top levels 24 people were shot dead by Soviet security forces. The media of government continued before, during and after independ- accused Rastokhez and Islamic leaders of blame for the riots. ence. Street demonstrations and anti-Government Further protests in ensuing months of the post-Soviet era became a regular occurrence in Dushanbe, with the opposition 464 www.europaworld.com TAJIKISTAN History

forcing the resignation of President Mahkamov at the end of automobiles subsequently continued. The authorities were August 1991—just over a week before independence was unable to control the situation. Industry had been virtually declared. In particular, during the failed August coup in paralyzed and the agricultural base in the outskirts of the city , the Russian and Soviet capital, Mahkamov had destroyed. The counter-opposition forces were soon planning to ‘supported the plotters’, an incidence which hastened his seize the city by force. On 24 October Popular Front forces, resignation. On 9 September, in line with its counterparts in commanded by Kenjaev and another prominent leader, Rus- several other SSRs, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan declared tam Abdurahimov, entered Dushanbe from the west and were independence for the republic. Soon afterwards, by popular repelled only after heavy street fighting. demand, the then acting , parliamentary Chair- At the beginning of November 1992 Emomali Rahmonov, the man Qadriddin Aslonov, banned the Communist Party, caus- Chairman of the Kulob Viloyat Executive Committee (i.e. the ing anger within the communist-controlled Supreme Soviet, regional governor), and Safarov, the strongest of the Popular which in turn ‘sought to re-legalize the party’ and to replace Front commanders, restated their rejection of the GNR Aslonov with Rahmon Nabiyev. A presidential election was and of the new acting President, Akbarsho Iskandarov. In held on 24 November, ‘a contest which Nabiyev won [with] 57% meetings with Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei of the votes cast, compared with the 30% won by the opposition Kozyrev, they both rejected a compromise with the Govern- candidate Davlat Khudonazarov’, a prominent nationalist and ment in Dushanbe, which was, in their view, unconstitutional, film producer. The opposition parties and their public support- unrepresentative and controlled by the opposition. During late ers refused to accept the victory of Nabiyev, a former First 1992 the Kulobi leadership continued to state its various Secretary of the HKT. demands to the GNR, including the request for the next Street protests reignited in early 1992, after the Government parliamentary session (the 16th) of the Supreme Council to tried to purge opposition supporters from their state positions. be held in Khujand, due to the insecurity in Dushanbe—a As the demonstrations gained momentum the Government proposal that was granted by the GovernmentReserved. in late October. decided that it needed its own counter- forces on the On 11 November the Government, including acting President street, since the police and law enforcement authorities were Iskandarov and the Presidium of the Supreme Council, sub- either unwilling or unable to end the opposition action. Soon mitted their resignation to make way for the 16th session of the there were two rival daily protests in Dushanbe’s two main Supreme Council to select a new government. The Kulobis squares (named Ozodi—‘Freedom’—and Shahidon—‘Mar- thereby became the clear victors in the political and military tyrs’), located about a kilometre apart, and violence began to struggles of late 1992. Accordingly, many of the most import- escalate during May, when the first deaths occurred, with both ant positions in the Government were allocated to Kulobis, sides blaming the other for initiating the violence. With this including the top leadership, the chairmanship of the Supreme came a regional and ethnic characterization of the two sides: Council (equivalentRights to the position of President), which was the opposition protests were almost completely dominated by awarded to Rahmonov. Meanwhile, the Supreme Council voted Gharmi Tajiks and ethnic , while the counter- to combine Qurghonteppa and Kulob Viloyats into one unit, opposition pro-Government protesters were mostly Kulobi Khatlon Viloyat. Tajiks. It wasAll not until 10 December 1992 that Popular Front forces moved into central Dushanbe from nearby district vir- Outbreak and Spread of War tually unopposed, with tanks, armoured personnel carriers In Dushanbe an extremely weak and ineffective Government and helicopters, seizing the main government buildings and was soon left with no choice but partially to capitulate to industrial infrastructure. The public face of the coup leaders opposition demands. On 11 May 1992 pro-opposition support- appeared in the form of the new Minister of Internal Affairs, ers started to leave the streets after the announcement of an Yaqubjon Salimov, a former criminal gang leader in Dushanbe, agreement to form a Government of National Reconciliation and Safarov’s deputy. Safarov, himself, despite no official title, (GNR), in which the opposition was to receive a share of power.2018.given both his popularity and brutality had been described by The worst of the violence seemed to have been averted by this some as ‘the real power’ and ‘the biggest butcher’ in Tajikistan. agreement. However, what instead happened was that the two Throughout the first year of war both the opposition and the still deeply disaffected groups of protesters left the capital and pro-Government side attacked civilians. returned to their rural regions where they continued their (HRW) argued that ‘Neither side distinguished itself by struggles against each other. The outbreak of violence in Kulob humanitarian conduct in the war; ultimately, the side that and Qurghonteppa Viloyats was a direct result of the protest- won committed more atrocities’. During the winter of 1992/93, ers from both sides of the May demonstrations returning home in Dushanbe alone, as many as 2,000 people may have been and bringing the conflict with them. killed. Some in the Russian secret services, the Ministry of In Qurghonteppa Viloyat, Kulobi Tajiks and also local Internal Affairs and the state prosecutor’s office admitted that Uzbeks fled from the region in mid-1992, after Gharmi- the killings were taking place, but that they were unable (and dominated opposition militias attacked primarily Kulobis perhaps unwilling) to stop them in such chaotic conditions. and confiscated their lands and houses throughout the Vakhsh By the end of 1992 the armed opposition had suffered a heavy Valley. Refugees fled to Dushanbe and to the neighbouring defeat, with survivors fleeing to mountainous areas of eastern eastern Kulob Viloyat. ManyRoutledge Kulobi refugees then quickly Tajikistan and, importantly, with around 70,000 largely ethnic joined militias which had already been organized in their home Gharmi civilians from the Vakhsh Valley seeking refuge in region, known as the Popular Front. Their counter-attack, led northern Afghanistan. There, the military arm of the oppos- by a Kulobi organized crime figure, Sangak Safarov, moved ition regrouped and, with the assistance of the Afghan former quickly to the west into Qurghonteppa and the surrounding mujahidin and probably from their allies linked to the Gov- Vakhsh Valley, probably with assistance from special forces of ernment of Iran, was able to rearm itself and train new Russia’s Main Intelligence Agency (GRU). The other counter- fighters. The character of the war from this point was that of opposition Popular Front faction was the Uzbekistan- a counter-insurgency with sporadic guerrilla warfare, as well supported forces of Safarali Kenjaev, a former state prosecutor as smaller operations against opposition strongholds in the who had been organizing his militia west of Dushanbe, near the mountains of the east, rather than, as had been the case earlier border with Uzbekistan. This pro-Government campaign in the year, a complete collapse of the state and a fight between would later (during September–December) almost completely two roughly equal parties. destroy the opposition militias, while targeting Gharmi and In March 1993 the death of two leading figures of the civil CopyrightPamiri civilian neighbourhoods and villages for murder, loot- war, Safarov and Faizali Saidov, was reported, supposedly as ing and rape. the result of an argument in which each had shot the other Dushanbe, still in the control of opposition militias, was in a dead. As Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw wrote, this state of near paralysis. By July 1992 public transportation was led to an opportunity and ‘a process whereby Rahmonov was near collapse and in August Dushanbe airport suspended most able to move skillfully from being a mere puppet [of the key flights due to lack of fuel. In late September there were warlords] to the arbiter, overseer and ultimately repressor of occasional armed clashes, and lawlessness, targeted assassin- warlord politics’. The fact that two weeks later the Soviet-era ations, kidnappings, the looting of stores and the theft of First Secretary of the HKT and the second post-Soviet www.europaworld.com 465 TAJIKISTAN History

President of Tajikistan, Nabiyev, also died (due to a heart guaranteed in the medium to long term. The Government attack) only increased Rahmonov’s political importance. has in response, over the last half-decade, refined the set of The Conflict Subsides authoritarian tools that it uses to meet these challenges to regime stability. By February 1993 the worst of the conflict had subsided. However, government forces were still focused on opposition Journalism and Media fighters in the eastern Gharm and (now ) Certain independent and quasi-independent media outlets regions, as well as along the Afghan border areas of southern have acted as a counter-balance to full government control Kulob and Qurghonteppa. The conflict from here on abated into over information, such as the Asia-Plus media group, Radio a low-grade guerrilla war in the mountains and small towns of Free Europe, and Akhbor.com (based in the ). eastern Tajikistan, with occasional skirmishes in Dushanbe, By 2018 Tajikistan’s press, however, was relatively weak, not but with levels of violence nowhere near those experienced in as free as before, and increasingly self-censoring. The Govern- late 1992. The opposition forces were now split into two main ment mainly fears reporting on corruption, economic crises, factions: the ethnic Pamiri forces who barricaded themselves and human rights abuses—all of which in reality undermine in the isolated eastern region of Kuhistoni Badakhshon, and President Rahmon’s legitimacy. Over the last few years prom- mostly avoided participating in the second phase of the civil inent journalists have continued to flee the country, often war, and the Gharmi Tajiks who fought in their home region citing a threat to their personal liberty. The Government has (now known as the Rasht Valley) and also formed their base jailed journalists or harassed them into silence or submission. across the border in Taloqan, Afghanistan, where thousands of In 2011 an investigative reporter, Ramziya Mirzobekova of Gharmis had taken refuge. Despite its will to defeat the independent periodical Asia-Plus, was questioned by the opposition forces, these regions (Gharm and Tavildara) were Prosecutor-General’s Office over an article she had written nonetheless a low priority for the Government, as they were far about deaths in custody, in which she accused the Ministry of from the centre, had a small population and no valuable Internal Affairs’ Department for the PreventionReserved. of Organized economic assets. While the country remained unstable, the Crime (‘Section Six’) of torture. A Section Six officer subse- war persisted for another three to four years. quently sued Asia-Plus and sought US $225,000 for slander, Peace Agreement while insinuating that Mirzobekova and her colleagues prob- ably ‘had relations’ with ‘those guilty of the September 2010 The Tajikistan peace agreement was facilitated by many dif- suicide attack on Section Six headquarters in Khujand’. ferent players, from the participants in the war themselves, to Although, on the whole, the situation for journalists may not the (UN) and even Iran. None of these entities, be as critical in Tajikistan as it is in many other authoritarian however, played such an overwhelmingly important role as the states, a combination of government harassment, blackmail, major outside influencers of the conflict: Russia, as the sup- personal attacks, restrictionsRights on the media, poor future pro- porter of the Tajikistani Government; and the Afghan forces of spects and inability to make a living wage have caused many to Ahmad Shah Masoud that sheltered, armed and trained the leave Tajikistan. Tajikistani opposition forces from their safe haven in northern Under pressure, several critical media outlets have shut Afghanistan. The peace process soon took on a sense of down. MostAll recently, the newspaper Nigoh, and the website urgency, as the militant Islamist was rapidly expand- TojNews, both known for criticizing the Government, ceased ing and taking control of Afghanistan. Russia and Afghan publishing, citing the restrictive media environment. The military commander Masoud, having been on opposite sides informal pressure, often by agents of the State Committee during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and having sup- for National Security, which causes journalists to self-censor, ported opposing sides in the , were now is now being matched by formal bureaucratic rules that pro- becoming allies in an anti-Taliban alliance. Both sides needed hibit media outlets from citing anything other than the gov- the Tajikistani conflict to end so that they could potentially ernment-controlled press agency when reporting ‘official’ transform Tajikistan into a unified base of operation for oppos-2018.government news. As for social media, the courts have made ing the Taliban. The peace agreement, which was signed in it clear with recent prosecutions that a person can and will be Moscow on 27 June 1997, included an amnesty for nearly all jailed for online criticism of the Government or the President. A participants and a minority power-sharing agreement which notable case is that of Umar Murodov, a Tajik economic brought Tajikistani opposition figures into 30% of all govern- migrant working in Russia who had supposedly posted anti- ment ministries and leadership positions. The Government governmental videos on his ‘Odnoklassniki’ (‘classmates’) mainly abided by the terms of the peace agreement for the next social media account. The authorities charged and threatened decade until it began to purge opposition figures from state him but also promised him a light sentence or even a pardon if structures and prosecute those who resisted. As part of the he returned to Tajikistan. After returning in June 2018, how- Government’s new policy, in September 2015 the Supreme ever, Murodov was promptly detained, charged with ‘Public Court again banned the Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston insult of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan or slander (HNIT—Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan), which had con- against him’ (Article 137) and ‘Public calls to forcibly change stituted the main part of the opposition during the civil war but the Constitutional system of the Republic of Tajikistan by use had been legalized as partRoutledge of the peace accord of 1997, and of the Internet’ (Article 307), and after a short trial was nearly all its top leaders had been detained, tried and sen- sentenced to five-and-a-half years in prison. Murodov’s father tenced to long prison terms by 2016. complained to the press: ‘The authorities had said that if [Umar] returns [to Tajikistan], he would be pardoned. We PRESIDENT ’S TOOLS OF sold the [family] cow, bought the ticket. He came. They REPRESSION detained him.’ What is also known is that the Government is likely to have full access to all non-encrypted internet traffic, Even after the end of the civil war, Tajikistan’s leadership telephone lines and mobile communication in Tajikistan, and faced serious challenges to state control and real and perceived in this process has the complete co-operation of communica- threats to its longevity. However, the President (who in March tions companies in the country, including those with European 2007 renamed himself Emomali Rahmon, on the grounds that ownership. this was more ‘authentically’ Tajik, despite the fact that the origins of his first name—‘Emom’, ‘Ali’—and last name— The Legal System ‘Rahmon’—are Arabic), and his inner circle have countered There is no separation of powers in Tajikistan. President Copyrightall threats to his rule, notably the opposition parties and his Rahmon’s inner circle completely controls the courts. The legal own former allies. Other threats to Tajikistan’s stability have system lacks independence and is notoriously corrupt, with a regularly been cited, notably drug trafficking, terrorism, and conviction rate approaching 100%. The judiciary is used not spillover from the war in Afghanistan, although these have only to attack the opposition, but also to attack the legal consistently been shown to be relatively minor threats. How- profession itself. In recent years the Government has begun ever, a new set of challenges is now appearing (economic crises to imprison lawyers not for being members of the opposition, and social dissatisfaction), and the stability of the state, appar- but merely for representing opposition members in court. ently even in the view of Government leadership, is not Prominent convictions of lawyers include those of Buzurgmehr 466 www.europaworld.com TAJIKISTAN History

Yorov and Nuriddin Mahkamov, the defence attorneys for assassination attempt’. The Tajikistani authorities had sought imprisoned HNIT leaders, including that party’s First Deputy Abdullojonov’s extradition from , where he had been Chairman, Saidumar Hussaini, who, together with his deputy, arrested under an Interpol warrant. However, pressure by the Muhammadali Haı¨t, was sentenced in June 2016 to life impris- UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in onment on what independent observers generally regarded as Europe (OSCE), and also by the USA (where Abdullojonov had politically motivated charges of terrorism. In October Yorov lived since 1998), is believed to have dissuaded Ukraine from and Mahkamov, in turn, received 23- and 21-year prison extraditing him to Tajikistan. The US Administration had also sentences, respectively. The Government’s case in these probably opposed Abdullojonov’s extradition to Tajikistan ‘to instances was that the lawyers were guilty of fraud, forgery avoid the embarrassment of seeing its refugee resident sub- and ‘public call for extremist activity’; in the case of Yorov, an jected to a probable kangaroo trial, imprisonment, or torture by additional two years of prison was later imposed for contempt a key Central Asian ally’. According to a Western expert on the of court, since he had, after a heated exchange with the region, ‘Torture is used routinely not just against dissidents in prosecutor, read in court a sarcastic 11th century poem by Tajikistan, but against anybody accused of a crime. Interro- Umar Khayyam to protest at his verdict—according to gation by beatings and abuse is standard operating procedure Khayyam’s poem, Yorov appears to have been implying that in Tajikistan’. his court accusers were ‘foolish’ as donkeys (to ‘consider them- A more recent case is that of an alleged GKNB defector, who selves the intelligent ones’ and ‘so deep in donkeyness/That in August 2018 revealed through a video on social media the they call ‘‘blasphemous’’ whomever is not a donkey’). Inde- existence of a conspiracy to murder the HNIT leader in exile, pendent observers have rejected the charges against Yorov and Muhiddin Kabiri, in Europe. In the video, the purported former Mahkamov and view their convictions as punishment for agent detailed his work with the GKNB, recounting how he had having defended the detained HNIT leaders. attempted to sow discord among followers of the HNIT in Moreover, Muazzama Qodirova, who had acted as the lawyer Russia, and how he was given the assignment to meet oppos- for Yorov, was herself threatened with criminal investigation ition supporters in Europe and inviteReserved. them to return to and accused of ‘leaking information about her client’s case to Tajikistan with promises that the state would pardon their foreign media’. To avoid the fate of her client, Muazzama fled wrongdoings. He claimed that the Government’s plans for Tajikistan to Germany in early 2017. According to Fayzinisso reconciliation with oppositionists had been reversed by the Vohidova, a prominent human rights lawyer, the Govern- head of GKNB, Saimuddin Yatimov, and that the plot to ment’s ‘pressure on lawyers is [a way of putting] pressure on assassinate Kabiri was devised instead. An interlocutor human rights, on the court justice system and on civil socie- reported that ‘The [Tajikistani] government’s campaign ty. . .[and they] leave human rights defenders with no desire to against the real and imaginary opposition to its rule has wor.’. been broad and ruthless,Rights instilling in the population a fear The State Committee for National Security of speaking out or taking action against government abuses’. The various authoritarian tools and counter-opposition cam- The Government has proposed granting new powers for its paigns and tactics, including attempted assassinations abroad, State Committee for National Security (GKNB), namely a law have simultaneouslyAll diminished the capabilities of the oppos- that would allow it to enter homes without a court order. ition, civil society and independent media, and made it almost However, this is just legalizing a practice that already exists: impossible to speak out forcefully against the Government. GKNB agents have always entered homes without a warrant. They have also been known to harass, psychologically pres- sure, physically threaten and extort funds from both citizens RECENT PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY and non-citizens. Furthermore, the GKNB is believed to have ELECTIONS tortured and on occasion extrajudicially to have executed The Presidential Election of November 2013 suspects and detainees. A notable case is that of an alleged Islamist militant leader, Alovuddin Davlatov, who was2018.In April 2013, in a meeting with President of the European reported to have been captured in January 2011 and subse- Commission Jose´ Manuel Barroso, President Rahmon made a quently tortured and extrajudicially executed, possibly along pledge that the impending presidential election would be ‘free, with seven other suspects. More recently, four suspected young transparent, and democratic’. In fact, the November presiden- terrorists, who were believed to have been part of a five- tial poll could almost have become a genuine contest, had the member group that killed four foreign tourists in southern human rights lawyer, Oinihol Bobonazarova, the only credible Tajikistan in July 2018, may also have been executed extra- opposition candidate, been able to gain registration. Bobona- judicially, either by the special forces police or the GKNB. zarova was a proposed joint candidate for the HNIT and the Media outlet Akhbor.com asked: ‘Why is it that of the five Hizbi Sotsial-demokratii Tojikiston (HSDT—Social Demo- attackers only one was caught alive? Was it difficult for our so- cratic Party of Tajikistan), with endorsements by a number called ‘‘elite’’ forces to catch [alive] the 18 to 21-year-old of non-affiliated prominent individuals. However, Bobonazar- attackers who were only armed with knives and axes?’. The ova failed (by just 8,000 signatures) to secure the 210,000 GKNB is now possibly the main tool of power and repression in signatures required, blaming her disqualification on ‘intimi- Tajikistan and is under theRoutledge direct control of President Rahmon dation tactics’ by the Government, which included threats and his son, Rustam Emomali. against her relatives, the harassment of campaign workers collecting the public’s signatures, and a near virtual censorship Assassinations and Renditions of her candidacy on state-run media. Furthermore, the author- Tajikistani security forces have been accused of carrying out ities had made Tajikistan’s 1m.–1.5m. migrant workers, who and attempting assassinations and attacks in other countries. are mainly in Russia and have more opposition sympathies This includes the leader of opposition movement in exile than domestic voters, ineligible to sign candidate nomination Gurohi 24 (Group 24), Umarali Quvvatov, who was assassin- lists. ated in I˙stanbul, Turkey, in 2015, and several opposition Non-governmental organization Freedom House described activists and regime critics in Russia, who have been stabbed the presidential election of 6 November 2013 as a ‘pre- or badly beaten. The Government also uses rendition tactics orchestrated affair, including an improbable voter turnout of and abducts those in Russia or elsewhere in Central Asia if it is almost 90%’ and a victory for the incumbent Rahmon, with unable to extradite them legally. Outside of Turkey, Russia 83.9% of the votes cast. Although Tajikistan in appearance is a and Central Asia, the Government attempts to use the Interpol multi-party system, the 2013 election was in reality, in com- Copyrightinternational extradition system, but this usually fails, as mon with previous polls, ‘a one-man race despite the presence Western governments generally refuse to send peaceful oppos- of five ostensible opposition candidates on the ballot’. Kirill ition activists back to Tajikistan owing to suspicions that they Nourzhanov of the Australian National University called will be tortured. A notable case is that of the 2013 attempted Rahmon’s rivals ‘bogus candidates’, who ‘gracefully conceded extradition of the former Prime Minister in 1992–93 and defeat [while] calling the election fair’. The five other candi- opposition presidential candidate in 1994, Abdumalik Abdul- dates match academic Andrew Wilson’s description of ‘virtual’ lojonov, who had fled Tajikistan in the mid-, ‘due to or invented ‘soft opponents. . .play[ing] the part of real chal- accusations of involvement in a failed putsch and presidential lengers to convince domestic audiences or international www.europaworld.com 467 TAJIKISTAN History

observers that a [real] contest is taking place’. The closest a report by the OSCE, prior to the March 2015 parliamentary among these virtual candidates to a real candidate was Ismoil elections, an HNIT member of the CCER was arrested, while Talbakov of the HKT, who obtained around 5.0% of the votes. no member of the HSDT was ever appointed to this body by the Despite the certain re-election of Rahmon, the authorities President, a fact that ‘diminished the CCER’s inclusivity’. The did everything in their capacity to ensure a respectable, i.e. OSCE’s report on the 2015 elections found, inter alia, that the high percentage, victory. Observers from the OSCE and the ‘campaign took place in a controlled environment, amid arrests European Parliament noted ‘widespread proxy voting’ and of opposition politicians, candidates, and election officials’. It ‘indications of ballot box stuffing’, among other violations, also reported a ‘restricted political space and fail[ure] to pro- while vote counts on the whole were determined to have vide a level playing field for candidates’. OSCE observers were been ‘bad’ to ‘very bad’ in one-third of the 3,158 polling stations. able to detect ‘multiple voting and ballot box stuffing’, while Given that no real competition was taking place, the Economist there was ‘disregard of counting procedures’. Observers also wrote that ‘the mere presence of the 200-plus Western obser- assessed the ‘voting process. . .negatively in over 20% of polling vers offers the ruling regime a degree of prestige and legitim- stations’. Furthermore, the OSCE reported that the ‘distinc- acy’ and criticized the expenditures of US $3m.–$4m. of tion between the ruling [HKhDT, chaired by Rahmon] and the primarily Western taxpayers’ money to monitor what an state was often blurred’ and that there were ‘credible reports of observer labelled ‘a preordained, fraudulent event’. harassment and obstruction of opposition parties, as well as Commenting on the November 2013 presidential election, a pressure on voters’. The report stated that ‘complaints and Freedom House analyst referred to the Rahmon regime’s appeals process lacked clarity’ and the ‘few complaints’ that gradually ‘tightened. . .noose around the only legal Islamic were received ‘were rejected’ by the CCER and the courts. party in the post-Soviet world’, the HNIT, while accusing it Although election law allows for ‘observers from parties, also of having ‘prevented progressive voices—such as the candidates, and international organizations’, there is no pro- Social Democrats—from promoting their ideas or joining the vision for ‘citizen observation’. Even exitReserved. polling, which is legislature’. Prior to the election, the Government had used a distinct from ‘election observation’ as it takes place outside number of tools, both ‘legal and extralegal. . .to intimidate the polling stations and is very common in countries world- critics and eliminate potential rallying for the opposition’. wide, is considered to be, in effect, illegal. Ultimately, the Perhaps the most egregious act (which many attribute to the OSCE also determined that as many as 67% of ‘vote counts Government, although their complicity has not been officially observed were assessed negatively’. It also reported that while proven) before the election took place in March, when Salimboy the ‘CCER declared the winners’, it failed to release ‘key data, Shamsiddinov, the head of the Society of Uzbeks in Khatlon including the number of votes received by each candidate or Viloyat, went missing. His family’s search for his whereabouts results disaggregated by district and polling station’. The was unsuccessful and, in the process, it received no significant OSCE concluded onRights the 2015 parliamentary elections that assistance either from the Tajikistani police or even inter- ‘Important procedures were often disregarded, including not national organizations, such as the OSCE, which had a per- cancelling unused ballots, selectively determining the validity manent field office in Shamsiddinov’s home town of Qurghonteppa. Four months after his disappearance, a body of ballots,All and signing blank results protocols’, indicating that resembling Shamsiddinov ‘washed up on the shore of the Amu ‘an honest count, as required by the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen River’. Shamsiddinov was an ‘an outspoken critic of [both] the Document, could not be guaranteed’. According to official [Tajikistani] and [Uzbekistani] governments’ on their treat- results, the ruling HKhDT won a total of 51 seats in the 63- ment of their respective minorities—the Tajik community in member lower legislative chamber, the Majlisi Namoyandagon Uzbekistan and Uzbeks in Tajikistan. Circumstantial evi- (Assembly of Representatives). dence certainly suggests that the authorities were responsible Apart from the obvious regime-engineered virtual democ- for his death, and a Freedom House analyst described the racy of , it has been argued that the GKNB as probably complicit in his disappearance. It is rea-2018.overall weakness of genuine political competition in the coun- sonable to posit that Shamsiddinov died as a result of torture try is due to ‘a largely weak and apolitical civil society unwill- while in the custody of the GKNB, following his critical ing to mobilize resistance against the status quo’, according to a remarks about the regime and his indications to a reporter Freedom House report. With regard to Bobonazarova’s failure shortly before his disappearance that he would rally the ethnic to qualify for the 2013 ballot, critics have additionally ‘blamed Uzbek community to vote for the HSDT candidate, Rahmatillo the ineffective, disjointed, and weak opposition, accusing them Zoirov, were Zoirov to contest the presidential poll. of lacking clear goals and failing to unite political parties. . .and In addition to that serious case, in April 2013 assailants the population at large into a force capable’ of challenging the severely beat a senior official of the HNIT, Mahmadali Haı¨t establishment. It has also been argued that, despite obvious (later imprisoned—see above). While recovering in hospital, repression, Rahmon is still a legitimate candidate whom the Haı¨t told international organization HRW that he had been majority regards as ‘the father of the post-Soviet Tajik nation, under surveillance by the GKNB prior to his assault. Further- having brought peace and stability to his country against great more, in May the authorities arrested Zaid Saidov, a prominent odds’. businessman and former Minister of Industry, who had The situation may have altered significantly since 2014, attempted to register a new oppositionRoutledge party, Hizbi Tojikistoni however, due to a drop in global oil prices which led to an Nav (New Tajikistan Party), to challenge the ruling Hizbi economic recession in Russia from that year, compounded by Khalqi-demokratii Tojikiston (HKhDT—People’s Democratic the impact of Western sanctions imposed against Russia fol- Party of Tajikistan). According to Freedom House, Saidov was lowing its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. All this, soon charged with a series of ‘dubious criminal charges, in turn, resulted in a fall of billions of dollars in the remittances including statutory rape, illegal deprivation of liberty, polyg- sent to Tajikistan annually, causing economic hardship there. amy, bribery, and fraud’ and sentenced to 26 years in prison. Given these factors, Freedom House quotes the comments of an analyst that a growing number of Tajiks are ‘losing faith in fair The Parliamentary Elections of March 2015 elections and political change’, with more youths leaning If Tajikistan’s past elections provide the pattern for future towards ‘a more radical opposition, closer to a fundamental ones, then the parliamentary elections of 1 March 2015 would interpretation of political Islam than to moderate Islamo- not have been expected to be free, fair and democratic. A few nationalism’. It can be argued that this is reflected in the weeks prior to the elections, a Freedom House analyst had hundreds, if not thousands, of Tajikistani citizens who have Copyrightpredicted that due to the ‘government’s growing determination joined Islamic State, most having been radicalized in Russia to suppress all significant opposition voices’, the forthcoming before travelling to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Radio Free parliamentary elections would ‘be among the least democratic Europe reports one study by the International Centre for and most fraudulent in Tajikistan’s postcommunist history’. Counter-Terrorism, tracking Islamic State suicide bombers Elections in Tajikistan are organized and overseen by the during a one-year period starting in December 2015, which Central Commission for Elections and Referendums (CCER), a determined that, excluding Iraqi and Syrian nationals, the supposedly independent body, but which in reality is under the largest contingent of Islamic State suicide bombers were from control of the executive led by President Rahmon. According to Tajikistan, at 27 suicide bombers (10 more than the number 468 www.europaworld.com TAJIKISTAN Economy

recorded among Saudi Arabian nationals during the same official title of ‘leader of the nation’ and designated him ‘foun- period). der of peace’, while also allowing him to seek unlimited However, some radicals and sympathizers susceptible to renewals of his mandate in office. By 2020, when the next radicalism and terrorism remain in Tajikistan. Furthermore, presidential election is scheduled, Rahmon will be 68 years old as uncertainly remains, the July 2018 attack on the tourists in and will have been in power for just under three decades. Some southern Tajikistan, which killed two citizens of the USA, and of the laudatory poetry written for him by subjects refer to one each of the Netherlands and , may be a fore- Rahmon as ‘shohanshoh’ (‘king of kings’). The throne of kings is warning of more violent extremism in the making. It can be normally inherited by their sons. The same 2016 referendum argued that authoritarianism, unemployment, economic dis- lowered the legal age of eligibility for presidential candidates parities and proximity to territory with ongoing religio- from 35 to 30 years. This amendment, nearly all observers political wars (Afghanistan) together act as a complex factor agree, was effected to allow Rahmon’s son, Rustam Emomali, creating potential instability for Tajikistan. Nevertheless, the currently aged 30 and the Mayor of Dushanbe, to be eligible to ruling class has no intention of introducing democratic change seek election in 2020, if not sooner. or eliminating endemic corruption. On the contrary, Rahmon Note: References to bibliographic material mentioned in organized a referendum in 2016 that resulted in an overwhelm- this essay are included in the list at the end of the accompany- ing vote to amend the Constitution, which bestowed on him the ing Economy essay.

Economy Reserved. INTRODUCTION GDP—almost 50% The steep decline in international oil prices According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Tajikistan in 2014, combined with Western economic sanctions imposed is the poorest post-Soviet country: the World Bank estimated against Russia following its annexation of the Ukrainian that gross domestic product (GDP) per head was just US $812 a peninsula of Crimea in March of that year, led to a sudden year in 2017. The country hosts a large agrarian sector which drop of remittance inflows to Central Asia, as Russia entered employs 43% of the working age population, who are primarily into recession. In 2017 Tajikistan’s remittances totalled engaged in subsistence farming and animal husbandry. The $2,400m. and were equivalent to 37% of total GDP. Given population suffers from a high level of malnutrition, with some the reliance of theRights Tajikistani economy on international mar- 20% of children under the age of five being ‘stunted’, and kets, its exports—whether aluminium, cotton or labour—are according to a 2014–16 study by the Food and Agricultural at the mercy of international markets and exposure to external Organization of the United Nations (UN), one-third of the total shocks, such as the fall in the oil price. population is malnourished. Furthermore, Tajikistan faces All increasing threats from the effects of global warming, includ- ing rising food insecurity, according to the UN World Food Programme (WFP), and is heavily reliant on remittances from THE TROUBLED BANKING SECTOR migrant workers abroad, rather than internal production, as a What the EIU has described as ‘the collapse in remittances’ source of economic growth. from Tajikistani migrants working in Russia, with the effects Based on World Bank data (which, in turn relies on data felt particularly in 2015–16, induced a crisis in Tajikistan’s provided to it by the Government), Tajikistan’s real GDP banking sector. The reduction in funds flowing into Tajikistan growth in 2017 was measured at 7.1%. The EIU, however,2018.from Russia translated into an increase in banks’ clients claims that Tajikistan’s ‘official data has long been open to defaulting on loans. Even before the fall in remittances, question’ and estimates that real GDP in 2016 contracted by Eurasianet reported that Tajikistani banks were ‘teetering 1% (while the government reported growth of 7%), and modest on the edge of ruin for years [given] reckless lending’. It growth of 2.5% in 2017. The EIU forecast growth of 3.5% in appears that banks were engaged in offering ‘[h]uge amounts 2018. of credit. . .to would-be entrepreneurs on purely political Tajikistan’s economy, is in large part dependent on the grounds’. In 2017 the Government withdrew the licences of export of aluminium (17% of total exports, according to the two financial institutions: Tajprombank (Tajik Joint-Stock EIU), cotton (10%), electricity (5%), gold and silver, and agri- Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and Fononbank. cultural products (such as Tajikistan’s renowned dried apri- The maximum sum depositors were to receive was a settlement cots). The volume of exports in 2017 totalled US $873m,—an of US $2,000, even if they held a higher level of funds with the increase of 31% compared with 2016. The principal destin- two banks. Desperation beset some of the 600 individual ations for exports were Turkey (27% of the total), the People’s depositors and 235 corporate depositors of the relatively small Republic of China (18%), the Russian Federation (13%) and Tajprombank. Khairiddin Qodirov, who had deposited $84,000 Switzerland (13%). The volumeRoutledge of imports during 2017 totalled of his savings with Tajprombank, committed suicide. Relatives $2,390m., a decrease of 6% compared with 2016. The principal have suggested that his suicide may have been ‘an attempt to imports in that year were electricity (around 40% of total force the bank’s hand’ into returning more money to his family. imports), oil and gas (10%), grains (7%), and alumina (4%). The In another incident, an account holder entered a branch of leading countries of origin for imports in that year were Russia Tajprombank with her child and doused herself in kerosene; (42% of the total), Kazakhstan (21%), China (10%) and Uzbeki- only the intervention of a security guard prevented her from stan (4%). setting herself on fire. Two of the largest banks in the country—Agroinvestbank and Tojiksodirotbank—had also experienced serious financial LABOUR AS THE COUNTRY’S MAIN EXPORT difficulties until the Government decided on a bailout, in their If the economic migration of Tajikistani nationals to Russia case in 2016, as a result of which non-performing loans (NPL) were categorized as ‘services’ or ‘foreign trade’ (as the writer as a proportion of total loans fell to 36% by the end of 2017, Carlos Fuentes does in one of his novels with regards to compared with 47% at the end of 2016, according to the EIU. CopyrightMexican migrants to the USA), labour would be categorized That trend appears to have continued as the National Bank of as Tajikistan’s biggest export. The 1m.–1.5m. Tajikistani Tajikistan reported that the level of NPLs had fallen to 32% in migrant workers, some 90% of whom work in Russia, have the first half of 2018—‘a marked improvement’ from the 43% become the primary source of economic security for several recorded 12 months before. Part of the Government’s million Tajikistani citizens within the coutnry. According to US $500m. Eurobond issuance in 2017 was intended to help the World Bank, Tajikistan’s inflow of remittances reached a the capitalization of banks, but in the end the Government peak of US $4,300m. in 2013, ranking the country first in the decided instead to allocate the funding primarily to the con- world in terms of the inflow of remittances as a proportion of struction of the hydropower plant. www.europaworld.com 469 TAJIKISTAN Economy

GROWING FOREIGN DEBT convicting him to 15 years’ imprisonment: he was one of a 12 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tajiki- officials to receive prison sentences for similar offences. stan’s gross external debt reached US $3,500m. in 2017, up from $2,900m. in 2016. Total public debt rose to 44% of GDP in THE ROGHUN HYDROPOWER PLANT 2017. According to Eurasianet, more than one-fifth the exter- Tajikistan is relying on much of its future energy supply to nal debt load was accrued in 2017. According to government come from a project that involves the construction of the tallest statements, Tajikistan had set aside $147m. for interest pay- dam in the world, measuring 335 m. The Roghun hydropower ments and the servicing of its foreign debt in 2018. Just over plant was conceived by Soviet planners in the 1970s, but 50% of Tajikistan’s debt is owed to the People’s Republic of construction was not completed in the Soviet era. Once it is China, while other creditors include the World Bank (owed completed, the plant is expected to ‘have an installed capacity $318m., 11% of Tajikistan’s total debt), the Asian Development of 3,600MW. . .producing as much power as three nuclear Bank ($278m., 10%) and the Islamic Development Bank plants’, according to The Financial Times. It could thus poten- ($112m., 4%). Despite World Bank warnings about financial tially not only meet domestic demand for energy, but also vulnerability (when debt levels exceeds the equivalent of one- generate several billion dollars of revenue annually through third of GDP), the Government intended to raise its debt ceiling the export of electricity, most likely to Tajikistan’s southern to 60% of GDP. According to the Minister of Finance Faiziddin neighbours, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and possibly even Qahhorzoda, in addition to the $500m. of Eurobonds raised in China, if a solution were to be found for the current lack of 2017 for the construction of the Roghun project (see The grid connectivity in the mountainous region of south-western Roghun Hydropower Plant), there were plans to raise an China, which borders eastern Tajikistan. Although the additional $200m. in 2018 for unspecified purposes. According Roghun plant was expected to commence partial operations to the World Bank in 2018, more than 40% of Tajikistan’s total and electricity production by November 2018, according to the debt repayments fall due in the next five years, which will Italian industrial firm Salini Impregilo,Reserved. which is charged with likely force the country into a vicious circle of borrowing more constructing the project, it would take at least a further decade funds in order to repay debts. before the full capacity of the hydropower plant would be realized. By the time of its completion, the ‘mega dam’ was THE CHALLENGES OF POVERTY AND HUNGER expected to have cost at least US $3,000m. and possibly con- siderably more. To ensure continuation of the construction The poverty rate in Tajikistan ‘continued its muted decline’ in project, in 2017 Tajikistan issued a $500m. 10-year dollar- 2017, according to the EIU, falling to just below 30% of the denominated international bond with an attractive coupon population—still a relatively high figure. The country con- rate of 7.2%. The EIU reported that the Tajikistani bond rating tinued to face challenges in both sustaining high rates of of ‘B3’ by Moody’s andRights ‘B-minus’ by S&P Global (Standard and economic growth and in pursuing ‘policies that promote inclu- Poor’s) indicated a stable outlook for investors. None the less, siveness and the shared benefits of growth’. This objective, the Moody’s had warned of Tajikistan’s ‘weak institutions’ and ‘low EIU claimed, could ‘be achieved by improving the efficiency of foreign reserve levels’, but it also reported that ‘despite the redistributive policies and creating a business-friendly envir- severe stressAll in the banking system, the government and onment for the private sector with a view to generating more central bank have maintained relative economic stability’. A jobs and achieving better results in poverty alleviation through positive development regarding Roghun took place in March employment earnings’. According to the WFP, of Tajikistan’s 2018 when the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev estimated 8.9m. population, some 1m.–1.8m. are ‘food inse- (whose country lies downstream from the waters that Roghun cure’ and the country as a whole is highly vulnerable to climatic would dam) issued a statement expressing his intention to shocks and stresses affecting the agricultural sector and pov- support the project: Uzbekistani opposition to the project had erty levels. Meanwhile, some of the country’s glaciers are been a major cause of strained relations in recent years, rapidly melting and diminishing in size due to the effects2018. of although the coming to power, in late 2016, of Mirziyoyev, global warming; the WFP estimated that an increased rate of appeared to signal a more co-operative approach. evaporation would lead to emergency water needs for the irrigation of basic agricultural crops, with a likely increased need of up to 20%–30% by 2050, compared with present climate THE TALCO ALUMINIUM PLANT conditions. In a leaked 2008 memorandum the US Ambassador to Tajiki- stan was reported to have said that the country’s largest industrial enterprise, Tajikistan Aluminium Company (Talco) CORRUPTION was used by President Rahmon for ‘generating income for The non-governmental organization Freedom House has himself, his family members, and his inner circle’ and that described Tajikistan as ‘a nepotistic kleptocracy’ or a ‘nepotoc- much of the company’s revenue ‘disappears for off-budget racy’, in which a small group of the e´lite with blood or relations activities [including the construction of] palaces and [holding by marriage to President Emomali Rahmon’s household ‘dom- of] lavish state entertainments [and likely large personal off- inate politics, the domestic market and foreign trade’. Chal- shore bank account]’. The memorandum goes on to say that lengers to the system faceRoutledge repercussions, as reported in ‘[h]undreds of millions or even billions of dollars have disap- October 2017 when Rajabali Odinaev, head of the petrol station peared from the company since 1992, and the huge subsidies company Umed, was arrested and accused of fraud and tax Talco receives in the form of cheap electricity are draining evasion, after he was found to have been in competition with enormous resources from the Tajik economy’. President Rahmon’s son-in-law. Other relatives of Rahmon are A key reason why the Soviet authorities decided to establish thought to ‘control the key industries, including cotton, Talco (known by its Russian acronym TadAz until 2007) in cement, aluminium and energy’. Estimates by the IMF have Tajikistan is water—specifically the energy produced by suggested that some US $3,500m. has been transferred to hydropower. This is because manufacturing aluminium pri- offshore accounts since independence in 1991. According to marily requires the base material compound aluminium oxide Freedom House, as many as 115 metric tons of Afghan nar- (also known as alumina, which is itself derived from rocks cotics are reported to be transported through Tajikistan annu- containing bauxite ore) in addition to the availability of a vast ally. In 2017 the Government’s anti-corruption efforts, which amount of electricity. The closest sources of alumina to Tajiki- normally catch only small-scale offenders, eventually indicted stan are in Mykolayiv (Ukraine) and Pavlodar (Kazakhstan). Copyrighta more substantial culprit: according to Asia Plus, Asqar Tajikistan’s Nurek dam (currently the second tallest dam in Nuralizoda, the deputy chief of the Department of Program- the world at 300 m) was completed in 1972, and aluminium ming and Regional Development of the Ministry of Economic production commenced at Talco in 1975. Talco’s smelter is Development and Trade, was detained and charged with located just outside the western town of , close to receiving a $490,000 bribe. Meanwhile, in 2017 Akhbor.com the border with Uzbekistan, and was built for a maximum reported that the Supreme Court had found Firouz Kholmur- capacity production of just over 450,000 metric tons of alumin- odzoda, the former head of the investigative unit of the State ium annually; peak production there was reached in 1990. Anti-Corruption Agency, guilty of financial corruption, While the Nurek hydropower plant produces an estimated 75% 470 www.europaworld.com TAJIKISTAN Economy

of all electricity in Tajikistan, Talco alone has used as much as It may not come at a huge surprise that Western liberal 40% of the electricity produced in the country. Furthermore, as states and businesses have had close economic and security- the production of aluminium has been prioritized (along with related agreements worth billions of US dollars with the newly the supply of electricity) in order to maintain the high level of independent Central Asian republics. One such entity is revenue from that activity, many of the outlying areas of the Hydro, a firm with a large global portfolio and in which the country have encountered long periods of electricity black- Norwegian Government owns a 34% stake. Cooley and outs—sometimes for weeks at a time—including in the bitterly Heathershaw write that during 2004–08 ‘by fair means and cold winter. foul, the Rahmon family and. . .key associates wrested com- The story of Talco’s financial intrigue is associated with plete control of Talco from the previous management and lawlessness in the post-communist era, and the climate of Rusal, before coming to a new arrangement with Norway’s chaos that ensued during and after the Tajikistani civil war Hydro as the chief international partner’. According to the that followed independence. In 1996, just before the end of the Norwegian daily newspaper Dagens Næringsliv, Hydro, which war, when Talco was under the protection of one of the key signed its first contract with Talco in 1993, later began dealing military-political leaders allied with the Government, Ghaffor with the Tajikistani Government through two offshore ‘shell’ Mirziyoyev, the director of the struggling plant, Abduqodir companies: CDH and Talco Management Limited (TML), each Ermatov, concluded an agreement with an associate of Mir- registered in the British Virgin Islands. According to testimony ziyoyev, Avaz Nazarov (a businessman and the owner of Ansol, given at a court in London by Talco’s chief financial officer, a registered on the island of Guernsey, a tax haven). The deal 35% stake of TML is owned by Vostokredmet, Tajikistan’s state involved investing in the aluminium smelter and providing it uranium producer; a further 35% is owned by the state elec- with its base inputs. Many of the transactions comprised tricity company, Barqi Tojik, while the remaining 30% is bartering—for example, finished aluminium was exchanged owned by a small group of unnamed wealthy Tajikistani for raw alumina. Once output at the plant began to increase private investors. CDH, in turn, is saidReserved. to be ‘wholly owned following the end of the conflict, the revenues generated from by Orienbank,’ thus by Asadullozoda, through Amatola, yet exports were substantial, but amid the general atmosphere of another offshore company. lawlessness at that time, such funds were vulnerable to being Thus, per Cooley and Heathershaw, Talco had been trans- diverted improperly. To maintain his lucrative position, formed from an ‘exporter to a [mere] processor of aluminium Nazarov paid bribes to the Talco management during 1996– and subcontractor’ to CDH and TML. However, it appears that 2004 by way of gifts to ‘Ermatov’s family members [such as] the ‘bulk of the money generated by the plant passes to its tolling partner’, TML, which thus acts ‘as a financial middle- London and Moscow flats, education fees, [and] sham consult- man between Talco and the world, buying raw materials for the ancies and company directorships’. In 2003 Nazarov is also factory and selling its finished product’ and in the process known to have made payments of US $1m. per month to Rights keeping nearly all the profits to be made from Tajikistan’s President Rahmon, in addition to a reported total of $1.5m. aluminium exports. While Talco bore ‘all the costs of produc- to purchase jewellery for the President’s wife in 2003 and 2004. tion, as well as the legal fees of the court case’, it made a profit of It appears, however, that such funds and gifts were considered only USAll $15m. in 2005–07, during a period when global alu- insubstantial by Rahmon, who believed that far more tangible minium prices had risen by 200%. In 2004 Talco reported losses wealth could be gained if he were to take full control of Talco. of $40m. and made redundant around 30% of its nearly 11,000 In the immediate aftermath of the 1997 peace accord that employees. However, during 2005–07 CDH and TML are ended the civil war, President Rahmonov (as Rahmon was thought to have obtained revenues (primarily profits) esti- known prior to 2007) further entrenched and centralized his mated at $500m. Cooley and Heathershaw have reported that rule, while improving the security of the population, by either Tajikistan’s Ministry of Finance had admitted in a report that eliminating those military leaders who had been opposed to the $1,100m. of Talco’s revenues during 2010–16 were Government, or by incorporating them in the structures2018. of ‘unaccounted for and concealed in offshore accounts’. This power. By the early 2000s peace and the rule of law had criticism, however, was largely due to an internal power generally been restored, and Rahmonov was enjoying both struggle between Rahmon’s son-in-law, Jamoliddin Nuraliev the genuine and state-engineered adulation of the population, (also deputy Minister of Finance) and Rahmon’s brother-in-aw in a period of relative calm. He was, however, unable to take Asadullozoda over Talco’s assets, rather than a concern for control of the increasingly lucrative Talco, until 2004, that is, financial fraud on part of Talco’s rich associates or a call to when Nazarov was forced out of the management, charged return of any remaining stolen profits of the company stored with fraud. With that strategic move, Talco was effectively offshore. taken over by Rahmonov and his brother-in-law, Hasan Asa- Hryniuk has investigated Hydro’s dealings with Talco and dullozoda (owner of Orienbank, the largest private bank in associated companies, and has written that Norway’s ‘parlia- Tajikistan, and a businessman with many commercial inter- mentarians found [it] particularly disturbing. . .that a Norwe- ests who was considered to be among the three richest people in gian partly state-owned company could have enriched one of the country). Nazarov, who by 2004 had fled Tajikistan, pro- the most corrupt families in Central Asia’. Norwegian deputy ceeded, through his company Ansol, to sue the Government; as Per Olaf Lundteigen, in turn, stated that ‘Norway is often his company was registeredRoutledge in Guernsey, a territory for which portrayed as a Sunday School in international context, but the United Kingdom is responsible, the legal case between then it seems Norwegians behave just like everyone else when Ansol and Talco was heard in the UK. This led, according to you can earn money on it and hope you don’t get caught.’ Cooley Olga Hryniuk of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent and Heathershaw use the term ‘neoliberal authoritarianism’ States) Arbitration Forum, to ‘one of the most expensive liti- when referring to the Rahmon regime’s global financial reach gations in the history of the London High Court’ in the UK, a through control of ownership and personal profiting from legal case that ultimately cost US $150m–200m. to try, and aluminium production, which remains one of Tajikistan’s which even after several years of litigation had led to no few lucrative industries. They also point out that ‘[w]ithout particular conclusion. Other parties had reason to complain the financial and international instruments of offshore about the change of Talco’s management, namely the Norwe- vehicles and extraterritorial legal processes, corruption on gian aluminium and renewable energy company Norsk Hydro the scale [of Tajikistan’s Talco dealings]. . .would neither be ASA and the privately owned, Russian-headquartered alumin- possible nor effective’. ium company, Rusal, both of which claimed a breach of contract Copyrightby Ansol. In 2013 courts in Switzerland and the British Virgin Islands ordered Talco to pay more than $350m. in damages to CONCLUSION its former business partner, Rusal. Any rulings against Talco, Despite problematic issues, including high debt levels, bank however, such as the decision of the Swiss arbitration tribunal failures, corruption and economic uncertainties, the economic in favour of a Rusal subsidiary, would require approval by outlook of Tajikistan, as forecast by the EIU, has strengthened, Tajikistan’s Supreme Economic Court, which appeared but the country continues to be challenged by numerous risks. implausible, given the court’s effective status as part of the The economy appeared likely to benefit in 2018 and beyond country’s executive branch. from improved trade with Uzbekistan, following the emerging www.europaworld.com 471 TAJIKISTAN Economy

significant amelioration in relations between the two coun- Limbs], 18 August 2016, internet bit.ly/2LVXdEa (accessed tries, as well as from the stabilization of the prices of its 4 September 2018). principal export commodities, aluminium and cotton. A grad- ‘Tajik Public Figures Appealed to International ual economic recovery in Russia, which in turn has led to Human Rights Organizations to Appeal to Tajikistan to Com- ‘economic growth and a continuing recovery in remittance ply With Its Laws’, 19 August 2016, internet catv24.com/ inflows’ for Tajikistan, was also expected to lead to a fall in the 23837-2/ (accessed 4 September 2018). proportion of the population living in poverty. 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