Issue 22 1st Issue 2021 ISSN: 2242-441X nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal

12th NMIOTC Annual Conference welcome address by Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis GRC N Deputy Chief of HNDGS

Ireland and EU Common Security & Defence Policy: Operation Sophia as an Example of EU Contribution in the Maritime Environ- ment

Restructuring regional stakeholder’s re- sponse to secure Western Indian Ocean Re- gion (IOR) Augmenting Maritime Command and Con- NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION NATO

OPERATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE OPERATIONAL trol over a Regional Common Information Sharing Environment Implementation: Montenegro Case 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference Speakers’ Inputs Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security Seminar Report 1 NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre

2 C O N T E N T S nmiotc COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL MARITIME INTERDICTION Editorial by Charalampos Thymis OPERATIONS GRC (N) JOURNAL 4 Commandant NMIOTC

MARITIME SECURITY Director Commodore Char. Thymis GRC (N) 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference welcome address by Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis GRC (N) Commandant NMIOTC 6 Deputy Chief of HNDGS

Restructuring regional stakeholder’s response to secure Western In- Executive Director 8 dian Ocean Region (IOR) R. La Pira ITA (N) by Anant Mishra, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) Director of Training Support

Ireland and EU Common Security & Defence Policy: Operation So- 14 phia as an Example of EU Contribution in the Maritime Environment Editor by Lt Cdr Tony O'Regan & Dinos Kerigan-Kyrou Captain P. Batsos GRC (N) Head of Transformation Section Augmenting Maritime Command and Control over a Regional Common Information Sharing Environment Implementation: 20 Montenegro Case by Mr Zdravko Paladin Layout Production Lieutenant JG I. Giannelis GRC (N) 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference Speakers’ Inputs 30 Journal Assistant Editor

Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security Seminar Report 44

NMIOTC COURSE & ACTIVITIES The views expressed in this issue reflect the opinions of 55 the authors, and do not nec- essarily represent NMIOTC's NMIOTC TRAINING or NATO’s official positions.

All content is subject to Greek 60 Copyright Legislation. Pictures used from the web HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS are not subject to copyright restrictions. 64 You may send your comments to: [email protected] NMIOTC Program of Work 66

3 NMIOTC Commandant’s Editorial

NMIOTC stands as the only NATO were implemented, the Center stands gence, Big Data, Quantum technology, Quality Assured Educational & Train- now full ready to reiterate its courses, Robotics and Autonomous Systems - ing Facility, dedicated in training and seminars and conferences with the to name but a few -, have already af- research in the maritime domain. Our safety of personnel and trainees al- fected many aspects of human life and core aim and endeavors correspond to ways remaining its first and foremost are certainly appraised to have a dis- the needs of the Alliance to enhance priority. ruptive impact mostly in the deterrence both capabilities and awareness in and defence arena, revolutionizing the maritime security, as well as to build This year NMIOTC organized its 12th future military capabilities, the strategy bridges and establish common un- NMIOTC Annual Conference. The and the operations. Long discussions derstanding among allied and partner Conference theme was “Opportuni- have been respectively carried out, nations, as well as the academia and ties and threats from Innovative and while intense investments are being the private sector, in all matters within Disruptive technologies: Shaping the made all across the globe towards the the broad maritime security spectrum. future of Security in the Maritime Do- development of these innovative tech- With regards to the unprecedented main”. nologies and their possible defence pandemic crisis, and thanks to the applicability. Greek de-escalation plan and the The Emerging and Disruptive Technol- preventive / protective measures that ogies (EDTs), such as Artificial Intelli- Why emerging? because they are

4 expected to reach full maturity in the convinced that a whole-of-government der perspective in maritime security is years to come. and a whole-of-society approach are still very much unchartered waters, yet paramount to access the necessary gender is indeed relevant in the mari- Why disruptive? because they attempt means and authorities to address such time domain. Assessing the different to displace established technologies challenges. Through this high-visibility threats that men, women, boys and and procedures from the market and conference, we anticipated to facilitate girls face when crossing sea borders, because their application drastically common cognition and approaches it is crucial in dealing with maritime changes the rules and habits of func- and to promote synergies among the security challenges. The lack of gen- tioning within societies, organizations international community of interest, der perspective may result in failing or industries. The invention of the conditions that we consider neces- to identify those in vulnerable situa- mobile phone strikes out as the most sary in order to effectively prepare tions who are in need of protection. prominent example of such develop- ourselves to defend against advanced Therefore, gender analysis does not ments! or unprecedented threats and avoid apply only on land but also at sea. Es- catastrophic impacts to our nations, sentially, acknowledging the gendered Therefore, EDTs are said to have the industries and societies. dimensions of vulnerabilities at sea, potential to change “the rules of the offers a more inclusive and “human game”, without any guarantee of suc- We have realized that peace and pros- centered” approach of the contempo- cess though. They may provide new perity in the world is more than ever rary maritime security challenges that and more effective military capabili- before dependant on the common may ultimately enhance operational ties on the one hand, but on the other understanding and honest collabora- effectiveness. hand they may renter existing defence tion among all stakeholders. They systems inefficient or even obsolete. should now enhance their synergy NMIOTC endorses the integration of At the same time the inherent uncer- and advance their level of coopera- gender perspective in all its training tainty characterizing the maturation of tion to fully respond to modern needs. products and activities. Consistent emerging technologies, creates ambi- NMIOTC counting more than 10 years with the NATO Education & Training guities and risks with regards to their of successful function stands ready plan for gender in military operations, potential exploitation by adversaries, in support to NATO effort to embrace the Center provides tailored gender posing a serious threat to the Alliance innovation, interoperability and disrup- awareness training to boarding teams security. tive approach to current and emerging and naval units during pre-deployment technologies in order to act as one of training. We strongly believe that the Recognizing the importance and the the key role players in capacity build- greatest effect is gained if gender complexity of this issue and being ing and stability projection in our trou- perspective is included in the earliest aligned with the Alliance’s approach bled world. forms of education and training, and to innovative technologies, the Center mainstreamed through courses at dif- chose to dedicate its annual confer- Right after the 12th NMIOTC Annual ferent levels to achieve lifelong and ence to these developments, focusing Conference, the Center organized its transformative learning. by definition in the maritime deter- “Gender Perspectives in Maritime Se- rence and defence spectrum. We are curity” Seminar. The integration of gen-

Charalampos Thymis Commodore GRC (N) Commandant NMIOTC

5 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference Welcome address of the Deputy Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis GRC N

Distinguished guests, esteemed colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.

First and foremost, I would like to thank our hosts for their warm hospitality and the outstanding organization of this high visibility Conference.

On behalf of the Framework Nation, Greece, I extend my greetings to all of you, who are attending virtually this event and I cordially welcome the rest of you, who have the chance to be in person here, at NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC) premises, in Souda Bay Crete.

To begin with, I would like to congratulate NMIOTC, for standing up very well to the occasion of the current pandemic. The Center, since its activation, has made an outstanding progress and placed itself proudly within NATO Education and Training community. NMIOTC made its best to maintain its activity, despite the pandemic restrictions, and now, it fur-ther boosts its courses, seminars and conferences, with the safety of personnel and trainees always remaining its first and primary priority.

Dear attendees, today, we are all witnesses to the unprecedented changes evolving around us, due to the occurrence of major technological achievements. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), smart phones, satellites, internet, five G (5G) networks and numerous other innovations have changed drastically and keep changing our lives, our societies and our world.

Today’s Conference, bringing together virtually individuals across the globe, into a single room, is a great example of the changes that take place. Organizations such as NATO and EU shall not and cannot stay unaffected of this transformation which is being carried out.

The level of technology has always dictated the warfighting capability of nations and played its own important role in shaping their strategies. World War II can tell us a lot. The access to vital intelligence, thanks to the British who developed decoding communication systems is just one typical case, which reveal the magnitude of the impact that technology can have on warfare and grand strategy.

6 Similarly, nowadays, Emerging and Disruptive Technologies are fundamentally challenging the manner in which deter- rence, defence and, more generally, security strategies are formulated and enforced at national and multilateral levels.

Any change in technology leads to modifications in the operational and combat plans. We must recognize that technology is developing much faster than doctrine, and a lot of effort is required in order to close this gap, as much as possible, with proper prioritization.

Hence, for any state, for any military organization, it is extremely important to monitor closely the progress made in technol- ogy realm, which has direct or indirect defence utility.

States would also be required to be aware of the military-specific technology interests of their adversaries. Investments made towards the development of new technologies and their possible defence applicability need to be monitored.

Today, once again, the military and defence sectors face their own challenges and dilemmas with Emerging and Dis- ruptive Technologies.

However, dear attendees, I am afraid that being just an observer of the technological train passing by, is not enough. It is vital also to adapt, to innovate and to seize the opportunities technology offers, to find solutions to our most pressing chal- lenges. It is crucial to rethink the way we work and operate. We shall be agile, but simultaneously cautious.

In the context of our Alliance and in the spirit of the agreed NATO Military Strategy and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, it is foreseen that the Alliance will pursue to acquire and use new technologies. They will be the means which will be exploited by the Alliance in order to develop and maintain its strategic and operational advantage against its threats and strategic competitors

Development of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies is based on innovation which in turn is developed by the academia and industry. The rapid rhythm of their development and their expected use by competitors, have made it imperative for the Alliance and its member states to timely adapt.

Undoubtedly, the ongoing developments on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, will inform other evolving NATO pro- cesses such as Deterrence and Defence Posture, NATO defence Planning Process, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non Proliferation and Export Controls as well as experimentation, training, exercises, and finally, Strategic Communications.

In this regard, Greece highly supports Supreme Allied Transformation priority to declare “innovation” as a priority for his Warfare Development Agenda.

As I said, we all have to work systematically to take advantage of the advance technology’s opportunity.

Finally, in close cooperation with the academia and corporate world, we need to develop an overarching strategy, which will frame Alliance’s attitude against Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, in order to harness their potential for our best benefit.

Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The theme of the current Conference sums up in a few words all the arguments around Emerging and Disruptive Technol- ogies. The advent of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies opens the window for huge opportunities, whereas their mis- use or their fall into the wrong hands poses a serious threat. Yes indeed, as the theme implies, EDT have the potential to shape the future of Security in the Maritime Domain. That is why I believe, that this Conference offers a great opportunity to further promote and broaden the discussion about EDT’s prospects.

Thank you for your attention. I wish you a constructive Conference with fruitful discussions.

For those ones who are lucky enough to be here in person, I wish you a joyful stay in Crete!

7 MARITIME SECURITY Restructuring Regional Stakeholder’s Response to Secure Western Indian Ocean Region (IOR) by Anant Mishra Web Manager-cum-Researcher at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Abstract imperative to have a sub-regional Furthermore, nations lying within the security framework to ensure the Western Indian Ocean are fragile. The regional security situation in commitment of both human and According to a recent in-house the western Indian Ocean Region technical resources to ensure the publication of a prominent maritime (IOR) remains volatile due to , stability of the region. security centric think tank, the levels trafficking and smuggling, despite the of instability in the region is higher presence of multinational naval task Introduction since the states (according to indexes force. It is because of the failure on the used by the think tank) lay between part of nations that have a substantial Today, the Indian Ocean Region 75 to 85 in its instability measuring stake in the region have shied away particularly the Western bound is at a indexvi. Importantly, The Western from developing a sub-regional crucial intersection. Threats to maritime Indian Ocean region hosts three of the security framework to strengthen security is exponentially increasingi. top ten most fragile states, particularly cooperation and coordination among The entire Western bound has Yemen, Somalia & Pakistan. various stakeholders. While numerous become a hotbed for drug traffickingii. talks and discussions have happened Migrant Smuggling, Human & organ Radical Islamic militant groups such to chart out the future course of action, trafficking, weapons (small & light as Islamic State, Al Qaeda and its nothing concrete has happened so far. arms) trafficking, illicit wildlife crimes affiliate groups such as Boko Haram Due to which most of the cooperation and poaching of aquatic species and Al Shabab are carrying out their that happens remains an individual have become rampantiii. The threats Jihad in these countries. Carrying initiative than a collective endeavour. emanating from Somali pirates, who out coordinated attacks at the sea, is The region not only have the presence were responsible for hijacking more a recent addition particularly taking of top three failed states but also than 170 small and large merchant place after the attack on the MV terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda shipsiv, have been momentarily Limburg in 2002vii. are active having metamorphosed suppressed. Nonetheless, the their operational capability from land organisational architecture of pirates Undoubtedly, the region to the West to the maritime domain, which earlier remains functional and mobile due to of Indian Ocean is of global critical was exclusive to piracy. Hence, it is which the threat remains eminentv. maritime importance. It hosts vital

8 international trade and important an issue. Policy makers and military intervals. movement of resources travelling leadership need to deliberate on through Persian Gulf, Europe and decreasing inter-naval rivalries and Interestingly, every regional partner/ Asia. Yearly, almost 42,000 shipping potential disagreements between stakeholder has formulated a policy MARITIME SECURITY vessels travel through this routeviii. In them and formulate mechanisms to counter challenges. Although, there an effort to counter piracy off the coast on strengthening coordination in applications/operational perspectives of Somalia, the region continues to case an international joint maritime to counter such challenges are witness heightened maritime patrolling security operation concludes in aggressive and on paper seems since 2008. A total of three international their region, while identifying other successful, none of the stakeholders maritime joint operations are currently international legal mechanisms which mention about tackling such functional in the region. This includes can temporary be activated to replace challenges jointly in the region, nor EU’s maritime Operation Atlanta, United Nations Security Council have they developed mechanisms to NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and Resolutions while giving the latter do so. US-supported Combined Maritime adequate time to formulate a new Forces reinforced by navies from India, counter-piracy legislation. The objective to formulate a dedicated Russia, China & Japanix. Irrespective security architecture in the region is of any particular time or day, all the Since 2016, there have no concrete undoubtedly complex as it is not only three operations are functional with international maritime security and intertwined with stakeholder’s politico- a significant response team of more counter-piracy centric legislation economic agendas, but regional rivalry than 30 rotary wing aircrafts supported nor any effective joint international further eliminates the joint security by numerous attack boats. Ironically, counter-piracy operations in the element out of the policy. Furthermore, 150 vessels were boarded alone in region. In the meantime, the maritime there are no established inter-agency 2015 out of which 12 vessels were security issues persist rather operational guidelines and varied fired upon, seven were hijacked, and increasing exponentially, with major interests between states further roughly 22 attacks were thwarted. militant actors evolving their piracy hamper any hope for a future intra- Such aggressive tactics employed tactics. Stakeholders must participate agency interaction. The complexity by pirates even after significance on strengthening international security is further plagued by overwhelming naval presence have forced maritime architecture by reinforcing it with SOPs to multiple institutions. These security and international counter- critical multilateral partnerships in an SOPs are more or less the same for terrorism experts to formulate a effort to make the region secure even every tasked agency in an effort to get dedicated strategy to effectively if international maritime task forces the job done. counter piracy in the Western Indian cease operations. Ocean region. As NATO decided not Moreover, resource deficient states are to renew its operation post 2016, To formulate a concrete region-specific forced to relocate available resources three years later, the fate of EU’s maritime strategy, the author spoke to to security centric institutions which counter-piracy operations too hang in numerous maritime security experts in are operationally inefficient due to vivid the balance. In the light of an abrupt an effort to formulate a skeletal plan objectives, inadequate personnel and closure of such vital international for a future maritime security centric binding operational restrictions. Such maritime security operations and with structure. The author was appalled institutions, let say hypothetically, no new joint maritime security mission to note no less than sixteen policies, will not be able to deliver desired in sight, it is important for decision agreements, intra-navy operating results or participate with regional makers and military leadership to dossiers, fluid SOPs during discussions partners effectively and efficiently. formulate a dedicated policy to particularly to formulate an initial This hurriedness to receive desired effectively counter vast maritime structure on joint maritime operations results with limited literally functionless security challenges while keeping in in the regionx. These policies where institutions needs to stop. Policy mind the region’s potency to counter strictly focussed on strengthening makers and military leadership must such adverse threats once the naval regional navies coordination & maintain a clear sight and a dedicated operations are complete. cooperation in countering illicit viable strategy on the region’s ability trafficking of aquatic animals/fishes, to secure its international waters In the light of significant increase in human & drug trafficking, migrant independently, without completely piracy and vessel-boarding incidents smugglings, weapons trafficking, and relying on international partnership, the discontinuation of international opening doors for maritime security making it self-sufficient. This process, counter-piracy operations and time stakeholders, military leadership, however, will remain a good paper- taken by military leadership to renew private partners and members of policy without regional state’s or initiate new operations remains the academia to deliberate on fixed partnership.

9 adequate and dedicated resources to fishes for their primary income and International assistance from multi- overcome domestic challenges, rather nutritional basics. Crimes against naval partners, is undoubtedly a it will be immense difficult even for aquatic animals and fishes adversely boost to strengthen regional security power nations to cater resources in an damages their local environment architecture, but their repetitive effort to eliminate emanating maritime and increases food insecurity in the interference in policy planning and threats, especially due to rampant fire region. According to one estimate of abrupt decisions to end an ongoing engagement between government the Food and Agriculture Organization naval operation or not to renew one, and rebel forces on the ground. (FAO), the lifestyle of roughly 3 million effectively weakens regional maritime Tanzanians are intrinsically linked to security structure; in such a scenario, The Western-IOR has a long historical fisheries centric occupation, such as its it is best for international partners relationship with maritime pre and sales and processing centres, besides to ratify agreements formulated by post-colonial trade. For more than a building trawlers, boats and other regional actors limiting and defining century, the Arabs, the Asians and fishing vesselsxiv. Experts continue to

MARITIME SECURITY their roles and responsibility including the then European empires flourished argue on the antecedent relationship operational tenures. However, to draft because of their economic relationship between piracy and illegal fishing, this, numerous factors needs to be with the kingdoms laying within the however, the sudden peak in piracy considered. Western-IORxiii. Cultural-economic off the coast of Somalia particularly relationships such as these have after 2008 highlights the seriousness Maritime security through a holistic resulted in the emergence of a multi- of this issue: fishing opportunities in prism cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic international waters and under the societies within intellectual boundaries, jurisdiction of other states created a Stakeholders within the IOR have which have been dominating global formidable pretext for local fishermen varying operational priorities and socio-economic societal structure to attack under the justification strategic objectives which are fulfilled even today. The traditional regional cloaked with the motive of defending through different naval tacticsxi. belongingness, although, weakened, their right to food and protest against Interestingly, South Africa & India are continue to remain fragile, as evident foreign exploitationxv. Amid regional the only two blue water naval powers from poor inter-ethnic cooperation insecurity and political instability, operating in the region. They do not in major economies in South East policy makers failed to address only possess strategic and economic Asia and Africa. This deteriorating the needs of local masses which superiority, but joined by Kenyan, regional fragility is further complexed attracted the attention of local religious Iranian and Pakistani navies, they also with boundary disputes and inter- jihadi militant groups resulting in an maintain the balance of power. Their state rivalries. Nonetheless, if it unprecedented saga of crime fuelled strategic and economic leadership is persists similar to Indo-Pak rivalry or with radicalisation which continues to critical to secure peace and security in that of Somalia or Kenya or remains exponentially proliferate as of today. the region. For smaller island regional heightened due to frequent claims on With international naval actors and economic states, such as Maldives small islands as between Mauritius, external stakeholders functioning and Seychelles, their interests lay Madagascar and the UK, efforts to under the come and go policy in predominantly in securing strategic implement cooperation & coordination the Western IOR, it will be foolish maritime objectives. Regional island or confidence building mechanisms to leave regional maritime security nations are suitable in brokering in the region will look seemingly on their behest. What needs is a maritime agreements as their impressive on paper. Innovative sustainable policy that is effective in leadership have the potential to provide regional cooperation mechanisms that combatting all maritime challenges new valuable thought-provoking too out of sheer ego and economic while strengthening regional naval insights on regional security matters to expansionist greed reinforced by capacities to jointly combat any issue intellectual global leaders and military recognition to its pre-colonial trade that threatens the integrity of the , which otherwise fails to relationships and establishing Western IOR. The states located at make it on the agenda. Initiating a new mechanisms to jointly work towards the hinterland, or in and around it, campaign to strengthen its maritime ensuring maritime peace and security, do not have the luxury to establish a dependent economy, Seychelles have could revive productivity in the region. multidomain state of the art navy to already taken the leadxii. maintain constant maritime vigil. The Effects of maritime insecurity on states laying within the hinterland have Conflict rigged nations, particularly regional economies an average Exclusive Economic Zone Yemen and Somalia, are at the of about 667,104 km2, with a total epicentre of rising maritime insecurity Masses living in and around the round of to an estimated 11 million in the region. They not only need coastal region depend majorly on km2xvi. Interestingly, many nations

10 such as Maldives, Comoros and counter-piracy mission or a dedicated the Seychelles have territorial lands international counter-piracy operation Furthermore, if the region becomes a smaller than their Exclusive Economic does not necessarily point to a host to geo-politico-strategic tussle, Zones. Regional nations such as complete withdraw of all naval forces petite tensions and regional stress MARITIME SECURITY India, South Africa and Iran have well from the region. Rather, it points to the could potentially burst into a major developed and experienced navies but fact that the international naval actors dispute. This is evident from the continue to face numerous challenges have not limited their agenda to combat tensions arising between India, China particularly in combatting illicit fishing, piracy but have a larger strategic and the US. While looking at these trafficking or intercepting foreign objective to achieve in the regionxviii. unintended rivalries, in the light of vessels crossing their EEZs illegally. This is evident from Beijing’s ambition, continued militarisation, cooperation With a responsibility to protect an EEZ which continues to expand its naval between regional allies will be highly of roughly 1.3 million km2, Seychelles, operational outreach and potentialities unlikely which could further diminish having the second largest EEZ, in the regionxix. Anti-piracy operations any hope for a dedicated structured second only to India in the Western not only opened opportunities for international mechanism to strengthen IOR region, possess a meagre naval Beijing, but for numerous naval maritime security in the region. strength of only two hundred officers powers, such as Australia, Japan and and nine-armed patrol vessels to vigil Korea, to exercise rapid long term- Formulating a dedicated the areaxvii. maritime deployments. Both China and international strategic group in the Japan have set up their first functional Western-IOR Fragility in the Western IOR region overseas naval base in Djiboutixx. With will continue to increase if maritime Indian Ocean in its own backyard, Interestingly, the UN committee and security remains delicate and shaky. New Delhi too is reinforcing its the IORA are the only two international Nonetheless, reinforcing additional strategic military and naval partnership institutions which overwatch maritime military support is not the only solution. with regional allys. France and the security mechanisms in the region. Although navies do play a critical role UK, once pre-colonial enemies and They need to be strengthened in an in strengthening maritime security naval arch-rivals too have numerous effort to increase their productivity mechanisms, law enforcement strategic naval bases in the region. to cater to the challenges of today. institutions, intelligence agencies The US Navy continues to conduct Furthermore, to formulate viable and coast guards have equal vitality. numerous joint-piracy operations in maritime security mechanisms, Sharing actionable intelligence and the region along with its allies. With a these aforementioned institutions coordinating & cooperating during full functional naval support facility in must function with cent per cent operations within international legal Diego Garcia, the US has access to its effectiveness and efficiency. These mechanisms play a crucial role in naval bases in Djibouti and Bahrain. aforementioned institutions possess reviving stability and security in the Displaying vivid manoeuvres through the desired/necessary architecture region and cost effectively does the aggressive deployment of naval power and operational framework, if job well without inviting state of the art in the IOR, the US is determined to harnessed carefully, could play the heavy naval firepower. Undoubtedly, keep a significant naval presence in role appropriately. To initiate dialogue/ maritime security is a transnational the region within the background of deliberation at the top echelons, the issue. Coordinating and cooperating maintaining peace and security while UN committee is the appropriate with regional stakeholders, jointly operating in disputed waters. place since it has direct access to gathering and sharing resources the members of the United Nations and conducting joint operations are A trans-national challenge Security Council and the General some of the significant steps which Assembly, and it could provide access could get the job done. However, Even if international and external to real time strategic details on the aforementioned steps are only actors do cease their joint counter- international naval movements in the possible with forward thinking piracy operations, their naval forces region. Regionally, IORA is the only institutional leadership and right might reposition themselves in a group with the potential to implement assets in the dockyard. strategic holding pattern to maintain viable strategic mechanisms in the presence in the region indefinitely. The region and synchronise it with tactical The challenges faced by Western IOR rampant deployment of strategic forces manoeuvres. The issue, here, is that is not only limited to fragile navies in the Western IOR further threatens they are thinly resourced to cover the and inadequate law enforcement peace and stability in the region. entire IOR with diverse operational institutions. One major issue is Although expecting any consequence objectives/expectations and planning. global nation’s rampant decisions to or a reaction at the South China Sea is To eliminate the confusion, decision militarize the region. Closing a joint highly improbable. makers could either align these two

11 organizational architectures or design later, if need be, expanding it (by to seriously deliberate on formulating new sub-institutions within them to increasing stakeholders), could get a dedicated operational maritime dedicatedly cater to the needs of the the desired results. Subsequently, security mechanism. Pirates off the Western IOR. certain mechanisms could be further coast of Somalia have increased strengthened by reinforcing them with their frequency to intercept ships, Importantly, the institution will be selective objectives from MASE or which has exponentially increased the tasked with supreme authority to DCoC. However, the implementation seriousness of maritime insecurity in plan and execute combined maritime of such mechanisms would rest the region. Besides piracy, smuggling security operations – tactical joint law majorly on cooperation from regional of aquatic species have also increased, enforcement operation, intelligence stakeholders, since interests of the and the rampant build-up of naval dissemination, deployment of joint emerging nations vary and so does dockyards by regional expansionist training and resource mobilisation financial contributions. Alternatively, economies have further complicated mechanisms along with maritime decision makers in consultation with the issue. As international joint-piracy

MARITIME SECURITY surveillance and joint crisis response. military leadership could formulate a missions come and go, maritime Today, most of aforementioned dedicated institution to cater needs security should be the only priority for tasks are carried by international of the Western-IOR. This is a highly regional economies. stakeholders. probable recommendation, as it would further add to the list of institutions This brings regional economies, However, there are numerous operating in the region. particularly those in and around the regional institutions that possess IOR, at an important intersection. The aforementioned capabilityxii. This Furthermore, a strengthened international trade (particularly that of involves joint operations functioning maritime security mechanism has blue economies on which sustenance under the counter-piracy agreement its roots from discussions/informal of local people depend) would flourish such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct policy deliberations between military only with a secure IOR. In 2019, (DCoC), operating under the European leadership, strategic experts, law policy makers must formulate a new Union initiatives to strengthen regional enforcement & intelligence institutional viable maritime security mechanism maritime security measures in the heads and members of the academia. dedicated to catering Western-IOR MASE region (Eastern and Southern This calls for decision makers to needs. The foundations were already Africa-IOR, or the United Nations initiate multilateral strategic regional laid in the institutions established after Drugs and Crime initiative such as discussions/dialogues at all levels. 2008. Although, it’s organizational the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Dialogues such as these will function architecture and operational Crime (IOFMC). The aforementioned as confidence building mechanism functionalities are largely complex and programs are strictly voluntary and which will then boost trust and a meagre reflection of global powers operates only on the stakeholder’s establish inter-disciplinary interaction strategic objectives. The baton should interest. Furthermore, programs within stakeholders. Moreover, using be given to regional economies with an such as the DCoC and MASE are such informal groupings/dialogue objective to initiate a vision for a safer, geographically limited. Their area of sessions, decision makers and secure IOR domain which is echoed in operation is strictly limited to Eastern military leadership could deliberate a dedicated regional centric maritime African and Arabian Peninsula. on challenges and work towards security policy through its effective formulating a dedicated maritime and efficient operational mechanisms. Taking the geographical expansion security mechanism for the region. A safer, secure Western IOR even in of the Indian Ocean Region into the light of regional tussle is possible account, it is safe to say that more A safer, secure Western IOR even today. The future of the region such operations the better. Although, lies in the decision of policy makers, considering regional territorial tussle It is in the interest of every stakeholder their ability to deliberate with regional between emerging and expansionist to create a safer and secure Western and external stakeholders, and their economies, overt deployment could Indian Ocean Region. States in the sheer will to succeed. backfire. Instead, deploying selective hinterland along with their international mechanisms in the region and and external stakeholders, will have

12 References i United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime (UNODC). 2013. “‘Transnational Organized Crime in East Africa: A Threat Assessment.”

https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/transnational-organized-crime-in-eastern-africa-_-a-threat-assessment_html/TOC_East_ MARITIME SECURITY Africa_2013.pdf. ii United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime (UNODC). 2014. “UNODC Taps into Maritime Crime-Fighting Experience to Tackle High Seas Drug Smugglers.” iii United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime (UNODC). 2013. “‘Transnational Organized Crime in East Africa: A Threat Assessment.” https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/transnational-organized-crime-in-eastern-africa-_-a-threat-assessment_html/TOC_East_ Africa_2013.pdf iv World Bank. 2013. “Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa.” http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/408451468010486316/pdf/Pirate-trails-tracking-the-illicit-financial-flows-from-pirate-activities-off-the-Horn- of-Africa.pdf. v Bueger, Christian. 2015. “Learning from Piracy: Future Challenges of Maritime Security Governance.” Global Affairs 1 (1): 33–42. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2015.960170. vi The author spoke to the head of the publication division who strictly refrained on mentioning their index. On permission, the author mentioned preliminary details. vii Murphy, Martin N. 2009. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World. Edit- ed by Oxford University Press. A Hurst. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/small-boats-weak-states-dirty-money- 9781849040792?cc=us&lang=en&. viii United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2014. “AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS, COSTS AND TRADE-RELATED IMPLICATIONS.” https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d1_en.pdf. ix Beckman, Robert, and Monique Page. 2014. “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.” In The Handbook of Security, 234–55. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-67284-4_11#citeas. x The author had an in-person interaction with some of the prominent strategic experts from various naval forces and academia. xi Mayer, Maximillian. 2018. Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations. 1st ed. Palgrave Macmillan, London. xii Commonwealth Secretariat. 2016. “The Blue Economy and Small States.” Commonwealth Blue Economy Series, No. 1. http://www. cpahq.org/cpahq/Cpadocs/The Blue Economy and Small States.pdf. xiii Ojwang, Dan. 2015. “Settled Strangers: Asian Business Elites in East Africa (1800-2000).” South Asian Diaspora 1 (7): 71–73. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19438192.2014.992702?journalCode=rsad20. xiv Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2018. “THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE.” http://www.fao. org/3/a-i0628e.pdf. xv Samatar, Abdi Ismail, Basil Mahayni, and Mark Lindberg. 2010. “The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: The Rich versus the Poor.” Third World Quarterly 31 (8): 1377–94. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2010.538238. xvi Ding, Qi, Xinjun Chen, and Yong ChenSiquan Tian. 2017. “Estimation of Catch Losses Resulting from Overexploitation in the Global Marine Fisheries.” Acta Oceanologica Sinica 36 (12): 37–44. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13131-017-1096-x. xvii Bateman, Sam. 2016. “Maritime Security Governance in the Indian Ocean Region.” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 12 (1): 5–23. Pejsova, Eva. 2016. “Scrambling for the Indian Ocean.” https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06885?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. xix Khurana, Gurpreet S. 2014. “China’s Maritime-Strategic Presence in IOR: Geopolitical, Geoeconomic and Security Import.” Mari- time Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 10 (2): 1–15. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0973315 9.2014.969549. xx The Reuters Beijing desk. 2017. “China Formally Opens First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti.” The Reuters. 2017. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3. xxi Bueger, Christian, and Timothy Edmunds. 2017. “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies.” International Affairs 93 (6): 1293–1311. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/6/1293/4111108.

AUTHOR

Anant Mishra is a Web Manager-cum-Researcher at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, where his research is focussed on military strategy & tactics. He is also a Visiting Research Fellow at the Terrorism & Security Directorate of the International Centre for Policing & Security, University of South Wales, Pontypridd.

13 MARITIME SECURITY

Ireland and EU Common Security & Defence Policy: Operation Sophia as an Example of EU Contribution in the Maritime Environment © European Union, 2015 by Lt Cdr Tony O'Regan & Dinos Kerigan-Kyrou

This paper will discuss the addressing the root causes of human background to the EU Naval trafficking and people smuggling in operation EUNAVFOR MED. It will the South Central Mediterranean. focus on Ireland's role providing Causes of this situation include a key maritime resource in a conflict, poverty, climate change, multinational environment working and persecution.2 The mission's core with partners across the EU and mandate was to identify, capture and NATO. It will explain some of the dispose of vessels and other assets unique aspects of the mission used by smugglers and people from the first-hand perspective traffickers.3 The aim was to contribute of an Irish Naval to wider EU efforts to disrupt human Service officer centrally involved smuggling and trafficking networks in with the EU operation. Finally, it the region, to prevent loss of life at will draw some conclusions about For five years from April 2015 sea, prevent terrorism, and to disrupt how all EU states can contribute to EUNAVFOR MED - also known as organised criminal networks involved a dynamic maritime operation such Operation Sophia - was a central part in illicit activities.4 as EUNAVFOR MED.1 of an EU comprehensive response

1 The authors are particularly grateful to Irish Defence Forces Lt Cdr Elaine Moloney for her role in enabling this paper. 2 For further information about EU civilian and military operations see: European Union External Action Service (EEAS) at: www. eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en 3 See: EEAS: EU NAVFOR MED at: www.operationsophia.eu 4 For a broad analysis see: Anne Ingemann Johansen, “Assessing the European Union’s strategic capacity: the case of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia,” Journal of European Security 26, no. 4 (2017).

14 Background was shared and coordinated with Navy.10 EU Member States' law enforcement The danger to Europe and the agencies, together with FRONTEX All of the activities undertaken in each wider region of the criminal activity 7 (the EU's border and coastguard phase adhered to and respected MARITIME SECURITY exploiting human misery is very clear. agency) and Europol8 (the EU's international law, including human According to Irish Defence Forces5 policing agency). rights, humanitarian and refugee law, Cmdr Caoimhin MacUnfraidh, Joint and the 'non refoulement' principle Operations Centre Director Op Sophia, Op Sophia was designed around four meaning that no rescued persons can Operational Headquarters, Rome: specific phases: be disembarked in a third country. 1) Forces deployment to build a The EU enables all Member States, "The brutal, human smuggling engaged comprehensive understanding of regardless of size, to make meaningful in by criminals on a well-documented smuggling activity and methods. and effective contributions.11 scale raises the possibility that certain 2) Maritime interdiction: the boarding, actors may, directly or by proxy, gain search, seizure and diversion of Ireland's Key Role control of that trade and of the oil trade smugglers' vessels on the high seas, in Libya, allowing the exertion of terrible under the conditions of applicable From 2015 to 2018 Ireland went from pressure on the EU. This combination international law. being a non-military contributor to of human rights, economic risk, and 3) Taking operational measures one of the top five EU contributors in geopolitical manoeuvring on the EU's against vessels and related assets Op Sophia with four ships, each with southern border has produced a febrile suspected of being used for human 57 crew, plus two Operational HQ and dangerous situation."6 smuggling or trafficking inside a state's appointments in Rome, and two Force territorial waters. HQ appointments aboard the Italian In 2016 Op Sophia's mandate was 4) The withdrawal of forces and aircraft carrier Cavour and then the reinforced with the addition of two completion of the operation in March Italian cruiser San Marco.12 supporting tasks: 2020.9 Ireland has maintained a peacekeeping - Training the Libyan Coast Guard Op Sophia conducted new surveillance presence around the world for over 60 (LCG) and ; activities on illegal trafficking of oil years.13 Nonetheless, when Ireland - Contributing to the implementation exports from Libya (in accordance deployed the offshore patrol vessel of the UN arms embargo on the high with UN Security Council resolutions). LÉ Niamh to Operation Sophia in seas off the coast of Libya. It also established a monitoring October 2017 it was the first time mechanism for the long-term efficiency an asset had Information on human trafficking of the training of the LCG and Libyan been involved overseas as a part of

5 For more information about the Irish Defence Forces and overseas deployments, see: www.military.ie/en/overseas-deployments/ 6 Commander Caoimhin MacUnfraidh, “Operation Sophia, EUNAVFOR Med,” An Cosantóir (March 2020), 14-16. For an analysis of Operation Sophia’s evolution in light of the emergent legal and political complexities, and the addition of United Nation’s authorised maritime security tasks see: Capt (NS) Burke, Pat “EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia – An Impossible Challenge?” Irish Defence Forces: Defence Forces Review (2020): 131-141. 7 See: www.frontex.europa.eu 8 See: www.europol.europa.eu 10 EEAS, op.cit. 10 EEAS, op.cit. 11 For more information and analysis see: Caoimhin MacUnfraidh, op.cit. The EU has further expanded its maritime operations in January 2021 with the ‘Coordinated Maritime Presences concept in the Gulf of Guinea’, reflecting how security concerns at sea near to and afar from the EU affect directly the EU’s security. ( See:www. eeas. europa.eu/topics/maritime-security_en) For an analysis of the background see: Commander Corrado Campana “Maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Experience from the Somali Basin,” NMIOTC Journal 9, (2014): 33-35. www.nmiotc.nato.int/wp-content/up- loads/2018/09/NMIOTCjournal91.pdf For more information and analysis of EU security and military operations see: EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance, edited by Spyros Economides and James Sperling. London: Routledge, 2019. 12 For more information see: Caoimhin MacUnfraidh, op.cit. 13 For a comprehensive analysis of Ireland’s role in UN peacekeeping globally see the dedicated edition of Defence Forces Review (2018), at: www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/defence-forces-review/df_review_18.pdf See also, , White Paper on Defence (Update, 2019) at: www.gov.ie/en/publication/a519cf-white-paper-on- defence-update-2019/

15 deployment, it was the Irish ships who conducted all six of the friendly approaches, a testament to the crews".19

Operational Resources

Since the inception of Op Sophia over 58 naval units have participated, including four Irish ships: the offshore patrol vessels LÉ Eithne (P31), LÉ Niamh (P52), LÉ Samuel Beckett (P61), and LÉ James Joyce (P62). Op

MARITIME SECURITY Sophia was the first time Ireland has a multinational mission.14 However, taken part in a multi-role and multi- 20 this was not the first time the LÉ It was these very attributes and acuity national naval operation. Niamh had been to the central that were the rudiments for Naval Mediterranean, having displayed her Service assets to take up station Force Headquarters (FHQ) was aboard prowess during Operation PONTUS,15 in Operation Sophia. These skill ITS San Marco L 9893, a San Giorgio- a bilateral arrangement with the Italian sets which were developed during class Amphibious Transport /Landing government. Therefore, the transition fundamental domestic framework Platform Dock (LPD). San Marco was for the Irish Naval Service to promote operations - conducted in the launched in 1987 with Brindisi as the maritime peace and security beyond unforgiving North Atlantic environment 's home port of assignment. The its shores and into the Mediterranean - laid the foundations for successful ship could accommodate five hundred was somewhat of a natural evolution. /recovery (SAR), and eight (508) personnel including Indeed, the Naval Service has honed its intelligence gathering, and friendly crew, , flight crew and SOF core mariner skills over many decades approaches18 (Boarding & MIO - (Special Operations Forces), as well in one the toughest environments in Maritime Interdiction Operations), as the FHQ Staff. San Marco's landing the world: the North Atlantic.16 As Irish on Vessels of Interest (VOI). It was deck proved to be an ideal placement Defence Forces Chief of Staff Vice this ability to complete indispensable for SOF sniper teams supporting Admiral Mark Mellett states: maritime tasks within the EU’s boarding and MIO operations. Fittingly, framework which confirmed that the San Marco's motto was: "Over the decades we've refined the Irish Naval Service could operate as a skills of launching and recovering first class military, leading the way in TI CON NU - NU CON TI - “You with boats in, what are statistically, some disrupting the business model of illegal us - We with you”, of the roughest seas in the world... trafficking. Moreover, as the coauthor the largest wave ever measured by of this article states: written in old Venetian language; scientific instruments was off the this tied nicely into the context of the northwest coast of Ireland...in excess "As the Irish liaison to the Force mission. ITS San Marco had taken of 29 m [over 95 ft]."17 Commander during my four month over the FHQ flagship duties from

14 For more info on the Irish Naval Service, see The Irish Defence Forces at: www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/naval-service/ 15 For further information and analysis on Op PONTUS see: Brunicardi, Michael. “Operation PONTUS: an eye witness account from on board L.É. NIAMH.” In Haven: The Mediterranean Crisis and Human Security, edited by John Morrissey, Chapter 8. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2020. 16 For background historical analysis see: McIvor, Aidan. A History of the Irish Naval Service. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994. 17 Vice Admiral Dr Mark Mellett DSM, Irish Defence Forces Chief of Staff, August 9, 2020. Interview with Dr Maxim Kozachenko, GEOCOAST. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6LGjksQgws&ab_channel=GEOCOAST 18 For more information on the types of approaches and legal environment of MIO see: Rear Adm. Eugene Diaz del Rio, “Maritime Security & Law Enforcement,” NMIOTC Journal 9, (2014): 42-43, www.nmiotc.nato.int/ wp-content/uploads/2018/09/NMIOTCjournal91.pdf 19 Lt Cdr Tony O’Regan. Two Irish Naval Service personnel were on board the FHQ - One Officer and one NCO. The NCO originally worked as the Ops room manager and later became a battle room watch keeper. Ireland maintained two Naval Service personnel in the FHQ throughout Op Sophia. 20 Caoimhin MacUnfraidh, op.cit.

16 the ITS San Giusto L9894 in August 2018 from her predecessor the aircraft carrier ITS Cavour. ITS San Marco was relieved by ITS Luigi Rizzo F595, MARITIME SECURITY Bergamini Class (FREMM) general purpose frigate in January 2019 remained as the FHQ at sea until April 2, 2019.

Article coauthor Lt Cdr Tony O'Regan states that having spent many years at sea conducting domestic Maritime Defence and Security Operations (MDSO) in Ireland’s Area of Operations (AO), and as a specialist clearance diver, his selection to ITS San Marco Force Headquarters (FHQ) Op Sophia presented a new and challenging role:

"Although my role was now somewhat different, it’s that innate ability to its continuance. This uncertainty in SAR and saving lives at sea. 23 adapt to changing situations made brought with it challenges to crews that Notwithstanding UNCLOS article 98, it all the more interesting. Now at were already operating far from home this ethos is engrained in every Irish the tactical level in the FHQ there in a hostile environment. sailor and serviceperson. The mission were fifteen nationalities to contend itself proved to be very significant in with, continuous personnel updates However, the greatest challenge terms of operational experience and (persrep) to the Operational HQ Rome faced was not disrupting the business development for the Naval Service and (OHQ), daily briefings to the Force model of human trafficking or the arms its personnel. As well as being within Commander, and maintenance of the embargo to Libya, but the humanitarian the top five Op Sophia EU contributors, daily battle rhythm. The administration crisis - especially having to deal with Irish personnel and Naval Service required in a multinational force and capsizing vessels and hundreds of assets came to the fore developing a military staff work to preserve the persons in the water. significant positive public reputation. FHQ, maritime assets and air assets Representing Ireland and the Naval in mission at all times made the CJ1 "We are sailors representing the Service in its first multinational appointment a demanding role."21 Irish Naval Service and the Defence naval mission, performing to the Forces of Ireland and with that comes very highest standards, was hugely Particular challenges of Op Sophia a duty of care coupled with a sense of rewarding; those who contributed responsibility to protect others and save should look back with a sense of pride. Op Sophia required more than a lives at sea. It was these situations in Sir Isaac Newton’s metaphor sums degree of flexibility, both in terms of my opinion that had a profound effect the experience up perfectly 'If I have professional and personal approaches. and left a deep impression on almost seen further, it is by standing on the 22 Maritime missions are by their nature all of the personnel involved." shoulders of giants'. Tony O'Regan complex, where any uncertainty at adds: "As I look back, we - Ireland Inc the strategic level can, and inevitably Many in the Irish Naval Service - were de facto those giants". As Vice will, feed into both the operational and (particularly the ships' crews), will say Adm. Mark Mellett states: tactical level. By late 2018 the mission the most rewarding aspect of Operation was surrounded by uncertainty about Sophia was their involvement "We bring our capability to bear...to

21 Tony O’Regan, op.cit. As an Operations Officer Lt Cdr Tony O’Regan had just completed a two year term in Command of L.E. Ci- ara (P42 Peacock Class- formerly RN HMS Swallow P242) when he was appointed to the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) CJ1 with responsibility for personnel and administrative duties on board the Force HQ - ITS San Marco (L9893). 22 Tony O’Regan, op.cit. 23 See: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at: www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e. pdf

17 undermine the criminality associated including multi-domain connections from participating countries onboard with people smuggling and people to optimise Maritime Situational the FHQ worked very well together, trafficking which is one of the biggest Awareness. This maritime information particularly at the tactical level where at tragedies in recent years that has was reported to its headquarters, times there was clear cross-pollination been happening in the context of the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and interoperability; each designated migration patterns in Europe. And where it was processed and shared department would feed into each there is a misery associated with among the allies and partners’ navies other, providing a holistic approach criminals and networks exploiting and with EU Op SOPHIA. Moreover, to the task at hand. For example the challenging circumstances of this coordination with Op SOPHIA CJ1 (Personnel) and CJ4 (Logistics) people who are forced out [of their increased the efficiency of both EU worked cheek by jowl, particularly countries] for a variety of reasons to and NATO operations, enabling when ITS San Marco required try and cross challenging seas like the tactical level coordination utilising refuelling at sea. This interaction was Mediterranean...The overwhelming continuous information exchange. conducted by a US Navy resupply

MARITIME SECURITY challenge in that period was to deal NATO and the EU shared daily ship operating in the Mediterranean, with the massive numbers we had...in situation reports and sailing intentions usually supporting NATO’s Operation terms of saving lives. We have saved, as well as schedules for air, surface Sea Guardian which was running as the Defence Forces, around 18,000 and submarine operations. Sharing concurrently. As part of its mandate, people in the Mediterranean."24 this information helped prevent OSG supported the EU’s Operation duplication in tasks and built a bigger Sophia by providing logistical EU framework and relationship with picture of maritime activities in the support.27 "This inevitably led to NATO Sea Guardian central Mediterranean.25 information sharing in order to provide maritime situational awareness and Operation Sophia coordinated Militaries - particularly navies - often to most efficiently utilize assets in the closely with NATO maritime security have very similar approaches to the central Mediterranean." Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) which specific mission framework when ran concurrently. NATO OSG has participating in operations. In this The EU Naval Force Mediterranean been implemented in response to the case it was EU CSDP - Common Operation IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED evolving maritime security environment Security and Defence Policy.26 Each IRINI), replaced Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean. OSG is Member State or participating nation on March 31, 2020 with the aim to characterised as a flexible operation maintained essential caveats imposed enforce the United Nations arms and adopts a comprehensive approach by their respective governments embargo on Libya. Led by Cmdre to the Maritime Security Operations, during Op Sophia. The personnel Theodoros Mikropoulos at sea and Rear Adm. Fabio Agostini at OHQ Rome, Op IRINI - like Op Sophia - is a European Union military operation under the umbrella of CSDP, taking full advantage of maritime, aerial and satellite assets. Greece took command of Op IRINI in October 2020. Op IRINI continues the very close liaison with NATO OSG which began with Op Sophia, enabling the greatest possible efficiency and utilisation of NATO and EU resources.28

24 Vice Adm. Mark Mellett, op.cit. 25 See: NATO MARCOM OSG at: www.mc.nato.int/missions/operation-sea-guardian 26 For more about CSDP, see European External Action Service (EEAS), at: www.eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and- defence-policy-csdp_en 27 NATO MARCOM OSG, op.cit. 28 See: European Union External Action Service (EEAS): OP EU NAVFOR MED IRINI at: www.operationirini.eu

18 Admiral Mark Mellett states: "Tragically we've seen hundreds of people drown and we recovered many bodies."29 MARITIME SECURITY The Mediterranean route is likely to continue to be utilized by traffickers wishing to profit from human suffering. Nonetheless, while the challenges are substantial, EUNAVFOR MED, Operation IRINI, and other military and civilian missions and operations across Europe, Africa, and Asia as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy enable all countries across the EU, regardless of size, to utilize their expertise and experience. This is Conclusions beyond the actual size of the country. highly beneficial not just for the EU and It built on Ireland's excellent reputation partners including NATO, but for those Operation Sophia placed Ireland on in international affairs combined with being exploited by gangs, criminals a national and International stage, substantial, practical experience and terrorist networks. EUNAVFOR working alongside and in cooperation at sea, especially within the vast Med / Operation Sophia was both an with other EU as well as NATO navies North Atlantic environment. But the excellent example of this response to - developing closer interoperability and challenges are, without doubt, long- the new asymmetric challenges we an ever closer working relationship term and will remain for many years. face, and a building block for the future between the EU and NATO. This While thousands were indeed saved in in EU and international cooperation for contribution manifested in a way far Op Sophia and Op PONTUS, as Vice the .

AUTHORS Lt Commander Tony O’Regan, Minewarfare and Clearance Diving Officer (MCDO) Lt Commander (OF-3) Tony O’Regan MCDO is a Irish Naval Service Officer with 27 years’ service. He has a wealth of seagoing experience culminating in his appointment as Officer Commanding L.E. Ciara from 2016-2018. His specialization as a Clearance Diver and in his capacity as Officer in Charge of Ireland’s Naval Diving Section has seen Lt Cdr O’Regan involved in some of Ireland’s prolific maritime operations. He is a graduate of the Defence Forces Command and Staff School and holds a Masters in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies and a diploma in sports psy- chology. From September 2018 to January 2019 he held the appointment as ACOS CJ1 on board the Force Headquarters for Operation Sophia.

Dinos Kerigan-Kyrou PhD Dinos Kerigan-Kyrou is a cybersecurity instructor on the NATO DEEP (Defence Education Enhancement Programme), based at the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC), Garmisch- Partenkirchen. He is the coordinator of the cybersecurity training on the Joint Command Staff Course at the Irish Defence Forces. Dinos is a coauthor of the NATO / PfPC Cybersecurity train- ing curriculum and the NATO / PfPC Hybrid Warfare training programme and curriculum (currently ongoing). He is the visiting lecturer in Strategic Cybersecurity at Abertay University.

29 Vice Adm. Mark Mellett, op.cit.

19 Augmenting Maritime Command and Control MARITIME SECURITY MARITIME SECURITY over a Regional Common Information Sharing Environment Implementation: Montenegro Case

by Zdravko Paladin1, Andrej Mihailović1,2, IEEE Member, Nexhat Kapidani1, David Merino Delgado3, Juan Manuel Grenner Nogueron3, Giuseppe Vella4, Marios Moutzouris5, Roberto Leuzzi6,7, IEEE Member

Abstract case of regional interconnections of is proposed in order to valorise maritime surveillance systems and regional potentials from strategic and Implementations of the rising EU data sources integrated via CISE safety aspects. We provide some maritime initiative, namely the network within collaborations of experiences/results of maritime C2 Common Information Sharing Maritime Authorities, border control operations and use cases in AMSPM Environment (CISE), involves agencies, IT industry and researchers during the Adriatic-Ionian trial period network connectivity and data sharing participating in the international EU of the ANDROMEDA project, showing processes among EU Member ANDROMEDA H2020 project. This the potential benefits of integrating States agencies. These interactions paper presents the operations of the Montenegro, as an EU candidate occur at the national, regional and Administration for Maritime Safety country, in the regional CISE network. international levels with the principal and Port Management of Montenegro Thus, EU agencies have interests in purpose to increase maritime borders (AMSPM), partner and an end-user in the proposed CISE extension, since safety, security and effectiveness. the ANDROMEDA project, during C2 Montenegro provides great potentials The developed infrastructure of the systems’ exploitation in the maritime for information exchange contributions CISE application augments the use safety domain. Specifically, the to the EU CISE network’s full of maritime Command and Control regional Adriatic-Ionian integration of operability. (C2) functions, enabling an enhanced maritime authorities’ legacy systems Common Operational Picture (COP), for monitoring and surveillance, with monitoring, interoperability, improved the application of high-level operational Key words: CISE, C2, regional situational awareness, and safety/ C2 systems, fully compliant to the cooperation, maritime safety security missions. We outline a enhanced maritime CISE data model,

Affiliations: 1- Administration for Maritime Safety and Port Management, Bar, Montenegro (emails format: [email protected]) 2 - Division of Engineering, King’s College London, UK. 3 - Maritime Surveillance Section, GMV, Spain ([email protected]) 4 – Engineering I.I., S.p.A. Italy ([email protected]) 5 – Satways Ltd, Greece ([email protected]) 6 – CODIN Sp.A., Italy ([email protected]) 7 – Department of Basic and Applied Sciences for Engineering (SBAI), Sapienza, IT

20 I. INTRODUCTION international cooperation, especially the regional interconnections and in the domains of safe and secure deployed command and control The need to broaden regional maritime traffic, its overall surveillance, systems from maritime safety aspects; interconnections between maritime control and management. To this Section IV presents the AMSPM MARITIME SECURITY and land safety and security agencies end, there are many development involvement in the Adriatic-Ionian has been recognised by many EU and and investment projects which aim to trial through adapted regional CISE surrounding countries. This is especially foster integrated maritime surveillance network via special C2 software; triggered by various challenges facing and management efficiency of the finally in Section V we give concluding Europe at the beginning of the XXI governing administrative bodies. remarks. century. Contemporary EU states Some of these are: VTMIS in and agencies, being aware of various Montenegro and Albania, maritime II. CISE INITIATIVE AND NETWORK issues arising due to the exposure of transport connectivity projects for ARCHITECTURE its southern border, have launched South Adriatic countries (Italy- varous initiatives for interagency Montenegro-Albania), the introduction Originally, the CISE initiative was cooperation based on institutional of National Maritime Single outlined in European Commission network of responsible stakeholders. Window (NMSW) in Montenegro, documents and guidance as a These issues are maritime risks, etc ([1],[2],[3]). All these activities voluntarily connection network possible criminal threats (piracy, are directed towards digitalisation between relevant entities within same smuggling), massive illegal migrations, strategy implementation for creating or related competencies for common environmental issues (oil pollution), a sustainable and interoperable sharing of important information and illegal fishing etc. The aim is thus maritime business environment with according to the principle "sharing on to create an integrated framework the use of intelligent ICT in maritime a need-to-know and responsibility- programme with close cooperation clusters [4]. The current situation in to-share basis" subject to EU legal of public administrative bodies of the the introduction of advanced maritime provisions [9]. It is pointed out that regional countries in order to raise information technologies shows CISE is not a system, but rather a maritime safety and security level and that the Western Balkan region has connection platform/interfacing tool suppress the rate of adverse impacts significant potentials for connectivity between many different data sources of maritime events. with EU member states, which need to of EU agencies which, through their Among many initiatives for be further intensified in maritime safety individual legacy systems, established connectivity of maritime sectors of and surveillance domains coordination cooperation and communication regional countries, the most important based on VTMIS and NMSW ([2],[3]), related to the identified areas of and prominent one is the Common as well as through the full involvement mutual interest in a decentralised Information Sharing Environment of EU pre-accessing countries manner. This initiative has been (CISE). This initiative, complementarily (Montenegro) in CISE network and started in 2010, under the COM with the EUROSUR network, should stakeholders groups. Alongside , the (2009) 538 [9], which sets out the enhance the processes of international Administration for Maritime Safety guidance principles and a roadmap and inter-sectoral exchange of and Port Management of Montenegro for establishing a comprehensive information. The prioritised aim of the (AMSPM) partners in research environment for information sharing CISE is to protect maritime borders projects in the area of autonomous in the area of maritime surveillance. and distribute the information to other marine vehicles and UxVs disruptive Primarily, CISE roadmap document inter/national authorities based on technologies’ application as sea emphasises the need for generating several types of the CISE Data and surveilance assets ([5],[6]). situational awareness for events at Service models. Here we continue the analysis of the sea, by interconnecting the maritime Also, it is important to note that Adriatic possibility for extending the EU CISE safety and security, border control and – Ionian seas and countries gravitating network adaptations to AMSPM of defence, maritime environment and towards this region represent a Montenegro, which participates in EU transport in EU, and all this to facilitate strategically important segment of the project ANDROMEDA (Horizon2020) the decision making process using European maritime transport system, described in [7] and [8]. We also the improved, high level technology which need to be fully integrated review command and control functions readiness software solutions. into the networking initiatives of the augmentation over CISE. This paper Therefore, it is expected that full European Union. Therefore, countries unfolds as follows: in Section II we give multidisciplinary implementation of the of the Western Balkans, which also a more detailed overview of the CISE CISE initiative contributes with: include Montenegro, are taking initiative and the network architecture - widened Common proactive efforts for connectivity in the context of EU guidelines and Operational Picture (COP), schemes and programmes for better regulations; Section III considers - flexible information sharing

21 environment and protocols with inputs (one/several actors on consumer/ of necessary national/international Since the legacy system is the provider sides) have several patterns data, fundamental block of elements in the such as: pull (request for consuming - higher efficiency of EU CISE Network Hybrid Architecture, the the information from provider), push Member states authorities (from both next one should be a special CISE (providing an information to consumer civilian and military) integration, Adaptor which through its particular upon request), pull/push unknown - development of national communication protocol connects (for receiving/sending the information maritime (civil-military) safety and with a LS (e.g. VTMIS maritime data without exactly knowing the security coordination centres and its of AMSPM could be transferred via consumer/provider), publish/subscribe collaborations, Inter VTS Exchange Format – IVEF). (for continual sending/receiving - non-hierarchical framework It enables translations of LS data to information from/to consumer/ of interoperability, the CISE Data and Service Model provider), and, acknowledgements. - improved interoperability with and vice versa. Furthermore, the Depending on each country’s technical

MARITIME SECURITY EUROSUR, MARSUR, SafeSeaNet, connection between CISE Adaptor infrastructure and preferences, Maritime Security Programme and CISE Network is done by CISE the general CISE network could (MASE), etc. Node/Gateway (i.e. CISE compliant be established in the following - safety and security of software). Originally, the CISE Node organisational structures [12]: maritime transport, navigation, various was developed within EUCISE a. Direct connection to the CISE operations (including SAR) and events 2020 project, as a maritime test- Network (with own CISE Adaptor and at sea, bed for information sharing founded CISE Node), - risk management and crisis in the frame of pre-operational FP7 b. Direct connection to the CISE response, as well as, Programme. This block is responsible Network using a shared CISE Node - Cost effectiveness. for decentralised management of (two or more Adaptors through one Further to these guidelines, the messages obtained by partners’ Node), general CISE network (Figure 1), LS via the CISE Adaptor and its c. Connection through National as a transmission tool for point-to- distribution to the CISE network. It Node (LS connected to one national point data transfers. It should be performs communication services Node, connected to one Adaptor based on multi-layered platform able (core, common and advanced) and following CISE Node to CISE to exchange and distribute relevant based on CISE Data and Services Network), information collected from various, model, which enable technical and d. Connection through a often different operational systems semantic interoperability among the Regional/European CISE Node. and data sensors of user communities. CISE stakeholders. Thus, the node It is designed by envisaging a technical does not store information, it is only III. REGIONAL INTERCONNECTION framework with already existing ICT a distributor of allowed information, BASED ON MARITIME COMMAND Legacy Systems (LS) (e.g. VTMIS, which are mostly located in LS or AND CONTROL SYSTEMS NMSW, C2/C3i, Radar, VMS, UxV, in the CISE Adaptor, depending on electro-optical and security systems, implementation of sharing actions by a A. Initiative for regional connections in and other surveillance assets) in user CISE Participant. Also, the CISE Nodes CISE network organisations on an interoperable and its software components (e.g. base for sharing certain data types’ Apache ActiveMQ, HSQL Database, As already suggested, EU Member content. This integration process Jboss, Wildfly, Nagios, Docker, states in the CISE network should will establish the comprehensive database servers, etc) communicate ensure the interoperability between ‘maritime situational awareness’ through VPN using the means of sectoral information exchange onto surveillance and security with Internet transport and IPSEC for systems at the national and EU improved early warning and facilitation securing all the information distributed levels (based upon the principles of of timely responses at sea, and, among CISE network participants collaboration and cooperation and by having a regard for regional priorities [12]. The communications between establishing protocols, authorisations ([10],[11]). participants in the CISE network and protections), in line with the European Interoperability Reference Architecture [10]. Following this recommendation, we emphasise the importance of close or neighbouring- to-EU regional interconnections based on CISE benefits and strategy. Also, the possibilities to make a small

22 regional CISE node for stronger to manage the delivery of the CISE surveillance in Montenegro, appointed collaborations between countries that services. In this case, Member State as a single CISE provider, could be share the same sea area, and, for has a single authority provider of an anchor point for CISE data and jointly exploiting the potentials of CISE the CISE services, which can also services transfer to other national MARITIME SECURITY should be further explored. According be provided by EU led initiatives. authorities. Furthermore, the CISE the proposed variants of involvement Therefore, a single integrated maritime messages would be distributed to the within the CISE network, special awareness picture can be offered per Adriatic-Ionian Regional Node which attention should be paid to option d, Member State, which comprehends all will, through CISE Adaptors , exchange that considers using the Regional/ other sectors such as border control, the information with the CISE Node(s) European Node and/or proxy owned defence, marine pollution, customs, and Network, subsequently. This external CISE Node to connect to fisheries, law enforcement [13] (Figure proposal is assumed to positively the CISE Network (e.g. AMSPM can 3). impact CISE connections between be a gateway for connection to CISE the regional maritime authorities and Network through an external EU Following this approach and proposing their equal participation in the CISE partner) (discussed in [7]) (Figure 2). the extension of CISE clusters to stakeholders group to make CISE initiative fully operational as planned by the European Commission. Therefore, by implementing this CISE extension through EU investments and research projects supported by JRC, EMSA, FRONTEX and software technical partners, the participating Adriatic countries will fruit many advantages of CISE Network. The most important benefits here would be maritime domain safety and border security integrations based on new ICT technologies with augmented C2, From the aspect of CISE Node EU neighbouring and accessing Data Fusion, Analytics and Decision organisation and based on the regions (e.g. Adriatic-Ionian east- Making capabilities, and cyber security previous organisational structure, coast countries, and particularly, as well. there have been defined several Montenegro), the most optimal visions of CISE architecture (A, B, solution would be designing a hybrid B. C2 systems exploitation in regional C, and hybrid) and integrations with CISE connection, based on agreed agencies integrations – Maritime national authorities. Among these combination of abovementioned Safety aspects visions, and based on the user needs options b and d for Regional Node, investigation, the most IT sustainable, approximated to Model 4 (National After determining the maritime CISE cost-effective and wide coverable one, Single node connected to Regional/ network and operational objectives and is the Vision C (corresponding with EU Adriatic CISE Node) in [14]. In seting up the necessary infrastructure structure b in II section). It proposes a this case, AMSPM, as a National components in the particular regions, governance model with each Member Competent Authority (NCA) for the next step is designing the software State’s appointed single authority maritime safety and marine traffic solutions. This shall comprise the highly developed interfaces for visibility of communication and information sharing among providers with various data sources. To this end, under the use cases defined by maritime agencies and their operational requirements, the special multi- layered platforms in the form of C2 systems are installed and operated by Coordination Centres of CISE Member states. These C2 systems, based on the CISE architecture guidance and interoperability principles, contain

23 all provided functions for timely, and tend to foster research results accurate, comprehensive and cyber- - quick response to dynamic implememtations and organisational secured information sharing. This safety threats and risks by exchanging efforts towards preparations for enables the COP to be seen by all relevant information with security future involvement in the CISE linked national and EU institutions/ sector. Stakeholder Group, implementation of entities participating in CISE regional/ Considering the CISE architecture and the CISE network, NMSW and other EU network. Therefore, the main its regional extension, C2 systems (if relevant maritime surveillance assets objective of C2 development is to they are not considered as existing development. Specifically, AMSPM enable all responsible authorities to LS) could be positioned in a design is involved in the ANDROMEDA have joint access to the CISE Network between already existing LS – Data project consortium within its end-users which functions as data hub adapted Sources, and CISE Network Adaptors. group, with key contributions in user for retrieval/sharing of relevant Thus, a C2 receives data from another requirements, testing and validation information, visible by a web/installed LS via CISE features and processes of the CISE trials (Figure 4). In the

MARITIME SECURITY application, and to exchange sensitive this data by using its own system ANDROMEDA project, the followed cyber data, services and information resources such as Data Fusion (DF) design was NATO Architectural Frame they need for various missions at sea and DST for completion of a maritime NAFv3 ([19],[20]). Furthermore, the ([15],[16]). awareness picture and according to integrated C2 capabilities in this Primarily, every C2 programme the entities modelled in CISE Data and project comprehended data collection has a military background since Services Model Architecture. (geodata, tracks video), their fusion, they were developed to enable the analysis (e.g. vessel abnormal defence and security organisations to IV. MONTENEGRO CASE STUDY behaviour, rule engine), dissemination manage various tactical and strategic (e.g. by terrain and feature streaming, operations on sea or land and share Administration for Maritime Safety and EUCISE), decision making process the information with strategically Port Management of Montenegro is and missions planning as well. important partners [17]. Therefore, NCA for: maritime traffic surveillance the C2 information exchange systems (with management of VTMIS), SAR, A. CISE Trials implementation should firstly satisfy the criteria of environmental protection as well interoperability, for instance with as aids in navigation maintenance. An enhanced CISE Data and Services EUROSUR (owned by FRONTEX) and Montenegro, over AMSPM, is part of model (e-CISE v2.2.0) deployed in MARSUR (owned by EDA). Following EU LRIT Data Centre, CleanSeaNet, the ANDROMEDA project relies on these features of cooperation in AIS/MAREΣ (for communication with the original CISE model of maritime maritime security domain, the EU and EMSA) and IMS (Integrated domain entities (such as objects, exploitation of C2 programmes is Maritime Services). Despite location, agent, risks, document, also intrinsic in maritime safety and Montenegro’s EU candidate status, event, period) with extended scope traffic surveillance, environmental there are many related important to land domain surveillance objects protection areas as well, in order to projects in the pre-accession and relevant entities exchange. fully connect all relevant sectors into schemes, out of which the most Particularly, AMSPM (using Socrates one COP monitored by maritime safety important ones, under the AMSPM C2 developed by GMV) being included authorities. responsibilities, are: IPA II and in the Adriatic-Ionian Maritime Border The C2 software, deployed in growing EUREKA (IPA ADRION Project); the Trial executed in March 2021, and maritime safety applications, generate CISE based ones like ANDROMEDA together with Italian Navy – ITN a high quality real-time maritime (www.andromeda-project.eu), (pivotal (using SMART C2 developed by situational picture comprehending the project for Montenegro since it is not a Engineering Ingegneria Informatica following: member of CISE Stakeholder Group), Sp.A. Company), Hellenic Navy – - enhanced Search-and- and EFFECTOR (www.effector- HN and Coast Guard – HCG (using Rescue (SAR) functions compliant project.eu); RESPOND-A (www. ENGAGE C2 developed by SATWAYS with GMDSS, respond-a-project.eu), related to SAR Ltd.), validated only maritime use - adequate maritime traffic equipment and AR training; ePIcenter cases and e-CISE model part related surveillance (by using integrated (www.epicenterproject.eu), partly for to SAR, maritime safety, surveillance sensors & external systems), NMSW; and the very significant one and missions. The important feature - appreciation of tactical COMPASS2020 (www.compass2020- of AMSPM’s involvement in the situation based on novel decision project.eu) (Horizon2020), which deals ANDROMEDA network system is the support tools (DST) design, which with persistent maritime surveillance connection to CISE by proxying the enables MRCC and VTS services to assets together with deployment of institution’s LS as data sources over persistently control responsibility area UxVs ([5], [6],[18]). These projects SOCRATES C2 and Data Fusion

24 the scenarios that are incorporated in the Trial implementation, as follows in Table 1 and Figure 5. MARITIME SECURITY Table 1. Tested operational scenarios in Adriatic-Ionian Trial

SAR #1 - Detection of vessel near Montenegro coast. - Identification of vessel emergency status and sharing the alert from AMSPM Socrates C2 to ITN, HN, HCG. - AMSPM defines a mission with tasks and sources and shares it to HN, HCG. - Generating and sharing the Report on Mission finished. platform, provided and operated entirely compliant to the e-CISE Data SAR #2 by GMV, Spain (www.gmv.com/en/ and Services Model with a high level - Detection of vessel near Greek Products/socrates/) through specific of efficiency and interoperability with Ionian coast with emergency alarm on MSD IVEF-to-CISE Adaptor. other C2 programmes, EUCISE, ENGAGE. and other EU initiatives related to - HN creates a track with loitering rule In detail, SOCRATES DF Services maritime surveillance. The structure and sharing to AMSPM, HCG and ITN. by GMV consist of a JDL Level 1 of this C2 is built by several function - HN defines a SAR mission with fusion as the first step in converting blocks optimally connected into rescue teams. a large amount of received data into the ANDROMEDA network, able to - AMSPM receives the mission to useful information. The JDL Level perform and monitor all maritime use coordinate, generates the Report and 2, is the Triton Behaviour Analysis cases, satisfy user requirements and shares it with HN. Service designed to be tailored by the provide various mission planning Smuggling operator through a set of rules that capabilities based on integrated assets - METOC data displyed by AMSPM to can be configured and customised. and operational systems. Information check the favourable position for HT This customisation is done by the sharing process management in activity in Adriatic sea. Rule Definitions Management Service SOCRATES is enabled by several - ITN sends Pull Request with MMSI providing further flexibility, and command functions. number to HN and shares the target/ modifying the parameters of a series All these capabilities were used to test anomaly with AMSPM. of predefined rules [21]. Concerning Fig.4 SOCRATES is interrelated to ANDROMEDA Hub through the Rest Web Service, the relation with Video Streaming is set over a UDP server, while the relation with Gateway DF, Triton and Adaptor Data Sources from AMSPM is set over a Kafka Server meaning that messages from AMSPM LS to SOCRATES are distributed via the Kafka Message Bus. SOCRATES C2 has a very user- friendly graphical interface and facilitates many advantages for information exchanges in the maritime safety and security domains, as proved during extended validation and Figure 5. Displays of C2 used in Adriatic-Ionian trial implementation of defined SAR #1 testing periods. SOCRATES provides and #2 operational scenarios (SOCRATES upper left, SMART upper right, ENGAGE an interactive environment down centred) (Source: Own. Screenshots were taken during Trial performance)

25 - SOCRATES operator creates rules, Regarding the Behaviour Management (NATO) level. Two core capabilities of alerts with geometry and WKTs for two tab, an operator can create a new rule, SMART are: the System Chart through vessels edit the area and relevant parameters, which the system provides the ability - HN sends media video RFI to launch the monitoring on the map to visualize the related RMP and the AMSPM which requests video and push the anomalies to selected Data acquisition and redistribution. By streaming, shows it, stores and reverts receivers. The most crucial feature of means of this capability the system it to HN. SOCRATES is mission management can acquire and redistribute data Illegal fishing with the coordination of scheduled according to a number of different - Defined WKT area for illegal fishing tasks in defined areas. An operator application protocols like AIS series in Adriatic sea by ITN. can manage the resource layer with messages (only Input), OTH Gold, - Identification of vessel performing the assets (e.g. SAR boats, aircrafts, XCTC, Locator, SISTRAM. Through fishing in the forbidden area. MRCC/NCC), create tasks with WKT the Smart Agent capability, SMART Generated anomaly shared with (Well-known text representation of allows ITN to create rules for observing

MARITIME SECURITY AMSPM and HCG for taking action. coordinate reference systems) area and understanding Maritime Abnormal - ITN sends the anomaly through located scenarios and handle Request behaviors. In particular the capability ECISE to CISE Adaptor (ECCA) to for Information. Smart Agents and Watchdogs consists HCG, which creates incident report Further to the involved C2, in the of a series of pre-set rules according and assigns patrol boat. Adriatic-Ionian trial SMART and to which the system reacts with Human Trafficking ESSG engines have been used as predetermined actions/alerts. - Anomaly generated for two suspicious well. SMART C2 is an informative In the specific case of the Adriatic- vessels near Otranto. Shared by ITN system realised by Engineering Ionian Trial, SMART has been to HN and HCG. Track is marked and Ingegneria Informatica for the Italian integrated with the ESSG data fusion monitored. Navy with the aim to gather, process service developed by CODIN to - AMSPM receives the anomaly and and deploy the data concerning the discover divergent behaviours at sea report and generates a route prediction maritime traffic and detect anomalies. and detect anomalies by applying using Socrates C2. SMART provides the means for an Artificial Intelligence. ESSG Heuristic Simulations effective understanding of all activities Engine is a JDL level 2 DF. The - Simulation services from CMCC carried out at sea that could impact core of the engine consists of an AI provider have been tested within each the security, safety, economy or modules dedicated to identify and scenarios steps where defined. environment of the nation. classify anomalies of all vessels in a - Drifting (OCEAN-SAR) It provides the users with: given area. Precise use of AI is crucial - Ship Navigation optimal route (VISIR) • a comprehensive maritime to define anomalies rigorously even - Weather conditions and current sea operational picture, based on networks without a prior definition of the static state (METOC) of sensors sites and centres (local, rules. With this goal, four classes regional, etc…), of anomalies have been defined. • integration of data acquired Three of them are defined through a Besides a comprehensive dashboard from a number of heterogeneous Deep Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) with monitored statistical information, organisations, [22]: Abnormal behavior is derived ANDROMEDA messages registers/ • full coverage of the area from the VAE reconstruction error, logs and standard map screen, of interest with a wide choice of i.e. the reconstructed behavior is far SOCRATES further provides a platforms (coastal, airborne, satellite, from what the VAE learned during common set of generic capabilities etc.) depending on operational the training phase; Divergent and regarding surveillance, mission requirements, Unstable behaviors are defined over planning, tasking and reporting. • correlation with intelligence the variation of cluster classification An operator using SOCRATES has data, over the time in the space of codes of the possibility to share entities in • abnormal behavior detection VAE. A cluster on the space of codes two modes. The simplest one is to support operators, improves data aggregation based on to mark the vessel and share it by • integration of assets (patrol features with high nonlinearity [23]. selecting the available receivers boats, helicopters, aircrafts, etc.), The fourth class of ESSG anomaly from the ANDROMEDA network. For • improved resource allocation is the Incongruous one, i.e. a vessel continually sharing the same entity, for greater efficiency and cost savings. that is performing a behavior far it uses the sharing service tab by In particular, the SMART System from the expected one depending on entering the relevant parameters in the receives information from a number the declared type. This anomaly is Sharing Service Editor and the partner of external systems, both at a national generated by a deep Long Short-Term to whom the information is pushed. (NAVY, Coast Guard) and international Memory [24] trained on kinematic

26 features. The most difficult task during VISIR, WITOIL, METOC) provided and features, further developments the implementation and training of AI is by Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui market/economical implications, C2 the general lack of information and the Cambiamenti Climatici Lecce (CMCC) and regional authorities cooperation sensibility of the models to the quality for the global data fusion to enable the implications as well. MARITIME SECURITY of AIS data in the input. To improve simulations for drifting, optimal routing The technical part of the evaluation the stability of the AI modules, ESSG and meteorological predictions, consisted of confirming the features has been equipped with a series of through the ANDROMEDA Network and capabilities of the structural filters and interpolation algorithms e-CISE adapter. Particularly, OCEAN- elements of the ANDROMEDA software to regularize data. The application SAR is a service provided to support solutions and numeric identification of of previously defined anomalies is a maritime authorities and operational some relevant information exchanges, direct consequence of their definition. centres during search-and-rescue used tools, and actions taken in the In particular, the prediction of the operations, while the VISIR is a service trial scenarios implementation. All the vessel class type from the vessel providing optimized nautical routes in questions were structured according to behavior is directly applied to detect the Mediterranean Sea. the Key Performance Areas (Figure 6) illegal fishing activities; the occurrence and Indicators which were concerned of two almost simultaneous instabilities B. Trial Results about: in a very small area is symptomatic of I. The Architecture (ANDROMEDA a possible smuggling activity. The aim of this trial is to demonstrate C2s and user/role management, To ensure proper neighbourhood interoperability of included C2s with sensors, DF and DSP services, open coverage of the Ionian-Adriatic ANDROMEDA Hub network based on standards, SOA, AEDP-19 standards Seas, the Hellenic Navy and Hellenic e-CISE Model with the evaluation of compliance, and connectivity); Coast Guard were involved using the defined Key Performance Indicators II. e-CISE Data Model, Interoperability ENGAGE BME system developed by and Measures of Effectiveness of and Information sharing; SATWAYS Ltd and deployed each at project solutions. III. Maritime and Land C2, which their premises. The ENGAGE BME After the trial completion, several examined the application, GUI, was connected to other participating surveys have been launched to get surveillance and tracking the objects, agencies using the ANDROMEDA more information from end-users management of tasks, missions Hub (eCISE) to exchange Missions, related to general survey for the project planning, resources, reports/ Intelligence Reports (video, pdf, text) User Community, e-CISE Data Model, documents/video (live stream), and vessels of interest. The ENGAGE BME also made use an improved Triton [25] service and SOCRATES DF for anomalous behaviour detection and fusion respectively. The Triton service processes data in real-time (vessels (from any source), land vehicles or persons) and provides a fast response for any suspected behaviours. Rules are configured by the operator in both maritime and land domains to detect over 30 suspicious behaviours and sent them to Triton. Ancillary databases are also used such as weather, vessel routes and vessel information stores to provide additional input when determining whether the behaviour of general Architecture of the system, anomalies, and incidents; an object matches a certain pattern. It ANDROMEDA Land and Maritime supports also the combination of rules, C2, and survey for Data Fusion and e.g. abnormal course change and AIS Decision Support Tool. IV. Data Fusion and Decision Support signal lost. Alerts can be triggered if Regarding the survey for User Tools, comprising detection of objects, one of rules are triggered or only when Community, there have been collected anomalies, and events, definition of both are triggered. inputs and estimations about the main behavior Rules (provided by real- Finally, the added value to the whole advantages of ANDROMEDA, its time Triton DF Engine developed trial comprehended the significant efficiency in land/maritime surveillance by SATWAYS Ltd. company and by Decision Support Tools (OCEAN-SAR, challenges facing, missing capabilities the real-time ESSG Heuristic Engine

27 developed in CODIN SpA), tools of Montenegro showed great EU maritime information data base, for predictions and decision making potential for involvement in regional hence, strengthening the relations processes (provided by CMCC). The cooperations with maritime authorities between regional states. special examination part concerned and information exchange based on the ethics and legal evaluation of the the CISE and particlarly with tested ACKNOWLEDGMENT Adriatic-Ionian Trial. e-CISE model in order to contribute to increasing maritime safety and This work has received funding from V. CONCLUSION security levels in the Adriatic Sea. the European Union’s Horizon 2020 The trial realisation proved successful Research and Innovation Programme Having in mind that the Adriatic- cooperation and connectivity based under Grant Agreement No 833881 Ionian region is quite a sensitive area on C2 software which implies that (project ANDROMEDA). This article since it suffers from intensive illicit augmenting these functions contributes reflects only the author’s views and the flow routes and smuggling, there is a to regional CISE interoperability goals. Research Executive Agency (REA) is

MARITIME SECURITY need to fully integrate this maritime Both Montenegro and the EU have not responsible for any use that may and land area into the CISE network mutual benefit from collaborating in be made of the information it contains. using the advanced command and this strategic area since AMSPM, control systems. Participating in by inclusion in the EU CISE, would the project ANDROMEDA, AMSPM provide significant accomplishment of

AUTHOR Mr Zdravko Paladin holds Spec.Sci of Maritime Transport degree from Maritime Faculty of Kotor, University of Montenegro and from 2018 he holds MSc diploma in Marine Sciences, graduated as one of the best students at this faculty. He accomplished the internship at Maritime Faculty and has worked in EU projects implementation, HERIC-INVO project as a consultant. From 2019, he works as a project team member and assistant on EU Horizon2020 projects ANDROMEDA and EFFECTOR at Administration for Maritime Safety and Port Management of Montenegro. Also, he has attended training courses related to maritime safety, management and smart ICT technologies in maritime business and transport. His researcher interests are maritime surveillance and safety, CISE, smart marine transporta- tion means and technologies.

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Monteiro, “Towards Augmenting Maritime Surveillance Capabilities via Deployments of Unmanned Aircrafts and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles”, paper published within EU Horizon 2020 project COMPASS2020 (No.833650), 14th NATO OR&A Conference, October, 2020. [19] ANDROMEDA PROJECT Deliverable D3.1 “D.3.1 e-CISE Data Model description”, Public deliverable, 2020, https://www. andromeda-project.eu/downloads/index.html [20] ASTER s.pa. Guidelines for the Development of Architectures Compliant to NAFv3, 2013. [21] ANDROMEDA EU Project - “An EnhaNceD Common InfoRmatiOn Sharing EnvironMent for BordEr CommanD, Control and CoordinAtion Systems”, Grant agreement ID: 833881, 2019-2021 https://www.andromeda-project.eu/ [22] M. Johnson, D. K. Duvenaud, A. Wiltschko, R. P. Adams, S. R. Datta, “Composing graphical models with neural networks for structured representations and fast inference”. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2946–2954, 2016. [23] J. Xie, R. Girshick, A. Farhadi, “Unsupervised Deep Embedding for Clustering Analysis”, Arxiv.org, https://arxiv.org/ abs/1511.06335 [24] X. Jiang, X. Liu, E. N. de Souza, B. Hu, D. L. Silver, and S. Matwin. Improving point-based ais trajectory clas- sification with partition-wise gatedrecurrent units. In 2017 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks(IJCNN), 4044–4051, 2017. [25] M. Tsogas, P. Parthymos, M. Moutzouris, N.Patlakas, G.Karagiannis, A.Kostaridis, D.Diagourtas, “A Geospatial Complex Event Processing Engine for Abnormal Vessel Behavior Detection Suitable for Maritime Surveillance”, Maritime Situational Aware- ness Workshop 2019, La Spezia Italy, 8-10 October 2019.

29 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference Speakers’ Inputs

The 12th Annual NMIOTC Conference «Opportunities and threats from Innovative and Disruptive technologies: Shaping the future of Security in the Maritime Domain» was held on June 1-2, 2021 at the NMIOTC in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece. In the beginning Commodore Charalampos THYMIS, the NMIOTC Commandant, welcomed the attendees. This year was another unique experience because COVID kept many of the speakers and participants from attending physically the conference. However, the conference that was conducted in blended mode, with in-person and virtual participation, still presented speakers that delivered valuable knowledge and information about emerging disruptive technology that is necessary for maritime security challenges. Wendi O. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel U.S. , provided this report. (email: [email protected]).

MARITIME SECURITY June 1, 2021 –Keynote Speeches Effective military capabilities can take decades to re- search, develop, procure, field and integrate. But new Keynote Speaker: Rene TAS threats can emerge with little warning. To address this im- ACOS Capabilities in Headquarters SACT Norfolk balance, European militaries, and the European Defense Agency (EDA) must plan ahead to anticipate future capa- We are leaving in a very transformational time and the bilities needs and adapt to the fast pace of change in the speed of the change has been increasing in the last de- technology and threat environments. cades with big impact in our profession as war fighters. This is especially true in the maritime domain, where in- U.S. Government Accountability Office states four broad novative technology, such as Artificial Intelligence and categories for emerging threats: unmanned systems, are pushing us to re-evaluate and • Adversaries Political and Military Advancements rethink doctrines and strategies that have been in place - Chinese Global Expansion, Russian Global Expansion, since the advent of the modern naval warfare. It is very Iranian Political and Military Developments, North Korean important for NATO to be at the forefront of this path. Military Developments NATO has many future programs in place that will enable - Foreign Government Capacity and Stability the Alliance to stay one step ahead in the coming years. - Terrorism One example is the Dynamic Messenger exercise that is - New Alliances and Adversaries an unmanned system exercise planned for 2022 that will • Dual-Use Technologies be a large-scale test to demonstrate unmanned systems - Artificial Technologies capabilities in the maritime domain and in operational en- - Quantum Information Science vironment. NATO must be prepared for the involvement of - Internet of Things new technologies in warfare, including in congested water - Autonomous and Unmanned Systems environment. Our adversaries are planning to challenge - Biotechnology us in all domains and we must be prepared to fight in such - Other Emerging Technologies multidomain scenario. As we deepen the discussion of • Weapons this topic, everyone will be mindful on how much new and - Weapons of Mass Destruction disruptive technology will impact our work in the maritime - Electronic Warfare, Hypersonic Weapons, Counter- domain now and in the years to come and also on how we, space Weapons, Undersea Weapons, Cyber Weapons as the Leadership of the NATO maritime enterprise, are - Missiles entrusted by all nations to ensure the Alliance remains the - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Plat- global leader in innovation. By doing so we will continue to forms provide free and safe use of the seas to all our nations, so - Aircraft that prosperity can be maintained and achieved as it has • Event and Demographic Changes been since the founding of the Alliance over 70 years ago. - Infectious Diseases - Climate Change Keynote Speaker: Vice Admiral Manuel Martinez, - Internal and International Migration Director for Engineer and Naval Shipbuilding at Divi- From Spain’s Navy sion de Planes del Estado Mayor de la Armada • Several Enabling Technologies: Title: New Challenges and Technologies for current - Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, Nano Tech- and future Spain Navy Warships nology - Cloud Computing

30 - Unmanned Vehicles, Robotics • New Battlefield Spain Navy Project 4E - Cyber Space 4E is envisioned as block of “technological projects” to - Cognitive Space (IW) develop capabilities to be included in a number of differ- MARITIME SECURITY - Legitimate Battlefield ent future European combat escorts which will be built by - Public Opinion Battle Space European Industry. • New Weapons - Hypersonic Weapons The three technological projects are: - New Generation of Submarines • AAW Destroyer 7000T - UXVs • ASW Frigate 6000T - Cyber Attacks • Multipurpose Frigate 4000T • New Framework – New Scenarios - No declared enemies Keynote Speaker: Brigadier General Davide Re - No governance Italian Air Force, NATO Strategic Direction – South - Open to (NSD-S) HUB Director - A variety of missions Title: Opportunities and threats from innovative and - Very Different Stakeholders disruptive technologies: Shaping the future of secu- - Disruptive Tech rity in the Maritime domain - Open information NSD-S Hub Mission - Technology is available to everyone Be a Virtual Docking Station that shares comprehensive - Reduction of development cycle information sharing, anticipates threats and challenges (Horizon Scanning), and identifies opportunities in the as- signed area of interest with a wide variety of International/ Regional actors. NSD-S Hub Vision A focal point for NATO to interact and cooperate with rel- evant Actors, integrate the regional perspective into NATO mindset, and assist Partners to contribute to projecting se- curity and stability. Innovative technologies are necessary, because of the complexity of modern society fast evolving dynamics among which the growing dependence on technology and “internet of things”. Just as a mere reference and example, 97% of internet traffic and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions pass through 1.2 million km under-sea cables: this means that everyone of us may be affected and victim of potential cyber-crimes, also in remote locations. How innovative disruptive technologies impact Africa and the Middle East • Technological change has been even more transforma- tive and disruptive for the global South than for Europe and North America. • Waterways in the Middle East could easily become chokepoints and secure maritime domain maximizes the gains for Africa. • Understanding technological innovation is necessary to secure the maritime environment.

Dynamics of the Horn of Africa (HoA) • HoA hosts 1/3 of African population and attracts many Global Powers striving to control its natural resources and trade routes (10% of world global trades). • International disputes, instability areas, unemployment and marginalization as promoters of VEOs and foreign ter-

31 rorist networks. Summary of CIAT & GIOS Results • Maritime security and thorough understanding of main drivers of instability is key to protect the routes crossing the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. • International cooperation and dialogue to ensure Free- dom of Navigation from Bab al Mandab to the Suez Canal.

Energy Security Recent history has shown how fundamental is the protec- tion of Critical National Infrastructures in a wide array of evolving challenges and threats (e.g., weaponized drones, cyber-attacks, malwares, etc.) • Attacks on Infrastructures & Routes:

MARITIME SECURITY - Chokepoints (supply disruption) - Kinetic Attack (vulnerable targets) - Cyber Attack (increasing digitalization) • Deniability Strategy: - Use of non-State Actors/Proxies - Cyber Domain Anonymity Lecture: EU Coordinated Maritime Presences: Where do we stand and what’s next NSD-S Conclusion: Captain (Navy) Stathis KYRIAKIDIS (EL N), Head of Foster HUB network to better understand potential risks Division OPS Coordination, European Union Military and possible opportunities with selected International/Re- Staff, Deputy Director of the EU Maritime Area of gional Actors through mutual respect and with an African Interest Coordination Cell (MAICC) and Middle-Eastern point of view. Focal point for NATO on different Areas of cooperation to EU Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept: enable support to Partners and to Non-NATO Partners in • It is complementary to the EU Maritime Security Opera- projecting security and stability. tions Only a joint coordinated effort is key to enhance under- • It creates new opportunities to enhance EU presence standing of EDTs capabilities, while exploring viable so- beyond the ongoing CSDP operations lutions, possible applications and trustful cooperation to • It maximum benefits from the EU M-S’ naval presences tackle together today and tomorrow’s threats and chal- around the globe lenges. • It does not affect the EU’s ability to launch a CSDP Op- eration Keynote Speaker: Rear Admiral Jean-Michel Martinet, • The military assets remain under national OPCON Deputy Operation Commander of EUNAVFOR MED Operation “IRINI” The role of the EU CMP Maritime Area of Interest Coordi- Title: European Naval Forces in the Mediterranean - nation Cell (MAICC): Operation IRINI • It collects situational awareness information based –

mainly - on the parent OHQs’ reports and open sources Core Task: Countering Illicit Arms Trafficking (CIAT) • It analyses and disseminates strategic assessments, UN Security Council Resolutions: within the EU M-S • UNSCR 1970 (2011) – Establishing the Arms embargo • It establishes relations with maritime partners • UNSCR 2292 (2016) – Authorizing boardings and diver- • It is not a Maritime Operations Centre (no shift rotation) sions • UNSCR 2578 (2021) – Extending UNSCR 2292 man- Lecture: Dilemmas of Deterrence in an Era of Emerg- date up to 3 June 2022 ing Destructive Technologies Secondary Tasks: Professor James Henry Bergeron, Political Advisor • Gathering Information Oil Smuggling: UNSCR 2146 to the Commander Allied Maritime Command (2014), UNSCR 2362 (2017), UNSCR 2509 (2020), UN- SCR 2571 (2021), Does Emerging Destructive Technologies undermine or • Contribution to the Human Smugglers Business Model stabilize our ability of deterrence? Some scholars see disruption Emerging Destructive Technologies as stabilizing while • Training and Monitoring LCG & N others view it as destabilizing.

32 Three things to consider when using deterrence: Despite the negative applications that may disrupt sea- • Mutual sphere of activity ward trade, innovative technologies are a must for the, • Requires knowledge of adversary capabilities environmentally friendly, development of the supply chain. • Requires specific parameters of time MARITIME SECURITY Lecture: Commercial and military use of unmanned/ Lecture: Innovation technologies in the Italian Navy autonomous vehicles in the light of hybrid threat – the future combat naval system in the 2035 multi- Commander Georgios Giannoulis, Hybrid Center of domain operation Excellence Captain Marco Casapieri, Chief of Space Section of the Italian Navy General Staff There are 4 degrees of autonomy • Ships with automated processes and decision support. Starting from 2020, ITN created the Technological Innova- • Manned but remotely controlled ships. tion Network, led by the General Staff, which connects all • Unmanned and remotely controlled ships. the Technical Centers of the Navy and oversees the ITN • Fully autonomous ships. main technological areas of interest in which it is strategi- cal to achieve/maintain a competitive advantage (under- Advantages of Unmanned/ Autonomous Marine Vehicles water, AI, Quantum, Robotics, Autonomy, sensors and • Operating for prolonged period of time without burdening weapons against the hyper-sonic threat, air-independent and endangering crew personnel. energy sources and technologies related to space do- • Can support various missions, ranging from recreational main). and commercial uses to those of militaries The Future Combat Naval System 2035 project is based • Minimize operational costs for shipping companies (in- on macro capabilities drawn from these technological creased cargo capacity due to absence of accommoda- areas of interest, encompassed in a specific operational tion spaces, decrease of fuel consumption by incorporat- framework. ing green power, savings from crew salaries) The FCNS35 macro capabilities are declined by the op- • Military applications erational environments (Surface, Underwater, Air, Litto- - minimize the casualties in case of war conflict ral, Space) or identified by their transversal effects (Un- - Force multiplier in the battlefield, manned Systems, Multi Domain C2, Enhanced Maritime - Perform different types of operations (ISR, AAW, ASW, Situational Awareness, Harbour and critical infrastructure ASuW), protection, Key Enablers). - Operate without any limitations in NBC environment. - Offer high level of stealth characteristics and difficulties in attribution, key ingredient for hybrid campaign - Are ideal for a hybrid actor in controlling the escalation level in low-intense conflicts

Challenges of Unmanned/ Autonomous Marine Vehicles • Outdated or missing regulatory framework • Possible absence of human decision-making process • Vulnerable to cyber attacks • Congested information to be processed from multiple sensors can lead to serious failure

Lecture: Modern technological threats from a ship- owner’s perspective Lecture: Windward’s Predictive Intelligence Plat- Dr. George Pateras, Hellenic Shipping Chamber form. A maritime AI platform to manage all maritime domain awareness and intelligence needs. Technological challenges in the maritime industry Mr. Dror Salzman, Windward Intelligence Research • Communication/”Big Data Transfer”. Developing the ef- Manager fective means to pass info to the end user. • Detection of GPS navigation system jamming attempts. Deceptive Shipping Practices: • Creating backups for cyber attack cases. • AIS Handshake • Variations on how necessary autonomous ships are and • Global Navigation System Manipulation whether they are worth the risks. • Insurance exclusions for computer viruses. Windward supports operational missions and intelligence analysis with Maritime AI to critical organizations.

33 • Maritime Intelligence to-staff exchanges were the main mechanism in the ad- • Law Enforcement vancement of EU-NATO relations, albeit relevant structur- • Defense al initiatives such as the establishment of the CoE Hybrid. Informal, ad hoc, and sectoral initiatives are positive, yet Lecture: EU-NATO Cooperation in Maritime Situ- they should be regarded as steps towards a structured ational Awareness: Advancements and Limitations and comprehensive relation, where informality and ad hoc Mr. Joao Almeida Silveira, Independent Policy Ana- solution plays a role, but not a central one. Thereby, the lyst, Research at Portuguese Institute of International full potential of EU-NATO cooperation remains to be un- Relations (IPRI) leashed.

Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) is an essential Lecture: A Simulation of Training Platform for Un- maritime security task. The task has become more chal- manned Surface Vehicles lenging in the last decades because of the global prolifera- Dr. Chrissavgi Dre, Deputy Director New Technolo-

MARITIME SECURITY tion and intensification of activities, actors, and interests gies, Intracom Defence at sea. Dr. Ioannis Dagres, Senior Engineer, Intracom De- Aware of the challenge, the EU and NATO have been de- fence veloping efforts in streamlining institutional responses, as well as in improving doctrines and instruments to enhance Intracom Defence Situational Awareness MSA. The efforts included autonomous actions, as well • Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) will be a key com- as activities within the framework of their strategic part- ponent of naval operations in the future, especially for nership, particularly after the Warsaw Summit of 2016. countries like Greece. At Warsaw, within a broader movement to deepen their • Modern USVs demonstrate high performance, autonomy, strategic partnership, the EU and NATO committed to the robustness, reliability, data/communications, interoper- improvement of interinstitutional cooperation in several ar- ability, mission versatility. Furthermore, they are designed eas linked with MSA, including in coordination, information for safety, easy deployment, operation and maintenance. sharing, and lessons learned6. • Simulation and training platforms can play a key role in MSA is a process that blends civilian and military as well the design of robust sea vehicles as they reduce time and as public and private inputs to achieve an accurate picture cost for design testing and sea-trials. of the maritime domain. • A novel simulation and training platform for the design of As a process MSA involves four main interconnected and Unmanned Surface Vehicles is presented. indissociable elements: Products Surveillance and Data Collection • Communication Systems • Maritime Surveillance • Missile Applications • Data Collection • Security Solutions • Regulatory Initiatives • Unmanned Systems • Hybrid Power Systems Data Fusion and Knowledge Development System Components • Data Fusion & Data Sharing • Autonomous Driving Stack Development Environment • Analysis & Knowledge development • Remote Control Workstation • Scenario Generator and Analysis Coordination and Knowledge Dissemination • 3D-6DOF Sim: Simulator Environment • Information sharing & Communication Systems • Command & Control

Management and Improvement of MSA Structures • Technology Development • Education & Training • Lessons Learned • Capacity Building

The empirical evidence contained in the MSA literature indicate that after the Warsaw Summit, the cooperation between the EU and NATO advanced mostly through ad hoc and sectoral activities. Informal, but sanctioned, staff-

34 • The underwater threat collides with the net and becomes Future Plans entangled. • Explore various open-source stacks (e.g. MOOS IvP, • The captured threat is towed out of harm’s way. Apollo, Autodrive) and build a complete USV AD stack MARITIME SECURITY • Extend the Scenario Generator with C2 functionalities Lecture: Unmanned Aerial System for Maritime • Extend the LGSVL to support high fidelity (near real- Domain Awareness (MDA) – A Ship Captain’s Per- time) communication links and jammers spective • Explore the adoption of HLA to be able to join Federate Mr. Mark A. Russell, Director, International Business Distributed Simulations Development of Martin UAV

Lecture: Arming Autonomous Vessels Maritime Domain Awareness is the effective understand- Mr. Matthew Searle, CTO Maritime Arresting Tech- ing of anything associated with the maritime domain that nologies could impact the security, safety, economy, or environ- ment. The maritime domain is defined as all areas and Choice of Weapons: things related to the sea, ocean, or other waterways, in- • Kinetic cluding all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, peo- - Surface: Direct fire, small missiles, kamikaze UXVs ple, cargo, ships, and other vehicles. - Sub-surface: Energetic, Super cav. , armed UUVs / tor- pedoes. What information can UAS give the captain, today? • Non-Kinetic (Non-Lethal) weapons • Cameras - Dazzling lasers - EO “Super Zoom”, EO/IR, Laser Marker/Pointer - 95Ghz microwaves - Laser Target Designator, AI, Processing, HD Imagery - Pulsed energy • AIS (Automatic Identification System) - Plasma balls - UAS extend AIS 200-300km+ - Drogue lines • Wide Area Surveillance “ViDAR” - Nets - Helicopter – using EO/IR, needed 30 mins to locate man - MVSOT occlusion technologies in water (sea state 2), in 4km x 4 km area. - Kestrel – only 90 secs Politics and Ethics: Any use of kinetic weapons in for- • Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) eign or domestics port will have political consequences. - All Weather Radar, Day/Night, Maritime & Land If used against misidentified innocent victims will cause • Communications & Video Relay significant moral and ethical issues. - Extended Range, MANET, VOIP/ROIP, Video, C2

Arming AXVs with non-kinetic effectors allows instant re- The VBAT is a VTOL system designed specifically for sponse maritime (small ships) and does not have a launcher or • Electric power allows instant launch recovery unit. No equipment on the deck. It can deliver • No need for crew to scramble the MDA capabilities and take off/land in a 3m x 3m space • Small size and low cost allow multiple units to be fielded on the ship, operating out to 150km from the ship, day and • Use of non-lethal / non-kinetic effectors allows low level night. This capability was not possible 2 years ago. The launch authorization VBAT is operational now with US and Allied forces.

Non-lethal weapons add capability to the kill chain Lecture: A review on current Maritime Threats Scen- • Non-kinetic effectors act like a spider’s web ery and operational challenges outlining needs and • Buys time for manned units to arrive cost-effective solutions of technology • Captured target allows more time for kinetic response if Mr. Alexandros Lyginos, CEO of Interarma Ltd needed For the past 3 years, we observe a slight fluctuation in the Stingray Interceptor C-UUV Net total number of piracy incidents occurred worldwide, whilst • The fully automated Stingray interceptor net is a non- almost half of them are reported in West Africa waters. kinetic system that can be deployed against any potential This fact shows the instability in Political, Social and Eco- threat without risk to persons or property. nomic Environment remains within the subject regions. • The Stingray net is deployed across the path of the in- coming underwater threat at up to 20 knots, taking less Piracy Per Year than 10 seconds to set. • 2018: 201 • Forms an invisible barrier from sea surface to seabed. • 2019: 162

35 • 2020: 195 way to better understanding how those existing techno- logical achievements may be utilized in a principal way of advancement in different military domains.

Keynote Speaker: Rear Admiral Mihai Panait Chief of the Romanian Naval Forces Title: Emergent, Innovative and Disruptive Technolo- gies – Opportunity or Threat?

Future Emergent and Disruptive Technologies • Big Data and Advanced Analytics • Artificial Intelligence • Autonomy Materials New Technologies Preventing Piracy

MARITIME SECURITY • Space • Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made headway to enhance • Hypersonic maritime safety, optimize business operations and pro- cesses, and aid in voyage planning and vessel mainte- Maritime Implementation of Emergent and Disruptive nance. Technologies I • The use of AI-based systems to create fully automated • Artificial Intelligence – drones communicate with each piracy alerts can allow seafarers a few moments to react, other to work as a group using AI operators can control the potentially saving lives. entire swarm at once • In cracking down on maritime piracy, one must first un- • Opportunity – cheap or less expensive drones derstand how pirates operate and make their advances. • Threats – swarms of drones for anti-ship warfare Behavioral analytics, a new holistic interpretation of raw launched by commercial vessels, give the adversary the empirical data, can dramatically enhance the crew’s situ- benefit of plausible deniability used for ISR missions or as ational awareness by monitoring data and motion within loitering munitions the vicinity of a vessel in detail. • This information includes identifying the number of boats Maritime Implementation of Emergent and Disruptive and other neighboring ships within the same waters, the Technologies II routes and speeds it crosses paths to determine distinct • Big Data Advanced Analytics (BDAA) patterns, unknown correlation and provide clarity to am- - OSINT enthusiasts routinely post pictures on social me- biguities. dia covering naval vessels positions and activities - Source of pictures is free or inexpensive imagery from commercial satellites June 2, 2021 – NMIOTC Keynote Speeches - Huge amount of data available and info on maritime assets Keynote Speaker: Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov • Opportunity – can augment own maritime domain aware- Commander of the Bulgarian Navy ness Title: Implications of Disruptive Technologies for • Threat – can have an impact on operations states with Smaller Navies underdeveloped ISR assets or non-state actors could po- tentially pay for such pictures in an effort to plan an attack Identifying disruptive technologies and their use in the military domain early is vital to achieving superiority on Maritime Implementation of Emergent and Disruptive the battlefield. Countries with small navies are not usually Technologies III expected to lead the way to technological breakthroughs • Novel materials and manufacturing and innovations, since this endeavor involves a lot of re- • Opportunity – Increased performance (speed, distance, sources and financial commitments. But making sure to effects etc.) observe closely the trends in the naval community and • Threat – Arms race and losing technological advantage implementing such innovations would yield surprising re- sults. Synergizing the military and civil industries can lead Keynote Speaker: Major General Alaa Abdulla Sey- to a fundamental change in operational technologies and adee strategies and only through working together can we ex- Commandeer of Bahrain Coast Guard ploit the opportunities that disruptive technologies provide. Title: Maritime Domain – An Approach to Information Furthermore cooperation and collaboration between enti- Sharing and Management ties, such as NATO and EU for example, would pave the

36 Strategic Approach Emerging Disruptive technologies, ranging from Artificial Bahrain costal surveillance system was designed and Intelligence (AI) and quantum technologies to hypersonic installed of multiple integrated coastal surveillance sen- weapons and new space technologies have a serious po- sors to provide the Coast Guard with a comprehensive tential to revolutionize our military capabilities, strategies MARITIME SECURITY maritime situational awareness and Command and Con- and operations. The EU has a strong potential in EDTs, trol capability. Includes establishing maritime surveillance indicated by a vibrant industry and start-up landscape in sensor sites and a state-of-the-art Regional Command fields such as AI and robotics, but for sure, more effort is Center. Fused sensors include X and S-Band surface needed to match the level of development in this field of search radar, Infrared Electro-Optical long-range cameras our partners and competitors. and AIS base stations. In November 2020, as a kick-off for the work on the Stra- Strategic Approach Phases tegic Compass (SC), the EU has originated its first intel- • Phase 1 = Technology & Partner Evaluation ligence based comprehensive, 360-degree analysis of the • Phase 2 = System planning and product selection full range of threats and challenges the EU currently faces • Phase 3 = Base Line AIS system or might face in the near future. In the analysis, the risk for • Phase 4 = System Enhancements the EU not being prepared to react to the new threats and Vessel Identification Transceivers challenges was mentioned. Building on the threat analy- Customized transceivers issued and securely installed on sis and other possible thematic input, the EU will define every vessel. Full vessel and operator details captured policy orientations and specific goals and objectives in electronically at point of installation. four baskets: • Crisis Management Command and Control • Resilience National maritime data center. Ergonomic command and • Capability development control center with state-of-the-art visualization technolo- • Partnerships gies and automatic data analysis and incident manage- ment. Lecture: Maritime security and smart technologies: Turning the attention to Africa Data Utilization and Information Sharing Professor Francois Vrey, PhD Research Coordinator Real time coverage across entire gulf. A total of 50 million Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in position reports every week processed and correlated in Africa- SIGLA real time. Captain Mark Blaine, Stellenbosch University, South Africa The Future • Integrate new sensor systems Maritime security and smart technologies: Turning the at- • Enhance data analytics tention to Africa • Refine command and control The information below is directly from https://howafrica.com/the-top-10-most-powerful-navy-in- Keynote Speaker: Brigadier General Bart Laurent africa/ : Director of the Operations of the European Union Military Staff “A ‘Blue Water Navy’ is a navy that has the ability to per- Title: Future of Security in the Maritime Security form all aspect of naval operations. They can travel, navi- gate, and support naval operations deep in the ocean. A The key elements to develop the EU future strategies, es- navy with Blue Water capabilities has the support systems pecially in the global maritime environment are resilience and infrastructure to travel unhindered to a part of the and capabilities development along with emerging disrup- world’s waters. tive technologies. • Examples of Blue Water Navy in Africa: - Resilience to adapt our structures, processes, our hard- - Algerian National Navy and software is needed, as ‘events’ may dictate and fore- - sight should indicate. The use of, and protection against, remotely operated vehicles of different sorts is just one A Navy can be called ‘Green Water Navy’, if it has the abil- of the ‘events’ that show how relatively small technologi- ity to project its naval operations far beyond it shores but cal developments may bring about big changes in military is still limited in its deep ocean operations. A Green Water actions. Navy can travel and navigate long distance but can only do so in a limited time due to its lack of deep water opera-

37 tions support infrastructures and platform There is a concern with regard to the use of technology in • Examples of Green Water Navy in Africa: Africa from a HUMAN RIGHTS perspective. Science and - its offspring technology have been used in this century as - Moroccan Navy brutal instruments of oppression. - Tunisian Navy African Maritime Legal Framework - Equatorial Guinea Navy • Domestic Law • United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN- The Brown Water Navy is a navy primarily focused on lit- CLOS) toral warfare. They usually excel in ‘swarm attacks’ using • Co-operation agreements numerous small boats to overwhelm an opponent. The • 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy major type of ships Brown Water Navies possesses are • International humanitarian law mainly small gunboats and patrol ships. • International human rights law The primary role includes maritime patrol, combating sea

MARITIME SECURITY criminals, coasts guard duties, harassing enemy forces, Lecture: Beyond the Responsibility Gaps in the Use and mine sweeping and clearing. of Autonomous Weapons • Examples of Brown Water Navy in Africa: Mr. George Kiourktsoglou, Greenwich University - Angolan Navy The use of autonomous weapons can be dangerous and - Tanzania Navy hinder government relations globally. This statement - Sudanese Navy leads to ethics being major factor when discussing the use - Ghanaian Navy of autonomous weapons. - Kenyan Navy - Namibia Navy A New Ethical Framework within a Democratic Political - Cameroonian Navy Context The following issues must be addressed when discussing A Constabulary Corp possess no credible deterrence plat- the ETHICs of the use of autonomous weapons forms neither do they have any warfighting capabilities or • No Human Agency skills. Its main role is to safeguard the seaports and har- • Νo Vectoral (causal) Attribution bors from criminals and other vices. • No Universal Legal Uniformity • Examples of Constabulary Corp • Split between high- and low-tech militaries - Libyan Navy - Togolese Navy Lecture: 3D Printing Security Issues - Senegal Navy Dr. Nikitas Nikitakos, Professor, Dept. of Shipping - Mauritius Navy Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean - Eritrea Navy - Gabon Navy Additive Manufacturing is the process of joining materials to make objects from 3D model data, usually layer upon There are many African countries that are landlocked that layer, as opposed to subtractive manufacturing method- do not own or operate a navy.” ologies. On an Additive Manufacturing printer, costs are roughly the same for producing complex objects and sim- The Way Forward for Maritime Security Capacity Building ple ones. Fabricating an ornate and complicated shape • Material does not require more time, skill, or cost than printing a - Equipment and Infrastructure simple block, once the digital design is completed. The • Human Capacity Building industry will undoubtedly continue to develop worldwide - Training Courses & Education over the next few decades, and the abilities of the printers - Mentoring will be vastly different than they are today in ways that are - Workshops & Tabletop Exercises not completely predictable. • Institutional - Strengthening organizational structures The Additive Manufacturing Framework - Law Making Capital versus scale: Considerations of minimum efficient scale can shape supply chains. AM has the potential to re- Lecture: Maritime security, smart technologies and duce the capital required to reach minimum efficient scale the law: An African perspective for production thus lowering the manufacturing barriers to Dr, Michelle NEL, Facility of Military Science, Stellen- entry for a given location. bosch University, South Africa Capital versus scope: Economies of scope influence how

38 and what products can be made. The flexibility of AM facil- distributed, and digital. itates an increase in the variety of products a unit of capital These technology trends will drive four key military capa- can produce, which can reduce the costs associated with bility trends: production changeovers and customization and, thus, the • Ubiquitous Sensors and Autonomous Systems MARITIME SECURITY overall amount of required capital. • Increased importance of Battle Networks • Expanding Operational Domains Additive Manufacturing and Future Security Threats • Increased reliance on Precision Warfare • Weapons Proliferation - VEOs (Violent Extremist Organizations) represent some Maritime Domain Awareness of today’s greatest security threats, and they are only go- • Space technologies are vital to Maritime Domain Aware- ing to be even more dangerous with the proliferation of ness because of: AM. - The expeditionary requirements of naval operations - Homemade weapons - Global maritime security architectures - Advanced technology weapons - Ability to track and identify vessels of interest - Chemical, Βiological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explo- • Sensors sive (CBRNE) - Quantum sensors • Drugs - Unprecedented detection • Miniature explosive drones - Smaller vessels • Nano Satellites - Expand area coverage - Cost effective - Reduce revisit times and data downlink latency

• Synergies - Combination of space technologies and new analytical methods - Increase speed and efficiency of analysis

Position, Navigation and Timing • Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) support: - Electronic Chart Display and Information System

- Automatic Identification System - Automatic Track Control • Part of weapons systems • Quantum - Precise gravity gradient measures - Mobile platforms • Artificial Intelligence - Detection of spoofed signals - Integration of multiple sensor modalities

Networks are the physical foundation of the information battlespace. In MIW, SATCOM plays an integral part in delivering net- worked capabilities. • SATCOM is limited: Additive Manufacturing is occurring but we need to con- - Cost of launching satellites sider government policy, law, and ethics. - Stabilizers needed for on-board antennas - Relatively low bandwidth incapable of supporting ap- Lecture: The Role of Emerging and Disruptive Space plications requiring high data rates Technologies in Maritime Information Warfare • High-throughput Satellites Ms. Lucy Lim, NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, - Take advantage of frequency reuse NATO Science & Technology Organization - Support high bandwidth applications • Artificial Intelligence Emerging and Disruptive Technologies - Space-Air-Ground integration The EDTs will be increasingly intelligent, interconnected, - Interference management

39 - Beam Hopping • Quantum Comms - Info transmission across ‘turbulent’ water - Secure comms

Conclusion Space technologies will play a central role in warfare de- fined by achieving narrative dominance. The latest innova- tions in space-based capabilities will be essential aspect of future Maritime Information Warfare systems. Scenar- io-based testing will further enhance NATO’s understand- ing of the value of space technologies and intersections with Emerging Disruptive Technology’s in operations. Representative use cases for the application of Artificial

MARITIME SECURITY Intelligence solutions in Border Management. Lecture: Emerging and Disruptive Technologies: • Automated Border Control EDA efforts in the field • Surveillance Towers Dr. Georgi Georgiev, Project Officer Maritime Capa- • UAS bilities Support, CAP, EDA • Maritime Domain Awareness • Object Recognition EU Global Strategy is vital for European security. Active • Robotic Systems work on EDT essential for European strategy autonomy • Machine Learning Optimalization • Predictive Asset Maintenance European Defense Agency (EDA) efforts are based on • Geospatial data Analytics three different perspectives • Technological Expected future Artificial Intelligence Maritime Domain • Operational Awareness Capabilities • Industrial • Main operational response trigger • Identify and assess abnormal behavior EDA efforts for research, technology, and innovation • Identify new threats • Post-quantum cryptographic algorithms • Integration of ad-hoc data sources • AI C2 Systems for cyber • Disruptive fuel: Hydrogen technologies for military opera- Lecture: ARSx2: A marine area surveillance system tions using UAS, assisting anti-privacy measures and • Energy storage for high energy demand applications contributing to hostages and/or vessels recovery • AI based technologies combined with big data Mr. Evan Christodoulou, CEO of A. S. Prote Maritime • Quantum information networks • Internet of things for defence A. S. Prote Maritime Ltd was founded in 2013 in Cyprus • Muscular, brain and cognitive UI (MUSCIUS) with the sole purpose of providing armed and unarmed • Hybrid multifunctional metamaterials security services to merchant ships, against piracy. • EMRG and hypervelocity projectile From 2017 our activities have expanded to the use of new • AI based multi-sensor seeker head digital technologies in merchant shipping, the maritime en- • Swarms, swarming and multi-robot cooperative systems vironment and relevant market.

Lecture: AI opportunities, requirements, and barriers Reasoning of using UAVs against piracy for adoption of AI in maritime use cases i) The need to improve existing measures to encounter Mr. Darek Saunders, Head of Border Security Re- piracy and provide other non-military options. search Observatory AI Research and Innovation Unit ii) Almost all previous attempts to assist in the fight against Capacity Building Division piracy by using UAVs: • remained only at a theoretical level and never developed • were of a purely military nature • were completely failed private efforts, poorly organized and staffed with inappropriate personnel, based on the na- ïve idea that “anyone can fly a UAV

The Project ARSx2

40 The innovative project ARSx2 deals with the development Lecture: Security Challenges in 2030: The Challenge of a maritime surveillance system, consisting of two UAVs, of Reality vs Unreality for the prevention of piracy or other illegal activities, as Mr. Christopher Kremidas-Courtney, Senior Fellow, well as the monitoring of pirate incidents in progress, and Friends of Europe; Lecturer Institute for Security MARITIME SECURITY search and rescue cases at sea. Governance (ISG); Lecturer, Geneva Center for Secu- • Phorcys rity Policy - The first UAV, called “Phorcys”, is a small and flexible VTOL hexacopter on a Y6 configuration. Its compact and The World by 2030 stocky structure enables it to operate in tropical weather • Democracy versus Authoritarianism environments. Equipped with a powerful hybrid EO/IR sta- • Women will own 55% of the world’s wealth bilized camera with object tracking capabilities, humans, • Over 7.5 billion internet users by 2030 and items such as guns, canisters, etc. can be identified • Cybercrime will be $10.5 Trillion by 2025 from a safe distance. Phorcys will act as the “long arm” • Next Industrial revolution: Sub-Saharan Africa of the private guards and/or the crew aboard merchant • Most populous country: India, Largest economy: China ships. • India’s economy larger than Germany or Japan • Ceto • Increasing impact of climate change - The second, easy to use by non-specialists fixed-wing • Major economic shifts as a result of all above UAV, called “Ceto”, is used in emergency cases as a “res- • Reality versus Unreality: by choice (recreation) and due cue beacon”. It is deployed when a vessel is already or to disinformation will be occupied by pirates, while real-time position, im- - Augmented Reality (AR) is a live direct or indirect view ages or video are transmitted to the patrolling authorities of a physical, real-world environment whose elements and rescue organizations. Its purpose is, either to follow are augmented by computer-generated sensory. i.e. Aug- the vessel captured by the pirates or the ship of the pirates mented Reality Glasses with hostages, during ongoing piracy action by transmit- - Emergence of improved affordable wearable devices ting at appropriate frequencies emergency signals as well such as as critical information, such as images etc. AR glasses in 2023 - will begin to replace mobile phones - Virtual Reality (VR) is a simulated experience that be ARSx2 System Advantages similar to the real world. • Increased maritime surveillance ability - Numerous positive applications for military training, men- • Early warning of potential pirate threats tal health, recreation, enabling handicapped and elderly, • Capture, process and analysis of data travel business, education, medical, communications • Real-time high precision intelligence to control stations - VR enables an immersive experience – future develop- and rescue authorities ments include the ability to plug directly into human ner- • Remote operation with mission management and au- vous system tonomous commands - AR and VR Implications for Security • Reliable network protocols for fast, safe and robust data • Espionage: recruiting of sources & subsequent activi- transmission ties in VR metaverse • Assistance to search and rescue operations • Hacking of AR systems to spoof navigational use by • Monitoring of a pirate attack or hostage situation public and private actors • Recognition and monitoring of marine hazards • Disinformation: More precise and potent delivery means • Alleviation of risk of injury or death of humans during or via AR and VR and AI-enabled bots after a pirate attack • Deeper societal divisions due to an emerging split • Reduced insurance costs for crews, ships, and freights based on competing forms of reality • Reduced economic loss of countries adjacent to high- - Disinformation-Driven Violence 2020-21 risk areas • Attacks on 5G towers – over 200 in Europe alone • Optimization of ship routes • Various Qanon attacks to include train derailments, at- • Fuel saving tack on Canadian PM residence, etc • Ship rental time saving • Attacks on vaccine centers • Security of the movement of humans and goods • August 2020 attempted storming of Bundestag (Ger- man Federal Parliament) • January 6, 2021 attack on U.S. Capitol - How to be prepared for AR/VR? • Regulate and build safeguard into security of AR and VR

41 Lecture: SYNORIS – The “Chariot” of Modern Mari- Commercial Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) can time Warfare significantly help fight against malicious drone attacks. Mr. Evangelos Mantas, DevSecOps Engineer at Infili Technologies Drone Detection Technologies Radar technology can provide the effective detection of Why Use Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) drones within an area, even able to • UUVs are far less expensive to operate and maintain detect long range It can be successfully paired with other than manned platforms. technologies, such as RF or optic to • Enhanced payload is able to maintain constant aware- provide thorough coverage if desired ness and long-range coverage of the field. Extended • Pros surveillance periods and data collection, enables a better - Longer range and constant coverage. Provides multiple understanding of long-term behavior patterns and trends. drone detection and tracking • Improved range coverage, as they allow manned plat- • Cons

MARITIME SECURITY forms to pursue tasks elsewhere. - It can be severely affected by nearby RF pollution Blind • UUVs keep human personnel and expensive equipment Sectors Requires authorizations from local authorities and away from danger. experiences difficulties in detecting small drones. No pilot localization Unmanned Underwater Vehicles are used for: • Marine Exploration Radio frequency analyses the RF spectrum within the • Wreckage Discovery protected area, searching for any form of communication • Research between the drone and its remote control RF can even • Search and Rescue identify the drone make and model • Technology advancement enable them to conduct au- • Pros tonomous and more complex mission scenarios - Features like drone and pilot localization as well as drone characterization It provides passive technology and The latest UUV capabilities include the detection of sub- multiple drone detection marines, such the Synoris UUV platform, providing an easily deployable solution to assist and enhance the situ- • Cons ational awareness of the underwater battlefield in littoral - It does not detect autonomous drones Likewise, local and open seas environments, using hydrophones as pas- RF pollution may also reduce effectiveness sive sonars to discover hostile vessels otherwise unde- tected by traditional detection equipment. The envisioned Optic cameras allow visual direction and identification of network of autonomous UUV can cover a greater area, approaching drones and their providing real and near-real time feed of the “underwater payloads Acting like a radar, optics may also be success- traffic”. fully combined with RF technology in providing thorough coverage Lecture: Threats and Operational Advantages of • Pros UAS in maritime and coastal environments - The visuals can be retained and used for forensic evi- Dr. Christos Skliros, Head of Engineering, Hellenic dence of drone intrusions It has passive technology Drones • Cons - Without the RF or radar back up, false alarm rates are Threats to the maritime and coastal environment often high Blind Sectors The performance is often impact- • Interference ed by light or weather conditions which usually results in • Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) difficulties detecting smaller drones nearby No pilot local- • Weaponization ization

Acoustic sensors are best in recognizing drone sounds from a database of drone acoustic Signatures • Pros - It can detect autonomous drones while providing azi- muthal information on incoming drone direction • Cons - The sound database must be updated in persistent to be effective Drones today are also becoming more and more

42 soundless as technology advances. Encounters difficul- to better fit profiles on your site? ties tracking modified drones. No pilot localization. • Upgrades –Is it a good long-term investment? Could it be easily updated to stay one step ahead of other drones’ Technologies for Drone Neutralization evolution without the risk of replacing everything? MARITIME SECURITY Jamming, allow safe return to home drone while safe- • Durability–Is the technology durable enough to outstand guarding the point of interest different weather situations? • Pros • Easy Installation and Integration –Is the technology easy - No collateral damages from intercepting drone (fall in to use and requires minimal training? Does it include an urban areas, crowded ports, refineries etc. easy-to-use interface? • Cons • Costs of Operation –How much is the cost to run the - It does not defeat autonomous drones with the exemp- technology? Will it consume a big amount of electricity? tion of systems with GPS jamming capacity. It can inter- Does it require dedicated staff to operate the system? fere the ambient communications Requires authorizations • Reactive/Accuracy –What is the technology’s way of de- from local authorities. tecting false alarm rates? How quickly can it detect drones within its area of coverage? Mitigation (wi fi spectrum restriction), allow safe return to • Pilot/Localization –Is the technology able to locate the home drone while pilot and the drone which in turn will give you the options safeguarding the point of interest to apprehend the person behind the intrusion? • Pros • Effectiveness (Even against multiple drones) –There are - No collateral damages from intercepting drone (fall in bigger security threats against drone swarms. urban areas, crowded ports, refineries etc. No authoriza- • Interference/Obstruction –Authorities may be extremely tions from local authorities. sensitive about the ‘frequency pollution’. Does the provid- • Cons er’s technology provide low interference or even passive? - It does not defeat autonomous drones It can interfere • Reasonable Price and High Quality –Protecting your air- the ambient communications space is considered as an investment but it doesn’t mean breaking your bank. Does your provider offer a fair cost to Selecting The Best C-UAS Solution quality ratio?

How to choose the best anti drone solution that provides CLOSING REMARKS the best optimal airspace security at the best cost and efficiency ratio while serving With eight keynote speakers and 24 powerful lectures you in the longest time from established maritime security experts and academic possible? professionals, this conference successfully addressed and discussed emerging disruptive technologies to signifi- Checklist: About the Technology cantly improve maritime security. • The ‘Modular’ –Is the technology scalable up and down

43 Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security Seminar Report

The “Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security” Seminar was held virtually on June 3-4, 2021 at the NMIOTC in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece. In the beginning Commodore Charalampos THYMIS, the NMIOTC Commandant welcomed the at- tendees. This year was another unique experience because COVID kept the speakers and participants from attending in person the seminar. However, the seminar was conducted through webinar, but still presented speakers that delivered valuable knowledge and information about recognizing gender inequality and addressing possible solutions, which are necessary for maritime security challenges. Wendi O. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Reserve, provided this report. (email: [email protected] ) GENDER ISSUES Keynote Speaker ing production, marketing, and the provision of after-sales LTC Diana Morais service. Head of the Office for Equality of the Ministry of De- • Women are also subject to sexual abuse, as the “fish-for- fense in Portugal sex” phenomenon has shown us, where women engage in Chair-elect of the NATO Committee on Gender Per- sexual work with fishers in order to obtain fish to sell and spectives (NCGP) support their families. • Piracy against ships threatens the economy by interfer- The NATO 2030 initiative is intended to ensure that the ing with international maritime trade. Women are joining alliance of nations remains ready to face piracy gangs; it should also be noted that piracy gangs tomorrow’s challenges. Leaders will make decisions on require the substantive and forward-looking NATO 2030 agenda support structures and networks for their operations that to deal with the expected challenges of the future. In this are essential to their success. This results in the involve- future, where does maritime security stand? ment of women through multiple tasks such as cooking and cleaning for the piracy gangs or the hostages during Three Critical Points lengthy negotiations. • The impacts that the new global geopolitical dynamics are having on the security and defense of the maritime How can NATO engage and leverage the integration of domain. gender perspective in maritime security? • The role of women in maritime security. • In recent years NATO has been implementing the wom- • How can NATO engage and leverage the integration of en, peace and security agenda aimed at protecting civil- gender perspective in maritime security? ians in armed conflict, countering human trafficking and preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual vio- The impacts that the new global geopolitical dynamics lence. It has worked to incorporate the gender dimension are having on the security and defense of the maritime of security (including operational, moral, political, and le- domain. gal considerations) into NATO operations, including mari- • Recognize unrestrained access to global maritime time operations. supply routes for trade or other vital infrastructures (like • Despite all efforts, the integration of gender perspec- data-carrying underwater cables) is under pressure from tive in the development of NATO`s strategic documents is increased geopolitical competition with potentially hostile something that should require further attention. actors with an increasing global naval presence. • Maritime strategies and policies should respond to a • Address violence at sea as a result of irregular attacks by human security approach, addressing, inter alia, actions transnational, non-state actors in the form of piracy, terror- against the illicit acts against women and girls at sea in ad- ism or other illicit activities and organized crime. dition to gender-balanced and trained navies, that include gender experts – male or female -, that will be able to bet- The role of women in maritime security. ter protect them from gender-based violence but also to • Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. These empower these women and girls. activities decimate fish stocks, erode the maritime envi- ronment and put economic hardship on coastal commu- SESSION 1 nities, and although it is known that the majority of the Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security Policy forced labor in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is conducted by male and children, women are also re- Lecture: Is Maritime Security Gender-Blind? ported to play a major role in fisheries value chains includ- Dr. Ioannis Chapsos

44 Assistant Professor in Maritime Security at CTPSR - • Piracy a ‘man’s job/ crime’; women are not expected to Coventry University go at sea, due to religious, cultural or even physical endur- ance issues. • UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: no • Women with very active/ land-based roles in Somali pi- reference to the maritime domain racy: relationship facilitators, resource dealers, care work- GENDER ISSUES • Existing literature focuses on the links between gender ers, financial investors etc. and security / human security but the maritime domain is • In Indonesia, Eva Novensia named as ‘Pirate Queen’ largely overlooked by her country’s mainstream media in one of the most in- Three contemporary maritime security challenges: famous domestic cases of piracy - 7,5 years in prison for • Maritime Piracy facilitating piracy, when the ship she owned was used in • Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing an attack on the Singaporean-flagged MT Joaquim, in the • Fisheries Crimes Malacca Strait in August 2015. [Fenton, A.J. & Chapsos, Three main categories: I. (2019) ‘Prosecuting Pirates: Maritime Piracy and Indo- • Security providers nesian Law’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 19, No. • Crime perpetrators 2, pg 9-10]. • Victims Victims Security Providers • Piracy victims predominantly males - as of 2019, women The STATE as the primary security provider represented only 2% of the world’s 1.2 million seafarers • Masculinity largely governs the role of states’ security (IMO, 2019). providers in the maritime space • Women as both direct & ‘indirect victims’ of piracy – ex- • Women first allowed to join the in roles other ploited in Somalia as sex workers, hostage carers, etc. / that nurses and do ‘men’s jobs’ at sea in 1993 caring for family when men taken hostage -> vulnerable • In 2019 women were approximately 10% of the Royal • Fishermen often victims of piracy – offshore fishing an- Navy’s workforce - the Royal Navy named as one of the other ‘men’s job’ / women can hardly be found onboard UK’s top employer for women fishing vessels in the high seas, their roles in the fishing • First ever women allowed to start training with the Royal industry are limited closer to the coast and even more on Marines as late as 2019 land • Women increasingly gain a standing and closing this em- • In 2014, women accounted for 19% of all persons di- ployment diversity gap. rectly engaged in capture fisheries and aquaculture and represented about half of the estimated 56.6 million peo- The private security sector as a contemporary trend in se- ple working both on land and on board the over 4.6 million curity provision fishing vessels that exist globally (FAO 2016) • Industry overwhelmingly dominated by male operatives • In 2015, more than 2,000 fishers were rescued in 2015 • Security Industry Association: approximately 10% of in Indonesia from modern slavery conditions, all males. the workforce is female, albeit mainly in land-based roles [Chapsos, I. and Hamilton, S. (2019) ‘Illegal fishing and (leadership development, executive, mentoring and in- fisheries crime as a transnational organized crime in Indo- creasingly in IT) nesia’. Trends in Organized Crime, 22 (3): 255-273] • Stereotypes and prevailing assumptions about masculin- • Trafficked fishermen away from home for extended pe- ity and femininity preoccupy images of who can actually be riod of time (usually for years) – indirect effects on women Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) who are left behind to look after and provide for the family • Who would expect to see a female PCASP providing hence become more vulnerable armed security services against pirate attacks onboard • Women in forced labour conditions in seafood process- vessels transiting the Indian Ocean? ing industry ashore; female exploitation ‘sex for fish’ • Female PCASP Ruth Tiik at interview: ‘… I think they are shocked, as they often haven’t seen a female doing Conclusions security before… I hear about other girls doing CP stuff, • Maritime delimitations and zones largely define and af- but only on land, I have never bumped into any others do- fect the relationship between gender and maritime secu- ing the maritime stuff down here’ [The Circuit magazine for rity. security & protection specialists (2018): ‘Women in Mari- • Both men and women can be identified as security pro- time Security] viders, as well as perpetrators and victims of maritime crimes but men are predominantly active at sea while Crime Perpetrators women on land. Maritime crimes occur at sea but infra- • Stereotypes preoccupy images of who can be pirate … structure, networks and support on land make them pos- or even a victim! sible à land-sea nexus and land dimensions of maritime

45 crimes à both genders play active roles • Employment and Integration • Gender approaches to security should consider the mari- • Sexual violence and harassment time dimensions • Kit and Equipment • Health Lecture: Women in Maritime Security Frameworks: Expanding the UNSCR 1325 at Sea You can read the full report here: https://bit.ly/32RjJbX Dr. Marianthi Pappa Assistant Professor in law at the University of Not- Below, four research activities which were detailed in the tingham lecture are profiled. The following information has been taken directly from the report. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)1325 • UNSCR 1325: dedicated to women, peace and security. Integration of Women into Ground Combat Units

GENDER ISSUES • Dual scope: to protect women during conflict and to in- crease women’s participation in peace processes. This System Analysis and Studies (SAS) research team • Through eighteen points, it calls for the prosecution of formed to research the social, cultural, and psychological crimes against women and the increased representation factors that impact gender integration in military organiza- of women at all decision-making levels of conflict resolu- tions, focusing on integrating women into ground combat tion. It also outlines the actions which the Security Council, units. the Secretary General, the UN departments and member States should take in order to ‘mainstream gender’ into the Main Objectives peace and security agenda. • To identify the influence of social, cultural, and psycho- • Unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 31 Oc- logical factors of gender integration in ground close com- tober 2000. bat units and their impact on combat effectiveness. • To identify effective processes and strategies for the inte- Should the UNSCR 1325 be expanded at sea? gration of women in ground close combat units. • The current maritime security frameworks are unable to • To identify appropriate methodologies for monitoring, address the challenges which women face at sea. The measuring, and assessing integration. UNSCR 1325 promotes a gender-sensitive approach in • To share best practices through collaboration. the security sector. • Critical Findings • The UNSCR 1325 can contribute in 3 ways: • Operational effectiveness can be enhanced by the par- - by acting as an ‘umbrella’ framework, it can extend the ticipation of women in combat teams. principles of gender equality (as these exist for land con- • Leaders play an essential role in promoting inclusion to texts) in maritime settings and enhance harmonization ensure that unit cohesion remains strong and that mar- among the relevant (national, international) developments ginalized and underrepresented members are effectively in the maritime domain. integrated. - it can offer a collective response to gender inequalities • Task cohesion has a more significant impact on team in land and maritime security and encourage the develop- performance than social cohesion. ment of good practices in individual sectors (e.g transna- • Targeted recruitment efforts are an essential step in en- tional organised crime, IUUF, human trafficking). suring that interested and capable women will have an - it can promote gender mainstream in decision-making opportunity to engage in ground combat roles as their mili- processes of maritime security, as it does on land. tary career choice.

Lecture: Mainstreaming Gender in Maritime Security Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors Research Ms. Eleanor Braithwaite This Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) research team Office of the NATO Chief Scientist came together to consider the impact of intercultural fac- tors that influence multinational military collaboration. The focus of this lecture was centered on the first NATO Chief Scientist Research Report, which was published Critical Findings in May 2021. This report is an aggregation of the collab- • Culturally-rooted gender differences in multinational orative, cross-national research conducted by the NATO military operations can contribute to tension or misunder- Science & Technology Organization (STO) over 20 years standing, both in the interaction between contingents as examining issues affecting women serving in the armed well as between contingents and the host population. forces. This wide-ranging and valuable research is broken • Differential treatment between deployed men and wom- down in the report into four main areas as follows: en may interfere with effective operations and successful

46 mission accomplishment. defense organizations, and the policies and directives that • Cultural sensitivity and awareness may wish to be pro- guide their management. The Military-Civilian Personnel moted through pre-deployment programs and training for Survey (MCPS), administered to nearly 8,000 civilian and all military personnel. military personnel working in departments or ministries of

defense in 11 Allied and Partner nations, was also devel- GENDER ISSUES Gender component oped to identify critical aspects of military-civilian working Factors discussed in the literature that may create tension relations. or the possibility of misunderstanding in multinational mili- tary operations include: Critical Findings • Stereotypes • Women constitute a lower percentage of the military • Hierarchical rigidity workforce compared to their representation within civilian • Differences in interaction and serving status defense workforces. • Ethnic and religious groupings • Male military and civilian members report a more posi- • Cultural and religious attitudes toward women tive military-civilian workplace environment compared to • The composition of military contingents that vary on the female military and civilian members. basis of gender • The study’s overall results were mixed, perhaps reflect- ing other factors such as national culture and local work- Civilian and Military Personnel Integration and Collabora- place dynamics. tion in Defense Organizations Combat Integration: Implications for Physical Employment Standards (PES)

This Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) research team came together to identify best practices for the develop- ment of Physical Employment Standards (PES) in Combat Integration. Main Objectives • Develop a research framework for designing PES to eliminate the potential for gender bias and develop agreed usage of terminology. • Provide advice and guidance on injury prevention and This Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) research team physical training strategies linked to PES for Combat Inte- was formed to research strategies and approaches for gration, specifically: effective personnel management of military and civilian • Facilitate international research efforts to monitor Mus- workforces in defence organizations. culoskeletal risk through longitudinal investigations. • Identify female-specific training strategies for achieving Main Objectives and maintaining PES. • To review and assess current knowledge and research in • Produce a final technical report with practical recommen- the area of civilian and military personnel work culture and dations for designing PES to support Combat Integration. relations in defense organizations. • To extend the understanding of civilian and military per- Critical Findings sonnel work culture and relations in defense organizations • Designing PES that accurately reflect the job/task will through theoretical analysis and empirical studies reduce sex-based differences compared to traditional fit- • To develop and test a conceptual model of military and ness testing metrics and represent a more valid selection civilian work culture and relations, identifying challenges of the right performer for the job. and enablers of effective civilian-military interaction and • The introduction of PES that reflect the physical de- collaboration in defense organizations mands of a job-role will result in a reduction in MSKI risk • To generate recommendations for best practices for ef- and positively influence job-related physical training. fective personnel management of both military and civilian • Compared to men, women experience some perfor- workforces. mance-enhancing benefits resulting in better preservation of lean mass and faster recovery following stressful long Approach duration Military Field Exercises. Existing data sources, databases, as well as policy and • Additional research is needed to better understand phys- strategic documents were examined in order to under- iologically-appropriate timelines for return to duty and the stand and compare military and civilian workforces within implementation of safe physical training programs during

47 pregnancy and post-partum. 2509 (2020), UNSCR2571(2021) • Personnel and health care providers need to be edu- • Contribution to the Human Smugglers Business Model cated on the medical issues that may follow pregnancy. disruption • Training and Monitoring Libyan Coast Guard & Navy Lecture: Progressing Gender Perspectives – an Art (LCG&N) not a Science Mrs. Helen Hale MARCOM/Deputy GENAD

From strategic planning to practice adding a gendered perspective brings its challenges: • Little resistance to giving Gender Perspectives presence

GENDER ISSUES – greater resistance for wider implementation • Perceived limited opportunity for civilian engagement • Lack of reference to Maritime in policies and official documents Lecture: The cooperation between the EU monitor- • Preventing or solving the problem – needs to be applied ing mission (EUMM) and UN Women in Georgia before problem arises not just in response. Major Sander Agterhyis • Looking outwards and inwards – to be applied with the GENAD/SME Gender, 1GNC widest lens Georgia is an ambitious country with a western orienta- However, there are great opportunities for this gender per- tion. The country plans to implement reforms and adhere spective momentum: to democratic and western values in EU NATO. As part • Awareness and preparedness – an asset ready to be of this ambition Georgia adopted a National Action Plan utilized 1325. • Future policy makers – gaining knowledge • Acknowledge that this movement is an art not a science – a gendered perspective does not always present itself with flashing lights • External audiences – applying demonstrates values of organization • Turning the lens internally – look at your won blind spots • Organizational diversity and inclusion – encourages em- bracing of gender perspectives.

SESSION 2 Gender Mainstreaming in Maritime Operations

Lecture: Gender Perspective in Maritime Security / Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI Captain Agnieszka Makrucka, POL(N) Operation IRINI/GENAD In addition, Georgia teamed up with UN women on the issue of domestic violence using male role models. UN- Core Task: Countering Illicit Arms Trafficking (CIAT) WOMEN women asked the national rugby team to speak UN Security Council Resolutions: out against domestic violence. Rugby is a very popular • UNSCR 1970 (2011) – Establishing the Arms embargo sport in Georgia. The rugby players agreed to take part • UNSCR 2292 (2016) – Authorizing boardings and diver- in the campaign and appeared on a poster with a slogan sions condemning violence against women and the number of • UNSCR 2526 (2020) – Extending UNSCR 2292 man- a toll free help-line. The EU monitoring mission helped to date up to 5 June 2021 distribute the poster during its patrols. While doing so, and • UNSCR 2578 (2021) – Extending UNSCR 2292 man- partly because of the popularity of the rugby players, the date up to 3 June 2022 distribution of the poster offered an opportunity to talk with Secondary Tasks: with interlocutors (police. military, and civilians) about an • Gathering Information Oil Smuggling otherwise very sensitive topic. - UNSCR 2146 (2014), UNSCR 2362 (2017), UNSCR

48 Lecture: Gender intelligent strategies to attract, pro- • Support all staff in the quest of balancing both profes- mote and maintain women within the broad military sional and personal dimensions of life. maritime domain • Leaders need to commit to learning and leading gender Captain Silvia Stanciu ROU(A), “Carol I” intelligent teams.

National Defense University Bucharest • Ensure an inclusive working environment where diversity GENDER ISSUES of the human resource is 100% capitalized. Gender Intelligence is based on three dimensions • Further insist on representation of women – niche for • Biological dimension - uses the brain science findings career advancement. • Social dimension – studies the social status and its impli- • Implement strategies that focus on flexible achievement cations associated to each gender of career milestones. • Cultural dimension – organizational culture, leadership commitment, diversity and inclusiveness attitude Conclusion Gender Intelligence – provides greater career op- All three dimensions provide accurate understating of be- portunities, open to everyone on the principle that great havioral tendencies and determine main human thinking minds think unalike and basically implies men and wom- processes such as decision making, problem solving, con- en, working and striving to succeed together, in terms of flict resolution, stress resistance, emotions management being equal in value not in numbers. and communication which are under gender influence. SESSION 3 Background Information Engendering Contemporary Maritime Security • 2% of the world’s seafarers are women Challenges • The Navy - the most underrepresented service • NATO – women represent less than 15% of staff within Lecture: Human security in the South Pacific – be- this service category tween the legal consequences of ocean change and • Maritime sector – still largely perceived as of male resort gender perspective • Target: multinational, integrated maritime force Dr Joanna Siekiera Postdoctoral Fellow Faculty of Law, University of Gender Intelligent Strategies Bergen, Norway To Attract: • Authentic role models – both women and men. Climate change differently men and women because of • Better use of media channels to give substantial informa- their gender role in villages, local communities, church tion on the opportunities of a Navy career. parishes etc. In the Pacific these different gender roles • Expand talent pool selection by insisting on diversity. are influenced by culture, social systems, local institutions • Employ Navy leaders as Champions of Change – and and religion, and it varies across the Pacific Islands.1 actively promote them as stakeholders in gender main- • Pacific Women face persistent inequality relative to men streaming. within the patriarchal society, including access to decision- • Align your military organization to the expectations of the making, high rates of sexual and gender-based violence, society you need to secure. poor working conditions, increased risk of HIV/AIDS and STIs, declining access to customary land rights and prop- To Promote: erty right,2 along with limited economic opportunities, • Lead by example. which all makes them more vulnerable to climate change • Have male formal and informal leaders guarantee their impacts. strong support and career mentoring for female staff. • Women are raised with gender specific roles and respon- • Offer constant feedback – surpass the minority complex. sibilities in their families and communities. • Networking and couching on the challenges regarding • Adopting gender-responsive approaches is essential in the full spectrum of aspects that comprise the Navy ca- achieving cost-efficient adaptation measures, disaster risk reer. reduction and sustainable development for the region.3 • Develop specialized military curricula regarding the pro- ficiency of gender diversity within matters regarding social Yet, we can observe the slow change, accelerated nomen life and career - at peace or during missions / operations. omen by ocean change. Women become active agents • Take all the necessary measures for the armed forces to of change and their unique knowledge and skills should prevent and respond to gender-based discrimination and be acknowledged and integrated into any projects/policy sexual harassment. to develop resilience strategy towards the effects of sea- level rise. To Retain Another institution that exists in communities is the

49 churches. This system, even though men are heads of the Dr Isabel Lirola-Delgado organizations, women and youth are the most influential; Full Professor for International Public Law. Univer- they know everyone, as well as know how to get through sity of Santiago de Compostela people in order to influence decisions. The same goes with civil society organizations, strongly supported by the UN Spain as one of the main European Union destination Women: They have established a useful handbook: The countries for irregular migration from Africa via the Medi- Pacific Gender and Climate Change toolkit is designed to terranean and the Atlantic. support climate change practitioners in the Pacific islands region to integrate gender into their programmes and proj- ects.4 As gender relations are influenced by culture, Pacific women are actively involved in the process of perfor- 5

GENDER ISSUES mance of traditional dance, traditional clothes, etc. In addition, most resources are communally owned by men, whereas women have limited access, being however able to generate income by selling handicrafts. This powerful cultural engagement by women is used in addressing ocean change issue, popularizing the topic, familiarizing the broad audience, not necessarily educated, with the matter and their own possible actions. We might even say that the impacts of climate change have introduced a new era in male dominance societies, where women now bring Profile and gender issues in more income for families and contribution to develop- • In most cases they come from Black African countries ment projects in their villages, communities, maritime na- • Some of them are pregnant tions. • They often travel in the boat with babies or very young Finally, gender is also considered as a priority in The Pa- children cific Adaptation To Climate Change Project held by The • In all cases their journey is linked to the smuggling of Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Pro- migrants gramme6 examples are planting salt tolerant varieties of • In many cases they are subject to human trafficking plants and locating community-water tanks. • In most cases they have suffered assaults, exploitation and sexual harassment at all stages of the journey

Lecture: International gender obligations and mari- Why is it difficult to integrate a gender perspective into time operations linked to irregular migration by sea maritime operations linked to irregular immigration in the from a Spanish Perspective case of Spain? • Multiplicity of stakeholders: No single protocol or policy on gender issues. 1 https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/4_Our_Work/ • Invisibility of gender issues during the “operation” versus past_projects/Pacific_Islands/Gender_relations_in_the_Pacific_case_ the moment of disembarkation: Need for coordination studies.pdf 2 https://gsdrc.org/publications/gender-issues-in-the-pacific-islands/ Spain needs to incorporate more intensively its interna- 3 https://www.uncclearn.org/wp-content/uploads/library/unwomen704. tional obligations and commitments on gender issues in pdf 4 https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/9/ maritime operations related to irregular immigration: pacific-gender-and-climate-change-toolkit • Adoption of contingency planning systems for sea arriv- 5 UiB project with the University of the South Pacific. als with a gender perspective, including rescue and inter- 6 https://www.sprep.org/news/gender-priority-pacific-adaptation- ception operations climate-change-project?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=61f62e355e2dba4e5 851f424d93d4134696e8630-1622455887-0-AW2ZpS1g2YF55pL • Establish coordination between all stakeholders partici- 55sVhobGXZjjHl5-E9RyTHNrFO9XDJK76KNGM0fpJ6B5wxledx- pating in maritime operations ua4irRBfejwxDC3wRa3CrPhHAXz5uL7QnNmjHrxA5OLZgUzY- • Incorporate instruments to connect gender issues arising iZ0FVsYE34xRkdchTAl1hZUSKqdRjCu-GF5JXIIbf5-gQYvMmDBtd- during the maritime operation and after disembarkation K1ZgNSFAbMPOe5kKFPgnUO9CrldBjirrjHuKUjVGwU6mXlJIrV65N- quyK6UavkhJN7Yo9m2x3i4-Yv3jBL2GiKDiWmfqzyHUOox0fCkKT5- OdKu8ph5Pt0zazze_EZUVXl8gxBHGx2WMAZ8a-aLtQqORlrKmbzd- Spanish participation in joint maritime operations can 6dUbVF8amVfJn7-G9wye5-GNgfidS-kGOYWnvMFNaFP1sGuKjqb- serve to create a number of synergies related to: derYmkgzoIuKOY4O92zcw5nTe5XgUKG4weYlI3sNJPRqcUfgP- • Collection of disaggregated gender data 8K8Vp2tvK2oDyVN7bNv8MZo8HpVIWTkee5BVqgQ_UvQZdluV- • Capacity building and training on gender issues f83aQwv6x57_tKhwiu1

50 • Integration of a gender perspective into all areas of the and math (STEM) knowledge and skills, accounting for operation 23% of core STEM occupations in 2017 (WISE 2017). - This pattern persists despite women successfully mov- Lecture: The gender dimensions of child piracy in ing into previously male-dominated areas such as life

Somalia sciences and medicine. Their underrepresentation is par- GENDER ISSUES Miss Lizzy Norman ticularly acute in the ICT sector, where levels of female PhD Coventry University employment are dropping (to 17% in 2017, from 18% in 2016), and where they tend to be concentrated in the Gendered roles of child pirates lower-paid sectors (WISE 2017). • Boys are more visible as girls do not go out to sea, but • Change to the employment relationship rather engage with pirate networks onshore - The gendered implications of these changes in the em- • Roles reflect the gender dynamics of Somali society - ployment relationship are evident from women’s dispro- girls used to carryout domestic tasks and some used for portional representation in non-standard forms of employ- sexual purposes ment and solo self-employment. • Some girls engage in more ‘frontline’ roles on land, act- - Those working in the gig economy (is a free market sys- ing as stakeouts or guards for female hostages tem in which temporary positions are common and orga- • Boys are likely to be promoted from land-based to sea- nizations hire independent workers for short-term commit- going roles ments) currently represent a relatively small share of the workforce, but this type of employment is on the increase. Why do girls engage with pirate networks? - Online platforms have international reach and may of- • Victims trafficked or forced into sexual relationships or fer new opportunities to women with limited access to marriages with pirates the formal economy, but gendered promises of freedom • Because they are attracted to the status of pirates and flexibility are situated in a context where around 60% • Because they think it offers the financial means to leave of the world’s population – many of them women in low- • They have a personal connection to a pirate network and middle-income countries – still lack internet access • For the same reasons linked to state fragility as their (OECD 2017). male peers do - The majority of these self-employed have been found to have a stable income and to be independent – not working Lecture: New technologies and gender equality for a single client. However, around two-fifths are classi- Dr. Nikitas Nikitakos fied as low paid and one-fifth receive low or medium pay Professor, Dept. of Shipping Trade and Transport, and are also insecure University of the Aegean • Change to access to work during the period of childbirth and childrearing - Concerns change in access to work over the period of childbirth and childrearing - At the same time new technologies could potentially make it easier for employers to accede to requests for flexible working, thereby perhaps reducing the proportion of women pushed into self-employment or the gig econo- my after childbirth. Again, the issue is not with the technol- ogy but the policies of employers

Main Recommendations for Change Four gender related dimensions of 4th Industrial Revolu- • While technology can help facilitate home-based work- tion Technologies ing, to date this has primarily benefitted higher-status, • Structural change male occupations, while women self-employed telework- - When considering women’s future access to quality ers experience a greater risk of work–life spillover. Re- jobs, it should be noted that although there has been an thinking the social relations of gender could transform historical tendency for women to be concentrated in repet- home-based working to provide wider benefits for women. itive work, recent trends found women to be outperform- • Given the growing demand for STEM knowledge and ing men in entering non-routine jobs requiring analytical or skills, the issue of low representation of women workers interpersonal skills. needs to be addressed. • Change to the nature and quality of work • Increasing levels of non-standard forms of employment - Women remain underrepresented in key growth areas and precarious work has been intensified by digitalization, such as jobs requiring science, technology, engineering leading to increasing fragmentation. The emergence of

51 platform-based working and gigs may appear to benefit the quality. women. 2. Avoid pink-washing Don’t tell it, show it – Ernest Hemmingway SESSION 4 It is easy to use the right hashtags and create visibility Women in the Maritime Domain, around a company’s gender equality work on SoMe. Make Regional Case Studies sure it is backed up by real progress. 3. Gender is not only about women Lecture: Women in the maritime: the Danish ap- Women’s rights are human rights, and human rights are proach to gender-equality in shipping women’s rights – Hillary Clinton Dr Jessica Larsen Just like we must include the two M’s – men and manage- Anthropologist and researcher at the Danish Institute ment – in the dialogue on gender equality, we must be for International Studies (DIIS) aware that gender is a more complex spectrum of self-

GENDER ISSUES identification than the male-female dyad. Women in the shipping industry: room for improvement • Only 1-2% are women in global shipping Lecture: The invisible Woman of the Royal Navy • Only 3% are women in Danish shipping Miss. Erin Bisset Assistant Head Efficiency British Army The Way Forward: the case of Denmark Danish Shipping is currently promoting women in shipping Recommends the book, The Invisible Woman by Caroline through a three-step approach. Criado Perez. Investigates the shocking root cause of gender inequality Step 1: Task Force and research Danish Shipping created a task force to examine how the Representation of the world is described by the words industry can attract and retain more women in the mari- according to men. Unfortunately, the point of view from time education system and in the maritime sector and to women are not included. develop recommendations to shipping companies. Lecture: Beyond gender rhetoric in African Maritime Step 2: Charter for More Women in Shipping operations Danish Shipping launched a charter with concrete goals Ms. Liezelle kumalo that signatories must follow to: a) increase women in ship- Researcher, Institute for Security Studies in South ping; b) ensure equal opportunities; and c) implement Africa measurable efforts to train, recruit and retain women in Mr. Denys Reva shipping. Research officer, Institute for Security Studies in South Africa Step 3: Action Plan Danish Shipping developed an action plan to hand-feed Beyond gender rhetoric in African Maritime operations the industry with best practices and ready-made packages • In Africa gender is often understood in term of a binary that can be customised to any company’s need. division between males and females, and most gender The Action Plan is simple, practical and concrete: it asks equality programs in the maritime sector focus on women management to specify the timeline, targets, deadline and • A proper gender analysis of maritime operations is need- responsible person to ease the success of implementa- ed that considers intersectionality of age, race and social tion. status as well as sex • Part of solution is to understand what drives gender in- Step 4: Reflection equality through an intersectional approach, for instance, Added to the three-step approach, Dr. Larsen introduced by using the Moser framework the need for taking a step back to reflect on some of the • The goal is to have gender transformative practices that unintended consequences or knock-on effects that may are reflected in the maritime sector come out of the work on gender equality. Particular attention needs to be paid to the following: SESSION 5 1. Don’t only rely on numbers Gender Diversity and Equality There are lies, damned lies and statistics – Benjamin Dis- raeli Lecture: Gender diversity in maritime industry and When tracking progress on gender equality, numbers can the way ahead cover up lop-sided developments within the company, or Mr. Diogenis Venetopoulos within the industry as such. Look beyond the quantity to DPA/CSO Partner Variety Cruise

52 Variety Cruise has small ship experiences and is very suc- sociological aspect, resting mostly on the participation of cessful in entertaining their customers. Management in women in the maritime industry and the steps that need to the cruise line industry has conduct critical think tank ses- be undertaken to achieve a gender balance therein. The sions and decided one of their 17 targets of the cruise line presentation under the topic of gender neutrality, equity industry is to implement and maintain gender equality. or equality, presented the topic from a legal perspective. GENDER ISSUES It answered the question of whether the law has a gen- Lecture: Maritime Security: Gender strengths in der biased approach and whether this legislative bias is Capability Building what leads or contributes to a continuous imbalance in the Mrs. Chrysanthi Laimou maritime domain. Frist it focused on the concept of gender Maritime College manager/Diaplous neutrality in the law of the sea and then it proceeded in Mrs. Lamprini Panagopoulou pondering on whether this concept translates into equality Maritime Security Expert in the maritime domain, and whether an equity consider- ation is needed in order to achieve gender equality. The Diaplous Group – The most reliable global partner This is an interesting approach, since the law of the sea of total security services covering any physical or cyber has traditionally been considered as one of the most well- threat against the crew, the vessel, the cargo and the established and technical areas of International Law, re- whole value chain lying on a robust convention such as the UNCLOS and landmark cases such the Lotus and the North Sea Conti- while remaining compliant to all the directives from the nental Shelf ones. Rules such as those regarding coastal International Organizations and the Governmental regula- delineation, fisheries, and flag states for example have tions. been viewed as operating beyond gender considerations, The Diaplous Group recognizes the lack women as sea- implying at least to some extent gender neutrality (Isabel farers compared to other industries such as security and Lischewski (IJCL 18 (2020), 652)). The first part of the pre- education: sentation pondered on this gender-neutral aspect of the law of the sea in the maritime domain. And indeed, the aspects mentioned above, fall under a technical category, that would make it challenging to attribute gender bias to them. At the same time, authorities in international law, such as Chinkin, have indicated the research of sociolo- gists such as Gilligan, who have highlighted that the fe- male approach to justice relates more to the “ethic of care” and sees “things in terms of relationships, responsibility, caring, context, communication;” while a male approach relies “on an “ethic of rights” or “justice” and analyze[s] problems in abstract terms of right and wrong, fairness, Regardless of gender, the focus of the maritime industry logic, rationality, winners and losers, ignoring context and can shift towards the existence of various skills, their as- relationships.” (Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & sessment and finally, cultivation through professional de- Shelley Wright, AJIL 85 (1991), 615). If that theory is to velopment, training and education. be followed, simply having male dominated negotiating teams when developing law, would translate into a de fac- to gender-biased legislation. When examining UNCLOS, it is often indicated that the words used in it make for mas- culine assumptions. Words such as fishermen instead of seafarers are used and “shipmasters, operators, contrac- tors, members of the Governing Board and the Director- General of the Enterprise, members of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and its President, as well as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, are all as- sumed to be male.” (see Articles 47, 51, 61, 62 and Papa- Lecture: Gender Neutrality, Equity, or Equality in the nicolopulu (ed.), Gabriele Goettsche-Wanli, (2019), p. 51). maritime domain However, Scovazzi (Papanicolopulu (ed.), Tullio Scovazzi Mrs. Nikoleta Chalanouli (2019), p. 147) questions whether such teleological impor- Legal expert in international law tance should be given to words and indicates the change that happens in the Spanish text of UNCLOS, when the Gender in the maritime domain is often examined under a sea becomes the high seas (el mar to la alta mar).

53 Hodson further indicates that concepts such as that of the has striven for answering fundamental technical ques- high seas, as that has been determined in the Lotus case tions. At least this appears to have been the effort of one of the International Court of Justice, entail a feminist as- of its most influential authorities, Elisabeth Mann Borgese, pect. It allows for a lack of specific State control and for a a woman. feminist use of the construct. Hodson delves into how the high seas for example, can be used to allow for women Lecture: Gender Parity in Maritime to ensure control over their own bodies and reproductive The invisible barriers and systemic errors that need rights; women who would otherwise be unable to obtain correction a legal abortion, can do so in the high seas, through a Mrs. Kate Bollanou specific NGO who has taken advantage of the lack of sov- Executive & Leadership Coach Maritime Diversity & ereignty in the high seas under the law of the sea (Papani- Inclusion colopulu (ed.), Loveday Hodson, (2019), 135).

GENDER ISSUES The debate surrounding the neutrality of the law of sea The three steps towards sustainable gender parity and the gender imbalance in the maritime domain and its • Creating Awareness industry, indicate that there is a disconnect between the o Meetings between leaders and female team theoretical gender neutrality that a technical field of law members should bring and its actual implementation. The current o Reciprocal mentoring programs with junior fe- male domination in the maritime industry and maritime se- male members of staff curity indicate that gender equality has not been achieved o Upward mentoring programs despite the fact that the law has not been specifically developed to discriminate between gender roles. When • Collaboration And Understanding such a gender imbalance however, exists, simply applying o Managing inequality moments when they hap- quotas, or changing pronouns or words when referring to pen seafarers does not achieve gender equality. This is where o Actively manage women’s careers equity becomes relevant. It is not a matter of determin- o Entry interviews ing the rights and obligations of women in the maritime o Allyship programs domain and attribute an equal piece of a pie. It is a mat- ter of pinpointing gender vulnerabilities and intervening in • Taking Action an affirmative manner in order to achieve the sought-after o Define what “good” means to you equality. This exercise might appear to be an imbalanced o Equality as an annual KPI one; equity is different than equality because it concerns o Thorough selection of employees, partners and itself with fairness. Equality requires equal amounts. The suppliers first can be understood to be a bridge to achieving the latter. And while the law can assist in changing precon- CLOSING REMARKS ceived notions, it is not the only actor. Gender equality in With a prominent keynote speaker and 18 powerful lec- the maritime domain requires a multidisciplinary approach tures from established maritime security experts and aca- and an attitude change from all involved actors. demic professionals, this seminar successfully addressed As a conclusion it was the presenter’s view that the legal and discussed the lack of females in maritime security and field under examination, when seen on its own, is not a emerging solutions to close the gender gap. discriminatory one; it is a field that, at least in its inception,

54 NMIOTC Course 26000 NMIOTC COURSES & ACTIVITIES “Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) / Combat Lifesaver (CLS) in Maritime Operations” Contributing to the continuous improvement of staff’s performance, NMIOTC conducted the Course 26000 “Tac- tical Combat Casualty Care/ Combat Lifesaver (CLS) in Maritime Operations” from 1st to 5th March 2021, for staff members from Greece, Poland, Germany and Czech Republic. The aim of this course was to provide knowledge and practical skills, in order to improve survivability on the battlefield by delivering necessary pre-hospital care with limited equipment and in confined spaces, based on the newest Co - TCCC Guidelines for Combat Lifesaver. Training was delivered by certified instructors specialized in combat medics and in absolute coherence with NAEMT’s policy and regulations.

NMIOTC Annual Information Meeting & Advisory Board 2021 NMIOTC’s Annual Information Meeting (AIM) and Advisory Board (NAB), chaired by NMIOTC Commandant, were held at the Center’s premises on Thursday 4th February 2021. This year due to the current COVID-19 pandemic situation and in absolute coherence with standing World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines, further to the physical participation, there was also Virtual participation. During the meetings, representatives of the Sponsoring Nations were informed about NMIOTC activities and achievements of 2020 and also provided advice to the Commandant for the effective execution of his mission.

55 NMIOTC’S Change of Command Ceremony On Tuesday 16th March 2021, the Change of Command Ceremony was held in NMIOTC. Commodore Panagi- otis Papanikolaou GRC (N) handed over the Command to Commodore Charalampos Thymis GRC (N). The Chief of Staff of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, Georgios Fasoulas GRC (AF) presided over the ceremony. All the preventive measures due to COVID-19 pandemic were followed. NMIOTC COURSES & ACTIVITIES NMIOTC COURSES &

NMIOTC Course 27000 Maritime Sniper Course From 19th to 23th April 2021 the NMIOTC Maritime Sniper Course is taking place at NMIOTC premises and in the broader area of Chania Crete. During the course, the participants will: 1. Engage and deliver fire from land to floating targets at sea 2. Engage and deliver fire from helicopter to stable and also towed targets at sea. 3. Engage and deliver fire from a naval vessel to stable and also towed targets at sea. 4. Plan and conduct Sniper Operations in Maritime Environment. The course is attended by 22 trainees from 6 countries (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Malta, and U.S.A.).

56 ΝΜΙΟΤC Coordination Board (NCB) 2021 NMIOTC COURSES & ACTIVITIES The ΝΜΙΟΤC Coordinating Board (NCB) was convened on the 12th of May 2021 at NMIOTC premises chaired by the Director of Education and Training Directorate of the Hellenic Navy General Staff and co-chaired by a representative from SACT JFD Branch Head Education and Training Plans and Programs through VTC.

NMIOTC Course 6000 – “WMD in MIO” From 17th to 21st of May 2021, the NMIOTC Course 6000, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in Maritime Inter- diction Operations” (WMD in MIO), was conducted at NMIOTC premises. In total eight (8) trainees coming from three (3) countries (Greece, Malta and Qatar) attended the course. Five (5) Subject Matter Experts from Greece and the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), were invited to support the course as augmenters as well as from JCBRN CoE via VTC, in addition to the Centre’s Instructors and Lecturers.

57 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference 2021 The 12th NMIOTC Annual Conference took place on 1st and 2nd June 2021 at NMIOTC premises, titled “Oppor- tunities and Threats from Innovative and Disruptive Technologies: Shaping the Future of Security in the Maritime Domain”. It was attended by 131 participants from 27 Allied and Partner Nations, International Organizations, the international academic community and representatives from the shipping and IT industry. Deputy Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis opened the Conference with the Host Nation welcome address. Among the keynote speakers were, the Commander of the Bulgarian Navy, Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov, the Chief of the Romanian Naval Forces, Rear Admiral Mihai Panait and the Commander of Bahrain Coast Guard, Major General Alaa Abdulla Seyadee. This year due to the current COVID-19 pandemic situation in addition to the physical conference, a virtual confer- ence has been delivered simultaneously. The aim of the conference was to discuss issues and share perceptions of the international community on how technological innovations will shape Maritime Security, considering the full range of disruptive technology impli- cations in the Maritime Domain. NMIOTC COURSES & ACTIVITIES NMIOTC COURSES &

58 Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security Seminar NMIOTC COURSES & ACTIVITIES From 3rd to 4th June 2021 the Gender Perspectives in Maritime Security Seminar, was co-organized with Cov- entry University’s Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations and Nottingham International Law and Security Centre and was conducted virtually at NMIOTC through “GoToWebinar” platform. The aim was to encourage collaboration in the utilization of the gender perspective in the Maritime Domain across the spectrum of Peace, Crisis and War. 82 participants and 22 speakers from 29 countries attended the seminar, consisting of scientific, industrial, naval staff, maritime and academic researchers, practitioners, members of maritime associations, shipping compa- nies, governmental departments/bodies, international organizations and agencies, the public and private sector in general.

NMIOTC Pilot Course 15000 “Migrant Handling Team Issues in Maritime Interdiction Operations in Support of International Efforts to Manage the Migrant and Refugee Crisis at Sea” From 14th to 18st of June 2021, the NMIOTC Pilot Course 15000 “Migrant Handling Team Issues in Maritime Interdiction Operations in Support of International Efforts to Manage the Migrant and Refugee Crisis at Sea”, was conducted at NMIOTC premises. The aim of the course was to deliver the appropriate knowledge and practical skills to members of the Security and Recovery teams of naval units in order to prepare them to fulfil their tasks on Migration Related Incidents at Sea. In total seven (7) trainees coming from three (3) countries (Egypt, Greece and Poland) attended the course.

59 NMIOTC TRAINING

Training of HS SPETSAI Boarding Team January 19-21, 2021

Training of HS THEMISTOKLIS Boarding Team January 26-28, 2021

60 NMIOTC TRAINING

Training of GRC SOF Team February 15-26, 2021

Training of USS PORTER Boarding Team February 19-22, 2021

61 NMIOTC TRAINING

Training of Hellenic Navy UDT February 22-26, 2021

Training of 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit May 10-21, 2021

62 NMIOTC TRAINING

Training of HMS DEFENDER Boarding Team June 2-4, 2021

Training of Maltese Armed Forces Team June 7 - July 2, 2021

63 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS HIGH VISIBILITY

Visit of the Defence Attaché of the United Kingdom March 9, 2021

Visit of the SOCEUR Delegation March 18, 2021

64 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

Visit of the US Army Europe and Africa Delegation April 21, 2021

Farewell Courtesy Call by the US Defence Attache, Captain (N) Tim Ketter June 17, 2021

65 Education and Training and Education COURSES (ETOC ID.) (ETOC COURSES 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 10 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 OCT JUL APR JAN Course 29000 - Detection and Identification of WMD (CBRN Materials) in MIO (WMD-MD-35660) MIO in Materials) (CBRN WMD of and Identification Detection 29000 - Course (WMD-CD-35614) Environment Maritime in Search Radiological 28000 - Course (SOF-SO-35603) Course Sniper Maritime 27000 - Course (MED-MS-35547) MIO in (CLS) Saver Life Combat / (TCCC) Casualty Care Combat Tactical 26000 - Course (ETE-IT-35477) Standards NATO of and Maintenance Production Drafting, 25000 - Course Development) (Under Domain Maritime the in Hybrid 24000 - Warfare Course (Pilot) (IED-ED-35437) Environment Maritime the in Supplement WIT 23000 - Course (MED-MS-34411) Operations Maritime in Care Combat Medical 21000 - Course (COP-CD-22104) Operations Maritime within Cyber 19000 - Aspects Security Course (MOP-MO-22373) Exploitation Site Forensic and Tactical Collection Biometrics Maritime 18000 - Course (ETE-IT-34432) Instructor Technical Trainers the Train 17000 - Course (MOP-MO-22078) Operations Joint of Aspects 16000 -Maritime Course of support in MIO in Issues Team Handling Migrant 15000 - Course (IED-ED-32008) Disposal IED Maritime 14000 - Course Manage to Efforts International of support in MIO in Issues Team Command 13000 - Course (IED-ED-31904) Operations Interdiction Maritime in C-IED 12000 - Course (MOP-MO-32012) Sea at Trafficking Illicit Countering of Support in MIO 10000 - Course Course 7000 - MIO in support of Counter Piracy Ops (MOP-MO-31210) (MOP-MO-31210) Piracy Ops Counter of support in MIO 7000 - Course (MOP-MO-21208) Terminology Course Operational Maritime 5000 - Course (MOP-MO-31205) Issues Practical Team Boarding 3000 - Course (MOP-MO-21203) Issues Theoritical Team Boarding 2000 - Course (MOP-MO-31201) Issues MIO Team Command 1000 - Course Course 20000 - MIO in Support of Managing Perilous Security Incidents on Coastal Critical Sites (SOF-SO-36734) Sites Critical on Coastal Incidents Security Perilous Managing of Support in MIO 20000 - Course (IED-ED-31679) Protection Force Maritime in Considerations C-IED 8000 - Course (WMD-MD-31209) MIO in Destruction Mass of Weapons 6000 - Course Request) (Upon (MOP-MO-31207) Exercise Tactical Final MIO 4000 - Course 23 3 1 F T T F 1 1 1 1 25

2 5 New Year's day WK 39 WK Training Courses Training WK 26 WK S S F F 2 2 2 2 S S S S 3 3 3 3 M M S S 4 4 4 4 M M T T 5 5 5 5 25 3 W W T T 6 6 6 Holy Water Rites 6 WK 40 WK 01 WK 10 International Efforts to Manage the Migrant and Refugee Crisis at Sea at Crisis and Refugee Migrant the Manage to Efforts International (MOP-MO-22015) Sea at Crisis and Refugee Migrant the 7 W W T T 7 7 7 7 WK 27 WK 14 WK 1 F T T F 8 8 8 8 S S F F 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 S S S S Tailored Trainings Tailored 11 11 11 11 M M S S 12 12 12 12 M M T T 15 3 14 17 12 16 13 13 13 13 W W T T WK 41 WK 02 WK 12 9 8 1 14 14 14 14 W W T T OCTOBER JANUARY WK 28 WK 15 WK APRIL 15 15 15 15 F T T F JULY 16 16 16 16 S S F F 17 17 17 17 S S S S 18 18 18 18 M M S S 2 19 19 19 19 M M T T 17 14 NATO Events 1 20 20 20 20 W W T T WK 42 WK 03 WK 27 27 2 8 21 21 21 21 W W T T 3 WK 29 WK 16 WK 22 22 22 22 F T T F 23 23 23 23 S S F F 24 24 24 24 S S S S 25 25 25 25 M M S S 26 26 26 26 M M T T Exercise MTTs / 3 27 27 27 27 W W T T WK 43 WK 17 WK 04 WK 8 28 28 28 28 W W WK 30 WK T T

National Day 8 29 29 29 29 F T T F 30 30 30 30 S S F Holy Friday F 31 31 31 S S S

NOV MAY NMIOTC Program Work 2021 (NPOW of 2021) M WK 17 WK S 1 1 AUG Holy Saturday FEB M S S T 1 2 1 2 Easter Trial Courses 18 W M M T 2 3 2 3

WK 44 WK Easter's Monday 5 1 W T T T 3 4 3 4 WK 05 WK W W T F 4 5 4 5 WK 31 WK 18 WK S 6 T T F 5 6 5 S S 7 F F 6 7 6 M S S S 8 7 8 7 ACTIVITIES 15 12 18 17 16 14 13 11 10 13 9 7 5 3 2 1 8 6 4 M S S T 9 8 9 8 19 28 20 Core Planning Team Activation (CPTA) / Scripting Workshop (SWS) / (SWS) / Workshop Scripting (CPTA) / Activation Team Planning Core Marines Recon Force Visit Site ACCI Visit - Survey Course Instructor SOF NSOS Embassy British Course EEZ Course International College Defence National Hellenic CDMD WG COE CJOS Seminar Maritime Security in Perpectives Gender Cyber HotSummer School (NPS) Symposium Policy Nuclear NMIOTC Annual Conference (NMIOTC) NAB OSG in Brief in OSG Cyber Gordian Knot Conference Security Cyber Alliance Crypto Task Force Meeting Force Task Crypto Alliance 2022-1 Interest Steadfast Exercise SHAPE (IPC) for Conference Planning Initial AFRICOM Visit Site NCB (HNGS) Conference - Meeting - Conference 10 # W M M T 9 9 WK 45 WK 11 10 10 11 W T T T WK 06 WK 12 11 11 12 1 W W T F 2 WK 32 WK 19 WK 13 12 12 13 S T T F NOVEMBER FEBRUARY 14 13 13 14 S S F F 15 14 14 15 M S S S AUGUST MAY 16 15 15 16 M S S T Virgin Mary's Day 20 7 17 16 16 17 W M M T WK 46 WK 18 17 17 18 W T T T WK 07 WK 1 1 6 19 18 18 19 W W T F WK 33 WK 20 WK Unit Training Unit 20 19 19 20 S T T F 12 21 20 20 21 S S Hel Arm Forces Day F F 22 21 21 22 M S S S 23 22 22 23 M T S S 24 16 14 W 23 23 24 M M T 1 WK 47 WK 25 24 24 25 W T T T WK 08 WK 18 10 26 25 25 26 W W F T WK 34 WK WK 21 WK National HolidaysNational EXERCISESMETTs / 27 5 3 1 4 2 26 26 27 S T T F Exercise MARSEC 21 MARSEC Exercise Navy) METT (BGN BREEZE METT Forces) (US Armed EXPRESS PHOENIX Malta METT Malta SEA BREEZE (UKR Navy) METT BREEZE SEA 28 27 27 28 S S F F 29 28 28 29 M S S S 16 14 30 30 30 M T S 4 31 31 M DEC T MAR W M 1 SEP JUN 1 16 14 W T T T 2 2 1 1 WK 48 WK 3 26 4 W W F T 3 3 2 2 11 WK 35 WK 9 WK0 Available Period for Training for Period Available S WK 22 WK 4 T F T 4 3 3 9 S S 5 F F 5 4 4 M S S S 6 6 5 St Nicolas 5 M T S S 7 7 6 6 15 W M M 8 T 8 7 7 WK 49 WK 16 21 W T 9 T T 9 8 8 8 4 12 10 WK 36 WK 10 10 W W F T 9 9 3 7 8 WK 23 WK 10 WK 11 11 10 10 S T F T TAILORED TRAININGS 15 12 14 13 10 16 11 12 9 7 5 3 1 8 6 4 2 12 11 11 S S F F Malta Armed Forces(Resident Course 1000) Malta SOF (ResidentCourse 10000) MaltaArmed Forces(Resident Course 20000) (VBSS) Forces Armed Malta MEU USMC 24 USMC Force Recon DFT Recon USMC Force US DDG ROSS US IRISH SOF TT SOF IRISH E&F TeamSEAL 10 DETRA (US) DETRA GERMAN BTII BEK CT & BT 274 PM ROS E&F TeamSEAL 10 FORMOZA POL NAVY SOF NAVY FORMOZA POL RM RNHMS DEFENDER & ► 13 M 13 12 12 S S S 15 14 14 13 13 M T S S DECEMBER SEPTEMBER MARCH . Updated 23 July 2021 23 July Updated 15 W 15 14 14 M M T 5 Ash Monday JUNE WK 50 WK 17 21 11 16 8 5 16 15 15 W T T T WK 37 WK 15 3 Evaluation of Courses / Maintenance / Courses of Evaluation 17 17 16 16 W W F T WK 24 WK 11 WK 18 18 17 17 S T F T 19 19 18 18 S S F F 20 M 20 19 19 S S S 21 21 20 20 M T S S 13 22 W 22 21 21 M M T

WK 51 WK Holy Spirit Day 23 5 23 22 22 W T T T WK 38 WK 24 5 24 23 23 W W F T 4 WK 25 WK 12 WK 25 25 24 24 S T F Christmas National day T 26 26 25 25 S S F Boxing Day F 27 M 27 26 26 S S S 28 28 27 27 M T S S WK 52 WK 7 29 W 2 29 28 28 M M WK 39 WK T 23 1 WK 26 WK 13 WK 25 30 6 6 5 30 29 29 W T T T 4 2 31 3 31 30 30 W W F T

66 NMIOTC Souda Bay 732 00 Chania Crete, GREECE

Phone: +30 28210 85710 Email: [email protected] [email protected]

Webpage: www.nmiotc.nato.int

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