Rwanda Burundi

COUNTRY REPORT

Rwanda Burundi

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4th quarter 1999

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ISSN 1465-6418

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Printed and distributed by Redhouse Press Ltd, Unit 151, Dartford Trade Park, Dartford, Kent DA1 1QB, UK Contents

3 Summary

Rwanda

5 Political structure 6 Economic structure 7 Outlook for 2000-01 9 The political scene 14 Economic policy and the economy 17 Foreign trade and payments

Burundi

19 Political structure 20 Economic structure 21 Outlook for 2000-01 23 The political scene 28 Economic policy and the economy 30 Foreign trade and payments

31 Quarterly indicators and trade data

List of tables

17 Rwanda: foreign reserves 29 Burundi: estimated cereal supply and demand, 1999 marketing year 30 Burundi: foreign reserves 31 Rwanda: quarterly indicators of economic activity 31 Burundi: quarterly indicators of economic activity 32 Rwanda: foreign trade 33 Burundi: foreign trade

List of figures

9 Rwanda: gross domestic product 23 Burundi: gross domestic product

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September 24th 1999 Summary

4th quarter 1999

Rwanda

Outlook for 2000-01 The RPF will be concerned that its clashes with the Ugandan army in Kisangani will have long-term consequences for relations between the two countries. A high-profile genocide trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Tanzania is expected to attract prominent witnesses from the former government of President Juvénal Habyarimana. The Rwandan government will be granted access to the second year of its enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) by the IMF in November. The government is expected to conclude a key policy document with the IMF and World Bank concerning the pursuit of economic reforms. Real GDP growth will remain buoyant over the forecast period, reaching 8% in 2000 and 7% in 2001 as a result of the high inflow of donor funds and strong performances of the services sector and agriculture.

The political scene Tensions between the Ugandan and Rwandan armies have resulted in open conflict in the town of Kisangani, Democratic Republic of Congo. The Uganda- backed faction of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, has been forced out of Kisangani. Meanwhile, the Rwandan vice-president, Paul Kagame, and the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, have attempted to limit the damage from the incident. Mr Kagame has outlined a security strategy in Congo. Security has improved in the north- west region. The Assemblée nationale has held government ministers to account for misappropriation of funds. The trial of the Catholic bishop, Augustin Misago, charged with genocide, has opened in Kigali. A new chief prosecutor has been appointed to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Tanzania.

Economic policy and the The IMF has indicated that it is satisfied with the government’s economic economy management during the first year of its three-year ESAF agreement. Fiscal revenue was lower than expected in the first half of 1999, and the government has consequently announced a 15% cut in budgetary spending for this year. Import tariffs have been raised for manufactured goods. Agricultural production has been poor during the second harvest in eastern areas of the country. Rwanda has become Uganda’s largest export market. The government has announced that it will clear external debt arrears.

Burundi

Outlook for 2000-01 The Arusha peace talks in Tanzania will resume in October. However, the Hutu militias will remain excluded from the Arusha talks. The talks will not bring an end to the war, although a compromise agreement on internal reforms and a transition programme are likely to emerge. Talks on direct negotiations between the government and the Hutu rebels will take place, exacerbating

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divisions within Frodebu. The war will intensify in the lead-up to the Arusha talks. International donors are likely to resume assistance to Burundi in 2000 following an agreement in Arusha. Real GDP growth will increase over 2000-01 in response to the resumption of balance-of-payments support and other foreign assistance.

The political scene The sixth round of peace talks at Arusha in Tanzania has been postponed until the end of October. The major parties involved in Arusha have met in advance to discuss the outlines of an agreement on internal reforms. The government has initiated discussions on bilateral talks with the Hutu rebels. Divisions have worsened between the internal and external wings of Frodebu. The war has intensified and attacks have increased in and around the capital, Bujumbura. More than 200,000 people have been moved in the government’s counter- insurgency operations. South Africa has taken a growing interest in Burundian affairs. Reforms have been carried out in the Ministry of Justice.

Economic policy and the The Burundian franc has weakened on the parallel market. Privatisation has economy proceeded slowly. Agricultural production has declined during the second harvest. Preparations have been made for a meeting of Burundi’s international donors in October.

Late note One uncertainty surrounding the Arusha peace talks is the need to find a new mediator acceptable to all sides. The death in London on October 14th of the Tanzanian ex-president, Julius Nyerere, who had mediated the talks so far, will add further obstacles to the progress and scheduling of the next round. Given Nyerere’s ill-health, other mediators had been proposed, including the Malawian president, Bakili Muluzi, but it is unclear whether he, or any other mediator, will be acceptable to all parties to the negotiations.

Editor: Douglas Mason All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 Next report: Our next Country Report will be published in March

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Rwanda

Political structure

Official name République Rwandaise

Form of state Unitary republic

Legal system Based on Belgian law, the June 1991 constitution and the Arusha accords of August 1993

National legislature Assemblée nationale, with 70 members, appointed by the government in consultation with party leaders

National elections December 1988 (presidential and legislative); next elections: no date has yet been set

Head of state President, Pasteur Bizimungu, appointed by the RPF on July 17th 1994

National government Self-appointed in July 1994; consists of ministers from the RPF, MDR, PSD, PL and PCD; last reshuffle February 1999

Main political parties Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF); Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR); Rassemblement pour le retour des réfugiés et la démocratie au Rwanda (RDR); Forces de résistance pour la démocratie (FRD); Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR); Parti centriste démocrate (PCD); Parti libéral (PL); Parti social démocrate (PSD)

President Pasteur Bizimungu (RPF) Prime minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema (MDR) Vice-president, minister of defence & national security Paul Kagame (RPF)

Key ministers Agriculture, animal resources & forestry Ephraim Kabaija (RPF) Commerce, industry & tourism Marc Rugenera (PSD) Communications Charles Ntakirutinka (PSD) Education Emmanuel Mudidi (RPF) Energy, water & natural resources Bonaventure Niyibizi (independent) Finance & economic planning Donald Kaberuka (independent) Foreign affairs & regional co-operation Augustin Iyamuremye (PSD) Health Ezechias Rwabuhihi (RPF) Information vacant Interior & community development Abdulkarim Harelimana (RPF) Justice Jean de Dieu Mucyo (independent) Lands, human resettlement & environmental protection Joseph Nsengimana (PL) Local government Desire Nyandwi (PSD) President’s office Patrick Mazimhaka (RPF) Public works, transport & communications Vincent Biruta (PSD) Public service & labour Jean Damascene Nayinzira (PCD) Social affairs Charles Ntakirutinka (PSD) Youth, culture & sports François Ngarambe (RPF)

Central bank governor François Mutemberezi

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Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a GDP at market prices (Rwfr bn) 165.1 347.7 427.0 561.6 651.6 Real GDP growth (%) –49.0 24.6 11.8 13.0 10.5 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 64.0 22.0 9.0 7.4 10.0 Population (m) 5.80 5.95 6.20 7.80 8.08 Exports fob ($ m) 42.2 56.7 61.7 93.2 82.1 Imports fob ($ m) 480.6 219.1 218.5 245.6 235.9 Current-account balance ($ m) –60.4 57.5 –7.1 –92.7 –120.0 Reserves excl gold (year-end; $ m) 32.0 125.8 154.8 153.3 168.8b Total external debt (year-end; $ m) 1,038 1,064 1,111 1,164 1,200 External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 11.6 20.8 20.4 42.0 35.0 Green coffee productionc (‘000 tonnes) 13.1 15.1 21.1 14.8 13.0 Exchange rate (av; Rwfr:$) 150.0a 262.2 306.8 301.5 312.3b

September 24th 1999 Rwfr333.7:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1997 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1997 % of total Agriculture 35.7 Private consumption 94.5 Industry 23.9 Public consumption 8.9 Services 40.1 Gross fixed capital formation 15.0 Others (incl import taxes) 0.3 Exports of goods & services 5.9 Total 100.0 Imports of goods & services –24.3 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1997 $ m Principal imports cif 1997 $ m Coffee 45.2 Intermediate goods 70.4 Tea 20.7 Capital goods 63.1 Hides 4.6 Food 55.1 Cassiterite (tin ore) 3.7 Energy 31.2

Main destinations of exports 1997d % of total Main origins of imports 1997d % of total Belgium-Luxembourg 36.1 Tanzania 14.8 Germany 20.6 Kenya 14.0 Netherlands 4.1 US 11.1 UK 2.0 Belgium-Luxembourg 8.3 US 1.0 Germany 5.1 a EIU estimates based on IMF, World Bank and national data. b Actual. c Crop years (April-March) starting in year stated. d Based on partners’ trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error.

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Outlook for 2000-01

Rwanda’s victory in Rwanda’s political agenda will continue to be dominated by its involvement in Kisangani may prove the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its strategy in Congo, however, is likely to costly— be weakened by the deterioration in relations with its main ally in the conflict, Uganda. Rwanda appears to have been the decisive military victor over Uganda in clashes on August 14th-16th between the two countries’ armed forces in the Congolese city of Kisangani, which the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) now occupies. Meanwhile, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba of the Congolese rebel movement, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), whom Uganda recognises as its rightful leader, has been forced to flee the city. Senior politicians in Rwanda are anything but jubilant about this victory, however, as they face its consequences in terms of relations with Uganda. Since it came to power in 1994, the Rwandan government has regarded Uganda as its only reliable African ally, and much of its foreign policy, particularly on Congo, has been premised on Ugandan support. As a result, it has felt able to pursue policies it knows will engender regional hostility, such as its latest Congolese intervention. Now its politicians are wondering if they can count on this support for much longer.

—and Uganda’s alliance Rwanda’s political leaders have long been aware of the domestic political with Rwanda will remain opposition in Uganda to President Yoweri Museveni’s closeness to them. In unpopular— fact, one of the reasons the now-ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 was because Mr Museveni had been under intense domestic pressure to force the Rwandan Tutsi refugees, from which the RPF was drawn, to leave the country. Many of the same Ugandan politicians who wanted the Tutsis to leave then are now denouncing Rwandan “treachery” and “expansionism” in Congo. Although this is troubling to the RPF, the party is more concerned about the shift in opinion within the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF), until now its main ally in the Congo conflict. Although Mr Museveni can afford to ignore politicians in the Ugandan parliament, he cannot do the same with the UPDF, which is the main guarantor of his hold on power.

—but may be saved by close Mr Museveni and the leadership of the RPF, particularly the Rwandan vice- relations at the top president, Paul Kagame, who used to be Mr Museveni’s intelligence chief, are still good friends, and this will prove invaluable in repairing relations between the two countries in the coming months. But Mr Kagame and the rest of the Rwandan government now know that they can no longer count on the UPDF and the Ugandan government to support Rwanda’s war aims in Congo, particularly the central objective of pursuing the Hutu militia group, Peuples en armes pour libérer le Rwanda (Palir). Nor can they count unconditionally on Uganda not to withdraw from Congo before Rwanda does, possibly by cutting a separate deal with Zimbabwe and Angola, which are the Congolese government’s main backers, thus leaving Rwanda dangerously exposed in the region.

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The RPF may rethink its Rwanda has employed an almost exclusively military strategy in Congo, strategy toward the Mai- making little effort to form broad-based political coalitions at a local level that Mai militia might sustain the RCD, its Congolese ally, once the RPA pulls out. The limitations of this strategy are becoming more apparent following the strategic alliance between Palir and the Mai-Mai militias, which are drawn from non- Banyarwanda ethnic groups in North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo. So far the RCD has only offered Mai-Mai fighters an amnesty if they stop fighting against it and join the RCD’s forces instead. This will not prove sufficient to break the Mai-Mai’s alliance with Palir. To achieve this, the Rwandan government will have to prove that it has no territorial ambitions in Congo, but is instead committed to political pluralism in the Kivus. So far there is no sign of such an attempt, and until there is the Mai-Mai will continue to find willing recruits for its fight against what it terms “Rwandan imperialism”.

Corruption investigations The ongoing efforts of the Rwandan Assemblée nationale (parliament) to may result in ministerial expose government corruption are likely to result in ministerial casualties. casualties Most vulnerable are ministers who do not belong to the ruling RPF. This includes the minister of commerce, industry and tourism, Marc Rugenera, and the minister of communications, Charles Ntakirutinka, both members of the Parti social démocrate (PSD). Mr Rugenera is the favourite target of many assembly deputies, especially those from the RPF, because he served as minister of finance under the former president, Juvenal Habyarimana, and is thus tainted by association, compounding any corrupt acts that he may have committed since assuming office in 1994.

A high-profile genocide The trial of Colonel Theoneste Bagasora for genocide crimes at the trial will attract prominent International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania is one witnesses of the most important to date. As a member of Mr Habyarimana’s inner circle, Colonel Bagasora knows better than almost anyone else in detention in Arusha exactly how the genocide was planned and by whom, although as he is pleading not guilty it will be up to the prosecution to prise the information from him. The case should attract high-profile witnesses, including the former commander of the UN forces in Rwanda in 1994, the Canadian general, Romeo Dallaire, who has already gone on record as saying that he regards Colonel Bagasora as one of those most responsible for the genocide. Another potential witness is Rwanda’s prime minister during the genocide, Jean Kambanda, who pleaded guilty before the ICTR and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1998 (4th quarter 1998, page 30).

The IMF’s endorsement will The positive assessment by an IMF mission during August of Rwanda’s increase donor confidence compliance with its enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) means in the economy that Rwanda is likely to be admitted to the second year of the three-year programme. Formal approval of the issue is to be decided by the board of the IMF in November. Ongoing fiscal discipline and monetary control, combined with structural reforms, including privatisation, have served to maintain confidence in the government’s economic policy among the Bretton Woods institutions and other foreign donors. As a result, the high levels of balance-of-payments assistance and other foreign assistance are set to continue over the forecast period.

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Growth will remain robust Real GDP growth is forecast to reach 9% in 1999, reflecting the continuing but is tapering off pursuit of economic reforms. The rapid pace of growth is tapering off to more sustainable levels, but will be maintained by strong performances from the Rwanda: gross domestic product % change, year on year services sector and by ongoing agricultural recovery. 14 Agricultural growth is likely to be strong in 2000, reflecting greater security in Rwanda the country and the resettlement of returned refugees, before levelling off in 12 Sub-Saharan Africa 2001 as a result of binding constraints including population pressures and 10 declining soil fertility. Overall real GDP growth will reflect this levelling-off 8 effect, while still reaching 8% in 2000 and 7% in 2001. Services will continue 6 to be a main engine of expansion, with strong performances from trans-

4 portation and communications. Higher international fuel prices and new import tariffs (see Economic policy and the economy) will put upward pressure 2 on domestic prices. Nonetheless, the government’s commitment to a tight n/a 0 1997(a) 98(a) 99(b) 2000(b) 01(b) monetary stance and apparent determination to meet its commitments with

(a) EIU estimates. (b) EIU forecasts. international financial institutions mean that inflation will remain broadly Source: EIU. within the targets set for the 2000-01 forecast period, at roughly 5%.

Weak prices will dampen Government hopes for growth in commercial agricultural production, the export growth expected source of higher export earnings, are optimistic, given the weak outlook for international prices of Rwanda’s main exports, coffee and tea. The EIU expects the prices of both commodities to decline over 2000-01: the price of coffee is forecast to fall from $1.02/lb in 1999 to 65 cents/lb in 2001, while the price of tea is expected to drop from $1.61/kg to $1.33/kg over the same period. Exports will therefore perform poorly despite increased volumes, rising moderately to $85m in 1999 before falling again in 2000. As a consequence, the overall current-account deficit will widen over the forecast period as economic expansion fuels increased imports.

The political scene

Rwandan and Ugandan Tensions between Rwandan and Ugandan troops active in the Democratic troops clash in Kisangani Republic of Congo exploded into open combat on August 14th-16th in the important eastern Congo city of Kisangani. The clashes initially centred around the airport, but soon spilled over into the city centre, resulting in hundreds of military and civilian casualties, with those of the Ugandan forces reportedly far higher than those of the Rwandan forces. The fighting was brought to a halt following an emergency meeting in the Ugandan town of Mweya between the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, and the Rwandan vice-president and minister of defence, Paul Kagame, on August 17th. The two governments subsequently put out conflicting statements about what had happened in Kisangani, with both accusing the other’s forces of instigating the fighting while at the same time insisting that relations between the two countries remained cordial.

A report on the conflict is An agreement was made at the Mweya meeting that a joint investigation kept secret should be conducted into the causes and circumstances of the clashes. Although the report was completed in early September, its contents have been kept secret. From the little that has been leaked of the report, its authors appear

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to hold the Ugandan army as primarily responsible for the clashes. The Rwandan government has indicated that it would like to see the report published, while the Ugandan army has reportedly initiated its own investigation into the clashes.

Rwanda wanted to drive Regardless of who may have instigated the fighting, the clashes principally Ernest Wamba dia Wamba resulted from the struggle of the two countries to promote competing factions of from the city— the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD). The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) clearly wanted the leader of the Uganda-backed faction of the RCD, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, removed from the city. The RPA also wished to bring Kisangani within the ambit of the RCD-Goma faction, headed by Emile Ilunga and backed by Rwanda.

—and gain control of Also clearly at stake, although not the prime motive for the clashes, was which lucrative business party would have access to the economic opportunities that come with control opportunities of Kisangani, including trade in timber, gold and diamonds, even though, as with most of Congo, this wealth is more potential than actual. Control over resources in Congo has been an important source of revenue for the RPA and a principal means of financing its war there without increasing official defence expenditure.

Uganda has been forced to The Rwandan troops and their Congolese allies now control Kisangani, and the relocate its Congolese Ugandan army has moved the bulk of its forces to Bafwabalinga, about 300 km military headquarters— to the north-east (along a poor road), and has relocated its Congolese headquarters to Gbadolite on the border with the Central African Republic (CAR), which is in the hands of the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba. Meanwhile, Mr Wamba of the RCD has moved to Bunia, which is near the Ugandan border.

—while Rwanda has With Ugandan forces retreating and Mr Wamba having fled the city, Rwanda achieved its aims in has broadly achieved what it wanted in Kisangani. This is certainly how Kisangani Uganda’s political and military elite interpret the Kisangani clashes, and Mr Museveni has since been seeking to convince them that he can and will, if necessary, face up to the Rwandan military. Mr Museveni reportedly told a closed session of the Ugandan parliament on August 30th that he had warned Mr Kagame that if the RPA did not respect the Mweya ceasefire, Uganda would not hesitate to fight back. This has not satisfied some Ugandan army officers, who allegedly accuse Mr Museveni of betrayal because of his orders not to use heavy weaponry in Kisangani. Some senior army officers have also recently told journalists that they regard the RPA as their number one enemy.

Mr Kagame outlines a Mr Kagame, in an address to the Rwandan parliament on August 30th, security strategy in Congo sounded conciliatory, describing the clashes as “deplorable and shameful” and rather implausibly blaming them on Mr Wamba, whom he said had sown confusion between the two armies. In his speech, Mr Kagame also attempted to outline Rwanda’s security interests in Congo, given the fact that the RPA has penetrated deep into Congolese territory far beyond Rwanda’s borders, leading to charges that both it and Uganda are seeking the de facto annexation of the eastern part of the country. In response, Mr Kagame explained that Rwanda’s

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security concerns remained the neutralisation of the Peuple en armes pour la libération du Rwanda (Palir) militia, which is composed of the infamous interahamwe militia and remnants of the former Rwandan army. In support of this objective, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has established two security perimeters. According to Mr Kagame, the first, outer wall runs from Pweto, which is on Congo’s border with Zambia, via Kabinda, which is near Mbuji- Mayi, to Kisangani. The second, inner wall runs the length of North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo, which border Rwanda.

In a sign of hardening attitudes on both sides, the Rwandan government announced on September 1st that its troops would not leave Congo until Palir had been disarmed. A few days earlier, the Zimbabwean government had said that it would not withdraw its troops until Rwanda and Uganda had done so.

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South Kivu “twins” with Many residents of North and South Kivu, particularly from non-Banyarwanda Kigali prefecture ethnic groups like the Hunde, Shi and Tembo, reject Mr Kagame’s “walls” thesis and are convinced that Rwanda’s real intention is to annex their provinces. Thousands have joined the Mai-Mai militia to fight what are termed the Rwandan “invaders”. The RCD-Goma, which controls North and South Kivu, and the Rwandan government insist that Rwanda has no desire to annex Kivu, and are attempting to persuade the Mai-Mai to join the RCD’s own army by offering all their fighters an amnesty. Nonetheless, following the visit on August 22nd-24th to Kigali from an RCD-Goma delegation designed to promote closer co-operation between Rwanda and South Kivu province, an announcement was made that Kigali prefecture and South Kivu were officially “twinned”. Congolese television broadcasting from Kinshasa reported the event as a further indication of Rwanda’s annexation of South Kivu. A few days later Mr Wamba stated publicly that he agreed with this view.

Security has improved Security in Rwanda has undoubtedly improved enormously since the RPA’s inside Rwanda intervention in Congo, particularly in the north-west region, and many residents there say they welcome the RPA’s presence in Congo, given the stability it brings them. Other signs of increasing domestic security include the fact that the lake-side town of Gisenyi is now reportedly safe to walk in at night: Kigali residents are starting to pass weekends there, as was common before Rwanda’s conflict intensified. In an indication that the RPF’s security policies are making gains, the local authorities in rural areas of the north-west have largely succeeded in persuading residents to disassociate themselves from Palir, and many have instead joined local defence forces to combat it. The Rwandan government has stated, however, that it believes that up to 2,000 Palir members have entered the countr among a total of around 13,000 Rwandan refugees who have returned from Congo in the past few months. Another 30,000 refugees are expected to return independently in the near future, according to estimates of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Estimates of the total number of Rwandan refugees remaining in Congo are highly contentious, however, with large discrepancies in figures used by different sources, including the UNHCR and the Rwandan government. Clearly, however, the RPA regards the last refugees remaining in Congo to be those most closely associated with the ex-government and the interahamwe militia. Also of concern in the north-west region is the fact that agricultural production, which used to be the highest in Rwanda, has yet to come anywhere near precrisis levels, in part because of this year’s drought (see Economic policy and the economy).

The Assemblée nationale The Assemblée nationale (parliament) has begun to exercise the powers it holds ministers to account gained in November 1997 to hold the government to account (1st quarter 1998, page 27) and has been summoning ministers to explain alleged misdeeds. On September 1st the minister of education, Emmanuel Mudidi, admitted to delegates that $3m of a $26m World Bank loan for a four-year educational project granted in 1995 had gone missing. Mr Mudidi denied any personal responsibility, mainly because he only became minister in February 1999, replacing Joseph Karamera, now the ambassador to South Africa (1st quarter 1999, page 13), but assured the assembly that the matter was now

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before Rwanda’s courts. The National Assembly members were not satisfied and have set up their own commission to investigate further. On September 8th Charles Ntakirutinka, the minister of communications, and Marc Rugenera, the minister of commerce, industry and tourism, both of whom are members of the Parti social démocrate (PSD) also appeared before the assembly. The case in question this time dates back to 1997, when the two ministers apparently allowed a business associate to siphon off $1m that was supposed to pay for vehicles for Rwanda’s secret police, the Internal Security Organisation (ISO). The ministers’ responses failed to satisfy the assembly members, and another commission has been set up to investigate.

A Catholic bishop goes on The Rwandan justice system is continuing with the task of prosecuting trial for genocide— genocide crimes, and so far 1,500 people have been brought to trial––resulting in roughly 300 death sentences––out of an estimated 123,000 currently in detention on genocide charges. Two trials were recently concluded in Rushashi and Gikongoro, resulting in 32 convictions and 7 acquittals. The most prominent case, however, is currently that of the Roman Catholic bishop of Gikongoro, Augustin Misago, who was arrested on April 14th on charges of genocide (2nd quarter 1999, page 11). The case is widely seen as a showdown between the government and the powerful Catholic Church in Rwanda, which has declined to conduct an internal inquiry into its role in the genocide and has denied complicity in it. The trial began on August 20th in Kigali and is being attended by senior Vatican officials. Attempts by Mr Misago’s defence counsel, Alfred Pognon, to have the case dismissed and Mr Misago released on bail were rejected by the court. Mr Pognon also argued that the case was part of a government campaign of harassment and intimidation against the Catholic Church. Mr Misago testified that he had attended security meetings during the 1994 genocide in which the massacres were allegedly planned, stating that as a Christian leader, he was allowed to meet anybody. The trial was postponed until late September.

—as does a senior military Another prominent genocide trial got under way on August 13th at the officer in Arusha— International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, for Colonel Theoneste Bagasora, who is pleading not guilty on all counts. Colonel Bagasora is the most senior member of the former Rwandan Army, Forces armées du Rwanda (FAR), to be detained in Arusha, and in 1994 was a member of the akazu, the innermost clique surrounding then-president, Juvenal Habyarimana, which is believed to have master-minded the genocide (2nd quarter 1996, pages 25-26). Colonel Bagasora is also thought to have played a main role in the killing of ten Belgian paratroopers in April 1994, which ultimately precipitated the departure of the entire UN military contingent in Rwanda (2nd quarter 1994, pages 21 and 24). Colonel Bagasora was arrested in Cameroon in March 1996 and extradited to Arusha in January 1997. His lawyers intend to call the former head of the Kigali army barracks, Bernard Ntuyahaga, as a defence witness. Mr Ntuyahaga is in detention in Tanzania while the Tanzanian government considers Rwanda’s request for his extradition (3rd quarter 1999, page 14). His lawyers appealed to the ICTR to try to block the extradition on the grounds that Mr Ntuyahaga’s life could be in danger, but this was turned down.

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—and four former cabinet The ICTR has also initiated proceedings against prominent politicians in the ministers previous Rwandan government in recent months. Two cabinet ministers in the transitional government that ruled the country during the genocide, Prosper Mugiraneza and Justin Mugenzi, pleaded not guilty to four genocide charges before the ICTR on August 17th, while another former minister, Jerome Bicamumpaka, had a not guilty plea entered for him after he failed to enter any plea at all. The former health minister, Casmir Bizimungu, who has been indicted on one of the four charges, pleaded not guilty on September 3rd.

The ICTR has a new chief The former ICTR chief prosecutor, Louise Arbour (3rd quarter 1999, page 15), prosecutor was replaced by Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss national, on August 9th. Before her resignation, Ms Arbour visited Rwanda and told the Rwandan supreme court president, Simeon Rwagasore, that she believed some ICTR trials should be held in Rwanda, and not just in Arusha. Meanwhile, the team appointed by the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, in May 1999 to investigate the UN’s role in the 1994 genocide (3rd quarter 1999, page 15) arrived in Kigali on September 1st on a fact-finding mission, and is due to deliver its report at the end of the year. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) eminent persons’ group investigating the genocide arrived on September 14th and met with senior Rwandan politicians.

Anglophone students Some 200 English-speaking post-secondary students took to the streets of Kigali protest at having to learn on August 17th to protest against having to study in French. Although the French students had applied for permission to demonstrate, Kigali’s mayor had not yet replied to their request, so the police ruled the march illegal and violently broke up the protest. Some of the demonstrators were later expelled from university. When Rwanda’s university re-opened in 1995 it was envisaged that half of the courses would be taught in French, but according to the authorities, some 80% are currently taught in English. Francophone students, who have the most adapting to do, are apparently keen to learn English, in sharp contrast with their anglophone counterparts.

Economic policy and the economy

The IMF is satisfied with The government concluded discussions with a mission of the IMF on August Rwanda’s first year under 29th regarding its compliance with conditions of the enhanced structural the ESAF— adjustment facility (ESAF) agreed in June 1998 (3rd quarter 1998, page 33). The mission concluded that although not all targets had been met, the government had broadly complied with the agreement. One sensitive issue was clearly the government’s defence budget, which has swelled as a result of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, although the minister of finance and economic planning, Donald Kaberuka, was at pains to stress that Rwanda had not exceeded its target of keeping defence spending under 4.5% of GDP. Formal approval for the second year of the ESAF programme will be decided by the board of the IMF in November.

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—and is negotiating a The government is also working to conclude a policy framework paper (PFP) policy document with both the IMF and the World Bank establishing a framework for the government’s main macroeconomic targets and policy reform measures. Rwanda’s first PFP was approved in June 1998, but must be updated annually. Currently, the main areas of policy agreed with the international financial institutions have been macroeconomic stabilisation, fiscal measures to raise revenue and improve the efficiency of public resource management, and the promotion of private-sector development, agricultural growth and rural development. The government missed its earlier target to conclude the PFP in July, but it is expected that an agreement will be reached by the end of October.

The RPF unveils a 20-year In an apparent measure of the party’s confidence of staying in power, the economic plan economic commission of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) announced in August a 20-year development plan to begin in January 2000. The plan’s distinctly ambitious objectives include raising Rwanda’s per head income from roughly $250 currently to $5,000 by 2020, and reducing the proportion of the population below the poverty line by more than one-half, to under 20% of the population. The plan also envisages raising Rwanda’s export earnings from $82m in 1998 to $200m by 2005, of which one-quarter should be from non- traditional sources.

Revenue is lower than Following a sharp revenue shortfall in the first half of 1999, Mr Kaberuka expected— presented revisions to the 1999 budget to the Assemblée nationale (parliament) on July 15th. The budget had originally been presented to the assembly in November 1998 (1st quarter 1999, page 18). Mr Kaberuka reported that receipts were 10-15% lower than anticipated in the first half of the year, at Rwafr73bn-77bn ($218m-231m), compared with an original budget forecast of Rwafr86bn. The revenue shortfall was blamed on lower-than-expected customs receipts, a major part of state revenue, owing in part to the doubling of freight costs caused by new transport regulations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (1st quarter 1999, page 21). In addition, new excise duties introduced in the 1999 budget on beverages, cigarettes and fuel have not delivered as much revenue as was at first expected.

—resulting in spending cuts Although government spending is within budget limits, and only 27% of a total budget of Rwafr171bn had been spent by mid-July, Mr Kaberuka expressed the concern that large upcoming expenses, including those for new diplomatic missions abroad and government commissions at home, combined with the revenue shortfall, would substantially raise the fiscal deficit. As a result, a 15% cut in government expenditure was announced, with the exception of the social sectors and debt service, which would be increased (see Foreign trade and payments). Despite the shortfall in domestic revenue, external budgetary support is on schedule, with $51m of the $120m pledged for 1999 disbursed by mid-July.

The government announces Mr Kaberuka also announced significant changes in the tariff regime and, by increased tariff extension, government policy towards the domestic manufacturing sector. At protection— the beginning of the year Mr Kaberuka stated that this sector had been

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cushioned by protective tariffs for too long and should be opened to com- petition, allowing consumers to reap the benefit of cheaper products from abroad (1st quarter 1999, page 19). In July, however, Mr Kaberuka announced a 15% surcharge on the import of finished and semi-finished goods, which would stay in place for an 18-month period in order to allow more time for Rwandan manufacturers to adjust. The charges would also earn the state an extra Rwafr2bn in revenue.

—to the displeasure of The policy reversal was received poorly by importers, including the Rwanda commercial importers Chamber of Commerce, whose president, Tribert Rujugiro, complained of a lack of consultation over the measure. Milk importers also complained, as this product will now be subject to a 50% increase in the import surcharge, from Rwafr200 (60 cents)/litre to Rwafr300/litre. They have also complained that the Rwanda Revenue Authority has scrapped a former provision allowing 40% of milk imports to be exempted from tax. Rwanda reportedly produces 3,000 litres of milk a day, but imports a further 12,000 litres from Uganda. The Ministry of Agriculture has defended the tariffs, claiming that Uganda is dumping its surplus on Rwanda and arguing that the tariffs are necessary to help build domestic production capacity. In support of this goal, 3,000 dairy cows are to be imported from Europe over the next two years.

Fuel prices rise despite the In early August fuel retailers raised the price of petrol from Rwafr230/litre to displeasure of the Rwafr265/litre, citing increased freight costs as the reason. Bus fares increased government immediately, as much as doubling in Kigali, from Rwafr50 to Rwafr100. The government, which is particularly mistrustful of the local fuel industry, denounced the price increases as illegal and called a meeting with the main industry representatives on August 5th. Afterwards, the government claimed that a compromise price of Rwafr240/litre for petrol had been agreed, although this price failed to stick with retailers. At another meeting on August 23rd the government apparently conceded its inability to fix the fuel price by diktat and agreed with retailers a new price of Rwafr260.

Poor rains harm prospects The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is anticipating poor crop for the 1999 harvest production in many areas for the 1999 second (or B) season harvest, which is now nearly complete. Rains began late and ended earlier than usual this year, particularly in eastern areas. As a result, eastern Rwanda is currently experiencing drought conditions, particularly in the normally dry Umutara prefecture, much of which used to be the Akagera national park before it was given over to cultivation in 1994. Some residents have reportedly already moved out in search of water and better pastures. In the south-eastern prefecture of Kibungo, the harvest is apparently 65% lower than last year’s. The Rwandan government and humanitarian agencies are preparing interventions to cope with the drought, and the Italian government donated $1.2m for this purpose in August. Despite drought conditions for the second season harvest in some areas, the better conditions during the first season, combined with improved security, mean that overall agricultural output will be healthy during the 1998-99 crop year.

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Malnutrition is widespread Despite the re-establishment of security in the north-west prefectures of in the north-west Gisenyi and Ruhengeri (see The political scene), which has enabled the resumption of agricultural production in about 60% of the area cultivated before the crisis, nutritional conditions have been negatively affected by the late distribution of agricultural inputs to formerly displaced people in the critical planting months of January-March. A nutritional survey carried out in Gisenyi in late July together by several agencies indicated that 60% of those surveyed suffered from chronic malnutrition, compared with a national average of 42%, and that 79% of households surveyed lacked any food stocks at all. The survey did not cover Ruhengeri, but its authors estimated that similar conditions were present there. The UN appealed for $19.6m in aid for the north-west region in July, including $6.9m in food aid, to cover funding gaps from a previous appeal.

New transportation Efforts to create a dry port for Rwandan goods transiting Tanzania at Isaka are initiatives are announced proceeding (3rd quarter 1999, page 16). The port, which will be managed by the Tanzania Railways Corporation, is due to open by October. Its managers claim that by reducing both transportation times and bureaucratic hurdles, the port could reduce transport costs from Dar es Salaam to Kigali by as much as 40%. On August 31st Rwanda Airlines and Air Burundi announced the launch of a weekly flight to Brussels from Kigali and Bujumbura. The airlines will be using a leased aeroplane from Ethiopia Airlines.

Foreign trade and payments

Rwanda is Uganda’s main Rwanda has become Uganda’s main trading partner in terms of exports, export market replacing Kenya and Tanzania, it was reported in July. Ugandan exports to Rwanda, which include electricity, foodstuffs and processed products, doubled between 1994 and 1996, from $20.6m to $42.4m. However, according to official data, Rwandan exports to Uganda remain negligible.

Foreign-exchange reserves According to the most recent IMF data, Rwanda’s foreign-exchange reserves increase have continued to increase, reaching $152m at the end of June 1999, reflecting ongoing donor support to the government and increased foreign-exchange inflows. Since 1994 the international community has provided in excess of $2bn for reconstruction efforts in Rwanda.

Rwanda: foreign reserves ($m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1998 1999 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr Foreign exchange 124.56 124.81 129.62 144.31 138.43 152.51 SDRs 26.13 24.70 25.24 24.44 21.88 18.61 Reserve position in the IMF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total reserves (excl gold) 150.69 149.51 154.86 168.75 160.30 171.12 Import covera (months) 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.6 a EIU estimates.

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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Debt arrears to be cleared In a budget revision announced to parliament in July, the minister of finance and economic planning, Donald Kaberuka, stated that the government will increase its allocation for external debt-service expenditure in order to clear arrears with bilateral lenders and make Rwanda eligible for fresh debt reduction. Rwanda has also received debt relief from the US government, which pledged $5m to Rwanda’s debt trust fund. Rwanda currently pays about $40m annually in debt-service payments on an external debt of $1.2bn. Mr Kaberuka promised that the funds released from debt payments by this contribution would be allocated in 2000.

Aid briefs

• On August 24th the Dutch government announced that it had given the UN Development Programme administered trust fund for Rwanda $6.7m for the strengthening of educational institutions and the civil service.

• On August 13th Rwanda and OPEC resumed bilateral relations, and the organisation agreed to release $18m that had been allocated before 1994. Most of the money will be used to import fuel products.

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Burundi

Political structure

Official name République du Burundi

Form of state Unitary republic

Legal system Based on Belgian law and the transitional constitution approved in June 1998

National legislature Assemblée nationale, with 121 members, 81 of whom were elected in 1993 and the rest appointed in 1998

National elections June 1993 (presidential and legislative); next election: date not yet set

Head of state President, currently Major Pierre Buyoya

National government Appointed by Mr Buyoya in June 1998

Main political parties Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu); Union pour le progrès national (Uprona, formerly the sole legal party); Parti du peuple (PP); Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social (Raddes); Rassemblement du peuple burundais (RPB); Parti pour le redressement national (Parena); Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD)

First vice-president Frederic Bamvuginyumvira Second vice-president Mathias Sinamenye

Key ministers Agriculture Salvator Ntihabose Civil service & labour Emmanuel Tungamwese Commerce, industry & tourism Darius Nahayo Communal development Gaspard Ntirampeba Defence Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Nkurunziza Development & reconstruction Leon Nimbona Education Prosper Mpawenayo Energy & mines Bernard Barandereka Finance Astere Girukwigomba Foreign affairs & co-operation Severin Ntahomvukiye Health Juma Mohamed Kariburyo Human rights & institutional reform Eugene Nindorera Information & government spokesman Luc Rukingama Interior & public security Colonel Ascension Twagiramungu Justice Terence Sinunguruza Land & environment Jean-Pacifique Nsengiyumva Peace process Ambroise Niyumbasa Public works & housing Denis Nshimirimana Resettlement of refugees & displaced persons Pascal Nkurunziza Transport & telecommunications Colonel Epitace Bayaganakandi Women, welfare & social affairs Romaine Ndorimana Youth, sports & culture Gerard Nyamwiza

Central bank governor Gregoire Banyiyezako

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Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a GDP at market prices (Bufr bn) 233.3 249.9 272.6 337.3 425.1 Real GDP growth (%) –18.0 –7.3 –8.4 0.4 4.5 Consumer price inflationb (av; %) 14.8 19.3 26.4 31.0 17.0 Populationc (m) 5.87 5.98 6.09 6.20 6.31 Exports fobd ($ m) 80.7 112.5 40.1 87.3 49.0 Imports fobd ($ m) 172.6 175.6 100.0 97.9 102.6 Current-account balance ($ m) –16.9 –7.8 –40.3 4.0 –33.3 Reserves excl gold (year-end; $ m) 204.7 209.5 139.6 104.4 65.5e Total external debt (year-end; $ m) 1,108 1,183 1,175 1,183 1,200 External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 39.6 27.7 123.4 44.6 61.2 Green coffee productionf (‘000 tonnes) 20.9 30.2 14.5 31.8 16.5 Exchange rate (av; Bufr:$) 252.7 249.8 302.8 352.4 447.8e September 24th 1999 Bufr614.15 :$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1997 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1997 % of total Agriculture 53.3 Private consumption 81.6 Industry 10.1 Public consumption 14.5 Manufacturing 6.6 Gross domestic investment 8.1 Services 30.0 Exports of goods & services 10.0 GDP at factor cost 100.0 Imports of goods & services –14.2 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1997 $ m Principal imports cif 1997 $ m Coffee 45.2 Intermediate goods 70.4 Tea 20.7 Capital goods 63.1 Hides 4.6 Food 55.1 Cassiterite (tin ore) 3.7 Energy 31.2

Main destinations of exports 1997g % of total Main origins of imports 1997g % of total Belgium-Luxembourg 36.1 Tanzania 14.8 Germany 20.6 Kenya 14.0 Netherlands 4.1 US 11.1 UK 2.0 Belgium-Luxembourg 8.3 US 1.0 Germany 5.1 a EIU estimates based on IMF, World Bank and national data. b Consumer price index for Bujumbura. c Mid-year estimates. d Balance-of- payments basis. e Actual. f Crop years (April-March) starting in year stated. g Based on partners’ trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error.

Outlook for 2000-01

The Arusha peace process The lack of progress of the Arusha peace process in bringing Burundi’s war to will not end the war— an end makes it increasingly unlikely that talks will be extended when the current round, scheduled to begin at the end of October, comes to a close. Most of the Burundian parties represented in the negotiations have publicly expressed a lack of confidence in the talks, aside from those whose own power and relevance derive from participation in them. International donors, who have funded the talks, have so far linked a resumption of assistance for Burundi to serious progress (3rd quarter 1999, page 22). In the absence of a peace agreement they are likely to withdraw this condition in order that aid can resume in 2000.

—although an agreement The prospect that a comprehensive settlement bringing the war to an end will may emerge— not emerge from the Arusha negotiations is causing many of the concerned parties to reassess the way forward. There is a growing expectation that the talks may instead result in agreement on a blueprint for Burundi’s transition to democracy, including guidelines for the electoral process and the trans- formation of key state institutions such as the judiciary, civil service and, perhaps, the armed forces. Discussion of the armed forces, however, will be compromised by the absence of the Hutu militias, since the integration of their fighters into the Burundian armed forces, a main demand of rebel groups, is strongly resisted by Burundi’s armed forces. Despite these shortcomings, it should be possible to present the agreements that come out of Arusha as sufficient to justify an announcement by donors of a resumption of balance-of- payments support and other development assistance early in 2000.

Late note: One uncertainty surrounding the Arusha peace talks is the need to find a new mediator acceptable to all sides. The death in London on October 14th of the Tanzanian ex-president, Julius Nyerere, who had mediated the talks so far, will add further obstacles to the progress and scheduling of the next round. Given Nyerere’s ill-health, other mediators had been proposed, including the Malawian president, Bakili Muluzi, but it is unclear whether he, or any other mediator, will be acceptable to all parties to the negotiations.

—and direct talks with the It is unlikely that the talks will include Burundi’s Hutu rebel militias, the rebels are expected continued exclusion of whom has been the greatest weakness of the negotiations, as no realistic end to the fighting is considered possible without their co-operation. Direct bilateral negotiations between the militias and the government therefore seem increasingly likely. The last time direct talks between the two parties were attempted, in 1997, the process collapsed almost as soon as it became public (2nd quarter 1997, pages 35-36). This was primarily because Tutsi political opinion was unprepared to accept negotiations with “genocidaires”, and the president, Pierre Buyoya, was not strong enough at that time to ignore these pressures. Today, the Tutsi political elite is more divided on the issue, with an influential portion accepting the need for talks in order to stop the war. Furthermore, this time round the predominantly Hutu Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu) is in government too, which should make negotiations between the government and the Hutu rebels less polarised than

before. However, rebel negotiators have in the past been uncompromising, demanding tight timetables for the resignation of the government and the integration of their fighters into the Burundian armed forces, while being unprepared to organise a ceasefire in the interim. A ceasefire is a prerequisite for the talks to succeed, as if ordinary Burundians, and the Tutsi political elite in particular, cannot see immediate benefits as a result, they will withdraw their support, with the likely consequence that the talks will have to be abandoned once again.

Frodebu is ill-prepared for Frodebu is ill-prepared for talks between the government and rebel groups government talks with because of growing divisions between its external and internal wings and from the rebels among the leading members of the internal wing itself. This will make the leading internal Frodebuists vulnerable to criticism from the Hutu rebels and other Frodebuists if they are seen to be compromising too much, in addition to the traditional mistrust they encounter from Tutsi political leaders. None of this will help their already shaky political partnership with Mr Buyoya. However, the partnership is still capable of delivering benefits, particularly in reform of the important areas of justice and public administration, where Frodebu’s long-standing concerns are to achieve greater representation and influence for the Hutu majority.

Rwandan and Burundian Whatever the outcome of the talks between Burundi’s rebel groups and the security co-operation will government, the rebels will continue to work closely with their Rwandan deepen— counterparts. Both groups regard Burundi and Rwanda as rightfully Hutu, but dominated by an entrenched Tutsi elite, and have done their utmost to spread this view in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite some success in this regard in 1994-98, there are now signs that Congolese Hutu are rejecting this view in favour of a renewed tactical alliance with Congolese Tutsis against other tribes hostile to the presence of both Hutus and Tutsis in Congo’s eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. This makes regaining control of Rwanda and Burundi all the more imperative for the Hutu rebel groups and, conversely, preventing them from doing so all the more important for the governments of Rwanda and Burundi. For these reasons, the Rwandan and Burundian governments will come closer together in the area of security co-operation, despite their mutual mistrust. Unfortunately, that will do nothing to ease regional fears about Tutsi “empire-building”, which will make it harder for either country to win support elsewhere in Africa. In the meantime, the level of violence in the civil conflict will intensify, particularly as serious negotiations get under way in Arusha, as it is now customary for the parties to the conflict to increase their influence through a display of force.

South Africa will proceed Mr Buyoya will continue with his efforts to woo President Thabo Mbeki of carefully in its relations South Africa. Certainly Mr Mbeki considers Burundi’s rebel militias to be a with Burundi danger to regional security, but the South African government has been chastened by the hostile regional response to its warm relations with Rwanda, and will proceed cautiously with Burundi.

Economic reforms are The expected resumption of foreign aid and agreement on a stabilisation and expected reform package with major donors, including the World Bank, will provide a clearer framework for the government’s macroeconomic targets and policy reform measures; these objectives will include a substantial reduction of inflation, tighter control over monetary policy and an end to domestic borrowing to finance the government’s fiscal deficit. The government will be pressured by donors to bring the official exchange rate closer in line with the parallel rate, although it will probably attempt to resist a complete devaluation.

Donor support will bolster Economic performance forecasts for Burundi in 2000-01 are based on the GDP growth assumption that the war will continue, depressing recovery in the agriculture- dominated economy. Nonetheless, agricultural growth should still reach 2% in Burundi: gross domestic product 2000 and possibly higher in 2001, owing to greater stability in some areas. A % change, year on year larger-than-expected upsurge in fighting, causing large-scale population dis- Burundi placement, would depress these levels. Economic recovery, however, remains Sub-Saharan Africa 6 dependent on the resumption of foreign assistance, particularly balance-of- payments support, given that scarcity of foreign exchange has been a critical 5 constraint on the commercial and industrial sectors. A decision to resume 4 donor support is expected to be reached in early 2000, and this will probably 3 raise real GDP growth to 5% in 2000 and 6% in 2001, following estimated 2 growth of 3% in 1999.

1 Improved cash-crop export volumes are expected over 2000-01, although an n/a 0 1997(a) 98(a) 99(b) 2000(b) 01(b) anticipated fall in international prices for Burundi’s two main exports, coffee and tea, means that export values are unlikely to rise. The EIU expects the (a) EIU estimates. (b) EIU forecasts. Source: EIU prices of both commodities to decline over 2000-01, with coffee falling from $1.02/lb in 1999 to 65 cents/lb in 2001, and tea expected to drop from $1.61/kg to $1.33/kg over the same period. As a result, exports will perform poorly despite increases in volume, rising moderately to $54m in 1999 before falling again in 2000 and 2001. The current-account deficit will widen over 2000-01 as import volumes recover owing to increased availability of foreign exchange, and as outflows associated with freight, insurance and other charges on the services account increase.

The political scene

The Arusha talks are set to The sixth round of the Burundian peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, originally resume— scheduled to begin on September 13th, was postponed until the end of October, and had been scheduled to resume under the mediator, the former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, whose absence in London for medical treatment was the reason for the delay. The subsequent death of Mr Nyerere in London on October 14th (see Late note) has resulted in some uncertainty about the scheduling of the next round of talks, although no delay has yet been announced. According to the organisers, this round is scheduled to last between six and eight weeks, and will focus on the transition to democracy, the electoral process and the issue of whether rebel militia can or should be integrated into Burundi’s national army. There is growing speculation that the Arusha peace process will reach an agreement by the end of the year, paving

the way for a resumption of balance-of-payments support and other development assistance. An advance meeting of the major parties involved in the Arusha talks took place in early September, and appears to have reached some consensus aside from the key issues of integration of the military and the length of the transition programme proposed by President Pierre Buyoya. This raises expectations that an agreement, however fudged, will be signed in Arusha, providing it is possible to resume the talks under a new mediator.

—and the rebels are still Otherwise, optimism about the prospects for the current round is lacking, excluded— largely because of the continued exclusion of the two main rebel factions and an upsurge in violence inside Burundi. Attacks have increased since August on Bujumbura city and the province of Bujumbura-Rural by the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Forces nationales de la libération (FNL), which are Burundi’s two main Hutu rebel groups. Repeated calls have been made to bring them into the Arusha talks from a wide body of opinion, including: the Burundi government, the internal wing of the predominantly Hutu Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu), most of the minor Tutsi parties represented in Arusha, Burundian church leaders (who also seek representation in Arusha) and the rebel groups themselves, on the assumption that peace talks will be fruitless in their absence. The Nyerere foundation, however, which is running the talks, has stuck to its position that the CNDD-FDD and the FNL can only be included at Arusha as separate entities to the CNDD and the Parti pour la libération des peuples Hutu—Palipehutu (the movements from which they have split) or as part of these groups. But the CNDD-FDD insists that it is the “true” CNDD, and the FNL says the same about its relationship with Palipehutu, and so both have rejected these options (3rd quarter 1999, page 25).

—but bilateral talks with Continued stalemate on this issue has prompted attempts to organise bilateral the government are talks between the Burundi government and the CNDD-FDD. Senior figures in the proposed Burundi government have been preparing local and international opinion for this development. On September 2nd Leonce Ngendekumana, the president of Burundi’s National Assembly and a member of Frodebu, announced that plans for such talks were under way, and whether Mr Nyerere accepted it or not, the government would “meet its opponents in Burundi or anywhere”. The CNDD- FDD has since ruled out Burundi as a venue for these talks, which will probably take place in Europe, although South Africa had also been considered. Mean- while, Leonard Nyangoma, president of the CNDD and the party’s representative at the Arusha talks, has responded to this threat to his position by calling for direct talks between himself and the government. The Burundi government, however, along with most observers, does not consider Mr Nyangoma to have any appreciable influence on rebel militias, and has ignored this call.

Frodebu’s divisions increase Divisions have become more apparent between senior members of Frodebu within Burundi. In particular, this concerns the ongoing power struggle between Jean Minani, the Tanzania-resident party president, and the Burundi- resident party secretary-general, Augustin Nzojibwami (3rd quarter 1999, page 26). Some Frodebu members have in recent months shown signs of warming to

Mr Minani, while Mr Nzojibwami has recently claimed that the CNDD-FDD is trying to kill him, possibly with the assistance of his rivals within Frodebu. Mr Nzojibwami’s most prominent opponent within Frodebu in Burundi is Domitien Ndayizeye, whom Mr Minani claims is Frodebu’s secretary-general. These latest events underline the extent to which divisions are increasing both within Frodebu in Burundi and with its external wing, which is growing closer to the CNDD. Nonetheless, Mr Nzojibwami enjoys the support of Mr Buyoya, given that he favours Frodebu’s co-operation with the president. Those politicians who do not, however, have been subjected to harassment by the authorities, as Mr Buyoya periodically arranges the detention of opponents to his “middle way”. In a sign of this, Mr Ndayizeye was arrested at Bujumbura’s airport on August 25th while on his way to talks with Mr Minani, while the deposed Union pour le progrès national (Uprona) president, Charles Mukasi, was reportedly arrested again on August 26th.

The war intensifies In the run-up to the Arusha negotiations, Burundi’s terrifyingly vicious civil war has intensified further. Some CNDD-FDD and FNL militiamen have been withdrawing from bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo in recent weeks, possibly in anticipation of attempts to dislodge them from there as part of the implementation of the Lusaka peace accords signed in July, and have moved to Burundi and Tanzania instead. Within Tanzania they have mostly refrained from the looting and violence that has characterised their behaviour in Congo, but have intensified their attacks in Burundi’s southern provinces, which border Tanzania. The militia have at times engaged Burundi’s armed forces in these areas, but the most serious clashes between the two have been in Bujumbura-Rural and within some of Bujumbura city’s suburbs. On August 8th militia attacked Kanyosha, a peri-urban settlement to the south of Bujumbura. A subsequent counter-insurgency operation by government forces resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties, according to the London-based human rights group, Amnesty International. Military spokesmen deny this, improbably insisting that the army killed 11 militiamen and no non-combatants. The UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, condemned the killings perpetrated on both sides. Following the Kanyosha attacks, there were dozens of smaller incidents throughout August in Bujumbura-Rural, culminating in some relatively large- scale attacks by rebels on Tutsis living in the Bujumbura suburbs of Musega and Mutanga on August 28th-29th, which resulted in at least 50 casualties. According to survivors of these raids, some of the insurgents spoke Kinyarwanda, Rwanda’s national language, providing further indications of the extent to which Rwandan and Burundian Hutu militia now co-operate.

The government responded to the increased insecurity in and around the capital in September by forcing residents of Bujumbura-Rural to abandon their homes and relocate to camps or move elsewhere. By mid-month more than 200,000 people had been forcibly moved. Within Bujumbura, the government has reportedly bolstered predominantly Tutsi local defence forces by supplying them with arms, although this has been denied by the government. The government is ambivalent about the local defence forces, as it needs to respond to the targeting by rebels of Bujumbura city, but cannot be sure that the resultant militia will remain loyal.

Rwandan and Burundian One reason for the intensification in fighting is the approach of another round militia deepen Hutu co- of talks at Arusha, when the rebel militias not present there habitually operation— highlight their absence with an increase in violence. These groups are also seeking to underline their power in preparation for direct talks between militia representatives and the Burundian government. The likely participation of Rwandan interahamwe militiamen in these raids is symptomatic of the growing pan-Hutuism of Rwandan and Burundian militias, who are confronted with an inability to effect political change at home and with growing indifference from Congo’s Hutu population to their struggle.

—while their opponents The Rwandan and Burundian governments are aware of the rise of pan-Hutu draw nearer militancy and are reactivating their joint commission as a forum in which to combat it. Rwandan and Burundian delegations to the commission, headed by the two countries’ foreign ministers, met on July 26th to discuss possible joint responses to the rebels’ co-operation and increased incursions from Congo and Tanzania into Burundi. The commission also agreed to a relaxation of the visa requirements for nationals of each country. According to Ugandan press reports, the Rwandan and Burundian military had co-operated during the clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in the Congolese city of Kisangani in August. The story was strongly denied by Burundi, and it is

unlikely that Burundian forces were directly involved in the fighting, but it is possible that Rwandan troops who were brought in from South Kivu as reinforcements for the battle were flown to Kisangani from Bujumbura.

Burundi accepts that Burundian and Tanzanian security officials held talks on August 11th in Tanzania is not assisting Kigoma, during which, according to the Tanzanian press, the Burundian the rebels delegation conceded that Tanzania was not actively assisting Burundian rebel forces. As usual on such occasions, both sides pledged to bolster security on their side of the border, but the Burundian delegation remained unconvinced that the Tanzanians would or could do so.

South Africa takes an South Africa’s newly elected president, Thabo Mbeki, is taking a strong interest in interest in Burundian the conflicts in Central Africa, and the South African minister of foreign affairs, affairs Nkosazana Zuma, has toured the region since her appointment in June. Mr Mbeki has apparently recognised that since one of the main elements of the Lusaka peace accords is firm action by the region against Rwanda’s Hutu militia in Congo, firm action is also required against Burundi’s militia, given the co- operation between the two groups. Mr Mbeki met the Burundian president in Pretoria on August 28th, during which Mr Buyoya requested that South Africa play an active role in the search for a negotiated solution in Burundi, and in lobbying efforts to persuade international donors to resume assistance to the country. Mr Mbeki has given no such assurance, in public at least, but has re- appointed a top Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Wulile Nhlapho, as his special envoy to Burundi, and clearly intends to keep a close watch on developments. This has made the CNDD-FDD nervous: its spokesman, Jerome Ndiho, recently stated that the South African government was under the influence of the pro- Tutsi lobby and should not be trusted. Mr Ndiho also again denied that the FDD militia is co-operating with Rwanda’s interahamwe militia.

Reforms are made in the Despite the pessimism that currently engulfs Burundian politics, activities in justice ministry the Ministry of Justice continue to provide some hope. The prosecutor-general, Gerard Ngendabanka, has persisted with his reform campaign, releasing 169 people on August 18th who had been detained without trial for over two years. About 7,800 of the estimated 10,000 people in Burundi’s prisons have not yet been tried. On June 3rd the National Assembly adopted a new penal code forbidding detention without trial of more than one year (3rd quarter 1999, page 28). The code comes into force on January 1st 2000, and the intention is to have cleared at least half of the backlog by then.

In early August Mr Ngendabanka ruled that the five military officers convicted of the assassination of the Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, who served from June to October 1993, could appeal against their convictions because of irregularities in the trial procedures. All of the senior politicians and military officials thought to be connected to the assassination were acquitted in the trial, and many believe that the five convicted officers are minor players who have been left to take responsibility (3rd quarter 1999, page 28).

Mr Buyoya sacks his In late July Mr Buyoya sacked the minister of commerce, industry and tourism, commerce minister Nestor Nyabenda, a Frodebu member, and replaced him with Darius Nahayo, also from Frodebu. The move was partly in response to public indignation over

Burundi’s sugar and fuel shortages (3rd quarter 1999, page 29). Another factor was the struggle between Mr Nyabenda and the minister of finance, Astere Girukwigomba, over whose ministry should be responsible for policy on fuel importation and distribution. Mr Girukwigomba is an old friend of Mr Buyoya and has emerged as the clear winner in this contest.

A new human rights On August 16th the UN High Commission on Human Rights announced the rapporteur is appointed appointment of Marie-Therese Aissata Keita of Côte d’Ivoire as its new rapporteur for Burundi. Ms Keita, who replaces the veteran Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, who resigned earlier in 1999, is expected to deliver her first report by the second quarter of 2000.

Economic policy and the economy

The franc falls further— The Banque de la république du Burundi (the central bank) has continued its policy of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate for the Burundian franc, which held steady against the dollar over the past quarter at the official rate, remaining at an average Bufr535:$1. The gap between the official and parallel rates, however, has widened, as the franc declined by 23% on the parallel market, falling from Bufr850:$1 in late July to Bufr1,100:$1 in early September. The Ministry of Finance is reportedly contemplating a 20% devaluation of the franc’s official rate, to roughly Bufr635:$1, although even at that rate the franc would still be some 70% overvalued. This will also do nothing to eliminate opportunities for arbitrage and corruption among those with privileged access to foreign exchange at the official rate, and little incentive for increased commerce is foreseen before such distortions are eliminated and the franc’s value is reduced to market clearing rates. Otherwise, the central bank continues to resort to domestic borrowing to finance its fiscal deficit in the absence of donor funding.

—and inflation rises Prices have increased sharply for a range of goods over the past three months, although wide variations exist, with some imported products increasing more rapidly. The price of sugar, however, which was believed to have been inflated earlier in the year as a result of high-level speculation, fell by 20% over the same period.

Privatisation proceeds The Service chargé des entreprises publiques (SCEP) produced a report in late slowly August assessing the state’s management of public enterprises during the first half of 1999. This followed a presentation on the state of Burundi’s parastatals and the privatisation process in April (2nd quarter 1999, page 32). The SCEP expressed concern about the level of internal debt that the government was accumulating, in part because of parastatal subsidies. Little progress was reported on the privatisation programme, aside from the fact that pre- privatisation procedures, including comprehensive audits, are under way for the telecommunications company Onatel, the energy company Regideso, and Bujumbura’s near-empty Hotel Source du Nil. The report acknowledged the SCEP’s own weakness in data collection and indicated that this area would be addressed.

The brewery is losing Johan Doyer, the director of Burundi’s brewery, Brarudi, stated in early August money that the company had lost Bufr150m ($244,000) in 1998 and was still losing money (2nd quarter 1999, page 32). The company has been negatively affected by the rising cost of imported inputs, while price increases passed on to consumers have depressed sales. Brarudi sold 1.6m hl of beer and soft drinks in 1998––a 31% decline since 1995. Sales declined further, by an annualised 10%, in the first half of 1999. Although Brarudi's domestic sales have fallen, it is apparently benefiting from export sales to neighbouring states owing to the opportunities for smuggling created by Burundi's exchange rate distortions. While a litre of Brarudi's Primus beer costs 84 cents at the official rate in Burundi, the same beer can fetch up to $1.39 in Congo and $2 in Kenya.

Food production falls— Fears that poor rains between March and May and an outbreak of army worms would harm the 1999 second (or B) harvest have proved well founded (3rd quarter 1999, pages 30-31). According to a joint World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) assessment mission, which released its findings in September, cereal production was estimated to have declined by 10% on 1998, while production of pulses was thought to have declined by 22%. The FAO estimates that there will be a 70,000-tonne cereal deficit in 1999, up from 40,000 tonnes in 1998, of which 50,000 tonnes will need to be supplied as food aid and the balance by commercial imports. According to the FAO, by August only 1,000 tonnes had been pledged and delivered by international aid donors.

Burundi: estimated cereal supply and demand, 1999 marketing year (‘000 tonnes unless otherwise indicated) Wheat Rice Coarse grains Total Production (milled terms) 10 33 233 276 Stocks 0 5 0 5 Food consumption 35 43 273 351 Import requirements 25 5 40 70 of which: commercial imports 10 5 5 20 food aid 15 0 35 50 Food aid pledges 0 1 0 1 of which: delivered 0 1 0 1 Estimated per head consumption (kg/year) 56 38 50 144 Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation.

—and aid agencies plan a The second season traditionally produces most of Burundi’s cereals and pulses, response and the WFP and FAO expect malnutrition rates to rise as a result of lower production. The FAO and partner non-governmental organisations have begun distributing agricultural materials to around 1m people for the first agricultural season in 2000. Burundi’s traditionally landless and impoverished Twa population, some of whom have recently been allocated land, has been designated as one of the intended beneficiary groups. The WFP is complementing the input distribution by providing 15-day rations, although its Burundi programme in general has been disrupted by supply and funding shortages. The WFP suspended its work in Burundi for most of July after an ambush early that month resulted in the death of one of its employees.

Foreign trade and payments

Exports are expected to rise Despite poor performance in the food crop sector, there are indications that coffee production is recovering, and could reach 20,000 tonnes in the 1998-99 agricultural year, compared with 16,500 tonnes in 1997-98. Because of price declines, however, total merchandise exports are likely to rise only slightly, to around $54m in 1999. This will do nothing to ease the ongoing shortage of foreign exchange. In the absence of substantial external assistance, particularly balance-of-payments support, Burundi’s foreign-exchange reserves have been under pressure, despite ongoing import compression. Foreign-exchange reserves had declined to an estimated two months of import cover by the second quarter of 1999.

Burundi: foreign reserves ($m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1998 1999 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr Foreign exchange 93.25 79.70 67.17 57.18 60.06 51.62 SDRs 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.01 Reserve position in the IMF 7.83 7.80 8.04 8.25 7.96 7.83 Total reserves (excl gold) 101.12 87.57 75.26 65.52 68.15 59.46 Import covera (months) 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.0 a EIU estimates. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Preparations are in motion The financially beleaguered Burundian government has hopes that a donor for the October donor roundtable conference, scheduled for October, will result in the resumption of conference international aid. Until now the country has received no balance-of-payments support and no significant development assistance, despite the fact that regional sanctions were lifted in January 1999. The conference, for which the Burundi government has gone to some lengths to prepare, will focus on good governance, macroeconomic issues and various government-driven reconstruction programmes, but the most important item on the agenda is likely to be the evaluation of the Arusha peace process. Burundi’s main bilateral and multilateral donors are using progress at these talks as the main criterion on which to base decisions on resuming financial assistance.

The UN says its Burundi The UN reported at the end of July that its consolidated appeal for Burundi was programme is seriously one of its most underfunded worldwide, and resulted in UN bodies inside underfunded the country only being able to offer emergency relief and very little development assistance. The UN said that the social sectors were most affected by the funding shortfall, particularly health, water, education and human rights.

EIU Country Report 4th quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Quarterly indicators and trade data 31

Quarterly indicators and trade data

Rwanda: quarterly indicators of economic activity 1997 1998 1999 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr Prices Monthly av Consumer prices 1995=100 115.2a 119.5 129.3 130.2 130.5 126.5 124.0 124.5 123.0 change year on year % n/a 9.4 15.3 14.3 n/a 5.9 –4.1 –4.4 –5.7 Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj Rwfr bn 50.96 51.21 53.91 50.31 50.89 48.55 53.32 53.30 56.67b change year on year % 22.2 17.2 22.7 2.0 –0.1 –5.2 –1.1 5.9 n/a Foreign trade Qtrly totals Exports fob Rwfr m 8,945 8,700 4,056 4,003 4,595 6,571 3,527 3,111 2,921 Imports cif ” 24,408 18,055 21,545 19,695 19,734 25,948 23,841 19,239 19,130 Exchange holdings End-Qtr National Bank: foreign exchange $ m 102.6 111.0 126.8 124.6 124.8 129.6 144.3 138.4 152.5c Exchange rate Official rate Rwfr:$ 299.6 302.5 304.7 307.6 312.4 317.2 320.3 342.6 337.7d Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a April only. b End-May. c End-July, 149.4 d End-July, 333.7. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Burundi: quarterly indicators of economic activity 1997 1998 1999 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr Prices Monthly av Consumer prices 1995=100 167.4 180.1 189.7 190.9 182.2 183.2 180.4 185.5a n/a change year on year % 28.3 26.7 25.0 16.5 8.8 1.7 –4.9 n/a n/a Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj Bufr bn 47.05 48.25 50.39 49.47 48.37b n/a n/a n/a n/a change year on year % 19.1 10.5 9.7 0.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Foreign trade Qtrly totals Exports fob Bufr m 5,316 9,431 9,040 6,311 4,412 8,873 10,267 2,180c n/a Imports cif ” 12,476 15,038 13,310 19,583 19,954 17,428 16,829 11,850c n/a Exchange holdings End-Qtr Central bank: goldd $ m 4.13 3.91 3.75 3.82 3.68 3.75 3.66 3.49 3.27e foreign exchange “ 114.89 105.07 93.25 79.70 67.17 57.18 60.06 51.62 50.98e Exchange rate Official rate Bufr:$ 348.3 408.4 415.7 429.9 490.3 505.2 535.6 548.3 533.9e Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a Average for April-May. b End-August. c Total for April-May. d End-quarter holdings at quarter's average of London daily price less 25%. e End-July. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Report 4th quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 32 Quarterly indicators and trade data

Rwanda: foreign trade (Rwfr m) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Mar 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Imports cif Food, drink & tobacco 2,708 9,713 4,047 14,098 15,848 5,354 of which: cereals & products 577 5,580 2,196 5,795 7,073 2,132 sugar & products 705 636 331 1,109 1,438 679 Mineral fuels 4,603 5,180 1,675 5,429 7,881 2,151 Animal & vegetable oils & fats 1,263 2,444 1,061 2,354 3,341 1,059 Chemicals 5,082 6,479 2,424 8,534 8,716 3,248 Paper & manufactures 1,366 1,056 385 964 1,240 537 Textile fibres, yarns, fabrics & manufactures incl clothing 3,045 2,835 963 4,124 3,538 2,193 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 802 990 275 701 1,121 287 Iron & steel & manufactures 2,499 9,270 1,193 1,725 3,093 1,050 Other metals & manufactures 1,397 1,662 619 2,649 3,555 462 Machinery excl electric 3,685 5,620 739 2,809 4,200 1,408 Electric machinery 3,202 2,413 846 3,850 2,972 1,154 Road vehicles incl tractors 2,988 9,468 1,481 7,625 12,389 2,680 Total incl others 38,434 47,866 17,366 62,193 78,189 25,689 Exports fob Coffee 4,672 5,428 2,445 11,294 13,123 1,095 Tea 2,761 2,684 834 1,119 2,845 960 Personal effects 222 340 98 7,198a 15,633a 682 Total incl others 9,139 9,766 4,056 21,929 34,388 5,116

$ m Rwfr m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Mar Exports fobb 1995 1996 1997 1998 Imports cif 1994 1995 1996 1997 Brazil n/a 82 n/a n/a EU 6,651 20,919 30,216 9,422 Belg-Lux 1 1 36 36 of which: Germany 12 27 20 16 Belg-Lux 2,658 8,270 13,382 3,703 Pakistan 2 4 7 6 Germany 841 3,278 3,805 1,026 Turkey n/a n/a 4 5 ZEP 5,641 23,118 25,641 10,299 France 3 4 2 5 of which: US 2 8 4 4 Kenya 2,358 14,843 15,589 5,214 Total incl others 54 55 103 110 UAE 170 3,699 4,761 1,057 Total incl others 17,366 62,193 78,189 25,689 a Inflated by withdrawal of UNAMIR. b Source, DOTS. Sources: Banque nationale du Rwanda, Statistiques économiques et financierès; IMF, Direction of Trade, yearbook, quarterly.

EIU Country Report 4th quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Quarterly indicators and trade data 33

Burundi: foreign trade (Bufr m) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Imports cif Food, drink & tobacco 4,174 5,174 8,731 9,471 6,115 7,723 of which: cereals & preparations 2,501 3,234 4,229 5,116 2,942 4,241 Petroleum & products 5,621 6,158 7,404 6,758 5,488 4,874 Chemicals 6,543 6,997 8,242 7,394 5,395 7,520 Rubber manufactures 1,076 1,710 1,002 1,158 692 827 Paper & manufactures 1,156 1,374 1,115 1,281 1,035 1,104 Iron & steel & manufactures 3,328 3,511 3,116 2,550 1,384 1,782 Machinery excl electric 4,744 5,030 3,997 4,340 2,455 3,216 Electric machinery 3,131 3,020 3,808 4,419 3,052 2,687 Road vehicles 4,818 4,495 4,271 5,465 4,703 4,547 Scientific instruments etc 2,039 1,023 2,214 1,548 726 876 Total incl others 46,106 47,434 56,468 58,200 37,332 43,249 Exports fob Sugar 856 0 0 1 953 65 Coffee 10,033 8,838 23,710 20,175 7,642 26,979 Tea 1,899 2,146 2,741 2,400 1,641 2,972 Beer 43 98 177 803 86 12 Tobacco & manufactures 549 749 431 3 58 n/a Hides, undressed 339 206 597 525 216 47 Cotton, raw 0 794 880 425 0 0 Minerals & ores 115 204 199 275 183 n/a Cotton fabrics 359 597 255 2 7 38 Total incl others 15,355 15,019 30,034 25,982 11,293 30,561

Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports foba 1994 1995 1996 1997 Imports cif 1995 1996 1997 EU 11,370 9,990 2,119 n/a EU 29,346 16,977b 20,085b of which: of which: UK 7,327 1,249 1,514 8,305 Belg-Lux 8,963 5,731 7,878 Germany 2,274 999 303 6,578 France 5,851 3,196 4,068 Tanzania 253 1,249 1,211 n/a Germany 4,738 3,296 2,834 Switzerland 4,043 2,997 908 4,154 Saudi Arabia 5,154 4,893 4,145 Rwanda 505 500 908 134 Japan 3,345 2,492 2,666 Total incl others 30,067 25,975 11,202 30,764 Zambia 1,932 1,298 2,382 Kenya 2,399 1,392 1,869 South Africa 823 1,341 1,699 Tanzania 1,582 1,179 1,077 Total incl others 58,200 37,332 43,249 a Source, DOTS. b Excluding Finland. Sources: Banque de la république du Burundi, Bulletin mensuel; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook, quarterly.