U.S. TERRORIST BORDER CROSSING DATA COLLECTION
BORDER-CROSSING EVENT CODEBOOK
Version: October 20, 2010
Methodology for identifying border crossing events During preliminary research, court records from cases found in the ATS dataset were reviewed for potential border crossing events. Each court case’s documents were searched to determine whether or not one of the defendants or accomplices crossed a U.S. border in the events documented in the records. These court cases involve either a completed terrorism incident, a thwarted or planned terrorism incident, material support for terrorism, general terrorism conspiracy, and in some cases immigration fraud. A list of terrorism related court cases that involved at least one successful, thwarted, or planned border crossing was then generated for further study.
Coding of border crossing events The potential border crossing events were originally found through searching court case documents and then identifying court cases to include in the project. Now that a list has been generated the coding of the border crossing events will start with the identification of an “incident.” Using a combination of the ATS dataset and the previously funded START project- MISTA, the court cases will be linked to either a completed terrorism incident, a thwarted or planned terrorism attack, material support of terrorism case, or a general terrorism conspiracy when no incident or planned incident can be identified. There can be many incidents per court case and/or many court cases per incident. This will result in a list of “incidents” with linked court cases for which the documents can be further studied for border crossing events. In addition, open source media searches will be used to augment the data collection and coding. Once an “incident” has been identified then related court case records will be mined for border crossing events. When an event is found all persons that were involved with trying to cross the border will be coded.
Terminology The terms incident, terrorism incident, or terrorism-related incident are used in the codebook to refer to several types of events, as included in ATS: successful completed incident (also included in GTD), a thwarted attack, a planned incident that never occurred, and in some cases a general terrorism or material support of terrorism conspiracy.
A single “border crossing event” is defined as when one or more persons successfully cross or unsuccessfully attempt to cross over the border of the U.S at a specific place, date, and time. This is also to include a planned crossing of the border that was never carried out as long as a date or place was specified in the source data about the planned crossing. What distinguishes one “border crossing event” from another is determined by the proximity of persons crossings and the date/time of the crossing. For multiple persons crossing the border to be coded as a single “border crossing event” then those persons would have to be traveling as a group on the transportation that takes them to the border. Ex. three persons riding in a single car, traveling on the same flight or ship, or walking across the border. If there is a temporal difference in the crossing (time to be determined- maybe an hour) or a proximity difference (like different ports or different flights to an airport) then these would be coded as separate “border crossing events”.
Incident Identification Variables
1. Unique id for the incident for the BORDERS dataset INC_ID (NUMERIC)
Assigns a unique id for each incident. An incident can be a successful completed incident, a thwarted attack, a planned incident that never occurred, and in some cases a general terrorism or material support of terrorism conspiracy or immigration related case.
2. Link to incident in TEVUS dataset INC_TEVUS_ID (NUMERIC)
If the border crossing is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the TEVUS.EVENTS_KEY for that incident.
3. Link to incident in ATS dataset INC_ATS_ID (NUMERIC)
If the border crossing is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the ATS ID for that incident. Copy exactly from the online ATS Terrorism Database or use the TEVUS.EVENTS.ATS_E_EVENTS_ID value.
4. Link to incident in GTD dataset INC_GTD_ID (NUMERIC)
If the border crossing is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the GTD ID for that incident. Copy exactly from www.start.umd.edu/gtd or use the TEVUS.EVENTS.GTD_EVENTID value.
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5. Incident name INC_NAME (TEXT) Designates a name to the terrorism incident for recognition during coding.
6. Incident description INC_DESC (TEXT) Designates a short description for the terrorism incident for recognition during coding. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
7. Type of Incident. INC_TYPE (NUMERIC)
Type of terrorist-related incident related to this border-crossing event. Values: 1= Assassination 2= Armed assault 3= Bombing/Explosion 4= Hijacking 5= Hostage taking (Barricade incident) 6= Hostage taking (Kidnapping) 7= Facility/Infrastructure attack 8= Unarmed assault 9= Material support 10= Financial support 11= Immigration 12= Other
8. Sub-Type of terrorism incident INC_SUBTYPE (NUMERIC) Sub-type of terrorist-related incident related to this border-crossing event.
3 Values: 0= No explicit link to terrorism found 1= Terrorist attack 2= Terrorist attack prevented 3= Other terrorism related
9. Extent to which the attack/conspiracy was carried out. INC_OCCUR (TEXT) Values: 0= Planning 1= Preparation 2= Attempt 3= Carried Out
10. Incident name INC_SUCCESS (TEXT) Was the goal of the conspiracy/attack successful.
Values: 0= No (No evidence of a successful goal completed) 1= Yes (Evidence of a successful goal completed)
11. Date of the terrorism incident INC_DATE (DATE)
Values: 12/JUN/99 DD/MMM/YY
If unknown or NA, leave blank
Note: If “incident” does not have a specific date then use the indictment date for the first defendant from the earliest court case that can be linked to the incident.
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12. Day of the terrorism incident INC_DAY (NUMERIC)
The day of the month on which the terrorist-related incident took place. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 01-31 DD
If unknown or NA, leave blank.
Note: If “incident” does not have a specific date then use the indictment date for the first defendant from the earliest court case that can be linked to the incident.
13. Month of Terrorism Incident/ Planned Incident INC_MONTH (TEXT) The month in which the terrorist-related incident took place. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 01-12 MM
If unknown or NA, leave blank
Note: If “incident” does not have a specific date then use the indictment date for the first defendant from the earliest court case that can be linked to the incident.
14. Year of Terrorism Incident/ Planned Incident INC_YEAR (NUMERIC)
5 The year in which the terrorist-related incident took place. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: (four-digit value) YYYY
If unknown or NA, leave blank
15. Number of border crossings related to incident INC_CROSSINGS (NUMERIC) Codes the number of border crossings related to a single incident. Each time a crossing happens it is counted (even if it is the same person - count each crossing.)
Values: 1=One crossing 2=Two crossings, etc. -9=Unknown
Note: Coding multiple individuals depends on whether they crossed separately or together. If there were 3 people related to one incident, and the 3 people were always together (same place, same date, same time) and they always crossed the border together 4 times, then this variable would equal 4. If the 3 people crossed the same border at different times of day, or different places then the number would change. It could potentially be 12 crossings if each of the 3 individuals crossed separately (not as a group) 4 separate times. Another example: 3 people flying on the same plane and going through customs would count as 1 “border crossing event”
16. Number of border crossers related to incident INC_CROSSERS (NUMERIC) Codes the number of border crossers related to a single incident. A crosser crossing multiple times counts as only one.
Values: 1= One crosser 2= Two crossers, etc. -9= Unknown
6 17. Was incident domestic or international? INC_DOM_INT (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not the incident was domestic or international using the FBI’s methodology. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset. Possible re-coding after definition of variable has been more clearly determined. See Paxton.
Values: 0= Domestic 1= International -9= Unknown
Note: Domestic terrorism: Unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.
International terrorism: Involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
18. Category of Incident INC_CATEGORY (NUMERIC) Codes category of terrorism the incident falls under
Values: 1= Left Wing 2= Right Wing 3= International 4= Single Issue- Environmental 5= Single Issue- Abortion 6= Single Issue- Anti-Islamic 7= Single Issue- Other 8= Non-Terrorist 9= Other
7 -9= Unknown -8= NA
Note: Left-wing Terrorists have a revolutionary socialist agenda and see themselves as protectors of the populace. They share a disdain for U.S. capitalism and its 'imperialism' and 'colonialism'. Leftists commonly have Marxist political focus and pro- communist/socialist beliefs.
Right-wing Terrorists are ideologically motivated by white racial supremacy, anti- government, or anti-regulatory beliefs. They commonly have ties to Christian Identity Movement, are strongly anti-communist, with beliefs in Protestant work ethics and distributive justice.
Single-issue Terrorists have a focus centered around one specific ideological belief such as the environment, animal rights, anti-abortion, anti- Islamic to name a few.
International Terrorists are those that are foreign born or are acting on behalf of a group centered outside of the United States.
19. Category of incident, details INC_CATEGORY2 (TEXT)
Provide any relevant details regarding the category of incident (terrorist group, type of incident if listed as other, purpose of conspiracy).
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
20. Incident planning abroad INC_PLAN (NUMERIC) Is there evidence that the terrorism-related incident was planned abroad?
Values: 0= No (no evidence to support) 1= Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
21. Crossers train for incident abroad INC_TRAIN (NUMERIC)
8 Is there evidence that crossers in this event trained for incident abroad?
Values: 0= No (no evidence to support) 1= Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
22. Target name INC_TARGET (TEXT) Refers to the physical/human target of the terrorism-related incident (e.g. Los Angeles International Airport, World Trade Center, etc.) This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Note: When an “incident” involves multiple locations or does not involve a specific attack or planned attack list the place where the majority of the activity took place.In immigration/MAT support cases, or similar incident types, list NA and city and state variables where the majority of the activity took place.
23. U.S. address of target INC_TAR_ADDRESS (TEXT) The U.S. street address for the location of the target of the terrorism-related incident.
Ex. 1333 McKay St.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Note: When an “incident” involves multiple locations or does not involve a specific attack or planned attack (MAT, immigration, financial support cases) use the location where a majority of the activity took place.
24. U.S. city of target INC_TAR _CITY (TEXT) The name of the U.S. city of the target of the terrorism-related incident.
9 If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Note: When an “incident” involves multiple locations or does not involve a specific attack or planned attack (MAT, immigration, financial support cases) use the location where a majority of the activity took place.
25. U.S. state of target INC_TAR_STATE (TEXT) The name of the U.S. state of the target of the terrorism-related incident, use 2-letter USPS abbreviations.
Values: AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE DC FL GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH
10 NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VA WA WV WI WY PR
Note: When an “incident” involves multiple locations or does not involve a specific attack or planned attack use the location where a majority of the activity took place.
26. ZIP code of the target location INC_TAR_ZIP (NUMERIC) The 5 digit zip code of the target of the terrorism-related incident location.
Note: When an “incident” involves multiple locations or does not involve a specific attack or planned attack use the location where a majority of the activity took place.
27. Distance of target location from the border crossing event location INC_CROSS_DIST (NUMERIC) Identifies the distance in miles between location of border crossing and location of the terrorism incident’s primary target. Use Google maps to calculate distance when at least city is known for target location and border crossing event location.
11
Or
-8=NA (no evidence of planned/thwarted/actual attack) -9=Unknown
28. General notes on the incident INC_NOTES (TEXT) Notes on the incident.
Border Crossing Characteristics
29. Unique ID for the border crossing event CROSS_ID (NUMERIC)
Assigns a unique id for each border crossing event. A border crossing event is defined as the crossing, attempted, or planned crossing of a U.S. border by one or more persons through customs at a port of entry or through a non-regulated crossing of the border.
Potential cases that involve multiple border crossing events related to a specific incident / prevention necessitate the need to assign in chronological order an ID to identify that specific crossing in accordance to when the crossing took place. See CROSS_NUM below.
When multiple border crossings events involve the same individual, they will be linked through CROSSER_ID below.
Note: in this case an incident is used to mean a completed terrorism incident and a prevention means a terrorism incident that was planned but not successful or was prevented by law enforcement.
30. Border crossing event involved entry/departure CROSS_ENTRY (NUMERIC) Was the border crossing entry to or departure from the U.S.?
Values: 0= Entry 1= Departure
12 2= Both entry and departure (layover)
If entry into U.S., details of journey (31 - 39) Notes: - origin city/country and last city/country variables both need to be coded even if it is 'unknown' and/or even if they end up duplicating each other or one of the stop1/stop2 variables - Stop 1 and Stop 2 can be -8=NA if it was a direct journey or if you do not have any evidence of additional stops. - All of these can be NA if it was a departure and not an entry
31. Planned or attempted border crossing event CROSS_PLAN (NUMERIC)
Was the border crossing only planned (i.e., it was never attempted), or was it actually attempted?
Values: 0 = Planned border crossing, no attempt 1 = Attempted to cross the border (* success of attempt will be coded in next variable) -9 = Unknown
Note: if the border crossing event was only a planned crossing: For the data below regarding the crossing we make inferences based on available evidence about individual’s intentions.
32. Outcome of border crossing event attempt CROSS_OUTCOME (NUMERIC) If the border crossing was attempted, was the border crossed and successful entry/departure to/from country gained?
Values: 0= No, it was thwarted 1= Yes, it was successful 2= Combination (some individuals made it across, some did not) -8= NA, no border crossing attempted (for planned but not attempted crossings) -9 = Unknown
Note: If person(s) did not make it through immigration/customs/was arrested before “getting to the other side,” code this as NO, IT WAS THWARTED!
13 33. Number for the border crossing event relative to the incident (key select variable) CROSS_NUM_INC (NUMERIC) The number for the specific border-crossing event, assigned in chronological order, when more than one border-crossing event is linked to a terrorism incident/prevention.
Values: 1= first known crossing found in documents 2= second known crossing found in documents, 3= third known crossing found in documents, etc. -9= Unknown (only if exact crossing dates are unknown/not listed chronologically in documents)
Date of the border crossing event (34-40) 34. Date of the border crossing event CROSS_DATE (DATE) The date of the on which the border crossing event took place.
Values: 12/JUN/99 DD/MMM/YY
If unknown or NA, leave blank
35. Day of the border crossing event CROSS_DAY (NUMERIC) The day of the month on which the border crossing event took place.
Values: 01-31 DD
If unknown or NA, leave blank
36. Month of the border crossing event CROSS_MONTH
14 (TEXT)
The month in which the border crossing event took place.
Values: MM 01-12
If unknown or NA, leave blank
37. Year of the border crossing event CROSS_YEAR (NUMERIC) The year in which the border-crossing event took place.
(four-digit value) YYYY
If unknown or NA, leave blank
38. Approximate date of border crossing event CROSS_DATE_APPR (TEXT) The approximate date on which the border crossing event took place. Code any temporal information that does not fit into another variable.
Ex. July, Spring, etc.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
39. Time of the border-crossing event CROSS_TIME (TIME) The time at which the border-crossing event took place.
Standard time (0:00 AM/PM)
If unknown or NA, leave blank
15 Note: For other temporal information that does not fit standard time field, fill in information in the next variable
40. Approximate time of border crossing event CROSS_TIME_APPR (TEXT) If approximate times are available, record this (e.g., “early morning,” “afternoon”).
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
41. Type of U.S. port of entry/departure for the border-crossing event CROSS_TYPE (NUMERIC)
The type of the U.S. port of entry/departure
Values: 0= Airport, general (unknown if official or unofficial (illegal) port of entry) 1= Airport, official port of entry 2= Airport, unofficial (illegal) port of entry 3= Seaport, general (unknown if official or unofficial (illegal) port of entry) 4= Seaport, official port of entry 5= Seaport, unofficial (illegal) port of entry 6= Land port, general (unknown if official or unofficial (illegal) port of entry) 7= Land port, official port of entry 8= Land port, unofficial (illegal) port of entry -9= Unknown
42. Port of entry code? CROSS _PORT_CODE (NUMERIC)
Values: See supplemental document for list of air/sea/land port of entry codes in the United States
Or
16 9000=other (port not listed) -8=NA (crossed at an unofficial port) -9=unknown
43. Additional/ supplemental port information? CROSS_PORT_CODE2 (TEXT)
If needed code additional / supplemental information about port.
Text field with name
Or
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Note: If crossed at unofficial port, provide as much information on the location as possible (state, city, area, etc). If crossed at unofficial port and you have no information on where the crossing occurred, also indicate that here.
44. U.S. address of border crossing event CROSS_ADDRESS (TEXT) The U.S. street address for the location of the border crossing event.
Ex. 1333 McKay St.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
45. U.S. city in which border crossing event took place CROSS_CITY (TEXT) The name of the U.S. city of entry/departure.
If unknown, leave blank
17 46. U.S. State in which border crossing event took place CROSS_STATE (NUMERIC) The name of the U.S. state of entry/departure.
Values: AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE DC FL GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK
18 OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VA WA WV WI WY PR
47. ZIP code of border crossing event CROSS_ZIP (NUMERIC) The 5 digit zip code of the border crossing event
If unknown, leave blank
U.S. Port entry/departure for border-crossing event details (20 - 28)
48. If land crossing, means of transport across border CROSS_LAND_MEANS (NUMERIC)
If land crossing, what means of transport was used to cross/try to cross the border?
Values: Adapted from http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=1358 0=Truck container, general (unknown if loaded or empty) 1= Loaded truck container 2= Empty truck container 3= Rail container, general (unknown if loaded or empty) 4= Loaded rail container 5= Empty rail container 6= Train passenger 7= Personal vehicle
19 10= Bus passenger 11= Pedestrian 12= Bike 13= other -8= NA -9= unknown
49. If land crossing, via Canada or Mexico? CROSS_LAND_MEXCAN (NUMERIC)
If border crossing was through a land port, was it a port along the US-Mexico border or US-Canada border?
Values: 0=Mexico 1=Canada -8=NA -9=Unknown
50. If aviation crossing, type of flight? CROSS_AIR_TYPE (NUMERIC)
Values: 0= commercial flight 1= charter flight (on commercial airline) 2= private jet 3= other -8= NA -9= unknown
51. If aviation crossing, which U.S. airport involved? CROSS_AIR_PORT (TEXT)
If border crossing via aviation, which U.S. airport was involved?
20 Values: Use three-letter FAA airport code available via http://www.airnav.com/airports/ (search by city or airport name)
Or
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
52. If sea crossing, type of vessel? CROSS_SEA_TYPE (NUMERIC)
Values: 0= commercial cruise line 1= public/private ferry 2= private pleasure boat 3= private freighter 4= government vessel 5= other -8= NA -9= unknown
53. If sea crossing, which U.S. seaport involved? CROSS_SEA_PORT (TEXT)
If border crossing via sea, which U.S. seaport was involved?
Text field with name of seaport
Or
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Note: If crossed at unofficial seaport, provide as much information on the location as possible (state, city, area, etc). If crossed at unofficial seaport and you have no information on where the crossing occurred, also indicate that here.
21 54. Border crossing event occurred pre or post terrorism attack or planned date of attack? CROSS_PRE_POST (NUMERIC) Did the border-crossing event occur prior to or post the terrorism- related incident or the planned terrorism-related incident? Note: When coding non-attack type incidents this variable will be coded as “pre incident” because it is unknown whether an incident was planned.
Values: 0= Pre incident 1= Post incident 2= Concurrent w/ incident (e.g. the crossing and incident were the same) -9= Unknown
55. If entry into U.S., city of origin of trip? CROSS_ENTRY_ORIGIN_CITY (TEXT)
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
56. If entry into U.S., country of origin of trip? CROSS_ENTRY_ORIGIN_COUNTRY (NUM)
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
57. If entry into U.S., stop 1 city of journey? CROSS_ENTRY_STOP1_CITY (TXT)
22 If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
58. If entry into U.S., stop1 country of journey? CROSS_ENTRY_STOP1_COUNTRY (NUM)
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
59. If entry into U.S., stop 2 city of journey? CROSS_ENTRY_STOP2_CITY (TXT)
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
60. If entry into U.S., stop2 country of journey? CROSS_ENTRY_STOP2_COUNTRY (NUM)
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
61. If entry into U.S., last city before entering US? CROSS_ENTRY_LAST_CITY (TXT)
23 For entry into the U.S., the city from which the border crosser(s) came to United States.
If air crossing, indicate the city of the airport. If sea crossing, indicate the city of the seaport. If land crossing, indicate city.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
62. If entry into U.S., last country before entering U.S.? CROSS_ENTRY_LAST_COUNTRY (NUM)
For entry into the U.S., the country from which the border crosser(s) came to United States.
If air crossing, indicate the country of the airport. If sea crossing, indicate the country of the seaport. If land crossing, indicate country.
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
63. If entry into U.S., details of journey CROSS_ENTRY_DETAILS (TXT) Provide info about travel itinerary, how long they stayed in each location, and any additional ports/locations they were before crossing border into US) If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
If departure from U.S., details of journey (40 - 48) Notes:
24 - Proximate city/country and Final city/country variables both need to be coded even if it is 'unknown' and/or even if they end up duplicating each other or one of the stop1/stop2 variables - Stop 1 and Stop 2 can be -8=NA if it was a direct journey. - Or, of course, all of these can be NA if it was a entry into US and not a departure
64. If departure from U.S., proximate city after leaving US? CROSS_DEPART_PROX _CITY (TEXT)
If air crossing, indicate the city of the airport. If sea crossing, indicate the city of the seaport. If land crossing, indicate city.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
65. If departure from U.S., proximate country after leaving US? CROSS_DEPART_PROX_COUNTRY (NUM)
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
66. If departure from U.S., stop 1 city of journey? CROSS_DEPART_STOP1_CITY (TXT)
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
67. If departure from U.S., stop1 country of journey? CROSS_DEPART_STOP1_COUNTRY (NUM)
25 Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
68. If departure from U.S., stop 2 city of journey? CROSS_ DEPART_STOP2_CITY (TXT)
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
69. If departure from U.S., stop2 country of journey? CROSS_DEPART_STOP2_COUNTRY (NUM)
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
70. If departure from U.S., final destination city? CROSS_DEPART_FINAL_CITY (TXT)
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
71. If departure from U.S., final destination country? CROSS_DEPART_FINAL_COUNTRY (NUM)
26 Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8= NA -9= Unknown
72. If departure from U.S., details of journey CROSS_DEPART_DETAILS (TXT) Provide info about travel itinerary, how long they stayed in each location, and any additional/relevant information If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Legality of crossing (49 - 51) 73. Legal or illegal border crossing event in terms of paperwork CROSS_LEGAL_PAPER (NUMERIC) Was the crossing of the border legal, in terms of the correct paperwork, no false documents, proper immigration, etc?
Values: 0= Illegal crossing (evidence of an illegal crossing) 1= Legal crossing (no evidence of an illegal crossing) -8=NA, crossing never occurred
Note: If the crossing was illegal for ANY individuals, then the entire ‘border crossing event’ should be coded as illegal
74. Legal or illegal border crossing event, regardless of paperwork CROSS_LEGAL_OTHER (NUMERIC) Was the crossing of the border legal in all other aspects? (e.g. not smuggling goods, not stopped/arrested for any other reason)
Values: 0= Illegal crossing (evidence of an illegal crossing)
27 1= Legal crossing (no evidence of an illegal crossing) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: If the crossing was illegal for ANY individuals, then the entire ‘border crossing event’ should be coded as illegal
Note: ‘illegal’ here would refer to transporting illegal materials, committing a crime while crossing, basically anything that is not related to the legality of the paperwork.
75. Nature of illegal crossing CROSS_LEGAL2 (TEXT) g was illegal, explain the circumstances: Did individual(s) use falsified paperwork? Cross into the U.S. somewhere other than a legal port of entry? Carry illegal materials, etc? Provide as much detail as possible.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
If crossin 76. Law enforcement non-routine contact during border crossing event CROSS_LAW (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact between law enforcement and any individuals during the border crossing?
Values: 0= No (no evidence of contact) 1= Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: If the crossing involved contact with law enforcement for ANY individuals, then the entire ‘border crossing event’ should be coded as ‘yes’ there was law enforcement contact
Note: ‘routine’ here refers to any kind of general contact that most travelers have with the law enforcement agencies (e.g. all international travelers technically have contact with CBP when going through customs. We are looking for non routine contact here – being stopped, questioned, chased, searched, detained and let go, detained and arrested, etc).
28 NON ROUTINE Law enforcement contact (53 - 62) Note: For these questions, code as ‘yes’ if ANY of the individuals involved in the border crossing event had non-routine contact with the law enforcement agency
77. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) contact CROSS_CBP (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with CBP during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
78. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contact CROSS_ICE (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with ICE during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
79. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) contact CROSS_TSA (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with TSA during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
80. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) contact CROSS_DEA (NUMERIC)
29 Was there non-routine contact with DEA during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
81. Local law enforcement contact CROSS_LOCALLAW (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with local law enforcement during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
82. Private security contact CROSS_PRIVSEC (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with private security during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
83. Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) contact CROSS_FAA (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with FAA during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
30 84. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) contact CROSS_FBI (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with FBI during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
85. Other law enforcement contact CROSS_OTHERCON (NUMERIC)
Was there non-routine contact with another law enforcement agency not previously mentioned during the border event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence of contact) 1=Yes (evidence of contact) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: if the crossing involved contact with agencies that no longer exist, code that information as ‘yes’ to other contact in this variable, and provide details in text variable below.
86. Nature of interaction with law enforcement? CROSS_LAW_DETAILS (TEXT)
If there was non-routine contact with law enforcement during the border crossing, provide any additional information on the nature of that interaction.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
87. Number of crossers in border crossing event CROSS_NUM_PER (NUMERIC) The number of people who crossed / attempted to cross the border in the border crossing event.
31
Values: Record the number of border crossers identified as being related to this border-crossing or attempted border-crossing incident. This also indicates the number of people who were planning to cross if crossing was never attempted.
Or
-9=Unknown
Crossing Suspicion details (64 - 65) 88. Why was crossing stopped CROSS_WHY_STOP (NUMERIC)
If crossing involved non-routine contact with law enforcement, what was the MAIN reason the agency stopped the crosser? (e.g. suspicion?) (pick one, can note additional reasons in next variable)
Values: 0 = agent suspected deception (includes one of the crossers acting suspicious) 1 = false paperwork 2 = chance/routine random search/stop/additional questioning 3 = tip from non-intelligence/govt agency 4 = tip from intelligence/govt agency 5 = other -8 = NA (no one in crossing stopped, crossing not attempted) -9 = UNKNOWN
89. Why was crossing stopped , details CROSS_WHY_STOP_DETAILS (TXT) If crossing involved non-routine contact with law enforcement, describe why the agency stopped one of or all of the crossers
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Communication details (66 - 73)
32 90. Dominant mode of communication used CROSS_COMM (NUMERIC)
The dominant mode of communication used in planning the crossing /attempting to cross with others involved.
Values: 1= Face to face 2= Phone calls (verbal) 3= E-mail 4= Mail 5= Through messengers 6= Through Web-based social networking sites (Facebook , Twitter, chat rooms, etc.) 7= Phone-based text messages 8= Other -8= NA, (e.g., a “lone” crosser with no evidence of involvement with other persons; no evidence of communication in planning for event) -9= Unknown
Note: If CROSS_COMM coded as -8, code all the other comm variables as 0=no.
Note: For below variables, when there is no mention in any of the court documents of whether (or how) individual communicated with others, code as 0=no (no evidence to support)
91. Did this border crossing event involve face-to-face communication with others in planning the crossing / attempting to cross? CROSS_COMM1 (NUMERIC)
Did this border crossing event involve face-to-face communication with others in planning the crossing?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
92. Did this border crossing event involve communication via telephone? CROSS_COMM2 (NUMERIC)
33 Did this border crossing event involve communication via telephone with others in planning the crossing / attempting to cross?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
93. Did this border crossing event involve communication via email? CROSS_COMM3 (NUMERIC)
Did this border crossing event involve communication via email with others in planning the crossing / attempting to cross?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
94. Did this border crossing event involve communication via mail with others? CROSS_COMM4 (NUMERIC)
Did this border crossing event involve communication via mail with others in planning the crossing / attempting to cross?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
95. Did this border crossing event involve communication via messengers? CROSS_COMM5 (NUMERIC)
Did this border crossing event involve communication via messengers in planning the crossing / attempting to cross?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
96. Did this border crossing event involve communication via social networking?
34 CROSS_COMM6 (NUMERIC) Did this border crossing event involve communication via Web- based social networking tools (Facebook, Twitter, chat rooms, etc.) with others in planning the crossing / attempting to cross?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
97. Did this border crossing event involve communication via phone-based text messages? CROSS_COMM7 (NUMERIC)
Did this border crossing event involve communication via phone- based text messages with others in planning the crossing / attempting to cross?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
Terrorism related materials and border crossing event (74 - 75) 98. Terrorism related materials transported during border crossing event CROSS_TRANSPORT (NUMERIC) Is there evidence that terrorism related materials were transported in the border crossing?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: Any reference to materials used for terrorism would be coded yes and then more specific info (if available) can be coded in the below variables. Or ‘materials’ can be used as catch-all if no specific info known.
99. Terrorism related materials, details CROSS_TRANSPORT2 (TEXT)
35 If there is evidence that terrorism related materials were transported in this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of what was being transported and how.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Drugs and border crossing event (100 - 101) 100. Drugs transported during border crossing event CROSS_DRUGS (NUMERIC) Is there evidence that illegal drugs were transported in this border crossing?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
101. Drugs transported, details CROSS_DRUGS2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that illegal drugs were transported in this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of what was being transported and how.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Weapons and border crossing event (102 - 103) 102. Weapons transported during border crossing event CROSS_WEAPONS (NUMERIC) Is there evidence that weapons were transported in this border crossing?
Values: 0= No (no evidence to support) 1= Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
36 Note: “weapon” is something that could be used by the crosser at that point in time.
103. Weapons transported, details CROSS_WEAPONS2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that weapons were transported during this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of what was being transported and how.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Bomb materials and components and border crossing event (104-105) 104. Bomb materials and components transported during border crossing event CROSS_BOMB (NUMERIC) Is there evidence that bomb components or materials (e.g. chemicals that could be used in a bomb) were transported in this border crossing?
Values: 0= No (no evidence to support) 1= Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8= NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
105. Bomb materials and components transported, details CROSS_BOMB2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that bomb components or materials (e.g. chemicals that could be used in a bomb) were transported during this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of what was being transported and how.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Terrorism docs transported and border crossing event (106-107)
37 106. Terrorism-related manuals or docs transported during border crossing event CROSS_MANUAL (NUMERIC)
Were documents/instruction manuals transported during this border-crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
107. Terrorism-related manuals, details CROSS_MANUAL2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that terrorism-related manuals were transported in this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of what was being transported and how.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Sham marriage and border crossing event (108-109) 108. Sham marriage linked to border crossing event CROSS_MAR_SH (NUMERIC)
Is there evidence of “sham” marriage related to this border- crossing?
Values: 0= No (no evidence to support) 1= Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: “Sham” marriage means where the purpose was so that a person can enter the country.
109. Sham marriage, details CROSS_MAR_SH2 (TEXT)
38
If there is evidence that a sham marriage was involved in this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of the marriage and how it related to crossing and/or incident.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Sham business and border crossing event (110-111) 110. Sham business linked to border crossing event CROSS_BUS_SH (NUMERIC) Is there evidence of “sham” business (illegal wire transfers, racketeering, meetings, activities, practices, etc. disguised by a business whose public purpose is unrelated to incident/conspiracy) related to this border-crossing?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: this can mean a “shell corporation” or business set up for terrorism related purposes (i.e. Funding, front, etc.)
111. Sham business, details CROSS_BUS_SH2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that a sham business was involved in this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of the business and how it related to crossing and/or incident.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Money laundering and border crossing event (112-113) 112. Money laundering linked to border crossing event CROSS_MON (NUMERIC)
39 Evidence of money laundering related to this border-crossing event. (For example, was the border crosser transporting gems, gold, or other items as part of a “hawala” operation?)
Values: 0= No (no evidence to support) 1= Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
113. Money laundering, details CROSS_MON2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that a money laundering was linked to this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of the money laundering and how it related to crossing and/or incident.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
114. General notes on the crossing CROSS_NOTES (TEXT) Notes on the crossing.
40 U.S. TERRORIST BORDER CROSSING DATA COLLECTION
BORDER CROSSER CODEBOOK
Version: October 20, 2010
Individual Characteristics of Border Crosser
Crosser name information 115. Unique ID for this border crosser person in border crossing event CROSSER_ID (NUMERIC)
This is a unique ID for the border crosser. If the person is already included in the ATS dataset then the unique ID from the ATS dataset will be used. If this is a new person then a unique ID will need to be created in the ATS. If the border crosser participates in multiple crossings this ID will always be the same.
Border crossers that are unknown will get the same unique ID
116. Crosser name CROSSER_NAME (ATS.D_PERSON.NAME) (NUMERIC) Identifies the first, middle, last name, suffix of crosser in consecutive order. Will copy and paste name from the ATS database. If person does not exist in ATS then will need to add to the dataset. Values will be copied from ATS dataset.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN
1= Juan David Cardona-Correa, Jr. etc
117. Crosser name, additional CROSSER_NAME2 (TEXT)
If the border crosser used aliases or alternative names, or if alternative spelling of the individual’s name was reported, record that here.
41 If unknown, write UNKNOWN
118. Link to Persons Key PERSONS_KEY (NUMERIC) If the border crosser is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the PERSONS KEY for that individual found in the TEVUS dataset in the PERSONS table.
119. Crosser link to terrorism CROSSER_LINKTERR (NUMERIC)
Was the individual linked to terrorism?
Values: 0= None (court documents stated “no link to terrorism”) 1= No explicit link (court documents did not mention terrorism or terrorist group) 2= Yes
120. Crosser number for the border-crossing event (key select variable) CROSSER_NUM_CROSS (NUMERIC) Assigns a number to each crosser that attempts to cross the border when a group of individuals attempt to cross together.
Values: 1=first crosser 2=second crosser, etc.
Note: If there were unknown individuals in the crossing, simply assign each one a number. The order does not matter.
121. Crosser country of birth CROSSER_B_COUNTRY (NUMERIC)
Identifies the country in which the individual was born. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
42 Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-9=Unknown
Crosser citizenship (121-122) 122. Crosser citizenship CROSSER_CITIZENSHIP (ATS.E_ACTORS.CITIZEN) (NUMERIC) Identifies the name of the country in which the individual had citizenship at the time of the border crossing. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-9=Unknown
123. Crosser dual citizenship? CROSSER_CITIZENSHIP_DUAL (NUMERIC)
Did individual have dual citizenship at the time of the border crossing?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
124. Second country of citizenship
43 CROSSER_CITIZENSHIP2 (NUMERIC)
If individual has dual citizenship, identifies the name of the second country in which the individual had citizenship at the time of the border crossing.
Values: Use GTD country codes, available via http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, see pg. 9- 16.
Or
-8=NA
125. Crosser immigration status CROSSER_IMMIGRATION (NUMERIC)
What was the person’s immigration status?
For those who crossed the U.S. border legally, which type of visa or passport did they use?
Values: compiled from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87170.pdf and http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87524.pdf
See supplemental document for more information about visas within each category
0=U.S. Passport (for U.S. citizens) 1=Green Card (for U.S. permanent residents) 2=Non-immigrant Visa (for citizens/permanent residents of Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda) 3= Border Crossing Card or “laser visa” (citizen/permanent resident of Mexico) 4=Visa Waiver Program participant (see list of participating countries at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html) 5=Non-immigrant Class A (foreign government employee) 6=Non-immigrant Class B (Temporary visitor - business/pleasure)
44 7=Non-immigrant Class C (In transit) 8=Non-immigrant Class D (Crewmember) 9=Non-immigrant Class E (treaty) 10=Non-immigrant Class F & M (students) 11=Non-immigrant Class G (representative of foreign government to international org/staff/family) 12=Non-immigrant Class H, L, O & P (specialty occupation/Temporary Workers) 13=Non-immigrant Class J (Exchange Visitor) 14=Non-immigrant Class K (non immigrant spouse) 15=Non-immigrant Class N (alien family) 16=Non-immigrant Class NATO 17=Non-immigrant Class Q (cultural exchange) 18=Non-immigrant Class R (religious worker) 19=Non-immigrant Class S (providing critical criminal/terrorist info) 20=Non-immigrant Class T (trafficking victim) 21=Non-immigrant Class U (criminal victim) 22=Non-immigrant Class V (perm resident family) 23=Immigrant Class - Family based immigration visas (immediate relatives) 24=Immigrant Class - Vietnam Amerasian Immigrants 25=Immigrant Class - Special Immigrants 26=Immigrant Class - Family Sponsored Preferences 27=Immigrant Class - Employment-Based Preferences 28=Immigrant Class - Other Numerically Limited Categories - Diversity Immigrants 29=Other -8=NA -9=UNKNOWN
Note: If the crossing was illegal (in terms of paperwork), then select -8=NA; If a visa was used in the crossing but it is unclear what kind of visa was used, select - 9=UNKNOWN
126. Crosser immigration status CROSSER_IMMIGRATION2 (TEXT)
Provides details about the immigration method used (passport, visa, etc)
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
45
127. Crosser gender CROSSER_GENDER (ATS.D_PERSON.GENDER) (NUMERIC)
Identifies male or female. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 0= Female 1= Male -9= Unknown
128. Crosser date of birth CROSSER_DOB (ATS.D_PERSON.B_DATE) (DATE)
Represents the individual’s date of birth. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: DD-MMM-YY
Leave blank if unknown
129. Day of birth CROSSER_B_DAY (NUMERIC) The day of the month on which the individual was born. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 01-31 DD
If unknown or NA, leave blank
130. Day of birth CROSSER_B_MONTH (NUMERIC)
46 The month in which the individual was born.
Values: MM 01-12
If unknown or NA, leave blank
131. Year of Birth INC_YEAR (NUMERIC)
The year in which the individual was born. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
(four-digit value) YYYY
If unknown or NA, leave blank
132. Crosser age CROSSER_AGE (NUMERIC)
Represents the individual’s age at the time of the border-crossing incident. Can calculate if needed from CROSS_DATE.
Values: Record the crosser age (in years)
Leave blank if unknown
Note: Do NOT use indictment date to calculate age. The crossing date is not to be confused with the incident/indictment date
Crosser arrests and charges (104 - 111) Note: For all cases, - if court documents explicitly state that the individual was previously arrested, charged, etc, then will code with the appropriate number. - If it explicitly says no prior criminal history, code as 0. - If no mention whatsoever, code as -9=unknown
Note: Do NOT make inferences such as: - if an individual was charged with a crime that they must have been arrested (e.g. they can be charged in absentia without being arrested), or - if arrested, they must have been charged (e.g. may have been arrested and then never charged with a crime), or
47 - if jailed they must have been charged (perhaps they were in a country where they were allowed to be jailed without charged?)
Note: - If jailed, though, we can assume they were arrested - Arrest warrants are not being counted here, but can note this info in arrest notes variable - For these categories, go by the language/wording of the court documents
133. Crosser criminal arrest history in the US CROSSER_ARR _US (NUMERIC)
Codes the number of times person was arrested prior the border crossing event.
Values: 0= No prior arrests listed in court documents 1= Arrested once prior in court documents 2= Arrested twice prior in court documents, etc.
134. Crosser criminal arrest history in the US, details CROSSER_ARR _US_DETAILS (TEXT)
Provide details about the individual’s US arrests.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
135. Crosser criminal charge history in the US CROSSER_CHARGE_US (NUMERIC)
Codes the number of times person was charged for crimes prior the border crossing event.
Values: 0= No prior charges listed in court documents 1= Charged once prior in court documents 2= Charged twice prior in court documents, etc.
136. Crosser criminal arrest history in the US, details
48 CROSSER_CHARGE _US_DETAILS (TEXT)
Provide details about the individual’s US charges.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
137. Crosser criminal arrest history overseas CROSSER_ARR_ABROAD (NUMERIC)
Codes prior arrests outside of the US
Values: 0= No prior arrests listed in court documents 1= Arrested once prior in court documents 2= Arrested twice prior in court documents, etc.
138. Crosser criminal arrest history overseas, details CROSSER_ARR _ABROAD_DETAILS (TEXT)
Provide details about the individual’s overseas arrests.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
139. Crosser criminal charge history overseas CROSSER_CHARGE_ABROAD (NUMERIC)
Codes prior charges outside of the US
Values: 0= No prior arrests listed in court documents 1= Arrested once prior in court documents 2= Arrested twice prior in court documents, etc.
140. Crosser criminal charge history overseas, details CROSSER_CHARGE _ABROAD_DETAILS (TEXT)
49
Provide details about the individual’s overseas charges.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Recruitment information 141. Terrorist connection evidence CROSSER_TERR_EVID (ATS.E_ACTORS.LINK_MADE) (NUMERIC) Is there evidence to support that the individual was involved in a terrorist conspiracy/terrorism movement? This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 0= None (“No link to terrorism” stated in court documents) 1= No explicit link (no explicit link to terrorism found in documents) 2= Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
142. Primary recruitment mechanism CROSSER_RECRUIT (ATS.E_AFFILIATIONS.RECRUITED) (TEXT)
Provide information regarding the primary way in which the individual was recruited into the events associated with border crossing. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Note, for next variables: if there is no mention of recruitment method anywhere in court document, code all as -9.
Note, for next variables: If there is mention of some kind of recruitment method somewhere (e.g. was recruited by other terrorists), will then code that variable as 1 = yes and then all other recruitment variables that are not mentioned in documents would be coded as 0 = no (no evidence to support)
Note, for next variables: These variables can be coded even if there is no mention of terrorism; code recruitment for whatever the ‘incident’/criminal matter was.
143. Involvement of family? CROSSER_RECRUIT_FAM (NUMERIC)
50
Did family member(s) encourage border crosser to get involved in terrorist conspiracy/terrorism movement?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
144. Involvement of family members? CROSSER_RECRUIT_FRNDS (NUMERIC)
Did friend(s) encourage border crosser to get involved in terrorist conspiracy/terrorism movement?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
145. Involvement of religious leaders? CROSSER_RECRUIT_RELIG (NUMERIC)
Did religious leader(s) encourage border crosser to get involved in terrorist conspiracy/movement?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
146. Forced involvement? CROSSER_RECRUIT_FORCED (NUMERIC)
Did leaders of the terrorist conspiracy/group pressure and force the border crosser to get involved in terrorist conspiracy/movement?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
147. Was the Internet a catalyst for recruitment? CROSSER_RECRUIT_NET (NUMERIC)
51
Did the border crosser seek out information on the Internet about the terrorist group/movement/cause prior to involvement in terrorist conspiracy/movement?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
148. Recruitment, details CROSSER_RECRUIT_DETAILS (TEXT)
Provide any available details about how individual was recruited into terrorist effort that involved the border crossing.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser Role information 149. Was one of the crosser’s roles to smuggle goods? CROSSER_ROLE_SMUG (NUMERIC)
Did the border crosser smuggle goods across the border? (smuggling includes weapons, bomb materials, money, etc. Basically anything except people)
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
150. Was one of the crosser’s roles to carry information or documents? CROSSER_ROLE_CARRY (NUMERIC)
Did the border crosser carry information or documents across the border?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
52
151. Was one of the crosser’s roles as an operation leader? CROSSER_ROLE_LEAD (NUMERIC)
Did the border crosser act as an operation leader?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
152. Was one of the crosser’s roles as an explosives expert? CROSSER_ROLE_EXPL (NUMERIC)
Did the border crosser act as an explosives expert?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
153. Was one of the crosser’s roles as a transporter of other individuals)? CROSSER_ROLE_TRNS (NUMERIC)
Did the border crosser transport other individuals?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
154. Was one of the crosser’s roles as a translator or language expert? CROSSER_ROLE_LANG (NUMERIC)
Did the border crosser act as an translator or language expert?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
155. Additional information about crosser role CROSSER_ROLE_DETAIL (TEXT)
53
Please provide any additional information (or information not captured above) about the crosser’s role.
Crosser occupation 156. Crosser occupation CROSSER_OCCUP (ATS.E_ACTORS.OCCUPATION) (TEXT) Crosser’s latest-known type of occupation. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
157. Crosser occupation, details. CROSSER_OCCUP_DETAILS (TEXT)
Provide any available details on the specifics of the border crosser’s previous occupation and/or position.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
158. Crosser education level CROSSER_EDU (NUMERIC)
Coded as a traditional measure of formal education. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 1= less than 8th grade 2= completed 8th grade 3= some high school 4= GED 5= high school diploma 6= some college or voc. School 7= vocational school graduate, assoc. degree 8= college graduate 9= post graduate work -9= Unknown
54
159. Crosser religious CROSSER_RELIG (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser’s religious affiliation mentioned in the source documents?
Values: 0= No (religious affiliation NOT mentioned in documents) 1= Yes (religious affiliation mentioned in documents)
Crosser religious affiliation 160. Crosser religious affiliation CROSSER_RELIG_AFFIL (NUMERIC) Codes religious denomination of border crosser
Values: 1=Jewish 2=Christian, Catholic 3=Christian, Other (non radical; e.g. Baptist, Lutheran, etc) 4=Christian, Radical Conservative 5= Christian, not specified 6=Sunni Muslim 7=Shiite Muslim 8=Other Muslim or Muslim not specified 9=atheist/agnostic 10=cult religion 11=Buddhist 12=Hindu 13= other -8=NA -9=unknown
161. Crosser religious affiliation, detail CROSSER_RELIG_AFFIL2 (TEXT)
Provide any additional details regarding individual’s religious affiliation.
55 If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
162. Crosser marital status CROSSER_MARITAL (NUMERIC) Coded as a traditional measure of marital status. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 1= married/common law marriage 2= single 3= divorced 4= separated 5= widow 6= cohabitation -9= Unknown (no evidence of individual being married, single, divorced, etc.)
163. Crosser children? CROSSER_KIDS (NUMERIC)
Codes whether or not individual has children
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
Note: may find this information in the court financial affidavit records
164. Crosser children? CROSSER_NUMKIDS (NUMERIC)
Codes the number of known dependents (children) of the crosser
Values: 0=none 1 = one 2 = two, etc -9=unknown
56
Note: may find this information in the court financial affidavit records
Crosser co-conspirator bonds Note for next variables: If there is mention of co-conspirators, but no mention crosser’s relationship, code as- 9=unknown.
Note for next variables: If no mention of co-conspirators at all, code as -8=NA.
Note for next variables: If there is mention of some relationship to co-conspirators somewhere (e.g. co-conspirators were other terrorists), then code that variable as 1 = yes, and then all other bonds variables that are not mentioned in documents would be coded as 0 = no (no evidence to support)
165. Family bonds with co-conspirators in incident/crime? CROSSER_BONDS_FAM (NUMERIC)
Did border crosser’s co-conspirators in terrorism-related incident include family members?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8=NA (no evidence that there were co-conspirators)
166. Friends with co-conspirators? CROSSER_BONDS_FRNDS (NUMERIC) Did border crosser’s co-conspirators in terrorism-related incident include friends of the border crosser?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8=NA (no evidence that there were co-conspirators)
Note: a ‘friend’ must be someone that the individual knew prior to terrorism incident/planning
167. Co-conspirators include religious leaders? CROSSER_BONDS_RELIG (NUMERIC) Did border crosser’s co-conspirators in terrorism-related incident include religious leader(s)?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support)
57 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8=NA (no evidence that there were co-conspirators)
168. Co-conspirators include members of terrorist organization? CROSSER_BONDS_TERR (NUMERIC) Did border crosser’s co-conspirators in terrorism-related incident include members of a terrorist organization?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8=NA (no evidence that there were co-conspirators)
169. Co-conspirators include co-workers/paid workers? CROSSER_BONDS_WORKERS (NUMERIC) Did border crosser’s co-conspirators in terrorism-related incident include co-workers/paid workers?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8=NA (no evidence that there were co-conspirators)
170. Co-conspirators, details CROSSER_BONDS_DETAILS (TEXT) Provide any available details about border crosser’s co-conspirators in the terrorism-related incident and their relationship to the border crosser.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser mental health/status 171. Mental State of Individual CROSSER_MENTAL (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not the source documents mentioned that the individual had a history of mental illness
58 Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes, PRE incident (evidence to support this occurred) 2=Yes, POST incident (evidence to support this occurred) 3 =Yes, unspecified time (evidence to support this occurred; can be pre or post incident, or both)
Note: mental illness needs to be documented in the source. Coder cannot deduce from behavior, etc.
Note: If mental health problems are not mentioned at all in document, code as 0= No
172. Mental state of individual, details CROSSER_MENTAL2 (TEXT) Provide details on nature of mental illness symptoms demonstrated by border crosser.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser planning abroad 173. Incident planned abroad by crosser CROSSER_PLAN_ABROAD (NUMERIC) Evidence that the individual was involved with planning incident/conspiracy to target U.S. while in another country?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
174. Incident planned abroad by crosser, details CROSSER_PLAN_ABROAD2 (TEXT)
Provide details on the evidence that the individual was involved with planning incident/conspiracy to target U.S. while in another country.
59 If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser training abroad 175. Crosser receive training abroad for incident CROSSER_TRAIN_ABROAD (NUMERIC) Evidence that the individual participated in training for terrorism- related incident while in another country?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
176. Incident planned abroad by crosser, details CROSSER_TRAIN_ABROAD2 (TEXT) Provide details on the evidence that the individual was involved with terrorist training while in a country other than the United States.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser transport terrorism materials 177. Evidence of individual transporting terrorism related material (to be used during terrorism incident/crime) during the border crossing event? CROSSER_TRANSPORT (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not individual transported terrorism related materials to be used during incident/crime
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: any reference to materials used for terrorism would be coded yes and then more specific info (if available) can be coded in the below variables. Or ‘materials’ can be used as catch-all if no specific info known.
60
178. Terrorism related materials, details CROSSER_TRANSPORT2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual transported terrorism related materials in this border crossing, please provide details on the nature of what was being transported and how.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser help 179. Was individual working alone or with others? CROSSER_HELP (NUMERIC) Did the individual act independently in the border crossing and/ or planning of the crossing , or did s/he have help?
Values: 0= Independent (no evidence of co-conspirators/co-planners in documents) 1= Working with others (no evidence of co-conspirators/co- planners in documents)
180. Crosser help, details CROSSER_HELP2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual had help in the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details on the nature of the help/what happened.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, drugs and border crossing event
61 181. Did the individual have drugs during this border-crossing event? CROSSER_DRUGS (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not individual had illegal drugs during this event
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
182. Crosser drugs, details CROSSER_DRUGS2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual had illegal drugs during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, weapons and border crossing event 183. Did the individual have weapons during this border crossing event? CROSSER_WEAPONS (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not individual had weapons during this event
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
Note: “weapon” is something that could be used by the crosser at that point in time.
184. Crosser weapons, details CROSSER_WEAPONS2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual had weapons during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
62 If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, bomb materials and components and border crossing event 185. Did the individual have bomb materials and components during border crossing event CROSSER_BOMB (NUMERIC) Is there evidence that bomb components or materials (e.g. chemicals that could be used in a bomb) were transported in this border crossing?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
186. Crosser bomb materials and components, details CROSSER_BOMB2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual had bomb materials and components during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, manuals and border crossing event 187. Did the individual have terrorism-related documents/manuals during this border crossing event? CROSSER_MANUAL (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not individual had terrorism-related documents/manuals during this event
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
63
188. Crosser bomb materials and components, details CROSSER_MANUAL2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual had terrorism related manuals/documents during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, Sham marriage and border crossing event 189. Did individual have “sham” marriage related to this event? CROSSER_MAR_SH (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not an individual’s “sham” marriage was related to this event
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
Note: “Sham” marriage means where the purpose was so that a person can enter the country
190. Crosser sham marriage, details CROSSER_MAR_SH2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual was involved in a sham marriage during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, Sham business and border crossing event
64 191. Did individual have “sham” business related to this event? CROSSER_BUS_SH (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not an individual’s “sham” business was related to this event
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
Note: this can mean a “shell corporation” or business set up for terrorism related purposes (i.e. Funding, front etc)
192. Crosser sham business, details CROSSER_BUS_SH2 (TEXT)
If there is evidence that the individual was involved in a sham business during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser, money laundering and border crossing event 193. Did individual launder money in relation to this event? CROSSER_MON (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not an individual’s money laundering was related to this border-crossing event. (For example, was the border crosser transporting gems, gold, or other items as part of a “hawala” operation?)
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned (not attempted) crossing)
194. Crosser money laundering, details CROSSER_MON2 (TEXT)
65
If there is evidence that the individual was involved in money laundering during the border crossing or planning of the border crossing, please provide details.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
195. Crosser detained CROSSER_DETAIN (NUMERIC) Was crosser detained by law enforcement during border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
Note: Detained should include both those detained and then released and those detained, but then arrested. We have a separate variable for arrest, so we can separate out those who were “detained, but not arrested.”
Date crosser detained 196. Date of the border crossing event CROSSER_DETAIN_DATE (DATE) The date of the on which the border crosser was detained.
Values: 12/JUN/99 DD/MMM/YY If unknown or NA, leave blank
197. Day the crosser was detained CROSSER_DETAIN_DAY (NUMERIC)
The day of the month on which the border-crosser was detained
Values: 1-31
66 If unknown or NA, leave blank
198. Month the border crosser was detained CROSSER_DETAIN_MONTH (NUMERIC)
The month in which the border-crosser was detained
Values: MM 01-12
If unknown or NA, leave blank
199. Year that the border crosser was detained CROSS_DETAIN_YEAR (NUMERIC) The year in which the border-crosser was detained
(four-digit value) YYYY
If unknown or NA, leave blank
Agency detained by 200. Detained by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) CROSSER_CBP (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by CBP during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
201. Detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) CROSSER_ICE (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by ICE during the border crossing event?
67
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
202. Detained by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) CROSSER_TSA (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by TSA during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
203. Detained by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) CROSSER_DEA (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by DEA during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
204. Detained by local law enforcement CROSSER_LOCALLAW (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by local law enforcement during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
205. Detained by private security CROSSER_PRIVSEC (NUMERIC)
68 Was the crosser detained by private security during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
206. Detained by Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) CROSSER_FAA (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by FAA during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
207. Detained by Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) CROSSER_FBI (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by FBI during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
208. Detained by other law enforcement agency CROSSER_OTHERDET (NUMERIC)
Was the crosser detained by another law enforcement agency not listed during the border crossing event?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred) -8 = NA (planned/not attempted crossing)
209. Detainment by law enforcement details
69 CROSSER_LAW_DETAILS (TEXT)
If the crosser was detained by law enforcement during the border crossing, provide any additional information
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser Suspicion details 210. Why was crosser stopped CROSSER_WHY_STOP (NUMERIC)
If crosser had non-routine contact with law enforcement, what was the MAIN reason the agency stopped the crosser? (e.g. suspicion?) (pick one, can note additional reasons in next variable)
Values: 0 = agent suspected deception (includes one of the crossers acting suspicious) 1 = false paperwork 2 = chance/routine random search/stop/additional questioning 3 = tip from non-intelligence/govt agency 4 = tip from intelligence/govt agency 5 = other -8 = NA (no one in crossing stopped, crossing not attempted) -9 = UNKNOWN
211. Why was crosser stopped, details CROSS_WHY_STOP_DETAILS (TXT)
If crosser had non-routine contact with law enforcement, describe why the agency stopped the crosser
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
Crosser charges and outcome
70 212. Crossers criminal charges CROSSER_CHARGES (NUMERIC) Was the border crosser faced with criminal charges as a result of the border crossing and/or incident?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
Note: This refers to anything related to the crossing or incident - E.g., false paperwork, smuggling goods, doing something illegal during the crossing, terrorism conspiracy charges etc?
213. Crossers criminal charges, Details CROSSER_CHARGES2 (TEXT) The criminal charges the crosser received if captured in the border crossing. Provide any relevant information here
214. Case outcome for crosser CROSSER_OUTCOME (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not individual was convicted or found guilty of any charges related to border crossing/incident. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
Values: 0= No (acquitted) 1= Yes (convicted) -8=NA (no charges related to border crossing)
215. Case outcome for crosser, details CROSSER_OUTCOME2 (TEXT)
Provide any relevant information here of charges related to border crosser.
71 216. Crosser perpetrator group association CROSSER_ASSOC (NUMERIC) Was the individual associated with a known terrorist group?
Values: 0=No (no evidence to support) 1=Yes (evidence to support this occurred)
Note: if there is no mention of terrorism in documents, code as -9=unknown
217. Name of terrorist organization CROSSER_PERP (TEXT) The name of the terrorist organization the border crosser is associated with from GTD perpetrator groups. Use list of groups at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/BrowseBy.aspx?category=pe rpetrator and be sure to match spelling of groups exactly to GTD spelling. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
If unknown, write UNKNOWN If Not Applicable, write NA
218. Terrorist perpetrator group ID PERP_ID (NUMERIC)
Unique ID for terrorist perpetrator organization from GTD dataset.
Values: See table in separate document for 2000+ group IDs found in Phase II folder: BORDERS_CODESHEET_SUPPLEMENT_V1
Or
-8=NA -9=Unknown
72 219. General notes on the crosser CROSSER_NOTES (TEXT) Notes on the crosser.
220. Number of days prior to or post successful, planned, or thwarted incident INC_CROSS_TIME (NUMERIC) Identifies the amount of time in days between when the border crossing took place and when the terrorism incident occurred.
Values: If border crossing is before terrorism-related incident, record number of days prior as “-x”. E.g. A value of -14 would indicate that the individual crossed the border 14 days prior to terrorism- related incident.
If border crossing is after terrorism-related incident, record number of days after as “x”. E.g. A value of 14 would indicate that the individual crossed the border 14 days after the terrorism- related incident.
Null = Unknown or NA
Note: If “incident” did not have an exact date then this calculation is made from the indictment date.
221. The number of miles from the border crossing to the target INC_CROSS_DIST (NUMERIC) Identifies the number of miles between the border crossing location and the target.
Null = Unknown or NA
NOTE: Remember the target variable is different for different incidents (review target information). If an actual target place is not listed, then use the distance from one city or state to another. Approximate as best as you can with the given information.
222. Court case number
73 CASE_NUM (ATS.D_COURTCASE.CASE_NUM) (NUMERIC)
Refers to the court case number and federal jurisdiction of court case in the ATS dataset.
1= 04-CR-10004 (MA) etc.
223. Links border crossing event to a court case in the TEVUS dataset. COURTCASES_KEY (NUMERIC) Unique ID.
224. Links border crossing event to a court case in the ATS dataset ATS_D_COURTCASE_ID (NUMERIC)
Unique ID. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset.
74 Descriptive Analyses of Data on Border Crossings by U.S. Terrorists March 2012
This research was supported by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs through grant award #2009ST061MD0003. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented here are solely the authors’ and are not representative of DHS, the United States’ government, or START. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Parameters of Data • Not a representative sample of border crossers: all are associated with Federal terrorism case in some way • Crossing may have occurred before or after an individuals’ involvement in terrorism-related cases • People not indicted may have also been involved in a crossing, but analyses of individuals looks only at those noted to be associated with terrorist activity in court case • There is varying depth of data available across cases • Analyses based on data from 2 data sets: one on border crossings and one on border crossers. – Some crossings have multiple crossers and vice versa.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A review of open-source data on indictees in Federal terrorism cases identified 221 incidents in which an individual indicted on terrorism-related charges crossed a U.S. border between 1962 and 2005.
Terrorist Border Crossings: Entry into US v. Departure from US
42% Departure Entry 58%
N=221 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
These 221 border-crossing incidents were associated with 43 terrorist attacks in the United States between 1975 and 2001. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Planned v. Attempted Border Crossings involving an Indictee in a Terrorism- The vast majority of crossing 3% Related Case incidents identified went beyond Attempted to the planning stage to indictees cross the border actually attempting to cross a U.S. border. Planned border crossing, no 97% attempt N=221
Was Border Crossing Successful?
13% No, it was thwarted And, the vast majority of Yes, it was successful attempted crossings resulted in 87% indictee(s) successfully crossing n=218 the U.S. border. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Timing of Border Crossings: 26%
Before, Concurrent During, or Post-incident 7% Pre-incident After Alleged 67% Terrorist Activity National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Border Crossings Involving an Indictee on Terrorism-Related Charges by Year, 1985-2005
20
18
16 14
12
10
8
6 #Terrorist Border Crossings Border #Terrorist 4
2
0
N=158 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Port of Entry Type for Border Crossings Involving Indictees in Terrorism-Related Cases
23%
Airport Land port 13% Seaport 64%
n=125, data unavailable for 96 cases National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Port of Entry # of Attempted Crossings
New York NY (JFK Airport) 15 Identified Chicago IL 7 Tampa FL 3 Locations Boston MA (Logan Airport) 2 Rouses Point NY 2 of Atlanta GA 2 Los Angeles CA (LAX) 2 Newark NJ 2 Attempted Richford VT 1 Boston MA 1 Border Alexandria Bay NY 1 Niagara Falls NY 1 Crossings Orlando FL 1 Memphis TN 1 at Official Nogales AZ 1 Las Vegas NV 1 Ports of San Francisco CA (SFO) 1 Point Wells/Seattle WA 1 Entry Minneapolis/St. Paul 1 Detroit MI 1 Data available for Columbus OH 1 only 49 crossings. Washington DC 1 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Country of Origin for Border Crossings In addition, 1 crossing originated from each Canada of the following: Dominican Republic Afghanistan Northern Ireland Algeria Venezuela Cuba Pakistan France Ireland India Mexico Jordan Israel Kenya Egypt Libya Germany Morocco Cyprus Panama Saudi Arabia Peru Lebanon Scotland England Spain 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Syria N=92 United Arab Emirates
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
The 221 border crossing incidents involved 314 individuals, 264 (84%) of whom had a direct link to terrorism, according to available court documents. An average of 1.5 terrorism-related individuals attempted to cross U.S. borders for each of the 221 incidents. * If an individual crossed the border multiple times, he/she is counted in the data set multiple times, one time per crossing. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Terrorist Group # of Crossers Associated with Group Group Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 32 Associations Al-Qa`ida 41 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 4 of Known Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 1 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 1 Terrorism- (FALN) Related Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 2 Hizballah 26 Border Japanese Red Army (JRA) 1 Macheteros 74 Crossers Omega-7 9 PIRA 47 N=241 Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 3 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Demographics of Terrorism-Related Border Crossers • Mean age at time of crossing = 31 years old • 86.6% of crossers were male • Average (mode) highest level of education was a high-school diploma (33%) • 82% were married at time of crossing • 11% were previously arrested in the United States, according to court documents • 11.1% were previously arrested abroad, according to court documents
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Citizenship of Attempted Border Crossers Linked to Terrorism Citizenship of # from that Crosser Country Canada 15* Ireland 12 Great Britain 8 Jordan 2 Northern Ireland 1 Pakistan 1 Saudi Arabia 1 United States 46 * Includes Canadian/Lebanese dual citizens N=95 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Immigration Status of Non-US Citizens: Elusive Data 3% J-1 Visa
Non-immigrant Class B (Temporary visitor - business/pleasure) 38% Non-immigrant Class H, L, O & P 53% (specialty occupation/Temporary Workers) Non-immigrant Visitor Visa
Other* 3% 3% N=34 Other statuses include: permanent resident alien of US, refugee /political asylum status, fraudulent documents National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Criminal Behavior Associated with Crossing
Money laundering
Possession of bomb components
Weapon possession
Drug possession
Transported terrorism-related material
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 # of terrorism-related crossers National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Only 15 of the 264 terrorism-related border crossers were detained by law enforcement personnel as they tried to cross the border (5.7%).
Those who were detained were stopped by: • Customs and Border Protection (50%) • Immigration and Customs Enforcement (12.5%) • Local Law Enforcement (12.5%) • FBI (25%)
• No reports of detainment at ports of entry by TSA, DEA, or private security personnel Descriptive Analyses of Data on Border Crossings by U.S. Terrorists March 2012
START Point of Contact: Dr. Kathleen Smarick, [email protected] DHS S&T Point of Contact: Georgia Harrigan, [email protected]
Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies
A report to the Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Revised August 2012
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence Based at the University of Maryland
3300 Symons Hall • College Park, MD 20742 • 301.405.6600 • www.start.umd.edu
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
About This Report
The primary author of this report is Jaime Shoemaker of START at the University of Maryland. Questions about this report should be directed to [email protected].
The author would like to acknowledge and thank Erin E. Miller and Kathleen Smarick of START and Paxton Roberts of the University of Arkansas for comments and contributions to this report.
This research was supported by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as part of the Office of University Programs Multi- Disciplinary, Multi-Institutional grant program through Grant Award Number 2009ST061MD0003 made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or START.
About START
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START uses state‐of‐the‐art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at [email protected] or visit www.start.umd.edu.
Citations
To cite this report, please use this format:
Shoemaker, Jaime. “Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies,” Report to Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START, 2012.
Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Contents
Introduction ...... 3 Background ...... 4 Use of Fraudulent Documents ...... 6 Political Asylum Seekers ...... 7 Case Study Methodology ...... 8 Section 1- Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer ...... 9 Case Selection: Why the Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer Cases? ...... 9 The US-Canadian Border...... 10 Case 1- Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber ...... 12 Background ...... 12 Preparation for the Border Crossing ...... 12 The Port Angeles Port of Entry (POE) ...... 13 The Crossing Event ...... 14 Link between Crossing Event and Terrorist Activity ...... 15 Case 2- Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer ...... 16 Crossing Attempt #1 ...... 16 Crossing Attempt #2 ...... 17 Crossing Attempt #3 ...... 17 Staying in the United States ...... 18 Link between Crossing Event and Terrorist Activity ...... 19 Case Comparison ...... 19 What Has Changed?...... 20 Section 2- 1993 World Trade Center Bombers and the North Carolina Financers of Terrorism ...... 23 Case Selection: Why the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers and the North Carolina Terrorist Financiers? ...... 23 Airport Security ...... 24 Case 3- 1993 World Trade Center Bombers ...... 25 Roles of Individuals ...... 25 The Crossings ...... 26 Link between Crossing Events and Terrorist Activity ...... 27 Case 4- North Carolina Terrorist Financing Ring ...... 28 Roles of Individuals ...... 29 Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 1 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
The Crossings ...... 31 Staying in the United States ...... 34 Link between the Crossing Events and Terrorist Activity ...... 34 Case Comparison ...... 35 What Has Changed?...... 36 Section 3- Common Themes and Important Changes to Legislation ...... 37 Political Asylum ...... 38 Fraudulent Documents ...... 39 Section 4- Conclusion ...... 40 Increase and Streamline Mass Data Sharing ...... 41 Increase Use of Biometric Technology ...... 42 Looking Back and Looking Ahead ...... 44 Works Cited ...... 47
Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 2 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Introduction
Preventing the illicit transportation of materials and personnel while still allowing for efficient licit movement is a delicate balancing act. Extensively invasive inspection procedures would exponentially increase waiting times at official ports of entry, greatly slow down trade, and have major repercussions for the national economy. However, inspection policies and procedures that are too lenient leave the country vulnerable to various illegal activities. Establishing this balance, while processing more than 960,000 people and almost 50,000 vehicles and vessels per day at ports of entry,1 is an ongoing challenge. Of special concern to many is the degree to which US borders serve as gateways for individuals who are looking to harm America or Americans. As the country’s counterterrorism efforts have increased, so too has attention on the issue of if and how potential terrorists can be stopped at US borders. But empirical, unclassified information about terrorists’ entries into and departures from the United States is relatively limited.
In 2010, the US Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate provided funding to launch a research project designed to improve understanding of terrorists crossing US borders2 The project involves a multi-methodological approach, employing complementary quantitative and qualitative analyses.
The research presented here is a product of this project, intended to provide systematic review of illustrative cases that can inform the process of efficiently preventing those with nefarious intentions from crossing into or fleeing from the United States. This report presents four in-depth case studies that examine how potential terrorists have sought to exploit US borders and enter the United States. The analysis reveals important themes—specifically, the use of fraudulent documents and political asylum claims to gain access to desired targets in the United States—that are important for counterterrorism officials and border security experts alike to consider.
The case studies examine in detail how the borders were crossed, what ports of entry (POE) were used, what was successful in preventing potentially dangerous individuals from freely entering into the country, and what weaknesses were exploited. The collection of case studies is divided into two sections. The first section includes cases of individuals who were not acting as part of a larger group. The second section includes groups of individuals, linked to designated foreign terrorist organizations, who consistently worked together and even crossed borders in groups. By examining them separately, one can explore unique attributes of crossing methods applicable to each social dynamic, as well as evaluate the different methods used to enter the United States.
The report begins with a review of existing literature on border security as it relates to counterterrorism objectives, with an emphasis on research relevant to two important themes that emerge from the current analysis: the role of fraudulent documents and political-asylum seeking in gaining access to the country.
1 Data on border traffic from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures.” Available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/accomplish/snapshot.ctt/snapshot.pdf. 2 See Award # 2009ST061MD003, Multi-Institutional, Multidisciplinary University Research: Border Crossings and U.S. Terrorist Attacks: Lessons for Protecting against Dangerous Entrants Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 3 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Then the methodological approach used in the current case study research is discussed, followed by the case studies themselves. The four cases examined in detail are Ahmed Ressam, Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers and the North Carolina cigarette smuggling group.
The backgrounds and border crossing information of the Ressam and Abu Mezer are discussed separately and then compared in order to identify common points at which border agents determined it was prudent to conduct further inspection. Similarly, the two group-focused cases are described, focusing on the roles of the various individuals involved, how they crossed into the United States, and the impact that arrests of individuals had on the groups’ planned and actual involvement in terrorist activity. The report concludes with an identification of key similarities among all four cases and a discussion of the relevance of the findings and implications for policy and future research.
Background
The purpose of border security, according to US Customs and Border Protection (CBP),3 is to secure borders “at and between the ports of entry by stopping inadmissible people and illicit goods as well as facilitating legitimate trade and travel.”4 As former CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin pointed out, the United States is committed to creating secure borders, not sealed borders.5 While it is important to keep threats out, people and goods still need to move in and out of the country.
While counterterrorism has developed as an important component of general border security, it has been added to efforts to combat the trafficking of narcotics, movement of illegal immigrants, and other criminal activities. Likewise, the use of forged or fraudulently obtained documents as a tool to cross the border is not unique to those intending to engage in terrorism. Anyone wishing to hide his or her identity or purpose for entering the United States may resort to this strategy. Nor is the misuse of the application for political asylum process in order to remain in the country unique to those planning to engage in terrorism related activities. Nonetheless, the use of fraudulent documents and asylum applications are a common theme among border crossings related to terrorism which will be considered in detail here.
The existing literature on border security is extensive and covers a range of issues. Three divergent perspectives on border crossings are relevant to this study. The first suggests that not enough is being done to achieve this goal, the second suggests that regulations are too strict and hamper effective flows of
3 US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was created in 2003 in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. It includes US Border Patrol and a number of other relevant agencies in an effort reduce the number of disparate agencies operating along the United States border regions. 4 US Customs and Border Protection, “Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures.” Available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/accomplish/snapshot.ctt/snapshot.pdf. 5 Alan Bersin speaking at the Center for American Progress, The State of US/Mexico Border Security: Assessing the Past, Present and Future From the Early Build Up to Today and Beyond. August 4, 2011. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 4 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence people and goods across US borders, and a third focuses on the impact of post-9/11 policies on the relationship between the United States and its neighbors.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted a number of studies of border security along both Northern and Southern US borders. Although they do indicate that progress has been made over time in monitoring US borders, the GAO analyses are critical of the level of security along the borders, claiming that more should be done to keep dangerous materials and individuals out of the country. The GAO is not alone in expressing concerns about the new border security standards and the progress that has been made since 9/11. Numerous authors agree that the impacts of the new policies are far-reaching and affect both trade and immigration.6 DeCastro and Dominguez point out that the shift in how the Southern border region was viewed by the US government after 2001 hindered a number of existing projects to make border operations more efficient: the shift from viewing the Southern border as “an economic region that badly needed investment to a vulnerable security zone” delayed projects that were intended to help those who had already been identified as non-threatening to cross the border more quickly.7
A number of books, articles, and reports focus on the impacts the new border security regime has had on trade with Canada as well.8 In 2008 study titled The Impacts of 9/11 on Canada-US Trade, Globerman and Storer analyze the stress that new security has put on economic relations between the neighboring countries, particularly in terms of time and money. The authors demonstrate that it now takes longer and is more expensive to move people and goods in both directions across the US-Canadian border.9 This study focuses on economic issues, however, and doesn’t examine national security consequences of current border practices.
In contrast, a report released by the US Department of Homeland Security notes that much progress has been made in implementing recommendations regarding border security since the 9/11 attacks. This report points to how, in many cases, CBP and other agencies involved in border security have exceeded the recommendations made by the 9/11 commission.10 The improvements the report references include efforts made at all levels of law enforcement to share relevant information with each other, as well as with other countries; improvements in pre-screening of passengers and cargo destined for the United States at
6 Other relevant sources include: Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Vega-Canovas, Gustavo. (2003). “Whither NAFTA: A Common Frontier?” The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context. Chapter 7. Routledge; Rudolf, Christopher. (2006). National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945. Stanford University Press. 7 De Castro, Rafael Fernandez. Dominguez, Jorge I. (2009). Between Partnership and Conflict: The United States and Mexico. Second Edition . Routledge. p. 195. 8 Other relevant sources include: Ackleson, Jason. (2009). “From ‘Thin’ to ‘Thick’ (and Back Again?): The Politics and Policies of Contemporary US-Canada Border”. American Review of Canadian Studies. Vol. 39, No. 4. December 2009. p. 336-351; Andreas, Peter. (2005). “The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdependence in a Changing Security Context”. International Journal. Vol. 60. No 2 (Spring 2005). p. 449-462; Konrad, Victor and Heather N. Nicol. (2008). Beyond Walls: Re- inventing the Canada-United States Borderlands. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 9 Globerman, Steve. Storer, Paul. (2008). The Impacts of 9/11 on Canada-U.S. Trade. University of Toronto Press Incorporated. 10 Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 5 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence land, air, and port crossings; pre-screening all passengers flying to the United States in order to check names against no-fly lists; and enhancing identification documents, making them more difficult to forge.11
In a 2011 presentation by former Commissioner of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service Doris Meissner and then-CBP Commissioner Bersin at the Center for American Progress, the two pointed out how much security, particularly along the Southern Border, had changed since 2001. Both emphasized that border security requires a successful combination of “people, equipment, and technology.”12 Meissner spoke specifically to the importance of the second two elements and noted that adding personnel is not the best strategy for improving border security. Bersin noted that certain programs, such as walls along the border, receive a great deal of criticism but emphasized that those programs are doing what they were designed to do, and that it is unreasonable to expect a border region where officers are able to keep 100% of those trying to cross the border illegally from doing so. As he pointed out “we do not expect perfection and zero crime from local police forces. It is unrealistic to expect US border agents to catch everything and everyone.”13 The cases included in this study represent both successes in preventing entry by those who are a threat (such as the Millennium Bomber), as well as situations in which dangerous individuals do gain entry (such as the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers) and tries to note distinctions that allowed for different outcomes among these cases.
Use of Fraudulent Documents
A number of factors can foster insecurity and vulnerabilities along the US border. Two methods adopted by would-be terrorists to bypass the established systems for entering the country are the use of fraudulent documents and the use/abuse of the political asylum application process.
The use of fake documents and documents obtained by fraudulent means in order to cross into the United States plays a key role in all of the cases discussed in this document and has long played a key role in undermining border and national security. It is a problem that government officials have been well aware of, and fighting against, for quite some time. According to Bersin, forged documents are currently less of a concern due to improvements in detection technology and the restrictions on the types of documents that may be used to enter the United States.14 However, that does not mean that the problem has been eliminated. In 2009, Secretary Napolitano stated that “…the reality that potential terrorists could use a variety of ways to enter the country illegally, [including] fake documents,”15 creates a challenge for US national security.
Rudner points out that the ability to travel can play a key role in allowing individuals within a transnational terrorist organization to function effectively. According to Rudner, “identity fraud, exercised through the
11 Ibid, pages 3-5. 12 Alan Bersin speaking at the Center for American Progress, The State of US/Mexico Border Security: Assessing the Past, Present and Future From the Early Build Up to Today and Beyond. August 4, 2011. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Council on Foreign Relations. July 29, 2009. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1248891649195.shtm (Accessed August 3, 2011). Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 6 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence misuse of passports, makes it possible for terrorist elements to cross borders… to enter or transit countries… [and] to engage in clandestine activities and resource mobilization…”16 Elements of these three uses of fraudulent documents, and fraudulently obtained documents, will be seen in the case studies below. Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer both used fake passports to get into Canada and used Canada as a transit country to the United States. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj used fake Swedish passports to enter the United States. Lastly, members of the North Carolina group convicted of terrorist financing used fraudulently obtained visas in order to enter the United States and raise money for Hezbollah.
The Congressional Research Service has assembled a useful primer on current policies and practices in place for administering visas,17 but a 2011 GAO report is critical of current policies and expresses concern that the system of administering visas to those wishing to travel to the United States still has weaknesses that can be exploited by those with nefarious intentions. For example, the report points out that there are inconsistencies in the amount of training individuals who distribute visas to the United States receive, particularly regarding identification of visa application fraud.18
Political Asylum Seekers
The political asylum process in the Unites States is an important legal option for those seeking to immigrate to the country. According to the US Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) website, “every year people come to the United states seeking protection because they have suffered persecution or fear that they will suffer persecution due to race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”19 Political asylum offers these individuals a mechanism for legal entry into the United States. There are two types of political asylum: affirmative and defensive. Affirmative asylum applications are made by individuals who are physically present in the United States and have not been placed in proceedings before an Immigration Judge, typically within one year of arrival. In defensive asylum applications, as seen in the cases presented here, the person seeking asylum makes his or her claim as a defense against removal proceedings.20
According to USCIS:
16 Rudner, Martin. (2008). “Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud, the Propensity to Travel, and International Terrorism”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 31:2, p. 95-110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701812803 (Accessed September 26, 2011). p. 97 17 Wasem, Ellen Ruth. Visa Security Policy: Roles of the Departments of State and Homeland Security. Congressional Research Service. June 30, 2011. 18 United States Government Accountability Office. (2011). Border Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Woldwide. Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. March 2011. 19 Asylum. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Updated March 31, 2011. http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f39d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM1 00000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f39d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD# (Accessed August 3, 2011). 20 Obtaining Asylum in the United States. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Updated March 10, 2011. http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=dab9f067e3183210VgnVCM10 0000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f39d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (Accessed September 28, 2011). Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 7 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
For asylum processing to be defensive, [an individual] must be in removal proceedings in immigration court with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
Individuals are generally placed into defensive asylum processing in one of two ways:·
They are referred to an Immigration Judge by USCIS after they have been determined to be ineligible for asylum at the end of the affirmative asylum process, or They are placed in removal proceedings because they: . Were apprehended (or caught) in the United States or at a U.S. port of entry without proper legal documents or in violation of their immigration status, OR . Were caught by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) trying to enter the United States without proper documentation, were placed in the expedited removal process, and were found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture by an Asylum Officer. For more information on the Credible Fear Process, see the “Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screenings” link to the right. 21
In the cases discussed below, individuals exploited this provision and used it as a way to stay in the United States after it was determined that the individual was in, or attempting to enter, the country illegally. In general, much of the literature currently available on the process of applying for asylum focuses most prominently on who is likely to succeed in being able to stay in the United States after applying for asylum. There has been little scholarly research on abuse of the system by those who apply falsely and exploit the protocol simply to stay in the country. However, it has been a legitimate concern in terms of the threat of terrorism. Since the early 1990s, there has been a “fear that international terrorists might enter the United States with false documents, filing bogus asylum claims, and disappear into the population.”22 This concern has proven valid on a number of occasions, as discussed below.
Case Study Methodology
The cases presented here were selected from the 221 incidents of border crossings between 1968 and 2005, involving at least one individual indicted in the United States on federal terrorist charges, as identified in the Terrorist Border Crossings data-collection effort.23 The process of selecting a small number of cases for in-depth analysis involved considering several key criteria related to the availability of quality information and the relevance of cases to border security today. First, cases involving arrivals to the United States prior to offending or planned offending were isolated, rather than focusing on departures from the United States. This focuses the analysis on those events that might provide insight for prevention rather than legal response. The pre-offense cases were then divided into subsets based on the type of crossing—either land/port- or air-crossings—to allow for comparison across venues. The sample of cases was further evaluated based on whether the person crossing the border was successful in entering the United States or detained. Once a short list of cases was identified in each subset, initial research was conducted to determine the quality and quantity of information available on each case. Among those cases with sufficient information, priority was given to those cases that had occurred most recently. This is
21 Ibid. 22 Wasem, Ruth Ellen. (2005). U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers. CRS Report for Congress. May 5, 2005. p. 5. 23 More information on these data can be obtained from this report’s author. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 8 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence important because laws and procedures have changed dramatically in the last twenty years. The location of crossing was also analyzed and sorted into groups based on regions of the United States because each point of entry has its own challenges. Note that race, religious affiliation, country of origin and group affiliation of border crossers were not factors in the selection of cases.
To examine these selected cases in greater detail, researchers examined a variety of primary and secondary sources of information. This included court documents, academic journal articles, books, news reports, and unclassified government reports. Court documents were particularly useful, as some testimony specified methods of entering the United States, motives, and other relevant information.
Section 1- Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer
In reviewing potential cases for analysis, it became evident that some border crossers were part of a violent extremist group (formal or informal), while others were acting independently. This distinction is relevant to understanding the challenges of counterterror efforts along US borders for at least two reasons: an independent operator might be more difficult to detect in trying to cross the border, as he or she might have fewer resources and less expertise available, but the interception at the border of an individual working alone might have a greater impact on preventing an event than the arrest of one individual working as part of a group. For example, as discussed below, when Ahmed Ressam was stopped while crossing the border, his plan to set off bombs at Los Angeles International Airport was foiled. However, the arrest of Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj upon entering the country at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York did nothing to prevent the eventual bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. His arrest had little impact on the execution of the plot developed between Ajaj and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. The cases examined below illustrate both similarities and differences among individual border crossers and groups working together to enter the country, with Section 1 focusing on individual border crossers linked to terrorism events.
Case Selection: Why the Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer Cases?
Even though they took place before September 11, 2001, the events involving Ahmed Ressam (commonly known as the Millennium Bomber) and Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer reveal relevant information regarding today’s borders, in part because they provide a baseline to show the progress made since the post-9/11 policies were implemented. They are also examples of how fraudulent documents and application for political asylum are used as tools in individuals’ efforts to access intended targets within the United States. Ressam used fraudulently obtained documents to hide his identity during his attempt to enter the United States, while Abu Mezer used the political asylum process to stay in the country. As presented in Table 1, both individuals originated from the same region of the world and immigrated to Canada where they lived illegally. Both crossed into the United States from Canada in the state of Washington, attempted to cross by illegal means, used the same type of crossing (land/port), crossed within a three-year period of one another, and had been arrested in other countries prior to arriving in the United States. While there are many similarities there is a key difference between the two. Despite two
Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 9 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence previous failed attempts, Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer (Abu Mezer) was able to successfully cross from Washington to his intended destination in New York City before being arrested, while Ressam was arrested at the border.
Table 1: Comparison the of Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi Abu Mezer Cases Arrested Type of Arriving Departing Legal Crossing Date of Before Interdicted? Crossing In From Crossing Date Arrest Entering US? Ahmed United Ressam Land/ Dec.14, Dec. 14, States Canada No Yes Yes (Millennium Port 1999 1999 (WA) Bomber)
Ghazi (Gazi) United Late 1996 Yes Land/ July 31, Ibrahim Abu States Canada No Late 1996 Yes Yes Port 1997 Mezer (WA) Jan. 1997 No
The US-Canadian Border
According to a 2010 GAO report, “the terrorist threat on the northern border is higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement coverage.”24 The US-Canadian border is the longest non- militarized border in the world25 and provides unique security challenges for a number of reasons. It stretches roughly 5,525 miles across both land and water26 and is almost three times the length of the approximately 2,000-mile US-Mexican border.27 As shown in Figure 1, the border touches 13 different US states and is comprised of eight different Border Patrol sectors. In addition to its scope, the northern border also has varying and harsh terrains. It includes vast plains, mountain ranges and dense forests, with large stretches of land that are far from habitation and have a sub-arctic climate. This geography complicates the ability of agents to effectively stop illicit movement. Relevant to the cases analyzed here, the unique challenges for those along the Canadian-Washington State border include 393 miles of urban and rural land (mostly rural) border and 167 miles of coastal border in the Blaine and Spokane Sectors.28
Coordination of law enforcement is particularly complicated along this border because of the many different parties involved. According to a 2010 congressional report, “overlap exists in mission and operational boundaries among agencies at the border that require coordination and collaboration for
24 United States Government Accountability Office. (2010). Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. Report to Congressional Requesters. p. 6 25 Lake, Jennifer. Seghetti, Lisa. Wasenm, Ruth Ellen. (2004). Border Security: Inspections, Practices, Policies and Issues. CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RL32399. May 26, 2004. p. 2. 26 United States Drug Enforcement Agency. (2008). United States- Canada Border Drugs Threat Assessment 2007. Department of Homeland Security Publications. http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/le/oc/_fl/us-canadian-report-drugs-eng.pdf (Accessed June 7, 2011). 27 Beaver, Janice Cheryl. (2006). U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts. CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RS21729. November 9. 2006. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21729.pdf (Accessed August 1, 2011) 28 United States Government Accountability Office. (2010). Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 10 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence efficient and effective law enforcement.”29 Coordinating efforts between Canadian border agents (Canada Border Services Agency, CBSA) and US Border Patrol agents is complex. There are numerous federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement groups operating along the border, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Washington State Patrol, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the US Forest Service. Although they have different mandates, these groups all share the common goal of protecting citizens from those engaging in illicit activities along the border.
As the cases of Ressam and Abu Mezer demonstrate, this complicated border between the United States and Canada has been a point of entry to the United States for individuals who plan to engage in terrorism.30 While diligent law enforcement have sometimes succeeded in preventing the entry of such individuals, at other times border crossers have been able to exploit the system to successfully gain access to the country.
Figure 1- US Customs and Border Protection- Office of Border Patrol Sectors
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Office of Border Patrol-Sectors. http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/careers/customs_careers/border_careers/bp_agent/sectors_map.ctt/Sectors_Map.pdf (Accessed July 19, 2011).
29 Ibid, p. 11. 30 Newly collected data from START on Terrorist Border Crossings found that 15 of 92 incidents of a border crossing involving an indictee on terrorism charges originated in Canada—the most frequent origin site for the border crossing attempts. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 11 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Case 1- Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber
Background Ahmed Ressam was born on May 9, 1967, in Algeria. While his father was a religiously devout man, Ahmed and his siblings were not religious.31 After failing his baccalaureate exams, Ressam began working in his father’s coffee shop, followed by approximately two years of moving from country to country using a variety of aliases. In Corsica in 1993, he was arrested on immigration violations. Instead of waiting to be deported back to Algeria, on February 20, 1994, Ressam traveled to Canada using a fake French passport under the name of Anjer Tahar Medjadi.32 Upon questioning by Canadian officials, he admitted the passport was fake, that he had simply covered up the original passport photo with his own, and applied for political asylum. Ressam claimed that he was persecuted in Algeria and had been falsely imprisoned for ties to organizations engaged in terrorist activity. Although his claims were false, Ressam was permitted to enter the country and even received welfare benefits.33
Until his relocation to Canada, Ressam had lived a secular life. After his arrival in Canada, however, that began to change. According to testimony given by Ressam at the trial of one of his collaborators,34 Ressam began regularly attending the Assuna Annabawiyah Mosque.35 It was during this same time that Ressam became involved in petty theft and became not only religious but radicalized.36 Ressam went beyond being devout and began to view his faith in a way that not only justified but encouraged him to engage in violence against civilians.
On June 5, 1995, Ressam’s application for political asylum in Canada was denied, but he was not deported due to an existing Canadian moratorium on extraditions to Algeria. He continued his life of petty crime, was arrested at least four times and convicted once, but never served any jail time in Canada.37 Despite the moratorium, certain conditions had been placed upon Ressam in order for him to stay in Canada. His arrests violated those conditions and a warrant was issued for Ressam’s arrest and deportation on May 4, 1998, but by that time Ressam was abroad at a jihadi training camp due to his “interest in joining [the] jihad in Algeria.”38
Preparation for the Border Crossing Upon returning to Canada (this time under the alias of Benni Noris) in February 1999, Ressam began assembling the materials needed to build explosives and plotting his attack within the United States.
31 Sageman, Marc. (2004). Understanding Terrorist Networks. University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 99. 32 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States of America v. Ahmed Ressam (No. 09-30000, D.C. No. 2:99-cr- 006660JCC-1), Western District of Washington, Argued November 2, 2009. 33 Sageman, p. 100. 34 His collaborator, Mokhtar Haouari, lived in Montreal and provided Ressam with the false passport and visa Ressam planned to use in order to get out of the United States after the intended bombing.- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. p. 178. 35United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, (s4 00 Cr.15 (JFK)) United States District Court Southern District of New York. 36 Sageman, p. 100. 37 United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, (s4 00 Cr.15 (JFK)) United States District Court Southern District of New York. 38 Ibid. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 12 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Originally, the plot was to be carried out by a cell of al-Qa’ida operatives involving three other people.39 However, the other members had difficulties with immigration in Europe and were unable to participate. This did not deter Ressam, and he began preparing to carry out the operation without the help of his fellow cell members.
Over the next few months Ressam collected the items he would need in order to carry out the plan of bombing an airport in the United States. This included chemicals, false passports, a driver’s license, and a visa to help him get out of the country once his mission was complete. Ressam was able to coordinate the documents that he needed through two accomplices, Mokhtar Haouari and Abu Doha. According to Ressam’s testimony, through his contacts with Haouari and Doha, he intended to build a fake Canadian identity under the name Benni Noris. It was under this name that Ressam had traveled back and forth to Canada and Middle East,40 and he similarly planned to use these documents to enter and exit the United States.
In November 1999 Ressam moved from Montreal to Vancouver, British Columbia (BC), and prepared explosives at the 2400 Court Motel,41 then continued on to Victoria, BC. In the days before attempting to enter the United States, “he called an Afghanistan-based facilitator to inquire [if] bin Laden wanted to take credit for the attack…”42 Although he never received a response, he proceeded with his plans. Finally, on December 14, 1999, Ressam attempted to cross from Tsawwassen BC to Port Angeles in Washington on the MV Coho vehicle and passenger ferry.43
The Port Angeles Port of Entry (POE) Ressam boarded the ferry destined for Port Angeles, WA. The Port Angeles port of entry (POE) is located in the US Border Patrol’s Blaine Sector that includes 163 miles of coastal border.44 According to the US Customs and Border Protection official website, Port Angeles “is located on Washington State’s Olympic Peninsula, approximately seventy (70) air miles west-northwest of Seattle, and eighteen (18) miles south of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.”45 It is a busy port, especially in terms of personal vehicles and personal vehicle passengers. In order to gain perspective on the size of the Port Angeles POE and the volume of traffic that moves through it, Figure 2 compares the traffic volume at Port Angeles and El Paso POEs. While El Paso is not the busiest land POE, it handles significantly more traffic than Port Angeles. Despite the smaller size of Port Angeles, the relatively low ratio of inspectors to people and vehicles crossing in a given day does provide a challenge for those working along the border.
39 Some reports claim that it was a cell of five people, while others claim that it was six people. 40 United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, (s4 00 Cr.15 (JFK)) United States District Court Southern District of New York. 41 United States of America v. Ahmed Ressam, (Case 2:99-cr-00666-JC, Document 367) United States District Court Western District of Washington at Seattle Filed April 20, 2005. 42 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. p. 177. 43 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States of America v. Ahmed Ressam ( No. 09-30000, D.C. No. 2:99-cr- 006660JCC-1), Western District of Washington, Argued November 2, 2009. 44 United States Government Accountability Office. (2010). Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border p. 5. 45 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Website, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_sectors/blaine_sector_wa/stations/port_angeles_stati on.xml, (Accessed June 12, 2011). Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 13 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Figure 2- Comparison of Traffic Volume at the Port Angeles and El Paso Ports of Entry
Research and Innovative Technology Administration- Bureau of Transportation Statistics46
The Crossing Event The first contact Ahmed Ressam had with a US border agent was during the boarding process onto a ferry, the MV Coho in Tsawwassen. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)47 Inspector Gary Roberts inspected Ressam’s fraudulent Canadian passport under the alias of Benni Noris.48 Inspector Roberts did run the passport through various databases, but Ressam’s criminal past and arrest warrants were not yet linked to his alias by Canadian authorities.49 Upon questioning, Ressam informed Inspector Roberts that his final destination was Seattle, WA. This made Inspector Roberts suspicious because the ferry was not a normal route for those traveling from Vancouver to Seattle, and he proceeded to search Ressam’s car. According to available documents, there was no reason for the agent to conduct an extensive search, and Ressam was cleared to board the ferry. Inspector Roberts, therefore, did not look inside the hidden wheel well in the trunk where Ressam had hidden explosive materials.50
Upon arriving at Port Angeles, Ressam purposely waited to be the last person to disembark the ferry, hoping that by the end of the process agents would not take as close a look at his documentation or his car. According to court documents, US Customs Inspector Diane Dean noticed that Ressam seemed nervous and sent him to the secondary inspection area.51 During the secondary inspection, Inspector Mark Johnson examined Ressam’s person, while Inspector Danny Clem conducted an extensive search of the
46 Border Crossing/Entry Data: Time Series Analysis. Research and Innovative Technology Administration. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCTSA.html (Accessed July 18, 2011). 47 Following the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), INS was abolished in 2003, with its functions transferred to three DHS agencies—CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/gc_1297963906741.shtm. 48 The passport itself was a real Canadian passport, but had been obtained fraudulently. There was no reason for Inspector Roberts to suspect that Benni Noris was an alias. 49 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 178. 50 United States of America v. Ahmed Ressam, (Case 2:99-cr-00666-JC, Document 367) United States District Court Western District of Washington at Seattle Filed April 20, 2005.
51 Ibid. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 14 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence car. Looking inside the spare-tire compartment, Inspector Clem discovered hexamethylene triperoxide (HMTD), cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX), ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN), a large quantity of urea, fertilizer, aluminum sulfate, and “four electronic timing devices designed to detonate primary explosives.”52 According to FBI Special Agent Gregory Carl’s testimony at Ressam’s trial, an explosion using these materials could have created a blast zone covering hundreds of feet. Noticing a commotion around his car, Ressam took off on foot. After attempting to hijack a car at a near-by stoplight, Ressam was re- captured by the inspectors and processed.53
Bomb-making materials were not the only contraband that Ressam had with him. He also had in his possession both counterfeit documents and legitimate documents obtained through fraudulent means (including his Canadian passport). During his testimony at Mokhtar Haouari’s trial in 2001, Ressam explained how he obtained each of the items in the trunk of his car and the various documents in his possession at the time of his arrest.54
Ressam was ultimately charged and convicted of nine criminal counts. These counts include committing an act of terrorism transcending a national boundary, placing an explosive in proximity to a terminal, smuggling, transportation of explosive, possession of an unregistered destruction device, and possessing false identification document. His original sentence was for life in prison, but it was reduced to a maximum of 130 years after he began cooperating with the US government in May 2001.55
Link between Crossing Event and Terrorist Activity In some cases it is difficult to establish a clear link between an individual crossing event and terrorist activity. This was not the case with Ahmed Ressam. The type and amount of explosive-building materials in the car made it clear that Ressam had nefarious intentions, and Ressam eventually divulged his entire plan in court. During his testimony at Haouari’s trial, the following examination occurred between Joseph F. Bianco (Assistant United States Attorney) and Ressam regarding Ressam’s planned attack:
Q: Did you consider at that time what type of target your attack would be on? A: Yes Q: What did you decide? A: An airport in America in Los Angeles. Q: Why did you decide on an airport? A: Because an airport is sensitive politically and economically.56
After this statement, Ressam described the intended event itself. Ressam explained that he planned to perform surveillance by placing a suitcase on a luggage cart and placing it in an unsuspicious place to
52 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States of America v. Ahmed Ressam ( No. 09-30000, D.C. No. 2:99-cr- 006660JCC-1), Western District of Washington, Argued November 2, 2009. 53 Ibid. 54 For more information about how Ressam acquired his materials, refer to the testimony in: United States District Court Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, s4 00 Cr.15 (JFK). 55 United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, (s4 00 Cr.15 (JFK)) United States District Court Southern District of New York. 56 Ibid, p. 572. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 15 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence observe the reaction by security personnel. He then planned on putting all of the explosive material into one suitcase. If it did not fit, he planned on expanding into a second bag, creating two bombs. While Ressam stated that his intentions were not to kill a large number of civilians, when asked “…no matter how you planted it, many [civilians] would die...” he responded, “yes.”57 In order to send his message the loss of innocent lives was an acceptable consequence. Based on Ressam’s own testimony, his entrance into the country was an essential step in his being able to execute his planned attack. As the sole individual working to launch this attack, his successful apprehension at the border prevented a potentially deadly incident at LAX.
Case 2- Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer
Background Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer is Palestinian and grew up in the West Bank. While it is unclear if he was a full member of Hamas, the Israeli police suspected that he was, and Abu Mezer was known to have “routinely battled with West Bank security police.”58 Because of these clashes, he spent some time in jail in Israel.
In 1993, Israel granted Abu Mezer an exit visa, and despite his criminal record, he obtained a student visa to travel to Canada. Upon arrival, Abu Mezer applied for refugee status which was later granted.59 Due to his refugee status, he was not deported after being arrested twice in Canada: once for using a stolen credit card and once for assault.
Within two weeks of arriving in Canada, Abu Mezer applied for a visa to go to the United States but was denied.60 After this failed attempt to cross the border legally, he then made three separate attempts to cross the border illegally. The first two failed attempts and his eventual success are described below and demonstrate Abu Mezer’s commitment to entering the United States.
Crossing Attempt #1 On June 24, 1996,61 Abu Mezer and another individual, Jamal Abed,62 attempted to cross into the United States through a mountainous area (not an official POE) approximately 70 miles east of Vancouver, near Bellingham, WA. However, the two had not properly prepared for the rough mountain terrain or the extreme cold and eventually developed hypothermia. After waving down a tourist in the area, Abu Mezer was
57 Ibid, p. 574. 58 Flaherty, Mary Pat. Gual, Gilbert M. (2001). “Potential Bomber Shows Resolve in Trips to U.S.” The Washington Post. 59 Jefferey. 60 United States. (1998). Bombs in Brooklyn: How the Two Illegal Aliens Arrested for Plotting to Bomb the New York Subway Entered and Remained in the United States. USDOJ/OIG Special Report. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/brookb/brbrtoc.htm (Accessed June 14, 2011). 61 While there is some debate about the exact dates of the first two crossings, the date here was reported after an interview with an INS spokesperson: McCoy, Kevin. Rashbaum, William K. Sutton, Larry. (1997). “Suspect Slipped Through Loophole.: Daily News (New York). 62 It is believed that Jamal Abed was a smuggler, known as a “facilitator”, whom Abu Mezer had hired to help him cross the border. According to some accounts, these facilitators are common in British Columbia and they advertise their services, in multiple languages, openly. – Katz, , Samuel M. (2005). Jihad in Brooklyn: The NYPD Raid that Stopped America’s First Suicide Bomber. New American Library, a division of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. p. 34. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 16 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence rescued by US National Park Service rangers. When Abu Mezer was unable to produce any form of identification and it was determined that he was attempting to cross into the United States from Canada, he was turned over to US Border Patrol agents. The official policy for processing individuals detained in this manner is to fingerprint them, run their names through a national criminal database to check for any known criminal activity in the United States, and then either deport them or allow them to cross voluntarily back into Canada. Abu Mezer was allowed to voluntarily return to Canada.63 The fact that the rangers had to wait overnight for Border Patrol agents to take Abu Mezer into custody was not surprising to the Inspector General. According to an interview he gave, “Blaine Sector’s staffing along 102 miles of the United States-Canadian border currently (as of 2001) consists of 19 agents and four supervisors…” He also explained that there were stretches of time during each day where there were no agents on duty along the whole Blaine Sector.64
Crossing Attempt #2 Less than a week later, on June 29, 1996, Abu Mezer tried to cross the border again, this time alone. According to a US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Special Report, for this attempt he posed as a jogger and attempted to cross the border by jogging in a park near one of the “ports of entry 65 miles west of where he had been apprehended” just five days earlier. This time, US Border Patrol agent Neal Clark stopped Abu Mezer and asked him to show proper documentation to cross into the United States. Posing as a jogger, Abu Mezer claimed that his documentation was back in the car and that he was just going for a run. Agent Clark did not believe Abu Mezer, particularly after he found $500 on Abu Mezer’s person. Once again, he was arrested. After performing the appropriate procedures (including a second fingerprinting), Agent Clark discovered that Abu Mezer had been arrested a few days earlier. Nonetheless, this crossing was considered a misdemeanor offense, and he was again allowed to cross back into Canada.65
Crossing Attempt #3 Roughly six months later, Abu Mezer tried to cross the border again. On January 14, 1997, he successfully crossed the border and made it 25 miles into the United States before being stopped. While it is known that he was arrested at a Greyhound bus station in Bellingham, WA after crossing the border, it is not clear how he got there. While some sources state that he had taken a bus,66 others argue that there is insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions about his border-crossing process. The ambiguity about his arrival in the country suggests that one of two things happened: either Abu Mezer did not go through an official POE, or his passport was not properly checked for the appropriate visa.67 It is plausible that Abu Mezer avoided an official POE when crossing, because he had done that on his first two attempts. However, it would also be reasonable for him to try crossing at an official POE considering his first two attempts failed.
63 Katz. p. 33-34. 64 Jefferey. 65 Katz. p. 36. 66 McCoy. 67 It is unclear if he had a passport with him. Some reports say that he had a Jordanian passport while others simply state that he did not have the “appropriate documents.” Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 17 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Sometime after entering the United States successfully Abu Mezer was stopped in Bellingham and questioned by Border Patrol agent Darryl Essing. Agent Essing was patrolling known hang-outs for illegal immigrants in an area sometimes referred to as “illegal-alien highway.” He had noticed three Middle Eastern men talking and behaving nervously while waiting to board a bus. Upon questioning them, Agent Essing had serious doubts about the explanations the three men provided as to why they were in the United States. The three men, including Abu Mezer, were arrested. This time, Abu Mezer faced more scrutiny by US officials.68 He was, however, released on bond after being taken into custody. Following his release, Abu Mezer was able to stay in the country, eventually traveling from Washington State to New York City. Upon reaching New York City, Abu Mezer sent his lawyer a letter stating that he intended to return to Canada. In response, Abu Mezer was sent a letter in return declaring that he had sixty days to leave the country. He disregarded this letter and no government official ever followed up to see if Abu Mezer had, in fact, left the country.69
Staying in the United States Although he was returned without any formal process the first two times he attempted to cross, Abu Mezer was not as lucky the third time. He was formally processed for deportation to Canada, but due to his previous criminal activity in that country, Canadian authorities refused to allow him to return. After that refusal, Abu Mezer applied for political asylum in the United States,70 indicating that he was terrified of being turned over to Israel, given his criminal record in Israel, Canada, and the United States.71 He claimed that he had been arrested, beaten and tortured by Israeli police (a statement that his own family says is exaggerated) after being accused of being a member of Hamas.72
Under the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Immigration Act of 1990, had those claims been true, Abu Mezer would have qualified to apply for asylum. While he still qualified, in 1996 there was a revision to the US asylum policies, changing the process by which he had to apply. In the past, as we will see in Section 3 with the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers, Abu Mezer would have been released pending his hearing. However, under the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, “foreign nationals arriving without proper documents who express to the immigration office a fear of being returned home must be kept in detention while their…case is pending.”73 With this new policy, authorities were able to detain Abu Mezer for a month.
Eventually, Abu Mezer was charged with a misdemeanor offense and his bail was set much higher than the other two individuals he was arrested with because it was suspected that he was part of a smuggling ring (due to his previous attempts), and because he had no ties to the community he was considered a
68 Katz. p. 38. 69 Ibid. 70 Kifner, John. (1997). “Reno Orders Inquiry on How Bomb Plot Suspect Stayed in U.S.”. New York Times, August 9, Late Edition (East Coast). http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed June 7, 2011). 71 Katz. p. 39. 72 Kifner. 73 Wasem. p. 5. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 18 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence possible flight risk. However, even after his bail was reduced and he was able to pay it, he stayed in the area and appeared to be willing to see the asylum process through.
After a few months, Abu Mezer decided to leave the Seattle area and requested to have his case moved to New York City. After waiting a few days to see if the request would be granted, he called his lawyer and requested the withdrawal of his application for political asylum, noting falsely that he had returned to Canada.74 As is the standard procedure, he was given 60 days to leave the country after withdrawing his asylum application, an order that he subsequently ignored.75 Authorities lost track of him, and he was not located again until he was arrested on July 31, 1997, after one of his roommates reported to police that Abu Mezer had a number of pipe bombs and was planning to use them in an attack.
Link between Crossing Event and Terrorist Activity The link between the crossing event and the intent to engage in an act of terrorism was established by one of Abu Mezer’s roommates, who reported the plan to the police. This intent was later confirmed by Abu Mezer himself. According to court documents Abu Mezer “stated that he had come to the United States because he wanted to punish the United States for supporting Israel” and that he “want[ed] to blow up a train and kill as many Jews as possible.”76 While Ressam’s plan at the time of his crossing into the United States was more readily apparent at the time of the crossing than Abu Mezer’s, Abu Mezer did successfully cross into the United States with the explicit intent of engaging in violence. Other documents presented during his trial also clearly demonstrate his intentions. In a letter to the State Department, sent only two days before Abu Mezer’s arrest, he stated his commitment (and the commitment of those he associated with) to shedding the blood of both Americans and Jews around the world. In another letter to the FBI he threatened a number of bombings in the United States.77 Ultimately, Abu Mezer was “convicted on two counts of conspiring and threatening, respectively, to use a weapon of mass destruction and one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to those crimes” and was sentenced to two life sentences (served concurrently), with a 30 year sentence to follow.78 Although he claimed to be a member of Hamas, Hamas has refuted that statement and does not claim any knowledge of Abu Mezer or his plans in New York City.
Case Comparison
There are a number of clear similarities between these two cases. Both were entries into the United States in the state of Washington from Canada, both were land or port crossings (as opposed to entry at an airport), neither crossing was legal, both were clearly tied to terrorist activity, they occurred within a three- year period, and both individuals had a criminal record. The major difference is that one managed to cross successfully, while the other did not. Due to the tip to law enforcement from his roommate, Abu Mezer was
74 Katz. 75 Malkin, Michelle. (2004). "Terrorists Exploited Insane Asylum Policy." Human Events 60, no. 21: 7. 76 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Lafi Khalil and Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, 214 F. 3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2000), Docket Nos. 98-1723(L), 99-1134. Second Circuit. Argued January 2, 2000. Decided May 31, 2000. http://openjurist.org/print/516918 (Accessed June 14, 2011). 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 19 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence stopped before putting his plans into action, but this was approximately six months after he had succeeded in crossing the border. In addition, it seems that Ressam’s plans to engage in violence were more mature than Abu Mezer’s were at the time of crossing.
Both individuals used false documents and/or application for political asylum in order to cross into and attempt to stay in the United States. While Ressam did not apply for asylum in the United States, he did go through a similar process in Canada in order to stay there and eventually make his way to the United States. In the case of Abu Mezer, it is not clear if he used any false documentation, but he did exploit the fact that at the time of his arrest he was allowed to be released and make his way to his intended target while his application for asylum was pending.
Both individuals were stopped because agents observed them acting in a manner that they had been trained to watch for. The suspicious behavior of both Ressam and Abu Mezer prompted border agents to investigate more thoroughly. In the case of Ahmed Ressam, his outward nervousness and the unusual route he was taking to get to his supposed destination (Seattle) were cues for agents to take additional actions. For Abu Mezer, agents repeatedly stopped him and, upon questioning him, decided that he should be detained and Canadian officials should be contacted. Even when he made it across the border, an INS official thought that his behavior was suspicious.
What Has Changed?
The laws for traveling into the United States have evolved since these two crossings, particularly after the 9/11 attacks. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, prior to 2001, “border agents were still using manual typewriters; inspectors at ports of entry were using a paper watchlist; the asylum and other benefits systems did not effectively deter fraudulent applicants.”79 Beyond the lack of material support and insufficient processes, there was also a lack of personnel. According to the US Border Patrol, during the relevant time period there were, on average, 256 border agents patrolling the 5,500+ mile border between the United States and Canada (see Table 2 for totals by year). Most officials agreed that this number of agents could not effectively patrol the border, and proposals for reform were presented in 1986, 1995 and 1997, but no action was taken.80
Table 2- Number of Agents on the Northern Border, 1992-2001; 2011 Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2011 Agents 299 310 306 296 292 267 289 311 306 340 +2,200 *United States Customs and Border Protection, US Border Patrol, Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year (Oct. 1st- Sept. 30th) http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/staffing_92_10.ctt/staffing_92_11.pdf
79 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 80. 80 Ibid, p. 80-81. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 20 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Following 9/11 there were numerous changes in US homeland security policy including increasing the number of border agents along the northern border to over 2,200 agents.81 The perceived lack of resources for border agents in the north was highlighted and targeted in legislation as part of the US PATRIOT Act. Title IV- Protecting the Border, Section 402 specifically approves appropriate funds to triple the number of agents along the northern border. The Act also authorized $50 million to improve technology and obtain the equipment needed to ensure the safety along the US-Canada border.
According to recent statistics released by CBP, the goals for agents along the northern border have both met and surpassed the levels established in the PATRIOT Act. Increasing the number of agents along the border is not the only change that has been made along the US-Canadian border. Starting before the 9/11 attacks, there have been efforts to increase cooperation and coordination between US and Canadian officials. According to Christian Leuprecht, Associate Professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada, the challenges still faced include asymmetric resources and jurisdictional confusion. With a large number of US law enforcement agencies continuing to operate along the border, it can be difficult to establish who should be in charge of an investigation or operation. However, he also makes it clear that efforts continue to be made on both sides to address those issues.
There is also an agreement between the United States and Canada regarding the asylum application process of individuals from a third country. The “Safe Third Country Agreement,” signed in December 2002 and implemented in December 2004, allows for the return of individuals from the United States or Canada to the other country if that person has spent time in the other country and qualifies for asylum.82 For example, had Abu Mezer not already obtained refugee status in Canada when he was detained trying to cross the border into the United States from Canada, the United States could have sent him back to Canada to undergo the asylum process there, rather than allow him to apply in the United States. However, due to the fact that he had previously obtained refugee status in Canada, and that status had been revoked due to his criminal past in Canada and his various attempts to cross into the United States illegally, the new agreement would not impact his case had he crossed the border today.
Finally, the issue of border security along the United States’ northern border is complex and there are economic implications with for the new policies established since 9/11. Both countries play key roles in each other’s economies with Canada being the leading export market for the vast majority of US states, and the United States absorbing roughly 78% of all Canadian exports.83 Due to the volume of trade between the two nations, it is vital that movement across the border runs efficiently. To put into context the impact of post-9/11 policies, according to a 2008 Congressional Research Service Report, the “average processing times have increased 200% from 45 seconds in December 2001 to 2.15 minutes in December 2004… [and] additional reporting, compliance, and delays add approximately $800 to the cost
81 CBP Commissioner Bersin Testifies on Northern Border Security. May 17, 2011. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/congressional_test/bersin_testifies.xml (Accessed September 26, 2011) 82 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, For Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, December 5, 2002. http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/appendix-c.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2012). 83 United States Drug Enforcement Agency. (2008). Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 21 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence of every North American produced vehicle…”84 Despite the fact that many consider the post-9/11 policies inadequate in terms of security, it is clear that they have had an economic impact on both nations, making further policy development increasingly difficult. Within the 9/11 Commission Report, published in 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States recommended that more thorough screenings, including extensive biometric screenings, should take place.85 These recommendations were made to expand on the changes that had already occurred since 9/11. As will be discussed in the case of Ghazi Abu Mezer, roughly 75% of the northern border is not adequately monitored, and yet, movement across the border has already significantly slowed.
The GAO has argued that these conditions have created a potentially dangerous situation, allowing those with mal intent towards the United States to enter into, and escape out of, the country. GAO found in 2011 that, “Border Patrol only has full situational awareness of about one-quarter, or 1,007 miles of the northern border.”86 One of the main reasons cited within its report for this massive shortfall is the lack of access to needed resources, including adequate personnel.
But border security is a complex issue and there are many different views on how to improve it. According to Leuprecht, the most useful tool for border agents on both sides of the border is coordination at all levels of enforcement.87 This means cooperation and coordination of both policies and daily operations. While promising developments have been made in the last fifteen years, full data sharing still remains a stumbling block that both sides are working to remedy. Had access to information been available at the time of the crossings of Ghazi Abu Mezer, US authorities would have seen that Abu Mezer had a criminal record in Canada when he tried to cross the first two times. This may have impacted how authorities approached his situation. Progress had been made on this issue by the time Ahmed Ressam tried to cross. His name was checked against a criminal database, however this was not productive because he was using an alias at the time. While sharing large amounts of data is not a panacea, according to Leuprecht increased data sharing would be a very important tool to help both sides correctly identify those planning illegal activity.88
As described above, both Ressam and Abu Mezer crossed the border in the Blaine Sector (see Figure 1). According to a 2001 report, “Border Patrol apprehends more aliens in [this area] than at any other place along the 3,500 mile border…”89 Within that same report, the Inspector General points out that due to the volume of traffic and inadequate staffing, INS agents were instructed to aim at only taking 13 seconds to check each vehicle. This included checking all of the passports and relevant visas for every person in each car. With these challenges, the opinion of the author of the report is that border patrol agents have to work very hard in order to do their job well. However, despite these restrictions, border agents were able to
84 Fergusson, Ian F. (2008) United States-Canada Trade and Economic Relationship: Prospects and Challenges. CRS Report for Congress. p. 19. 85 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 385-390. 86 Hardly, Calvin Biesecker. (2011). “Most of the Northern Border At Unacceptable Level of Control, GAO Finds. 2011. Defense Daily International”. Defense Daily. http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed June 10, 2011). 87 Leuprecht, Christian interviewed by author. Telephone Conversation. College Park, MD. July 20, 2011. 88 Ibid. 89 Jefferey, Terence P. (2001). “The INS Catch-and-Release Program.” Human Events 57, no. 46:7. Academic Search Premier, http://seach.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=5649324site=ehost-live (Accessed June 7, 2011). Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 22 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence recognize suspicious activity and correctly stopped Ressam, demonstrating how important it is to train agents to detect behavioral cues.
Section 2- 1993 World Trade Center Bombers and the North Carolina Financers of Terrorism
Case Selection: Why the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers and the North Carolina Terrorist Financiers?
This section reviews the entry into the United States of those known to be involved with the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing and of those in North Carolina who were financing Hezbollah through cigarette smuggling. There are a number of similarities between these two cases. Both involved entry into the United States at airports. Some of the members of each group traveled in teams. Individuals associated with both cases bribed officials at some point in their crossings. And finally, various false documents were used with varying degrees of success. The key differences between the two are the intentions of the groups and the timing and dynamics of the formation of the groups. In the bombing case, the group was not formed until after the leader, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, arrived in the United States. In contrast, the group in North Carolina had been established as a prayer group in the United States by another member of Hezbollah. Although the members of the group may have changed over time, the general structure already existed.
Table 3: Comparing the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers and North Carolina Financing Group Cases
Some Intention to Type of Use of False Bribed Traveled in Members Engage in Crossing Documents Officials Groups Interdicted Violence
1993 World Trade Center Airport Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Bombers
North Carolina Airport Yes Yes Yes Yes No Financing Group
The North Carolina case stands out from the other cases selected because, as far as available evidence indicates, the individuals involved were not engaged directly in planning to carry out acts of violence. However, this was the first case in the United States in which someone was convicted of providing material support to a designated terrorist organization.90 Understanding terrorist support networks—including their financial bases—is crucial to counterterrorism efforts. Since border crossings were relevant to such financing, this case provides useful insights for the current research.
90 Dias, Tom. Newman, Barbara. (2005). Lightning out of Lebanon. Presidio Press. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 23 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Airport Security
The border crossings examined in this section occurred at airports. Land/port crossings (discussed in the previous cases) differ from airport crossings in a number of ways, many of which would theoretically make it more challenging for someone with ill intentions to enter via an airport. One of the most important differences is that, for air travel, there is an initial scan of passports before passengers board a plane to the United States. This extra check is useful to identify fraudulent passports, but it is not failsafe and travelers with false documents may be able to get access to a plane due to faulty procedures at the airport of departure.91 It was suspected that this was the case with at least two of the 1993 WTC bombers. Although there is no definitive evidence available to the public, the INS district director for New York stated at the time that he “believe[d] there is some degree of collusion or some degree of assistance -- whether with agents of Pakistan Airlines or government officials or smugglers -- in terms of soliciting official cooperation in boarding these people,”92 thus undermining one of the system’s defenses.
Another advantage for border agents working in airports is that they receive a passenger manifesto including the names of passengers arriving on each flight. Beyond letting agents know who is coming in, this list makes it easier to predict the volume of people that will be present in the customs area at any given time as flights arrive. This gives agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the ability to plan more efficiently for the number of agents needed.
As with land and port POE’s, a balance is needed between being thorough and needing to be efficient processing efforts. Before the 9/11 attacks, US legislation limited the amount of time it could take to process incoming international passengers to 45 minutes.93 This meant that regardless of the number of passengers in the processing area holding foreign passports, INS officials had only 45 minutes to process them all. This law, later repealed, was in place during the crossings of the individuals involved in both of the cases below.
Most crossings examined here happened at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City in the early 1990s. While there are no statistics publicly available on the volume of travelers going through that airport for those specific years, in the year 2000, almost 33 million people (90,000 per day on average) traveled through the airport. At that level of traffic, JFK was considered number 21 in a list of the top 30 busiest airports in the world.94 Since then, the volume of passengers has only increased. In the
91 The corruption of officials is common in number of countries around the world. In his book, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security, Tony Payan discusses at length the corruption of officials, principally on the Mexican side. These corrupt officials will look the other way and allow individuals engaged in illicit activity to move freely in and out of their borders. Payan, Tony. (2006). The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Praeger Security International. pages 37-40. 92 Mitchell, Alison. (1993). “Bomb Suspects Used Notorious Path to U.S.”. New York Times. May 21, 1993. Late Edition. Section B. Page1. Column 2. 93 United States Government Accountability Office. (2005). International Air Passengers: Staffing Model for Airport Inspections Personnel Can Be Improved. Report to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. July 2005. 94 Airports Council International. Passenger Traffic 2000 Final. Last Updated November 1, 2001. http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_content07_c.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-5-54-55-189_666_2__. (Accessed July 11, 2011). Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 24 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence first three months of 2011 alone, more than 11 million people have moved through JFK.95 That is roughly 122,315 people per day –an increase of almost 35% since 2000.
Case 3- 1993 World Trade Center Bombers
On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in the parking garage under the North Tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, killing six people and injuring more than 1000.96 Those responsible for the attack include Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalim, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. None of these men were born in the United States. While there is not detailed information on how each of them entered the country, we do have sufficient information to identify the nature of the relationships among the members of the group, as depicted in Figure 3 below. However, given the availability of border-crossing information, the activities of Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef are the focus of this study.
Figure 3- Relational Diagram for the 1993 World Trade Center Bombers
Mahmoud Abouhalima (MA) ~ Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj (AMA) ~ Nadal Ayyad (NA) Mohammed A. Salameh (MAS) ~ Abdul Rahman Yasin (ARY) ~ Ramzi Ahmed Yousef (RAY)
Roles of Individuals
Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj- Ajaj provided the technical skill for the bombing despite the fact that he was in jail at the time that the attack occurred. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Ajaj met Ramzi Ahmed Yousef in a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. It was there that they developed their plan to
95 Airports Council International. Year to date Passenger Traffic: March 2011. Last updated May 13, 2011. http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_content07_c.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-5-212-218-222_666_2__ (Accessed July 11, 2011). 96 Combs, Cindy C. (2009). Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Fifth Edition. Pearson Education, Inc. p. 181. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 25 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
attack a target in the United States “and assembled a ‘terrorist kit’”97 before making their way to the United States. After being arrested (related to his border crossing), Ajaj stayed in touch with Yousef by phone. It was Ajaj’s notes that Yousef used to build the bombs and carry out the attack.98 Ajaj remained incarcerated until March 1, 1993, and he was arrested by INS about a week after his release in connection with the WTC bombing.
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was the organizer of the attack. He did not give up on his and Ajaj’s plan to carry out an attack after Ajaj’s arrest. Instead, Yousef organized a team in order to obtain the materials he would need to achieve his goals. After the attack he fled the United States at the same time as Mahmoud Abouhalima and Abdul Rahman Yasin. He was eventually arrested in Pakistan in February 1995.99
The Crossings Although there are not comprehensive details on how each member of the group traveled in and out of the United States, court documents report that Ajaj and Yousef started in Pakistan and arrived at New York’s JFK airport on September 1, 1992.100 Ajaj was the first to be inspected by INS agents and, upon detecting that the passport was fraudulent, Ajaj’s luggage was searched. He was carrying a fake Swedish passport bearing the name Khurram Khan.101 The search did not bode well for Ajaj since his “terrorist kit” full of instructions for making explosives, was in his bag. Documents in his possession included “diagrams showing how to make silencers, videotapes on car bombings, and [instructions on] how to make TNT.”102 He was immediately detained and charged with trying to cross into the United States using false documents. At the time, authorities were unable to put the twelve documents into context; Ajaj was only convicted of passport fraud. However, those documents were later used, in part, to tie him to the WTC bombing.103
Yousef had more success making it through customs. Upon being detained, Ajaj claimed that he was not traveling with Yousef to give him a chance to make it into the country successfully, despite their airline tickets being in sequential order.104 Yousef passed through the primary inspection, but was stopped when he presented his passport at secondary inspection. There, authorities noticed that he lacked the
97 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. Second Circuit. 152 F.3d. 88, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 602. Nos. 94-1212 to 94-1315. Argued Dec. 18 and 19, 1997. See also, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, p. 73. 98 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. Second Circuit. 152 F.3d. 88, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 602. Nos. 94-1212 to 94-1315. Argued Dec. 18 and 19, 1997. 99 Ibid. 100 Mitchell. “Bomb Suspects Used Notorious Path to U.S.” 101 Mitchell, Alison. (1993). “A Sixth Suspect Charged in Blast”. The New York Times, May 7, 1993. Late Edition. Section A, Page 1, Column 1. 102 Mitchell. “Bomb Suspects Used Notorious Path to U.S.” 103 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. Second Circuit. 152 F.3d. 88, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 602. Nos. 94-1212 to 94-1315. Argued Dec. 18 and 19, 1997. 104 Mitchell. “A Sixth Suspect Charged in Blast”. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 26 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence appropriate visa.105 He then applied for political asylum, claiming that he “had been persecuted and beaten by Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait.”106 According to the laws at the time, “aliens arriving at a port of entry to the United States without proper immigration documents were eligible for a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether the aliens were permissible.”107 After making his claim, he was then released by INS, pending a formal hearing. This was a weakness in the system that, in part, prompted the 1996 revisions that allowed authorities to keep Abu Mezer in custody for a period of time. Prior to the revisions, critics voiced concerns that the “policy was unwieldy and prone to abuses because it provided for multiple levels of hearing reviews, and appeals.”108 This created large backlogs and a system were cases dragged on for years. As a result, there was “fear that international terrorists might enter the United States with false documents, filing bogus asylum claims, and disappear into the population.”109 This turned out to be exactly what Yousef did.
Regarding the process of Yousef’s inspection, the turning point triggering further inspection by government agents in this case was the recognition of a false document. Agents were able to recognize that Ajaj should be more carefully checked due to suspicions about his documentation. This case, in context with the first two cases, demonstrates the complexity of the job border officers perform. Not only are they watching for visual cues, such as nervousness, but they are also looking at various documents from around the world for forgeries. Agents must be able to recognize dozens of passports, multiple types of visas and process all of this information in a timely manner.
Link between Crossing Events and Terrorist Activity The links between the crossing of Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj and his partner, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and terrorist activity are very clear. The bomb-making materials found in Yousef’s apartment (and believed to have been used in the WTC bombing) match those described in the “terrorist kit” found in Ajaj’s luggage. According to court documents, the kit included:
“(1) a video tape of the bombing of an American embassy which also provided instruction on how to make explosives and timing devices; (2) Ajaj’s handwritten notebooks on how to make explosives (including urea nitrate)110 and improvised weapons; (3) a videotape containing a chemistry lesson on manufacturing explosives; (4) manuals on catalysts, detonators and other
105 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. Second Circuit. 152 F.3d. 88, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 602. Nos. 94-1212 to 94-1315. Argued Dec. 18 and 19, 1997.. 106 “Ramzi Yousef Got Iraqi Help: INS Official”. (1997). News India Times. August 22, 1997. Volume 27. Issue 43. Page 6. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=6&did=467915101&SrchMode=1&sid=10&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&V Name=PQD&TS=1309194638&clientId=41143 (Accessed June 28, 2011). 107 Wasem. p. 4. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Urea nitrate was one of the chemicals used in the bombing of the World Trade Center. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 27 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
bomb ingredients… (6) a book… which described the destruction of buildings and contained a formula for using explosives to accomplish this end.”111
This, along with Yousef’s fingerprints also found inside of the kit112 was detrimental to the defense’s case. Attempts were made, on behalf of a number of those convicted of involvement in these crimes, to have the evidence contained in this kit declared inadmissible, but ultimately all appeals were denied. The contents of the kit and Yousef’s fingerprints, plus airline records showing that Yousef and Ajaj traveled on the same flight, link them to each other and directly to the WTC bombing. Eventually, both men were tried and convicted of:
conspiracy to bomb buildings used in interstate and foreign commerce, bomb property of the United States, transport explosives in interstate commerce for the purpose of damaging or destroying property, and bomb automobiles used in interstate commerce; traveling in foreign commerce with intent to promote, facilitate, and commit crimes of violence; and assaulting federal Secret Service agents as a result of the bombing, among other charges based on each individual’s involvement.113
Case 4- North Carolina Terrorist Financing Ring
In the United States, the first law making it illegal to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization was not enacted until April 1996. The 2002 trial of Mohamad Hammoud and his co- conspirators was pivotal in US counterterrorism efforts because it was “the first in the country of a federal ‘material support to a designated terrorist organization’ charge.”114 In total, eighteen people were convicted on charges ranging from credit card fraud, marriage fraud, and providing material support to a designated terrorist organization.115 This group engaged in smuggling cigarettes from North Carolina to Michigan where the taxes were much higher in order to raise money for Hezbollah. The ring was broken after lengthy mutual and coordinated investigations by FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF); INS; State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS); local law enforcement and
111 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. Second Circuit. 152 F.3d. 88, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 602. Nos. 94-1212 to 94-1315. Argued Dec. 18 and 19, 1997. 112 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Uousef, Eyad Ismoil and Abdul Hakim Murad. (2002). (Docket Nos. 98-1041 L, 98-1197, 98, 1355, 99-1544, 99-1554. August Term, 2001), Second Circuit: Argued May 3, 2002. 113 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammad A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Also Known As Khurram Khan, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Also Known As Mahmoud Abu Halima, Defendants-appellants,ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, Also Known As Bilal Elqisi, Abdul Rahman Yasin, Also Known As Aboud, Abdul Hakim Murad, Also Known As Saeed Ahmed, Eyad Ismoil, Also Known As Eyad Ismail, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Also Known As Grabi Ibrahim Hahsen. ((2001). 261 F.3d 271.) Second Circuit , Argued April 18. 2001. 114 Tompkins, Anne M. (2011). Department of Justice: For Immediate Release, Thursday, January 27, 2011. http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncw/press/hammoudsentence.html (Accessed June 23, 2011). 115 Those arrested, charged and later convicted are Mohamad Youssed Hammmoud, Bassam Youssef Hammoud, Chawki Youssef Hammoud, Mohamad Atef Darwiche, Ali Hussein Darwiche, Said Mohamad Harb, Angela Georgia Tsioumas, Mehdi Hackem Moussaoui, Jessica Yolanda Fortune, Marie Lucie Cadet, Many Denise Covington, Hussein Chahrour, Mohit Behl, Nabil E. Ismail, Ali Adham Amhaz, Mohamad Hassan Dbouk, and Hassan Hilu Laqis. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 28 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (among others).116 Due to available information and relevance to border crossings, only nine of those individuals will be reviewed in this case study. The links among them are presented in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Relational Diagram of the North Carolina Terrorist Financing Ring
Haissam Mohamad Harb (HMH) ~ Fatme Mohamad Harb (FMH) ~ Samir Mohamad Ali Debk (SMAD) Chawki Youssef Hammoud (CYH) ~ Ali Hussein Darwiche (AHD) ~ Mohamad Atef Darwiche (MAD) Ali Fayez Darwiche (AFD) ~ Mohamad Youssef Hammoud (MYH) ~ Said Mohamad Harb (SMH) *Colors only used to clarify lines*
Roles of Individuals
Mohamad Youssef Hammoud (M. Hammoud) is considered the leader of this cell of Hezbollah supporters. According to court documents, he had strong ties and a long history with the designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Before making his way from Lebanon to the United States, he had been active in the organization and maintained his connections to those with status and influence within Hezbollah after immigrating to the United States. Upon entering the United States he both applied for political asylum and married three different women in order to stay in the country.117 His home eventually became a gathering place and M. Hammoud routinely held Thursday night prayer
116 Fromme, Robert. Schwein, Rick. (2007) “Operation Smokescreen: A Successful Interagency Collaboration”. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. December 2007. Volume 76. Number 12. 117 His entrance into the United States and subsequent marriages are discussed in greater detail under “The Crossings.” Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 29 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
meetings where he engaged in indoctrination, fund raising, and “recruitment of like-minded anti- Western ideologues committed to the cause of Hezbollah.”118
M. Hammoud was the main organizer of this group. He was directly involved in buying, transporting and selling the cigarettes. At one point he was also caught with a large amount of cash ($45,922) and was unable to adequately account for its origins. Lastly, he was charged and later convicted on multiple types of financial fraud and money laundering.119
Said Mohamad Harb (S. Harb) has been described by the FBI as “the linch-pin between the fund-raising conducted in Charlotte [North Carolina] and procurement activities directed by Hezbollah in Vancouver, Canada.”120 According to reports published by the agency, beyond involvement with M. Hammoud, he was linked by Canadian authorities to Mohamad Dbouk who was attempting to obtain various surveillance and military equipment to send back to Lebanon.121 Once arrested, Harb turned on the rest of the group, exposing the involvement of certain key individuals and other important information that was critical to the successful prosecution.
S. Harb helped a number of members within the group obtain business, vacation and marriage visas, by use of fraudulent statements, to enter the United States. Some of the people that he helped cross into included Haissam Mohamad Harb, Samir Mohamad Ali Debk, and Fatme Mohamad Harb. He also arranged the marriages of these individuals to American citizens, making it easier to stay in the US122
According to court documents, S. Harb was also a direct participant in the cigarette smuggling scheme. S. Harb was accused, and later convicted, on charges including the transportation of the cigarettes from North Carolina (where the cigarette tax is very low) to Michigan (where the tax is very high). He also, along with M. Hammoud, recruited others to transport the contraband. Lastly, he was accused of credit card fraud and money laundering.123
Chawki Youssef Hammoud (C. Hammoud) is M. Hammoud’s brother and played an important role in helping his brother organize the smuggling operation and other activities. According to some sources, he was the second in command.124 Court documents also state that C. Hammoud is,
118 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud. (No. 03-4253, CR-00-147-MU), Western District of North Carolina at Charlotte. Argued August 2, 2004. 119 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. 120 Fromme and Schwein. 121 Ibid. 122 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. 123 For a complete list of all the charges filed against Said Harb and their details, refer to United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. 124 Levitt, Mathew. (2005). Testimony. Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. United States Senate. May 25, 2005. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 30 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
without a doubt, a member of Hezbollah.125 Like many other members of the cell, he committed immigration fraud by marrying a US citizen simply to obtain a visa that would allow him to stay in the country. Like both his brother and Said, he was directly involved in all aspects of the criminal activity and was charged with crimes including money laundering, cigarette smuggling, and financial fraud.126
Haissam Mohamad Harb, Fatme Mohamad Harb, and Samir Mohamad Ali Debk are all related to Said Harb either through blood or marriage. S. Harb arranged false marriages in Cyprus to US citizens for all three, allowing them to obtain visas to travel to and stay in the United States All three were active in the cigarette smuggling, but did not play a unique role within the group.127
The marriages that the three engaged in are considered shams because they did not live as married couples. In fact, the two women that Haissam and Samir married were lovers.128 All of the American citizens involved in the false marriages were real people who were subsequently prosecuted for their role in deceiving the Immigration and Naturalization Service.129 The three involved with Haissam, Fatme and Samir were all recruited and paid by Said Harb to marry his siblings and brother in law.130
Ali Hussein Darwiche, Mohamad Atef Darwiche and Ali Fayez Darwiche are brothers and also were general workers in the cigarette smuggling who did not play a unique role. All three were also convicted on a number of charges similar to the others mentioned above.131 What is unique about them is the information that is available regarding their crossing into the United States, as discussed below.
The Crossings In this case, individuals within the group crossed principally in small groups. While details on each crossing are not available, particularly by Said Harb, there is enough information to develop a clear picture of methods preferred by this group. Also, while it is not known what type of visa each individual obtained in order to cross, it is known that some obtained 90-day tourist visas and then simply stayed beyond the time allotted. In order to give a clearer picture of how and when these individuals crossed into the United States, a timeline is provided in Figure 5 below. The timeline clearly depicts how the group transformed and grew.
125United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud. (No. 03-4253, CR-00-147-MU), Western District of North Carolina at Charlotte. Argued August 2, 2004. 126 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. 127 Ibid. 128 Diaz and Newman p. 198. 129 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. 130 Diaz and Newman p. 198. 131 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 31 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Figure 5: Timeline of border crossing events by NC cigarette smuggling group
The most prolific member of the group, both in terms of crossing in and out of the United States and criminal activity, was Said Harb.132 He first arrived in 1988 on a student visa, studied at a local community college and eventually married a woman who was born in the United States.133 From that marriage he became a naturalized citizen, and it was this status that allowed him to move so freely in and out of the country in later years. In early 1996, S. Harb decided to move his family back to Lebanon, but conditions were bad there, and he quickly returned with his family to the United States. Due to $65,000 debt he owed, after his move back to the United States he decided to join the cigarette smuggling business.134 The last crossing where information is available is from October 1999 when Said Harb traveled again to Lebanon. The purpose of this crossing was to arrange a marriage between his sister, Fatme, and an American citizen. The three then returned to the United States in January 2000.
M. Hammoud is one individual on which there is significant information. According to court documents, on at least three occasions M. Hammoud attempted to obtain a visa in Damascus that would allow him to enter the United States legally. All three applications were denied, although there is no public record of why the applications were denied. Failing to gain a legal means of traveling to the United States, he flew “to Margarita Island in Venezuela, a known Hezbollah stronghold.”135 In Venezuela, M. Hammoud met up
132 Beyond participating in the cigarette smuggling, Said Harb also engaged in missive identity and credit card fraud. He also ran a pornographic web site and funneled the funds gained from that back to Hezbollah.- Dias and Newman. 133 Dias and Newman. p. 165. 134 Ibid. p. 167. 135 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 32 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence with his cousins, Mohamad Atef Darwiche and Ali Fayez Darwiche,136 and all three purchased fraudulent US tourist visas. The three boarded separate flights from Venezuela to JFK International Airport “on or about June 6, 1992.”137 While going through customs, M. Hammoud was stopped and questioned by agents. After claiming political asylum, the three were allowed to enter the United States pending an asylum hearing.138
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) did flag Ali Fayez Darwiche while he was in route from Venezuela to the United States. The DOJ sent a Notice to Detain, Deport, Remove or Present Aliens to the airline Ali Fayez was using, requiring the airline to detain him upon arrival.139 It is not clear why the request was made and why the other two individuals were not flagged. However, it does demonstrate the various methods the government uses to try to keep those who should not be legally able to enter the United States from entering. Due to political asylum application laws,140 Ali Fayez was able to enter the country despite DOJ concerns.
According to court documents, M. Hammoud’s brother, Chawki Youssef Hammoud, entered the country legally through JFK International Airport on August 16, 1990. His visa, obtained in Damascus, Syria, permitted him to stay legally until January 30, 1991.141 However, C. Hammoud never left.
Ali Hussein Darwiche, entered the United States on November 18, 1991.142 While court documents have more details regarding ports of entry and the documents carried by other individuals within the group, the only information available on Ali H. Darwiche is the date of his arrival.
While Said Harb seems to have made his crossings legally, he did help his brother, sister, and brother-in- law cross illegally. According to court documents, “on or about January 5, 1999”143 Haissam Mohamad Harb and Samir Mohamad Ali Debk (S. Harb’s brother and brother-in-law through marriage to his sister, Fatme) were sent money to bribe a corrupt official at the US embassy in Cyprus into giving them 90-day visas to enter the United States. With those fraudulently obtained visas, the two took a flight on January 11, 1999, to Chicago144 and proceeded to Charlotte NC, where they eventually married two American women in order to stay in the country.
136 Some sources, like Dias and Newman, say that it was Ali Hussein Darwiche (not Ali Fayez Darwiche) who crossed with M. Hammoud. However, according to United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147- MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001.it was Ali Fayez. Because the court documents are more official, we have chosen to go with the court documents. 137 Ibid. p. 5. 138 Dias and Newman. 139United States Department of Justice: Immigration and Naturalization Services. (1992) Notice to Detain, Deport, Remove or Present Aliens. Submitted June 6, 1992. 140 For more information about the process of applying for political asylum, please refer to Section 4- Common Themes. 141 United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud et. all . (2001). (Docket NO. 3:00CR147-MU.) United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Charlotte Division. March 28, 2001. 142 Ibid. p. 7. 143 Ibid. p. 10. 144 Ibid. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 33 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
S. Harb’s sister, Fatme Mohamad Harb, took a similar route, only she was “married” to an American citizen (despite being legally married to Debk) first. After the arrival of Said Harb and Fatme’s new “husband,” Wayne Jeffrey Swaringen, on October 5, 1999 the three then sought to obtain the needed documentation to get Fatme to the United States. After a number of months preparing, the three flew to Atlanta via Cyprus on January 27, 2000,145 using the fraudulent marriage visa to get Fatme into the country.146
Staying in the United States One of the most interesting aspects of this case is how these individuals managed to stay in the United States. While other individuals used the political asylum application process, like Abu Mezer, most of the members of this group used sham marriages to US citizens in order to either gain entry to the United States, or to remain in the country. Within the group, the case of M. Hammoud is the best example of techniques used. He married three different women, according to court documents. The first marriage only existed on paper, meaning he never even met the woman. His lawyer at the time simply drew up the paperwork. The second marriage was to an employee (whom he apparently could not stand to live with), and the third was to Angela Tsioumas. It was the third marriage that finally secured his immigration status.147
S. Harb, while not engaging in a sham marriage himself,148 helped to arrange a number of marriages of family members to US citizens. In the cases of Haissam Mohamad Harb and Samir Mohamad Ali Debk, they were married to women in the United States immediately after arriving in the country. On the other hand, Fatme Mohamad Harb, S. Harb’s sister, was “married”149 in Lebanon and then flew via Cyprus to the United States.150 None of the unions were ever questioned by US officials.
Link between the Crossing Events and Terrorist Activity The links between militant Hezbollah activity and this group of cigarette smugglers centers around the relationships and activities of two of the individuals, Mohamad Hammoud and Said Harb. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, “Hezbollah is a Shiite Muslim political group with a militant wing” that began in the early 1980’s in Lebanon.151 The organization has been a US designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) since 1996, and has even claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in the Americas in the early 1990’s.152 Hezbollah became a popular militant group in the neighborhood where M. Hammoud and S. Harb lived until they were adolescents.153 As discussed below, both individuals had close ties to active members within the organization. In the case of M. Hammoud, he came to the United States with the express purpose of providing material support to Hezbollah. While S. Harb may have initially stumbled
145 Ibid. p. 11. 146 Dias and Newman. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 149 According to Dias and Newman, no one would actually marry the couple in Lebanon because the groom was not Muslim. 150 Kephart, Janice L. (2005). Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel. Center for Immigration Studies. 151 Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah. Council on Foreign Relations. Updated July 15, 2010. http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155 (Accessed August 2, 2011). 152 The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Argentina. 153 Dias and Newman. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 34 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence into the cigarette smuggling ring, his movements between the United States and Canada—facilitated by his status as a naturalized citizen-- to visit prominent members of the organization and provide them with money and other material to send back to Lebanon demonstrate that at least some of his crossings were directly motivated by his ties to Hezbollah.
Both M. Hammoud and S. Harb grew up in the same area of Lebanon, Bourj al-Barajneh, during very tumultuous and violent times in the region as a whole, and specifically in their neighborhood. Their neighborhood was part of a turf war between various armed groups within Lebanon and the residents bore the brunt of the violence. M. Hammoud had a number of direct links to those in positions of power within Hezbollah. According to court documents, when M. Hammoud was young, he joined the Hezbollah Al-Mahdi Scouts, a youth group within the organization. He was also the next door neighbor of Sheik Abbas Harake,154 a military commander within Hezbollah, with whom M. Hammoud became very close to while he was young. Even after arriving in the United States, he remained in constant contact with Harake. It was claimed by prosecutors that the alms collected at the weekly meetings in M. Hammoud’s house and a large portion of his income went directly to Harake.155
Another way that money was transferred from the cigarette smuggling operation run by M. Hammoud to Hezbollah was through S. Harb. Harb had close personal ties to a man living in Canada named Mohammed Hassan Dbouk. According to US court documents, Dbouk was the chief procurement officer for the group.156 S. Harb and Dbouk had been very close friends from the time they were teenagers and reconnected as adults. Harb funneled money from his multitude of criminal activities, including the cigarette smuggling, to Hezbollah via Dbouk.157 Harb was also known to deliver money directly to members of the organization within Lebanon. Official records state that “in September 1999, Defendant (M. Hammoud) had Harb carry a sum of money… back to Lebanon to give to Harake,”158 M. Hammoud’s mentor above.
Case Comparison
While these cases are each unique in some ways, they are similar with respect to the border crossings. In both cases, members traveled into the United States by airplane, with most traveling through JFK Airport in New York City. They did not fly to Mexico or Canada and then go through a port or a land crossing POE. As illustrated by the description above, the process of crossing into the United States at an airport is different than the land/port crossings described in the first two cases, and each of the individuals in the latter cases encountered US law enforcement at least once as they were processed at the airport. Also, both groups made extensive use of false documents, either with false names or legitimate documents that had been obtained under false pretenses. Lastly, despite their best efforts, some of the individuals were interdicted during the crossing. No plan was completely successful. However, in both cases, even some of
154 According to Diaz and Newman, Harake is the principal military commander for Hezbollah in the region around Beirut. They also claim that he selected M. Hammoud for this mission and was M. Hammoud’s principal contact within the organization. 155 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud. (No. 03-4253, CR-00-147-MU), Western District of North Carolina at Charlotte. Argued August 2, 2004. 156 Ibid. p.13. 157 Dias and Newman. 158 United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud. (No. 03-4253, CR-00-147-MU), Western District of North Carolina at Charlotte. Argued August 2, 2004. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 35 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence those who were apprehended at the border were able to remain in the United States indefinitely, with Yousef relying on the same political asylum claims that Abu Ghazir had and that Ressam had in Canada, while the North Carolina cigarette smugglers were able to remain in the country through a combination of illegally overstaying visas and exploiting US laws that allow for spouses of US citizens to remain in the country.
What Has Changed?
There have been a number of changes in airport security since these cases occurred. Most significant is the creation of DHS. The creation of this agency combined the separate agencies involved in border crossings under one umbrella agency facilitating cooperation. The screening process is much more intense and updates have been made in technology and passport scanning. However, not all of these changes would have made a difference in stopping the individuals from these two groups from entering the country. One of the most important changes that has occurred since the individuals above crossed into the United States is the repeal of the 1990 law requiring INS159 to process all incoming passengers with foreign passports arriving on international flights in 45 minutes. According to legislation enacted in May 2002:
“(b) STAFFING LEVELS AT PORTS OF ENTRY.—The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall staff ports of entry at such levels that would be adequate to meet traffic flow and inspection time objectives efficiently without compromising the safety and security of the United States. Estimated staffing levels under workforce models for the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall be based on the goal of providing immigration services described in section 286(g) of such Act within 45 minutes of a passenger’s presentation for inspection.”160
This means that, while immigration officers should aim to have adequate staffing to process individuals in 45 minutes or less, it is not required and should not be a priority over the security of the United States. This is critical because it helps to strike a balance between processing people quickly and thoroughly checking each individual. Hopefully time will show this to be a more effective policy then the previous one.
Another significant change that occurred in terms of passenger screening is that “DHS requires all airlines flying to the United States from foreign countries to provide Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Records prior to departure…”161 At the time of the crossings in these two cases, providing Advanced Passenger Information was a voluntary process. With the new regulations agents have time to thoroughly screen passenger information before they even board the plane destined for the United States and increase their chances of interdicting those with nefarious intentions. One of the ways they do this is by checking the “No-Fly” list against the passenger list provided by airlines. This list was developed
159 INS has since been dissolved and its operations transferred to CBP, ICE and USCIS. 160 Public Law 107-173- Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. Bill Number H.R. 3525. Approved May 14, 2002. SEC. 403-b. 161 Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. p. 4. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 36 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence by multiple government agencies and is meant to keep dangerous individuals from boarding planes.162 Part of the passenger screening takes place at the US Customs and Border Protection’s National Targeting Center (NTC). By using their Automated Targeting System (a tool to analyze data), analysts at the NTC are able to more effectively identify individuals or travel patterns that may indicate some sort of risk.163
Regarding the North Carolina case, there has been a change in the process to determine if an individual has overstayed the amount of time permitted by his/her visa. A number of the individuals in the North Carolina group entered the United States with visas permitting them to stay for only 90 days. However, they all stayed well past that time period. Today the US-VISIT164 program, established under DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, assists the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in conducting overstay investigations. Along with the US-VISIT program has been a greater effort to collect and share biometric information in order to correctly identify individuals. There have been significant efforts to share information and coordinate between these two groups and CBP in order to identify, track, investigate and (when applicable) detain individuals who have stayed in the United States longer than they had been authorized to.165
There have also been improvements in the visa application process since the crossings in these cases occurred. Under the Visa Security Program, ICE and DOS “deploy special agents overseas to high-risk visa activity posts to identify potential terrorist and criminal threats before they reach the United States.”166 With this new practice, it is likely much more difficult to bribe officials to provide documentation, as members of the NC group did in Cyprus in the 1990s.
Section 3- Common Themes and Important Changes to Legislation
There are two themes in particular that emerge in a number of cases, regardless of whether the crossers are part of a group or unaffiliated (Table 4). These include individuals falsely applying for political asylum and the use of fraudulent visas and/or passports.
162 “Secure Flight”. Transportation Security Administration Official Website. http://www.tsa.gov/approach/secure_flight.shtm (accessed September 27, 2011) 163 “National Targeting Center keeps terrorism at bay”. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Today. March 2005. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/March/ntc.xml (Accessed November 1, 2011) 164 US-VISIT stands for the United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology Program. 165 United States Government Accountability Office. (2011). Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would have Costs. Report to the Committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. April 2011. 166 Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. p. 24. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 37 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Table 4- Comparing all Four Cases
Applied for Political Asylum Used Fraudulent Documents
Case 1- Ahmed Ressam
Case 2- Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer Unknown
Case 3- 1993 WTC Bombers
Case 4- North Carolina Group
Political Asylum
One of the patterns that emerges repeatedly throughout the cases discussed above is application for political asylum and disregard for subsequent legal process. A pattern among these cases is that crossers adopt this strategy after another method of crossing into the United States has failed. Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer (case 2) applied for political asylum only after he had tried three times to cross the border, and it was discovered that he lacked the appropriate visa after his third and only known successful crossing. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef (case 3) also applied for political asylum after the legitimacy of his passport was questioned, and Mohamad Yousef Hammoud (case 4) applied after being detained by INS at the JFK airport. Although Ahmed Ressam (case 1) did not apply in the United States, he applied for the equivalent of political asylum in Canada after customs officials noticed that the picture of Ressam was not the original image in his passport. Ahmed Mohammad Ajaj (case 3) applied for asylum as well during a crossing in 1991 prior to the events discussed here. At the time he showed pictures of broken bones and burns on his body, allegedly inflicted by Israeli officials. However, before his case went to trial, Ajaj “left to attend a university in Peshawar, Pakistan.”167
Since these crossings occurred, changes to policies and procedures for processing those entering the country with fraudulent documents and using the defensive asylum process have been implemented. Starting in 1997, new expedited removal provisions came into effect. These provisions allow for the removal of individuals from the United States without a hearing before an immigration judge. If a person then claims political asylum, they then undergo a screening process to determine if their fear of being returned to their country of nationality is credible.168 While this legislation would have already been in
167 Mitchell, Alison. (1993). “A Sixth Suspect Charged in Blast”. New York Times. May 7, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/07/nyregion/a-sixth-suspect-charged-in-blast.html (Accessed July 6, 2011) 168 Immigration and Nationality Act, Act 23: Inspection by Immigration Officers; Expedited Removal of Inadmissible Arriving Aliens; Referral for Hearing, Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 38 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence effect for the crossings of the North Carolina terrorist financing group (case #4) and Ahmed Ressam (case #1), this portion of the legislation could have had an impact of the crossings of the individuals involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (case #3) and the crossing of Abu Mezer (case #2).
Efforts to further combat the misuse of the political asylum process have continued to evolve since then. In a 2011 assessment by DHS, the authors highlight that, “DHS has worked closely with federal partners to improve and expand procedures for vetting immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicants, asylees, and refugees.”169 While individuals applying for political asylum are still released pending their hearing, more thorough investigations into the individual are conducted prior to allowing the asylum application to be processed and the applicant sent out into the public.
Fraudulent Documents
Another pattern that emerges is the use of fraudulent documents. These documents fall into two categories. Some documents are simply forged and others are legitimate documents obtained through fraudulent means. In many of the cases within this report, individuals used a combination of forged documents and fraudulently obtained documents.
One of the most complex and interesting cases in terms of the use of false documents is that of the North Carolina group. This group used a number of fraudulently obtained documents. Two of the members of the group, as mentioned earlier, obtained legitimate tourist visas in a fraudulent way by bribing an official in Cyprus. The group also used completely falsified documents. Mohamad Hammoud, Mohamad Darwiche and Ali Hussein Darwiche traveled with forged visas. These were obtained by tapping into local criminal networks that already engaged in producing the fraudulent documents. 170 After that, M. Hammoud participated in a sham marriage and from that was able to apply for residency. Sham marriages were a regular part of this group’s methodology for staying within the United States. However, as mentioned above, it was also the method that Fatme Mohamad Harb used in order to obtain a visa to initially move to the United States.
Said Harb was involved in massive credit card and identity fraud. He was able to obtain drivers licenses from the DMV in multiple names, social security cards from the Social Security Administration, and numerous credit cards under all of his aliases.171 While he did not use these aliases to travel in and out of the United States, the prolific use of fraudulent documents and his ability to obtain them from official government offices is noteworthy. It is also possible that he used some of the money from his schemes to help pay bribes to officials and the US citizens who married his family members, allowing them to cross into and stay in the country. So, while the documents were not passports or visas used for international travel, they helped Said and his family members obtain the resources that allowed them to enter the United States. http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1 000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=act, (Accessed May 18, 2012). 169 Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. p. 24. 170 Dias and Newman. p. 14-15. 171 Ibid. p. 161-162. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 39 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
In the case of Ahmed Ressam, there is well-documented evidence of both the false documents he used and how he obtained them, in part due to the fact that he testified against one of the individuals who provided a number of the documents to him. Ressam received false documents in the name of Benni Antoine Norris from Abu Doha as well as other documents from Mokhtar Haouari in the name of Mario Roig. According to court documents, Doha was known to have provided “false and fraudulent travel documents and identification documents to men who wanted to attend terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.”172 According to Ressam’s testimony against Haouri, Haouri supplied Ressam with an Algerian passport. The passport was to be used by Ressam after bombing LAX in order to return to Algeria.173 Mohammad Ajaj was arrested at New York’s JFK Airport after presenting a Swedish passport under the name Khurram Khan.174 However, he was not the only one carrying false documents in this crossing. His partner, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, also carried a false passport. While the name and nationality of the passport is not specified in court documents, it is clearly stated that Yousef did use a false name when crossing into the United States.
Ghazi Abu Mezer is the one exception in this area. According to all publicly available accounts, his documentation was completely valid. He received a legitimate exit visa from the Israeli government and a student visa from the Canadian government. While he did not sign up for the business administration classes he originally listed on his application, he did enroll in English language classes.175 While Abu Mezer may have been the exception in some ways, he was also not completely honest. He had no intention of fully attending school in Canada, and thus his student visa was essentially fraudulent. Ultimately, it is clear that the use of false documents is a very popular method used by individuals engaged in activity related to terrorism, for crossing into the United States.
Efforts to enhance scrutiny of visa applications, especially in certain high risk countries, were discussed above. However, there have also been major joint efforts by various agencies including ICE, USCIS and the State Department to enhance their ability to detect fraudulent documents. This also means that they have made efforts to improve the quality of driver’s licenses, passports and transportation worker identification cars in order to make them harder to produce fraudulently.176
Section 4- Conclusion
It is been hard to define what “adequate security” is along US borders. A thorough inspection of every car, truck and container that crosses into the country at land, air and sea ports of entry would stifle trade and impact both the US economy and the economies of its’ closest allies. However, checking too few cars, trucks and containers would allow illicit materials and those with nefarious intentions to easily move in and out of the country. The same stands true for checking individuals crossing, such as those flying or driving
172 Indictment. United States of America v. Abu Doha. (01 Cr.) United States District Court, Southern District of New York 173 United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, (s4 00 Cr.15 (JFK)) United States District Court Southern District of New York. 174 Mitchell “A Sixth Suspect Charged in Blast”. 175 Katz. p. 29. 176 Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 40 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence into the United States. As pointed out in the case studies discussed here, the balance between doing sufficiently thorough checks and allowing people and property to flow efficiently across the border is a problem that has been struggled with at all levels, from government officials to policy makers and down to individual law enforcement agents.
There are a number of possible methods for helping to address this situation that have been proposed by various organizations, individuals and agencies. Three main areas that have been focused on by agencies like the Government Accountability Office are increasing (1) coordination at the ports of entry, (2) mass data sharing between US agencies and international agencies, and (3) the use of advanced technology (such as biometrics). Of course, another option is maintain the status quo and continue to fund the programs already in existence.
According to GAO, by the end of 2010 there were roughly “20,000 agents assigned to patrol the US land borders and 20,600 officers assigned to air, land, and sea ports of entry.”177 That is almost double the number of agents patrolling the land borders in 2004. Also, a number of steps have been taken to improve sharing information between agencies and to improve technological resources.
Increase and Streamline Mass Data Sharing
Observers frequently cite the need for more efficient sharing of mass data, at national and international levels, in order to identify illicit activity, obtain background information on a case or individual, and coordinate joint investigations/operations. One example regarding the need for improved information sharing involved coordination across agencies is the case of US-VISIT, USCIS, ICE and CBP. Efforts to coordinate and share data among these agencies in order to identify, track, investigate, and (when appropriate) detain individuals who have violated the terms of their visa have been made. However a recent review of the efforts to share that information has identified problems. Currently there are five databases used just to identify non-immigrants who have overstayed their visas (Table 5). Each one stores different information and files that information in a different manner.
Table 5- Government Databases Monitoring Immigration Agency responsible Database for managing the Information maintained in the database related to overstays database Nonimmigrant arrival and departure information, the date until which Arrival and Departure an individual may remain in the United States, and various other US-VISIT Identification System information (e.g., the address where the individual will reside in the United States). Automated Biometric Biometric information collected from nonimmigrants upon their entry US-VISIT Identification System into the United States (i.e., fingerprints and photographs). Used at POEs to verify traveler information and contains lookouts— TECS CBP electronic alerts—for certain individuals (e.g., overstays). TECS also
177 United States Government Accountability Office. (2011). Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. March 30, 2011. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 41 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
interfaces with other agencies’ databases to share this information. Student and Exchange Immigration status information for nonimmigrant foreign students and Visitor Information ICE exchange visitors. System Arrival, departure, and other information on nonimmigrants who are National Security Entry- ICE required to register with immigration authorities either at a POE or at a Exit Registration System designated ICE office for national security reasons. Source: Government Accountability Office178
Although all of the relevant agencies fall within the scope of DHS, the GAO has cited complications in coordinating information from all of the databases and to sharing relevant information in a timely manner. Another office that plays an important role in this process is USCIS. According to the GAO document mentioned above, “CBP officials from… POEs… visited reported facing challenges on some occasion obtaining information from USCIS.”179 This is a problem that is acknowledged by USCIS and is something that they are working towards solving. One of the reasons for the complication cited by CBP officers is that the information on the USCIS is stored in a way that makes it difficult for CBP officers to query for information on a case and they have trouble, at this time, getting a response from USCIS when assistance is requested. Also, despite CBP having access to USCIS computer databases, “USCIS’s operating processes are paper based, which can result in some application and other case information not being captured electronically, and thus not… available to officials from other agencies…”180 Due to these complications, it appears that further facilitation of information sharing is needed.
Increase Use of Biometric Technology
According to the Congressional Research Service, “Biometrics are physical or behavioral characteristics of a person that can be measured and used for identification… Images and measurements of biometrics are typically digitized and reduced to a numerical identifier that is unique to a particular person.”181 The advantage of using biometric technology to determine someone’s identification compared to other forms of I.D. is that biometric technology recognizes individuals’ unique identifiers. These are qualities about a person that distinguish the individual from the general population to the extent that it is significantly high probability that no other person would have the exact same characteristics. According to the GAO, the “leading biometric technologies include facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and iris recognition.”182 The advantage of biometric information is that It is not something that can easily be lost, copied or forged. Having this technology in place would have made it more difficult for individuals like Ramzi Ahmed Yousef (one of the 1993 WTC bombers) to cross into the United States using only a fake passport.
178 United States Government Accountability Office. (2011). Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would have Costs. p. 13. 179 Ibid. p 51. 180 Ibid. p. 53. 181 Krouse, William. Morgan, Daniel. (2005). Biometric Identifiers and Border Security: 9/11 Commission Recommendations and Related Issues. CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RS21916. February 7, 2005. p. 2. 182 United States Government Accountability Office. (2004). Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives. May 19, 2004. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 42 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
One such program using the ideas is the e-passport program. These passports have an electronic chip in them that store, not only traditional identification information- such as name and date of birth- but also stores some key biometric information. These passports are more sophisticated and therefore, harder to forge. It is also more difficult to alter the passport by methods such as replacing the picture in the passport as there is also a digital photograph stored in the electronic chip.183 While using biometric systems at border crossings may seem like a perfect solution for blocking those using fraudulent identification there are some drawbacks. For example, in order for these methods to effectively identify people, individuals need to be in a database initially. In order for the database to be accurate, an investigation to verify that the person is who they claim to be must be undertaken before placing them in the database. Biometric analysis is only as reliable as the reference samples collected. There are three problems that have been cited in terms of building this type of database. 1. Verifying a person’s identity before entering them into the database would require the use of things like photo I.D.’s, Social Security Numbers, and other documents, that has already been established in the case studies, can be forged or obtained through fraudulent means. 2. Collecting enough data to make biometric screening useful at POE’s would involve a massive international effort where countries would be willing to openly share information and agree to use a standard program or a group of compatible programs. Coordination at this level is highly unlikely. 3. There are many who view the mass collection of this personal data as an invasion of privacy. As reported by the GAO in 2005, there is public concern about how and when that information will be used. Part of this concern is because there is no law that clearly defines under what conditions a person’s biometric data may be shared with other government agencies or foreign governments.184 American citizens have always valued their privacy so it is important that the balance between security and personal space is respected when considering the scope of implementation of biometric technology.185
There have also been some other criticisms to using biometric information for border security because of its cost, reliability problems, and lack of standards. First, implementing biometric technology into border security would cost billions to both implement and maintain. Second, there are also some reliability problems. For example, individual characteristics may be altered due to plastic surgery, injury, lighting, or simple aging. Systems have been tricked in the past by someone presenting a picture to the scanner. Finally, there are no universally excepted standards for “the physical format in which data [is] stored… and the software format for data collection and interchange.”186 These limitations make it clear that, while biometrics have the potential to greatly increase border security, the technology involved is still very young and there are a number of challenges that need to be overcome before it can relied upon without much human intervention.
Biometric technology has other potential uses in border security beyond identification and verification. For example, in conjunction with DHS, BORDERS at the University of Arizona has developed an AVATAR kiosk that interacts with a person in order to determine if that person is being deceptive and should be screened
183 Department of Homeland Security. e-Passports. Last updated February 1, 2011 http://www.dhs.gov/files/crossingborders/gc_1161636133959.shtm (Accessed November 1, 2011) 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 186 Krouse and Morgan. p. 6. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 43 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence further. According to UA, “individuals would approach the AVATAR kiosk, scan their identification, answer a few simple questions, and then move on.”187 The computer in the kiosk scans for certain cues that a person is being deceptive. If those cues are detected, that person is flagged for secondary screening. In testing, the kiosk correctly identified all of the individuals who were attempting to go past it with fake bombs. However, the kiosk also flagged people who were “innocent” in the exercise.188 This shows that some work needs to be done, but this technology could have helped detect the fact that Fatme Harb was lying about being married to an American citizen, or that her brother, Haissam Harb, was lying about only intending to visit the country for a short time.
Looking Back and Looking Ahead
While criticisms of US border-crossing policies and practices persist, it is important to note that many changes that have occurred in the last ten years have strengthened the role of border patrol as part of the US counterterrorism program. Even GAO has stated that “CBP [has] significantly increased personnel and resources for border security at and between the ports of entry and reported some success in interdicting illegal cross-border activity.”189 As time goes by, more thorough assessments of how current practices assist in the identification and interdiction of those who are seeking to engage in terrorism against the United States will be possible and important to conduct.
But we know of successes at the anecdotal level: United Press International cites cameras catching a Czech man trying to sneak across the border, away from an official POE, in the first weeks of July 2011.190 Another report states that CBP arrested 14 individuals in Laguna Beach CA after they were spotted by California National Guard in a boat off the coast. As was the case with Abu Mezer, these individuals were well inside the US border. However, CBP has recognized the importance of having agents stationed beyond the immediate border area, and this case shows how useful of a strategy this can be,
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that “information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and knowledge.”191 As reported in a recent DHS report, there have been major efforts towards that goal. There has been collaboration between various agencies geared towards solving information sharing problems at the federal, state and local levels. This has improved the ability of law enforcement at all levels to coordinate more effectively192 and specifically supports the goal of countering potential terrorists along and around the borders.
187 Warren-Pederson, Liz. (2010). “AVATAR Kiosk Aims to Automate, Augment Border Enforcement”. Eller Buzz. The University of Arizona Eller College of Management. February 2010. http://www.eller.arizona.edu/buzz/2011/feb/avatar.asp (Accessed July 26, 2011). 188 Ibid. 189 United States Government Accountability Office. (2011). Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. Under “What GAO Found”. 190 “Camera Catches Canadian border hoppers”. United Press International. July 3, 2011. (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/07/03/Camera-catches-Canadian-border-hoppers/UPI-49601309672470/ . (Accessed July 25, 2011). 191 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. p. 417. 192 United States Government Accountability Office. (2011). Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. p. 11-13. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 44 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
The US government is engaged in a number of international initiatives and agreements to support these goals, as well. Per GAO, “working closely with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, DHS participates in biographic and biometric data exchange, which enables each country to query each other‘s fingerprint databases and voluntarily provide data about criminals and terrorists.”193 Had some of these projects been in place at the time, it could have been more difficult for Ahmed Ressam to attempt to cross using a false identity: If biometric information, such as fingerprints, had been shared, the fact that he was using an alias would have been revealed immediately and he would have been detained even if his car had not been searched.
Specifically in terms of the US-Canadian border, increased cooperation and information sharing has greatly improved, as pointed out by Leuprecht. This started well before 9/11 and was only accelerated afterwards. Some of these programs include (but are not limited to) the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,194 the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America195 and the Smart Border Action Plan.196 Within these initiatives, both governments have repeatedly stated their desire for continued cooperation and improvements to that cooperation.
However, there have also been some criticisms and there is still much room for improvement. One of the challenges cited is the difficulty establishing who has jurisdiction, particularly on the US side at the federal level.197 For example, if a Canadian border patrol agent detects smuggling of firearms, drugs and people between the US and Canada by a single group of individuals, who does he contact? Does he contact the FBI, DEA, ATF, or CBP? Often there is no clear answer to these questions, creating potential vulnerabilities in screening efforts.
Although definitive generalizations about the border-crossing behaviors of those who plan to attack US targets cannot be drawn from only four examples, it has been demonstrated through these case studies common methods have been used—both successfully and unsuccessfully—by individuals who wished to
193 Ibid. p. 13. 194 “The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) requires U.S. and Canadian travelers to present a passport or other document that denotes identity and citizenship when entering the U.S. It is a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The goal of WHTI is to facilitate entry for U.S. citizens and legitimate foreign visitors, while strengthening U.S. border security. Standard documents will enable the Department of Homeland Security to quickly and reliably identify a traveler. WHTI went into effect June 1, 2009 for land and sea travel into the U.S. WHTI document requirements for air travel went into effect in 2007.- http://www.getyouhome.gov/html/eng_map.html (Accessed July25, 2011). 195 “The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) is a trilateral initiative that was launched in March 2005 to increase cooperation and information sharing for the purpose of increasing and enhancing security and prosperity in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The SPP is a government initiative that was endorsed by the leaders of the three countries, but it is not a signed agreement or treaty and, therefore, contains no legally binding commitments or obligations.”- Lake, Jennifer E. Villarreal, Angeles M. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An Overview and Selected Issues. Congressional Research Service. May 27, 2009. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22701.pdf (Accessed July 25, 2011). 196 The Smart Border Action Plan was signed just two days before the 9/11. It is a 30-point plan geared towards both enhancing security and facilitating trade across the U.S.- Canadian border. This includes sharing information and policy coordination. For a complete list of the 30-points in the action plan, please refer to the DHS website: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0024.shtm . 197 Leuprecht. Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 45 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence launch terrorist attacks against the United States. This review of key border-crossing cases by terrorists and intended terrorists demonstrate, though, that violent extremists are resourceful and will work to overcome barriers limiting their entry into the United States. As practices along US borders evolve, potential terrorists trying to gain access to the country will also likely adapt their techniques, so the mission to counter terrorism at the border by identifying and apprehending potential terrorists will likely continue to be a complex challenge.
Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 46 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
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Sageman, Marc. (2004). Understanding Terrorist Networks. University of Pennsylvania Press Tompkins, Anne M. (2011). Department of Justice: For Immediate Release, Thursday, January 27, 2011. http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncw/press/hammoudsentence.html (Accessed June 23, 2011) United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States of America v. Ahmed Ressam ( No. 09-30000, D.C. No. 2:99-cr-006660JCC-1), Western District of Washington, Argued November 2, 2009. United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Lafi Khalil and Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, 214 F. 3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2000), Docket Nos. 98-1723(L), 99-1134. Second Circuit. Argued January 2, 2000. Decided May 31, 2000. http://openjurist.org/print/516918 (Accessed June 14, 2011). United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, and Abdul Rahman Yasin. Second Circuit. 152 F.3d. 88, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 602. Nos. 94-1212 to 94- 1315. Argued Dec. 18 and 19, 1997. United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohammad A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Also Known As Khurram Khan, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Also Known As Mahmoud Abu Halima, Defendants-appellants,ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Bilal Alkaisi, Also Known As Bilal Elqisi, Abdul Rahman Yasin, Also Known As Aboud, Abdul Hakim Murad, Also Known As Saeed Ahmed, Eyad Ismoil, Also Known As Eyad Ismail, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Also Known As Grabi Ibrahim Hahsen. ((2001). 261 F.3d 271.) Second Circuit , Argued April 18. 2001. United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Mohamed Youssef Hammoud. (No. 03- 4253, CR-00-147-MU), Western District of North Carolina at Charlotte. Argued August 2, 2004. United States Court of Appeals, United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Uousef, Eyad Ismoil and Abdul Hakim Murad. (2002). (Docket Nos. 98-1041 L, 98-1197, 98, 1355, 99-1544, 99-1554. August Term, 2001), Second Circuit: Argued May 3, 2002. United States Department of Justice: Immigration and Naturalization Services. (1992) Notice to Detain, Deport, Remove or Present Aliens. Submitted June 6, 1992 United States Drug Enforcement Agency. (2008). United States- Canada Border Drugs Threat Assessment 2007. Department of Homeland Security Publications. http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/le/oc/_fl/us-canadian-report-drugs-eng.pdf (Accessed June 7, 2011) United States Government Accountability Office. (2004). Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives. May 19, 2004 United States Government Accountability Office. (2005). International Air Passengers: Staffing Model for Airport Inspections Personnel Can Be Improved. Report to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. July 2005 United States Government Accountability Office. (2010). Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. Report to Congressional Requesters
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Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies 51 Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Case Studies DHS S&T Brownbag Presentation: August 21, 2012
This research was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of University Programs through START. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented here are solely the authors’ and are not representative of DHS or the United States Government.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Case Study Methodology
Start: 221 incidents of border crossings involving at least one individual indicted in the US on federal terrorist charges
Entry to the US Departure from the US
Land/Port Airport
Ahmed Ressam 1993 WTC Bombers North Carolina Terrorist Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer Financiers National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Ahmed Ressam and Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Why These Cases?
Arrested Type of Arriving Departing Legal Crossing Date of Interdicted? Before Crossing In From Crossing Date Arrest Entering US?
Ahmed United Ressam Land/ Dec.14, Dec. 14, States Canada No Yes Yes (Millennium Port 1999 1999 (WA) Bomber)
Ghazi (Gazi) United Late 1996 Yes Land/ July 31, Ibrahim Abu States Canada No Late 1996 Yes Yes Port 1997 Mezer (WA) Jan. 1997 No National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism US-Canadian Border RCMP CBSA
USCG DEA
ICE Bureau of Indian Affairs
FBI
US Forest Service National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Ahmed Ressam (the Millennium Bomber)
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism The Crossing • November 1999- moved from Montreal to Vancouver • December 14th, 1999- made his crossing attempt. – Boarded the MV Coho passenger and vehicle ferry in Tsawwassen BC – Landed in Port Angeles, WA • Had passports and other legal documents under the name of Benni Norris.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Contact with Border Agents
• Tsawwassen- INS • Checked passport and ran name • Searched car, but did not check wheel well in the trunk • Port Angeles- US Customs • Purposely waited to get off last- appeared nervous • Sent to secondary inspection- car searched again • Found: hexamethylene triperoxide (HMTD), cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX), ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN), a large quantity of urea, fertilizer, aluminum sulfate, and timing devices • Tried to run and steal a car • Eventually confessed and explained his plans
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Ghazi (Gazi) Ibrahim Abu Mezer
Applied for US Visa- Denied
1996- 3 attempts to Travels to NYC enter US. First 2 Failed Born in the West Bank National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism What has changed?
• Number of Agents on the Northern Border, 1992-2001
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2011
Agents 299 310 306 296 292 267 289 311 306 340 +2,200
*United States Border Patrol- Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year (Oct. 1st- Sept. 30th) http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/staffing_9 2_10.ctt/staffing_92_10.pdf • Increased funding for technological improvements • Increased cooperation within the US and between the US and Canada.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Trends Begin to Appear
Applied for Political Used Fraudulent
Asylum Documents
Case 1- Ahmed Ressam Case 2- Ghazi Ibrahim Unknown Abu Mezer Case 3- 1993 WTC Bombers Case 4- North Carolina Group National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 1993 WTC Bombers and NC Terrorist Financers National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Why these cases?
Some Intention to Type of Use of False Bribed Traveled in Members Engage in Crossing Documents Officials Groups Interdicted Violence
1993 World Trade Center Airport Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Bombers
North Carolina Financing Airport Yes Yes Yes Yes No Group National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Airport Crossings
• Advantages: – Primary screening before passengers get on the plane – Agents receive a list of names before individuals arrive – Agents can anticipate the number of individuals going through customs at any time National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 1993 WTC Bombers National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
The Crossing
• INS agent realized Ajaj’s • Yousef passed primary passport was fraudulent inspection – Ajaj’s luggage was searched • At secondary • Luggage contained a kit inspection- wrong visa full on instructions on • Then applied to political making explosives asylum • Ajaj charged and • Released pending convicted of passport formal hearing fraud National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Terrorist Financing Ring National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Timeline National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Crossings
• Methods Used: – 90 day tourist visas • Some purchased in Venezuela • Some provided by corrupt official in Cyprus – Married US nationals (fraudulently) • Both before and after entering the US • When all else fails, apply for political asylum.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Link to Hezbollah
• S. Harb and M. Hammoud had close ties to active, well known, members of Hezbollah • M. Hammoud had been a member of a youth group within the organization • M. Hammoud came to US with the expressed purpose to raise money for Hezbollah • S. Harb visited the regional procurement officer in Canada on multiple occasions. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism What has changed?
• Creation of DHS as umbrella agency • Improvements in technology and passport scanning • Increased staffing • More information given to US personnel before flight arrives • Better monitoring of visas National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Trends
Applied for Political Used Fraudulent
Asylum Documents
Case 1- Ahmed Ressam Case 2- Ghazi Ibrahim Unknown Abu Mezer Case 3- 1993 WTC Bombers Case 4- North Carolina Group National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Conclusion
• Three areas of focus 1. Coordination at ports of entry 2. Mass data sharing nationally and internationally 3. Increased use of advanced technology National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Jaime Shoemaker GTD Research Assistant [email protected] 301-405-6600 www.start.umd.edu
3300 Symons Hall College Park, MD 20742 301.405.6600 www.start.umd.edu