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US TERRORIST BORDER CROSSING DATA COLLECTION BORDER-CROSSING EVENT CODEBOOK Version

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US TERRORIST BORDER CROSSING DATA COLLECTION BORDER-CROSSING EVENT CODEBOOK Version U.S. TERRORIST BORDER CROSSING DATA COLLECTION BORDER-CROSSING EVENT CODEBOOK Version: October 20, 2010 Methodology for identifying border crossing events During preliminary research, court records from cases found in the ATS dataset were reviewed for potential border crossing events. Each court case’s documents were searched to determine whether or not one of the defendants or accomplices crossed a U.S. border in the events documented in the records. These court cases involve either a completed terrorism incident, a thwarted or planned terrorism incident, material support for terrorism, general terrorism conspiracy, and in some cases immigration fraud. A list of terrorism related court cases that involved at least one successful, thwarted, or planned border crossing was then generated for further study. Coding of border crossing events The potential border crossing events were originally found through searching court case documents and then identifying court cases to include in the project. Now that a list has been generated the coding of the border crossing events will start with the identification of an “incident.” Using a combination of the ATS dataset and the previously funded START project- MISTA, the court cases will be linked to either a completed terrorism incident, a thwarted or planned terrorism attack, material support of terrorism case, or a general terrorism conspiracy when no incident or planned incident can be identified. There can be many incidents per court case and/or many court cases per incident. This will result in a list of “incidents” with linked court cases for which the documents can be further studied for border crossing events. In addition, open source media searches will be used to augment the data collection and coding. Once an “incident” has been identified then related court case records will be mined for border crossing events. When an event is found all persons that were involved with trying to cross the border will be coded. Terminology The terms incident, terrorism incident, or terrorism-related incident are used in the codebook to refer to several types of events, as included in ATS: successful completed incident (also included in GTD), a thwarted attack, a planned incident that never occurred, and in some cases a general terrorism or material support of terrorism conspiracy. A single “border crossing event” is defined as when one or more persons successfully cross or unsuccessfully attempt to cross over the border of the U.S at a specific place, date, and time. This is also to include a planned crossing of the border that was never carried out as long as a date or place was specified in the source data about the planned crossing. What distinguishes one “border crossing event” from another is determined by the proximity of persons crossings and the date/time of the crossing. For multiple persons crossing the border to be coded as a single “border crossing event” then those persons would have to be traveling as a group on the transportation that takes them to the border. Ex. three persons riding in a single car, traveling on the same flight or ship, or walking across the border. If there is a temporal difference in the crossing (time to be determined- maybe an hour) or a proximity difference (like different ports or different flights to an airport) then these would be coded as separate “border crossing events”. Incident Identification Variables 1. Unique id for the incident for the BORDERS dataset INC_ID (NUMERIC) Assigns a unique id for each incident. An incident can be a successful completed incident, a thwarted attack, a planned incident that never occurred, and in some cases a general terrorism or material support of terrorism conspiracy or immigration related case. 2. Link to incident in TEVUS dataset INC_TEVUS_ID (NUMERIC) If the border crossing is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the TEVUS.EVENTS_KEY for that incident. 3. Link to incident in ATS dataset INC_ATS_ID (NUMERIC) If the border crossing is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the ATS ID for that incident. Copy exactly from the online ATS Terrorism Database or use the TEVUS.EVENTS.ATS_E_EVENTS_ID value. 4. Link to incident in GTD dataset INC_GTD_ID (NUMERIC) If the border crossing is linked to a terrorist attack, record here the GTD ID for that incident. Copy exactly from www.start.umd.edu/gtd or use the TEVUS.EVENTS.GTD_EVENTID value. 2 5. Incident name INC_NAME (TEXT) Designates a name to the terrorism incident for recognition during coding. 6. Incident description INC_DESC (TEXT) Designates a short description for the terrorism incident for recognition during coding. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset. 7. Type of Incident. INC_TYPE (NUMERIC) Type of terrorist-related incident related to this border-crossing event. Values: 1= Assassination 2= Armed assault 3= Bombing/Explosion 4= Hijacking 5= Hostage taking (Barricade incident) 6= Hostage taking (Kidnapping) 7= Facility/Infrastructure attack 8= Unarmed assault 9= Material support 10= Financial support 11= Immigration 12= Other 8. Sub-Type of terrorism incident INC_SUBTYPE (NUMERIC) Sub-type of terrorist-related incident related to this border-crossing event. 3 Values: 0= No explicit link to terrorism found 1= Terrorist attack 2= Terrorist attack prevented 3= Other terrorism related 9. Extent to which the attack/conspiracy was carried out. INC_OCCUR (TEXT) Values: 0= Planning 1= Preparation 2= Attempt 3= Carried Out 10. Incident name INC_SUCCESS (TEXT) Was the goal of the conspiracy/attack successful. Values: 0= No (No evidence of a successful goal completed) 1= Yes (Evidence of a successful goal completed) 11. Date of the terrorism incident INC_DATE (DATE) Values: 12/JUN/99 DD/MMM/YY If unknown or NA, leave blank Note: If “incident” does not have a specific date then use the indictment date for the first defendant from the earliest court case that can be linked to the incident. 4 12. Day of the terrorism incident INC_DAY (NUMERIC) The day of the month on which the terrorist-related incident took place. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset. Values: 01-31 DD If unknown or NA, leave blank. Note: If “incident” does not have a specific date then use the indictment date for the first defendant from the earliest court case that can be linked to the incident. 13. Month of Terrorism Incident/ Planned Incident INC_MONTH (TEXT) The month in which the terrorist-related incident took place. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset. Values: 01-12 MM If unknown or NA, leave blank Note: If “incident” does not have a specific date then use the indictment date for the first defendant from the earliest court case that can be linked to the incident. 14. Year of Terrorism Incident/ Planned Incident INC_YEAR (NUMERIC) 5 The year in which the terrorist-related incident took place. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset. Values: (four-digit value) YYYY If unknown or NA, leave blank 15. Number of border crossings related to incident INC_CROSSINGS (NUMERIC) Codes the number of border crossings related to a single incident. Each time a crossing happens it is counted (even if it is the same person - count each crossing.) Values: 1=One crossing 2=Two crossings, etc. -9=Unknown Note: Coding multiple individuals depends on whether they crossed separately or together. If there were 3 people related to one incident, and the 3 people were always together (same place, same date, same time) and they always crossed the border together 4 times, then this variable would equal 4. If the 3 people crossed the same border at different times of day, or different places then the number would change. It could potentially be 12 crossings if each of the 3 individuals crossed separately (not as a group) 4 separate times. Another example: 3 people flying on the same plane and going through customs would count as 1 “border crossing event” 16. Number of border crossers related to incident INC_CROSSERS (NUMERIC) Codes the number of border crossers related to a single incident. A crosser crossing multiple times counts as only one. Values: 1= One crosser 2= Two crossers, etc. -9= Unknown 6 17. Was incident domestic or international? INC_DOM_INT (NUMERIC) Codes whether or not the incident was domestic or international using the FBI’s methodology. This variable is coded from the ATS dataset. Possible re-coding after definition of variable has been more clearly determined. See Paxton. Values: 0= Domestic 1= International -9= Unknown Note: Domestic terrorism: Unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. International terrorism: Involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 18. Category of Incident INC_CATEGORY (NUMERIC) Codes category of terrorism the incident falls under Values: 1= Left Wing 2= Right Wing 3= International 4= Single Issue- Environmental 5= Single Issue- Abortion 6= Single Issue- Anti-Islamic 7= Single Issue- Other 8= Non-Terrorist 9= Other 7 -9= Unknown -8= NA Note: Left-wing Terrorists have a revolutionary socialist agenda and see themselves as protectors of the populace.
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