The Next Stage of Proliferation

Number 19, Fall/Winter 2010 The Next Stage of Proliferation Peter Brookes a new Mideast arms race Stephen Blank Russia’s troubling (non)proliferation policy Joshua Pollack atomic dreams in Damascus Carolyn Leddy needed: a new approach to North Korea Emily Landau the arms control community targets Israel Keith Payne the pitfalls of New START Peter Pry dark days for America’s strategic deterrent H. Cooper & R. Pfaltzgraff the enduring logic of missile defense The Struggle Against Radical Islam

• Russia’s Islamist threat • Radicalism south of America’s border • Obama’s misguided policy toward the Muslim World • Iraq, the day after featuring Brig. Gen. David L. Grange & Efraim Karsh

$7.95 US $12.50 CAN 0 3 Perspective Ambassador Robert Joseph Former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 0 7 4 4 7 0 5 7 8 8 2 6 www.securityaffairs.org Ilan Berman Editor

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From the Publisher Tom Neumann 3 Editor’s Corner Ilan Berman 5

The Next Stage of Proliferation

The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade Peter Brookes 7 Fear and loathing – and an emerging arms race —in the Persian Gulf Nonproliferation, Russian Style Stephen Blank 15 The Kremlin’s strange approach to countering the spread of WMD

Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions Joshua Pollack 23 Why Syria wants the bomb, and how it is trying to get it

Tackling Pyongyang’s Proliferation Trade Carolyn Leddy 35 North Korea is arming the world’s rogues, here’s how to stop it

The NPT’s Challenge to Israel Emily B. Landau 43 How arms control threatens to undermine the Jewish state’s nuclear opacity

Off to a Bad START Keith B. Payne 49 The new arms control treaty between Washington and Moscow is harmful for America

Provocatively Weak Peter Vincent Pry 57 The dire consequences of America’s shrinking strategic deterrent

The Last Line of Defense Henry Cooper & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 69 Missile defense can serve as a key counterproliferation tool, here’s how The Struggle Against Radical Islam

Adrift in Arabia Efraim Karsh 77 The Obama administration’s Mideast policy seriously misjudges regional realities The Yemeni Vortex Ian Illych Martinez 87 A troubled Gulf state stares into the abyss Defeating Decentralized Terrorism David Grange 95 How “communities of interest” can subvert adversaries and strengthen partnerships Radicalism South of the Border Jon B. Perdue 101 Islamism’s expanding foothold in America’s backyard The Tabligh Challenge Timothy R. Furnish 115 Meet Tablighi Jamaat, the most important Islamist movement you’ve never heard of The Caucasian Cauldron Sergey Markedonov 123 Russia’s turbulent periphery, and its growing Islamist threat Taking Stock in Iraq P.J. Dermer 129 Operating Enduring Freedom has ended. Now what?

Perspective

Dubious Disarmament 137 An Interview with The Honorable Robert G. Joseph

Dispatches

MOROCCO: The Promise of a United Maghreb Mbarka Bouaida 141 TUNISIA: The Tunisian Model Roger Bismuth 143 AUSTRIA: Kreisky’s Corrosive Legacy S. Hartmann & F. Markl 145 Book Reviews

Course Correction Shawn Macomber 147 Newt Gingrich’s new vision for America—and U.S. national security

Prodigal Son Asaf Romirowsky 151 Mosab Yousef’s change of heart about terror

Through the Monitor, Darkly Eric R. Sterner 153 Richard Clarke explores the nature—and the politics—of cyber warfare

Counterinsurgency 2.0 Martin Sieff 157 Thinking deeply about irregular warfare with Richard Shultz and Roy Godson From the Publisher

I recently wrote an article in which I coined a new word, “gradualization.” It is a word that should eventually find its way into the 21st century political lexicon. It is the alternative to revolution.

The word refers to a predetermined outcome that comes about so gradually that the populace accepts the change before it has realized just how much things have changed. Gradualization is accompanied by rhetoric to the effect that the agents of change have changed nothing at all.

There are many current examples of gradualization but a perfect and illus- trative one is the change brought about by the AKP party in Turkey. When first elected, everybody said that this was the end of modern day Turkey and that Islamization is just around the corner. The Turkish military was poised to defend Turkey’s constitution as it had done so many times before.

But there was no rapid change that allowed the Turkish military to react within the framework of its authority.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan learned from the failure of his Islamist predecessor, Necmettin Erbakan, who had almost immediately tried to make dramatic changes that challenged the secular constitution of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and, as a result, was forced by the country’s military to step down.

Now move the clock forward several years and Erdogan has consolidated his power and there is a totally new Turkey. It is Islamized, and it still has further to go. Where it crossed over the line is hard to tell. But Erdogan knew where he was going from day one.

American Turkophiles, myself included, now view with nostalgia the old Turkey that used to be an ally. For the moment, that is history. Part of the problem was the perennial belief on the part of democracies that “it can’t happen here.” This makes the case for the old adage that “the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.”

Just as some in the Arab community yearn for the glory days of the Caliph- ate, Erdogan and his crowd dream of a return to the days when the Caliphate emanated from the Ottoman Empire.

And who, in these dreams, is the Caliph? I suspect that in at least one dream his name is Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Tom Neumann Publisher The Journal of International Security Affairs 3 Go ahead. Try explaining to him that $2.9 billion would be better spent on an F-35 extra engine than on what our troops really need.

America’s warfighters are intimately acquainted with the true cost of freedom. They pay it daily. So, it’s difficult to explain why Congress is preparing to waste another $2.9 billion on an extra engine for the Joint Strike Fighter – something the DoD neither wants nor needs – especially considering it could be far better spent on the resources our servicemen and women need to fight today’s wars. And return home safely. Learn more at f135engine.com.

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JSF GoAhead_JINSA Jrnl BW.indd 1 9/8/10 11:44 AM Client: Pratt & Whitney Joint Strike Fighter Ad Title: Go Ahead. Publication: JINSA Journal BW Trim: 5.25” x 8.5” Editor’s Corner

This April, the Obama administration hosted a major summit of 47 world leaders in Washington. The topic on their agenda was singular, and timely: the security of the world’s nuclear materials. The meeting highlighted the urgency of an issue that has steadily risen on the strategic agenda of the United States.

It is only fitting, therefore, that in this issue we tackle the subject with a series of articles examining the changing nature of proliferation, and America’s response to it. Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation chronicles the dangerous arms race taking shape in the Middle East, as regional states scramble to acquire strategic counterweights to the emerging Iranian bomb. Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army War College takes a look at Russia’s utilitarian approach to weapons of mass destruction—and how Moscow’s peculiar take on proliferation hurts American (and global) security. Arms control expert Joshua Pollack then examines Syria’s short, frenetic quest for an atomic capability, and how Israel stopped it. Former NSC staffer Carolyn Leddy probes the dynamics of North Korea’s proliferation practices—and suggests a much- needed reboot of American policy toward the DPRK. From there, Tel Aviv Uni- versity’s Emily Landau explains the new—and dangerous—push in the global arms control community to eliminate Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity. Keith Payne of the National Institute for Public Policy takes aim at the specifics, and the pitfalls, of the new arms control agreement recently concluded between Moscow and Washington. Longtime WMD expert Peter Pry then provides a trenchant examination of America’s increasingly vulnerable strategic deterrent, and the ominous implications thereof. We conclude with an analysis by former Strategic Defense Initiative director Henry Cooper and Robert Pfaltz- graff of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis of how missile defense can help with the growing demands of counter-proliferation in the 21st century.

From there, we turn our attention to the enduring struggle against radical Islam, in an attempt to gauge how we are faring in the conflict formerly known as the War on Terror—and the future threats confronting the United States and its allies. Middle East Quarterly editor Efraim Karsh details how Presi- dent Obama’s vaunted outreach to the Muslim world has sounded a discordant note among its intended audience. Former CIA officer Ian Martinez provides a comprehensive and timely overview of the dynamics at play in what might just become the Middle East’s next failed state: Yemen. General David Grange explores how the private sector can help in a “whole of government” approach to counterterrorism. Jon Perdue of the Fund for American Studies explains how, and why, radical Islam is gaining strength and adherents in the West- ern Hemisphere. Islam scholar Timothy Furnish introduces the reader to the opaque and influential Islamist movement Tablighi Jama’at. Sergei Marke- donov, one of Russia’s leading experts on the Caucasus, details the changing nature of the challenge confronting the Kremlin on its turbulent periphery. And military officer P.J. Dermer examines the shifting parameters of Amer- ica’s engagement in Iraq, and what is likely to follow America’s withdrawal.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 5 This issue also features a “Perspective” interview with Ambassador Robert G. Joseph, who served as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Inter- national Security under the Bush administration, as well as Dispatches from Morocco, Tunisia and Austria. We conclude, as always, with reviews of a quartet of timely books dealing with the U.S. national security debate, cyberwar- fare, Palestinian terrorism and American counterinsurgency strategy.

Here at The Journal, we pride ourselves with providing foresight and insight into the changing global national security debate. With this issue, we hope you’ll agree that we have once again done so.

Ilan Berman Editor

6 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade Peter Brookes

ith the exception of a handful of capitals friendly to Tehran, and of course the Iranian regime itself, few now dispute the notion Wthat the Islamic Republic of Iran is involved in a nuclear weapons program—and one that will, unfortunately, come to fruition in the next few years. News of Iran’s seemingly-unstoppable drive for nuclear status is no real surprise, of course; despite four UN Security Council Resolu- tions condemning Iran and imposing punitive economic sanctions, Tehran continues to enrich uranium for those weapons virtually unhindered.

Making matters worse, Iran recently informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would move beyond the three to four percent uranium enrichment level normally used for reactor fuel, alarmingly increasing enrichment to 20 percent.1 While not illegal under the 1968 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran is a signatory, there is no benign reason to enrich uranium beyond those levels, leaving little doubt about Teh- ran’s strategic intentions. It clearly puts Tehran on track to being able to enrich uranium to 80 percent or more—the levels needed for a nuclear weapon. Putting a finer point on it, Central Intelligence Agency director Leon Panetta told an American national news program this summer that “[w]e think they [Iran] have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons.”2 The U.S. intelligence community now believes Iran will be able to weaponize this fissile material in the next one to two years.3

Peter Brookes, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Congressional staffer, CIA and State Department officer, and navy veteran. Peter Brookes

American officials aren’t the proliferation environment are now only ones worried. Intense suspicion generating significant discussion and over Iran’s nuclear program, com- debate, especially in the Middle East. bined with nervousness over Teh- Geopolitically, some Sunni Arab ran’s already-capable short-range states clearly feel threatened by the and medium-range ballistic missile rise of a Shi’a Persian superpower in arsenal, is increasingly palpable in their midst, and are worried about the Middle East, where a dangerous Middle Eastern leadership shifting domino effect is taking shape. towards Tehran and away from the region’s traditional centers of power, Regional restlessness Cairo and Riyadh. Once in possession Commentators tend to focus on of a bomb, Iran could quickly become the United States, Israel, and Iran in the region’s dominant state, reassert- the seemingly quixotic struggle to ing its long-lost place as a historical, prevent Tehran from joining the once- cultural and political hegemon in the exclusive nuclear weapons club. But Middle East and even South Asia. Tehran’s efforts are not taking place It might also see an opportunity to in isolation from the rest of the region; redress what it perceives as perni- Iran’s nuclear program increasingly is cious discrimination against Shi’ism garnering the rapt attention of coun- by Sunni-led states, animating Shi’ite tries in the Middle East. minorities along the Persian Gulf, The consequences are potentially across the Middle East—and beyond. profound. When a country becomes a And, less challenged by conven- nuclear weapon state, its clout, lever- tionally-armed rivals, a nuclear Iran age, prestige, and even legitimacy are might flex some military muscle in bolstered significantly, often at the the Persian Gulf, affecting commerce expense of others. In addition, the and the flow of energy through the development of a nuclear deterrent, Strait of Hormuz, a major regional depending on the circumstances, can chokepoint. provide a state with a new degree of Of course, its new status might freedom to undertake policies that it also encourage Tehran to increase might not otherwise be able to con- its support for terrorist proxies such duct due to political, economic or as Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in conventional military opposition. A Lebanon, further roiling the region’s dramatic development such as the security situation, especially for arch- one embodied in a nuclear breakout nemesis Israel. If its recent, inflam- can shift existing balances of power, matory language is to be believed, destabilize security situations, create a nuclear Iran also might look for or increase existing tensions, and opportunities to engage Israel infuse regional dynamics with addi- directly in some way on a conventional levels of uncertainty. tional military level or, worse yet, opt Tehran’s neighbors are justifi- for the unspeakable nuclear option. ably concerned about the effect a And while Tehran has been quietly new nuclear weapons state will have meddling in the internal affairs of on the neighborhood—and how such neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan a development will affect their own for some time now, possession of a respective national security inter- nuclear bomb might prompt it to play ests. Not surprisingly, questions an even larger, more destabilizing regarding Iranian behavior in a post- role in those places.

8 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade

Indeed, as a recent editorial in an effi cient and durable source of the Wall Street Journal noted, “The energy. There are even those that world’s most open secret is that the may be attempting to diversify their Arab countries of the Middle East energy sources beyond simply oil fear a nuclear Iran as much, and per- and natural gas, or seeking to free up haps more, than Israel does.”4 And their energy reserves for profi table because they do, countries in the international export instead of costly region are taking steps to protect domestic consumption. In addition, their national interests and address due to increasing concerns about cli- the security dilemma that Tehran is mate change, some have come to see creating in the Middle East. nuclear power, once considered an expensive investment, as an attrac- Atomic aspirations tive alternative to fossil fuels, due to abound its reduced emissions and potential In just the last four years, no cost effi ciency. fewer than fourteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa have Intense suspicion over Iran’s announced their intention to pursue civilian nuclear programs—pro- nuclear program, combined with grams which, irrespective of their nervousness over Tehran’s already- stated purpose, many believe are capable short-range and medium- a hedge against the possibility of a range ballistic missile arsenal, is nuclear Iran. increasingly palpable in the Middle East, where a dangerous domino Possible Atomic Aspirants effect is taking shape. Syria United Arab Emirates In some cases, it could also be Jordan an issue of national pride—a matter Egypt of keeping up with the nuclear Jones- Yemen es; or even an effort to demonstrate Saudi Arabia to your neighbors and the world the Bahrain scientifi c and technical achievement Kuwait involved in developing, building, and Oman safely operating a peaceful, civilian Qatar nuclear power industry. Algeria Of course, developing an indige- Libya nous nuclear industry is a signifi cant Morocco undertaking. A nuclear reactor can Tunisia take a decade and three to ten billion dollars to build. Even more time and money is required if a full nuclear fuel Of course, it is possible that the cycle, including enrichment capacity, intentions of these states are honest is desired. ones, spurred on by domestic energy But such work is transforma- needs. Not all countries are blessed tive. The development of scientifi c with abundant natural resources, and technical capabilities for a civil- and consequently could be seeking ian nuclear power program is instru-

The Journal of InTernaTIonal SecurITy affaIrS 9 Peter Brookes

mental to the subsequent building of tial dilution of its nuclear deterrent the bomb. Even if it remains in com- against rival India. Egypt, the long- pliance with the tenets of the NPT, a standing leader of the Arab world, state can go quite a long way toward operates two research reactors, has developing a nuclear program with a significant scientific and technical potential military dimension. Having capabilities on nuclear matters, and the necessary nuclear infrastructure, is interested in nuclear power. Of especially that which would provide course, developing a nuclear program for a full nuclear fuel cycle, would with a military dimension is a possi- allow concerned states to offset an bility; however, doing so would surely Iranian nuclear breakout by possess- hurt its ties with United States, could ing the theoretical potential to create increase tensions with neighboring a nuclear arsenal themselves. Israel, and drain less-than-plentiful government coffers. Other countries that have Geopolitically, some Sunni Arab expressed an interest in nuclear states clearly feel threatened power, such as Jordan, Morocco, and by the rise of a Shi’a Persian Tunisia, are likely doing so because superpower in their midst, and of more local concerns. None of them have significant indigenous energy are worried about Middle Eastern sources, and as a result are focused leadership shifting towards Tehran on the development of alternative and away from the region’s energy sources. But that isn’t true for all of the states that have launched traditional centers of power, atomic plans. Kuwait and Qatar have Cairo and Riyadh. significant holdings of oil and natural gas, which makes their respective Indeed, some analysts see decisions to pursue a nuclear pro- the construction of nuclear power gram difficult to explain in a context plants in Saudi Arabia as symbolic other than that of a hedge against of Riyadh’s dread over Iran’s nuclear Iran’s growing capabilities. activities, and as a move which will And in some cases, these nuclear surely deepen tensions between the dreams have started to become real- cross-Gulf rivals. In fact, many are ity. For example, the United Arab convinced that the development of Emirates (UAE), a country with the an Iranian Shi’a bomb will inevitably fifth largest proven oil reserves in be matched by a Saudi Sunni bomb. the Middle East, last year completed It has long been rumored the Saudis a “123” agreement with the United have a deal with the Pakistanis for States, paving the way for heightened access to its nuclear inventory, or the nuclear cooperation and technology stationing of Islamabad’s nuclear- transfer between Washington and capable missiles in the Kingdom in Abu Dhabi. During the Bush admin- the likelihood of a change in Iran’s istration, Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi nuclear status.5 Arabia also signed Memoranda of Of course, while this is possible, Understanding related to nuclear it does pose a number of political cooperation that—if pursued by the and strategic dilemmas for Pakistan, Obama White House—could lead to such as the health of its relationship additional agreements such as the with neighboring Iran, and a poten- one struck with the UAE.

10 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade

Turkey, another major regional of the members’ interest in nuclear power and NATO member, is also issues is stronger than others, as evi- considering its nuclear options. Since denced by the existence of separate taking power in 2002, the country’s indigenous programs, many analysts ruling Justice and Development believe this joint effort was sparked Party (AKP) has plotted a friendlier specifically in response to Iran’s course toward neighboring Iran, a nuclear activities.9 country Ankara historically has seen But the nuclear option is not the as a competitor. But despite the cur- only one being explored by states rent, warm ties, Ankara may eventu- confronted with a rising Iran. ally come to see Tehran as a regional rival that could “undercut Turkey’s Countries in the region are desired role as a respected and pow- looking to missile defense as a erful mediator between east and west,” according to a 2008 Report to way to blunt the growing Iranian the Senate Foreign Relations Com- missile and nuclear threat. mittee.6 Indeed, a shift in Ankara’s sentiments toward Tehran could Arms racing incite interest in a nuclear program Rife with rivalry and conflict, with a military dimension. And the the Middle East is one of the world’s current strains in Turkey’s existing most volatile regions. Considering relationships with the United States the challenges confronting regional and Europe may make such a deci- states, it is no surprise to see a robust sion less taboo than in the past. arms trade under way. And Iran’s Then there is Syria. Damas- ascent as a power is only accelerating cus was caught with its hands in this trend. the nuclear cookie jar when Israel Indeed, defense spending in the destroyed its undeclared nuclear Middle East is up 40 percent over the facility at al-Kibar back in 2007. That past decade, according to the Stock- plant—likely a reactor capable of pro- holm International Peace Research ducing fissile material—was being Institute (SIPRI), an organization built with North Korean assistance.7 which closely follows global military Of course, Syria’s nuclear activities expenditures.10 SIPRI also claimed are not focused on checking Iran; in an April 2009 report on “Recent indeed, given the enduring partner- Trends in the Arms Trade” that ship between the two countries, Syria from 2004-2008, nearly 40 percent might be receiving nuclear assistance of American exports of major weap- from Iran. Rather, Syria’s strategic ons systems went to the Middle East, efforts are directed toward Israel. including “207 combat aircraft and Regional states are also band- 5,000 guided bombs.” Israel and the ing together in pursuit of nuclear UAE were the region’s main recipi- status. Most directly, the Gulf Coop- ents, garnering 11 percent each of eration Council (GCC)—consisting U.S. sales.11 of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, During the same period, accord- Oman, UAE, and Qatar—is now said ing to SIPRI data, 40 percent of to be contemplating a joint nuclear France’s arms exports went to the program that would pool resources region as well, with the UAE its top and share electrical power among weapons recipient, and the United member states.8 And although some Kingdom sent 10 percent of its exports

The Journal of International Security Affairs 11 Peter Brookes

to Saudi Arabia alone.12 (Russia, And, of course, Israel, which sees meanwhile, is believed to be selling a nuclear Iran as an existential threat, billions of dollars in arms to Iran.) has also taken steps to deal with the growing challenge, including acquir- One thing almost all observers ing bunker-busting JDAMs and conducting air exercises simulating a do agree on is that once Iran raid on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. goes nuclear, the Middle East Rumors also abound about the pos- will never be the same. Iran’s sibility of the Israeli Defense Forces using Saudi airspace to conduct a nuclearization will, by necessity, strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, entail a significant shift in the which now seems increasingly plau- regional balance of power. sible considering the poor state of relations between Israel and its one- Oil-rich Saudi Arabia, which time ally, Turkey, whose border once has often led the region in defense provided an alternative route to Iran. spending, continues to spend heav- Israel is also playing defense. ily on arms—over $40 billion in 2009, Squarely in the crosshairs of Iran’s including advanced weapons systems nuclear and missile programs, it such as smart bombs from the United has developed and deployed the States and Tornado fighters from the Arrow missile defense system, and United Kingdom, even cruise mis- is now seeking to expand its missile siles from European producers.13 defense capabilities with a three- But Riyadh is not the top arms tiered program designed to deal client in the Middle East. That honor with a full spectrum of rocket and belongs to tiny UAE, which now missile threats. ranks fourth in the world for weapons Israel is not alone. Other coun- imports, including U.S.-made Patriot tries in the region are looking to surface to air missiles, C-17 trans- missile defense as a way to blunt the port aircraft, helicopters, F-16 fight- growing Iranian missile and nuclear ers, and multiple rocket launchers.14 threat. The UAE has made a multi- The reasons for Abu Dhabi’s spend- billion dollar request of the United ing spree are unequivocal: according States for THAAD (Theater High to the Emirati Ambassador to the Altitude Air Defense) and the Patriot United States, Yousef al-Otaiba, “Out Advanced Capability (PAC-3) mis- of every country in the region, the sile defense system. Bahrain has UAE is most vulnerable to Iran. Our also held discussions with the United military ... wake up, dream, breathe, States on missile defense. And Qatar eat, and sleep the Iranian threat.”15 and Kuwait have expressed inter- Some are looking to bring est in a missile shield, while Saudi friends closer, too. Bahrain, a major- Arabia has requested missile defense ity Shi’a country ruled by a Sunni requirements analysis.16 monarchy, is unsettled about Iran’s rise and the possibility of Tehran’s The coming storm interference in its domestic affairs, in There is little doubt today that the view of some analysts. As a result, Iran’s rise, especially its troubling Bahrain has given the United States nuclear work, has stirred up a sand- permission to increase its presence at storm of interest and activity. But its Manama naval facilities. whether Iran can actually be stopped

12 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade from crossing the nuclear weap- 5. Stephen Blank, “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear ons threshold to become the tenth Gambit,” Asia Times, November 7, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_ nuclear weapons state is the subject East/EK07Ak01.html. of significant debate. The believed 6. Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms range and depth of Iran’s nuclear pro- Race in the Middle East, Report to the Com- gram makes a limited military strike mittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, February 2008, 110-34 (pg xi). a difficult undertaking—one which 7. “Syria Country Profile,” Nuclear Threat may delay, but not derail, Tehran Initiative, July, 2009, http://www.nti.org/e_ from its goal of assuming a seat at the research/profiles/Syria/Nuclear/index. global nuclear table. html. 8. Sammy Salama and Heidi Weber, “The One thing almost all observers Emerging Arab Response to Iran’s Unabated do agree on, however, is that once Nuclear Program,” Monterey Institute for Iran goes nuclear, the Middle East International Studies, Center for Nonprolif- will never be the same. Iran’s nucle- eration Studies, December 22, 2006, http:// www.nti.org/e_research/e3_83.html. arization will, by necessity, entail a 9. Lynda Hurst, “Is Mideast on Brink of an significant shift in the regional bal- Arms Race?” Toronto Star, January 27, 2007, ance of power. http://www.thestar.com/article/175516. While all parties would prefer 10. “Media Background—Military Expendi- ture,” SIPRI Yearbook, June 2, 2010, http:// a peaceful, diplomatic solution that www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/press- would keep Iran’s nuclear genie in releasetranslations/storypackage_milex. the bottle, many in the region are 11. Mark Bromley, Paul Holtom, Sam Perlo- taking deliberate steps to counter- Freeman, Pieter D. Wezeman, “Recent Trends in the Arms Trade,” SIPRI Back- balance what some see as the inevi- ground Paper, April 2009, http://books.sipri. table emergence of a nuclear Iran. org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0904a.pdf. Unless Tehran changes course, or 12. Ibid. is compelled to abandon its nuclear 13. “Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, program, the Middle East may be 2009, http://www.sipri.org/databases/arm- bound for a destabilizing explosion of stransfers. nuclear weapons-capable states and 14. Kareem Shaheen, “UAE Becomes more dangerous times ahead. And Fourth-Biggest Arms Buyer,” The National (Abu Dhabi), March 21, 2010, that would be in the interest of no http://www.thenational.ae/apps/ one—not even Iran. pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100321/ NATIONAL/703209834/1042/rss. 15. “Iranian Official Sees Penalties Slowing Nuclear Work” Global Security Newswire, July 7, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/archive. php?Date=07/07/2010. 16. “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,” National 1. Associated Press, “Iran Moves Closer to Nuke Defense Industrial Association, June 4, Weapon Capacity,” CBS News, Feb. 8, 2010, 2009, http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divi- http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/08/ sions/MissileDefense/Documents/Hemp- world/main6184932.shtml. hill%20Presentation.pdf. 2. “Political Punch: Power, Pop, and Prob- ings from ABC News Senior White House Correspondent Jake Tapper,” ABC, June 27, 2010, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politi- calpunch/2010/06/cia-iran-could-be-two- years-from-nuclear-bomb.html. 3. Ibid. 4. “The Arabs on Iran,” Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB1000142405274870363640457535323069 3833718.html.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 13 Since 1976, JINSA has fulﬁ lled an important role in the American Jewish community by supporting a strong U.S. military and a strong U.S. defense and security relationship with Israel and other like-minded democracies. Nonproliferation, Russian Style

Stephen Blank

key component of the Obama administration’s new “reset” policy is the idea that a new relationship with the Kremlin can Aelicit Russian support for U.S. nonproliferation efforts relating to Iran and North Korea. The logic is clear; nonproliferation has long figured as the Administration’s highest priority, and Russia—a key strategic partner of the Islamic Republic and important regional inter- locutor for the regime of Kim Jong Il—has the potential to play a key role.

To this end, the White House has recently granted Russia many incentives for its cooperation. It has agreed to accelerate negotiations on Moscow’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has resubmitted the U.S.-Russian treaty on civilian nuclear cooperation to Congress. Together with the Kremlin, it has issued a joint call for a nuclear-free Middle East. And it has acquiesced to a larger role for Russia in the diplomatic Quartet intended to facilitate the Arab- Israeli peace process.1 But is this approach justified? Does Russia really support U.S. nonproliferation goals, or even nonproliferation in general? A careful analysis indicates a very different and often antithetical Russian approach to these issues, and suggests that the belief in a shared threat assessment now being touted in Wash- ington is sorely misplaced.

Dr. Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsyl- vania. His latest book, co-edited with Richard Weitz, is The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow, out now from the Strategic Studies Institute Press. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or any other branch of the U.S. government. Stephen Blank

Misreading Russian sure competitors in the nuclear and attitudes arms markets.6 This misconceived approach is Due to its vulnerability, Rus- entirely our own fault. Moscow has sia’s non-proliferation stance is much made it abundantly clear that on prolif- more cautious and flexible than that eration issues it follows its own inter- of the U.S. Indeed, Moscow sees both ests—interests that are qualitatively the DPRK and Iran as potential part- different from, and often opposed ners, not enemies, and therefore will to, those of the United States. To be not categorically oppose their pro- sure, Moscow opposes adding new grams as does Washington. To the members to the nuclear club and contrary; similar to the way it was regards proliferation writ large as a viewed by the Soviet leadership in the threat.2 But beyond that, it diverges 1980s, instability in the Middle East from U.S. thinking. Indeed, prolifera- is seen by the Kremlin as a headache tion ranks a distant fifth in terms of for the United States that raises Mos- threats in Russia’s new defense doc- cow’s worth as an arbiter and prob- 7 trine, behind a whole series of U.S.- lem-solver. inspired threats, among them NATO Moreover, given Russia’s post- enlargement and the U.S. deployment Cold War weakness it has been forced of missile defenses.3 to confront other security threats that Also, unlike America, Russia are incomparably more urgent to it evaluates proliferation issues not than proliferation. These threats, as according to whether the regime in articulated by Alexei Arbatov of the question is democratic, but on the Moscow Carnegie Center, include: basis of whether a country’s nuclearization would seriously threaten itself • Instability and conflict across the and its interests.4 Thus, when then- “post-Soviet space” and in the President Vladimir Putin—in an North Caucasus; effort to assuage American fears over Iran—proposed in June 2007 to allow • NATO’s continued expansion to the United States to jointly manage the east, against strong Russian the Russian missile defense radar objections. at Gabala, Azerbaijan, then-Russian General Staff Chief Yuri Baluyevsky • The continuing stagnation of the downplayed the danger from Iran, Russian armed forces and defense insisting “this trend is not something industries, and Russia’s growing catastrophic, which would require conventional and nuclear infe- a global missile defense system riority to the United States and deployed near Russian borders.”5 NATO; Accordingly, Moscow has tended to view American policy towards non- • The threat of expanding Muslim proliferation in jaundiced fashion, radicalism in Central Asia; displaying a visible schadenfreude when North Korea tested missiles • The ominous growth of China’s and then a nuclear weapon in July economic and military power; and October 2006. Or alternatively, and Russian officialdom views Washing- ton’s insistence on nonproliferation • U.S. plans to deploy missile 8 controls largely as an effort to pres- defenses in Eastern Europe.

16 The Journal of International Security Affairs Nonproliferation, Russian Style

This is not to say that Russia is not worried about proliferation. Moscow has made it abundantly Kremlin officials have made clear clear that on proliferation issues that the issue ranks high on their it follows its own interests— list of national security priorities. As Vladimir Putin told the BBC in June interests that are qualitatively 2003, “If we are speaking about the different from, and often opposed main threat of the twenty-first cen- to, those of the United States. tury, then I consider this to be the problem of the proliferation of weap- Keeping the ayatollahs ons of mass destruction.”9 This concern isn’t simply rhetorical. Russia close has put a number of nonproliferation For the U.S., Iran represents measures into play, among them key a key test case of Russian com- export control regulations and con- mitment to nonproliferation. The straints on the transfer of WMD and Obama administration has invested dual use materials both inside and enormous time and effort in obtain- outside the country. ing Russian support for sanctions But the perceptions of those against the Islamic Republic, based dangers as they affect Russia differ upon the conviction that it needs greatly. Iran is a major consumer Russian support to curb Iran’s prolif- of Russian arms, which helps the eration threat. Thus, spokesmen like military-industrial sector to survive, Michael McFaul of the National Secu- given many years of limited defense rity Council have pointed out that if orders for the Russian armed forces. Russia wanted an adversarial rela- Iran likewise is an extremely impor- tionship with the U.S. on Iran there tant geopolitical partner, a growing are many things that it could do to 13 “regional superpower” that balances worsen our situation. Based on such the expansion of Turkey and the an understanding, President Obama increasing U.S. military and political has voiced his optimism that the U.S., presence in the Black Sea/Caspian with Russian (and Chinese) coopera- region and Middle East, and simul- tion, will be able to successfully pass taneously contains the expansion of and then implement “tough, strong 14 Sunni radicalism into the North Cau- sanctions” against Iran. casus and Central Asia.10 Russia also Even before the Obama adminis- views Iran as the dominant regional tration took office, Russia had made power in the neighborhood who can some positive movements in this project power into the Caucasus, Cen- regard. It withheld delivery of the tral Asia, and the Persian Gulf.11 As S-300 from Iran, despite the conclu- for Korea, Russia fears that a major sion of a commercial contract for the conflict involving the DPRK would advanced Russian air defense system 15 destabilize the region more than it back in 2007. It likewise repeat- does North Korean possession of edly deferred completion of the Bu- nuclear weapons. Indeed, in 2008 For- shehr plutonium reactor until August eign Minister Sergey Lavrov made 2010, citing technical and economic 16 clear that his government saw North snags. These actions have served to Korea’s nuclear weapons as a threat to rile the Iranians, as have Medvedev’s the international order, whereas Iran’s hints of possible sanctions. potential nuclearization was not.12

The Journal of International Security Affairs 17 Stephen Blank

Yet instances of meaningful oppo- petroleum products and petrochemi- sition from Moscow to Iran’s nuclear cals; and Russia’s establishment of will to power are few and far between. a $100 million liquefied natural gas Despite its warnings to Iran to come (LNG) plant to supply remote regions clean on its nuclear program, Moscow of Iran.19 Most recently, in August still formally opposes the imposition 2010, Moscow formally inaugurated of “paralyzing sanctions” against the plutonium reactor at Bushehr, Tehran. Instead, Medvedev speaks making the Islamic Republic a de publicly of “smart sanctions” and has facto nuclear power—and greatly clarified to Washington that Russia complicating Western efforts to dis- will support only measures that 1) suade the Iranian regime from fur- induce Iran to stop enrichment and ther nuclear development. weaponization, and 2) advance Rus- This state of affairs should not sian interests.17 Moreover, the smart have eluded U.S. commentators. For, sanctions that Moscow now advocates as John Parker observes in his master- would not rise to the level of an arms ful study of Russo-Iranian relations, or energy embargo on Iran.

No matter how much Russia and Since Iran’s nuclear program the United States might share kicked into high gear over the security concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and expanding past half-decade, Moscow has influence in the Middle East, a offered nuclear reactors to no common approach by Washington and Moscow was always under- fewer than 13 Arab states as cut by Russia’s rivalry with the part of its efforts to advance its United States’ other interests in Iran, and the historical approach economic, political, and strategic to dealing with that country.20 interests in the Middle East— hardly a contribution to non- That historical approach, as Parker demonstrates, is one that proliferation. acknowledges Russia must always have close relations with Iran as a Indeed, although Moscow grudg- neighbor even though it could ulti- ingly went along with the latest round mately represent a threat. Indeed, of multilateral sanctions passed by the already in 1993, Moscow recognized Security Council in June, it has vocif- Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile erously opposed the supplemental programs might one day represent a measures applied by the U.S. and EU threat to its territory, neighbors, and 21 since then. And in mid-July, Russian vital interests. But its reaction was Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and greater engagement, not isolation; Iranian Oil Minister Masoud Mirka- indeed, the Russian government’s zemi jointly announced a thirty-year continued sales of weapons to Iran road map for bilateral cooperation in after 1992 was driven in no small part oil and gas.18 The deals mapped out by the recognition that an unbridled as part of that partnership are con- Tehran had the potential to disrupt siderable, and include cooperation the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even 22 on the transportation, swaps, and possibly Afghanistan. Economic marketing of natural gas; sales of calculations to keep defense industry

18 The Journal of International Security Affairs Nonproliferation, Russian Style markets and preserve that sector of Middle East—hardly a contribution its economy were also present, with to non-proliferation. The lesson is Russia harboring a long-standing clear. For over a decade, Russian pun- (and probably not unfounded) belief dits and officials have openly stated that if it did not sell weapons to Iran, that they want Iran to be a partner Europe and the U.S. would do so. of Russia, lest the U.S. consolidate Arms sales to Iran, in other its position as the leading foreign words, have always been an arrow in power in the Middle East.25 Iranian- Moscow’s quiver aimed at preventing American hostility precludes such a Iran from pursuing a policy inimical consolidation and permits Russia to to its interests. And from the Krem- exercise influence by supporting the lin’s point of view, this approach has maintenance of a system of controlled succeeded handsomely.23 To openly tension there. renege on outstanding contracts, such as the S-300 surface to air mis- Opportunity within sile, not only causes financial losses adversity on Korea and Iranian anger and distrust of While the Kremlin appears to Russian promises, it also opens the be increasingly upset by Iran, par- door to Iranian retaliation. Therefore ticularly following revelations of Russia finds it difficult to take West- a secret Iranian nuclear facility in ern concerns seriously. Qom, Russian officials from Presi- In turn, taking Russia seri- dent Dmitry Medvedev on down have ously means acknowledging that publicly expressed far more con- Russia’s robust economic interests cern about North Korea. Through- in Iran and the nuclear, energy, and out 2009, Russia’s mounting anxiety defense industry lobbies that ben- about trends on the Korean penin- efit from those interests greatly influ- sula was palpable, encapsulated in ence Moscow’s policies. And beyond Medvedev’s expression of “great those lobbies, Russia’s fundamental alarm and concern” in response to strategic interests lie in promoting the DPRK’s April-May nuclear and Iranian-U.S. hostility, rather than missile tests,26 and his warnings that cooperation. Official Russian state- Pyongyang was more dangerous ments advocate strengthening Iran’s than Iran because of its international role as a legitimate actor in a Middle isolation.27 Moscow even deployed its East security system, even as Iranian new S-400 air defense system in the leaders threaten to destroy Israel and Russian Far East on fears that North promote state-sponsored terrorism. Korea might launch more missiles Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has that could go awry, or that the Kim even gone so far as to insist that Iran regime might even provoke a major be invited to participate in any secu- 28 24 conflict in Northeast Asia. rity system for the Black Sea region. Still, this has not translated into Russia, meanwhile, is reaping a sterner Russian stance toward the dividends. Since Iran’s nuclear Pyongyang. To the contrary, Moscow program kicked into high gear over has consistently counseled mod- the past half-decade, Moscow has eration towards North Korea, been offered nuclear reactors to no fewer very cautious about sanctions, and than 13 Arab states as part of its steadfastly argued for a resumption efforts to advance its economic, polit- of multilateral diplomacy despite ical, and strategic interests in the North Korea’s provocative nuclear

The Journal of International Security Affairs 19 Stephen Blank

and missile tests. Likewise, Moscow through diplomacy, which is used has steadily argued against mili- to avoid direct confrontation (and tary action, hinted that sanctions still better, to sustain normal relations) with new nuclear nations.31 might be lifted if the DPRK rejoined the talks, suggested that the IAEA Based upon this logic, Russia’s become involved with this issue, and response to Indo-Pakistani prolif- proclaimed its willingness to pro- eration has been similarly low-key. vide economic assistance.29 At the Instead, Russia regards vertical pro- root of these overtures is the belief, liferation (the qualitative improve- articulated by Moscow’s envoy to ment of systems within countries) South Korea, Gleb Ivashentsov, that with greater alarm than it does hori- the United States is to blame for the zontal proliferation (the diffusion of unstable situation on the Korean Pen- WMD and ballistic missile technol- insula, and that Pyongyang’s behav- ogy to a growing number of states). ior is the product of “ultimatums and Russia’s posture thus effectively is sanctions” on the part of the interna- the photo negative of that of America, tional community.30 which expresses greater alarm at Yet even here, Moscow sees horizontal proliferation than that of opportunity within adversity. Krem- the vertical variety.32 lin officials have made clear that they view the proliferation crisis in East Asia as generating a need for regional Proliferation by design and collective security institutions Clearly, as the foregoing sum- based on equal security—i.e., those mary suggests, and as Kremlin erected at the expense of U.S. lead- officials themselves have made abun- ership. In other words, while North dantly clear, Russia takes a more Korea represents a serious crisis utilitarian view of proliferation than threatening Russia’s Asian territory, does the U.S. While it now appears it also offers Russia a chance for gains prepared to go part of the way toward at Washington’s expense. a new arms control compact with The Korean example is not an Washington, Moscow is not likely anomaly. Rather, it fits perfectly with to support the decisive measures Alexei Arbatov’s 2008 depiction of needed to address the threats posed Russian thinking about proliferation. by both Iran and North Korea. To wit: To the contrary, Kremlin maneu- vers suggest strongly that Russia For Russia the acquisition of is attempting to preserve its part- nuclear weapons and ballistic nerships with both Pyongyang and missiles by India and Pakistan Tehran. There are even signs that and the prospects of further pro- Russia is trying to sell reactors to liferation are adding some new Pakistan, supposedly the greatest elements to a familiar and old proliferation threat that it perceives. threat, rather than creating a dramatic new one as is the case Needless to say, this is a very strange with the United States. The USSR posture indeed for a government that and Russia have learned to live supposedly opposes proliferation with this threat and to deal with and supports the objective of global it on the basis of nuclear deter- nuclear disarmament. rence, some limited defenses (like the Moscow BMD system and national Air Defenses) and

20 The Journal of International Security Affairs Nonproliferation, Russian Style

1. “U.S. Agrees to Press Russia’s Bid for 19. Vladimir Radyuhin, “The Russian Iranian WTO,” Moscow Times, April 29, 2010; Julian Road Map,” Chennai, The Hindu, July 27, Borger, “US and Russia to Propose Ban on 2010. WMD in Middle East,” Guardian (London), 20. John W. Parker, Persian Dreams: Moscow May 2, 2010. and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah (Wash- 2. “Russia Opposes Expansion of Nuclear ington: Potomac Books, 2009), xi. club—Medvedev,” RIA Novosti, Octo- 21. Ibid., 135, 146, 307-308. ber 9, 2009, http://www.en.beta.rian.ru/ 22. Ibidem; Stephen Blank, “Russia and Iran in russia/20091009/156406422.html. a New Middle East,” Mediterranean Quar- 3. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federa- terly III, no. 4, Fall 1992, 124-127. tion,” kremlin.ru, February 5, 2010. 23. Parker, Persian Dreams, 135, 146, 307-308. 4. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Global Security 24. Vremya Novostey (Moscow), September 11, Norms,” Washington Quarterly XXVII, no. 2, 2006. Spring 2004, 65. 25. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, 5. “Missiles Key to Counter U.S. Shield Interview to Turkish Media, www.mid.ru, Plans—Top Russian General,” RIA Novosti May 29, 2006. (Moscow), June 21, 2007. 26. “Medvedev’s Strong Words for North 6. Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” Korea,” BusinessWeek, June 3, 2009, 65-70. www.businessweek.com/magazine/con- 7. Quoted in Yuri E. Fedorov, “Russia’s Relations tent/09_24/b4135000777180.htm; “Rus- with the West,” in Bertil Nygren et al., eds., sia’s Medvedev Calls for Way to Deter N. Russia on Our Minds: Russian Security Policy Korea,” Reuters, June 3, 2009. and Northern Europe (Stockholm: Swedish 27. “RAI Interview with Russian President National Defense University, 2010), 13. Dmitry Medvedev,” www.realclearworld. 8. Alexei Arbatov, “Terms of Engagement: com, July 5, 2009, www.realclearworld. WMD Proliferation and US-Russian Rela- com/articles/2009/07/06/rai_interviews_ tions,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for medvedev_96880.html US-Russian Security Cooperation (Carlisle 28. “Russia Deploys S-400 Air Defense Sys- Barracks, Pa. Strategic Studies Institute, tems in Far East,” RIA Novosti (Moscow), U.S. Army War College, 2009), 147-149. August 26, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_ 9. Vladimir Putin, interview with the BBC, news/20090826/155930246.html. June 22, 2003. 29. See, for example, Jun Kee Baek, “Medve- 10. Ibid. dev’s Russia, a ‘Revisionist Power’ or an 11. Thomas E. Graham, “The Friend of My ‘Architect of a New World Order”? The Evo- Enemy,” The National Interest no. 95, May- lution of Ideational Factors and Its Cases,” June 2008, 36-37. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XXI, no. 12. Robert D. Blackwill, “The Three R’s: 4, December 2009, 477-481. Rivalry, Russia, and 'Ran,” Asia Times, Janu- 30. Gleb Ivashentsov, “Russia and the Republic of ary 10, 2008 Korea: New Horizons of Partnership,” Inter- 13. The White House, Office of the Press Secre- national Affairs (Moscow) no. 1, 2009, 88. tary, Press Briefing, July 6, 2009. 31. Arbatov, “Terms of Engagement: WMD Pro- 14. “Joint News Conference with US President liferation and US-Russian Relations,” 147-149. Barrack Obama,” www.kremlin.ru, April 8, 32. Ibid., 74-76. 2010. 15. Pavel Felgenhauer, “The ‘Unravelling Rela- tionship’ between Russia and Iran,” BBC News, July 24, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-10684110. 16. Konstantin Bogdanov, “Bushehr Power Plant: Russia Balances on the Edge of a Sword,” RIA Novosti (Moscow), August 23, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100823/160312619.html. 17. Ibid. 18. “Loopholes Opening in US, EU Sanctions on Iran”; Vladimir Socor, “Moscow-Tehran Oil and Gas Roadmap to Circumvent Sanc- tions on Iran,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 14, 2010.

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300-58150_JINSA_spring2010.indd 1 1/20/10 11:35:47 AM Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions

Joshua Pollack

he first indication that something unusual had happened in a remote corner of the Middle East was an item published on the Tafternoon of September 6, 2007, by Syria’s official state news agency. Israeli aircraft had infiltrated Syrian airspace early that morn- ing, it reported. According to a Syrian military spokesman, air defense units chased away planes that dropped “ammunition,” but did no damage.1 Israeli officials had little to say in reply. “I don’t know what you are talking about,” Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the press.2

It fell to an unexpected source to start spelling out the nature of events. In a message carried a few days later by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang condemned Israel for its “dangerous provocation,” denounced the “intrusion,” and extended “full support and solidarity” to the Syr- ians.3 Although it mostly mirrored the Syrian announcement, the North Korean statement contained some of the first accurate details about the incident, alleging that Israeli Air Force planes had dropped bombs in Syria’s northeastern desert. (The exact location and effects of the bombing were left unstated.) The North Korean condemnation also raised eyebrows for having been issued in the name of the Foreign Ministry—a distinction used by Pyongyang to call attention to more serious declarations. Within days, Western reporters had published multiple, conflicting rumors about the event, including allegations of a North Korean connection to a secret

Joshua Pollack is a consultant specializing in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. He writes a monthly column for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and is a regular contributor to the ArmsControlWonk blog. Joshua Pollack

nuclear program in Syria. When Syrian presentation with detailed photo- President Bashar al-Assad finally graphs of the facility, first while under acknowledged the destruction of a construction and then while being Syrian facility, he described the target demolished after the attack. Construc- as being of no real importance, simply tion had started in 2001; at the time a group of empty military buildings of its destruction in 2007, the officials still under construction. He also denied explained, the reactor was nearly com- interest in “any nuclear activity.”4 plete, but had not been fueled.7 But new reports soon began to Curiously, that may be where appear in the American news media the rest of the world is content to alleging that Israel, after lengthy leave matters. Despite having joined consultations with the United States, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had indeed attacked a North Korean- (NPT) as a non-weapons state in 1969, made nuclear facility in the desert. Syria has faced no identifiable penalty By late October, the website of ISIS, for its clandestine nuclear program a nonprofit organization based in other than the destruction of the reac- Washington, D.C., had published tor itself. By comparison, NPT viola- commercial satellite photographs of tions by North Korea and Iran have a box-like structure, tucked into a faced widespread condemnation and remote wadi (canyon) alongside the multiple rounds of international sanc- Euphrates River near the town of tions. Israel, which is not a member Dayr al-Zawr. The length and width of of the NPT, has faced increased pres- the “box” resembled the proportions sure to join the treaty. The Interna- of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where North Korea had produced which is charged with confirming plutonium for its first nuclear test the NPT member states’ compliance with previous year. nuclear safeguards, has not pursued Faced with these suspicions, an the Syrian matter aggressively, and anonymous Syrian official conceded has been hobbled by a lack of coopera- to American journalist Seymour tion from Damascus. Hersh that North Korean construc- Foreign governments have not tion workers had been at the scene of pressed the Syrians in public; the the bombing, which he described as United States was largely silent until its a manufacturing plant for “low tech” April 2008 presentation, and has added missiles. Another Syrian source little to it since then. At the time, a hinted to Hersh that the project senior administration official explained might have been related to chemi- the earlier secrecy as part of an effort to cal weapons.5 Earlier, Syrian officials avoid starting a war by painting Syria allegedly had told a Turkish delega- into a corner. Only once the danger had tion that the building had been a mis- “receded,” the official explained, was sile depot.6 it responsible to discuss the matter in In April 2008, American intelli- public.8 The Syrian government, for its gence officials finally confirmed the part, continues to deny the allegations. existence and destruction of a secret nuclear reactor built in Syria with WMD in Syrian strategy North Korean assistance, a project that The September 2007 incident may have begun as early as 1997, under provided a glimpse into the evolving the rule of late leader Hafez al-Assad. strategic logic of the world’s sole The officials released an audio-visual remaining Ba’athist state. Although

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions

Syria has rivalries with other Arab An early version of this policy was states and a history of disputes with unveiled at an Arab summit in 1974 Turkey, Syria’s central motive for by Bashar’s father and predecessor, acquiring weapons of mass destruc- Hafez al-Assad, who gave it the name tion (WMD) seems to be the need al-tawazun al-istratiji—“strategic to offset Israel’s conventional mili- parity” or “strategic balance.” Origi- tary power. nally, the idea referred to the achieve- This point is not always spelled ment of parity between Israel and the out by Syrian leaders, who often Arab states as a group, but as Egypt cite Israeli nuclear capabilities when withdrew from the confrontation and hinting at their own motives for pos- Iraq became embroiled in its war with sessing WMD. However, the record Iran, the elder Assad’s conception of shows Syria’s most fundamental parity became increasingly focused military requirements to be twofold: on the narrower Israeli-Syrian arena. counteracting Israel’s superior air Less obviously, Syria’s strategy power, and deterring any possible of deterrence against Israel also sup- advance into Syria by Israel Defense ports the regime’s survival against Forces (IDF) armored units. internal threats. Syria’s authoritar- The IDF overran the Golan ian government faces two major Heights during the 1967 Six-Day challenges at home, each of its own War and came within a short dis- making. First, although Syria has a tance of Damascus during the 1973 Sunni Muslim majority, the govern- Yom Kippur War. Accordingly, the ment has become the patrimony of Syrian military received its first SS-1 the Assad family, which belongs to “Scud-B” missiles from the Soviet the Alawite minority. Indeed, Syria Union in the mid-1970s. Syria also is almost as famous as Saddam Hus- imported Soviet SS-21 “Scarab” mis- sein’s Iraq for its repressive govern- siles shortly after the 1982 Lebanon ment and sectarian politics. Although War, when Syria lost dozens of Soviet- the country has not experienced a made fighter aircraft in a one-sided successful coup since Hafez al-Assad engagement with the Israeli Air seized power in 1970, the brutally Force, and IDF land forces plunged suppressed uprising by the Muslim deep into Lebanon, close to most of Brotherhood in the city of Hama in Syria’s major cities. the early 1980s underscores the basic It was presumably with these fragility of the regime’s position. experiences in mind that Bashar al- Second, Syria’s economy is stag- Assad once told an interviewer, “Yes- nant even by regional standards. terday’s situation is not today’s and I Despite some diversification of the do not believe any clever official in the economy in recent years, promises Zionist entity can ignore the essential of far-reaching reform, such as elimi- developments that have taken place nating price controls and ending the in the methods of confrontation, the preferential lending practices of state- most prominent of which is the ability controlled banks, have yet to material- to transfer the battle into the enemy’s ize. So long as statist policies provide territories.”9 Similarly, Foreign Min- the government with opportunities to ister Walid Moallem recently warned mollify the public and reward internal that any future war “will move to the allies, they are unlikely to be aban- Israeli cities,” a clear reference to doned, even if the economy as a whole Syria’s missile capabilities.10 continues to underperform.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 Joshua Pollack

A government that represents sought more advanced missiles from the interests of a small minority and China and Russia in the 1990s, but offers the rest neither freedom nor these suppliers proved more suscep- prosperity must still offer something; tible to American pressure than the in Damascus, that “something” is North Koreans. continuing to confront Israel long North Korea has also proven far after the other Arab states have quit more willing than other sellers to the arena. Carrying the banner of transfer the basis of an independent the Arab cause provides the Assads missile production capability to its cus- with a claim to regional leadership tomers, Syria included. Over the last greatly out of proportion to Syria’s decade, working with what the U.S. population, economy, or territory, intelligence community describes as and grants them popular legitimacy North Korean and Iranian assistance, that they would otherwise lack. It Syria has developed Scud-D missiles presumably dissipates some of the with a 700-kilometer-range, which pressure for economic liberaliza- allows missiles located deep inside tion, since a permanent war footing Syria to reach anywhere in Israel.12 explains and justifies a lack of pros- The Scud-D is reportedly accurate perity. Syria carries out this policy of enough to be useful against airfields confrontation rhetorically and mate- and other military targets, and not rially, by allying with Iran, hosting only against cities. This improvement most of the Palestinian “resistance” may contribute to Israeli concerns organizations (including Hamas) in about a possible transfer of Scuds Damascus, and channeling arms and from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The intelligence community Without the ability to deter Israel, also reports that Syria has produced Syria would find it impossible to sus- a chemical weapons stockpile, with tain such a belligerent posture with- air-dropped bombs, warheads for out courting more wars and defeats. artillery rockets, and warheads for Syria’s strategic deterrent has ballistic missiles.13 Syria’s chemical been built through a series of foreign arsenal allegedly has been produced partnerships beyond the Arab world. under the cover of the same civil- In the early 1980s, Syria came to see ian research center that is reported the USSR, which supplied it with mis- to oversee ballistic missile develop- siles and warplanes, as a more impor- ment, the Centre D’Etude et Recher- tant ally than the other Arab states. ché Scientifique (CERS). The Syrian But as the Soviet Union began to chemical arsenal appears to consist crumble in the late 1980s, the Syrians of sarin, mustard gas, and possibly were compelled to look further afield. VX nerve gas. Some of Syria’s Scud Starting in March 1991, Damascus missiles are reportedly armed with imported North Korean Scud-C mis- submunition-dispensing warheads siles, whose 500-kilometer-range can filled with sarin or other agents.14 reach any point in Israel from south- Although Syria is not a party to ern Syria.11 (These imports also pro- the Chemical Weapons Convention, it vided the option of striking Baghdad has wrapped a veil of secrecy around from western Syria, which may have its chemical weapons program, offer- seemed prudent after the “Wars of ing only oblique forms of public the Cities” between Iraq and Iran acknowledgment. While European during the late 1980s.) Syria also suppliers seem to have played more

26 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions important roles in selling Syria chem- prohibited by the Biological Weapons ical precursors and equipment suit- Convention. A hint of interest was also able for producing chemical-warfare dropped in the form of an article on agents, some sources claim that biological warfare that appeared in an North Korean experts have partici- Iranian military journal in late 1999 pated in the development of chemical under the name of Syrian Defense warheads for Syrian ballistic mis- Minister Mustafa Tlas. siles.15 Asked in early 2009 whether North Korea or Iran were involved Investigating Syria’s atom in Syria’s chemical weapons efforts, The sole organization with the President Assad responded with a authority to investigate undeclared non-denial, saying, “We work trust- nuclear facilities in NPT member ingly together with many countries states is the IAEA. But the nuclear on research programs.”16 watchdog played no such role in This aspect of the Damascus- Syria for the better part of a year Pyongyang relationship is opaque, after the Israeli air raid. The situa- and details tend to emerge only in tion was haunted by two previous fragments. A handful of reports in crises: first, the invasion of Iraq in late September 2007 described a fatal March 2003, when IAEA and UN accident at a Syrian military facility, inspectors were still working on ver- said to involve a Scud missile with ifying Iraq’s declaration of its past a chemical warhead, possibly with WMD activities; and second, the North Korean technicians present.17 long-running investigation of Iran’s These claims echoed a similar report nuclear program, which had failed to from May 2004 in the Japanese news- compel Iran to stop sensitive nuclear paper Sankei Shimbun. According to activities that had commenced under Sankei, a massive train explosion in cover of secrecy. Recalling Iraq, North Korea involved Syrian tech- IAEA Director-General Mohamed nicians from CERS, who had been ElBaradei feared a collapse of the transporting “large equipment.” nonproliferation regime if states North Korean military personnel in resorted to force based on privately protective suits allegedly removed held suspicions. The leaders of the debris from the section of the train United States, Israel, and other that had carried the Syrians and their states, meanwhile, feared that a pro- cargo.18 Less ominous but better tracted investigation would only give attested was a different interrupted Syria time to obfuscate and entrench transaction: four shipping containers its nuclear program. full of nuclear-biological-chemical On October 15, the IAEA Secre- protective suits in transit from North tariat announced that it had “no infor- Korea to Syria were seized in a South mation about any undeclared nuclear Korean port in 2009.19 facility in Syria,” declaring with evi- Seemingly the only WMD-based dent frustration that it “expects any rationale that Syrian officials have not country having information about offered for the building at Dayr al-Zawr nuclear-related activities in another would be biological warfare. Syria country to provide that information is not believed to possess biological to the IAEA.”20 And in a televised weapons, although the United States interview later that month, ElBaradei has alleged that Syria has engaged acknowledged being “very distressed” in “BW-related activities” of the sort about the air raid, “because we have

The Journal of International Security Affairs 27 Joshua Pollack a system. If countries have information to support this claim. Neverthe- tion that the country is working on a less, the inspectors were able to take nuclear-related program, they should samples of microscopic particles at come to us. We have the authority to the site, turning up traces of uranium. go out and investigate. But to bomb Confronted with the evidence in Octo- first and then ask questions later, I ber, the Syrians insisted that the traces think it undermines the system and must have come from Israeli weap- it doesn’t lead to any solution to any ons, alluding to the depleted uranium suspicion, because we are the eyes and munitions used by some militaries.24 ears of the international community.”21 However, the particles were chemi- Almost eight months after the cally processed natural uranium, not air raid, on April 24, 2008—the same depleted uranium.25 day that the U.S. intelligence com- The uranium traces proved to munity finally briefed Congress and be so plentiful that they could only the news media about the details of be explained by a substantial amount the Syrian reactor—the American of uranium at the site at the time of ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna the bombing, although there were not received an urgent cable instructing enough to indicate a fully fueled reac- him to brief the Director-General.22 tor. One plausible theory was that the In a later interview, ElBaradei called Syrians had brought a “test assem- the delay “unacceptable,” and again bly” to the site to ensure that the fuel lamented the use of force: “Of course, channels were properly configured. we could toss out everything in the Suspicions quickly arose that the way of collective security systems possible test assembly might have that we have built up since World been removed from the Yongbyon War II and say: Let’s go back to the complex and sent to Syria, but Sieg- Middle Ages and pull out our clubs. fried Hecker, a distinguished former This is a decision that must depend Director of Los Alamos National Lab- upon the international community of oratory who has visited Yongbyon on nations. I am horrified by how little multiple occasions, confirmed that protest the military action in Syria nothing was missing from Yongbyon has triggered.”23 as of February 2008. The processed Only at this point did the inves- uranium apparently had come from tigation commence. Because Syria somewhere else.26 has yet to sign an agreement giving Dayr al-Zawr was not the only safeguards inspectors wide-ranging site the IAEA had sought to visit. access (an “Additional Protocol”), the Through satellite photographs and IAEA began by seeking permission to “other information,” presumably visit locations not declared by Syria to meaning tips from foreign govern- be nuclear sites. On May 2, the IAEA ments, the IAEA had also identified sent a letter to Syria announcing its three other locations of interest in intent to dispatch inspectors from Syria and requested access to them Vienna. After a long delay, the Syrians in its letter of May 2. The Syrians consented to the visit, and the IAEA never responded to this request, but team arrived in Damascus on June 22. the IAEA did observe, based on sat- The group visited Dayr al-Zawr the ellite photographs, “that landscaping next day. The Syrians described it as activities and the removal of large a non-nuclear-related military facility, containers took place shortly after but refused to provide documenta- the Agency’s request for access.”27

28 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions

Stonewalled concerning unde- to support experiments in chemical clared sites beyond Dayr al-Zawr, conversion (for making fresh fuel) and denied plausible answers to its and reprocessing (for separating plu- questions about Syria’s suspicious tonium from irradiated fuel). acquisitions activities, the IAEA In March 2010, the IAEA under- intensified its scrutiny of Syria’s took a complete inventory of all ura- declared nuclear facilities. In August nium stored at MNSR. At this point, 2008, inspectors took samples at the Syrians acknowledged that they the small research reactor supplied had conducted previously undisclosed by China in the early 1990s. In May experiments in uranium conversion 2009, the results came back: traces and irradiation.31 Syria had been of chemically processed natural ura- secretly experimenting with some of nium were present in the “hot cells,” the technologies necessary for fueling equipment used for the safe handling a reactor and separating plutonium. of small amounts of irradiated mate- The IAEA’s work in exposing rial. It was increasingly apparent that Syria’s concealed nuclear activities Syria had obtained a uranium supply remains incomplete. For Director- that it had kept a secret. The location General ElBaradei, Damascus was of the traces also hinted at small- the aggrieved party, and was to be scale experiments with reprocessing. considered “innocent until proven Initially, the Syrian authorities guilty” even while it changed its explained that the hot cell uranium story and withheld cooperation from traces reflected the accumulation of safeguards inspectors. ElBaradei’s sample and reference material rou- successor, Yukia Amano, has not tinely used for scientific experiments, expressed similar views about Syria, and could also involve contamination but has continued to move cautiously. from a shielded transport container.28 The glacial pace of the international After this story fell through, the Syr- investigation has led to calls for the ians conceded that they had imported IAEA to invoke a “special inspec- small amounts of uranyl nitrate with- tion,” a rarely used tactic that would out declaring them to the IAEA, and legally oblige Syria to cooperate. The also mentioned domestically pro- IAEA’s reluctance to use this power duced “yellowcake” uranium as a has allowed the Syrians to block source of the traces.29 access to the three mystery sites and These admissions intensified the to prevent the IAEA from returning IAEA’s suspicions about what might to Dayr al-Zawr for a second look. The have been taking place at the three IAEA has also refrained from prepar- mystery sites, especially since Syria ing a formal finding of noncompli- had larger amounts of uranium to ance, which would place Syria on the work with; during a July 2004 visit docket of the UN Security Council. to a plant near the city of Homs that The risk of exercising these extracts uranium impurities from options is that they may provoke phosphoric acid, IAEA inspectors Syria to refuse all cooperation, and to had noted the presence of “some hun- threaten to exit the NPT—the strat- dreds of kilograms of yellowcake.”30 egy chosen by North Korea after This amount would not be sufficient to the IAEA’s invocation of the special fuel a Yongbyon-type reactor, which inspection authority in 1993. The requires about 50 tons of uranium, editor of a Syrian newspaper close but it would be more than enough to the government has even hinted

The Journal of International Security Affairs 29 Joshua Pollack at a replay of this scenario, asking Iran’s nuclear programme” between why Arab states should not consider 1998 and 2001; the Iranian side nuclear weapons of their own.32 Until has acknowledged that the trips recently, however, it has appeared occurred, but denied any relationship that no member states would urge to the nuclear program.36 Amano to initiate a special inspection. Although there is no conclu- By one account, official Washington sive evidence, it is possible that a considered Syria’s nuclear program connection exists between Syria’s to have been successfully disrupted, secret nuclear program, and a facility and preferred to avoid a confronta- established in 1999 in southern Iran tion.33 But after years of obstruction, to mine and mill uranium ore. The the mood has finally begun to shift. amount and whereabouts of the ura- In early August, the U.S. ambassador nium produced at Iran’s Gchine mine to the IAEA called for the Agency to are unknown, but its declared maxi- consider a special inspection.34 mum capacity runs to 21 tons a year, enough to produce a load of fresh fuel An Iranian connection? for the Dayr al-Zawr reactor every Questions still left unanswered two and a half years.37 include how far Syria had progressed There also may be connections toward uranium conversion and between Dayr al-Zawr, Gchine, and reprocessing, and who was giving a group of concealed nuclear and Damascus assistance in this area. missile research projects described North Korea is not the only potential in a set of Iranian documents appar- partner, or necessarily even the most ently passed to the IAEA by German desirable one: Iran also has experi- intelligence. The documents link the ence with these technologies, espe- company that established the Gchine cially uranium conversion. facility, called “Kimia Maadan,” to Connections between Iran and a secret uranium conversion effort the Syrian nuclear project have been called the Green Salt Project. Making asserted before, but not spelled out in green salt, also called uranium tetra- any detail. According to a report in fluoride, could serve more than one the German newsmagazine Der Spie- purpose, but it is a necessary step in gel, a high-ranking Iranian defector to manufacturing fuel for a Yongbyon- the United States revealed that Iran type reactor. The same set of docu- was “apparently funding a top-secret ments also describes weaponization nuclear project in Syria, launched research, including Fahkrizadeh’s in cooperation with the North Kore- reentry-vehicle project. All of the pro- ans,” about which he knew nothing grams mentioned in the documents more. Without mentioning a source, have what the IAEA calls “adminis- the same report also mentions a visit trative interconnections.”38 to Damascus in 2005 by Mohsen The Iranians have (unconvinc- Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, an Iranian ingly) denied the authenticity of engineer who appears to have been most of these documents, and even deeply involved in an effort to design if they are completely legitimate, it a missile re-entry vehicle suitable for does not guarantee that Gchine and a nuclear warhead.35 The IAEA has Green Salt are connected to Syria. questioned Iranian officials about Still, these puzzle pieces connect foreign travel by Fakhrizadeh “and well enough that the resulting pic- other people known to be involved in ture gives pause.

30 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions

Possible Syrian motives Etel Solingen concludes that attempt- Because Damascus continues ing to acquire nuclear weapons is in to deny the existence of the North fact the norm in the Middle East; for Korean-designed nuclear reactor Arab states, this pursuit appears moti- near Dayr al-Zawr and has curtailed vated primarily by a competition with its cooperation with the IAEA, no each other for regional leadership. authoritative account exists of the More generally, Solingen finds that Assad regime’s motives or decision nuclear-weapons programs tend to be to seek nuclear weapons. With due associated with inward-looking states caution and an appreciation for how with closed economies that need not much remains unknown, it is at least attend closely to the sensitivities of possible to describe some potential the international community.39 This Syrian motives for acquiring nuclear perspective would be consistent with weapons by examining the manner decades-long Syrian nuclear-weapons and timing by which Syria sought to ambitions that only neared success produce fissile material. after the appearance of one or more Four main possibilities emerge. foreign partners that were sufficiently First, Syria may have long sought capable, affordable, and immune from nuclear weapons as part of its pursuit of third-party pressures. regional leadership, but took decades A second possibility, a “rebal- to find the right partner (or partners) ancing” hypothesis, centers on the in North Korea (and potentially Iran disappearance of Syria’s nuclear- as well). Second, the Assad regime armed superpower ally. Syria effec- may have sought to compensate itself tively lost the backing of the USSR for the loss of its nuclear-armed super- by the time of Hafez al-Assad’s visit power ally, or for a perception that its to Moscow in April 1987, when Soviet chemical weapons arsenal had lost effi- President Mikhail Gorbachev asked cacy as a deterrent. Third, the Assads Syria to repay its debts, and report- may have seen the North Korean edly advised Assad to abandon the nuclear program as a successful adap- goal of strategic parity with Israel.40 tation to difficult circumstances, and Regardless of the exact timing, this decided to follow suit. Fourth, Syria turn of events may have inspired may have been hosting an “offshore” Assad to move ahead on his own with program jointly owned with North a nuclear-weapons program, or to Korea, Iran, or both. These possibili- redouble previous efforts. ties are not necessarily entirely mutu- Both the “supplier” and “rebal- ally exclusive: the truth could involve ancing” hypotheses leave at least elements of more than one of the ideas one key question unanswered: why, presented here. if Syria was so determined to pursue The first possibility that emerges nuclear weapons, would it have taken from this record—a “supplier” so long to move from the purchase of hypothesis—would involve a long- North Korean missiles, first delivered standing interest in nuclear weapons, in 1991, to the joint construction of a perhaps as old as Assad’s “strategic reactor, agreed upon in 1997? One parity” concept, that had only started potential answer involves the greater to come to fruition after the right sensitivity involved in a clandes- supplier came along. Based on an tine nuclear trade, which may have analysis of the nuclear histories of required time to build up trust. For Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, and Egypt, comparison, North Korea exported

The Journal of International Security Affairs 31 Joshua Pollack missiles to Pakistan in 1994, but does Korea’s nuclear program may even not appear to have shipped uranium have contributed to the successful hexafluoride—which Pakistan’s A.Q. transition of power from father to son Khan subsequently reshipped to in 1994. All of these advantages would Libya—until around 2000. have looked enviable to the Assads in Third is the “exemplar” hypoth- the mid-to-late 1990s. esis. It is possible that the North Fourth is the “offshore” hypoth- Koreans provided Syria not only with esis, which would credit North Korea nuclear technology, but with an exam- with much of the initiative for Dayr ple of how an isolated, authoritarian al-Zawr. Because North Korea had state with a weak economy could frozen its facilities at Yongbyon as survive in an American-dominated part of an agreement with the United international environment. The States, it might have had an interest Syrian regime faced a difficult situ- in resuming the production of pluto- ation in the 1990s, having just lost nium in some other, far distant loca- its main ally and arms supplier, and tion. Notably, the U.S.-North Korean having witnessed the abrupt end of Agreed Framework was negotiated in the authoritarian regimes of Eastern 1994 by the founder of North Korea, Europe, not to mention the alarming Kim Il Sung, who died later the same dissolution of a multi-confessional year. His son and successor, Kim state in Yugoslavia. Jong Il, does not seem to have cared The prospect of new sources for the Agreed Framework, and may of foreign aid may have encouraged have sought a way to evade it. Damascus to join the American-led A similar line of thinking could coalition assembled against Iraq in extend to Iran. From Tehran’s point 1990, and to participate in the regional of view, developing and transferring peace talks convened in Madrid in nuclear technologies to Syria, or 1991. These dramatic gestures took locating joint facilities there, unlike pressure off the Syrians, and helped any nuclear facility found in Iran, instill a perception in Western lead- would serve a valuable purpose: it ers that Syria, like Egypt in the late would backstop their own efforts 1970s, could be courted and brought with an alternative technology in an into the moderate camp through a unlikely location. Even if nuclear work peace treaty with Israel. But an exten- in Iran were to meet insurmountable sive process of American mediation technical hurdles or be detected and throughout the 1990s foundered in disrupted, the “offshore” program in the face of Syrian inflexibility. Syria could continue. North Korea also pursued negotiations in the 1990s, but its possession Is the program finished? of nuclear facilities and a small stock- To a greater or lesser extent, pile of plutonium strengthened its all four possibilities above involve a hand. Pyongyang was able to engage serious determination by Damascus with the United States as a counter- to make fissile material in secret. part, not just a mediator. It managed None is very reassuring. There is to extract aid from both Washington no obvious reason that the bombing and Seoul, simultaneously easing of Syria’s nearly completed reactor internal pressure for reform and would unravel its motivation to go providing the best available guaran- nuclear, especially given the lack of tee against external threats. North consequences for the first, thwarted

32 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tracing Syria’s Nuclear Ambitions attempt. After Israel bombed Iraq’s betray its partners, and make new reactor in 1981, the Iraqis switched arrangements for its security. But for to a harder-to-detect uranium- reasons already discussed here, this enrichment program; Syria could do scenario appears quite unlikely, and something similar. One question is Washington’s patience has started whether it has access to any uranium- to wane. At some point, perhaps not enrichment technology. very far in the future, Syria will face In a 2007 interview, Bashar al- a tougher, less forgiving stance from Assad claimed to have previously the international community. rejected an advance from Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, who sold gas centri- fuges for uranium enrichment to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, and also attempted to sell them to Iraq. According to Assad, “In early 2001, 1. “Air Defense Units Confront Israeli Air- craft over Syrian Airspace Forcing Them to someone brought a letter from a cer- Leave,” Syrian Arab News Agency, Septem- tain Khan. We did not know whether ber 6, 2007. the letter was genuine or a forgery 2. Yoav Stern and Mazal Mualem, “Israel Mum by the Israelis who wanted to lure us on Any IAF Entry into Syria Airspace,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), September 7, 2007. into a trap. We rejected it anyway. We 3. “Israel Condemned for Intrusion into Syr- were not interested in having nuclear ia’s Territorial Air,” Korean Central News weapons or a nuclear reactor. We Agency, September 11, 2007. never met with Khan.”41 4. “Full Text of the Interview Given by HE Dr. Bashar al-Assad, President of the Syrian Beyond general skepticism, Arab Republic, to Lyce Ducet of the BBC,” there is some reason to doubt Assad’s Syrian Arab News Agency, October 1, 2007. version of events. According to one 5. Seymour Hersh, “A Strike in the Dark,” New report, Khan traveled to Beirut in the Yorker, February 11, 2008. 6. Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper, “An mid-1990s to meet a senior Syrian Israeli Strike on Syria Kindles Debate in the official.42 It is possible that Khan U.S.,” New York Times, October 10, 2007. made multiple approaches to Damas- 7. Office of the Director of National Intelli- cus, first under Hafez, then under gence, “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Bashar. While there is no indication Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,” that any arrangements were con- April 24, 2008. cluded, the Syrians do appear more 8. Ibid. For comparison, see also Mark Mans- familiar with the Khan network than field, “A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden,” Studies in Intel- Bashar lets on. Syria was recently ligence 54, no. 2 (June 2010). named as one of seven countries said 9. “An Interview with Bashar al-Assad,” to be courting former members of the Middle East Media Research Institute Spe- Khan network. The list also includes cial Dispatch no. 244, July 23, 2001. 10. Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Minister Adds 43 Iran and North Korea. With Khan Heat to Exchange with Syria,” New York himself out of business, one or both Times, February 5, 2010. of these countries are Syria’s most 11. “Syrian Missile Milestones—1972-2005,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control likely partners for pursuing enrich- Risk Report 11, no. 5 (September-October ment technology. 2005); National Air and Space Intelligence For the United States and other Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile supporters of the nonproliferation Threat,” NASIC-1031-0985-09, 2009, 11, 13. 12. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for regime, the ideal outcome would be Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress for Syria to follow Libya’s path: to on the Acquisition of Technology Relat- come clean about its past activities, ing to Weapons of Mass Destruction and

The Journal of International Security Affairs 33 Joshua Pollack

Advanced Conventional Munitions, Cover- Republic,” GOV/2009/75, November 16, ing 1 January to 31 December 2009,” 7. 2009, 2. 13. Ibid. 30. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- 14. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria Profile: guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Chemical Overview,” September 2009. Republic,” GOV/2010/11, February 18, 15. M. Zuhair Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Bio- 2010, 3. logical Weapons: Assessing Capabilities 31. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- and Motivations,” Nonproliferation Review guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab 5, no. 1 (Fall 1997), 104-10; “Syria’s Chemi- Republic,” GOV/2010/29, May 31, 2010, 3. cal Weapons—1997,” Wisconsin Project 32. “Syrian Daily: Why Shouldn’t the Arabs on Nuclear Arms Control Risk Report 3, Have Nuclear Weapons?” Middle East no. 6 (November-December 1997); Dany Media Research Institute Special Dispatch Shoham, “Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria’s no. 2936, May 4, 2010. Ultimate Weapons,” Middle East Quarterly 33. Mark Hibbs, “The IAEA’s Agenda,” Car- 9, no. 3 (Summer 2002). negieEndowment.org, June 7, 2010. 16. “’Peace without Syria Is Unthinkable,’” Der 34. Adrian Croft, “IAEA Should Look at Manda- Spiegel (Hamburg), January 19, 2009. tory Syria inspection: U.S.,” Reuters, August 17. Markus Binder, “Explosion at Syrian Mili- 3, 2010. tary Facility: A Chemical Weapons Acci- 35. Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Story dent?” WMD Insights, November 2007. of ‘Operation Orchard,’” Der Spiegel (Ham- 18. “DPRK Train Explosion: Syrian Technicians burg), November 2, 2009. on Board,” Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), May 7, 36. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- 2004. guards Agreement and Relevant Provisions 19. “Seized NK Containers Had Chemical of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), Weapons Items,” Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), Octo- 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic ber 6, 2009. A handful of conventional arms Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/15, May 26, shipments from North Korea to Syria have 2008, Annex, A3. also been intercepted in recent years. 37. Jonathan Tirone, “Iran Raises Uranium 20. IAEA, “Recent Media Reports Concerning Output as Photos Show Need for Wider Syria,” Press Release 2007/18, October 15, Checks,” Bloomberg, November 4, 2009. 2007. 38. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- 21. Transcript of Interview with IAEA Direc- guards Agreement in the Islamic Republic tor General Mohamed ElBaradei, CNN Late of Iran,” GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006, Edition with Wolf Blitzer, October 28, 2007. 8; IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- 22. Gregory L. Schulte, “Investigating the guards Agreement and Relevant Provisions Rubble of Syria’s Secret Reactor,” Nonprolif- of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) eration Review 17, no. 2 (July 2010), 403-17, and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of at 404-05. Iran,” GOV/2008/4, February 22, 2008, 5-7, 23. “’If We Fail, Humanity’s Survival Will Be on 9-10; IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT the Line,’” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), June 11, Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provi- 2008. sions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 24. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/15, Republic,” GOV/2008/60, November 19, May 26, 2008, Annex, A1-2. 2008, 1-3. 39. Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrast- 25. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- ing Paths in East Asia and the Middle East guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Republic,” GOV/2009/09, February 19, 2007), 250-89. 2009, 2. 40. Michael Eisenstadt, “Arming for Peace? 26. Mark Hibbs, “US Expert: North Korea Syria’s Elusive Quest for ‘Strategic Parity,’” Didn’t Divert Safeguarded Fuel to Syrian Washington Institute for Near East Policy Reactor,” Nucleonics Week, December 18, Policy Paper no. 31, 1992, 34-35. 2008. 41. Christian Ultsch, “Assad: ‘Ohne die USA 27. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- geht gar nichts,’” Die Presse, December 18, guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab 2007. (Author’s translation.) Republic,” GOV/2008/60, November 19, 42. Peter Slevin, John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, 2008, 3. “At Least 7 Nations Tied to Pakistani Nuclear 28. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- Ring,” Washington Post, February 8, 2004. guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Repub- 43. Eli Lake, “Nuke-Smuggling Network in lic,” GOV/2009/56, August 28, 2009, 2-3. Demand: Agents Seek to Lure Group ‘Out of 29. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safe- Retirement,’” Washington Times, July 28, 2010. guards Agreement in the Syrian Arab

34 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tackling Pyongyang’s Proliferation Trade Carolyn Leddy

.S. administrations come and go, but nothing ever really changes with respect to American policy toward North UKorea. For decades, a static and risk averse U.S. approach has enabled the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang to endure. U.S. policy remains hostage to the faulty premise that the regime of “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il can be persuaded to voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons capability and forswear its illicit proliferation activities.

But such an assumption is deeply flawed. North Korea’s nuclear weapons provide the ultimate guarantee of survival for that decrepit and insular Stalin- ist regime. Moreover, there has never been any credible intelligence or tan- gible demonstration from Pyongyang that it is committed to denuclearization. Continuing to allow this flawed hypothesis to underpin American policy only serves to undermine U.S. national security, and to stymie our strategy on the Korean Peninsula. The United States must jettison once and for all the carrot and stick approach that has failed repeatedly to alter the Kim regime’s perception of the intrinsic value of its nuclear weapons program. There may not be a silver bullet solution for ending North Korea’s nuclear program and continued proliferation activities. But the absence of a foolproof strategy does not render the United States powerless to confront North Korea. To the contrary, the United States and the international community must commit themselves to a pragmatic strat-

Carolyn Leddy served in the administration of President George W. Bush from 2003-2007 at both the Department of State and as Director for Counterprolifer- ation Strategy on the National Security Council staff. In 2007, she participated in a U.S. delegation site survey of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility. Carolyn Leddy

egy that punishes North Korean bel- Korea and Iran have exchanged ligerence—one that protects against information on avionics, propulsion North Korean intransigence and pre- technology, and related materials for vents further proliferation activities ballistic missile development.3 by the regime in Pyongyang. Moreover, there are serious concerns regarding the extent of Pyongyang’s nuclear cooperation between the two proliferation habit countries. There have been uncon- It is common knowledge that firmed reports that Iranian officials were present during North Korea’s North Korea engages in a variety of 4 illicit activities, from counterfeiting first nuclear test in October 2006. U.S. currency to the production of imi- In addition, Iranian scientists were tation cigarettes, in order to generate said to be working alongside North hard currency for its cash-strapped Korean and Syrian technicians at regime. But it is North Korea’s sale of the al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria prior to its destruction by Israel in nuclear and ballistic missile technol- 5 ogy that poses the gravest threat to September 2007. international security. Iran is not North Korea’s only It should come as no surprise Middle Eastern client, however; that the Islamic Republic of Iran has Syria is another well-known con- emerged as one of North Korea’s best sumer of DPRK missile technology. customers. Pyongyang and Tehran Over the past two decades, Syria is have an extensive history of military suspected to have purchased nearly relations, including ballistic missile 100 Scud-C missiles from North assistance and cooperation dating Korea. And Syria is known to often back to the 1980s. Indeed, North serve as a transshipment point for Korean technical assistance has been missile technology bound for Iran instrumental in the development of from North Korea. In 2008, the Iran’s indigenous ballistic missile United States made public classified program, and Iran is suspected to information documenting years of have modeled its Shahab-3 missile on covert nuclear assistance provided by North Korea to Syria for the con- North Korea’s Nodong ballistic mis- 6 sile technology. struction of a nuclear facility. Photos Furthermore, North Korea and taken of the al Kibar facility in Syria Iran are suspected of having collabo- prior to its destruction reveal that rated on the development of North the facility closely resembled North Korea’s Taepodong-2 ballistic missile. Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility. Pyongyang is reported to have shared North Korean nuclear prolifera- test data with Tehran shortly after the tion, however, significantly predates Taepodong-2 test launch in 2006.1 Sev- its cooperation with Damascus. In eral North Korean entities have been 2004, uranium hexafluoride—the designated by the United States for feedstock for uranium enrichment— illicit proliferation activities, including was recovered in Libya after dicta- ballistic missile assistance to Iran.2 tor Muammar Qadhafi voluntarily And last year, Lieutenant General Pat- abandoned Libya’s nuclear program. rick O’Reilly, head of the Pentagon’s While the evidence remains inconclu- Missile Defense Agency (MDA), sive, there is some indication that the testified before Congress that North nuclear material recovered in Libya may have originated in North Korea.

36 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tackling Pyongyang’s Proliferation Trade

Then there is North Korea’s own bound for the Republic of Congo from nuclear potential. Pyongyang’s pluto- North Korea illustrates the methods nium program is well-known, and has employed by Pyongyang in an effort been documented extensively. But to evade United Nations sanctions: comparatively little is known about the manifest of the Congo-bound the extent of Pyongyang’s uranium shipment reportedly indicated that enrichment program, which North the cargo was loaded on a container in Korea admitted to the United States the Chinese port of Dalian; a French in 2002. Traces of highly enriched shipping company based in Malay- uranium were reportedly found on sia was used to transport the cargo; documents handed over by North the cargo manifest indicated that the Korea to the United States in 2008, contents of the shipping container raising considerable concern.7 For included spare parts for a bulldozer; good reason; the mastery of uranium and the illicit items were reportedly enrichment could provide North hidden among sacks of rice and other Korea not only with an alternative non-prohibited items. path to nuclear weapons, but also present Pyongyang with yet another The Obama administration has potentially lucrative proliferation revenue stream. And whereas the contended that the greatest Yongbyon-like nuclear facility under threat to the United States and construction in Syria was fairly visi- its allies is the proliferation of ble, the transfer of nuclear material or weapons of mass destruction. the construction of an underground uranium enrichment facility by But, like his predecessors, North Korea would be extremely President Obama has failed thus difficult, if not impossible, to detect. far to demonstrate the requisite Furthermore, North Korea has large deposits of naturally-occurring ura- political will to impose meaningful nium which could serve as a source consequences on Pyongyang for for other states, namely Iran, which its illicit proliferation activities. is reported to have limited deposits of uranium ore. The Congo shipment provides a In addition to its lucrative nuclear telling glimpse into how Pyongyang and ballistic missile sales, North carries out its nefarious business. Korea generates significant revenue North Korean entities and trading from the sale of conventional arma- companies routinely provide false ments. It is estimated that North Korea information on the origin and des- generates more than $1 billion a year tination of illicit cargo, including from exports of conventional arma- nuclear-related and ballistic missile ments, including small arms and light technology. Cargo manifests are fal- weapons.8 North Korea’s clients are sified routinely and prohibited items manifold, but African states deserve are concealed among legitimate special mention; Kenya, Ethiopia, goods such as household items. In Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa are addition, North Korea often employs all acknowledged past customers of multiple intermediaries and transit the Kim regime’s arms sales. companies in order to increase the The recent interdiction by South difficulty of identifying the point Africa of a shipment of tank parts of origin, tracking the movement,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 37 Carolyn Leddy

and locating the intended destina- the proliferation of weapons of mass tion of the cargo. Constantly wary destruction, particularly nuclear of international surveillance, North weapons and related materials. But, Korean entities and front companies like his predecessors, President routinely change names, phone and Obama has failed thus far to demon- fax numbers as well as office loca- strate the requisite political will to tions to evade detection. In addition, impose meaningful consequences on North Korea is suspected of using Pyongyang for its illicit proliferation air freight, including the national air- activities. And absent U.S. leadership, line—Air Koryo—to transport highly the international community will con- sensitive nuclear-related equipment tinue to fail to confront North Korea’s and ballistic missile technology. nuclear program with any serious- To facilitate these activities, ness of purpose or sense of urgency. Pyongyang has forged extensive For far too long, U.S. policy pre- links with criminal networks the scriptions have fallen short of ade- world over. Legitimate trading com- quately addressing North Korea’s panies and businesses are often used nuclear weapons program and illicit wittingly and unwittingly to conduct proliferation activities. The rhetoric illicit activities for the Kim regime. from Washington condemning North In recent years, the United Nations Korean acts of belligerence—from Development Program (UNDP) Pyongyang’s first nuclear test in office in North Korea was complicit October 2006 to its second nuclear in the procurement of sensitive tech- test in June 2009 to the recent tor- nology for Pyongyang. The UNDP pedo sinking of the South Korean office also provided access to hard naval vessel Cheonan—has been pre- currency to North Korean officials in dictably robust. But, time and time violation of UN procedures and was again, the strong condemnations of closed down by the UN in response North Korea’s nefarious activities fail to these revelations.9 to elicit a comparable policy response North Korea’s proliferation prac- from the United States and the inter- tices, and its customers, are relatively national community. well-documented. Yet the international The failure of U.S. policy to community continues to do the bare match its rhetoric in seriousness and minimum to confront North Korea’s resolve serves to weaken the credibil- proliferation activities. As a recently ity of American deterrent capabilities released United Nations sanctions against the Kim regime. Moreover, committee expert panel review reveals, it undermines U.S. nonproliferation North Korea continues to engage policy at a time when the interna- in illicit proliferation activities while tional community confronts a regime international implementation and in Tehran that is inching closer and enforcement of North Korean sanc- closer to attaining a nuclear weapons tions remains woefully inadequate.10 capability. The United States and the international community must con- New administration, sider carefully the choice of words same approach in confronting Pyongyang, because The Obama administration has these words reverberate in Tehran contended that the greatest threat too. And the failure to impose con- to the United States and its allies is sequences on North Korea for illicit proliferation activities is a powerful

38 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tackling Pyongyang’s Proliferation Trade signal to other would-be proliferators The incident exposes one of and nuclear aspirants that such activi- the fundamental flaws of U.S. policy ties will be tolerated by the interna- toward North Korea—the absence of tional community. U.S. political will and resilience to stay Arguably the most glaring case the course. The Bush administration of this policy confusion is the failure squandered an opportunity to send of the international community to a clear message to North Korea and punish North Korea for its nuclear other would-be proliferators by return- proliferation to Syria. In response ing tainted funds to the Kim regime in to North Korea’s first nuclear test in exchange for empty promises. October 2006, then-President George Writing last year in the Wall W. Bush issued a declaratory state- Street Journal, former Undersecre- ment condemning the nuclear test tary of State for Arms Control and and laying down a marker for North International Security Robert Joseph Korea regarding future nuclear pro- underscored the devastating effect liferation activities. But this declara- of the Bush administration’s retreat tory policy proved hollow when North from its North Korea defensive mea- Korea blatantly crossed the U.S. red sures strategy. “The spectacle of line by constructing a nuclear facility American diplomats pleading for in Syria and did not face meaningful foreign banks to facilitate the return consequences for it. of the assets from Macao, some of U.S. and international options for which were known to stem from the confronting North Korea’s nuclear North’s proliferation activities, could program are admittedly limited not have been more pathetic or, ironi- because of the delicate balance of cally, more damaging to the pros- security in East Asia. But the con- pects for diplomacy,” wrote Joseph.11 straints do not preclude all options. In Today, the Obama administra- fact, there are a number of tools at the tion should move expeditiously to disposal of the United States and the renew the fledgling international international community. One of the sanctions regime and reinvigorate most potent remains the multitude of defensive measures directed toward defensive and financial measures to North Korea. As the recent UN target illicit North Korean prolifera- expert panel report noted, sanctions tion activities. can have a significant impact on The full potential of defensive North Korean illicit activities.12 But measures to deter North Korea in order for them to do so, a renewed remains relatively untested. During commitment on the part of the inter- the Bush administration, the seizure national community to implement of $25 million in illicit North Korean and enforce such measures with funds in Macao’s Banco Delta Asia greater consistency is necessary. (BDA) served as an early effort at According to the UN report, North financial pressure, and a glimpse into Korea continues to engage in prolif- the potential effect such measures eration-related and other illicit activi- could have on the Kim regime. But ties in contravention of UN sanctions the Banco Delta Asia sanctions had resolutions.13 Moreover, experts have scarcely begun to take effect when found evidence indicating that North they were abruptly halted in favor of Korea continues to engage in nuclear diplomatic outreach via the Six-Party and ballistic missile-related activities Talks framework. with Iran, Syria and Burma.14 These

The Journal of International Security Affairs 39 Carolyn Leddy

revelations are a damning indictment Such an expansion of powers should of the failure of the international be buttressed by the recognition that, community—and particularly of U.S. whether or not North Korean revenue leadership—to ensure enforcement is linked directly to illicit prolifera- of sanctions on North Korea. The tion activities, every dollar generated results, as Israeli President Shimon by Pyongyang provides for the con- Peres recently noted, is that the tinued existence of the Kim regime. North Korean “duty-free” shop for Washington should also focus nuclear and ballistic missile technol- upon North Korea’s key political play- ogy remains open for business.15 ers. The Kim regime’s continued grasp on power is due in part to the Hitting Pyongyang loyalty of the country’s political and where it hurts military elite. To a certain extent, Kim A reinvigorated strategy must Jong Il sustains this loyalty by provid- begin with redoubled efforts to ing access to luxury goods such as target and expose states, entities, alcohol and electronics. Accordingly, and individuals providing both UNSCR 1718 prohibits the export of explicit and implicit support to North luxury goods to North Korea. But Korea’s proliferation activities. As there is ample evidence that—not- the UN report noted, the list of UN withstanding that prohibition—such designated entities and individu- commodities continue to flow to als involved in Pyongyang’s illicit Pyongyang, particularly across the activities is incomplete, and does not porous Chinese border. Many North capture the full inventory of known Korea watchers scoff at restricting facilitators.16 Nor is the breadth and this trade, and consequently have scope of the Kim regime’s vital rev- adopted a cavalier attitude regard- enue streams, such as the sale of ing its implementation and enforce- small arms and light weapons, encap- ment. Of course, stemming the flow sulated in UN sanctions under Secu- of luxury goods to North Korea is rity Council resolutions 1718 and unlikely to topple the regime. But 1874. Accordingly, the United States any effort to increase the difficulty may consider conditioning future or financial costs for Kim to acquire assistance to African states on their such items is an important element of discontinuation of military relation- a sound North Korea strategy. ships with North Korea, including The recent appointment of U.S. the purchase of conventional arma- State Department nonproliferation ments from Pyongyang. official Robert Einhorn to oversee Additionally, the United States North Korean and Iranian sanctions should target North Korean “Dear implementation is an encouraging Leader” Kim Jong Il’s personal signal that the Obama administra- finances and assets. The U.S. Trea- tion may have taken to heart some sury Department should be given of the lessons from the previous greater latitude to target global administration’s failure on the North financial institutions, entities, and Korean front. Still, it remains to be individuals that continue to provide seen whether Mr. Einhorn will have safe haven for the assets of the Kim the requisite support from the White regime—and by doing so, provide House and officials involved in North aid and comfort to the Stalinist state. Korea policy to pursue sanctions implementation and enforcement.

40 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tackling Pyongyang’s Proliferation Trade

Nonproliferation and counter- countries remains a primary tran- proliferation officials were largely sit route for UN prohibited items to sidelined from the development and North Korea. China, in other words, implementation of policy toward is in a key position to exert pressure North Korea during the latter part of on North Korea to change course. the George W. Bush administration. So far, the U.S. approach has been This marginalization resulted in an hampered by excessive deference to ineffective North Korea policy devoid Beijing’s concerns—deference in no of a strategic perspective and absent small measure bred by America’s own an appreciation for the broader deep (and unbalanced) trade relation- impact on the global nonproliferation ship with the PRC. But there may be regime. It is an error that must be a window of opportunity emerging corrected, since North Korea policy on that score; the international com- does not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, munity is growing increasingly frus- Iran’s continued defiance of the inter- trated with China’s reluctance to act national community in its pursuit of a as a “responsible stakeholder” for nuclear weapons capability is a sober- issues of global concern, even as its ing reminder of the global conse- international assertiveness continues quences of not holding proliferators to expand. If the United States can to account. reinvigorate international sanctions In this regard, no country looms against North Korea, the opportunity larger than China. There is near una- may present itself to compel China to nimity among North Korea watch- do more. ers that China is a key player in Undoubtedly, confronting Chi- efforts to denuclearize the Korean na’s North Korea policy is a com- Peninsula. But Beijing’s reticence to plex and uncertain task. But if the pressure the Kim regime remains a Obama administration seeks to seri- thorny and complex challenge for ously stem the proliferation ema- the United States. China’s reluctance nating from the North, it will need is understandable; it stems from the to ratchet up pressure on the PRC. fact that genuine pressure on Pyong- Consequently, it may be time for the yang could create a flood of refugees United States to review its diplomatic across the Chinese border—and strategy with China. In doing so, the heighten instability within China United States should consider impos- itself. In addition, Beijing remains ing consequences on China for con- wary of the impact a unified Korean tinued explicit and implicit support Peninsula is likely to have on its own for the regime in Pyongyang. More- strategic position in East Asia. over, the United States may consider In large part because of these putting Beijing on notice that it will be considerations, U.S. diplomatic held accountable for any negligence efforts thus far have failed to per- that results from North Korea’s pro- suade China of the gravity of the liferation of nuclear material to other threat to international security posed rogue states or terrorist groups. by North Korea’s nuclear weapons Time and time again the United and ballistic missile program. But States has allowed the latest provo- Beijing holds considerable lever- cation by Pyongyang—whether age over Pyongyang. China is North a nuclear test or ballistic missile Korea’s largest trading partner, and launch—to paralyze its policy efforts. the porous border between the two Moreover, American policymakers

The Journal of International Security Affairs 41 Carolyn Leddy remain reluctant to run the risk of http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/ antagonizing the Kim regime. So long pdf/ps_sasc_06162009.pdf. 2. Press Release, “Treasury Targets North as U.S. policy toward North Korea Korea’s Missile Proliferation Network,” U.S. continues to fail to apply and sustain Department of the Treasury, June 30, 2009, pressure consistently on Pyongyang, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ efforts to denuclearize the Korean tg191.htm. 3. O’Reilly, Testimony before the United States Peninsula will continue to be unsuc- Senate Armed Services Committee. cessful. And the global nonprolifera- 4. See, for example, Siegfried Hecker and tion regime will remain subject to the William Liou, “Dangerous Dealings: North whims of Pyongyang. Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran,” Arms Control Today, Washington’s approach must March 2007. start with Beijing, but it cannot end 5. “Iranian Scientists Worked at Syria’s Al there. Moving forward, the United Kibar,” Middle East Newsline, June 30, 2008, States must rebuild the tattered inter- http://www.menewsline.com/article-613- Iranian-Scientists-Worked-At-Syria.aspx. national consensus surrounding the 6. White House, Office of the Press Kim regime’s status as a pariah, and Secretary, “Statement by the Press reinforce the stigma of conducting Secretary,” April 24, 2008, http:// business with such an unscrupulous georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2008/04/20080424-14.html. regime. Doing so will require a patience 7. “Uranium Traces Reportedly Found on and force of will that the United States Papers from North Korea,” Los Angeles has been reluctant to display in its past Times, June 21, 2008, http://articles.lat- dealings with Pyongyang. imes.com/2008/jun/21/world/fg-korea21. 8. “FACTBOX—North Korea’s Arms Trade, The primary objective of U.S.- Sanctions,” Reuters, December 14, 2009, North Korea policy must remain the http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/news- denuclearization of the Korean Penin- desk/TOE5BD00Y.htm. sula. But pragmatism needs to dictate 9. As detailed in Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme the U.S. approach in coming months and of the United Nations Population Fund, and possibly years. Moreover, policy- “Draft Country Programme Document for makers must harbor realistic expec- the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tations regarding the potential impact (2011-2015),” June 21-July 2, 2010, http:// www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/060210_ of an enhanced defensive strategy. UNDPprogram.pdf. North Korea’s nuclear status is not 10. Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. Report Raises necessarily a fait accompli, and it is Concerns about North Korea Sanctions,” a fallacy to suggest that pursuing a Reuters, June 12, 2010, http://www.reuters. com/article/idUSTRE65B1B320100612. pragmatic strategy that punishes, 11. Robert Joseph, “How to Deal with a Dicta- protects against, and prevents fur- tor,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2009, http:// ther proliferation requires de facto online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB1 acceptance of a nuclear North Korea. 000142405297020445660457420821120452 7926.html. In the final analysis, the only fool- 12. Charbonneau, “U.N. Report Raises Con- hardy North Korea strategy is one cerns about North Korea Sanctions.” that continues to advocate the failed 13. Ibid. carrot-and-stick approach of the past 14. Justin McCurry, “North Korea ‘Is Exporting Nuclear Technology,’” Guardian (London), several decades. May 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2010/may/28/north-korea-exporting-nuclear-technology. 15. Greer Fay Cashman, “‘N. Korea Is Nuke Arms Duty-Free Store,’” Jerusalem Post, May 2, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/ 1. Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, Tes- Article.aspx?id=174479. timony before the United States Senate 16. McCurry, “North Korea ‘Is Exporting Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009, Nuclear Technology.’”

42 The Journal of International Security Affairs The NPT’s Challenge To Israel Emily B. Landau

alls for Israel to end its policy of nuclear ambiguity and join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty are certainly not new or Cunprecedented. Demands for the Jewish state to join the NPT have been voiced throughout the Middle East ever since the treaty came into force in 1970. Israel’s policy of ambiguity in the nuclear realm similarly has often been the target of complaints from Arab states. As long ago as the early 1990s, the convening of the Arms Con- trol and Regional Security (ACRS) working group as part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process created a formal framework for Arab states to increase pressure on Israel on the nuclear issue.

Over the past year, however, there has been a new peak in both the frequency and intensity of rhetoric intended to pressure Israel to join the NPT. This has emerged against the backdrop of efforts to prevent Iran from moving toward a military nuclear capability, and the idea that all Middle East states should be treated equally in the nuclear realm. This trend culminated in the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, or RevCon, which produced a final document that singled out Israel, and called for a conference on the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) for the region in two years.

A claim of double standards In both conceptual and practical terms, Israel’s policy of ambiguity and the

Dr. Emily B. Landau is Senior Research Associate and Director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), at Tel Aviv University. She teaches nuclear arms control at Tel Aviv and Haifa Universities. Emily B. Landau question of accession to the NPT are A major impetus for the greater actually two distinct issues. Ending attention that has been directed ambiguity relates solely to the ques- of late toward Israel’s ambiguous tion of Israel’s openness about its nuclear posture is the intensifying nuclear policy. As such, putting an international discussion over the end to this policy could simply mean best means for stopping Iran’s march that Israel would adopt an open, to the bomb. The argument that rather than secret, nuclear stance. has increasingly been made is quite Indeed, this is what the few advo- straightforward: why is so much cates of this position in the Israeli pressure directed at Iran when it public debate seem to be referring is not even a nuclear state, whereas to when they call for discontinuing nuclear Israel is allowed to escape an approach they claim isn’t fooling international scrutiny and pressure? anyone. Whether based on the belief Simply put, why is one state allowed that secrecy is something that should what another is denied? be shunned on moral grounds, or an At the official level, the most assessment that Israel could gain clear-cut statements in this vein more in practical terms by adopting are coming from three states in the an Indian/Pakistani approach, these Middle East: Egypt, Turkey, and of commentators aren’t advocating that course Iran itself. But the trend is Israel give up its nuclear option.1 creeping more and more into the But when similar calls come unofficial public debate in the West as from other states in the Middle well: in media commentary, at profes- East, the implication is very differ- sional conferences and meetings, and ent. Those demanding that Israel other unofficial forums. With the pros- increase transparency and end its so- pects for stopping Iran looking less called nuclear “deception” invariably and less favorable, it is not surprising couple this with a call for Israel to join that some attempts are being made to the NPT. Of course, the only way for divert attention in other directions, Israel (or any of the other states out- perhaps as a means of minimizing the side the treaty) to join the NPT is as sense of impending failure. a non-nuclear weapon state; therefore This shift of focus to Israel has the call for Israel to join the NPT is dovetailed over the past year with an necessarily a call for Israel to disarm additional development that has also itself of whatever nuclear capability encouraged greater attention to Isra- it is assumed to have. The conflation el’s assumed nuclear capability, albeit of the two conceptually distinct mes- inadvertently: U.S. President Barack sages underscores that the parties Obama’s nuclear disarmament voicing them have little interest in agenda. The new American approach transparency as such, nor are they to nuclear arms control—presented seeking a confidence-building mea- by Mr. Obama in April 2009, in a sure and/or a means to enhance the speech delivered in Prague—under- extent of Israel’s cooperation with scores an across-the-board nuclear the international community. Rather, disarmament logic, which has had they consider the removal of ambi- the side-effect of strengthening the guity a move that will significantly hand of those who would argue that boost their case that Israel must join Iran and Israel can and should be the NPT—and of course disarm.2 placed on equal footing in the nuclear realm, and vis-à-vis NPT obligations.

44 The Journal of International Security Affairs The NPT’s Challenge to Israel

Atomic inequality important normative values: “equality” The “equality norm” being pro- and the “right of self-defense.” With moted as the primary justification regard to the former, even though for increasing pressure on Israel the NPT enshrines a basic inequality deserves closer scrutiny. There are among states by defining two catego- good reasons to dismiss attempts to ries of members—nuclear and non- equate Israel and Iran in the nuclear nuclear—it nevertheless underscores realm. At the most basic level, Iran the equal obligation of all members to is a member of the NPT that took work toward the goal of a nuclear-free upon itself an obligation to remain world. Thus, alongside the commit- non-nuclear, whereas Israel made the ment of non-nuclear states to maintain choice to remain outside the treaty, their status, nuclear state parties also which it believes cannot address its pledged to work toward disarmament. unique security concerns. By leaving the identity of the state out- Moreover, Israel and Iran are side the boundaries of the treaty, and different in some very important focusing solely on nuclear weapons respects. They have vastly differ- as such, the NPT did not create any ent records of behavior toward their space for treating one differently from domestic populations, as well as another based on its commitment to in the regional and international nonproliferation and disarmament. spheres. The very fact that the focus But the rival norm inherent in is on nuclear weapons cannot justify the NPT alters this picture. To under- discounting these differences in favor stand the status of the “right of self- of a position that advocates treating defense” under the treaty, one must them as virtually identical entities. revisit the reasoning behind the initial These differences matter. decision to base it on two categories The argument for a differential of states. The question is why nuclear approach gains additional strength states were unwilling to immediately from the fact that Iran is specifically disarm, and why non-nuclear states threatening Israel in a manner that were compensated for remaining non- goes to the latter’s very existence as a nuclear—with the offer of cooperation legitimate state. Ignoring the fact that in the civil nuclear realm, a commit- there is no basis for conflict between ment on the part of nuclear states to the two states, territorial or other- work toward disarmament, and an wise, the Islamic Republic of Iran in exit clause from the treaty in case 1979 declared Israel its mortal enemy. their “supreme interests” were jeop- It proceeded to direct the most mali- ardized by “extraordinary events.” cious rhetoric toward Israel, including Henry Sokolski explains that this repeated denials of its right to exist. was because it was recognized and In fact, these threats underscore the accepted at the time the NPT was basic rationale for Israel’s nuclear formulated that nuclear weapons actu- deterrent: an insurance policy against ally have considerable strategic value. threats to its very existence. And because all states have an inher- Indeed, the grounds for challeng- ent right to self-defense, if a state was ing the idea of “equality,” and advocat- willing to compromise this right (by ing a differential approach to Israel agreeing not to pursue nuclear weap- and Iran, can actually be traced to the ons), it deserved to be compensated.3 conceptual roots of the NPT itself. At Thus security and self-defense its inception, the NPT legitimized two are implicitly recognized by the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 45 Emily B. Landau

NPT, and the right of self defense, support of the Arab states for putting especially when a state’s supreme more pressure on Iran. interests are jeopardized, consti- The full impact of the growing tutes a rival value to that of equality. insistence on a greater focus on Israel Over the years, however, equality culminated at the 2010 NPT RevCon, became the dominant norm in NPT with Egypt’s massive campaign to discourse, whereas the right of self- pressure the U.S. to accept its Middle defense—though implicitly upheld East agenda—one which placed spe- by the treaty’s provisions—was com- cific demands on Israel. Coming on pletely sidelined. Still, the enduring the heels of the “New START” agree- importance of the security value of ment between the U.S. and Russia, as nuclear weapons continues to be well as Washington’s much-publicized reflected in the behavior (if not the Nuclear Security Summit, it was clear rhetoric) of states. Brazil and Argen- that the Obama administration would tina, for example, both joined the accept nothing less than a proclaimed NPT only relatively late in the game success for the RevCon. The stage (Argentina in 1995 and Brazil in was set for political blackmail, which 1998), after they had resolved their was exactly what Egypt was count- political rivalry. Settling this facet of ing on. Cairo explicitly threatened to their relations was a necessary pre- block consensus on any decision at requisite for settling the question of the RevCon if its Middle East agenda their respective nuclear advances. focusing on Israel was not accepted. Obama himself, in the context of his The Egyptian threat to bring Prague disarmament speech, clari- close to 120 non-aligned states in line fied that while this was the vision, with its position presented a clear the U.S. still views nuclear weapons dilemma for the Obama administra- as vital to its national security for the tion. While not averse to asking Israel foreseeable future. for some indication of willingness to broach the nuclear issue, the admin- A corrosive quid pro quo istration strongly rejected Egypt’s For Israel, however, matters agenda aimed at forcing Israel’s hand have gotten increasingly complicated regarding its policy of ambiguity and over the past year. New and impor- membership in the NPT. But because tant evidence of the Iranian regime’s of its renewed commitment to disar- military nuclear intentions made the mament, it found itself trapped by the situation more and more acute, but a normative precepts of this approach. diplomatic solution remained elusive The equality norm was especially due to Iran’s continued rejection of strong within the framework of NPT U.S. (and broader “P5+1”) diplomatic discussions. This constrained Amer- overtures. At the same time, the ica’s ability to advance arguments Obama administration was express- about Israel’s unique security con- ing strong rhetorical support for the cerns in order to convince the Egyp- equality norm embedded in the NPT, tians to back down. Ultimately, the to the point that it advocated doing U.S. gave in to some (although not more to meet its own disarmament all) Egyptian demands, resulting in a commitments. The implicit message final document in which Israel alone to Israel was that it needed to make at was named, Iran was not mentioned, least some minimal concession in the and the idea of a conference on a nuclear realm in order to secure the WMDFZ in 2012 was included.

46 The Journal of International Security Affairs The NPT’s Challenge to Israel

But then something interesting security and to its policy of nuclear happened. Almost immediately after ambiguity are more important than the final document was adopted, offi- what appears in the final document. cial U.S. statements strongly attacked Here, it’s interesting to note that the the communiqué for doing what the Arab states take their cues from the U.S. had just hours before reluctantly U.S., and not necessarily in the manner agreed to: singling out Israel and fail- one might expect. The common ing to mention Iran. The White House wisdom of the Obama administration further clarified that the U.S. would had been that in order to increase the object to any steps that would endan- prospects for gathering a coalition of ger Israel’s security.4 It was as if the Arab states against Iran, Arab griev- administration were saying: “If we ances against Israel would have to be can’t challenge the Egyptians from addressed. Yet recent developments within the RevCon, then we’ll step give reason to believe that when the outside the conference and say what U.S. indicated a decrease in its com- we really think.” The message of sup- mitment toward Israel’s policies—and port to Israel, and the commitment adopted a harsher approach toward to uphold its policy of ambiguity in it—it may have been interpreted by the nuclear realm, was reiterated and Arab states as a green light to press significantly bolstered when Israeli Israel on nuclear matters. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Now that the U.S. has firmly met with President Obama in Wash- expressed its ongoing commitment ington in early July.5 Ultimately, the to Israel’s security and the means by “right of self-defense” norm seemed which to ensure it, Arab states might to carry the day. conclude that their message is likely to fall upon deaf ears, resulting in a Refocusing on Iran diminution of pressure. This would be In the final analysis, it would very much in line with the findings of probably be fair to say that the a study of Arab perceptions of Israel’s NPT—and its accompanying RevCon nuclear image which charted both documents—are what states make the content and frequency of Arab of them. And while the preceding reactions to Israel’s nuclear program analysis demonstrates the impact of from 1960 to the early 1990s.6 In that normative precepts on the behavior survey, there was a clear dynamic of states and the outcome of the con- according to which the nuclear ference, political positions and com- issue was purposely “played up” and mitments of strong actors hold more “played down” in correlation with sway—at least in the short to medium assessments about whether increas- term. So while Egypt was able to ing attention to Israel had a realistic make headway at the conference, it is chance of producing results. When the strength of the U.S. commitment it was judged that these efforts were to Israel that will determine whether unlikely to engender change, there its “success” translates into some- would be a noticeable decrease in thing more concrete down the road. the overall amount of statements and While NPT documents can and do commentary devoted to this issue. serve as precedents and as platforms More importantly, and some- for increasing pressure at future Rev- what paradoxically, it could be this Cons, at present the Obama adminis- dynamic—rather than the one tration’s firm commitment to Israel’s whereby the U.S. tries to appear

The Journal of International Security Affairs 47 Emily B. Landau more even-handed in its nuclear 1. Avner Cohen, for one, often targets the approach—that may stiffen Arab morality issue, whereas others point to the benefits of being an openly declared nuclear opposition to Iran’s nuclear advances, state, such as enhanced deterrence. For a col- and decrease the focus on Israel. lection of positions of Israeli analysts on this Indeed, in the weeks following the issue, see “Should Israel End Nuclear Ambi- NPT RevCon, there has been a guity?” Ynet, April 15, 2010, and Leslie Susser, “Israel’s Policy of Ambiguity Comes under noticeable increase in concern from Fire,” Jerusalem Post, May 26, 2010. See also Arab states, particularly those in Avner Cohen’s forthcoming book, The Worst- the Gulf, over the Iranian nuclear Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb program. This has included hints (Columbia University Press, October 2010). It is noteworthy that focusing solely on the of a willingness on the part of Saudi secrecy aspect of ambiguity risks ignoring Arabia to turn a blind eye to Israel more significant features of Israel’s nuclear using Saudi airspace in order to carry policy that are served by ambiguity: namely out military action against Iran, and the restraint and responsibility that Israel has exercised over the years in the nuclear a statement attributed to the UAE realm and that have become the hallmark of ambassador to the U.S. that military its nuclear deterrent posture. action against Iran would be prefer- 2. Official U.S. policy, of course, also calls on able to Iran gaining the bomb.7 While all states outside the NPT to join the treaty, including Israel. But this policy stems from these media reports were officially its position with regard to the treaty, and not denied by the states in question, they to any particular state. Indeed as far as Israel are in line with opinions expressed in particular is concerned, additional U.S. at unofficial levels in at least some of statements have clarified repeatedly that regional conditions in the Middle East would the Gulf states. Moreover, the UAE have to change dramatically before Israel immediately supported the fourth would be able to consider actually joining. round of UN sanctions against Iran, 3. Henry Sokolski, “Taking Proliferation Seri- and expressed its commitment to ously,” Policy Review 121, Oct-Dec 2003, 51-64. 4. See “Obama Slams NPT’s Israel Focus,” do more to adhere. Other reports Jerusalem Post, May 30, 2010. note an increased level of concern in 5. “Obama Backs Israel on Nuclear Confer- Egypt and Jordan as well.8 ence,” Agence France-Presse, July 6, 2010. But while pressure on Israel to 6. Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, Israel’s Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel’s join the NPT is highly unlikely to Nuclear Posture (Tel Aviv: Papyrus Publish- materialize, the same cannot be said ing House, 1994), 167-170 (Hebrew). about the idea for a conference on 7. For reference to Saudi Arabia, see: Hugh a WMDFZ in the Middle East.9 As Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia Gives Israel Clear Skies to Attack Iranian Nuclear Sites,” opposed to the NPT—which focuses Times of London, June 12, 2010; for the UAE solely on the weapons, underscor- ambassador’s remark, see Eli Lake, “UAE ing the equality norm—a regional Diplomat Mulls Hit on Iran’s Nukes,” Wash- process is where the hard realities ington Times, July 6, 2010. 8. On the UAE position re UN sanctions, see of inter-state relations in the Middle Samir Salama, “UAE Tightens Noose on East can be directly addressed by the Front Companies,” Gulf News, June 21, 2010. participating parties. Taking regional On the position of Egypt and Jordan, see realities into account in arms control Yaakov Katz, “Cairo, Amman Worried about Iran Nukes,” Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2010. efforts is the only way to advance 9. For some principles that should be applied more effective arrangements for the to this conference, see Emily B. Landau, “A Middle East. It is in this arena that Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Israel must focus its energies, and in the Middle East: Shaping the Contours of Discussion toward 2012,” Heinrich Boell concentrate its arms control efforts, Stiftung, July 6, 2010, http://www.boell.de/ in the years ahead. intlpolitics/security/middle-east-weapon- mass-destruction-free-zone-middle- east-9625.html.

48 The Journal of International Security Affairs Off to a Bad START

Keith Payne

erious students of strategic forces and deterrence know that the credibility of our forces for deterrence is dependent on their flexibility to pro- Svide a spectrum of deterrent options, and their resilience to adjust in a timely way to changes in the threat environment. The U.S. need for flexible and resilient strategic forces to deter enemies and assure allies credibly has been recognized for decades, and is the reason that Democratic and Republi- can administrations since the 1960s rejected the old “assured destruction” standard popularized by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in his day.

McNamara’s horrific yet rigid and finite threat of nuclear “assured destruction” was discarded specifically because it alone was deemed to be anincredible deterrent threat vis-à-vis many of the severe threats we and our allies faced, including limited nuclear threats. The basic U.S. and allied concern was that a U.S. “assured destruction” deterrent would leave the United States and allies vulnerable to attack because opponents would not actually believe that the United States would employ an “assured destruction” deterrent in response to any but the most severe nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Thus U.S. and allied governments agreed on the need for greater flexibility through multiple more limited deterrent options to help provide credible U.S. deterrence strategies to a spectrum of possible attacks. Virtually all major nuclear policy documents made public since the 1960s have emphasized this need for flexibility and multiple strategic force options.1

Dr. Keith B. Payne, President and Chairman of the National Institute for Public Policy and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is Professor and Head of Missouri State University’s graduate Department of Defense and Stra- tegic Studies, located in Fairfax, Virginia. This article is adapted from his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 27, 2010. Keith Payne

Strategic force flexibility is particu- the long term. Under New START, larly important today for credible would the combination of U.S. reduc- deterrence because the contempo- tions and possible Russian force rary threat environment can shift rap- deployments (with or without Rus- idly and in surprising ways. In one sian cheating) threaten the neces- crisis we may need one set of strategic sary flexibility and resilience of our capabilities to deter credibly, while in forces? After all, we cannot allow our another, a different set of strategic enthusiasm for quantitative nuclear capabilities may be necessary; assur- reductions to undermine our abil- ing allies credibly may necessitate still ity to credibly deter war and assure different types of strategic forces; and American allies. As the late Herman when an attack cannot be deterred, an Kahn often observed, “The objective altogether different set of forces may of nuclear-weapons policy should not be necessary to defend against it. be solely to decrease the number of weapons in the world, but to make the The material question is whether world safer—which is not necessarily the treaty is compatible with the same thing.”3 the continued force flexibility Drawing down American and resilience essential to the capabilities credibility of U.S. deterrence New START raises some con- strategies over the long term. cerns in this regard. For example, a recent Administration report on ver- If we want a credible deter- ification emphasizes that “any” Rus- rent to a spectrum of severe attacks, sian cheating “would have little effect including for example, nuclear and on the assured second-strike capabil- biological attacks on our allies, our ities of U.S. strategic forces...”4 This deterrence forces must have the quan- claim is ominous because it suggests tity and diversity necessary to be flex- that the Obama administration has ible and resilient. The 2009 report by resurrected “assured destruction”- the bipartisan Strategic Posture Com- type capabilities as the standard of mission, entitled America’s Strategic adequacy for U.S. strategic forces, Posture, emphasizes this contempo- and on that limited basis has deter- rary U.S. requirement given the cur- 2 mined that “any” Russian cheating rent, fluid threat environment. could have no serious effect on our Understanding this require- ability to deter or assure.5 This flies ment is the necessary starting point in the face of every Republican and for any review of New START, the Democratic administration since arms reduction agreement recently the 1960s and their proper conclu- finalized by the White House and sion that U.S. “assured destruction” Kremlin. Indeed, at New START’s capabilities alone are inadequate lower force levels, the need for flex- because they require little or none ibility and resilience in our remain- of the flexibility and resilience so ing forces becomes increasingly important for credible deterrence important. The material question is and assurance. Assured destruction whether the treaty is compatible with is a conveniently finite, undemand- the continued force flexibility and ing force standard; it imposes few resilience essential to the credibility requirements on U.S. offensive capa- of U.S. deterrence strategies over

50 The Journal of International Security Affairs Off to a Bad START bilities and none on U.S. defenses, New START, we would be mightily but it also undermines U.S. deter- constrained from doing so because of rence and assurance missions. The the treaty’s limits and its required 1:1 Administration’s celebratory claims trade-off with our nuclear forces. about New START verification that appear tied to some version of this Stretched to the limit old Cold War-type of measure are far In addition, New START’s force more troubling than reassuring. limits do not allow “more [capability] In addition, the treaty would than is needed” for deterrence under limit U.S. strategic force flexibility current planning.10 Leaving little or and resilience because it requires no such margin may be risky when sizeable reductions in the number force flexibility and diversity is nec- of U.S. strategic nuclear launchers, essary to deter and assure credibly and would limit some types of stra- across a range of threats. tegic conventional forces for prompt Senior U.S. military leaders global strike (PGS). Administration have noted in open testimony that officials have said, “The treaty does New START would indeed allow not constrain our ability to develop sufficient U.S. strategic force flexibil- and deploy non-nuclear prompt global ity.11 However, the analysis behind strike capabilities.”6 But in fact, this important conclusion report- New START would restrict deploy- edly was predicated on three key ment of any U.S. conventional PGS assumptions: 1) U.S. planning guid- options based on existing ICBMs ance for strategic forces would or sea-launched ballistic missiles. remain the same; 2) there would These would be limited under New be no requests for an increase in START’s ceiling of 700 deployed forces; and 3) Russia would be com- launchers.7 And, we would have to pliant with New START.12 reduce our strategic nuclear force But would the treaty allow suffi- launchers further below 700 on a 1:1 cient U.S. flexibility and resilience if basis for each of these conventional one or all of those optimistic starting PGS systems deployed. Such a substi- assumptions do not hold, as is plausi- tution in general, it should be noted, ble? For example, what if Russia again has understandably been rejected for decides to violate its treaty commit- deterrence purposes by senior U.S. ments? What if relations with China military leaders.8 and Russia return to a crisis pitch, Administration officials, though, and they express more severe nuclear have said that limiting these conven- threats to our allies or to us? What if tional PGS options in this fashion is Iranian deployment of nuclear weap- acceptable based on the assumption ons and missiles throws the entire that only a small number of such sys- Middle East into an unprecedented tems will be needed.9 Unfortunately, security crisis? What if the apparent there can be no certainty behind that nuclear nexus of Burma, Iran, North assumption given the many different Korea and Syria poses unprecedented and now-unknown threats that will threats to our allies or our forces arise in New START’s 10-15 year time abroad?13 U.S. planning and force frame. Perhaps the option of deploy- requirements might have to change ing many such conventional PGS sys- with any and all of these unwanted tems will be critical for deterrence, developments that could arise during assurance or defense. Yet, under New START’s tenure. What new

The Journal of International Security Affairs 51 Keith Payne

quantitative or qualitative strategic refuge in a return to old “assured force requirements might arise as a destruction”-type thinking. If our result for credible deterrence, assur- strategic forces are to be reduced fur- ance or defense, and would New ther, we also must take care to ensure START preserve the necessary U.S. that they also are modernized with force flexibility and resilience to the specific goal of maximizing their meet those requirements? These are flexibility and resilience at lower fundamental questions regarding the numbers—whether through tradi- treaty and international security. tional means or as a result of innova- tions. Past administrations have so balanced reductions with necessary New START neither requires real modernization programs, but this is a Russian reductions nor does it tall order to which the Obama admin- provide hard limits on a renewed istration has not yet committed. buildup of Russian strategic For example, bombers have great inherent flexibility and resil- nuclear forces. ience, and the weapons counting rules for bombers under New START More simply, will the U.S., at are extremely permissive. Yet, while least, develop and deploy the diverse Russia has decided to build a new strategic force structure that remains strategic bomber and apparently possible under the treaty and could has a new long-range air-launched help preserve U.S. force flexibility nuclear cruise missile near deploy- and resilience at lower levels? The ment,14 the Obama administration traditional U.S. triad of bombers, plans to cut U.S. nuclear-capable ICBMs, and sea-based missiles— bombers by more than one-third now buttressed by missile defenses under New START and has made and the potential for new non-nuclear no commitment to replace the ven- PGS capabilities—can be extremely erable B-52 or to build a new air- valuable in this regard because the launched cruise missile.15 Similarly, diversity of offensive and defensive the Administration has announced options helps provide the necessary that it will deMIRV U.S. ICBMs and basis for adjusting to a multitude of reduce the number of U.S. ICBM different threats and circumstances. launchers by at least 30 under New The Obama administration has START,16 while Russia is deploying expressed its intention to support the new MIRVed mobile ICBMs, and has triad, missile defense deployment, decided to move ahead with a new and conventional PGS, but at this heavy MIRVed ICBM as is now per- point it has made no apparent committed under New START. mitment to advanced conventional Over time, this New START- PGS deployment or to modernizing inspired combination of U.S. ICBM the aging ICBM and bomber legs of reductions and permitted Russian the triad, including the air-launched MIRVed heavy ICBMs could again cruise missile. This fosters concern challenge the survivability of U.S. that the Administration’s enthusiasm ICBMs, bombers, and missile- for force reductions may now come carrying submarines not on patrol— at the expense of the long-standing a situation long recognized as highly requirements for force diversity, “destabilizing.” And if the survivabil- flexibility, and resilience, and take ity of these U.S. forces is at risk, so

52 The Journal of International Security Affairs Off to a Bad START too will be much of the triad’s flexibil- slowly. Alexei Arbatov, the former ity and the corresponding credibility Deputy Chairman of the Duma of U.S. forces to deter and assure. Defense Committee, notes that “[t]he The Administration will need new treaty is an agreement on reduc- to make some hard commitments ing the American and not the Russian to U.S. force modernization if we [strategic nuclear forces]. In fact, the are to move forward with flexible latter will be reduced in any case and resilient offensive and defensive because of the mass removal from the capabilities at lower force levels. order of battle of obsolete arms and How much confidence can we have the one-at-a-time introduction of new that the Administration will take the systems.”18 Prior to the New START necessary strategic modernization negotiations, Russian open sources steps given its highest nuclear pri- already projected that by 2012 Rus- ority of nonproliferation and move- sian strategic nuclear forces could ment toward a nuclear-free world, its have as few as 406 launchers and commitment to further negotiations fewer than 1,500 accountable war- with Moscow, and its presumption heads—well below New START ceil- against any new nuclear warheads?17 ings using its counting rules.19 The A solid U.S. commitment to bomber point was made most succinctly by and cruise missile modernization, Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA Minuteman ICBM life extension and and Canada Institute in Moscow: “We ultimate replacement, and missile will not have to reduce anything pre- defenses of all ranges likewise could maturely. In effect, the ceilings estab- help provide this confidence. Indeed, lished by the new START Treaty do credible assurances and the neces- not force us to reduce currently avail- sary strategic modernization budgets able strategic offensive forces… Only should be the corresponding sine qua the United States will have to con- non of any acceptance of New START. duct reductions…”20 Russian defense expert Mikhail Barabanov again Disproportionate makes the same point: “The truth is, burden Russia’s nuclear arsenal is already at Concern about New START’s or even below the new ceilings. At impact on U.S. force flexibility and the time of the signing of the treaty, resilience—however modest or Russia had a total of just 640 strategic significant—might be eased if the delivery vehicles—only 571 of them treaty’s ceilings on Russian forces deployed... It therefore becomes actually would reduce the threats we evident that Russia needs no actual might face. But, according to numer- reductions to comply. If anything, it may need to bring some of its num- ous Russian open source accounts, 21 New START’s ceilings are of little bers up to the new limits, not down.” real consequence for Russia because In other words, New START’s Russia’s aged Cold War strategic common ceilings essentially appear launchers already have been reduced to require unilateral reductions by below New START’s ceilings, and will the United States. Russian officials decline further with or without the and analysts have long celebrated treaty—while Russia’s comprehen- this situation, while some U.S. officials and treaty proponents have sive post-Cold War nuclear modern- 22 ization programs are moving forward acknowledged it only recently. In this context, it is difficult to take seri-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 53 Keith Payne

ously the notion that the treaty’s sup- cial problems are causing reductions posed reductions for Russia justify its in Russia’s force numbers precipi- prospective limitations on U.S. flex- tously—with or without New START. ibility and resilience. But, Russia has committed to the Nor does the treaty provide solid comprehensive modernization of its barriers against the re-emergence of strategic forces; if and when it has Russian strategic forces. New START the necessary financial and produc- neither requires real Russian reduction capacity to realize this goal, New tions nor does it provide hard limits on START will not prevent Russia from a renewed buildup of Russian strategic deploying new forces well beyond the nuclear forces. That is because New treaty’s specified ceilings within the START contains sufficient loopholes terms of the treaty. and permissive counting rules to allow Russia to deploy far beyond the trea- New START and missile ty’s 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads defense ceiling within the terms of the treaty if Senior administration officials Russia finds the financial resources to have said about missile defense that do so. In fact, according to a report by “[t]here are no constraints of any kind RIA Novosti, the official news agency in the New START Treaty,”25 and that of the Russian Federation, Russia “[t]he treaty does nothing to con- could deploy 2,100 strategic actual strain missile defenses... there is no nuclear weapons under the treaty— limit or constraint on what the United well above the putative 1,550 warhead 23 States can do with its missile defense ceiling. There are avenues that would systems.”26 But such statements are allow Russia to deploy many more than simply false; New START contains even that number and remain within both explicit and implicit limitations the confines of the treaty. on U.S. missile defense options. Judg- This may be significant over time ments may differ regarding their because Russia’s highest defense significance, but there should be procurement priority is the compre- no further denials that New START hensive modernization of its strategic 24 includes them. nuclear forces. According to Russian For example, Article 5, para- open sources, Russia has a new stra- graph 3, of the treaty prohibits tegic air-launched nuclear cruise mis- the United States from converting sile near deployment, is MIRVing its ICBM or sea-based missile launch- new mobile ICBMs (the RS-24), and ers for missile defense purposes. has committed to deploy at least one The Administration has said that new strategic bomber, a new 5,000 this is not a significant limit on U.S. km-range submarine-launched cruise defenses because the United States missile, and a new heavy ICBM. There has no plans for such conversions.27 also has been interest expressed Yet, missile agency directors exam- in the Russian press in a new rail- ined such options in the past and mobile ICBM and a new air-launched have said publicly they found them ICBM—neither of which, according technically credible and of interest. to some Russian public commentary, New START—a treaty that is sup- would necessarily have to be counted posed to have no restrictions on mis- under the treaty’s force ceilings. sile defense—would now preclude At the moment, aging forces this option from the possible plans of and Russia’s production and finan- future administrations.

54 The Journal of International Security Affairs Off to a Bad START

U.S. missile defense options may consent, from the BCC’s potentially need to be protected, particularly secret proceedings. given Russia’s long-standing goal In sum, strategic force flexibility to veto American missile defenses, and resilience are key contributors to and the Administration’s apparent the credibility of our deterrence strat- commitment to further negotiations egies and assurance commitments to with the Kremlin. Here, Congress allies. This was true in the past and can play a key role; the Senate could is even more so today. New START direct the President to make more warrants our concern and close scru- clear to Russia that the United States tiny because its reductions and limi- recognizes no treaty limits on mis- tations will constrain flexibility and sile defense beyond those in Article resilience, even to include limitations 5, paragraph 3, and that the U.S. on U.S. conventional PGS and missile will not agree to any further negoti- defense options. The most important ated limits of any kind on its missile question regarding New START is defense options. whether U.S. forces in the future will In addition, New START estab- retain sufficient flexibility and resil- lishes the Bilateral Consultative ience to be credible for deterrence Commission (BCC) and gives it and assurance in conditions that are broad authority to “agree upon such less optimistic than those assumed additional measures as may be nec- by the Administration in its New essary to improve the viability and START analyses. Three key con- effectiveness of the Treaty.”28 Missile siderations in this regard are: 1) the defense is part of the subject matter treaty’s ceilings appear not to require of the treaty and its protocol, and real Russian nuclear force reductions the BCC is authorized specifically in the near term, and its loopholes to discuss the unique distinguishing and extreme permissiveness would features of missile defense launchers not prevent the resurgence of Russian and interceptors and make “viability strategic capabilities over time—the and effectiveness” changes in the beginning of which already is visible; treaty. These could be done in secret 2) enthusiasm for further reductions and without Senate advice and con- should not be permitted to inspire a sent.29 Such institutions are not sup- retreat to old “assured destruction”- posed to make substantive changes type planning measures that were in the terms of treaties. But, START inadequate during the Cold War and I’s Joint Compliance and Inspection are more so today; and, 3) the Obama Commission (JCIC) served with a administration has not committed more limited scope, and appears to to the modernization of U.S. strate- have made significant changes in gic forces necessary to ensure their START’s terms without Senate con- continued viability, flexibility, and sultation. This past precedent is not resilience at lower force levels. Such comforting. a commitment is critical with or with- The Senate might find it particu- out New START, but in its absence larly valuable to insist on continuous moving forward with New START and complete visibility into the ongo- could further undermine U.S. and ing workings of the BCC. This could allied security. be particularly helpful to ensure that no new limits on missile defense emerge, without Senate advice and

The Journal of International Security Affairs 55 Keith Payne

1. See Richard Nixon, National Security Deci- 15. White House, “Fact Sheet on the 1251 sion Memorandum-242: Policy for Planning Report,” May 13, 2010, www.whitehouse. the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, January gov/sites/default/files/New%20START%20 17, 1974 (Top Secret, declassified February section%201251%20fact%20sheet.pdf. 20, 1998). See also, Jimmy Carter, Presiden- 16. Ibid. tial Directive/NSC-59, July 25, 1980 (Top 17. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Secret, partially declassified August 20, Review Report, April 2010, vi; Miller, House 1996); Department of Defense Annual Report Armed Services Committee testimony, Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. April 15, 2010. Government Printing Office, 1981), 40. 18. “Russia: Arbatov Critique of Khramchikhin 2. America’s Strategic Posture: Final Report of Article on Poor State of RF Air Defense,” the Congressional Commission on the Strate- Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March gic Posture of the United States (Washington, 5, 2010. D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 19. See “Russia: Strategic Missile Troops 23, 24-26. Chief, Aide Cited on 25 December RS-24 3. “Herman Kahn Quotes,” BrainyQuote.com, Test Launch,” NEWSru.com, December 25, n.d., http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/ 2007. quotes/h/hermankahn224157.html. 20. Sergei Rogov, “Attempt Number 6: the Bal- 4. Unclassified potions of the report quoted ance of Achievements and Concessions. by Chairman Carl Levin, Senate Armed Only the United States Will Have to Reduce Services Committee, Hearing on the New Its Strategic Forces,” Nezavisimoye Voyen- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) noye Obozreniye, April 9, 2010, http://nvo. Implementation, July 20, 2010, CQ Congres- ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-09/1_snv.html. sional Transcript. 21. Mikhail Barabanov, “The Arms Non- 5. “Assured devastating second strike capa- Reduction Treaty,” Moscow Defense Brief no. bility” is the descriptor used by Dr. James 2 (2010), 2-3. Miller in his testimony before the Senate 22. See for example, Woolf, The New START Armed Services Committee on July 20, Treaty, 20. 2010. 23. Ilya Kramnuk, “New START Treaty Based 6. Ibid.; see also Department of State, Bureau on Mutual Russian-U.S. Concessions,” RIA of Verification, Compliance, and Implemen- Novosti, April 22, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/ tation, Fact Sheet, April 8, 2010, http://www. analysis/20100409/158499862.html. state.gov/t/vci/rls/139899.htm. 24. First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir 7. Under New START, the number of deployed Popovkin, as cited in Pavel Felgenhauer, U.S. strategic launchers will have to be “Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty reduced from today’s reported level of 880 on the US by Developing BMD,” RIA launchers to a ceiling of 700 deployed launch- Novosti, July 16, 2010. ers. Amy Woolf, The New START Treaty: 25. Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Testimony before Central Limits and Key Provisions (Washing- the House Armed Services Committee, ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2010, 19. June 18, 2010), 19. 26. Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Press Briefing, 8. Gen. Kevin Chilton, Testimony before the “New START Treaty and the Obama Admin- Senate Armed Services Committee, April istration’s Nonproliferation Agenda,” March 22, 2010. 29, 2010, www.state.gov/t/us/139205.htm. 9. Woolf, The New START Treaty, 17-18; James 27. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Miller, Testimony before the Senate Armed Testimony before the Senate Armed Ser- Services Committee, April 22, 2010. vices Committee, June 17, 2010. 10. Gen. Kevin Chilton, Testimony before the 28. New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 6, Sec. 1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June paragraph b. 16, 2010. 29. New START Treaty, Article XV, paragraph 2; 11. Chilton, Senate testimony, April 22, 2010. New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 6, Sec. 5. 12. Ibid. 13. For more, see the discussion in “Article Sees Serious Implications for India from Burma’s Purported Nuclear Plans,” The Tri- bune Online (Chandigarh), July 17, 2010. 14. See “Moscow Upgrades Strategic Bomber Fleet,” Air & Cosmos (Paris), January 8, 2010, 34-35; “Russian Military Pundits Con- sider Recent Missile Launches, Prospects,” Mayak Radio (Moscow), August 8, 2001.

56 The Journal of International Security Affairs Provocatively Weak

Peter Vincent Pry

n 2008, Congress established a bipartisan expert commission to help it understand the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Istrategic posture amid the growing thaw in relations between Moscow and Washington. Chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, colloquially known as the Strategic Posture Commission, delivered its report the following year, providing analysis and consensus recommendations on a wide range of issues vital to the future U.S. strategic posture, among them missile defense, the scientific-industrial nuclear weapons infrastructure, and defense against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.1

On one issue, however, the Commission remained conspicuously silent. The Commission had been specifically tasked by the Congress to include “force-on-force exchange modeling” as part of its analysis, in order to “calculate the effectiveness” of the U.S. deterrent “under various scenarios.” Yet, its final report contains no such analysis. No consensus could be reached among the Commissioners about the necessity or relevance of this classic means of evaluating the strategic nuclear balance, now that the Cold War is over.2

Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is President of EMPact America, Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, and served on the staffs of the Strategic Posture Commission, the EMP Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA. Peter Vincent Pry

This article is based on analysis nuclear war with U.S. ally Pakistan, performed for the Strategic Posture would be unpredictable, and could Commission, in fulfillment of that even conceivably pit New Delhi congressional requirement. While it against Washington. did not achieve the consensus sup- A well-rounded analysis should port necessary among the commis- include the present and future sioners for publication in their final nuclear capabilities to threaten U.S. report, the key findings of this analy- forces and population posed by these sis are offered here in the hope that countries and actors—as well as by members of the Congress and the Russia, with whom America is now general public may find the informa- attempting to forge a new strategic tion useful in evaluating the U.S. stra- understanding. Such an analysis tegic posture today—and the risks of would show that a disproportionately America’s new arms control treaty large amount of damage could be with Russia. inflicted on U.S. military forces, population, and industry by a very small Potential nuclear number of nuclear weapons—even by adversaries a single weapon. Perhaps because rig- The Cold War is over, and Russia orous analysis of potential adversary is no longer considered a threat to nuclear attack options has been out of the West officially—though many vogue since the end of the Cold War, experts are skeptical of this view. Nor most U.S. political leaders and the are China, North Korea, Iran, Paki- general public at large are unaware stan, and India officially regarded by that profound changes in U.S. stra- the United States as nuclear threats. tegic posture have greatly increased Nonetheless, this judgment is at its U.S. vulnerabilities. Awareness of core one based on political factors this reality may partially account for that could change rapidly. Moreover, the great enthusiasm in Russia and while the United States no longer China for modernizing their nuclear presently regards its relations with arsenals and, in North Korea and any state as so strained they could Iran, for acquiring nuclear weapons. spark nuclear confrontation or war, others do; Russian, Chinese, North The Cold War “window Korean, and Iranian political and mil- of vulnerability” itary leaders regularly and publicly In order to better understand advocate preparedness for conflict how the present U.S. strategic pos- with the United States.3 ture has become markedly more Nor is it hard to imagine cir- vulnerable since the Cold War, it cumstances under which Pakistan or may be useful to revisit U.S. strate- India’s nuclear weapons could imperil gic vulnerabilities that were of great the United States. Pakistan’s nuclear concern during the Cold War. More- arsenal could, as a result of a jihad- over, recounting these Cold War vul- ist coup or Taliban takeover, virtually nerabilities may be instructive, since overnight become a threat. For the many policymakers are unaware of moment, Pakistan’s regional rival, these nuclear threats faced by the India, seems impossibly removed United States. from ever becoming a threat to the Estimates of some possible Soviet United States, but its behavior in a nuclear threats—or attack options— supreme national crisis, such as a against U.S. strategic nuclear forces

58 The Journal of International Security Affairs Provocatively Weak were provided to Congress on Sep- the U.S. population made these Coun- tember 11, 1974, by then-Secretary terforce nuclear attacks credible. The of Defense James R. Schlesinger. The more limited the collateral damage, briefing was classified “Secret” but and the more effective the Counter- later sanitized and declassified.4 force attack, the less risky and more At that time, Defense Secretary credible the attack option. Schlesinger testified to Congress that Defense Secretary Schlesinger Moscow then had a range of limited described to the Senate some limited nuclear Counterforce options that it nuclear war scenarios that Moscow could threaten or execute against the could pursue that would destroy United States. Any and all of these vitally important elements of the U.S. Counterforce options, according to strategic deterrent, while limiting Defense Secretary Schlesinger, were U.S. civilian casualties to a very small more credible and more likely than an percentage of the total U.S. popula- all-out nuclear attack on the United tion. The Defense Secretary pre- States, which would guarantee an all- sented a number of tables and graphs out nuclear response from the U.S. in to support Department of Defense return. Limiting collateral damage to calculations.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 59 Peter Vincent Pry

According to Defense Depart- destroying the unalerted bomber force, ment calculations circa 1974, Moscow composing 75 percent of all U.S. stra- could make a limited nuclear attack tegic bombers. Such an attack would on U.S. ballistic missile submarine kill 300,000 people and produce total bases that would destroy U.S. sub- casualties, killed and injured, of about marines in port (about one-third 700,000. This was less than 0.004 of the of the American fleet). The attack total U.S. population. would limit collateral fatalities from Likewise, according to Defense all nuclear effects, including fall- Department calculations in 1974, out, to about 100,000 Americans, or Moscow could destroy one-third of less than 0.0005 of the total national U.S. submarines and three-quarters population at the time (212,600,000 of U.S. strategic bombers—which car- people in 1975). ried collectively more than two-thirds According to then-current Defense of all U.S. strategic nuclear weapons— Department calculations, Moscow could while inflicting just 400,000 deaths on make a nuclear attack limited to all 45 U.S. civilians, less than 0.002 of the U.S. strategic bomber bases, thereby U.S. total population.

60 The Journal of International Security Affairs Provocatively Weak

Moscow was also estimated to higher level, something on the order be able to make a nuclear attack lim- of 3 million,” according to Secretary ited to U.S. intercontinental ballistic Schlesinger. missiles (ICBMs), with the warheads The 1974 Schlesinger briefing airburst to minimize fallout, at a cost demonstrated that a Soviet Coun- of 800,000 American dead. Total terforce attack on all three legs of casualties, dead and injured, were the U.S. Triad—submarines in port, estimated at 1.5 million, about 0.007 bombers, and ICBMs—could be of the total national population. If the accomplished while limiting U.S. warheads were groundburst against civilian fatalities to about 1 to 3 mil- U.S. ICBMs to produce fallout “it lion, about one percent of the total would drive the number of fatali- national population. ties or casualties to a significantly

Today’s “window of much smaller and more vulnerable vulnerability” strategic posture. To wit: Today, Russia would be much Today, one-third of U.S. ballistic more effective than it could have been missile submarines (SSBNs)—those in 1974, both at destroying U.S. stra- normally in port while the others are tegic forces and in limiting collateral at sea—could be destroyed by attack- damage to the U.S. civilian popula- ing just two submarine bases (King’s tion. This is because of the increased Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washing- 5 effectiveness of Russian strategic ton). But today, as compared to 1974, forces, and because of America’s the capability to threaten or destroy

The Journal of International Security Affairs 61 Peter Vincent Pry

one-third of U.S. SSBNs would have this limited nuclear option against a much more crippling effect on the U.S. strategic bombers today. North U.S. nuclear deterrent, because a Korea, Iran, and India are develop- larger proportion of U.S. nuclear ing ICBMs that could perform such weapons and Counterforce capabili- an attack, which requires only three ties are now invested in submarines. warheads. China could easily carry out such In 1974, about 25 percent of U.S. a limited disarming strike against strategic bombers were maintained U.S. SSBNs today. North Korea, Iran, on strip alert, armed and ready to and India are developing ICBMs that take off on short notice. Today, how- could perform such an attack as well. ever, the U.S. is especially reliant on And today, North Korea, Iran or ter- strategic bombers like the B-2 to con- rorists are capable of attacking U.S. duct selective, surgical strikes that SSBNs in port by launching conven- are politically necessary in order to tional anti-ship missiles off a freighter. prosecute conventional conflicts or Unclassified overhead imagery is now “police actions.” Yet today U.S. strate- available on the Internet showing the gic bombers are not on alert, or even exact location of Ohio-class SSBNs at armed, and would therefore be totally their berths—information that could destroyed in a surprise attack. support geo-location for their precise Similarly, because strategic targeting by ballistic or non-nuclear bombers in 1974 were on strip alert, cruise missiles. they complicated an adversary’s first strike, making it difficult to attack bombers and ICBMs simultane- Perhaps because rigorous analysis ously. Today, because bombers are of potential adversary nuclear no longer maintained on alert, bomb- attack options has been out of ers, ICBMs and SSBNs in port can be vogue since the end of the Cold attacked simultaneously. In 1974, the Defense Depart- War, most U.S. political leaders ment postulated that Moscow would and the general public at large are attack 1,054 U.S. ICBM silos. Today, unaware that profound changes in the number of U.S. ICBM silos U.S. strategic posture have greatly has been reduced to 450. China may be tempted to acquire Coun- increased U.S. vulnerabilities. terforce capabilities against this much-diminished target set—one In 1974, the Defense Depart- that, under New START, is likely to ment postulated that Moscow would diminish still further. attack 45 strategic bomber bases. In 1974, U.S. strategic command Today, the number of U.S. strategic and control was much more robust bomber bases has been reduced to than it is today. Airborne Launch three (Minot, Barksdale, Whiteman Control Centers (ALCCs) provided AFBs).6 Defense Department calcu- redundant launch means for ICBMs. lations in 1974 showed that Moscow TACAMO (“Take Charge And Move could attack three U.S. strategic Out,” the acronym commonly used for bomber bases and limit collateral the E-6B strategic communications civilian casualties to about 10,000 platform) aircraft were widely dis- persons, using high-yield “dirty” persed and on strip alert to communi- bombs. China could easily manage cate an Emergency Action Message

62 The Journal of International Security Affairs Provocatively Weak

(EAM) from the President to subma- 500 Russian nuclear warheads could rines at sea. SSBNs cannot launch be used to destroy virtually all U.S. without an EAM. An Extremely Low strategic bombers, ICBMs, SSBNs Frequency (ELF) buried antenna in port, and critical command and supplemented TACAMO commu- control nodes necessary to execute nications with submarines. Today, SSBNs at sea, achieving an exchange ALCCs and ELF no longer exist, all ratio and operational outcome highly replaced by TACAMO aircraft. Today, favorable to Russia. TACAMO are almost entirely de- alerted and concentrated on a single Under New START, for the first base (Tinker AFB), where they could be mostly destroyed by a single war- time in the history of the U.S.- head. A single ICBM, in other words, Russian nuclear competition, U.S. would place the potential for a decapi- retaliatory capabilities following tating strike against U.S. strategic forces within the grasp of not only a Russian first strike will no Russia or China, but of North Korea, longer be able to achieve Assured Iran, India, or Pakistan as well. Destruction against Russia, Today, as compared to 1974, or offer robust Counterforce a Russian or other hostile nuclear planner has some unprecedented tar- capabilities. geting “bargains,” which are worth repeating for emphasis: Two war- Achieving such a Counterforce heads on SSBN ports could destroy capability, requiring 500 warheads, one-third of the strongest Triad leg. is not out of the question for China. Three warheads could wipe out the China would have to develop only 50 bomber leg of the strategic Triad. ICBMs like Russia’s SS-18 for the 500 One warhead could buy most of the warheads needed to pose a disarm- TACAMO aircraft, now a vital C3 link ing Counterforce threat against the for both ICBMs and SSBNs. Today United States. virtually all ICBMs can be destroyed Finally, the development of new using less than one-quarter the generation nuclear weapons, that number of warheads required in 1974. have no counterparts in the U.S. In other words, a hypothetical nuclear deterrent, could decisively Russian Counterforce attack against tilt the strategic nuclear balance any Triad leg, or against all U.S. stra- against the United States, render- tegic nuclear forces, would be much ing existing U.S. nuclear arms obso- more effective now, and result in far lete. Russia, according to their open fewer collateral civilian casualties source writings, has achieved a than projected in 1974. Today, esti- revolutionary technological advan- mating conservatively, Russia could tage over the United States in “third probably attack all three legs of generation” nuclear weapons. These the U.S. Triad at a cost of less than include “clean” neutron tactical 300,000 casualties, less than 0.001 nuclear warheads and “Super-EMP” (or less than 0.1 percent) of the U.S. weapons. The latter, according to total population.7 This represents, Russian claims, can generate a super- compared to 1974, a tenfold improve- energetic electromagnetic pulse over ment in Russia’s ability to limit col- the entire continental United States lateral casualties. Approximately that would destroy the electronics of

The Journal of International Security Affairs 63 Peter Vincent Pry all strategic forces and communica- have no equivalent in the United tions, and so win a nuclear war against States. Nor does the U.S. have Rus- the U.S. with a single weapon.8 sia’s thousands of hardened com- China, according to their open mand posts, including hundreds of source writings, also claims to have deep underground shelters, many “Super-EMP” weapons. If North virtually invulnerable to nuclear Korea also has or develops “Super- attack, that would allow hundreds of EMP” weapons, as alleged by some thousands of Russia’s political-mili- credible sources, Iran—the world’s tary elite to survive and enable their leading sponsor of international ter- nation to recover from a nuclear war. rorism—may not be far behind.9 During the Cold War, some U.S. military planners were so concerned that The dangers of New a Russian first strike and strategic START defense could so dangerously dimin- Under New START, for the first ish U.S. retaliatory capabilities that time in the history of the U.S.-Rus- the notion of “synergistic deterrence” sian nuclear competition, U.S. retalia- was introduced, where each Triad tory capabilities following a Russian leg was supposed to be indepen- first strike will no longer be able to dently capable of Assured Destruc- achieve Assured Destruction against tion. Today’s U.S. nuclear Triad is no Russia, or offer robust Counterforce longer sufficiently powerful to sup- capabilities. U.S. Assured Destruc- port “synergistic deterrence”; nor tion against Russia is equated with will it be able to support Assured a retaliatory capability, following a Destruction under the limitations Russian disarming attack, capable of imposed by New START. destroying 25 percent of Russia’s pop- Something like Assured ulation and 75 percent of its industry. Destruction, though “politically Cold War era calculations indicated incorrect” and not much publicly that U.S. Assured Destruction was discussed today, is still part of U.S. achievable against Russia with a sur- strategic thinking and military oper- viving retaliatory force of 400 equiv- ational planning. The 2009 U.S. Air alent megatons (EMTs).10 Despite Force Doctrine Document Nuclear the collapse of the Soviet Union, Operations still expects U.S. strate- 400 EMTs remains a valid Assured gic nuclear forces to have a surviv- Destruction criterion against Russia, able retaliatory reserve for intra-war because its population and industry deterrence and successful war ter- is dispersed over a much larger area mination: “The goal behind using than that of the United States. In con- nuclear weapons is to achieve U.S. trast, about 50 percent of the total political objectives and resolve a con- U.S. population and over 75 percent of flict on terms favorable to the U.S.... U.S. industry is concentrated in just Finally, the U.S. must maintain forces 50 urban-industrial areas, targetable in reserve which will continue to by fewer than 100 Russian EMTs. protect against coercion following a This asymmetry in urban- nuclear strike, convincing the adversary that further hostilities on its part industrial vulnerability, already 11 highly favorable to Russia, is made will be met by a swift response.” even more marked by Russia’s still During the Cold War, and today, extensive civil defense programs to the idea of Assured Destruction was protect the general population, which not actually to employ this capabil-

64 The Journal of International Security Affairs Provocatively Weak ity to destroy the adversary’s popu- the reserve for Assured Destruction, lation and industry. Rather, Assured would offer only about 375 warheads Destruction was intended to deter for Counterforce attacks—wholly nuclear war in the first place. Failing inadequate against the thousands of that, an Assured Destruction capa- military targets in Russia or China. bility held in reserve, it was hoped, 375 U.S. weapons would be vastly might contain a nuclear exchange overmatched for a nuclear exchange to Counterforce by deterring the with Russia, which after a first strike adversary from escalating to nuclear under New START would still have attacks on cities. over 1,000 strategic warheads and In fact, New START so dimin- thousands of tactical nuclear weap- ishes the numbers of U.S. strategic ons for additional attacks. weapons that, after a Russian disarming attack, all three legs of the U.S. Triad—ICBMs, bombers, and sub- The Congressionally mandated marines—will not collectively have Commission to Assess the enough surviving forces to muster Threat to the United States from 400 EMTs to threaten Assured Destruction against the aggressor, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) who may then contemplate a second Attack has warned that any wave of attacks against U.S. cities nuclear weapon could be used to to compel Washington to surrender. make an EMP attack against the Current thinking about New START seeks to preserve the U.S. Triad, but United States—with catastrophic this is not compatible with Assured consequences for U.S. critical Destruction, as ICBMs and bombers infrastructure that supports the are so vulnerable. Nor will abandon- economy and survival of the ing the Triad for a more survivable Dyad of bombers and submarines, national population. sharing equally the 1,550 warheads allowed under New START, salvage Yet all these calculations about Assured Destruction. A surprise Assured Destruction are rendered attack that wipes out the bombers obsolete by the proliferation of nuclear and submarines in port will still leave weapons to rogue states, which can the U.S. with fewer than 400 EMTs. achieve an Assured Destruction Even a Monad comprising only sub- capability against the United States marines, the most survivable plat- by means of an electromagnetic pulse form, even if all submarines survive a (EMP) attack. surprise attack, will still fall short of The Congressionally mandated the 400 EMTs for Assured Destruc- Commission to Assess the Threat to tion if all are armed with the W76 the United States from Electromag- 100-kiloton warhead. Only a Monad of netic Pulse (EMP) Attack has warned submarines, all armed with the W88 that any nuclear weapon could be 475-kiloton warhead, could suffer used to make an EMP attack against the loss of submarines at port, and the United States—with catastrophic still offer a strategic reserve of 400 consequences for U.S. critical infra- EMTs for Assured Destruction and structure that supports the economy intra-war deterrence. However, this and survival of the national popula- submarine Monad, above and beyond tion.12 Electronic systems are indis-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 65 Peter Vincent Pry pensable and increasingly vital to Russian aggression on its periph- the operation of the national critical ery, like its recent war with Georgia, infrastructure—electric power, com- may in the future be aimed at bigger munications, transportation, banking game, and go so badly that Moscow and finance, food and water—that may resort to tactical nuclear strikes sustains modern civilization and the to extricate itself, rapidly escalat- lives of the American people. An ing to the strategic level. So a local EMP attack could destroy the critical or regional conflict could inadver- infrastructure that is indispensable tently lead to a confrontation between to the existence of the United States, Russia and the United States, in a perhaps beyond recovery. During nuclear replay of World War I. China, the Cold War, the United States North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and India estimated that an adversary threat all have local potential nuclear flash- of Assured Destruction against the points—for example, in Taiwan, South U.S. population and industry would Korea, Iraq, and Kashmir—that could require large numbers of warheads. escalate in unpredictable ways. Today, any nation or group armed with In a nuclear replay of World a single nuclear missile can threaten War II, Moscow might gamble on a or carry out an EMP attack against the cosmic roll of the dice to reverse the United States that is essentially equiv- verdict of the Cold War, by launch- alent to Assured Destruction of U.S. ing a surprise nuclear attack to crush population and industry, with all the the United States, and thereby domi- diplomatic and strategic leverage that nate the world. China, North Korea, capability implies. or Iran could be similarly motivated for lesser goals, such as regional Why worry about dominance, that might satisfy their nuclear war? highest aspirations. Nor should ven- Why would Russia or any state geance by collapsing states, such as attack the United States? Miscal- North Korea or Iran should their own culation may be the most likely policies lead to self-destruction, be cause. Moscow’s political and mili- underestimated as a motive for war, tary elites still often think in Cold even nuclear war, if the means and War terms, perceive the United opportunity present themselves. States as a threat, and may overre- Hopefully, these scenarios and act catastrophically to some U.S. or the nuclear arithmetic that could allied action, even a perfectly inno- make them possible will never matter. cent one. For example, the Russian But no one can foresee the future. nuclear alert on January 25, 1995, These scenarios and the nuclear bal- in mistaken response to Norway’s ance could matter very much to Con- launch of a meteorological rocket, gress and the President someday, is probably the closest Moscow has and perhaps soon. ever come, closer even than the Cuban missile crisis, to launching What is to be done? a nuclear strike.13 Elites in China, None of this is to argue against North Korea, and Iran, for different ratification of New START under reasons and from different perspec- any circumstances. New START tives, share Russia’s suspicious view can become a boon to U.S. national of the United States. All states are security if hearings on the Treaty capable of miscalculation. in Congress can begin rebuilding a

66 The Journal of International Security Affairs Provocatively Weak bipartisan strategic consensus and rent U.S. unpreparedness, the United become a launching pad for initia- States might never recover from an tives, supplemental to New START, to EMP attack. correct the vulnerabilities in the U.S. To its credit, the Department strategic posture described here. of Defense is beginning to take If the bipartisan strategic con- some steps to protect U.S. military sensus that prevailed in the Cold War forces from EMP by reintroducing were still functioning today, solu- EMP hardening requirements for tions to the problems described here some select communications links would include the following: 1) Build- and forces. But few EMP experts ing up U.S. nuclear forces to cancel agree that DOD is doing enough, Russia’s overall advantage in num- or moving fast enough to counter bers of nuclear weapons, in order to the emerging EMP threats. In Con- negotiate a ban or equal reductions gress, meanwhile, liberal Democrats in tactical nuclear weapons; 2) U.S. and conservative Republicans have development and deployment of new- made common cause to protect the generation nuclear weapons, in order critical civilian infrastructure from to negotiate a ban or equal reductions EMP, including through HR 5026, in such weapons; and 3) Increasing “The Grid Reliability and Infrastruc- the survivability of U.S. strategic ture Defense Act,” which passed forces, so they can fulfill Assured the House unanimously, but is now Destruction and robust Counterforce stalled in the Senate Committee on missions, by returning strategic Energy and Natural Resources. bombers to strip alert and dispersed HR 5026, the GRID Act, is per- basing, and protecting strategic haps emblematic of these strange forces with missile defenses. and dangerous times, made more But that strategic consensus dangerous by the obsolete strate- no longer exists, even within the gic thinking represented by New Republican Party. Most of the vulner- START. The little known GRID Act abilities in the U.S. strategic posture is far more important to U.S. national began and worsened when Republi- security than New START. To a very cans controlled the presidency and large extent, national security against both houses of Congress. EMP attack rests, not in the hands of Yet strategic consensus within the august Senate Committees on the United States may be achiev- Foreign Relations and Armed Ser- able on at least one crucial point— vices but, oddly, in the lesser known protecting U.S. military forces and Committee on Energy and Natural critical civilian infrastructure against Resources, whose staff rarely thinks nuclear EMP attack. EMP is the about nuclear strategy. single most worrisome nuclear chal- The most dangerous times and lenge facing the United States today. the most dangerous threats are those Terrorists or rogue states armed with that demand for security a radical a single nuclear missile could inflict paradigm shift in thinking strategi- an EMP catastrophe on the United cally and in acting institutionally, as States that, given our current state is the case with EMP. Let us hope of unpreparedness, would kill two- that Congress—and the U.S. govern- thirds of the U.S. population within ment at large—is up to the challenge. the year through starvation, disease, and societal breakdown. Given cur-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 67 Peter Vincent Pry

1. America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report see Vladimir Belous, “Characteristics and of the Congressional Commission on the Stra- Missions of Modern Neutron Weapons,” tegic Posture of the United States (Washing- Yadernyy Kontrol (Moscow) no. 3 (May- ton, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 1999); Viktor Mikhaylov, “Russia’s 2009). Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Vek 2. Ibid. 115; see also: National Defense Authori- (Moscow), February 20-26, 1998; Schnei- zation Act for FY 2008, Public Law 110-181, der, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Sec. 1062, paragraph (e), (3). Russian Federation. 3. See for example, Nikolay Poroskov, “NATO’s 9. Kim Min-seok and Yoo Jee-ho, “Military Eastward Expansion Prompting Review of Source Warns of North’s EMP Bomb,” Joong- Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Vremya Novostey Ang Daily (Seoul), September 2, 2009. For (Moscow), July 7, 2004; Mark Schneider, more on interest in nuclear EMP attack and The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Rus- work on “Super-EMP” weapons in Russia, sian Federation (Fairfax, Va. United States China, and North Korea, see the author’s Nuclear Strategy Forum, National Insti- testimony and statement for the record on tute Press, 2006); Department of Defense, behalf of the EMP Commission submitted Annual Report to the Congress: The Military to the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005 Technology and Homeland Security, March (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 9, 2005. 2005); Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces 10. An “equivalent megaton” (EMT) is a mea- and Doctrine of the People’s Republic of China sure of the area that a nuclear weapon can (Fairfax, Va. United States Nuclear Strategy destroy by subjecting all targets in the area Forum, National Institute Press, November to at least 5 psi of blast overpressure, which 2007); Cynthia E. Ayers, “Ahmadinejad’s will severely damage or destroy most build- Dangerous Worldview: A Nightmare Sce- ings and people. One EMT will cover an area nario,” Proteus Futures Digest (Carlisle Bar- of about 58 square miles with 5 psi overpres- racks, Pa. National Intelligence University sure. See Peter Vincent Pry, The Strategic and U.S. Army War College, 2007); A Trea- Nuclear Balance: And Why It Matters (New tise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of York and London: Crane Russak, 1990), 187- Mass Destruction against Infidels (Fairfax, 189. Va. United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, 11. U.S. Air Force, Nuclear Operations: Air National Institute Press, September 2008). Force Doctrine Document 2-12 (May 7, 4. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, 2009—UNCLASSIFIED), 9. Hearing before the Senate Committee on 12. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms to the United States from Electromagnetic Control, International Law and Organiza- Pulse (EMP) Attack, Volume 1: Executive tion, September 11, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Report (Washington, D.C.: 2004); Report of U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), the Commission to Assess the Threat to the sanitized and declassified January 10, 1975. United States from Electromagnetic Pulse 5. Normally on a daily basis, when U.S. ballis- (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastruc- tic missile submarines are not generated, a ture (Washington, D.C.: April 2008). Reports surprise attack would find about one-third by the Strategic Posture Commission (2009) of the submarines at port while two-thirds and the Department of Energy (2010) inde- are at sea (one third in transit and one third pendently confirm the EMP Commission’s on station). warning that rogue states and terrorists 6. A useful source for the current numbers could make a catastrophic EMP attack on and status of U.S. strategic forces is Amy E. the United States. See America’s Strategic Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Back- Posture, 90-91; U.S. Department of Energy ground, Developments, and Issues (Washing- and North American Electric Reliability ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Corporation, High-Impact Low-Frequency January 20, 2010). Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power 7. 300,000 casualties, killed and System (Washington, D.C.: DOE and NERC, injured—200,000 from attacking 450 June 2010), 77-89. ICBMs and C3, 90,000 from attacking three 13. Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Russia and SSBN bases, and 10,000 from attacking America on the Nuclear Brink (London: three bomber bases. Praeger, 1999), Part V. For another example 8. See Aleksey Vaschenko, “Russia: Nuclear of nuclear miscalculation by Moscow, see Response to America Possible Using Super- Ben B. Fisher, A Cold War Conundrum: The EMP Factor,” Zavtra (Moscow), November 1983 Soviet War Scare, CSI 97-10002 (Lang- 1, 2006. For some other examples of Russian ley, Va. CIA Center for the Study of Intelli- commentary on advanced nuclear weapons, gence, September 1997).

68 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Last Line of Defense

Henry Cooper & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

or years, conventional wisdom had it that missile defense and counterproliferation were at odds with one another. According to this flawed Flogic, the deployment of missile defenses would lead to the development and deployment of greater numbers of increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles designed to penetrate them, resulting in an ever-escalating arms race. Conversely, the more flimsy the defense, the lower the offense.

But the conventional wisdom was dubious at best. If anything, the Cold War experience proved the converse was true in the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms competition. If offensive strategic arms had been sharply limited in the initial U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, and improving defensive strategic arms became the basis of the U.S.-Soviet competition, a more stable defense domi-

Dr. Henry F. Cooper served as Chief U.S. Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks with the Soviet Union (1985-1989) and subsequently as the first civilian director of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1990. Ambas- sador Cooper is Chairman of High Frontier, a non-profit organization study- ing issues of missile defense and space, and Chairman Emeritus of Applied Research Associates. He is a member of the Independent Working Group on Post-ABM Treaty Missile Defense and the Space Relationship.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., is President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. He has lectured widely at government, industry, and academic forums in the United States and overseas. He is the author or co-author of many publications on national security, foreign policy, and international relations. He has served on the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), and is co-chairman of the Independent Working Group on Post-ABM Treaty Missile Defense and the Space Relationship. Henry Cooper & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

nant relationship might have evolved. Mutual Assured Destruction, or And today, that condition might more MAD, neither side would need more easily be extended to discourage the strategic forces to assure such a dev- proliferation of nuclear weapons. astating retaliatory strike. Achieving None of that happened, however, those low levels was the hope of the and the lesson is instructive. As the ABM Treaty, even though the asso- Obama administration embarks upon ciated Strategic Arms Limitations its vaunted “reset” of U.S. relations Talks (SALT) I Agreement did not with Russia, achieving a defense dom- actually limit the numbers of nuclear inant strategic relationship should be weapons to the 1972 levels. the goal of our bilateral relationship. In any case, the United States So should fostering a multilateral had already capped its deployment of environment that can help restrain strategic offensive forces and subse- the proliferation of nuclear weapons quently abandoned building ballistic and their means of delivery. And mis- missile defenses to protect the Ameri- sile defense can help on both counts. can people and U.S. and allied troops. Instead, it chose to rely entirely on this MAD doctrine for its security Beginning in the early 1980s, and that of its allies. The single U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s site permitted by the ABM Treaty strategic modernization program, ended after just one month’s operation in 1974, and no U.S. Theater his Strategic Defense Initiative Missile Defense (TMD) systems (SDI), and the Strategic Arms were developed until the Patriot air Reduction Talks (START), for defense system was modified—over the first time, focused on actually the objections of the arms control community—during the late 1980s, reducing offensive arms while just in time to play a role during the building effective defenses. 1991 Gulf War. In contrast, the Soviets con- Flawed assumptions tinued improving their missile To understand this, consider the defenses—against both strategic troubled history of America’s missile and theater ballistic missiles—to and defense programs. beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty. ABM Treaty advocates argued In conjunction with a massive civil that if the United States and the defense program, they maintained Soviet Union deployed little or no and continuously upgraded an oper- missile defense, then neither would ational defense of Moscow against have any compelling incentive to long-range Intercontinental Ballistic build more offensive nuclear forces Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine than then existed—stabilizing Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). the so-called arms race. At a lim- They also deployed air defense sys- ited offensive force level, each side tems with more TMD capability than would be deterred from striking the our 1991 Patriot; many believed they other in fear of a devastating retalia- were also capable against ICBMs, tory strike—a condition referred to in violation of the ABM Treaty. And as “strategic stability.” Under this concurrently, the Soviets proceeded deterrence theory, commonly called with the largest buildup of strategic offensive forces during the Cold War,

70 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Last Line of Defense contradicting the underlying premise ICBMs and strategic bombers, a that the ABM Treaty would stabilize condition widely regarded as desta- the arms race—at least as seen by bilizing in the U.S.-Soviet deterrence the Soviets. relationship. When the SALT I Agreement Furthermore, the Soviets began and ABM Treaty were signed in 1972, deploying a variant of the Soviet the third-generation Soviet ICBMs single RV mobile ICBM, the SS-16, and SLBMs should have been suffi- as the 3-RV SS-20, to threaten our ciently capable to meet Soviet deter- West European allies—leading the rent requirements (as U.S. strategic U.S. to counter by developing the Per- analysts calculated them). However, shing II ballistic missile and Ground the Soviets showed no inclination to Launched Cruise Missile, beginning reduce their massive development of in the Carter administration, and strategic offensive forces—by then deploying them, during the Reagan focused on their fourth-generation administration, in five West Euro- ICBMs and SLBMs, thereby under- pean NATO partner nations. But well cutting the aforementioned logic before the end of the 1970s it had behind the SALT I Agreement and become clear that the Soviet Union ABM Treaty, even as they were sign- was bent upon deploying as large and ing them (and, it turns out, already modern a nuclear force as possible. In violating their terms). And develop- short, Moscow’s behavior was exactly ment of the fourth-generation systems the opposite of what proponents of continued unabated throughout the the ABM Treaty had predicted would 1970s in spite of U.S. attempts in the be the case. In fact, with the ABM SALT II negotiations to the contrary. Treaty the Soviet Union behaved as In fact, the failure of SALT II, which many of the Treaty’s supporters had legitimized even greater numbers of suggested Moscow would have acted strategic arms, was so apparent that it in its absence. was never ratified by the Senate. Thus—notwithstanding the ABM Treaty and continuing arms Our ability to protect foreign control negotiations—the evidence countries from nuclear attack is clear that, even though it limited depends on the credibility of our its strategic offensive forces and abstained from serious development commitment to their defense. of missile defenses, the United States If that guarantee is eroded, the did not in fact dissuade the Soviet incentive on the part of such Union from deploying a large offen- countries to acquire their own sive nuclear force. If anything, these actions increased the incentives for nuclear weapons rises. the Soviets to build more such capabilities. By the late 1970s, their huge Flipping the script SS-18 missile with its 10 high-yield What happened next strongly nuclear warheads, together with suggests the converse is so—at least several other ICBMs and improved for a time. Beginning in the early strategic submarines and associated 1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s SLBMs, posed a threat to the sur- strategic modernization program, vivability of U.S. strategic offensive his Strategic Defense Initiative forces, particularly our land-based (SDI), and the Strategic Arms Reduc-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 71 Henry Cooper & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

tion Talks (START), for the first based defenses, were needed to drive time, focused on actually reducing down nuclear forces, and proposed a offensive arms while building effec- transition strategy, developed coop- tive defenses. President Reagan’s eratively with the Soviets, to move approach quite deliberately turned from the past offense-dominant the above theories on their head. mix of strategic forces to a defense- dominant one. The SDI program To underwrite a constructive was to conduct the research and development to enable the building counterproliferation role in the of effective defenses to underwrite years ahead, the United States that strategy. must be prepared to deploy missile The key adjective, “effective,” defenses that discourage nuclear came to be associated with the so- called “Nitze Criteria,” which called weapons acquisition and deter for defenses that were: (1) survivable nuclear weapons use. against direct attack and (2) cost- effective at the margin (meaning that At the outset of the SDI program, the cost of a given defensive inter- the myth that defenses accelerate ceptor was less than the cost of an the deployment of nuclear forces additional attacking offensive nuclear continued to hold sway among the weapon). The SDI program eventu- cognoscenti. This was clear from ally met these challenging conditions, the widespread outcry following primarily via space-based defenses— President Reagan’s March 23, 1983, most notably by the Brilliant Pebbles announcement initiating the SDI space-based interceptor system. The program. Soviet General Secretary Soviets surely understood the value Andropov, echoed by MAD advo- of such space-based defenses from cates throughout the West, asserted the outset and argued in all settings that SDI would lead to an unbridled against the U.S. building them, no arms race—particularly in space. doubt to preserve their advantage in And the doubters argued that these strategic offensive forces. conditions made impossible meet- The U.S. delegation at the ing Reagan’s goal of actually reduc- Nuclear and Space Talks insisted that ing nuclear weapons under START as the United States and the Soviet (rather than legitimizing their Union relied increasingly on such an growth, as had been the case under effective missile defense, they could the ever-increasing SALT limits). reduce the large numbers of nuclear This prognosis turned out to be as weapons targeted against each other. false as the original underpinnings of To help establish his firm interest the MAD and arms race stability doc- in achieving such a regime, Reagan trines of the 1960s and 1970s. expressed willingness to actually In turning the MAD logic on share missile defense technologies its head, Reagan in effect contended with the Soviet Union as part of a tran- that effective missile defenses would sition from a strategy of deterrence reduce the demand for offensive bal- based on mutually assured destruc- listic missiles—that is, they would tion to one founded on mutually constitute a necessary counterpro- assured survival. Reagan also refused liferation tool. He believed effective to sacrifice the most effective missile missile defenses, particularly space- defense at the Reykjavik Summit with

72 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Last Line of Defense

Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev the George H. W. Bush administra- in October 1986. Since Reagan saw tion did not take advantage of Russia’s the deployment of increasingly acceptance of Reagan’s vision to con- robust missile defense as the indis- clude what would have been a historic pensable basis for reducing reliance agreement with the Kremlin. Subse- on ballistic missiles, he refused Gor- quently, the Clinton administration, bachev’s demand to restrict testing when it took office, regressed to the of space-based defenses to the labo- traditional arms control framework ratory in exchange for eliminating of strengthening the ABM Treaty; intermediate-range nuclear forces adopting again the failed MAD model and deep reductions in strategic for strategic stability; and drastically offensive forces. And as is often said, reducing the funding for ballistic mis- the rest is history. sile defenses—cancelling the most Reagan’s buildup of our nuclear cost-effective system concept devel- forces while emphasizing his belief oped by the SDI program, the Bril- that it was preferable to base a deter- liant Pebbles space-based interceptor; rence strategy on defense or sur- gutting the ground-based programs; vival at lower levels of nuclear forces and sharply scaling back the Theater rather than on the idea of retaliation Missile Defense programs. or avenging a nuclear attack was rewarded with the first arms con- If a full complement of ground- trol agreement ever to eliminate an entire class of nuclear forces, the based, sea-based and space-based 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear defenses is deployed, the utility Forces (INF) Treaty, and subse- of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles quently to achieve deep reductions will be significantly degraded— in strategic offensive forces in the 1991 START I Treaty. No additional and that would be a major concurrent arms control constraints counterproliferation achievement. were placed on the SDI program, which, by 1991 when START I was Although SDI did not result in signed, was developing a global pro- actual missile defense deployments tection against limited strikes, or during this era, it cast a long politi- GPALS, system—one which promi- cal shadow. It indisputably led to the nently featured a space-based inter- fundamental framework of the 1985 ceptor component. Discussions of Nuclear and Space Talks and the sub- this concept were included in the sequent major reductions in offensive continuing Nuclear and Space Talks nuclear arms and contributed strongly and briefed to the Russian leader- to the demise of the Soviet Union—a ship in the Kremlin by a representa- clear and significant counterprolif- tive of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. eration achievement. It provided the In January 1992, then-Russian technical basis for building truly President Boris Yeltsin proposed at effective future missile defenses— the United Nations that the SDI pro- as had been Reagan’s objective in gram be redirected to take advan- his March 23, 1983, speech. And it tage of Russian technology and that set the stage for a continuing politi- together the United States and Russia cal debate that led eventually to the build a Joint Global Defense to protect 1998 Missile Defense Act that made the world community. Regrettably, building an effective ballistic missile

The Journal of International Security Affairs 73 Henry Cooper & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

defense system the law of the land, Missile defense can play other the end of the ABM Treaty in 2002, counterproliferation roles as well. and a currently growing complement U.S. security guarantees have been of missile defense systems to protect given to more than thirty countries, the American people and our troops, including but extending beyond friends and allies. NATO members and Japan. Extended U.S. security guarantees are likely to Still salient become more difficult, and yet more Today of course, the world is necessary, in the years ahead if we dramatically different. In place of the become more vulnerable to nuclear Soviet Union, we still have Russia attack, making extended guarantees with large, but reduced, numbers of less credible. Our ability to protect nuclear weapon systems which they such countries from nuclear attack continue to modernize, together with depends on the credibility of our China with its growing nuclear arse- commitment to their defense. If that nal. We also have substantial numbers guarantee is eroded, the incentive on of nuclear aspirants and emerging the part of such countries to acquire nuclear possessors. Many other states their own nuclear weapons rises. have differing levels of nuclear latency, The U.S. collaborative missile and could move quickly to nuclear defense development program with weapons status if they chose to do Japan began in earnest following so, given the widespread availability North Korea’s 1998 ballistic missile of knowledge and information about test, and today Japan has operations nuclear matters. Our need for defense in the Sea of Japan. And we have against nuclear weapons therefore is worked closely with Israel to develop growing year by year. their missile defenses since the SDI In the absence of effective mis- era. These and other bilateral and sile defenses, nuclear-armed missiles multilateral (e.g., in NATO) coop- are relatively cheap, compared to erative missile defense programs the overall cost of equivalent conven- reinforce U.S. security guarantees, tional capabilities. Nuclear weapons offering a more credible alternative offer countries like North Korea and to a threat to retaliate with nuclear Iran a capability that would be next to weapons in order to deter an attack impossible to create with conventional or to engage in escalation control. weapons. Nuclear weapons also are To underwrite a constructive believed to confer political prestige on counterproliferation role in the years their possessors. They can threaten ahead, the United States must be pre- neighboring states (Japan and Israel pared to deploy missile defenses that come immediately to mind in the case, discourage nuclear weapons acquisi- respectively, of North Korea and Iran). tion and deter nuclear weapons use. Because missile defense degrades And because the future world will the prospects for successful nuclear contain different kinds of nuclear use, the acquisition of a nuclear force possessors, our missile defense must becomes a less attractive option. To have increasingly robust capabilities. the extent that missile defense reduces Given the quickening pace of global the likelihood that ballistic missiles ballistic missile proliferation, assur- will reach their intended target, it ing that missile defenses remain serves an indispensable counterprolif- ahead of the quantitative and quali- eration role. tative improvements being deployed

74 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Last Line of Defense by hostile states will be a significant Allies, including Japan, are joining challenge, particularly when the the United States in building a global United States and its allies face situa- sea-based defense that will continue to tions in which more than one nuclear improve and grow in numbers. weapons state pose a political/mili- Perhaps most important will be tary threat. to develop a future global capabil- Taken together, these consider- ity to shoot down attacking ballistic ations strengthen the case for a U.S. missiles in their boost phase, before missile defense that: (1) affords mul- they can release multiple warheads tiple opportunities to intercept mis- and decoys. The most cost-effective siles and warheads in all phases of boost-phase defense would be based flight; (2) can be quickly positioned in in space. Furthermore, space-based or near crisis points; and (3) is under- interceptors would have multiple going improvements that keep the opportunities to intercept attacking defenses as far in front of emerging ballistic missiles in all their phases of threats as possible. A missile defense flight—in the boost phase, through- with these important characteristics, out the midcourse phase and into the taken together, would maximize its reentry phase. Such a concept was a counterproliferation role. centerpiece of the SDI from the outset, and by the end of the SDI era in 1993, Back to the future the key technology was on the verge These conditions are, in fact, of being demonstrated—and the most the same as those contemplated cost-effective missile defense system by the SDI program in 1990 under concept was within sight. the GPALS concept. The defense Thus, we strongly urge the must be a global defense, able to revival of a well-funded technology protect against missiles that might development effort to build space- be launched from uncertain origins based defense interceptors. If a full almost anywhere in the world toward complement of ground-based, sea- uncertain targets in the United States based and space-based defenses is and among our overseas troops, deployed, the utility of nuclear-armed friends and allies. It likewise must ballistic missiles will be significantly have a high probability of intercept- degraded—and that would be a ing attacking ballistic missiles, in major counterproliferation achieve- order to assure protection. ment. It would also be consistent Most system concepts included in with the defense dominant strategic GPALS have progressed and today are capability at the core of Ronald Rea- being deployed and improved. Ground gan’s vision for reducing the threat based defenses play an important role, of nuclear weapons. Reagan’s proven but for political and economic reasons approach of building defenses and cannot be deployed to provide global reducing threatening nuclear forces coverage. Still, such ground-based is preferred to the apparent strategy defenses can be part of our alliance behind the New Start Treaty, which relationships—for example, in NATO, legitimizes increased numbers and to strengthen a global defense archi- capabilities of Russian nuclear forces tecture. Sea-based defenses can pro- while threatening to limit our own vide global protection—about 40 U.S. efforts to improve missile defenses. missile defense capable ships will After all, we’ve seen this play before. be at sea around the world by 2015.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 75

Adrift in Arabia

Efraim Karsh

ransforming America’s relations with the Islamic world has been perhaps the foremost foreign policy issue through which Presi- Tdent Obama has sought to set himself apart from his immediate predecessor. Having long downplayed his Muslim roots—going so far as to disguise not only his middle name, Hussein, but also to sub- stitute for Barack the less conspicuous Barry early on in his career1— Obama has embraced them since taking office. As he explained in his much-ballyhooed June 2009 address to the Muslim World in Cairo:

I’m a Christian, but my father came from a Kenyan family that includes generations of Muslims. As a boy, I spent several years in Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan at the break of dawn and at the fall of dusk. As a young man, I worked in Chicago communities where many found dignity and peace in their Muslim faith... So I have known Islam on three continents before coming to the region where it was first revealed. That experience guides my conviction that partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t.2

Reverting to standard “post-colonial” rhetoric, the president squarely blamed the West for “the great tension between the United States and Muslims around the world.” “The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars,” he claimed,

Efraim Karsh, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is Professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College London. Efraim Karsh

More recently, tension has been historical injustice. Osama bin fed by colonialism that denied Laden highlighted “the tragedy of rights and opportunities to many Andalusia” in the wake of the 9/11 Muslims, and a Cold War in attacks,4 which Muslim-majority countries while the perpetrators of were too often treated as prox- the subsequent March 2004 Madrid ies without regard to their own bombings, in which hundreds of aspirations... Violent extremists people were murdered, mentioned have exploited these tensions revenge for the loss of Spain as one in a small but potent minority of the atrocity’s “root causes.”5 of Muslims… [culminating in] Indeed, even countries that have the attacks of September 11, never been under Islamic imperial 2001 and the continued efforts of these extremists to engage rule have become legitimate targets in violence against civilians.”3 of radical Islamic fervor. Since the late 1980s, various Islamist move- While there is no denying the ments have looked upon the grow- widespread appeal of this argument, ing number of French Muslims as a there is also no way around the fact sign that France, too, has become a that, in almost every particular, it is potential part of the House of Islam.6 demonstratively, even invidiously, In Germany, which extended a warm wrong. The depiction of Muslims welcome to the scores of Islamists as hapless victims of the aggressive fleeing persecution in their home encroachments of others is patroniz- countries, the radical Muslim Broth- ing in the worst tradition of the “white erhood has successfully established man’s burden,” which has dismissed itself, with ample Saudi financing, regional players as half-witted crea- as the effective voice of the three- tures, too dim to be accountable for million-strong Muslim community.7 their own fate. Moreover, Islamic his- Their British counterparts have fol- tory has been anything but reactive. lowed suit; “We will remodel this From the Prophet Muhammad to country in an Islamic image,” Lon- the Ottomans, the story of Islam has don-based preacher Sheikh Omar been the story of the rise and fall of Bakri Muhammad told an attentive an often-astonishing imperial aggres- audience less than two months after siveness and, no less important, of 9/11. “We will replace the Bible with never quiescent imperial dreams and the Qur’an.”8 repeated fantasies of revenge and res- This goal need not necessar- toration. These fantasies gained rapid ily be pursued by the sword; it can momentum during the last phases of be achieved through demographic the Ottoman Empire, culminating in growth and steady conversion to its disastrous decision to enter World Islam. But should peaceful means War I on the losing side, as well as in prove insufficient, physical force can the creation of an imperialist dream readily be brought to bear. that would survive the Ottoman era Nor is this vision confined to a to haunt Islamic and Middle Eastern tiny extremist fringe, as President politics into the 21st century. Obama apparently believes. That To this very day, for example, much is clear from the overwhelming many Muslims unabashedly pine for support the 9/11 attacks garnered the restoration of Spain, and look throughout the Arab and Islamic upon the expulsion of the Moors worlds, the admiring evocations of from that country in 1492 as a grave bin Laden’s murderous acts during

78 The Journal of International Security Affairs Adrift in Arabia the 2006 crisis over the Danish car- Misreading Iran toons, and polls indicating significant Take Iran’s quest for nuclear reservoirs of sympathy among Mus- weapons, the foremost threat to lims in Britain for the “feelings and Middle Eastern stability, if not to motives” of the suicide bombers who world peace, in the foreseeable attacked London in July 2005.9 future. In a sharp break from the In the historical imagination of previous administration’s attempts to many Muslims, bin Laden represents coerce Tehran to abandon its nuclear nothing short of the new incarnation program, Obama initially chose the of Saladin, defeater of the Crusaders road of “engagement that is honest and conqueror of Jerusalem. In this and grounded in mutual respect.”12 sense, the House of Islam’s war for In his al-Arabiya interview, a world mastery is a traditional, indeed mere week after his inauguration, venerable, quest that is far from over. Obama already promised that if Iran If, today, America is reviled in the agreed “to unclench their fist, they Muslim world, it is not because of its will find an extended hand from us.” specific policies but because, as the Two months later, in a videotaped preeminent world power, it blocks the greeting on the occasion of the Iranian final realization of this same age-old New Year, he reassured the clerics in dream of a universal Islamic commu- Tehran of his absolute commitment nity, or umma. “to diplomacy that addresses the full It is the failure to recognize range of issues before us,” claiming this state of affairs that accounts for that this “new beginning” would win the resounding lack of success of Iran substantial economic and politi- Obama’s policies toward the Middle cal gains, most notably worldwide East and the Muslim World. For all acceptance of the legitimacy of the his hyped outreach to Arabs and Islamic regime derided by the Bush Muslims—from the pledged “new administration as a central part of the way forward” in his inaugural speech “Axis of Evil.” This, however, could to his first major presidential inter- only be achieved “through peace- view, given to the al-Arabiya televi- ful actions that demonstrate the sion network, to his submissive bow true greatness of the Iranian people to Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, to and civilization. And the measure of his instruction to NASA to reach that greatness is not the capacity to out to the Muslim world—Obama destroy, it is your demonstrated abil- has failed to win the quiescence, let ity to build and create.”13 alone the respect and admiration of In his Cairo address, Obama these societies. On the contrary, in amplified this suggestion. While line with Osama bin Laden’s handy warning Iran that its nuclear ambi- quip in the immediate wake of the tions might lead to “a nuclear arms 9/11 attacks that “when people see race in the Middle East that could a strong horse and a weak horse, lead this region and the world down a by nature, they will like the strong hugely dangerous path,” he made no horse,”10 his prestige has been on a allusion to the possibility of coercion, downward spiral since the first days going out of his way to show empathy of his presidency. In the recent words with Iran’s supposed sensitivities. “I of a Saudi academic, who had been understand those who protest that formerly smitten with the first black some countries have weapons that U.S. president: “He talks too much.”11 others do not,” he said.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 79 Efraim Karsh

No single nation should pick to impress the clerics in Tehran. and choose which nation holds Quite the opposite, in fact. Since their nuclear weapons. And that’s why nuclear ambitions emanate from I strongly reaffirmed America’s imperialist rather than defensive con- commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear siderations, the disarmament of other weapons. And any nation—includ- nuclear powers (notably Israel) could ing Iran—should have the right only whet their appetite by increasing to access peaceful nuclear power the relative edge of these weapons if it complies with its respon- for the Islamic Republic’s quest for sibilities under the nuclear regional hegemony, if not the world Non-Proliferation Treaty. That mastery envisaged by its founding commitment is at the core of the treaty, and it must be kept for father, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah all who fully abide by it. And I’m Khomeini. As Khomeini put it in hopeful that all countries in the his day: “The Iranian revolution is region can share in this goal.14 not exclusively that of Iran, because Islam does not belong to any particular people… We will export our revo- If, today, America is reviled in the lution throughout the world because Muslim world, it is not because of it is an Islamic revolution. The strug- its specific policies but because, gle will continue until the calls ‘there is no god but Allah and Muhammad as the preeminent world power, it is the messenger of Allah’ are echoed blocks the final realization of this all over the world.”15 same age-old dream of a universal Moreover, Obama’s eagerness Islamic community, or umma. to demonstrate his even-handed- ness and goodwill to a regime that views the world in zero-sum terms However appealing as intellectual has only served to cast him as weak sophistry (though China and Russia, and indecisive, an image that was among others, have remained con- further reinforced by the adminis- spicuously unimpressed), the framing tration’s knee-jerk response to the of Iran’s nuclear buildup within the Islamic regime’s brutal suppression context of the NPT is totally miscon- of popular protest over the rigging ceived, for the simple reason that the of the June 2009 presidential elec- matter at hand is one of international tions. That the U.S. president, who security rather than international had made a point in his inaugural legality. Even if Iran were not a signa- address to warn “those who cling to tory to the NPT, and hence legally free power through corruption and deceit to develop nuclear weapons, it would and the silencing of dissent” that they still be imperative for the international were “on the wrong side of history,” community to prevent this eventual- and who lectured Muslim regimes ity, since the existence of the deadli- throughout the world that “you must est weapons at the hands of a militant maintain your power through con- regime driven by messianic zeal and sent, not coercion,”16 remained con- committed to the worldwide export of spicuously silent in the face of the its radical brand of Islam would be a flagrant violation of these very princi- recipe for disaster. ples did not pass unnoticed by the Ira- Nor is Obama’s professed com- nian regime. Iran’s leaders responded mitment to a nuclear-free world likely accordingly; President Mahmoud

80 The Journal of International Security Affairs Adrift in Arabia

Ahmadinejad not only demanded that had made that country a major cor- the United States apologize to the Ira- nerstone of his engagement strategy. nian people, but also that it withdraw “This is my first trip overseas as Pres- its troops from conflict zones around ident of the United States,” he told the the world and “stop supporting the Turkish parliament on April 6, 2009: Zionists, outlaws, and criminals.”17 He reiterated the demand for an I’ve been to the G20 summit in American apology five months later, London, and the NATO summit this time for its supposed meddling in Strasbourg, and the European in the June 2009 Iranian elections, Union summit in Prague. Some people have asked me if I chose to while the country’s supreme leader, continue my travels to Ankara and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ridiculed Istanbul to send a message to the Obama for privately courting Iran world. And my answer is simple: while censuring it in public. “The U.S. Evet—yes. Turkey is a critical President said that we were waiting ally... And Turkey and the United for the day when people would take States must stand together—and to the streets,” he stated in a Friday work together—to overcome the challenges of our time.19 sermon. “At the same time they write letters saying that they want to have Having praised Turkey’s “strong, ties and that they respect the Islamic vibrant, secular democracy,” Obama Republic. Which are we to believe?”18 voiced unequivocal support for the Iran’s leaders backed their defi- country’s incorporation into the ant rhetoric with actions. In a Feb- European Union—a highly conten- ruary 2010 visit to Damascus, for tious issue among the organization’s example, Ahmadinejad signed a members. In his opinion, Turkey was string of agreements with his Syrian “an important part of Europe,” which counterpart, Bashar Assad, and the had to be “truly united, peaceful and two held warm meetings with the free” in order to be able to meet the leaders of the Lebanese Hezbollah challenges of the 21st century. “Let and the Palestinian Hamas Islamist me be clear,” he said: terror groups aimed at underscor- ing the indivisibility of their alliance. The United States strongly sup- Coming a day after Secretary of State ports Turkey’s bid to become a Hillary Clinton urged Syria “to begin member of the European Union. to move away from the relationship We speak not as members of the with Iran” and to stop supporting EU, but as close friends of both Hezbollah, the summit was a clear Turkey and Europe. Turkey has slap in the face of the administra- been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and tion—and proof of the abject collapse European institutions. Turkey is of Obama’s “engagement” policy. bound to Europe by more than the bridges over the Bosporus. Losing Turkey Centuries of shared history, cul- So was the Turkish Republic’s ture, and commerce bring you sudden and dramatic disengage- together. Europe gains by the diversity of ethnicity, tradition ment from the founding principles and faith—it is not diminished underpinning its creation in the wake by it. And Turkish membership of World War I. This latter setback would broaden and strengthen was particularly galling to the White Europe’s foundation once more.20 House, in part because the president

The Journal of International Security Affairs 81 Efraim Karsh

“I know there are those who like to pean subjects under its domination debate Turkey’s future,” he continued. unleashed a prolonged orgy of blood- letting and mayhem, from the Greek They see your country at the cross- civil war of the 1820s to the Crimean roads of continents, and touched War to the Balkan crisis of the 1870s by the currents of history.... to the Balkan wars of 1912-13. They wonder whether you will be Obama’s exercise in appeasement pulled in one direction or another. was wholly unnecessary. By the time But I believe here is what they he was addressing the Turkish parlia- don’t understand: Turkey’s great- ment, the country’s “strong and secu- ness lies in your ability to be at lar democracy,” lauded by Obama as the center of things. This is not Atatürk’s foremost and most enduring where East and West divide—this legacy, was well and truly under siege. 21 is where they come together. In the eight eventful years since it won the November 2002 general elections, As with his Cairo speech, the Islamist Justice and Reconciliation Obama’s reading of the historic Party (AKP) has transformed Tur- Turkish-Western interaction (and its key’s legal system, suppressed the attendant implications) was disas- independent media, and sterilized the trously flawed. Far from being a political and military systems, even as bridge between East and West, the hundreds of opponents and critics have Ottoman Empire was an implacable found themselves indicted on dubious foe that had steadily encroached on charges of a grand conspiracy to over- Europe and its way of life. It is true throw the Turkish government.22 that the 19th century saw numer- This process was not confined to ous instances of Ottoman-European the domestic scene. Turkey’s grow- collaboration; but this was merely ing Islamization has been accompa- pragmatic maneuvering aimed at nied by a mixture of anti-Western arresting imperial decline and hold- sentiments and reasserted aspira- ing on to colonial possessions. tions for regional hegemony, aptly described by a growing number of Rather than reward America’s Turkish and foreign commentators as “Neo-Ottomanism.”23 Hence Turkey’s longest and most loyal ally in growing alignment with Iran, exem- the Middle East, the Obama plified most notably in the attempt to administration has ruthlessly avert the imposition of international exploited the Jewish state’s sanctions on Tehran by signing (with Brazil) a nuclear fuel swap deal in growing international isolation for May 2010, which would have provided the sake of winning over enemies for the dispatch of low-enriched Ira- and critics. nian uranium to Turkey in return for fuel for one Iranian nuclear reactor. Similarly evocative has been Turkey’s This failed, and from the end of eagerness to wrest the mediator’s the Napoleonic wars (1815) to the role between Syria and Israel from outbreak of World War I, Turkey was the West, despite the AKP’s overt the most violent part of the European hostility to Israel and to Jews more continent, as the Ottoman Empire’s generally. Then there is Turkey’s attempt to keep its reluctant Euro- embrace of the Palestinian branch of

82 The Journal of International Security Affairs Adrift in Arabia the Muslim Brothers, better known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas, which A year after announcing “a new reached its peak in May 2010 with beginning between the United the sponsorship of a flotilla aimed at States and Muslims around the breaking the Israeli blockade of the world,” Obama’s grandiose Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. outreach lies in tatters.

Exacerbating the Arab- Nor did Obama succeed in Israeli conflict advancing his avowed commitment to Instead of backing the Israeli the two-state solution of Israel and a effort to contain a murderous Islamist Palestinian state in the West Bank and group, implacably opposed to West- the Gaza Strip. On the contrary, by ern values and ideals and commit- putting excessive pressure on Israel ted to the establishment of “a great and none whatsoever on the Arabs, Islamic state, be it pan-Arabic or and by casting the issue of West Bank pan-Islamic,” on Israel’s ruins,24 the settlements as the foremost obstacle Obama administration viewed the to peace while turning a blind eye international outcry attending the flo- to continued Palestinian and Arab tilla incident as a golden opportunity rejection of Israel’s right to exist, he to tighten the noose around Israel— managed to alienate the Israeli public the main, indeed only, defined and to harden the position of the Pal- component of its policy toward the estinian leadership, which watched Arab-Israeli conflict. the recurrent crises in U.S.-Israeli To be sure, in his Cairo address relations with undisguised satisfac- Obama made a point of emphasiz- tion in anticipation of substantial (and ing the permanence of “America’s unreciprocated) Israeli concessions. strong bonds with Israel.” But then, Thus, for example, when on June 14, by predicating Israel’s right to exist 2009, in an abrupt departure from on the Holocaust (which he diluted Likud’s foremost ideological precept, by putting on a par with Palestinian Prime Minister Benjamin Netan- suffering), rather than on the historic yahu agreed to the establishment of Jewish attachment to Palestine, he a Palestinian Arab state provided the effectively adopted the Palestinian Palestinian leadership responded in narrative. Under that telling, the Pal- kind and recognized Israel’s Jewish estinians are the real victims of the nature, the Obama administration Holocaust, forced to foot the bill for did nothing to disabuse Arab regimes the West’s presumed desire to atone of their adamant rejection of Jewish for its genocidal tendencies and indif- statehood and instead pressured the ference through the establishment of Israeli government for a complete a Jewish state. Never mind that there freeze of building activities in the was no collective sense of guilt among settlements and East Jerusalem. Europeans, many of whom viewed This behavior is not difficult to themselves as fellow victims of Nazi understand. Appeasement of one’s aggression. Anti-Semitic sentiments enemies at the expense of friends, remained as pronounced as ever, whose loyalty can be taken for especially in Eastern Europe, which granted, is a common—if unsavory— witnessed a few vicious pogroms human trait. Rather than reward shortly after the end of WWII. America’s longest and most loyal

The Journal of International Security Affairs 83 Efraim Karsh

ally in the Middle East, the Obama parts of mandatory Palestine, if not administration ruthlessly exploited the entire country, into the greater the Jewish state’s growing interna- Syrian empire he coveted; Egypt tional isolation for the sake of win- wanted to prevent that eventuality ning over enemies and critics. It was by laying its hands on southern Pal- also a telling affirmation that the estine; Syria and Lebanon sought Obama administration subscribes to to annex the Galilee; Iraq viewed the common fallacy that the Pales- the 1948 war as a stepping-stone in tinian-Israeli conflict constitutes the its long-standing ambition to bring root of all evil, and that its resolution the entire Fertile Crescent under will lead to regional peace. its rule. Had the Jewish state lost the war, its territory would not have fallen to the Palestinians but would In order to have even the have been divided among the invad- slightest chance of success, ing Arab forces. Obama’s “new beginning” During the decades that followed, the Arab states manipulated must be promptly ended, with the Palestinian national cause for appeasement replaced by their own ends. Neither Egypt nor containment and counterattack. Jordan allowed Palestinian self- determination in the parts of Pales- Such a view is wildly inaccurate. tine they had occupied during the For one thing, violence was an inte- 1948 war (respectively, the West gral part of Middle Eastern politi- Bank and the Gaza Strip). Palestinian cal culture long before the advent of refugees were kept in squalid camps the Arab-Israeli conflict, and physi- for decades as a means of derogating cal force remains today the main if Israel and stirring pan-Arab senti- not the sole instrument of regional ments. “The Palestinians are useful political discourse. For another, the to the Arab states as they are,” Egyp- Arab states have never had any real tian President Gamal Abdel Nasser stake in the “liberation of Palestine.” candidly responded to an inquiring Though anti-Zionism has been the Western reporter in 1956. “We will core principle of pan-Arab solidarity always see that they do not become since the 1930s, it has almost always too powerful.”25 As late as 1974, Syr- served as an instrument for achieving ia’s Hafez al-Assad referred to Pales- the self-interested ends of those who tine as being “not only a part of the proclaim it. Arab homeland but a basic part of Consider, for example, the southern Syria.”26 pan-Arab invasion of the newly pro- If the Arab states have shown claimed state of Israel in May 1948. little empathy for the plight of ordi- On its face, it was a shining demon- nary Palestinians, the Islamic con- stration of solidarity with the Pales- nection to the Palestinian problem tinian Arabs. But the invasion had is even more tenuous. It is not out far less to do with winning indepen- of concern for a Palestinian right to dence for the indigenous population national self-determination but as than with the desire of the Arab part of a holy war to prevent the loss regimes for territorial aggrandize- of a part of the “House of Islam” that ment. Transjordan’s King Abdullah Islamists inveigh against the Jewish wanted to incorporate substantial state of Israel. In the words of the

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Hamas covenant: “The land of Pales- his struggle against violent extrem- tine has been an Islamic trust (waqf ) ism—has seriously deteriorated, throughout the generations and until owing to his indecisive and poorly the day of resurrection... When our conceived strategy. Particularly enemies usurp some Islamic lands, damaging was the announced inten- jihad becomes a duty binding on all tion to withdraw from the country in Muslims.”27 That current American the summer of 2011, which has left policy ignores this reality not only the Taliban in the enviable position serves to weaken Israel and embolden of lying low and biding its time until its enemies, but also to make the the departure of American forces, or prospects of Arab-Israeli peace ever wearing them down in a sustained more remote. guerrilla and terror campaign, so as to portray the withdrawal as an igno- A new beginning? minious retreat. A year after announcing “a new The truth of the matter is that beginning between the United States in order to have even the slightest and Muslims around the world,” chance of success, Obama’s “new Obama’s grandiose outreach lies in beginning” must be promptly ended, tatters. The clerics in Tehran con- with appeasement replaced by continue their dogged quest for the tainment and counterattack. As a first “bomb” and have intensified arms step, the president and his advisers supplies to their Lebanese terrorist must recognize the Manichean and proxy, Hezbollah, with Syria’s con- irreconcilable nature of the challenge nivance and support. Turkey persists posed by their adversaries. There is in its Islamist odyssey, and Hamas no peaceful way to curb Iran’s nuclear continues its military buildup and ambitions, stemming as they do from occasional terror attacks, while at its imperialist brand of Islamism; a the same time promoting its removal military strike must remain a seri- from the EU’s list of terror organi- ous option. Turkey’s Islamist drift zations. Nor for that matter has the is bound to make it an enemy of the cold-shouldering of Israel enhanced West, rather than the ally it was over Obama’s popularity in the Arab the past half-a-century. Hamas and world, as evidenced, inter alia, by Hezbollah will never reconcile them- recent surveys showing a steady selves to the existence of a Jewish decline in his standing and making state on any part of the perceived him only marginally more popular in House of Islam, however tiny. And comparison with his much maligned there is no way for the U.S. to resolve predecessor, George W. Bush.28 the century-old war between Arabs Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Jews unless the Palestinian and Obama has failed to chart a course Arab leaders eschew their genocidal that is different in any meaningful hopes for Israel’s destruction and way from that of the previous admin- accept the Jewish right to statehood. istration. On the contrary, while Failure to grasp these realities is an credit for the relative calm in Iraq assured recipe for disaster. is undoubtedly due to the Bush-era “surge,” which Senator Obama had bitterly opposed at the time,29 the military situation in Afghanistan— which he has made the edifice of

The Journal of International Security Affairs 85 Efraim Karsh

1. “When Barry Became Barack,” Newsweek, Follows Will of Israel,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), March 22, 2008. April 4, 2010; “Iran: Ahmadinejad Threatens 2. The White House, Office of the Press Sec- Obama with ‘Tooth Breaking’ Response to retary, “Remarks by the President on a New U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” Los Angeles Times, Beginning,” Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, April 7, 2010; “Ahmadinejad: Iran Is Obama’s June 4, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ Only Way to Stay in Power,” CNN, April 10, the_press_office/remarks-by-the-presi- 2010. dent-at-cairo-university-6-04-09/. 18. “Ayatollah Mocks U.S. Pre-election Over- 3. Ibid. ture,” CBS, June 24, 2009, http://www. 4. “Statement of Osama Bin Laden,” Al-Jazeera cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/24/world/ (Doha), October 7, 2001, http://www.mid- main5109744.shtml. eastweb.org/osamabinladen3.htm. 19. The White House, Office of the Press Sec- 5. “Beyond Madrid,” Times of London, Novem- retary, “Remarks by President Obama to ber 1, 2007, http://www.timesonline. the Turkish Parliament,” Ankara, Turkey, co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/arti- April 6, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ cle2781174.ece. the_press_office/Remarks-by-President- 6. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Obama-to-the-Turkish-Parliament. Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University 20. Ibid. Press, 2002), 306. 21. Ibidem. 7. Michel Gurfinkiel, “Islam in France: The 22. Michael Rubin, “Turkey, from Ally to French Way of Life Is in Danger,” Middle Enemy,” Commentary, July/August 2010; East Quarterly 4, no. 1 (March 1997). Dani Rodrik, “The Death of Turkey’s 8. Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brother- Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, hood’s Conquest of Europe,” Middle East 2010. Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Winter 2005). 23. See, for example, Suat Kiniklioglu, “The 9. “Poll Shows Muslims in Britain Are the Return of Ottomanism,” Zaman (Istanbul), Most Anti-Western in Europe,” Guardian March 20, 2007; Omer Taspinar, “Neo- (London), June 23, 2006; “British Muslims: Ottomanism and Kemalist Foreign Policy,” London Bombing Justified,” The Trumpet, Zaman (Istanbul), September 22, 2008; October 26, 2006, http://www.thetrumpet. Tariq Alhomayed, “Turkey: Searching for a com/index.php?q=2807.0.87.0. Role,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), May 19, 10. As cited in James Poniewozik, “The Banal- 2010. ity of Bin Laden,” Time, December 13, 2001, 24. This according to senior Hamas leader Mah- http://www.time.com/time/nation/arti- moud al-Zahar. He added that “Islamic and cle/0,8599,188329,00.html. traditional views reject the notion of estab- 11. As cited in Fouad Ajami, “The Arabs Have lishing an independent Palestinian state... Stopped Applauding Obama,” Wall Street In the past, there was no independent Pal- Journal, November 29, 2009. estinian state.” “Exclusive Interview with 12. “Obama’s Tone in Iran Message Differs Hamas Leader,” The Media Line, September Sharply from Bush’s,” Washington Post, 22, 2005, http://www.themedialine.org/ March 21, 2009. news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=11354. 13. “Obama to Iran—‘A New Day, a New Begin- 25. John Laffin, The PLO Connections (London: ning,’” Times of London, March 21, 2009. Corgi Books, 1983), 127. 14. “Remarks by the President on a New Begin- 26. Damascus Radio, March 8, 1974. ning.” 27. Articles 11, 13, 15, 27, The Covenant of the 15. Farhad Rajaee, Islamic Values and World Islamic Resistance Movement, August 18, View: Khomeini on Man, the State and Inter- 1988, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_cen- national Politics (Lanham, Md. University tury/hamas.asp. of America Press, 1983), 82-83. 28. See, for example, Daniel Pipes, “Obama 16. “Text of Barack Obama’s Inaugural Makes Little Headway among Arabic- Address,” New York Times, January 20, Speaking Muslims,” The Lion’s Den: Daniel 2009; “Remarks by the President on a New Pipes Blog, May 29, 2010; Pew Research Beginning.” Center, Global Attitudes Project, “Muslim 17. “Ahmadinejad Says Obama Must Apolo- Disappointment,” June 17, 2010. gize to the Iranian People for Bush,” Times 29. See, for example, “Obama: Iraq Surge Has of London, January 28, 2009; “Iran Rebuffs Hurt American Interests,” New York Sun, Obama’s Surprise Offer of a ‘New Begin- July 15, 2008. ning,’” Times of London, March 20, 2009; “Obama Dismisses Ahmadinejad Apology Request,” Washington Times, June 26, 2009; “Ahmadinejad: Obama Is a Cowboy Who

86 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Yemeni Vortex

Ian Illych Martinez

n Christmas Day 2009, Yemen was thrust into the international spotlight by the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines OFlight 253 by Nigerian-born militant Abdel Farouk Abumut- talab. In the months since, legions of pundits have rushed to describe how and why Yemen—where Abumuttalab trained and received religious instruction—has become the new epicenter of global terrorism.

Overwhelmingly, the commentary has focused on one element of the contemporary problem posed by Yemen: the emergence of the bin Laden network’s Persian Gulf franchise, known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), within its borders. Yemen’s problems, however, go far beyond AQAP, and include two other intractable conflicts: the Huthi rebellion in the country’s north and a renewed armed secessionist movement in its south. Indeed, until Abumuttalab’s botched December bombing, it was these two conflicts, and not the fight against AQAP, that were the main focus of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Today, they continue to pose the most immediate challenges to his rule. Throw in falling oil returns—Yemen may run out by 2017— and severe water shortages, and you have all of the necessary ingredients for a new failed state in the Persian Gulf.

A tribal quarrel turns global The most pressing concern for the Saleh regime is the persistent rebellion among the Huthi ethnic clan in Yemen’s Saada province. The Huthis are Zaydis,

Ian Illych Martinez is a former CIA Intelligence Officer who covered Africa and the Near East. He is currently an attorney in private practice in Miami, Florida. Ian Illych Martinez

Shi’ite Muslims of a sect unique to tactics, however, have had the oppo- Yemen. The Zaydi had their own site of their intended effect, serving as Imamate from the ninth century until a beacon for other groups aggrieved the country’s 1962 officers’ coup. at the government’s tactics. Today, they are attempting to bring The struggle against the Huthi about its reestablishment, and push did not remain localized for long. In back against the Sunni elite in Sana’a. the late fall, Saudi Arabia, which had been providing material and financial A collapse of the Yemeni state support to the Yemeni government, entered the war in earnest after one would most directly threaten the of its border posts was attacked by security of Sana’a’s immediate the Huthis. On November 4, 2009, neighbors in the southern Gulf. Saudi Arabian jets entered Yemeni airspace, bombing Huthi positions It could also, however, serve to inside Yemen. Seven days later, Saudi destabilize regional shipping, with Arabia imposed a naval blockade local jihadists seeking to link to upon the coast. Then, in January, their brethren on the Horn of Saudi Arabia pushed out Huthi rebels who had captured a border village. Africa—something which has long The fighting has been intense, claim- been a stated goal of AQAP. ing the lives of more than a hundred Saudi soldiers.4 There have been several upris- The government’s tactics—and ings of the Huthi to date. The cur- the entry of Saudi Arabia into the rent one began on June 18, 2004, fray—have led to accusations that when government forces were sent to Sana’a is recruiting jihadists to quell arrest the then-clan leader, Hussein the Huthis.5 A second cease-fire was al-Huthi.1 Al-Huthi had been a vocal announced on February 12, 2010, but opponent of President Saleh, terming it too quickly collapsed. him “a tyrant… who wants to please By most informed estimates, the America and Israel, by sacrificing Huthi rebellion is not strong enough the blood of his own people.”2 Three to topple the central government.6 months later, al-Huthi was killed by But its power and appeal should not government forces. be underestimated. Government The revolt did not die with him, repression has had the unintended however. Al-Huthi’s death prompted consequence of lending public sympa- the breakdown of a tenuous cease- thy and support to the Huthis, while fire that had been arranged by Qatar returning jihadists from Afghanistan in 2008, and the resumption of Huthi and newer recruits may have contrib- fighting against the Saleh govern- uted to the rebellion’s rise. ment. In response, Saleh sent his The revolt, moreover, has the closest advisor, Ali Mohsen, to deal potential to grow to become regional with the uprising. Mohsen, a veteran war, with Riyadh and Tehran acting of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghani- through their proxies. In September stan, adopted a scorched earth policy 2009, Saleh accused Tehran of med- to end the rebellion, complete with dling in the conflict, using its proxy, widespread government bombing of Hezbollah, to provide support to targets throughout Saada and the use the Huthis in neighboring Eritrea.7 of jihadists against the Huthis.3 These Yemen has also issued statements

88 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Yemeni Vortex that it has found caches of Iranian North Yemen was now in a state weapons inside Yemen and has of civil war. Egypt backed the repub- claimed to have seized an Iranian- licans, who governed the towns. The flagged vessel with weapons intended British in Aden and Saudi Arabia to for insurgents in its waters.8 The sei- the north backed the royalists and zure was the first concrete proof that the Zaydi Imam, who controlled the Iran may have been helping the rebel- countryside. This bloody status quo lion, confirming Sana’a’s continued persisted until 1967, when Egypt, as assertions of Iranian intervention in a result of the Six-Day War, opted to response to increased Saudi attacks end its expedition and withdraw its against a Shi’a group. troops from North Yemen. A month later, the British did likewise from The scourge of southern Aden. The day after, the Aden Protec- secessionism torate became the Southern Yemen Yemen, the legendary home of People’s Republic. the Queen of Sheba, has had a natu- In the North, meanwhile, tur- ral divide since antiquity. Its North is moil persisted. Egypt’s puppet mountainous and temperate, with a government was overthrown, and hot and humid strip of coastland adja- within a month after its departure, cent to the Red Sea. Its South, by con- North Yemen was plunged into civil trast, is barren and arid. The South war. Saudi Arabia intervened and was historically ruled by a variety coached both sides to a cease-fire of dynasties and caliphs until a Brit- and a power-sharing arrangement. ish Royal Navy ship ran aground and South Yemen became a staunch was looted in 1837. In 1839, the Royal Communist state—the only one Navy took its revenge by steaming with a state religion, Islam—where into Aden and acquiring the first pos- the state ruled Aden and the tribes session of Queen Victoria’s reign. roamed at will in the countryside. The British subsequently physi- Its major source of income was foreign remittances by Yemenis work- cally divided the country into North 10 and South Yemen. South Yemen— ing in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, called the Aden Protectorate—was the Communist government main- anchored by Aden in the west and tained the rule of law inherited from ran along the coast eastward. North the British, outlawed weddings of Yemen was centered around Sana’a, minors, and increased literacy and the current capital, and not subject female rights. to British rule (although its Imam North and South Yemen fought a major border war in 1979, and again claimed dominion over South Yemen 11 as well). in 1980. Both countries tried vari- The death of the Imam of North ous unity governments, all of which Yemen in September 1962 touched were unsuccessful until the May 1990 off a coup attempt by republican ele- unification of the North and South to ments in the military. Egyptian presi- become modern Yemen. The move dent Gamal Abdel Nasser, a natural was prompted by two events in South ally of these republican officers and Yemen: a nasty civil war and the end of a persistent thorn in the side of the Soviet subsidies in 1989. Oil had been British, immediately flew in troops found in between both countries, and recognized the new state.9 and unity seemed a better outcome than fighting over the oil deposits;

The Journal of International Security Affairs 89 Ian Illych Martinez

although roughly seventy percent of 100 people have been killed since the oil lies in South Yemen.12 2007. Southerners have now raised Yemen’s joy at reunification was the former Marxist flag of South short-lived. Iraq invaded Kuwait in Yemen and wax nostalgic for Brit- August 1990, and Yemen took Sad- ish rule. dam’s side, voting later that year President Saleh, in other words, against a United Nations resolution is facing a secessionist movement of which sought the ouster of Iraqi his own creation, fostered by dismiss- troops from Kuwait. Yemen’s decision ing those involved in the 1994 upris- led to the expulsion by Saudi Arabia ing, by limiting their opportunities, of all Yemeni guest workers, causing and by neglecting the South’s econ- the immediate collapse of Yemen’s omy while at the same time draining economy, which relied heavily on for- its oil. Without significant reforms, eign remittances.13 The U.S. stopped the Southern secession could find nearly $70 million in aid. Meanwhile, common cause with AQAP, trans- in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden— forming a local political struggle into whose father was Yemeni—was pro- a regional religious one. posing the mountains of Yemen as a training base for his army to oust 14 the Iraqis. (The Saudis rejected his Al-Qaeda attacks in Yemen proposal and instead turned to the United States.) December 29, 1992: Bombing of In 1994, all-out rebellion broke hotel in Aden aimed at U.S. troops out in the South, and Saleh used transiting through to Somalia. No former jihadists from the Afghan casualties. This is al-Qaeda’s first campaign against the secessionists.15 official attack. These fighters looted everything of January 9, 2000: attempted value in Aden. Massive street pro- attack against the USS The Sul- tests broke out in 2007, instigated by livans fails when the boat carrying former soldiers and Marxists claim- the explosives sinks. ing that their pensions had not been October 12, 2000: The USS Cole paid and that major opportunities and is attacked in Aden Harbor, killing jobs went to northerners.16 A group 17 and wounding 39. calling itself the Southern Movement June 1, 2001: Attempted bomb- was born, with a platform advocating ing of U.S. Embassy. for independence. In the summer of October 6, 2002: In a similar 2008, street riots erupted through- attack to the Cole, the French oil out the South.17 In May 2009, the tanker Limburg was attacked, kill- protests turned deadly when over 16 ing one French sailor. people were killed and the Southern March 2008: Attempted mortar newspaper’s offices were raided and attack against the U.S. Embassy. closed. Shortly thereafter, Ali Salem September 2008: Car bombing of al-Bidh, Southern Yemen’s Marxist U.S. Embassy leaves sixteen dead, pre-unification president, was made including one American. leader of the Southern Movement. April 2008: Mortar attacks For now, the Southern Move- against the Italian Embassy. ment is peaceful. However, rumors April 2010: Attempted suicide of it stockpiling weapons have cir- bombing attack against the British culated for over a year.18 More than Ambassador.

90 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Yemeni Vortex

Al-Qaeda comes home of al-Qaeda in Yemen, was killed in Around 1990, Osama bin Laden, a U.S. Predator drone strike. Subse- convinced the U.S. had made a secret quently, in September 2004, a judge alliance with Sana’a, began financing sentenced to death four of the USS jihadi operations in Yemen from his Cole planners. That same year, the home in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.19 Bin leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia— Laden began to travel to Yemen, advo- a Yemeni—was ambushed and killed cating a revolt against the govern- by Saudi forces. With the court ruling ment there. His actions, along with and further government action, the his financing, eventually brought movement was driven underground President Saleh to Riyadh in protest. and its operations severely restricted. Bin Laden’s subsequent move to The onslaught prompted a the Sudan, following a brief spell in change of tactics. In March 2008, Afghanistan, did nothing to temper al-Qaeda websites began instructing his activism toward Yemen. In 1992, their members to go to Yemen, lead- al-Qaeda declared that the U.S. mili- ing to an upsurge in attacks against tary presence in Saudi Arabia and Western targets there.23 Less than a Yemen should be targeted. It began year later, in January 2009, al-Qaeda’s arming Somali factions, which subse- franchises in Yemen and Saudi Arabia quently battled U.S. forces in Soma- merged, announcing the union in lia in October 1993.20 In November a webcast made by former Guantá- 1995, al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. mili- namo Bay detainees and graduates tary advisory facility in Riyadh, and of a Saudi rehabilitation program.24 in June 1996 the Khobar Towers were The founder of the new hybrid group targeted. From 2003-2007, Saudi appeared to be none other than Arabia was engulfed in a series of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a former assis- terrorist attacks. In response, Saudi tant to bin Laden and one of the 23 security forces ruthlessly hunted suspects who broke out of a Yemeni down al-Qaeda operatives, success- prison in 2006. Al-Qaeda’s second-in- fully pushing them largely out of the command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, him- Kingdom and into Yemen.21 self confirmed al-Wuhayshi as “emir” There, al-Qaeda launched one of AQAP and endorsed the merger.25 of its most spectacular attacks. In The developments raised worries October 2000, the USS Cole docked in Washington. “Yemen is reemerg- in Aden Harbor pursuant to the 1998 ing as a jihadist battleground and U.S.-Yemeni treaty, which allowed potential regional base of operations U.S. warships to refuel there. Tar- for Al Qaeda [sic] to plan internal geting a vessel in Yemen had been a and external attacks, train terror- goal of al-Qaeda since 1998, and the ists, and facilitate the movement of attack on the USS Cole was financed operatives,” Dennis Blair, then the and planned by bin Laden himself.22 Director of National Intelligence, The resulting suicide attack killed 17 told the Senate Select Committee and wounded 40, and was hailed as on Intelligence in February 2009.26 a “great victory” for bin Laden. Al- Subsequently, that May, Deputy CIA Qaeda waited for the U.S. to retaliate, Director Stephen Kappes visited but it never did. Yemen in an effort to convince Presi- Nearly a year after 9/11, Abu dent Saleh to take the offensive in Ali al-Harithi, the mastermind of targeting AQAP.27 Since then, Wash- the USS Cole bombing and the head ington has matched its political atten-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 91 Ian Illych Martinez

tion with financial backing. While the water is spotty; half the population is Obama administration has stopped illiterate, unemployment for those 15 repatriating detained Yemenis held at to 24 stands at nearly fifty percent, the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo— and half the population lives on less hoping in some measure to “drain the than $2 a day.30 Western and Arab swamp” in the southern Gulf—it has donors need to step in to prevent a also earmarked $150 million in mili- complete socio-economic collapse. tary assistance for Sana’a this year, Regional neighbors should loosen more than double the $67 million in restrictions on the employment of aid the Yemeni government received Yemenis in the region, even as the in 2009.28 government in Sana’a is prodded to enact systemic reforms. Secession- Preventing state failure ists in the South require a bigger President Saleh, who cannot run voice in the government, and must be for political office after 2013 unless made to understand that separation he amends the country’s constitu- will not necessarily equate to a rise in tion, is facing his toughest tests since living standards. The role of Iman—a assuming power in 1978. Riven by nod to the Huthi—similarly could be conflicts in the north and south, and created as a ceremonial post. beset by an increasingly aggressive, Whatever happens, neither adventurist AQAP, Yemen is descend- Washington nor Riyadh should suc- ing into chaos. cumb to the temptation to get sucked The implications for Washington further into Yemen’s troubles. Nor and its allies are grave. A collapse of should they simply be content to pre- the Yemeni state would most directly serve the current status quo, provid- threaten the security of Sana’a’s ing a virtual blank check for the Saleh immediate neighbors in the southern government. Yemen’s problems are Gulf. It could also, however, serve to deeper, and more diverse, than are destabilize regional shipping, with commonly understood. The solution local jihadists seeking to link to their to them should be as well. brethren on the Horn of Africa— something which has long been a stated goal of AQAP.29 But an infusion of Western special forces—an option currently being discussed in Washington—is 1. Brian Whitaker, “Conflict in Saada,” Middle not the answer, since the presence East International 1 no. 729, July 9, 2004. of significant numbers of U.S. troops 2. As cited in Andrew McGregor, “Shi’ite would surely serve as a magnet for Insurgency in Yemen: Iranian Intervention jihadists throughout the Peninsula. or Mountain Revolt?” Jamestown Founda- tion Terrorism Monitor 2, iss. 16, August 11, Nor should Riyadh overeact to any 2004. Huthi provocations, or Iran’s alleged 3. “Many Killed in Yemen Air Raid,” BBC complicity in the conflict. (London), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ Rather, the solution lies in soft hi/8260414.stm. 4. “A Bloody Border,” The Economist, Novem- power. After years of mismanage- ber 5, 2009; “Saudis Impose Naval Blockade ment and neglect under the Saleh off Yemen Coast,” Associated Press, Novem- regime, Yemen is suffering from ber 11, 2009; Michael Slackman and Robert desperate economic and societal F. Worth, “Saudi and Yemeni Forces Fight Rebels on 2 Fronts,” New York Times, Janu- malaise. Outside the cities access to

92 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Yemeni Vortex

ary 12, 2010; “Yemen: Rebels Offer Truce to base and as a springboard into Saudi Arabia Saudis,” New York Times, January 26, 2010, A7. is very distinct from what pundits have said 5. “A Bloody Border”; See also Steven Erlanger, is Yemen’s affinity to al-Qaeda based on “Yemen’s President Says Government Is Bin Laden’s ancestral claims. The latter is Willing to Talk to Disarmed Qaeda Fight- simply not the case. ers,” New York Times, January 11, 2010, A5. 15. Steven Erlanger, “Yemen’s President Says 6. “Yemen’s Huthi Rebellion Has a Regional Government Is Willing to Talk to Disarmed Dimension,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Novem- Qaeda Fighters,” New York Times, January ber 10, 2009, http://www.janes.com/news/ 11, 2010, A5. security/terrorism/jiwk/jiwk091110_1_n. 16. “Unraveling Yemen,” The Economist, June shtml. 2, 2009, http://www.economist.com/ 7. Hakim Almasmari, “President Saleh: research/articlesBySubject/displaystory. Houthis Were Trained by Hezbollah cfm?subjectid=5189851&story_id=E1_ Experts,” Yemen Post, April 10, 2010, TPSGGQDS&source=login_payBarrier. http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789. 17. “Jangled Nerves,” The Economist, October aspx?ID=3&SubID=456&MainCat=3; “Pity 2, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/ Those Caught in the Middle,” The Econo- middle-east/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_ mist, November 21, 2009, 49. TNPQNNDQ. 8. “Yemen Finds Iranian-Made Weapons in 18. Ibid. al-Houthi Caches,” 26 September News, 19. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New August 21, 2009, http://www.26sep.net/ York: Vintage Books, 2006), 174. news_details.php?lng=english&sid=56562; 20. John Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Histor- Intelligence and Terrorism Information ical Perspective, Global Presence and Impli- Center, “Yemen Announced That It Seized cations for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: an Iranian Arms Ship Carrying Weapons for Congressional Research Service, February the Shi’ite Rebels in the Country’s North,” 5, 2010), 6. November 5, 2009, http://www.terrorism- 21. Ibid. info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/ 22. Ibidem. eng_n/html/iran_e036.htm; “Pity Those 23. “Yemen and al-Qaeda: A Nice Safe Haven for Caught in the Middle.” Jihadists,” The Economist, January 29, 2009, 9. Manfred W. Wenner, Modern Yemen 1918- http://www.economist.com/world/middle- 1966 (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore east/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13041120. 1967); Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: Why 24. Ibid. and Where They Are Happening (London: 25. “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Bloomsbury, 1992), 369; see also Robert Al-Jazeera (Doha), December 22, 2009, Lacey, The Kingdom (New York: Har- http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middle- court Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 342; Albert east/2009/12/2009122935812371810.html. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New 26. Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates, 11. York: Warner Books, 1992), 411; Michael 27. Ibid. B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 6, 1967 and 28. “A Lonely Master of a Divided House,” The the Making of the Modern Middle East (New Economist, April 24 2010. York: Presidio, 2002), 15. 29. “Is Al Qaeda in Yemen Connected to Al 10. Brogan, World Conflicts, 370. Qaeda in Somalia?” Christian Science 11. R. Ernest Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Monitor, January 7, 2010, http://www. Military History (New York: HarperCollins, csmonitor.com/World/2010/0107/Is-Al- 1993), 1505. Another border war was fought Qaeda-in-Yemen-connected-to-Al-Qaeda-in- in 1980. Somalia. 12. Michael Horton, “Why South Yemen Is 30. Robert F. Worth, “U.S. to Join Talks on Help- Pushing for Secession,” Christian Sci- ing Yemen Gain Stability,” New York Times, ence Monitor, December 15, 2009, http:// January 27, 2010, A12. www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle- East/2009/1215/Why-southern-Yemen-is- pushing-for-secession; “A Lonely Master of a Divided House,” The Economist, April 24, 2010. 13. Tim McKintosh-Smith, Yemen: The Unknown Arabia (New York: Overlook, 2001), 251. 14. Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom (New York: Viking, 2009), 148. The fact that Bin Laden wants to use Yemen as a training

The Journal of International Security Affairs 93 FNM_Airforce_JINSA01_27.pdf 1 1/27/10 11:01 AM

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Defeating Decentralized Terrorism David Grange

he global security environment is changing dramatically. The complexity of current and future national security realities highlights the necessity of Tbringing together all elements of national power in unprecedented fashion. Since the attacks of 9/11, U.S. government entities including the intelligence community and the Departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security have made significant strides in synchronizing efforts at both the strategic (i.e., regional planning) and tactical (i.e., counterterrorism) levels. But the most powerful tools of U.S. national power—our economic and informational engines in the public and private sectors—have yet to be effectively harnessed by the U.S. government.

This is a critical error. For, if properly synchronized, America’s economic and private sectors hold the power to proactively create “positional advantage” for the United States government and its allies against terrorist adversaries that employ irregular methods to exploit increasingly non- or under-governed spaces, such as Somalia and Yemen. Furthermore, the same initiative can leverage non-governmental organizations and other private sector entities to improve the success rate of America’s public/private international development projects. So, where in this article terrorist leadership is cited as the target the reader may understand that the utilization of network co-option can be employed, for example, to maximize development assistance in areas where criminal gangs, for instance, prevent access and/or intimidate the local populace.

Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, USA (ret.), was an Army Aviator, Ranger, Special Forces (Green Beret), and Special Operating Units officer. He commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. He is currently CEO of PPD, Inc. For nine years, he provided CNN with on-camera commentary. He is now a military analyst for CBS. David Grange

Today, the understanding of this tage to support operations. These potential is becoming increasingly amorphous, seemingly invisible commonplace. Yet implementation has adversary networks coalesce around lagged behind, at least at the official a shared, central cause such as inter- level. Here, the U.S. government can national jihad (global Islamic revo- learn from successful private sector lution) and use all the tools at their businesses, which have effectively disposal to collaborate and execute employed networks in global commer- decentralized operations. cial activities, and from philanthropies To counter this vast, multi- and not-for-profit organizations, which faceted “network of networks,” have done the same across a wide American networks must be thor- range of humanitarian fields. Harness- oughly restructured. Accordingly, ing these actors can help Washington an ongoing attempt is under way to across a variety of complex contem- foster friendly networks that work in porary security challenges, from concert to disrupt enemy activity. To operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to do so, the inward-looking tendencies Russian dominance over the Republic of U.S. government bureaucracies of Georgia to the looming threat of Ira- must be dramatically reduced if not nian nuclear weapons. eliminated. Such deficiencies stymie information sharing and collabora- If properly synchronized, tion. Still in its infancy, this friendly America’s economic and private network model has begun to chart successes and offers possibilities for sectors hold the power to expansion across the range of those proactively create “positional areas that make up a country’s abil- advantage” for the United States ity to influence other states, known as government and its allies against the DIME spectrum: diplomacy, intelligence, military and economic. terrorist adversaries that employ Previously untapped and unco- irregular methods to exploit ordinated private and corporate increasingly non- or under- resources can be integrated into a larger public/private sector strategy governed spaces. to form another front in the larger It takes a network to American approach to irregular conflict. Such a system, however, involves defeat a network more than sophisticated collabora- The enormous challenges pre- tion technology and strategic part- sented by the decentralized nature nerships. To operate efficiently, the of modern terrorist organizations has system would require stimulating net- served as an impetus for significant works around specific problem sets advances in collaboration and inter- and areas, and organizing and manag- agency coordination on the part of the ing Communities of Interest (COIs). U.S. government. The complex and often compartmentalized networks within which these terrorist groups Communities of Interest operate include increasingly complex Communities of Interest (COI) sub-networks in areas such as financ- describes activity that often appears ing, logistics, training, media, and randomly around shared causes propaganda to gain positional advan- and is manifested on the Internet through social websites, chat rooms

96 The Journal of International Security Affairs Defeating Decentralized Terrorism and blogs. Frequently spontane- goals that attract the Communities of ous, this phenomenon is accelerated Interest in the first place. At the core through information-age technology of this intentional self-organization that makes possible an improved situ- is a Coordination and Collaboration ational awareness as disparate indi- node that acts as the catalyst for mobi- viduals and groups post information, lization. Examining the evolution of pictures and videos. terrorist networks, counterterrorism In certain cases, these spontane- theory refers to these Coordination ous COIs change from simply a group and Collaboration nodes as “identity with a shared awareness to collective entrepreneurs,” “operational lead- action. Armed with instantaneous ers,” and “spiritual sanctioners.” information, improved access, and The 2007 New York Police connected by a common cause, ele- Department report “Radicalization in ments of the network emerge to drive the West: The Homegrown Threat” activities that the individuals that provides this description: compose it would otherwise be incapable of accomplishing on their own. Although there are many groups Intentionally creating such a net- or clusters of individuals that are work, or COI structure, to counter on the path of radicalization, each those of the terrorist organization group needs certain archetypes to evolve from just being a “bunch of requires both an understanding and guys” to an operational terrorist employment of the organizing prin- cell. All eleven case studies had: ciples that “spontaneously” cause a random COI to form. These prin- • A “spiritual sanctioner” ciples can be summarized by several who provides the justifica- common traits: tion for jihad—a justification that is especially essential • Group focus around a common for the suicide terrorist. In come cases, the sanctioner and/or shared problem was the nucleus around which the cluster formed. • A specific event or new information that draws them to this problem • An “operational leader” who is essential as the group • Shared situational awareness decides to conduct a terrorist made possible by the Internet act—organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.1 • A combined willingness to contribute to the solution and work for the Therefore, it is essential that greater good of the community friendly, intentionally formed Com- munities of Interest have a similar • The employment of individual mobilizing and operational leader- and group efforts to solve mutual ship element. problems COIs can be created Community of Interest While unintentional Communi- structure ties of Interest may spontaneously The COI network is, in essence, a form, a COI structure can actually be framework composed of the common created around a specific problem. challenges, problems, and collective

The Journal of International Security Affairs 97 David Grange

By intentionally attracting known nizational structure of the network and emerging players to a high- together. Trusted agents or known priority common problem, the net- experts, often introduced through work of Communities of Interest liaisons, are charter members of the can be quickly organized and led. COI. Over time, members will intro- These organizations and resources duce other members who add value are often disparate, untapped, and to the network. may already be acting individu- Direction and focus are critical. ally for their own benefit. Focused The Coordination and Collaboration together, they can act as a unit of nodes are essentially responsible for employment (UE), which is essen- managing the disparate interests, tially a highly modifiable unit fostering entrepreneurial initia- that integrates and synchronizes tives, and maintaining operational groups so it can take on larger priorities within the COI. These and more complex issues. The designated representatives must UE, when combined with essential intuitively and selflessly think about ingredients from other elements in collaboration, and always be looking the system, can create, in a sense, to share/link information to other a comprehensive “private/public efforts. They must tie in vertically sector combined arms team” whose to the leadership—usually a stake- sum is greater than its parts. holder to the Coordination and Col- Such a UE would be best applied laboration node—outward to COI toward problem solving rather than stakeholders, and horizontally to simply rallying around a cause. their fellow COI Coordination and Furthermore, led by loosely inte- Collaboration nodes. grated leadership nodes (described Communities of Interest are below), this network of Communi- expected to adapt, flex, and evolve ties of Interest will inherently find over time. The key to successful lead- other stakeholders, discover other ership and management is flexibility critical elements of information, and and focus. To be relevant to the net- spur multiple approaches against the work, Communities of Interest must common problem set. integrate into the common cause, encourage collaboration, solve asso- Employing intentional ciated challenges, and channel effort Communities of Interest into shared credit. After a common cause, problem As with enemy networks, set, or “influence zone” is desig- friendly COI networks often require nated, the Coordination and Collab- multiple Communities of Interest oration node is responsible for its acting independently. Geographi- daily and weekly management and cally, they can be located forward, maintenance. The community’s in or around the “influence zone,” members interact primarily through or in safe rear areas including the information technology such as United States. Ideally, a combination video teleconferencing and e-mail. of the two provides optimized place- Nevertheless, it is the human dimen- ment. In all cases, it is imperative sion—the people, relationships, col- that Coordination and Collaboration laborative spirit, and focus—that nodes and the Communities of Inter- serves as the glue binding the orga- est communicate and work together.

98 The Journal of International Security Affairs Defeating Decentralized Terrorism

Boosting international operating environment is compatible economic development with future development programs Private sector Communities of and initiatives. They would also scout Interest could be developed using for indigenous and allied investor net- similar steps at the investor, cor- works that may have mutual interests porate headquarters, and local in establishing capital growth. overseas levels, albeit with several For instance, in a friendly “influ- unique caveats. Ideally, investors ence zone,” private sector COIs may would be motivated by a compelling be financially self-sustaining, rely- national problem that coincides with ing on outside synchronization for a personal interest or opportunity for more strategic priorities and for financial gain. Mobilized by a third coordination once operations in the party private sector venture capital local environment commence. Out- node, they would invest resources so side investors from a private sector that others (or they themselves) can COI may be able to pool resources, improve the situation or solve a criti- confident in the ability of specialized cal problem. security teams to provide backup for This venture capital node would mitigating risks associated with eco- need to be aligned with the strategic nomic development. Consequently, intent of U.S. government entities to while the private sector Coordina- ensure that corporate stakeholder tion and Collaboration node would Communities of Interest receive the synchronize priorities with the necessary assistance, access and/or Department of Defense and U.S. gov- placement to thrive in the affected ernment-designated influence zones, regions. It would be naïve to think external partnerships would more the private sector would embark on inherently involve U.S. embassies, a risky proposition in an emerging local commercial entities, interna- market or ungoverned state without tional industry, and NGOs. reasonable assurances of enhanced To manage resources more effi- security or competitive advantage. ciently, private sector businesses Thus, a private sector COI node would be the vanguard for friendly should mobilize and establish a for- influence zones and expend more ward presence to assess security resources on the front end while the risks, conduct advanced economic U.S. government would benefit from scouting, and form local area private a more receptive local populace. sector networks. Depending on the In a hostile “influence zone,” operating zone, this can be done inde- however, it is anticipated that the pri- pendently or to augment existing U.S. vate sector may require more com- government efforts. This advance plex interaction with the Department force/risk mitigation team of special- of Defense and other elements of ized private sector personnel would the U.S. government on all levels— be prepared to enter the region as a from strategic to tactical—including sort of “economic special operations planning and execution, rear sector force” to train, advise, and assist the resources, and forward deployed sup- local population. Self-sustaining, they port. This is necessary for a variety would establish local networks and of reasons, including security de- build security and economic capac- confliction, augmentation of existing ity at the local level while interfacing Department of Defense/U.S. govern- with the host nation to ensure that the ment contracts, as well as collabora-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 99 David Grange

tion across the aforementioned DIME while powerful, can solve only a finite spectrum. For areas under some number of problems. To effectively form of international administration, confront an irregular adversary who the effort would be more of a hand-in- has enjoyed relative freedom of move- hand approach, while areas actively ment in the shadows, in the schools, contested by enemy forces would in the boardrooms, on the Internet, be left mostly for U.S. government and has created instability and uncer- forces initially, most likely harness- tainty, and thwarted development ing existing private sector contracts and progress. and deliverables, followed by inde- This model is a conceptual start- pendently operating private sector/ ing point for a serious dialogue of business COIs once conditions have how to make private sector mobiliza- been set. tion successful on a scale not yet seen Therefore, in a hostile zone, in the Global War on Terror. Drawing while the crisis may attract private from lessons learned in academia, sector interest quickly, it is expected social networking, and Department that once a COI emerges to assist of Defense/Information Architec- ongoing efforts, financially there will ture fusion centers, the central tenets be some level of sub-contracting and expressed in this brief article provide mutual support brokered to augment an outline for coalescing economic prime contractors. Through shared and private sector strengths with tra- situational awareness, private sector ditional Department of Defense and COIs can pool resources and expand U.S. government efforts. to other COIs with similar interests to execute privately what the U.S. government or the Department of Defense would be incapable of doing. An example of this may be the formation of a private COI composed “Defeating Decentralized Terrorism” of industry experts from untapped is adapted from “Whole of Nation areas that get involved analytically Approach to Irregular Conflict/War- at first, then are “tapped” to support fare” by Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, ongoing efforts through sub-con- USA (ret.), keynote address, IW Sympo- tracts to existing prime contractors sium, MacDill AFB, September 2, 2009. if their solutions are beneficial to existing efforts or can fill gaps and seams otherwise left uncovered. 1. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radical- ization in the West: The Homegrown Threat Toward a “Whole of (New York: New York City Police Depart- Nation” approach ment, n.d.), http://hoekstra.house.gov/ The incorporation and synchro- UploadedFiles/NYPD_Report-Radicaliza- tion_in_the_West.pdf. nization of America’s economic and private sectors into government efforts, referred to as a “Whole of Nation” approach, is necessary for the U.S. and allied efforts to actively engage and defeat the global terrorist threat. The U.S. government,

100 The Journal of International Security Affairs Radicalism South of the Border

Jon B. Perdue

he point at which the United States’ southern border changes from a political issue to a security issue has been Treached. While it has been utilized primarily as a political tool in recent years, new revelations of actual terror cells in Mexico have made border security a far more serious issue.

When General Douglas Fraser, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, mentioned the increased presence in Venezuela of the Quds Force, the section of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for foreign operations, in a hearing in March, it put Islamist infiltration on the radar amongst policy circles in Washington, though the issue received little attention in the media. But the issue received greater scrutiny after June 23rd of this year, when Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC) wrote a letter to Director of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano requesting a task force be set up and a report to Congress issued on the cooperation between Islamic terrorist groups and Mexican drug cartels. Myrick’s letter quoted former Chief of Operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Michael Braun, who reported: “Hezbollah relies on the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartel… They work together; they rely on the same shadow facilitators. One way or another they are all connected.”1 The issue was given further import with the July 22 presentation to the Per- manent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) by Colombia’s

Jon B. Perdue is the Director of Latin America Programs at The Fund for American Studies in Washington, D.C. This article is excerpted from his forthcoming book on Iran and Venezuela, The War of All the People (Potomac Books). Jon Perdue

OAS representative Ambassador America has been supplanted by the Luis Alfonso Hoyos, revealing that far more radicalized and menacing Venezuela was allowing the region’s threat of Islamic terrorism. To gauge most lethal terrorist group, the Revo- the problem, it is important for policy lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia makers to understand the differences (FARC), a safe haven within its ter- between long-term migration and ritory. Hoyos’ two-hour presentation strategic infiltration in the Western included intelligence reports, satel- hemisphere. lite photos and witness testimonies The first Muslim to arrive in the that laid out the case with embarrass- Americas, Estavanico, or “Stephen ingly irrefutable evidence to an OAS the Moor,” traveled to Cuba and that had grown accustomed to little Hispaniola (present day Dominican more than supportive silence about Republic and Haiti) in 1527 with Pán- the region’s rogue regimes.2 filo de Narváez’s futile expedition to colonize Florida. In the nearly 500 The history of Middle Eastern years since, only Suriname, where and Latin American terrorist Muslims make up 21 percent of the country’s small population of some cooperation is long and varied, 510,000 people, boasts a Muslim and belies the notion that regimes population greater than 10 percent that use radicalized religion of the total. Just 30 years ago, Roman Cathol- to gain and hold power are icism claimed almost 90 percent of incompatible with those that use the total population in Latin America. radicalized political ideology. Today, only 55 to 65 percent of Latin Americans count themselves as Cath- The religious of the olic. While there has been a large Middle East and the increase in “evangelicos,” or non- secular of Latin America Catholic Christians, there has also The nexus of Middle Eastern been an effective recruiting effort by Islamist terrorist groups with Marxist various Muslim groups. and Maoist terrorists in Latin America Whereas the influence of Islam in is often treated as a novel and unusual the past in Latin America was mostly partnership between strange bedfel- based on smaller immigrant Muslim lows that share no cultural or ideolog- enclaves, there has been some recent ical ties. This “burqa-bikini paradox,” success in proselytizing indigenous so to speak, is too often mistaken as tribes and remote populations by both a new, and likely ephemeral, relation- Shi’a and Sunni preachers and activ- ship of convenience. ists. Muslim populations significant In truth, the history of Middle in numbers if not total percentages Eastern and Latin American terror- exist today in Argentina, Panama, ist cooperation is long and varied, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and and belies the notion that regimes Brazil, which contains the largest that use radicalized religion to gain Muslim community in South Amer- and hold power are incompatible with ica with estimates of its size ranging those that use radicalized political from 250,000 to nearly one million. ideology, despite their ostensible cul- The most successful Islamic prosely- tural differences. Since the end of the tizing movement in Latin America is Cold War, Soviet influence in Latin believed to be Spain’s al-Murabitun.

102 The Journal of International Security Affairs Radicalism South of the Border

The al-Murabitun, an Islamist In March 2009, the then-com- revival movement founded by a Scot- mander of U.S. Southern Command, tish convert to Islam who goes by Admiral James G. Stavridis, told the the name Shaykh Dr. Abdalqadir House Armed Services Committee as-Sufi, draws inspiration from the that the connection between illicit Almoravids, a Berber dynasty of the drug trafficking and Islamic radical western Sahara who ruled North terrorism was a growing threat to the Africa and Spain in the 11th and 12th United States, and stated that the pre- century and included a significant vious August, “U.S. Southern Com- population of converts to Islam from mand supported a Drug Enforcement Spain and other European countries. Administration operation, in coor- The al-Murabitun advocate a dination with host countries, which “collective reversion to Islam and a targeted a Hezbollah-connected drug return to the region’s true heritage,” trafficking organization in the Tri- as opposed to what most Muslims Border Area.” would consider a true conversion to Stavridis also mentioned that an Islam. The al-Murabitun preach a interagency operation the previous form of Islam that is not imbued with October led to the arrest of dozens of “imperialism,” but instead claims to Colombians associated with a Hezbol- serve as a “remedy for the oppres- lah-connected narco-trafficking and sion and destruction brought by money-laundering ring that funded Spanish conquest.”3 Hezbollah terrorism worldwide.5 It has been reported that the Recently, numerous cases have al-Murabitun made an attempt, been reported of Hezbollah operat- though unsuccessful, to form an ing on the border with Mexico. In alliance with Mexico’s Subcoman- 2008, Salim Boughader Mucharra- dante Marcos, the head of the fille, a Mexican of Lebanese descent, Zapatista Army of National Libera- was sentenced to 60 years in prison tion (EZLN) of Mexico, after his on charges of organized crime and unsuccessful 1994 uprising in Chi- immigrant smuggling. Mucharra- apas. Although Marcos refused fille had been arrested six years ear- the offer, many of the Zapatista lier for smuggling immigrants into insurgents that belong to the the United States, some of whom Tzotzils, a Yucatan tribe, did con- were connected to Hezbollah. A year vert to Islam, a fact that alarmed before, in 2001, Mahmoud Youssef Mexican President Vicente Fox Kourani illegally crossed the Mexi- enough to accuse them of having can border and traveled to Dear- links to al-Qaeda.4 born, Michigan, where he was later Since the 1980s, the terrorist charged and convicted for “material group Hezbollah has been recruit- support and resources ... to Hezbol- ing and raising money from Leba- lah,” according to the indictment.6 nese and Syrian immigrants living In July 2008, it was reported in mostly in three specific areas—the the Mexican newspaper El Universal Tri-Border (TBA) Area at the inter- that a U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin- section of Argentina, Brazil and Para- istration (DEA) document suggested guay, Venezuela’s Margarita Island, that since 2005 two Mexican drug and the Caribbean coastline of cartels had been sending operatives Colombia, concentrated in the towns to train in Iran with the Revolutionary of Maicao and San Andres. Guard Corps. Reportedly, the train-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 103 Jon Perdue

ing included instruction in sniper ish High Court Judge Eloy Velasco tactics and use of rocket launchers.7 issued warrants for 13 ETA and Though the DEA would not confirm FARC terrorists, one of whom was the report, it clearly indicated that a Venezuelan government employee there was now a link between Latin who was born in Spain. The Span- American narco-traffickers and ish High Court declared that the Middle Eastern terrorists. Venezuelan government had served In a speech in Mexico in 2007, as a go-between for ETA and FARC, Robert Grenier, the former head of and that, after the contact, the FARC the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, had sought logistical assistance from warned that the U.S. was concerned ETA if it chose to assassinate Colom- that Hezbollah or Hamas would try bian officials visiting Spain. Colom- to set up operations in Mexico in bia’s President Alvaro Uribe, the order to infiltrate America’s south- court said, was one of the targets. ern border and carry out terrorist According to the magistrate, attacks.8 His warning proved pre- several ETA terrorists had traveled scient when, as recently as July of to Venezuela to train members of the this year, a Hezbollah cell was busted FARC to use cell phones as detona- by Mexican police in Tijuana, where tors for bombs containing the explo- Mexicans of Lebanese origin had sive C4, and members of Venezuela’s been recruited to set up a cell to armed forces had accompanied them train for attacks against Israel and on at least one occasion. Several the West. The head of the opera- ETA terrorists had also traveled to tion, Jameel Nasr, had been under FARC camps in Colombia, via Ven- Mexican police surveillance as he ezuela, to receive guerrilla training. traveled frequently back and forth to The same day that the magistrate’s Lebanon, and also spent two months report was released, Spanish police in Venezuela in the summer of 2008.9 released the names of three ETA Nasr’s 2008 stay in Venezuela terrorists that were captured the day has become more troubling since the before. One of those terrorists, José 2010 publication of the book El Pales- Ayestaran, was wanted by Spainish tino, by Antonio Salas. Salas, a Span- authorities in connection with 10 ish journalist known for his earlier killings. Ayestaran had lived in Ven- book, Diario de un Skin, in which he ezuela for many years.10 infiltrated a skinhead group, repeated the exploit by going undercover as a The Chávez problem Muslim terrorist-in-training. Salas As Hugo Chávez has consoli- was able to travel worldwide amongst dated power in Venezuela and used terrorist operatives, and shot under- his country’s oil wealth to spread his cover video of several supposed terror- influence into other countries in the ist training camps inside Venezuela. region, his relationship with Iran has Spain, whose socialist president emerged as a growing threat to both José Luis Zapatero would normally the United States and his neighbors. maintain a close relationship with And while many have blithely dis- fellow traveler Venezuela President missed Chávez as more of a sideshow Hugo Chávez, demanded that Vene- than a threat, his ability to function zuela explain its assistance to Basque as a sanctions buster for Iran makes ETA terrorists plotting attacks on him a much bigger problem. But the Spanish soil. In March of 2010, Span- threat does not stop there.

104 The Journal of International Security Affairs Radicalism South of the Border

Within the Chávez regime, there of other Chávez acolytes with con- are a large number of apparatchiks nections to Hezbollah, Iraq’s Ba’ath and bureaucrats with ties to Hezbol- Party, and other terrorist and radical lah and other terrorist groups in posi- groups: tions that allow them to aid not only Iran, but other terrorists in the region Tarek William Saab Halabi, gover- as well. nor of the province of Anzoategui; The Miami Herald reported George Kabboul Abdelnour, who on Tarek El Aissami as far back as heads Bariven, the purchasing arm of state-owned Petroleos de 2003—a young Chávez confidante Venezuela, SA (PDVSA); Imaad who serves as both Minister of Inte- Saab, Venezuela’s ambassador to rior and Minister of Justice. El Ais- Syria; Radwan Sabbagh, president sami, age 34, was previously a radical of a mining company operating in student leader at the Universidad de the province of Orinoco; Aref Rich- los Andes, where, during his tenure any Jimenez, a brigadier general as student body president, “support- in the Venezuelan army who heads the military’s industrial company ers are alleged to have consolidated and is a director of PDVSA; Fadi their control of the Domingo Salazar Kabboul Abdelnour, PDVSA’s student dormitories and turned them director of planning; the minister into a haven for armed political and of interior’s sister, Amin Obayda criminal groups.”11 El Aissami Maddah, an execu- The Miami Herald article about tive in PDVSA’s technology arm; El Aissami noted that a report done Kamal Naim Naim, president of the Bolívar provincial assembly.12 by Oswaldo Alcala, the vice-rector of academic affairs at the university, stated that “of 1,122 people As he has purged many of his living in the eight residences, only former closest friends and military 387 are active students and more colleagues that have denounced his than 600 have no university con- descent into dictatorship, Chávez’s nections.” In other words, radical cabinet has become both younger groups with strong connections to and more radical. both Marxist terrorists as well as Hezbollah and the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath Parties had taken over the The Venezuela-Iran axis university’s dormitories. The modern relationship The vice-rector also mentioned between Venezuela and Iran began to the Miami Herald that, in the resi- in the 1960s, when both countries dences where this group of radical became founding members of the students lived with other students, Organization of Petroleum Exporting “There’s always weapons there. This Countries (OPEC). Despite the suc- is something you see in the movies.’’ cess of OPEC in keeping petroleum Before he was named minister of inte- prices high and the coffers of its mem- rior and justice, El Aissami served bers, including several terrorism- as deputy director in the ministry sponsoring states, filled, the most that issues cedulas (national identity current threat to the hemisphere cards) and passports. didn’t arrive until Hugo Chávez was Roger Noriega, former Assis- elected president of Venezuela. tant Secretary of State for Western Almost immediately after he took Hemisphere Affairs, reported a cadre office in 1999, Chávez made his first

The Journal of International Security Affairs 105 Jon Perdue

overtures to Mohammed Khatami, Chávez would continue helping then the Iranian president. Chávez Iran by running interference and partnered with Khatami to persuade buying influence in the United Nations the cartel to cut back oil supplies, and other international bodies. Vene- which tripled the price per barrel on zuela, Syria, and Cuba were the only the world market from $12 to $36 a countries on the 35-member board barrel by the year 2000.13 In return, of the UN’s International Atomic Khatami lobbied for Caracas to host Energy Agency (IAEA) to vote OPEC’s Second Summit in Septem- against reporting Iran’s nuclear activ- ber 2000. The last time that Venezu- ity to the Security Council.15 Khatami ela had hosted an OPEC meeting had would visit Chávez two more times been in 1975, when OPEC declared before he left office, once to boost an oil embargo against the West for the oil price at an OPEC meeting, its support of Israel in the 1973 Yom and once to sign bilateral cooperation Kippur War.14 agreements to solidify the Venezuela- Iran partnership. But the Venezuela- As Hugo Chávez has consolidated Iran relationship wouldn’t reach its power in Venezuela and used his zenith until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president of Iran on August country’s oil wealth to spread his 3, 2005. influence into other countries in In July 2006, Chávez made a spe- the region, his relationship with cial trip to Tehran to try to thwart international criticism of Iran for its Iran has emerged as a growing nuclear intransigence and for aiding threat to both the United States Hezbollah terrorists. He would visit and his neighbors. again in November 2007, and after a two-hour closed-door meeting with Chávez’s 2000 OPEC meeting Ahmadinejad, Chávez stated, “Here was considered a great success, as he are two brother countries, united rolled out the red carpet and put the like a single fist… God willing, with power of the state and his supporters the fall of the dollar, the deviant U.S. to work making sure that the visi- imperialism will fall as soon as pos- tors were treated like royalty. At the sible, too.”16 meeting, Chávez was able to secure Chávez was later given Iran’s an agreement by the cartel to restrict highest honor, the Higher Medal of production in order to keep the price the Islamic Republic of Iran, for “sup- of oil high. porting Tehran in its nuclear standoff The fact that Chávez secured with the international community.” the OPEC summit made him a major Upon receiving the medal, Chávez player within the organization. To took the occasion to condemn Israel consolidate his status, Chávez toured for the “terrorism” and “madness” of ten OPEC countries, including Iraq, its 2006 attacks in Lebanon, and also where he became the first head stated, “Let’s save the human race, of state of any nation to meet with let’s finish off the U.S. empire.”17 Saddam Hussein since the first Gulf After handing Chávez the medal, War. Saddam Hussein used the visit Ahmadinejad said, “Mr. Chávez is a to polish his image in the interna- kindred spirit, and my brother. He is tional community after being isolated a friend of the Iranian nation and the for the previous decade. people seeking freedom around the

106 The Journal of International Security Affairs Radicalism South of the Border world. He works perpetually against new gravitas. Chávez promised to sell the dominant system. He is a worker 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day to of God and a servant of the people.” Iran, a sanctions-busting maneuver Many of those in the foreign designed to help the regime, which, policy establishment didn’t take though awash in oil, lacks sufficient Hugo Chávez seriously until New refining capacity for its domestic York County District Attorney Robert needs. He has also been implicated by Morgenthau decided to hold a public various security agencies in provid- press conference in September 2009, ing the uranium necessary to effectu- where he reported the following: ate an Iranian nuclear warhead.19 Last year, Ha’aretz reported on In April 2008, Venezuela and Iran a secret three-page memo that Israel entered into a Memorandum of prepared before Deputy Foreign Understanding pledging full mili- Minister Danny Ayalon’s visit to an tary support and cooperation. It Organization of American States has been reported that since 2006 Iranian military advisors have conference in Honduras. Chávez been embedded with Venezu- and Bolivian President Evo Morales elan troops. Asymmetric warfare, strenuously denied the report’s find- taught to members of Iran’s Revo- ing that Venezuela and Bolivia were lutionary Guard, Hezbollah and providing Iran with uranium.20 Hamas, has replaced U.S. Army But it was recently announced field manuals as the standard by the Iranian minister of industry Venezuelan military doctrine.18 and mines, Ali Akhbar Mehravian, that Iran is providing $250 million Morgenthau laid out a very good in funding for mining operations case for taking the Iran-Venezuela in Bolivia that include geological partnership seriously, even more so prospecting for uranium and lith- with the world watching Iran’s esca- ium. “President Mahm[o]ud Ahma- lating belligerence and its nuclear dinejad has ordered us, in keeping intransigence. As the IAEA tries to with whatever priorities and proj- monitor Iran’s nuclear program, and ects are suggested, to begin assist- the United States tries to implement ing and transferring technology to sanctions designed to stop the rogue Bolivia through Iranian and Libyan nation’s ability to develop a deploy- experts,” the Iranian minister said able nuclear warhead, the veteran at a joint press conference in La Paz DA’s statement sounded even more with President Evo Morales. ominous: “based on information developed by my office, the Iranians The method within the with the help of Venezuela are now madness engaged in… economic and prolifera- It is hard not to dismiss Hugo tion sanctions-busting schemes.” Chávez as a madman or buffoon. He Though the active policy has a weekly television show, Alo Pres- throughout the Bush and Obama idente! (Hello President!), in which administrations has been to ignore he pontificates for Castro-length epi- Hugo Chávez’s histrionics, the abil- sodes on everything from novel ideas ity of oil-rich Venezuela to undermine on statecraft that pop into his head to the sanctions regime designed to the length of time that Venezuelans deter Iranian nuclear ambitions has should spend in the shower (in order given this cross-cultural relationship to save water during state-induced

The Journal of International Security Affairs 107 Jon Perdue water shortages). He has changed eral Warfare and Revolutionary the name of the country to match his Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics ersatz socialist governing program, of Asymmetric Warfare), by Jorge and on a whim changed Venezuelan Verstrynge, a Spanish social- standard time by 30 minutes. ist, distributed to the Venezuelan It would be foolhardy to dismiss Army as its new training manual. Chávez’s machinations as the ravings The manual calls Islamic ter- of a lunatic caudillo, however. He has rorism “the ultimate and preferred been part of a fifth column group method of asymmetric warfare within the Venezuelan military since because it involves fighters willing to at least 1980, where he and others sacrifice their lives to kill the enemy.”22 have planned coups as well as how The manual also includes instruc- they would govern once their coup tions for building and exploding a succeeded. And it should be noted nuclear “dirty bomb.” Verstrynge has that the main reason that the coup since become a consultant to the Ven- to remove Chávez in 2002 failed is ezuelan Army, whose members have because the opposition had no plan also been forced by Chávez to recite in place to make a constitutional tran- the Cuban-style pledge “Fatherland, sition in the event of a coup. Yet the Socialism or Death.”23 Chávez plan has continued apace. The “peripheral” portion of Ver- And whether coordinated or coinci- strynge’s title defines the strategy dental, Venezuela and Iran have fol- used by Iran of gradually increas- lowed similar military paths since ing its military capacity through Chávez became president. surrogates along the borders of its Since the Iran-Iraq War, although adversaries. Iran used Hezbollah Iran has built up all branches of its and Hamas on Israel’s northern military forces, it has not budgeted and southern borders to prepare for a war-ready conventional army. specialized missile crews. These Instead, Iran has focused on missile Hezbollah terrorists would be the technology to harass its neighbors ones responsible for starting the and naval capacity to be able to cause 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War by firing problems in the Persian Gulf. But Katyusha rockets into Israeli civil- more importantly, Iran has fortified ian areas.24 its networks for international sub- Even before the United States version with groups like Hezbollah government decided to remove and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran had Corps, or IRGC, that specialize in been utilizing this peripheral warfare asymmetrical warfare. tactic by financing, supplying and Similarly, Chávez began train- training several Shiite groups within ing his military in this method in Iraq. Iran continued this strategy 2004, at the “1st Military Forum on by building up a presence in Sudan, Fourth Generation War and Asym- just south of Egypt, in order to sup- metric War,” where he encouraged port terrorist operations against his soldiers to change their tactical President Hosni Mubarak’s govern- thinking from a conventional style to ment, and supported or infiltrated a “people’s war” paradigm.21 anti-government groups into Yemen Chávez then had a special to enable them to threaten Saudi Ara- edition of La Guerra Periferica bia’s oil infrastructure.25 y Islam Revolucionaria (Periph-

108 The Journal of International Security Affairs Radicalism South of the Border

The Hezbollah influence of warfare in which at least one of on Chávez the combatants is not a state but a Hugo Chávez also utilizes violent non-state entity. It has since “peripheral warfare” methods mod- been elaborated upon by military eled after Hezbollah’s war with Israel. and security experts, but it has yet He recently sent an invitation to sev- to be internalized within the state eral mayors in the Amazon region of security bureaucracy in Washing- Peru whose municipalities lie near ton, although military commanders the area where the borders of Peru, and the Department of Defense have Colombia and Brazil meet. Although shown a much greater comprehen- some mayors refused the invitation, sion and acceptance of the concept. others stated that they knew of some More recently, as cooperation that had accepted. One of the mayors has increased between Iran and Ven- explained, “Chávez is searching for ezuela against the U.S., the necessity friends on the border with Colom- of effectively countering the threat bia, probably because he considers has become a higher priority among Colombia an enemy and a threat.”26 policy circles. In this region of Peru, FARC members have also forced farmers to Iranian involvement grow coca leaves to supply its cocaine south of the border not operations that have been displaced unnoticed by the Colombian government’s On January 27, 2009, Secretary of aggressive anti-drug and counter- Defense Robert Gates testified about terror policies. Chavez’s entreaties to the threat of Iran in Latin America: mayors in the region, it is also specu- lated, are to buy their acquiescence I’m concerned about the level in the cross-border gambit of both of, frankly, subversive activity drug smuggling and coca cultivation, that the Iranians are carrying as well as providing a FARC refuge on in a number of places in Latin within Peru. America, particularly in South Peripheral warfare conducted by America and Central America. Hugo Chávez also includes the use They’re opening a lot of offices of “ALBA houses,” ostensible medi- and a lot of fronts, behind which cal offices for the poor that serve as they interfere in what is going on recruitment centers for insurgents in some of these countries. To in neighboring countries. These are be honest, I’m more concerned modeled after Cuba’s “Barrio Aden- about Iranian meddling in the 27 tro” program that has been utilized region than I am the Russians. for years to infiltrate spies and agi- tators into neighboring countries Still, there has been a tendency under the guise of doctors, coaches among regional security analysts to and advisors to help the poor. downplay this threat in America’s The concept of asymmetric backyard. Chris Zambelis, a Middle or fourth generation warfare was East analyst with the Washington- first defined in a 1989 Marine Corps based Jamestown Foundation, has Gazette article, “The Changing Face stated that, although Latin Ameri- of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” can islands like San Andres and Isla as a return to a decentralized form Margarita do have large numbers of Muslims, “there’s no evidence at all”

The Journal of International Security Affairs 109 Jon Perdue

to suggest that local Arab merchants same activities performed by are financing Hezbollah. other groups make up the greater Zambelis’ reasoning is worth criminal network so prominent in the AOR [Area of Responsibility]. considering, as there is an incentive Illicit activities, facilitated by the to cast any suspect activity within a AOR’s permissive environment, host government’s territory as ter- are the backbone for criminal ror-related. According to Zambelis, entities like urban gangs, narco- “Colombian and regional govern- terrorists, Islamic terrorists, and ments have played on U.S. concerns worldwide organized crime.30 by moving to curry favor with the United States to further their own The Treasury Department domestic agendas and international issued memos in 2002 and 2006 standing. In doing so, they often high- that stated that there were “clear light the alleged threat of al Qaeda or examples” of Islamic groups in other brands of radical Islamist ter- the region that “finance terror- rorism within their own borders.”28 ist activities” through ventures in the Tri-Border Area. The groups The Tri-Border Area mentioned in the memos included Still, this tendency to understate al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Egypt’s al- Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and Islamic the potential threat sounds oddly sim- 31 ilar to the treatment given al Qaeda Jihad, among others. following the 1993 World Trade In this Tri-Border Area, there Center bombing, and more impor- exists a sophisticated operation of tantly, it ignores previous attacks counterfeiting in everything from such as the 1994 bombing of the main luxury goods to health and beauty Jewish community center in Buenos products, alongside a growing popu- Aires, Argentina, in which 85 people lation of Hezbollah converts that are died. The bombing was traced back to suspected of terrorist fundraising. Hezbollah members that planned the While many of the converts may be operation from within the Tri-Border far from radical, the ability of the Area where the borders of Argentina, enclave to harbor terrorist elements, Paragay and Brazil come together.29 even unwittingly, makes its presence The U.S. Southern Command, a concern. which oversees coordination opera- The New Yorker’s Jeffrey Gold- tions in Latin America and the Carib- berg described the Tri-Border Area bean, said the following concerning as follows: security in Latin America: The sidewalks are dense with stands selling sunglasses and We have detected a number of perfume, and with tables of por- Islamic Radical Group facilita- nographic videos. Marijuana is tors that continue to participate sold openly; so are pirated CDs. in fundraising and logistical sup- The music of Eminem came from port activities such as money one shop; from another, there laundering, document forgery, were sounds familiar to me from and illicit trafficking. Proceeds South Lebanon and the Bekaa from these activities are support- Valley—martial Hezbollah music. ing worldwide terrorist activi- I bought a cassette recording of ties. Not only do these activities the speeches of Sayyid Hassan serve to support Islamic terrorist Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader.32 groups in the Middle East, these

110 The Journal of International Security Affairs Radicalism South of the Border

As non-state actors utilize United States, as we have done [for] peripheral warfare tactics around a long time, continue to strongly border areas, the affected states will support your approach, your execu- be forced to decide to use asymmet- tion, and obviously your results.”33 ric tactics in retaliation, or to watch The chairman’s remarks were a vin- their borders be used against them. dication for Uribe, who had been When Ecuador, under Chávez acolyte criticized for the very tactics that Rafael Correa, let the FARC cross its would turn the tide against a terror- borders while the Colombian Army ist insurgency that killed and kid- was denied the same right in order napped civilians as a policy. to pursue them, Colombian Presi- For the previous five years, most dent Alvaro Uribe decided to invoke American military leaders and politi- Colombia’s right to attack on either cians had treated Uribe as radioac- side of the border. tive, since he had made a speech in Uribe’s predecessor, President September 2003 in which he called Andres Pastrana, had ceded a Swit- human rights groups “spokesmen zerland-sized swath of Colombian ter- for terrorism” and “politickers of territory to the FARC while they worked rorism,” challenging them to “take on a peace treaty – a strategy that off their masks... and drop this cow- illustrated a lack of understanding of ardice of hiding their ideas behind asymmetric warfare. And while Pas- human rights.” trana’s administration subsequently Uribe was referring to the pan- crumbled for its failure to understand oply of soi disant “human rights” the conflict, the FARC consolidated groups that seemed to find abuses its power and utilized the “peace and atrocities everywhere that zone” as a rest and staging area for could be blamed on state police or increased terrorist operations. When military, but hardly commented on Uribe won the presidency after cam- the atrocities of the FARC and other paigning on using the “mano dura” terrorist groups that killed and (iron hand) against terrorism, the kidnapped civilians as a matter of FARC had grown such that it was policy. Moreover, these groups had able to fire mortars within striking been successful in bringing pros- distance of the reviewing stand at ecutions against members of the Uribe’s inauguration. military while defending the FARC as beleaguered freedom fighters. Advent of fourth Although Uribe was attacked fero- generation war ciously for his comments, he would President Uribe, more than any be later vindicated when some of his other president in the hemisphere, critics’ names showed up in FARC documents as allies or abettors of demonstrated an understanding of 34 the need to break from conventional the terrorists. techniques to fight a fourth generation war. On a visit to Colombia in Fighting and winning a March 2009, Admiral Mike Mullen, fourth generation war Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of In a fourth generation war, for Staff, congratulated Colombian every tactic that terrorist groups leaders “for the great successes utilize to gain an advantage over you have achieved” against narco- the state security apparatus, they terrorists, and stated, “We in the expose themselves to having those

The Journal of International Security Affairs 111 Jon Perdue

tactics turned against them. But this trained in Latin America, make the can only occur once the state actu- issue of Islamist infiltration in the ally makes the decision to take the region a security priority. Since then, threat seriously. The primary arma- there has been constant cooperation ment in a fourth generation war is between Latin American and Middle psychological or political warfare, Eastern terrorist groups. As Mexico or better stated, the will to use one’s battles its own escalating war against armaments carries as much impact narco-terrorists, the U.S. border will as the amount of killing power that become an increasingly precarious they contain. security issue as Hezbollah and other The decision by President Bush operatives take advantage of the to do the “surge” in Iraq was as much chaos to infiltrate the United States. a psychological warfare tactic as it And as Iran’s nuclear brinksmanship was a conventional tactic. Although brings the world closer to confron- the increase in troops would be used tation, its proxies in Latin America to secure and hold territory, it was will become an increasingly perilous the decision itself, to send in more threat much closer to home. troops despite worldwide condemnation, that let Iraq’s people and politicians know that the U.S. was serious and in for the long haul. The “message” was as important as the number of troops. 1. Myrick Calls for Taskforce to Investi- The enemies of modernity under- gate Presence of Hezbollah on the US Southern Border, Letter to Homeland stand this too, though policymakers Security Director Napolitano, June 25, may not yet. In a 1982 article in The 2010, http://myrick.house.gov/index. New York Times, Salvadoran guerrilla cfm?sectionid=22&itemid=55. Hector Oqueli summed up fourth 2. Uribe Ramps up Tension with Venezuela, Financial Times, July 25 2010, http://www. generation warfare succinctly, stat- ft.com/cms/s/0/01a671f8-981a-11df-b218- ing, “We have to win the war inside 00144feab49a.html. the United States.”35 This sentiment 3. Chris Zambelis, “Radical Islam in Latin was reinforced two years later by the America,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, No. 23, December 2, Sandinista leader Tomas Borge in a 2005. Newsweek interview, when he stated, 4. Ibid. “The battle for Nicaragua is not being 5. Ibid. waged in Nicaragua. It is being fought 6. “EXCLUSIVE: Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S.,”Washington Times, 36 in the United States.” This type of March 27, 2009, http://www.washington- political warfare, as these men under- times.com/news/2009/mar/27/hezbollah- stood, is much closer to think tank uses-mexican-drug-routes-into-us/. warfare than tank warfare, and its 7. “Iran Increases Its Political and Economic Presence in Latin America,” Israel News, combatants understand that winning April 19, 2009, 34. the hearts and minds of some policy- 8. Roee Nahmias, “Expert: Hama, Hizbollah makers in Washington is a far more Cells May Be Active in Mexico,” YNET, attainable objective than winning November 2, 2007. 9. “Mexico Thwarts Hezbollah Bid to Set Up over their own populations to their South American Network,” Ha’aretz, June threadbare ideologies. 7, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ The two bombings in Argentina diplomacy-defense/mexico-thwarts-hez- in 1992 and 1994, already believed to bollah-bid-to-set-up-south-american-network-1.300360. be the work of Hezbollah terrorists

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10. “Hugo Chávez ‘Terrorist Link’ Sparks Dip- 25. The Rise of Nuclear Iran, by Dore Gold, lomatic Row between Spain and Venezu- (Regnery Press, 2009), pp. 276-277. ela,” The Guardian, Tuesday, 2 March 2010, 26. Interview by the author during travel to the http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ Loreto region of Peru in October 2009. mar/01/hugo-chavez-venezuela-spain-eta. 27. “Gates: Iran Opening ‘Offices and a Lot of 11. Phil Gunson, “Chávez Appoints Radical to Fronts’ throughout Latin America,” World- Head Venezuelan Passport Agency,” Miami Tribune.com, Tuesday, February 10, 2009, Herald, November 28, 2003. http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtri- 12. “Hugo Chávez’s Criminal Nuclear Network: bune/WTARC/2009/la_iran0118_02_10. A Grave and Growing Threat,” by Roger F. asp. Noriega, Latin American Outlook, October 28. Chris Zambelis, “Al-Qaeda in the Andes: 2009. Spotlight on Colombia,” Terrorism Moni- 13. “U.S.: Will Oil Worries Send the Economy tor, Volume: 4 Issue: 7, April 6, 2006, Skidding?” Business Week, January 20, 2003. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ 14. “Venezuela: OPEC Should Become a Politi- gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=727&tx_ cal Actor against Imperialism,” Published ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1. on November 19th 2007, by Kiraz Janicke— 29. “Iran Increases Its Political and Economic Venezuelanalysis.com. Presence in Latin America,” Intelligence 15. Iran’s Latin American Power Play, by Dina and Terrorism Information Center, April 8, Siegel Vann, InFocus, Summer 2007. http:// 2009 (Hebrew Edition), 36. www.jewishpolicycenter.org/26/irans- 30. Gen. Brantz J. Craddock, U.S. Army Com- latin-american-power-play. mander, U.S. Southern Command, State- 16. Chávez, Ahmadinejad Vow to Defeat U.S., ment to the 109th Congress, Senate Armed The Associated Press, November 11, 2007. Services Committee, March 15, 2005. 17. “The Meeting of Minds and Moves: The 31. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups Substance and Significance of the Middle in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South East to Venezuela´s Foreign Policy 1999- America,” a report prepared by the Federal 2008,” Makram Haluani, Department of Research Division, Library of Congress, Economics and Business Administration, July 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf- Simon Bolivar University, Caracas, Venezu- files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf. ela, February 2009. 32. Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God,” Part 18. Remarks by NY County District Attorney 2 of 2, The New Yorker, 28 October 2002. Robert M. Morgenthau at Brookings Institu- 33. “Lessons of Colombia Can Be Applied Else- tion, Washington, D.C., September 8, 2009. where, Mullen Says,” by Jim Garamone, 19. “Venezuela to Export Gasoline to Iran,” American Forces Press Service, Mar 5, CNN.com, September 7, 2009. www.cnn. 2009, www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news. com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/07/iran. php?storyId=1578. venezuela.gasoline/index.html (accessed 34. “A FARC Fan’s Notes,” Mary Anastasia October 7, 2009). O’Grady, Wall Street Journal, March 25, 20. “Secret Document: Venezuela, Bolivia Sup- 2008. plying Iran with Uranium,” May 5, 2009, 35. Philip Taubman, “Salvadorans’ U.S. Cam- Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ paign: Selling of Revolution,” The New York secret-document-venezuela-bolivia-supply- Times, February 26, 1982, p. A-10. ing-iran-with-uranium-1.276675. 36. From Mainline to Sideline: The Social Wit- 21. Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregu- ness of the National Council of Churches, lar Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chávez, Lloyd Billingsley, University Press of Amer- Max G. Manwaring, August 2007, published ica (February 12, 1990), p. 116. by Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 23-24. 22. See Joe Sweeny, “Jorge Verstrynge: The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,” in http://www.vcrisis.com/index.php?content =letters/200509091152. 23. “Chávez Seeks Tighter Grip on Military,” New York Times, May 29, 2009, http:// www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/world/ americas/30venez.html. 24. “Clashes Spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah Raids Israel,” International Herald Tribune, The New York Times, July 12, 2006, http:// www.nytimes.com/2006/07/13/world/ africa/13iht-web.0713mideast.2188501. html?_r=1.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 113 BRINGING SUPPORT TO OUR WARFIGHTERS.

Elbit Systems of America – Supporting our troops. Supporting freedom.

Timothy R. Furnish

ablighi Jama`at is almost certainly the world’s largest Islamic missionary group. Having originated in the Indian sub- Tcontinent early in the 20th century, Tablighi Jamaat, or TJ, is now active in some 165 nations, and its annual gathering in Tongi, Bangladesh, is exceeded in size only by the hajj to Mecca.1

Because of its blend of Islamic ideology and missionary methodology, TJ poses a unique challenge to American analysts and policymakers. It does not fit neatly into the categories of “radical/extremist” and “moderate” so beloved of the Obama and Bush administrations. Nor is it amenable to the usual range of foreign policy, security and defense approaches. Herewith, a primer on what is perhaps the least appreciated challenge posed by ideological Islam.

Origins and development TJ is a product of the Deobandi strain of Islam that originated in the north of India in the mid-19th century as a reaction to British rule of India and the subsequent Christian and Hindu missionary activity there. The Deoband movement combined Sufism (Islamic mysticism) with rigorous study of hadiths (Islamic traditions) and adherence to Islamic law.2 TJ’s founder, Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944), graduated from the central Deoband madrassa in 1910 but eventually developed the idea that a Deobandi-style education, while necessary, was insufficient to revitalize Islam. In his view, “only through physical move-

Dr. Timothy R. Furnish works as an analyst and author specializing in Islamic eschatology, Mahdism and sects. He blogs on these topics at the History News Network (as Occidental Jihadist) and his own site, www.mahdiwatch. org. His new book, The Caliphate: Threat or Opportunity?, is due out in 2011. Timothy R. Furnish

ment away from one’s place could one Most important of all, however, leave behind one’s esteem for life and are TJ mission trips. Members of its comforts for the cause of God.”3 the organization must spend at least three days each month, and 40 days TJ is now, according to the few per year, on these self-financed tabligh treks, where they enter a town or experts on the group, the most- city, stay at a sympathetic mosque or followed Islamic program on the home, and go door-to-door summon- planet; indeed, it may well be ing Muslims to Quran study, prayer and classes on Islamic doctrine—to, the most influential transnational in effect, re-inject piety into their lives. Islamic organization, bar none. Between 1947 (the date of Indian independence and partition) and the Ilyas combined this concept with end of the Cold War, under the lead- that of tabligh, an idea he borrowed ership of Ilyas’ son, Mawlana Yusuf, from another Islamic sect in India, TJ expanded its geographical area of the Barelvis. The result was the novel operations out of South Asia (India idea, enshrined in TJ ideology at the and Pakistan) to most of the rest group’s official inception in 1934, that of the world, and also expanded its dissemination of Islam should be the methodology to include attempting duty of each and every Muslim, rather to convert non-Muslims to Islam.6 TJ than the exclusive province of the emissaries spread mainly to majority- spiritual elites.4 And while TJ shared Muslim countries in the Middle East, the Deobandi-derived hatred of other Africa and Southeast Asia. Two sec- faiths’ inroads into the Muslim com- ondary TJ hubs, in Mecca and Medina munity, there was an even stronger and in London, were also established. concern about the deleterious effects After the USSR’s collapse in 1991, of Westernization and secularization. the organization moved into former The resulting belief system man- Soviet Central Asia. In countries with dated for members of TJ is standard a majority, or substantial, Muslim issue in most regards. It advocates population, TJ’s target list starts with a Sunni dogma that includes adher- the ulama, then moves to the intellec- ence to doctrinal staples (Muham- tuals and professionals, followed by mad’s prophethood, the authority influential merchants and, finally, hoi of the Qur’an, Islamic eschatology), polloi. This approach obviously has observance of veiling for women, an worked, since TJ is now, according emphasis on daily prayers, and the to the few experts on the group,7 the teaching of Islam in the home to chil- most-followed Islamic program on dren. But TJ adds several additional the planet; indeed, it may well be the wrinkles to this orthodoxy, promot- most influential transnational Islamic ing `ilm, “[book] knowledge,” and organization, bar none. dhikr, “remembrance,” a Sufi practice of prayer recitation supposed to TJ in Africa lead to a mystical state of union with Responding to TJ is quickly Allah. It also stresses respect for emerging as one of the most signifi- other Muslims, regardless of sect, cant—and unexpected—challenges firmly rejects other religions, and confronting the newest U.S. Combat- espouses an obsessive observance of ant Command, AFRICOM, which Islamic rites and rituals.5 is responsible for the entire African

116 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Tabligh Challenge continent save Egypt. TJ is known to ceived un-Islamic libertinism of the be active in at least 35 of Africa’s 54 older generation. countries, but its activities are well Morocco’s 31 million people are documented in only a handful. 99 percent Muslim, almost entirely Gambia is a tiny country in West Sunni, and while the country shares Africa, surrounded on all sides by Islam as the majority religion with its larger neighbor Senegal. How- Gambia it is in many ways a world ever, Gambia’s 1.5 million people apart, being Arab and Berber in are 90 percent Muslim, and despite culture. TJ was introduced into its small size and population it may Morocco as Jamaat al-Tabligh very well be the hub of TJ activity wa-al-Dawah (JTD) in 1960, and in West Africa.8 TJ has had a pres- officially recognized by the govern- ence in Gambia since as early as ment in 1975.10 JTD has focused on the 1960s, but did not make much the need for individual Muslims headway there until the 1990s. The to reform their lives and avoid the reasons were primarily twofold: corruption of the world—in this 1) its missionaries there preached they are rather analogous to an in En-glish, the lingua franca of evangelical/fundamentalist Chris- the country (as a former British tian denomination. One seemingly colony), and 2) the global Islamic novel practice of JTD members is to resurgence made many Gambians not only visit Muslim homes in the receptive to different interpreta- vicinity of mosques, but also make tions of Islam. What is most strik- calls upon hospitalized Muslims. ing about TJ in Gambia is its appeal The group’s greatest focus is on rit- to the indigenous Muslims, particu- ualized conduct, controlled in detail larly youth. This state of affairs con- so as to accord with the presumed trasts greatly with the situation in practice of Muhammad—to include South and East Africa, where TJ’s eating, drinking, preparing for bed, greatest concentrations are among sleeping, visiting a graveyard or the Africans of South Asian descent (on market, and bathing. Such activities which more below). help foster a sense of synchronized The latest data indicates that religious community, which—while only about 1 percent of Gambia’s not overtly associated with any Muslim population—perhaps 13,000 jihadist groups—may mean that TJ people—are involved with TJ. How- in Morocco is functioning as “a kind ever, the group is punching far above of crossroads for future Islamists.”11 its weight, promoting strict Islamic ritual observation there with considerable success. In fact, an unnamed TJ is known to be active in at member of Gambia’s Supreme least 35 of Africa’s 54 countries, Islamic Council fears that within a but its activities are well decade [from 2006] TJ will dominate, and even destroy, the country.9 TJ’s documented in only a handful. appeal to youth contains an element of rebellion against their parents’ TJ likewise is active in the West typically African Muslim attachment African Saharan countries of Mali, to Sufism, and counterintuitively it is Mauritania and Niger—particularly the youth who assume modest dress in Mali,12 which has 12 million people, and demeanor, over against the per- 90 percent of them Muslim. (Mau-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 117 Timothy R. Furnish

ritania’s three million people are South Africa would seem a officially 100 percent Muslim, while strange venue for TJ activity: the coun- Niger’s 11 million are 80 percent try’s 49 million citizens are 80 percent Muslim, but with significant minori- Christian. But thanks to centuries ties of Christians and adherents of of British rule, there is a substantial traditional African religions.) TJ minority—some 2 million people—of members, like Salafis, are far ahead South Asian descent in Africa’s most of U.S. forces in that, being Muslim, advanced and economically power- they more easily fit into the regional ful nation, of whom perhaps half are Islamic context. Thus, TJ has become Muslim, providing a ready-made audi- one of the three most important out- ence for TJ missionaries. side players in the Saharan region The organization’s popularity in stretching across Mauritania, Mali that country stems from three factors: and Niger, the others being the U.S. 1) its “Sufi-lite” orientation, which military and al-Qaeda in the Islamic appeals to South Asian Muslims; 2) Maghreb (AQIM). The region is its Deoband origins, since South Afri- poor, smuggling is an integral part of can Islam has a heavy Deobandi tint; the economy and everyone has “ille- 3) the two Deoband Islamic seminar- gal” weapons—all of which makes ies in the country that promote TJ this an extremely volatile area. Yet TJ as positive for Muslims. The discon- actually lost popularity in the region nect between TJ and the larger Sunni after 9/11 because the African Saha- community in South Africa is evi- ran peoples realized that TJ’s South dent in the separate mosques built in Asian Muslim origins made them many South African Muslim commu- possible American targets. In fact, nities. However, many Muslims have the Malian government extradited 25 become disenchanted with majority members of TJ not long after 9/11.13 black rule because of its tolerance for Since then, TJ connections among abortion, prostitution, pornography some of the Touareg leaders in Mali and other immoral activities. Almost have surfaced, although the group’s undoubtedly, TJ has had a role in this leaders have repeatedly said that TJ’s increased social conservatism among activities in the region are totally Muslims, as it has fostered increased unconnected to the global jihad. piety and an larger numbers of South Africa’s Muslims sending their children to Islamic schools, more and The evidence from TJ activities in more women wearing head and body Africa—Gambia, Morocco, Mali, coverings, increased patronage of South Africa, and Tanzania— Islamic banks, and so forth. TJ clearly has had a large hand in polarizing strongly supports the contention South Africa’s Islamic community. that the organization reinforces But TJ is perhaps most active in Sunni group solidarity and increases the eastern environs of Africa, partic- adherence to conservative Islamic ularly in Tanzania and Uganda.14 Tan- zania’s 44 million population is at least norms. However, evidence of TJ one-third Muslim, while Uganda’s 32 serving as a gateway to jihad is more million populace is 84 percent Chris- limited. tian and some 12 percent Muslim. Uganda’s Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Muslim separatist group, is

118 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Tabligh Challenge alleged to have recruited from TJ. But al-Shabaab attacked a mosque and it is in Tanzania that the TJ-terrorist killed at least five TJ members19 in nexus truly developed. Islamic iden- the central Somali town of Galkacyo. tification runs high particularly on So rumors of automatic TJ-jihadist the island of Zanzibar, which in the cooperation in Africa remain (pend- 18th and 19th century was the capital ing more data) at least somewhat, if of the Omani Sultanate, ruling over not greatly, exaggerated. much of East Africa, as well as on the twin island to the north, Pemba. It’s not surprising, therefore, that not Viewed through a realpolitik lens, only TJ but Wahhabi/Salafi preachers the very characteristics that have found fertile soil there. In fact, make TJ a potential security in Tanzania, there seems to be a conflation of Wahhabi fundamentalism concern could also make it a and TJ-style reformism, at least in the fulcrum for an American policy popular mind. An example of a Wah- that aims to exploit sectarian habized, militant TJ member is Zahor cleavages within the Islamic Issa Omar, who travels from Pemba to mainland Tanzania, Kenya and world, particularly in Africa. Uganda on regular preaching missions, allegedly supported by Saudi TJ in comparative money; it is also alleged that Saudi perspective clerics send these itinerant preach- Just what kind of Islamic group is ers preferred khutbah (“sermon”) 15 Tablighi Jamaat? The answer depends advice. More traditionalist Zanzi- to some extent on the analytical para- bari Muslim leaders consider the TJ digm that is brought to bear. In the missionaries intruders, even a threat; last two centuries, Islamic societies one such cleric is Maalim Moham- have three broad responses to the med Idriss, who has stated that TJ perceived encroachment of West- and Wahhabism both pervert Islam ern ideas and culture: 1) emulation; and pose a threat to the ancient Sufi 16 2) fusion of Western concepts with traditions of East Africa. Islamic institutions; 3) total rejection Indeed, two of the indicted terror- of Western ideas and things in favor ists involved in the 1998 U.S. embassy of Muslim ones.20 bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nai- The first mode was practiced by robi—Khalfan Khamis Mohammed Ottoman-era reformers like Muham- and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—were mad Ali of Egypt and the Ottoman Zanzibaris who had been initially Turks with their Tanzimat reforms. involved with TJ before “graduating” 17 These were mainly attempts in the to the al-Qaeda network. It would military and educational realms. The seem that in Tanzania—or at least ultimate example of this category was in Zanzibar and Pemba—TJ is fulfill- Kemal Atatürk’s wholesale jettison- ing the alarmist prophecy of providing of Islamic traditions and practice ing at least some of jihad’s willing (among them the Ottoman Arabic legionnaires, if not quite legions, as 18 script and the idea of the caliphate) some have posited. But elsewhere in favor of Western ones, such as a in East Africa, Salafi/Wahhabi Mus- European alphabet and a separation lims are not so well-disposed toward between mosque and state. TJ. In August 2009, the Somali group

The Journal of International Security Affairs 119 Timothy R. Furnish

The second pattern was predi- Reid, John Walker Lindh, the Lacka- cated on the idea that there was no wanna Six and Jose Padilla, but that inherent contradiction or conflict terrorist group recruiters scout TJ’s between the ideas and things of the Raiwind, Pakistan, training com- West and of Islam. Thinkers such plex looking for prospects.22 Much as the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh the same indictment of TJ is shared argued that Islam was perfectly com- by Fred Burton and Scott Stewart of patible with Western science and STRATFOR.23 By contrast others, even democracy—a belief which mainly academics, argue that TJ not motivated the short-lived attempt to only ostracizes any members who turn the Ottoman empire into a con- join jihadist groups24 but also that its stitutional, democratic monarchy in (alleged) privatization of faith makes the 1870s.21 it compatible with modernity.25 Ana- lysts such as these also point out that TJ preaches jihad as “personal purifi- TJ clearly does support al-Qaeda cation,” not holy war; many Islamist and similar groups, albeit indirectly groups openly criticize TJ for its apo- and passively (and, it might even be litical and non-violent teachings; and Wahhabi online fatwas include TJ in argued, unintentionally). a list of heretical groups, in the same category as Shi`is. The third response, rejection- The evidence from TJ activi- ism, was exemplified in the past by ties in Africa—Gambia, Morocco, the Wahhabis, whose founder, Ibn Mali, South Africa, and Tanzania— Abd al-Wahhab, repudiated not only strongly supports the contention anything Western but beliefs and that the organization reinforces practices of other Muslims, such as Sunni group solidarity and increases the Sufis and Shi’a, deemed insuf- adherence to conservative Islamic ficiently devoted to the absolute, norms. However, evidence of TJ transcendent unity of Allah. Tablighi serving as a gateway to jihad is more Jamaat would seem to fit into this limited, and only clearly seen in Tan- third category, its teachings rejecting zania, with the Dar es Salaam and Western concepts and modernity as Nairobi bombers. a danger to Islam, and focusing on a The more pressing issue, then, return to Islamic roots. is that of TJ’s alleged role in groom- But despite its official pacifist ing future jihadists. While it may be stance, is TJ nevertheless a “gate- hyperbole to say that TJ preaches the way” or “crossroads” to violent jihad? same creed as Wahhabis and Salafis, Some analysts certainly think so. it does promulgate a literalist reading Alex Alexiev even goes so far as to of the Qur’an and strict emulation of argue that TJ constitutes “jihad’s Islam’s founder, Muhammad—both stealthy legions.” He maintains that of which are problematic. Not only “all Tablighis preach a creed that are the “sword,” or jihad, verses of is hardly distinguishable from the the Qur’an numerous—number- radical Wahhabi-Salafi jihadist ide- ing some 164 by one count26—but ology” and that, more concretely, under the doctrine of naskh, “abro- TJ involvement has not only been gation,” they supersede all of the instrumental in the backgrounds of Qur’an’s apparently peaceful verses. prominent Islamists such as Richard In addition, TJ members are taught

120 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Tabligh Challenge to emulate Islam’s prophet unswerv- Africa; while TJ’s comparatively mild ingly. Thus, when some learn about communal religious programs could Muhammad leading armies in battle be used to provide an alternative to or ordering the execution of theo- the Saudi-funded Wahhabi groups logical and political opponents, they active in Africa. may decide that the jihadist groups As the Army Counterinsurgency are more faithful followers of their Manual made famous by General prophet than TJ itself—and so make David Petraeus points out: the transition. Thus, the key issue is not whether TJ is actively inculcating A feature of today’s operational jihadist thought, per se. What is more environment deserving mention important, and disquieting, is that is the effort by Islamic extrem- the organization is instilling Qur’anic ists, including those that advocate violence, to spread their literalism and Muhammadan emula- influence through the funding tion, both of which are also staples of and use of entities that share violent jihadist groups. their views or facilitate them to And there’s no arguing with TJ’s varying degrees. These enti- success. The Muslim Brotherhood ties may or may not be threats and other Islamist organizations themselves; however, they can may castigate the organization for provide passive or active support to local or distant insur- its disengagement from politics and gencies.27 (Emphasis added.) for its lack of popular welfare and education programs, but one could TJ clearly does support al-Qaeda argue that Tabligh is better than its and similar groups, albeit indirectly detractors at keeping its eye on the and passively (and, it might even real prize: renewing piety among be argued, unintentionally). As a Muslims and indoctrinating them transnational, yet non-violent orga- with a strong sense of Islamic com- nization, Tablighi Jamaat presents munity that is global in scope. a sui generis challenge to American foreign, defense and counterter- Dividing and conquering rorism policy—one not amenable Viewed through a realpolitik to Predator strikes or other kinetic lens, the very characteristics that solutions. Yet opposing TJ could be make TJ a potential security con- seen as tantamount to opposing the cern could also make it a fulcrum spread of Islam itself—a prospect for an American policy that aims to that may give many pause. The key to exploit sectarian cleavages within the a constructive approach, then, lies in Islamic world, particularly in Africa. understanding what makes TJ tick— For example, TJ is deemed too Sufi and thereafter harnessing it as a tool by strict Wahhabis/Salafis and not to promote American interests. nearly Sufi enough for Barelvis and many African Muslims. Strategic communications programs could play up theses cleavages, should TJ come to be considered a threat in certain countries or regions of Africa. 1. Yoginder Sikand, The Origins and Develop- TJ’s anti-Shiìte beliefs could, alterna- ment of the Tablighi-Jamaàt, 1920-2000: A Cross-Country Comparative Study (Hyder- tively, be accentuated in order to help abad, India: Orient Longman, 2002), 2-13. confound Iranian Shiì inroads into

The Journal of International Security Affairs 121 Timothy R. Furnish

2. According to Ira Lapidus, A History of Network, June 26, 2006, http://hnn.us/arti- Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge cles/27268.html. University Press, 1988), 725-6. 22. Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy 3. Muhammad Khalid Masud, “The Growth Legions.” and Development of the Tablighi Jamaat in 23. “Tagblighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Ter- India,” in Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., rorism,” STRATFOR, January 23, 2008, Travelers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/tablighi_ Jama at Movement as a Transnational Islamic jamaat_indirect_line_terrorism. Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: Brill, 24. Nicholas Howenstein, “Islamist Networks: 2000), 7. the Case of Tablighi Jamaat,” United States 4. Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Institute of Peace Peace Brief, October 2006, Tablighi Jama’at, 48. http://www.usip.org/resources/islamist- 5. Masud, “Growth and Development,” 10-11, networks-case-tablighi-jamaat. 21-24. 25. Barbara Metcalf, “‘Traditionalist’ Islamic 6. Marc Gaborieau, “The Transformation of Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” the Tablighi Jama at Movement into a Trans- Social Science Research Council/After Sep- national Movement,” in Masud, Travelers in tember 11, November 1, 2004, http://essays. Faith, 121ff. ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm. 7. Most notably Yoginder Sikand and Muham- 26. See http://www.answering-islam.org/ mad Khalid Masud. Quran/Themes/jihad_passages.html. 8. This section derives from Marloes Janson, 27. FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency” (U.S. “The Prophet’s Path: Tablighi Jamaat in The Department of the Army, 2006), section Gambia,” Institute for the Study of Islam in 1-90. the Modern World Review 17 (Spring 2006), 44-5. 9. Ibid., 45. 10. Mohamed Tozy, “Sequences of a Quest: Tab- lighi Jamaat in Morocco,” in Masud, Travel- ers in Faith, 161-173. 11. Ibid., 171. 12. Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pit- falls on the Saharan Front,” Journal of Con- temporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 141-166. 13. Ibid., 151. 14. Gregory Pirio, African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 2007). 15. Ibid., 167-68. 16. Ibidem, 168. 17. Ibidem, 157-58, 175. 18. Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 3-11, http://www. meforum.org/686/tablighi-jamaat-jihads- stealthy-legions. 19. “Somalia Islamic Militants Behead Four Christian Orphanage Workers,” Religion- NewsBlog.com, August 13, 2009, http:// www.religionnewsblog.com/23555/somalia-islamists-murder-christians. 20. A clear exposition of these three modes is presented in Albert M. Craig et al., eds., The Heritage of World Civilizations. Volume II: Since 1500. Seventh Edition (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice-Hall, 2006), 812-816. 21. See the author’s article “Are Islam and Democracy Incompatible? Some Reflec- tions from Ottoman History,” History News

122 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caucasian Cauldron

Sergey Markedonov

oday, as the Republic of Kyrgyzstan plunges into crisis and the threat of a new failed state in Central Asia looms larger, the tur- Tmoil in the neighboring Caucasus has receded from the front pages. The worst-case scenarios predicted by analysts and politicians at the height of regional unrest in August 2008 have not materialized. Russia did not attempt to topple the government of Mikhail Saakash- vili in Georgia, or apply the same approach to Ukraine, as many in the West fully expected. Nor has the West attempted to goad Georgia into a rematch with Moscow, as Russian policymakers believed it would.

Nevertheless, the Caucasus remains one of the most vulnerable, and volatile, parts of Eurasia. It is the place where the breakup of the former USSR began, and now the site where a newly-assertive Russia is demonstrating its willingness to play the role of a revisionist state for the first time since 1991. Russia defines the “Greater Caucasus” as an indispensable part of its sphere of vital interests, and consequently seeks to be a key stakeholder for the region. But the costs of this engagement are steep. Russia may style itself as the guarantor of security and stability in the Caucasus, but it now has serious challenges within its own borders in those areas that abut the region. President Dmitry Medvedev said as much in his 2009 address to the Federal Assembly, Russia’s upper house of parliament, when he characterized the situation in the region as his administration’s most important domestic policy issue.1

Dr. Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Sergey Markedonov

From ethnic nationalism was predictable; the disintegration of to Islamic revival any imperial or quasi-imperial state In truth, the problem detailed by is inevitably accompanied by a quest Medvedev is not new. Ethnic separat- for “roots” and a new identity among ism in the Russian Caucasus has been its constituent parts, and Russia was a persistent problem for Moscow no exception. Notably, this drift had since the Soviet collapse. Over the a strong religious component as well. past two decades, this struggle has Russia’s Caucasian republics had been punctuated most publicly by been part of the Soviet state for more two military campaigns in Chech- than seven decades, saddled with nya (1994-96 and 1999-2000), and by a policy of official atheism actively the 1992 Ossetian–Ingush conflict, enforced by Moscow. Religiosity was which—nearly two decades on—still prohibited, while ethnicity was culti- has not been fully settled. vated. As a result, upon the breakup of the USSR, a movement of Islamic radicals naturally emerged in the Russia may style itself as the North Caucasus, seeking to combine guarantor of security and stability religious rhetoric with ethnic nationalism. And it found a receptive audi- in the Caucasus, but it now has ence among those searching for a serious challenges within its own new, post-Soviet identity. borders in those areas that abut The rise of Islamic radicalism the region. across the North Caucasus, in other words, was much more than just a But these conflicts were only manifestation of Chechnya’s struggle part of a much larger picture. In the against the Russian federal center. early- to mid-1990s, other ethno- Moreover, it was only indirectly con- nationalist movements in the North nected with Chechnya. It also was Caucasus were also brandishing the much more pervasive. Next door idea of self-determination. During in the Russian Republic of Dages- the same period, separatists in the tan, the first clashes between Sufi Caucasus formulated plans for seces- Muslims and Salafists took place sion—not only from Russia, but also in 1994-1995. By 1997, Dagestan’s from the constituent republics of the Sufis had moved to bar Salafist activ- former USSR. Other irredentist proj- ity, and that December the Repub- ects abounded as well; in Dagestan, lic’s People’s Assembly passed legal the largest North Caucasian repub- restrictions on the public activities of 2 lic, the anti-establishment Party of Salafi Muslims. The following year, Independence and Revival was active Islamic radicals attempted to carry during the early 1990s, while in Kara- out a coup in the Dagestani capital chay-Circassia, five separate political of Makhachkala, and three settle- entities proclaimed independence in ments within the Republic were uni- 1991 alone. laterally proclaimed by the “Special The popularity of ethnic nation- Islamic area.” It’s not by accident alism reached its peak in the first that Chechen jihadists like Shamil half of the 1990s. Its rise during this Basayev and Ibn ul-Khattab chose period was fueled not only by the Dagestan as the weakest link in Rus- “weakness of the state,” but also by sia’s republics—and as the target for objective circumstances. The trend their infamous Fall 1999 raids.

124 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caucasian Cauldron

Dagestan’s troubles were part of Indeed, the current instabil- a larger transformation taking shape ity plaguing Ingushetia, Chechnya, in the Caucasus. Over time, the Kabardino-Balkaria or Dagestan has popularity of ethnic nationalism and little to do with ethnic nationalism ethnic separatism began to decline, and separatism, and everything to do as public disillusion and corruption with religion. Ever since the Beslan among ethnic elites served to blunt tragedy of September 2004, the main the appeal of those ideologies. At the driver of anti-Russian sentiment in the same time, a radical Islamist environ- North Caucasus has not been slogans ment was emerging in the North Cau- of ethno-political self-determination casus. This project gained popularity but the green flag of radical Islam. not because of the illiteracy of the And this challenge is evolving. local population or their alleged native “provincialism.” Rather, it was due to the appeal of the ideology espoused The rise of Islamic radicalism across by radical Islamists, who advocated the North Caucasus was much a world religion and religious values more than just a manifestation of that extended beyond ethnic groups and clan politics. The ideologues of Chechnya’s struggle against the this so-called “pure Islam” also skill- Russian federal center. fully targeted the disenfranchised segments of the region’s youth, who had been deprived of opportunities Foreign elements in the for employment and education. As a Caucasus jihad result, radical Islam began to spread The rise of Islamic radicalism in not only across the eastern part of the the Caucasus has created a qualita- Russian Caucasus (i.e., Chechnya, tively different set of problems than Dagestan and Ingushetia), but also those confronted by Russian authori- across its west, where the religios- ties in the past. But what are the con- ity of the population had traditionally tours of the problem? To accurately been less pronounced. evaluate the external influences on The tragic events that took place Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus, it in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino- is necessary to understand its char- Balkaria, on October 13, 2005, were acteristics. a product of this trend. In that attack, First, Arab nations have never a large group of militants targeted a had a common policy toward the Rus- number of buildings associated with sian Caucasus. Nor is such a stance the Russian security forces. More even possible, given the lack of politi- than 100 people, including at least 14 cal and confessional unity in the Arab civilians, were reported to have been world. Secondly, many Arab states killed during the ensuing shooting, (Syria, Egypt and the Palestinian which continued into the following day. Authority among them) have been, Many others were wounded. Caucasian and continue to be, interested in warlord Shamil Basayev subsequently expanding Russia’s role in the Middle claimed responsibility for the attack, East peace process. As a result, an which was depicted as a jihad by Islamic internal weakening of Russia cannot mujahideen against the kafirs (unbeliev- be one of their objectives. ers, i.e., Russians) and munafiqs (trai- Thirdly, it is necessary to tors, i.e., local authorities).3 clearly separate the official positions

The Journal of International Security Affairs 125 Sergey Markedonov

of Arab states and those of Cauca- for Caucasian Islamists is even more sian diaspora communities resident problematic, and ephemeral. in the Middle East. Chechnya, for By contrast, much greater sup- example, boasts a large expatriate port has come from Islamists in community in Jordan, and many of East and Central Asia. This interest its representatives openly expressed was showcased in the recognition of their sympathy for the unacknowl- Chechnya as an independent Muslim edged Chechen Republic of Ichkeria state in the late 1990s not by Iraq or created during the mid-1990s. By Syria, but by the so-called Islamic contrast, Jordanian diplomats explic- Emirate of Afghanistan ruled by the itly stated that the Hashemite King- Taliban.5 The Islamic Movement of dom opposes terrorism and under Uzbekistan and the Islamist grass- no circumstances interferes with roots movement Hizb ut-Tahrir like- the internal affairs of other states. wise have attempted repeatedly to In Egypt also, official policy was penetrate the region, albeit with far pro-Moscow during the last decade’s less success than they have experi- conflicts in the Caucasus, even while enced in Central Asia.6 Islamists in the region embraced the Al-Qaeda’s role in Islamist activ- work of Egyptian militant Sayyid ity in the Caucasus deserves special Qutb as their manual.4 attention. On the one hand, Rus- sian law enforcement agencies have The growing popularity of radical been unable to prove any direct links between the Bin Laden network and Islam in today’s Caucasus is terrorist attacks or operations in the explained, first and foremost, not region. Al-Qaeda’s leaders didn’t pro- by foreign intrigues, but by the claim the Caucasus to be the “new battlefield of jihad” after Afghanistan region’s endemic problems—and and Iraq. However, operating through the lack of obvious solutions to proxies, al-Qaeda is known to have them. organized financial and ideological aid, and coordinated operations, in In the end, not one Arab country both Dagestan and Chechnya.7 acknowledged the independence of Yet the growing popularity of Chechnya or of the “Special Islamic ter- radical Islam in today’s Caucasus is ritory” (the Kadar zone) in Dagestan, explained, first and foremost, not by although Chechen delegations were foreign intrigues, but by the region’s officially received in the United Arab endemic problems—and the lack of Emirates and in Qatar. Zelimkhan obvious solutions to them. Russian Yandarbiyev, the second president political analyst (and former Min- of the Chechen Republic of Ichke- ister of the separatist Chechnya) ria, actually found his final refuge in Shamil’ Beno correctly evaluated the Qatar, where he was granted refugee situation when he said that “[f]unda- status in 2000 but barred from carry- mentalism cannot appear in a place ing out political activity of any kind. where there are no serious problems (Yanderbiyev was killed in Doha in in the society. Only an atmosphere 2004). Today, with the disappearance of complete spiritual vacuum can of the de-facto independent Chechen force a young man to give up worldly state and the lack of any authority out- temptations.”8 In this sense, any pen- side of Russian control, Arab support etration from the outside, including

126 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caucasian Cauldron that of Arab or Central Asian co- federal authority. Though weaker religionists, can be effective only if in power and influence than in past the path has already been paved for years, these groups remain active— it. All of which begs the question: is and viable. confrontation between Russia and the West warranted, when radical The main challenge to the security forces consider us to the same extent their main enemy? of the Russian state is no longer posed by ethnic separatism, but by Common ground radical Islamism. Today, after nearly two decades of neglect and Islamist growth, there Today, therefore, the situation is no shortage of alarmist prognoses in the North Caucasus is no worse and predictions about the state of sta- than it was in the early 1990s. But bility in the Caucasus. But a narrow it is considerably different. The window of opportunity still exists. It main challenge to the security of is useful to remember that every reli- the Russian state is no longer posed gion adapts itself to local conditions, by ethnic separatism, but by radi- and Islam is no different. In the 19th cal Islamism. One should keep in century, the famous Imam Shamil mind that this political movement is spread the “Tarikat” variant of Islam fueled by the shortcomings of both by force in what is now Dagestan and the central and regional Russian Chechnya. Over time, however, this authorities. Nepotism, incompe- brand of Islam has come to be con- tence, political exclusion and a lack sidered “traditional” in the eastern of transparency have conspired to part of the Caucasus. And while it provide fertile soil for radical Islam. undoubtedly possesses its own radi- Correcting these deficiencies is cals, this form of Islam is generally therefore more than simply an issue pro-Russian and loyal to the state. of good governance for Moscow. It The example is instructive. With is an issue of national security. the passing of time, today’s Wahhabi To this end, Russia needs to Islam in the Caucasus is likely to develop an anti-terrorist strategy undergo a complex transformation, commensurate with its overall objec- becoming more “traditional” and tives. Following the two Chechen less radical. But helping this process wars, some Russian officials and along will require significant work, terrorism experts embraced Israeli not only on the part of the authorities methods of fighting terrorism, with of the North Caucasian republics, but significant “hard power” successes. also on the part of Russia as a whole. But Russia needs an approach that Russian authorities, experts and citi- melds ideological warfare and social zens must differentiate between ter- integration with security opera- rorists and those who would be ready tions—something which Israel, for to pledge political loyalty to the state. all of its strengths in the counterter- Likewise, it is incorrect to label rorism arena, has not made a priority the entire opposition movement in in its dealings with the Palestinians. the North Caucasus as Islamist. A Moscow, by contrast, needs to focus strong secular opposition still exists on the divide between Islamic “mod- in Ingushetia and Dagestan, and erates” and “radicals,” even as it it opposes both Islamist ideas and carries out surgical strikes against

The Journal of International Security Affairs 127 Sergey Markedonov terrorist groups which pose a clear and present danger to its security. 1. Office of the Presidential Administration, It likewise needs to differentiate Government of Russia, “Poslanie Federal- nomu Sobraniu Rosiyskoy Federatsiyi [Dis- between terrorism and criminality, patch to the Federal Council of the Russian combating the former through the Federation],” November 12, 2009, http:// promotion of tolerant variants of the www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979. Muslim religion while rooting out the 2. Author’s interview in Makhachkala, Dages- tan, Russia, June 20, 2006. latter by anti-corruption measures, 3. “Units of the Caucasus Front enter Nal- greater accountability and a fresh chik,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, October 13, 2005 cadre of public service officials not http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/con- beholden to the existing regional tent/2005/10/13/4146.shtml. 4. Author’s interview in Makhachkala, Dages- status quo. tan, Russia, June 20, 2006. And the West can help. Washing- 5. Akhmet Yarlykapov, Wahhabism na Sever- ton’s recent decision to include Doku nom Kavkaze: Social’no-politicheckaya situ- Umarov, the head of the Islamist atsiua na Kavkaze [Wahhabism in the North Caucasus: Social-Political Situation in the resistance in the North Caucasus, Caucasus] (Moscow: M. Institut Politichesk- on its official foreign terrorist list ogo I Voennogo Analiza, 2001), 154. is an encouraging, if early, sign of 6. For more on HuT’s regional activities, see the “reset” now under way in U.S.- Tyler Rauert, “The Next Threat from Cen- tral Asia,” The Journal of International Secu- 9 Russian relations. The United States rity Affairs no. 9, Fall 2005; For more on the arguably has not made a substantive Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, see Alexey step of this sort in Russia’s direc- Malashenko and Martha Brill Olcott, “Islam tion since September 2001. Official na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzglyad iznutri” [Islam in the Post-Soviet Space: The Washington’s decision is all the more View from the Inside] (Moscow: Moscow valuable in that Russian President Carnegie Center, 2001). Dmitry Medvedev considers the 7. Murat Batal al-Shishani, “Portrait of a North Caucasus to be his country’s Chechen Mujahid Leader,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 2, iss. 8, “main domestic political problem.” April 22, 2004, http://www.jamestown. Of course, the State Department’s org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_ decision will not solve all the prob- news%5D=26429. lems of violence in the North Cauca- 8. As cited in “Musul’manskiye organizat- sii Rossii vyrazhayut obespokoennost’ po sus. Many of them are of a systemic povodu uchastivshihsya obvinenii v ter- domestic nature, and depend on the rorisme “[Russia’s Muslim organizations will and effort of Russia itself to over- express their concern on the frequent accu- come them. sations of terrorism], religare.ru, March 21, 2005, http://www.religare.ru/print15568. Nor can Washington’s latest step htm. be seen as a manifestation of geo- 9. U.S. Department of State, Office of the political altruism. It is, however, an Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Desig- acknowledgment of a shared interest nation of Caucasus Emirates Leader Doku Umarov,” June 23, 2010, http://www.state. with Russia in combating the scourge gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/143564.htm. of radical Islam. It is also a hopeful sign that, at least when it comes to the issue of Islamic extremism, U.S.- Russian relations don’t necessarily need to be zero-sum.

128 The Journal of International Security Affairs military forum TheMade possible Herzstein by the support of the Albert & Ethel Herzstein Charitable Foundation

Taking Stock In Iraq

P.J. Dermer

he U.S. military withdrew the last of its major combat forces on August 31 as bilaterally agreed upon with the government of TIraq. The remaining forces, totaling approximately 50,000, will have a mandated operational mission of training, advising and partner- ing—with their Iraqi counterparts clearly in the lead. By December 2011, the majority of U.S. forces are scheduled to be out of the country, leaving behind an as-yet undecided advisory and assistance effort along the lines of other legacy defense missions in the Middle East.

Given the still-unsettled nature of Iraq’s post-Saddam environment, the question on the minds of U.S. officials and pundits alike is obvious: can the drawdown proceed as planned, regardless of continuing public announcements that it will? This remains a hot topic for Iraqis as well—one on par with, or even more pressing than, talk about the national political election stalemate. Iraqis, quite simply, are asking whether their national army is strong enough to protect them after American forces withdraw, and what will happen to them when they do?1 Iraqi Chief of General Staff General Babakir Zebari added to the fray in mid- August by publicly stating that Iraq will not be able to defend itself adequately after a U.S. withdrawal and therefore U.S. forces should stay until at least 2020.2 So, just how far have the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) come since 2003? What are their relative strengths and shortcomings? And what are the threats the

Colonel (Ret.) P.J. Dermer is a former U.S. Army infantry soldier, aviator and Middle East Foreign Area Officer. His experience includes conventional and special operations venues. Over twenty years in the Middle East, he served two tours in Iraq, where he was a key player in the foundation of Iraq’s new security institutions. P.J. Dermer

Iraqi military will face after Amer- • The Iraqi Air Force, with approxi- ica’s departure? Answering these mately 4,000; questions is essential to determining whether the U.S. military can indeed • Iraq’s Navy, with approximately withdraw from Iraq, and what it will 2,900; and leave in its wake if and when it does. • Border Directorate, with approxi- Force strength, by the mately 42,300. numbers It is hard to find anyone in Iraq The primary security arm, the who knows authoritatively the actual Army, consists of 16 divisions—albeit number of forces on the Iraqi security with two under Kurdistan Regional payroll. The figures cited tend to vary Government control. (Iraqis south greatly. Nevertheless, knowledgeable of the Green Line consider these two Iraqis currently estimate a working to be non-operational, since they do figure of approximately 680,000 by not answer to Baghdad.) Operation- combining Iraqi Ministry of Defense ally, security forces are organized (MOD) and Iraqi Ministry of Interior into seven commands modeled on (MOI) security personnel strengths. the Baghdad Operations Command As a point of reference, U.S. Operation (BOC), the first of its kind to be Iraqi Freedom planners believed that stood up in 2007. The BOC’s primary 400,000 to 600,000 armed personnel charter was to coordinate and part- were available to Saddam Hussein at ner Iraqi security forces’ efforts with the onset of the war. U.S. planners Coalition forces to implement the considered that number formidable, now infamous “surge” strategy. On and were convinced that Iraq’s new the surface, the commands work as a security forces would never need to coordinating headquarters between be that robust again. But they are. the Army, Federal Police, Local The approximate breakdown Police, Border Forces and Navy of the combined figure above is the Forces (where applicable). These following: commands were also envisioned to perform as regional “Corps” level • the Iraqi Army, with approxi- headquarters in the western sense, mately 197,000 men in arms; but because their commanders do not exercise real command and con- • Federal Police, with approxi- trol over all their subordinate forces mately 100,000; such as the Police, the concept has not been fully realized. • Blue Civil Police, with approxi- But these numbers don’t shed mately 300,000; much light onto the actual state of Iraqi security, or the ability of Iraqi • Oil Police, with approximately forces to fill the inevitable vacuum 29,000; that would be left by a U.S. withdrawal. Though often touted by • Fixed Protection Service (exact Administration officials as a bench- numbers unknown); mark of real progress, the figures are not relevant in assessing either • Special Forces units, with approx- Iraqi professional capabilities or their imately 4,120; qualitative development to date. The

130 The Journal of International Security Affairs Taking Stock in Iraq devil, as always, lies in the details organizations which report directly and the behind-the-scenes nuances. to him. Of particular note is the Iraqi security forces are clearly oper- Ministry of State for National Secu- ating in the public view and their rity Affairs, focusing on intelligence capabilities constantly evolving. They collection against those deemed a are able to impose a sense of secu- threat to the regime, and the Office rity in most locations, but violence of the Arm of the General Secretary continues to simmer in several key (OCINC), a civilian office with a urban and some rural locations. The military style title with amorphous influences affecting Iraq’s security responsibilities close to the office development are legion, and include of the Prime Minister. Likewise, in political and cultural dynamics, as 2008, Maliki ordered the formation of well as systemic hangovers from the the Baghdad Infantry Brigade and its previous regime. cantonment permanently stationed inside the Green Zone. Its orders Political and cultural ostensibly come from his office, not influences the Ministry of Defense or Joint Staff. Senior Iraqi leaders tell foreign Last, Iraq’s only armored division is interlocutors that, unlike under the commanded by one of Maliki’s cous- previous regime, their new security ins. Its tanks now guard the entrances forces are clean, politically indepen- to the Green Zone. dent, and free from militia influences. Honest critics, however, diverge Senior Iraqi leaders tell foreign from that assessment to varying interlocutors that, unlike under degrees. Political influence is rampant throughout, as exemplified by the previous regime, their the fact that Prime Minister Nouri new security forces are clean, al-Maliki is widely known to person- politically independent, and free ally approve the activities of his major operational commands and divisions, from militia influences. Honest lest he be caught by surprise. Indeed, critics, however, diverge from that Maliki often holds court (usually late assessment to varying degrees. in the evenings) with unit commanders without regard for their chain of command, and retains promotion Political factionalism also authority for those who make clear abounds. Maliki’s surprise crack- their loyalty to Maliki and his party— down on Shi’a forces in Basra and regardless of sect. This has bred no Baghdad in 2008 was just as much shortage of discontent among mili- an effort to rid himself of a political tary peers, and painted an image of competitor and nuisance—Muqtada a cronyistic regime strikingly similar al-Sadr—as they were intended to to its predecessor. It has also served free Iraq’s southern economic lifeline to undermine the governmental chain from harmful militia elements. But of command, since neither the MOD the threat from Sadr is hardly over; nor the MOI can be said to be strate- the political stalemate in the wake gically leading their forces. of the country’s March elections has Maliki, moreover, has created left some security commanders hesi- extralegal security and intelligence tant to alienate Sadr’s Jaysh Al Mahdi militia (JAM), which gained 40 seats

The Journal of International Security Affairs 131 P.J. Dermer

in the new parliament. Indeed, a on the scale or at a pace sought by recent assessment by the RAND Cor- the Coalition. Organizations remain poration notes that it is unlikely that centralized at the top; only a handful the Iraqi Army will effectively engage of key actors make all the decisions; JAM if it chooses to attack the remain- and conservatism and concomi- ing U.S. forces during the drawdown. tant fear of independent decision Rather, it argues that huge numbers remain clearly embedded through- of JAM operatives work in the army out the military hierarchy. There as soldiers and are expected to step are exceptions, of course, particu- aside if JAM chooses to attack again.3 larly among the younger generation The Kurds have their strategic of military leaders. But even they political influences in the security tend to micromanage their staffs services as well. The current Chief of and keep a close hold on any infor- Staff is a seasoned KDP Peshmerga mation. Last, sectarianism, though (Kurdish militia) officer with little hard to see on the surface, remains conventional military experience. He a deeply-rooted problem. assumed his key military position by Operations are hampered by virtue of the political assassination of growth and development problems. his predecessor, a Sunni Arab officer, Iraqi security services on the whole several years ago. It must be noted are not yet adept at synchronized that while more than 90 percent of combined arms operations or plan- Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslim they ning without the help of their U.S. are not Arabs. Coalition Provisional counterparts. They are not maneu- Authority planners originally man- ver-oriented and cannot deploy or dated the Chief of Staff position be control battlespace outside of their filled by a Sunni Arab, and the gen- traditional areas of operation for long eral has made it known he has been periods of time. Apart from the Iraqi more than ready to retire for some Special Forces units, the current time now. Iraq’s Sunni Arab security modus operandi is very much that of elite, meanwhile, does not hide the the past; static checkpoint and fixed fact it wants the position back. But base operations with short patrol- Kurdish political leaders are loath to ling “outside the wire.” Integrated give up this key position unless they staff planning, when it does occur, are likely to gain another key security is initiated and driven by the com- position in return. mander from the top down. Engi- neering assets, a critical component Systemic dilemmas for mobility and sustained combined Systemic shortcomings likewise arms operations, remain deficient. continue to hamper Iraq’s new secu- Rules of engagement are loose, par- rity services on a number of fronts. ticularly the rule of proportionality The first is leadership. Iraq’s in the use of force. Individual initia- senior security leadership, simply tive and acumen at lower ranks is put, is a mixed bag. U.S. and Coali- also lacking. Lastly, despite intense tion trainers and partners have spent efforts at fostering intra-service an extraordinary amount of effort cooperation by U.S. advisors, mis- to foster initiative, critical think- trust between Iraq’s various forces ing and mental flexibility in their remains palpable. Iraqi counterparts. But lowering Force modernization is uneven, cultural barriers has not happened uncoordinated and all over the geo-

132 The Journal of International Security Affairs Taking Stock in Iraq graphical map. Claims of insider “inflation” for their systems, which influence, outright corruption and has hampered the purchase of reli- biased competition tenders are con- able, modern, state-of-the-art equip- stantly heard in the late evening ment—to include systems in use by hours when drinking strong Iraqi tea. U.S. forces. Culturally predisposed to freestyle Although they are a constant wheeling and dealing, Iraqi security focus of U.S. officials and interna- officials dislike the bureaucratically tional agencies, human rights remain cumbersome U.S. foreign military a work in progress. Old ways die sales (FMS) system. Moreover, due hard, even after years of close part- to the fighting over the last few years, nership. Modern equipment and force modernization has focused on training do not develop or adjust prin- ground infantry and police units— ciples and values. Particularly telling to the detriment of other branches in this regard is the recent discovery of Iraq’s military. The result is a lop- of another secret prison for holding sided fighting force suitable for some Sunni Arabs at Baghdad’s old Muth- combat missions under some condi- anna military airfield.4 tions, rather than the fully flexible warfighting machine envisioned by The political stalemate in the Coalition planners. wake of the country’s March Intelligence capabilities are lacking. Always a sensitive occupation elections has left some security and subject in the Middle East, Iraqi commanders hesitant to alienate security services today do not yet Sadr’s Jaysh Al Mahdi militia conduct proper or synchronized intelligence activities in support of their (JAM), which gained 40 seats in myriad operational services. Iraqis the new parliament. note that most reports continue to be politically motivated and hence are of A multilayered threat no real operational value. Analysis, picture particularly that of long-term trends The situation in Iraq today is and developments, is non-existent, far better when compared against as is counterintelligence and opera- metrics of the very violent years of tional military security (OPSEC). As 2005-2007. Better is relative, how- such, operations planning, personnel ever, depending on where one lives information and other sensitive infor- in Iraq. The threat of increased vio- mation are often breached. lence hovers constantly due to the Corruption, a tough concept to political stalemate and unresolved define in a western sense, has unques- vendettas from previous fighting tionably taken its toll on force devel- that continue to fester. It is not just opment. At a personal level, citizens al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that presents are being denied a job in a security a clear and present danger; Shi’a service based on their sect (notably and other party-affiliated militias, Sunni). On a larger level, Iraqi secu- battered in 2008, still exist outside rity services remain stymied in their traditional security structures. And efforts to address serious security then there are the Kurds. threats (for example, that of Impro- AQI, it should be noted, is not vised Explosive Devices) because of the foreign monolith it once was. The their insistence on natural pricing Bin Laden network’s regional fran-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 133 P.J. Dermer

chise lost most of its power bases abdication of violence, or a complete and strongholds when local Iraqis disavowal of AQI. Moreover, Iraqi turned against it in 2007 in a phenom- Sunnis simply cannot be seen to be enon that came to be known as “the in league with Maliki’s Shi’a govern- Awakening” or “Sons of Iraq.” Cur- ment in its effort to disarm their own rently dominated by Iraqis, AQI is community, leaving it defenseless. still a threat, as demonstrated by the Prime Minister-elect Iyad Allawi’s steady stream of incidents, especially inability to form a government has in mixed Sunni-Shi’a population cen- only added to the sense of dislocation ters, that imperil local stability. While among Iraq’s Sunnis. the organization has suffered recent As a result, there are some who leadership setbacks, it still maintains believe that AQI will go on the offen- local bases and will remain a threat sive again, especially if political con- until the political situation in Iraq ditions remain unsettled. But the becomes more inclusive (i.e., there organization’s ranks have thinned are substantially more Sunnis in key considerably, and—having learned positions of power than currently). the lesson of the Awakening—its interests cannot not be in conflict It is not just al-Qaeda in Iraq with those of the greater Iraqi Sunni Arab community. Therefore, contain- (AQI) that presents a clear and ing and managing AQI is likely to present danger; Shi’a and other be more of a political venture than party-affiliated militias, battered a security challenge in the months ahead. Nevertheless, deep divisions in 2008, still exist outside within the Sunni Arab community traditional security structures. persist with scores still to be settled, as presently witnessed. For the fore- At present, many members of seeable future, AQI will remain an AQI are either in a dormant state or uncertain and dangerous player. have joined other organizations to But the residual violence in Iraq mask their activities. Others have is about more than just AQI. Iraq’s been absorbed into the remnants of Shi’a political parties and their mili- the Awakening/Sons of Iraq, and are tias are not down and out. Some are believed to be willing to renounce still licking their wounds from the AQI if given a chance. But this will beating administered by the Maliki not happen so long as Sunni Arabs government in 2008. Others are believe they are still politically disen- hedging their bets and cautiously franchised by a government deemed observing political developments. to be closer to Iran than to the coun- Therefore, the violence at present try’s own body politic. Adding fuel to in Iraq’s Shi’a strongholds is mostly the fire are promises made by Prime politically and criminally motivated. Minister Maliki’s Shi’a government Regardless, the militias remain well that have failed to materialize, as well armed and recruit constantly. More- as his continuing purge of the Awak- over, the Shi’a militias are still being ening’s ranks. These developments aided and abetted by Iran, whose cur- highlight a critical problem: without rent focus is as much economic as political inclusion and a concomitant it is political.5 Still, within both the period of relative stability, Sunni Arab MOI headquarters and other security leaders will not be able to justify a full units, efforts are under way to purge

134 The Journal of International Security Affairs Taking Stock in Iraq the most radical of these elements while regional commanders appear from the rank and file. These efforts committed to ridding their country of are halting and difficult, but they are the malign elements that were never unequivocally a good sign. tolerated in the past. Lastly, the Iraqi Finally, the threat from the Army is staying out of the political Kurdish Peshmerga (as well as the fray, at least for the time being. two divisions controlled by Kurdish commanders in the North) is simply that they are not under the direct The real focus of the Iraqi Army control of Baghdad. As such, they today is on regaining the country’s remain available to protect Kurdish “honor” and primacy as a regional interests, to the concern of their Iraqi military power—not simply being counterparts. They are well trained, and have benefited from a wind- the nation’s new policeman. Their fall of heavy weaponry and matériel preferred center of attention is acquired during the fall of Saddam. against time-honored conventional Despite their perceived capabilities, however, they are proving to be less regional threats: Iran and Syria. than capable against their indigenous PKK problem. As the country’s premier security arm, the real focus of the Iraqi The logic of withdrawal Army today is on regaining the The preceding analysis leaves country’s “honor” and primacy as a room for cautious optimism that the regional military power—not simply withdrawal from Iraq can continue being the nation’s new policeman. along the current timeline. Predic- Their preferred center of attention tions about the future in Iraq are is against time-honored conventional guesswork at best, and the angst vis- regional threats: Iran and Syria. In ible regarding the U.S. departure is order to focus externally, however, understandable. Yet, when assessed Iraqi security commanders under- comprehensively, the picture in the stand they must first put their domes- longer term is positive if the Iraqi tic house in order. political stalemate resolves itself and And while there are those who the security services can get their clearly wish the United States to stay, collective act together. there are those who clearly want us to There are signs that this is pos- leave. Regardless of their own inad- sible. Although Mosul and Baghdad equacies, at least some senior-level remain particularly problematic Iraqis feel the U.S. presence is more (albeit for different reasons), other problematic then helpful. They note areas of the country are relatively that the withdrawal will strengthen peaceful. Nor is the overall picture of the confidence and self-esteem of the Iraqi security services as bleak Iraqi troops, while at the same time as it appears at first blush. Yes, there stripping politicians of the convenient are inadequacies, disconnects and “occupation” card used to justify challenges, but at the end of the day opposition to the legitimacy of the the Iraqi security forces more or less central government in Baghdad. believe they are evolving, and suc- Then there is the issue of our ceeding. Iraqi Special Forces units own resources. Perhaps John Nagl, are both very good and very busy, president of the Washington-based

The Journal of International Security Affairs 135 P.J. Dermer

Center for a New American Security 3. See Walter L. Perry et al., Withdrawing from and himself a former Army officer, put Iraq, Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies (Santa Monica: the problem best when he noted that: RAND, 2009). 4. Ned Barker, “Secret Prison Revealed in Leaving Iraq is not only a public Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2010, relations issue, but a recovery- http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/19/ of-force issue. The Army has not world/la-fg-iraq-prison19-2010apr19. recovered from its surge into Iraq, 5. See, for example, “Iran Supports Three and now it is surging in Afghani- Insurgent Groups in Iraq: US General,” Agence France-Presse, July 21, 2010, stan, which hasn’t turned the http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/ corner at all. There are many con- article/ALeqM5jCA6iGhsEI3i-z4hAG - nections between the two wars, 8Z2Cu4kV3Q. and the fact we only have one 6. As cited in Scott Wilson, “U.S. Withdrawal Army is one of them. We just don’t from Iraq Will Be on Time, Vice Presi- have enough Army to do every- dent Biden Says,” Washington Post, May thing we want it to do right now.6 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/ AR2010052605349.html. That said, withdrawal does not mean we are throwing in the “strategic” towel. At 50,000, the remaining contingent of military trainers, mentors and capacity builders is not a small force. And, in coordination with Iraqi counterparts, this group is likely to evolve into a robust train and equip mission along the lines of those developed by Iraq’s neighbors. This presence will support Iraq’s continued development, and provide a level of conventional deterrence against external threats, something Iraq needs to allow it space and time to find its own way internally. Iraqis know how to take care of their problems if they really want to. Our withdrawal is an unmistakable signal that it is time for them to begin in earnest to do so on their own.

1. Author’s conversation, Baghdad, Iraq, April 2010. 2. Matthew Weaver, “Iraqi Army Not Ready to Take Over until 2020, Says Country’s Top General,” Guardian (London), August 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2010/aug/12/iraqi-army-not-ready- general.

136 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective

Dubious Disarmament An Interview with The Honorable Robert G. Joseph

mbassador Robert G. Joseph currently holds the position of Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Pre- Aviously (2005-2007), he was Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, serving as the State Department’s principal officer for non- and counterproliferation matters, arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations, and security assistance. Before that, Dr. Joseph served in the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense. In that capacity, he was responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. policies and strategies for preventing, deterring and defending against threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction.

In July 2010, Amb. Joseph spoke with Journal editor Ilan Berman about the state of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, the Obama administration’s “reset” of relations with Russia, and the new shape of U.S. missile defense.

You were one of the principal architects of what was perhaps the Bush administration’s most far-reaching counterproliferation effort, the Proliferation Security Initia- tive (PSI). Yet the PSI remains poorly understood, even within national security circles in the United States. What were the rationale and organizing principles of the PSI?

The Proliferation Security Initiative was announced by President Bush in May 2003. The purpose then, as now, was to create a cooperative multilateral mechanism for disrupting the trade in illicit WMD and missile-related materials and technologies. Perspective

As for organizing principles, the approach was rather unconventional. Initially, we gathered a small number of states that shared our commitment to stopping proliferation and were in a position to contribute to this common goal. In this early phase, the focus was on developing the “Statement of Interdiction Princi- ples,” which remains in effect today. The objective was twofold: first, to motivate states to be proactive in enforcing their legal rights to act against the proliferation trade, and second, to create an enabling framework to build national and international capacities to interdict proliferation trafficking.

Consistent with these goals, there was significant progress in the first years of the Initiative. The number of PSI partners increased to well over 90 states, making PSI participation a standard of good nonproliferation behavior. And cooperation grew to include law enforcement and customs communities. Dozens of major exercises in almost every region of the world were held to improve coordination and capacities to act effectively. The results, in actual interdic- tions, were impressive.

In its heyday, the PSI was the world’s most successful security partnership, more than double the size of NATO. Recently, however, it has fallen into disrepair. What is its status today?

Soon after coming into office, the Obama administration stated its intention to strengthen the PSI, as well as other initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. I found this welcome and encouraging. However, progress has been slow and incremental. As a practical matter, PSI-type activities seem to have a much lower priority for this White House than traditional arms control negotiations with Russia, or agreement on a consensus document at the NPT Review Conference—a document that calls out Israel and fails to mention Iran.

Since taking office, President Obama has made nuclear disarmament one of the key elements of its foreign policy. How is his administration pursuing this objective, in practical terms?

There is no doubt that the Obama administration has placed disarmament at the top of its national security agenda. The President’s April 2009 Prague speech set the tone and direction his Administration would follow toward a “world free of nuclear weapons.” The underlying worldview appears to be: lead by example and others will follow.

And lead the Administration has. The abrupt cancellation of the planned third missile defense site in Europe to pave the way for “New START”; the concessions made to Russia in those negotiations; the unilateral, U.S.-only, commitment in the Nuclear Posture Review not to pursue any new nuclear design or capabilities are only several of many examples.

But to what end? In the first instance, we have not seen the results that Presi- dent Obama, Secretary Clinton and others promised. While the Security Coun- cil recently passed yet another sanctions resolution against Iran, its fourth, the

138 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective measures outlined in it are far from “crippling,” and Iran defiantly continues to enrich uranium on the path to a nuclear weapon. Nor is there any progress with North Korea, with Pyongyang declaring it will expand its nuclear and missile programs. As for bringing along the international community, leading by example has produced even fewer results; Iran’s president was able to hijack the NPT Review Conference on its very first day.

Nevertheless, the Administration appears determined to stay the course— seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the ini- tiation of arms control negotiations in areas that would undermine U.S. security, including on missile defenses and space.

The Obama administration’s recent “reset” of relations with Russia has yielded a new strategic arms limitation agreement, known as “New START.” What are the benefits of this agreement for the United States? What are the drawbacks?

The Obama administration has stated that “New START” will contribute to a “reset” of the U.S.-Russia relationship. What exactly that means is unclear.

Not surprisingly, Russia’s leaders appear quite pleased with the negotiated out- comes, almost to the point of dancing in the end zone. Clearly, Russia got what it wanted: limits on strategic launchers that constrain the United States but not Russia; elimination of monitoring provisions that provided transparency on Rus- sian modernization; no limits on so-called “non-strategic” nuclear forces that give Russia a major advantage in overall force levels; and—all Administration protestations to the contrary—direct constraints on both U.S. missile defenses and on future conventional global strike capabilities. Short of re-establishing the ABM Treaty, it is hard not to conclude that Russia got pretty much everything it wanted. For our part, we got a new arms control agreement.

Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that the treaty may contribute not to a more normal relationship with Moscow, but to the return to a competitive, and perhaps adversarial, relationship with the United States. The signing cer- emonies and summit photo ops are reminiscent of the Cold War days. For some in Moscow, this symbolism is welcomed as a reflection of restored superpower status—a status that continues to be defined in opposition to the United States. And for those Russian leaders who see the United States as the enemy, the treaty holds value because it restores nuclear weapons as the principal currency of the bilateral relationship. This is perhaps the only category of arms in which Russia can compete.

Instead of pursuing old-style arms control of the type practiced during the Cold War, we should be seeking new avenues of cooperation with Russia in areas where our interests intersect—such as furthering our cooperation against nuclear terrorism and managing the expansion of nuclear energy in a way that reduces the prospects for proliferation. It is much more likely that we can build trust and confidence on this basis in the future than by relying on the approaches of the past.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 139 Perspective

American missile defense has undergone several transformations over the past decade. Currently, the Obama administration’s plan emphasizes short- and medium-range defenses, deployed abroad, over long-range defense of the U.S. homeland. Do these priorities track with the current proliferation challenges facing the United States?

The United States does not have the luxury of choosing which missile threats it will defend against. We must act to develop and deploy effective defenses simultaneously against short, medium, and long-range threats. We must protect our forces abroad, our friends and allies, and our homeland from missile attack.

Iran and other countries are actively seeking the capability to hold U.S. cities hostage, perhaps to deter us from fulfilling our security commitments and assisting our friends in vital regions of interest, including the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. We need to stay ahead of this threat by investing in real capabilities that can be deployed when and where they are needed.

140 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

The Promise of a United Maghreb Mbarka Bouaida

CASABLANCA—The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) can claim some successes since its inception on February 17, 1989. Yet much still remains to be done to integrate the countries of the Maghreb. True regional unity, and the prosperity that flows from it, will require an examination of future challenges facing the North African region: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. That task has never been more crucial. The current international environment and the proliferation of multiple crises—financial, economic, food, energy- related or other—makes the removal of impediments to effective development more important than ever. The Kingdom of Morocco has blazed a trail in this regard, spearheading the drive for a strong, united, and mutually beneficial Maghreb. It has done so not only due to shared history, language (Arabic and Amazigh), and religion, but also because it is a necessity dictated by our shared destinies and aspirations. Quite simply, North African integration is a duty that we cannot ignore in the face of globalization. More than ever before, the well-being of the citizens of the Maghreb hinges on the free circulation of people, services, goods, merchandise, and capital in a North African common market—one that will eventually lead to a monetary and economic union that contributes to robust, revitalized trade among the countries of the region. Such a dream is achievable. Increasing national growth rates by just two points, admittedly an ambitious goal in these difficult economic times, would make regional states powerful, complementary, and competitive—and make North Africa a hub for domestic and international investment. With growing competencies across a range of business capabilities, the opportunities

Ms. Mbarka Bouaida is a member of the Moroccan Parliament, and chair of its Committee of Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Religious Affairs. She also represents Morocco in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Dispatches

inherent in African markets will contribute to international attention, and regional development. And with greater coordinated responses to cross-border opportunities, we could begin thinking bigger. North African states would be able take advantage of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation via the Mediterranean Union, and expand contacts with other parts of Africa and the Middle East to more effectively deal with transnational threats, be they financial, economic, food, energy-related or environmental. Indeed, North African integration can serve as a model for joint action and effective cooperation across the Arab and Islamic worlds, both on the African continent and beyond it. It would offer to Arab, Islamic, and African countries a unique cultural model that underscores common values like the respect for diversity, and serve as a source of inspiration to neighboring nations. The first step along this path is a return to the region’s rich shared cultural heritage. Revisiting our history, our language, and religion is key to recalling that what joins us together is more important than what separates us. But our march toward a modern Maghreb should not stop with these mem- ories. Rather, we should focus on the potential complementarities emerging in our region. By keeping close watch on various strategies to develop North Afri- can agriculture, tourism, the deployment of networks (oil and gas pipelines, electrical cables, telecommunications, transportation, etc.), and the opening of free trade to other Maghreb countries, we will successfully embrace the challenge of the Maghreb integration. By making our countries more business friendly, via the harmonization of legal, administrative, and financial measures that create a favorable climate for inter-Maghreb transactions and investment, and by lifting impediments to trade, in particular the logic-defying closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border, the road to a Greater Maghreb could be paved. At the same time, by opening up a common regional market of more than 80 million consumers, large enough to attain economies of scale, North African corporate entities could boost their competitiveness in a globalized environment, and improve the living conditions of local populations. But a strategy for regional integration will only succeed if local leaders make intelligent use of the many opportunities that are afforded to them. It is far more effective for the North African counties to speak and negotiate with their global partners with one voice. In turn, dealing with a single regional policy and purpose is more attractive to international partners interested in investing in the Maghreb. To put a modern twist on an old adage, the countries of the Maghreb today have a clear choice: they can prosper together, or they can stagnate separately.

142 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

The Tunisian Model Roger Bismuth

TUNIS—Every year, far from the media spotlight, a great Jewish pilgrimage occurs where few would expect it. That place is Tunisia, a moderate Muslim country that takes pride in its religious tolerance and equal rights for women. The pilgrimage culminating at the historic Ghriba Synagogue on the island of Djerba would be extraordinary in any other part of the Arab world. But it is not in Tunisia, where modernity is embraced and openness to other cultures and religions is a way of life. You probably don’t read about this, for most reports out of the Arab World depict a monolithic bloc of nations aligned against the West. This is far from the truth—and far from the case in Tunisia. The extent to which Tunisia stands up for religious tolerance is not well known abroad. Opposition radicals at home and bigots abroad seize on the Ghriba pilgrimage to try to vilify the Tunisian government. Fundamentalist- inspired Middle Eastern television stations have tried in the past to “embarrass” Tunis by criticizing the presence of Jewish and Israeli pilgrims on Tunisian soil. Curiously, this bigotry has received no attention and provoked no real criticism in the West. Fortunately, Tunisia remains undaunted. In my position as a member of the Tunisian Senate, I am a constant and proud witness to my country’s prin- cipled commitment to religious tolerance. Holding the pilgrimage requires a lot of effort and planning. But we in Tunisia have always believed that the potent symbolism of the event was the most important consideration. The Ghriba pilgrimage is a microcosm of Tunisia’s uniqueness. An heir to ancient Carthage, Tunisia has a long history of contributions to global causes that belies its relatively small size. The country has also managed to achieve stability and prosperity for more than two decades with limited natural resources. When it comes to religious faith and practice, it is no exaggeration to say that there is no country in the region that is fighting fanaticism in all its forms better than Tunisia. We have done so even when our friends and allies in the West were not yet particularly aware of the threat. In Tunisia we ensure that children of all races, religion and gender have access to education and healthcare. Our schooling and vaccination rates often exceed those of developed countries. More than 80 percent of Tunisians now own their own homes. Simply put, there is no other country in the region which can boast similar progress, and especially in terms of gender equality. Women hold 27 percent of seats in Tunisia’s Chamber of Deputies, and more than 15 percent in our Senate—outpacing many developed nations. And Tunisia is primed for the future: more than 60 percent of university students in Tunisia are women.

Roger Bismuth is the president of the Tunisian Jewish community, as well as a member of the Tunisian Senate and the executive committee of the country’s business federation.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 143 Dispatches

Fighting the religious fanaticism threatening to turn back the clock for women and others in Tunisia continues to be a top priority for the government of President Zine Abidine Ben Ali. Some international organizations, which seem more interested in “the rights” of Salafist jihadis than those whom they have violently targeted, should remember that the danger these radicals pose to the whole region is both clear and present. Tunisia has successfully thwarted terrorism at home since the late 1980s. But we are not naïve; the threat is now both regional and global. This is why Tunisia has adopted a multi-dimensional approach, introducing broad educational reforms, fighting poverty and launching job-creation programs—and thereby depriving violent extremists of fertile ground. Still, we remain vigi- lant, even while upholding the legal and human rights of all suspects in terrorism cases. Perhaps Tunisia’s “problem,” in the eyes of some critics, is simply that we refuse to submit to the will of those who believe a fundamentalist future might not be a very bad thing after all, even if it means religious intolerance and discrimination would be the rule rather than the exception. Advancing democracy and tolerance is not easy, particularly when there are so many extremists working against that objective. Distant observers must shed their illusions; democracy cannot bloom instantly in all environments. It must be protected and nourished over time in order to take firm root. In Tunisia, it is—and it has.

144 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

Kreisky’s Corrosive Legacy Simone Dinah Hartmann & Florian Markl

VIENNA—On June 24th 2010, Israeli President Shimon Peres welcomed Aus- tria’s Social Democratic Chancellor, Werner Faymann, for a working meeting during the latter’s official state visit to Israel. On that occasion, Peres urged Euro- pean leaders to “return to the doctrine of former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Krei- sky” and support the Middle East peace process. Like Kreisky allegedly did with Yasser Arafat in the 1970s, Europeans nowadays should “turn to Hamas, which controls Gaza, and pressure its leaders into supporting negotiations toward peace, recognizing Israel, and stopping the weapons smuggling and acts of terrorism.” Peres’ statement was odd in various respects. Its underlying assumption, that Hamas could be turned from an enemy into a supporter of the Israeli- Palestinian peace process, is highly questionable. Even more problematic, Arafat is held up here as a historic example of the metamorphosis of a terrorist leader into a partner for peace—even though the reality was quite different. Not least, following in the footsteps of Bruno Kreisky could hardly be good for Israel, since his Middle East policy consisted of pressuring the Jewish state while appeasing and supporting its worst enemies. Kreisky, a staunchly secular socialist and lifetime opponent of Zionism, was born into a Viennese Jewish family, and spent the years of National Socialism in exile in Sweden. After his return to Austria, he embarked upon a career in the foreign ministry. In 1970, Kreisky became Austria’s first socialist Chancellor, despite an anti-Semitic campaign waged against him by his conservative opponents. He burst onto the Middle East policy scene in September 1973, when two Palestinian terrorists kidnapped Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union on their way through Austria. Kreisky negotiated their release, but at a price—the closure of the transit-camp at Schonau castle run by the Jewish Agency. Although the transit of Jews from the Soviet Union through Austria continued, Kreisky’s decision to close the camp at Shonau was highly symbolic, widely seen as the first case of a government capitulating to the demands of Palestinian terrorists. In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the Socialist International, until then staunchly pro-Israel, changed course. Under Kreisky’s leadership, European socialists began to reach out to “socialist” parties throughout the Arab world. It was during the first of those so-called “fact finding missions” that Kreisky met Yasser Arafat for the first time. While not impressed on a personal level, Krei- sky quickly became the PLO leader’s most ardent supporter, despite Arafat’s status—just two years after the 1972 massacre at the Munich Olympic Games and following years of Palestinian terrorist attacks throughout the world—as persona non grata on the world stage. Contrary to all available evidence, Chancellor Kreisky claimed to have never seen proof of the PLO’s declared goal of the destruction of Israel. He spent much

Simone Dinah Hartmann is director of STOP THE BOMB Austria and co-editor of Iran in the World System (Studienverlag, 2010). Florian Markl, a former histo- rian for the General Settlement Fund for Victims of National Socialism in Vienna, is currently completing his doctorate on Palestinian terrorism in Austria.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 145 Dispatches

of the 1970s trying to enhance the status of Arafat and the PLO in the international arena, which did not prevent Palestinian terrorists from perpetrating attacks in Austria, including the spectacular hostage-taking of OPEC ministers in Vienna in 1975, and two bloody attacks on Vienna’s main synagogue in 1979 and 1981, respectively. In 1979, Kreisky provoked yet another international outcry by hosting Arafat in Vienna. In 1980, Austria became the first western country to officially recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Even as Palestinian terrorists cut a bloody swath through Austria, Kreisky’s relations with Israel went from bad to worse. Once the right-wing Likud party came to power in Jerusalem in 1977, Kreisky’s already frosty attitude turned overtly hostile. His decision in 1982 to welcome Muammar al-Gaddafi, another rogue Arab politician deeply involved in anti-western and anti-Israeli terrorism, only further exacerbated Austria’s mounting tensions with Israel. The Kreisky “doctrine” bore strange fruit elsewhere in the Middle East as well. During the Iran-Iraq-war, the state-owned VOEST steel concern—in flagrant violation of Austria’s weapons-export regulations—sold hundreds of artillery pieces first to Iraq, and later on to Iran as well. While the Iraqi war effort was supported by other western countries as well, the Islamic Republic of Iran was not—until, that is, Austrian politicians with their odd predilection for rogue regimes stepped in. In 1984, Austrian Social Democrat Erwin Lanc became the first West- ern foreign minister to visit Iran following the Islamic Revolution. In 1987, Ali Akbar Velayati came to Vienna in the first state visit to a western country by an Iranian foreign minister since 1979. When an Iranian hit team murdered Iranian-Kurdish leader Abdel Rahman Quassemlou in Vienna in 1989, Austrian officials not only did not reconsider their relations to the Iranian regime, they actively helped the murderers to flee the country. Kurt Waldheim, the Austrian president whose term in office was clouded by revelations about his Nazi past, became the first Western head of state to pay the regime in Tehran a courtesy visit in 1991, even going so far as to place a wreath atop Ayatollah Khomeini’s sarcophagus. His trip to Tehran paved the way for further visits by high-ranking politicians from other Western European countries—especially from Germany. Austrian trade relations with Iran have since flourished, nearly doubling in the last decade. Despite international attempts to pressure Iran into abandoning its nuclear program, Austria has positioned itself as a valuable economic partner for the Islamic Republic. The head of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce has described Austria as Iran’s “gateway to the European Union.” And even though Austria, currently a member of the UN Security Council, supported the latest round of sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program, regime representatives still receive a warm welcome in Vienna: this past May, Iranian foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki, the opening speaker at the infamous Holocaust denial conference in Tehran, was hosted by conservative Austrian foreign minister Michael Spindelegger. Most recently, Vienna’s city council demonstrated its adherence to the Kreisky “doctrine” by unanimously passing a one-sided resolution condemning Israel’s military action against the Gaza flotilla, just hours after the incident in the Mediterranean. It should come as no surprise that the resolution was initiated by the Social Democrats; the party once led by Kreisky can still be found at the forefront of anti-Israel activism in Europe. In short, not much has changed since Kreisky left office in 1983. While occasionally paying lip service to Israel’s security concerns, Austria’s politicians continue to pursue policies that are deeply detrimental to its interests.

146 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Course Correction Shawn Macomber

Newt Gingrich, To Save America: Stopping could have wealth without working Obama’s Secular-Socialist Machine (Wash- for it and security without defend- ington, D.C.: Regnery, 2010), 356 pp. $29.95. ing it. The inescapable truth is that we have not been honest with ourselves. We are emerging from a pattern of self-deception “Democracy,” H.L. Mencken that transcends partisan and ideo- once famously quipped, “is the theory logical lines. Repeatedly refusing that the common people know what to face the facts, we have been they want, and deserve to get it good surprised by obvious events that and hard.” In Newt Gingrich’s sprawl- we only missed due to our deter- ing new jeremiad and call-to-arms, mination to deceive ourselves. To Save America, the former House speaker appears to endorse a modi- Whether some apparatchik fied version of that maxim: somewhere within the “machine” hatched a plan to sell American [T]he secular-socialist machine voters on that fantasy world is an open gained power through dishonesty, question. That Team Obama messag- deceit, and deception. But the ing gurus David Axelrod and David American people have not been Plouffe explicitly advertised the entirely innocent in this process. same cannot be disputed. Married For years we avoided hard choices by retreating into a fantasy world to the rampant anti-Bushism of the where difficult problems didn’t moment, a free lunch at the expense exist. We thought our country of whatever industry or tax bracket

Shawn Macomber is a contributing editor to The American Spectator. Book Reviews the promised imperial presidency On the last concern, Gingrich is chose to demagogue and strong arm, not terribly persuasive. A confluence proved a persuasive electoral argu- of history and demography have now ment. Lest any pundit be confused coalesced into a Chinese moment, but about voters’ “honest” intent, they neither element is static, and China proceeded to load Congress to the will soon face internal schisms as the gills with blustering, activist liberals. short-sighted One Child policy and Alas, the reality of activist gov- the foundational tensions of mashing ernment which can be evaded during authoritarian rule atop an increas- a theoretical campaign cannot be so ingly dynamic, quasi-free enterprise easily shaken during the practice economy come home to roost. And if of governance. Transitioning from Gingrich’s bleak outlook on the post- promising the stars and a cynical, Obamanomics American economy Pollyanna-ish mantra of “change” to has merit—which it does—then so bureaucratic coercion and a chaotic much the worse for a China holding fiscal policy is a tough trick. Today, our debt and desperate for spend- the prognosis is dire. Our enemies— thrift export markets. the “irreconcilable wing of Islam,” On the remaining four threats, as Gingrich calls it, along with the however, Gingrich’s descriptions are authoritarian nation-state power sobering—if not outright terrifying. jockeys and nettlesome tin-pot dicta- And a regulatory state sanctioned tors—are as intractable as ever, the by an Alfred E. Neuman “What, me war-on-business-plus-massive-stimu- worry?” government and adminis- lus method of combating joblessness tered by elite, unelected bureaucratic has failed utterly, and Obama’s “Not rulemaking cliques, Gingrich fears, only can we afford to do this, we can’t will not engender, especially when afford not to do this” theory of bud- combined with an anemic economy, geting has produced endemic deficits the type of vision necessary to keep dwarfing those of the shameful Bush these nightmares from invading the era. The consequences of evading waking world: reality have, in other words, taken on the characteristics of compound Imagine going back in time a hun- interest, without Americans seriously dred years and talking to Henry grappling with the tab coming due. Ford about a hybrid electric A great deal of To Save Amer- engine… Or explain to the Wright brothers the U.S. military’s stealth ica necessarily deals with domestic bombers. Or talk to Edison about policy. That is, after all, the arena in three dimensional full color Imax which Obama and the Democratic movies. None of these inventions Congress have mostly chosen to do could have been built even if they battle. But the approach of the cur- could have been imagined that rent administration does not bode long ago. More important, none well for the prospects of address- of them were developed based on taxing and regulating other indus- ing the five major national security tries into extinction. They were threats Gingrich outlines: Terrorists the product of American ingenu- with nuclear weapons, an electro- ity, not government mandates. magnetic pulse attack, cyberwar- fare, biological warfare, and the The problem is, even as the growing gap between Chinese and Obama-Pelosi-Reid overreach American capabilities. launches Republicans into office, it

148 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews is not at all clear that even those who generally share Gingrich’s worldview are prepared to expound the awful truth to the masses. Let’s say establishment Republicans do begin talking straight about what it will take to defend ourselves, while simultaneously crawling out of our fiscal black hole. The same electorate that recently rewarded the gauziest, most substance-free campaign in recent memory with the highest percentage of the vote in two decades isn’t likely to become overnight devotees of emphatic, unvarnished, apocalyp- tic truths. Thus, To Save America is a very good bill of particulars against the current ruling philosophy of government, a chilling look at what the resti- tution for these years could look like in blood and treasure, and a fount of guarded optimism. Gingrich proves himself a forward-looking “ideas man” once again. But when he asks, “We have the power, but do we have the will?” the answer isn’t immediately clear. And when it is not, unfortunately, a “No” is implied. At one point in To Save Amer- ica, Gingrich recalls walking to the Atlanta Public Library in October of 1962, wondering en route if the entire city, along with every other American metropolis, would soon be a mass grave covered in radioactive ash. It’s an anecdote that showcases a willingness to confront the abyss quite a bit more unique than Gingrich supposes. What else can we do but hope that he, once again, proves the skeptics and doubters wrong?

The Journal of International Security Affairs 149 T:5.25”

A strong foundation gives us limitless potential to reach new

heights and accomplish what was never thought possible. T:8.5”

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Prodigal Son Asaf Romirowsky

Mosab Hassan Yousef with Ron The stories of Yousef’s subsequent Brackin, Son of Hamas: A Gripping exploits would make for a great work Account of Terror, Betrayal, Politi- of fiction, were they not fully corrobo- cal Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices rated by the Shin Bet. The Ha’aretz (SaltRiver, 2010), 288 pp. $26.99. newspaper’s Arab affairs correspondent, Avi Issacharoff, quotes Yousef’s Shin Bet handler expressing genuine They called him the “Green admiration for his most valuable asset: Prince,” because of his royal Hamas “So many people owe him their life pedigree and in deference to the sig- and don’t even know it. People who nature color used by Islamists. But did a lot less were awarded the Israel Mosab Hassan Yousef was also Israel’s Security Prize. He certainly deserves most valuable spy inside Hamas—and it. The amazing thing is that none of certainly the most successful one. his actions were done for money. He Over more than a decade, he prevented did things he believed in. He wanted dozens of suicide bombings and assas- to save lives.” sination attempts by the Palestinian Infiltrating the upper echelons Islamist group, saving hundreds of of Hamas came relatively easily to lives in the process. Yousef, because of his father’s stat- Yousef’s remarkable memoir, ure. He used the access in good stead; Son of Hamas, begins with his child- during the second intifada, Yousef sup- hood in Ramallah—a youth marked plied crucial intelligence that led to the by close family ties amid the Israeli arrests of several key Palestinian lead- “occupation.” Yousef’s father, an imam ers—among them, Ibrahim Hamid, a educated in Jordan, rose to notoriety Hamas commander in the West Bank, in their hometown. In 1986, he— and Marwan Barghouti, accused of along with six other men, including orchestrating numerous attacks on wheelchair-bound Gaza cleric Sheikh Israeli civilians and soldiers, including Ahmed Yassin—formed Hamas at a the deadly Passover Massacre at the secret meeting in Hebron. The first inti- Park Hotel in Netanya on March 27, fada broke out the following year, and 2002. Moreover, since he accompanied Yousef did his share, throwing rocks at his father to meet with Yasser Arafat Israeli civilians and military vehicles. prior to the start of the so called “al- His personal transformation took place Aqsa” intifada, Yousef can corroborate after his first arrest in 1996, when he the premeditated nature of the upris- was approached by Israel’s General ing, which was the product of a deal Security Service, the Shin Bet. His brokered by Arafat and Yousef père, subsequent discovery of Christianity rather than a spontaneous response to only served to solidify his new calling.

Asaf Romirowsky is a senior fellow at EMET and an associate fellow at the Middle East Forum.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 151 Book Reviews then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sha- has been granted “tentative” refuge in ron’s visit to the Temple Mount. the U.S. Yousef’s tale illustrates the impor- Happy ending notwithstand- tance of HUMINT, human intelligence ing, Yousef’s tale is a cautionary one. gathered by agents in the field working Over the years, the U.S. government their sources, on which Israel’s secu- time and again has welcomed Islamist rity forces have relied so extensively radicals with open arms, even as it has since the state’s founding. If anything, turned against the very heroes that the need today is even more pressing; have tried to keep it safe. Yousef’s book with the Gaza disengagement in 2005, is a remarkable story of courage and Israel lost much of its nascent human conviction in the face of radicalism. His capital in the Palestinian Territories. subsequent experience at the hands of In this intelligence vacuum, individu- U.S. authorities is a timely reminder als like Yousef have become supremely that—when it comes to the struggle important in the Israeli government’s against radical Islam—America still tireless quest to protect innocent lives. has a great deal to learn about who its The one person whom Yousef friends really are. would not help capture was his father. Upon learning about his son’s activities, Sheikh Hassan Yousef released a statement from his prison cell saying that, although it might have been possible for the Israelis to recruit his son, Mosab had no access to the movement’s secrets, and must have been “blackmailed” into cooperat- ing by Israeli security forces. More recently, the Sheikh wrote a letter from jail saying that he and his whole family “inclusively and exhaustively denounce our eldest son.” Yousef himself retired from the spy business and fled the West Bank in 2007. He now lives in California, a devout Christian. But no good deed goes unpunished; despite his extensive contributions to counterterrorism, in 2009 the U.S. Department of Home- land Security (DHS) opposed Yousef’s request for political asylum, and initiated proceedings to deport him on terrorist charges. It was only after his Shin Bet handler came forward to tes- tify on his behalf, and after his cause was taken up directly by a number of champions in Congress, that the government dropped its objections to Yousef’s requests for political asylum. As of this writing, the “Green Prince”

152 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Through the Monitor, Darkly Eric R. Sterner

Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Former National Security Coun- Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat cil staffer Richard Clarke falls into the to National Security and What to Do latter camp. Clarke is best known for about It (New York: HarperCollins having made Osama bin Laden his per- Publishers, 2010), 290 pp. $25.99. sonal policy crusade prior to 9/11, but his portfolio while in government also included U.S. critical infrastructure, Science fiction author William including cyberspace. In that capacity, Gibson coined the term “cyber- beginning in the Clinton administra- space” way back in 1984. The con- tion, he pioneered national policymak- cept has since gained in popularity ing related to cyber security. His latest as the information revolution gath- book, Cyber War, represents a culmi- ered speed. Unfortunately, Gibson’s nation of that experience. fictional description does not offer Part memoir, part policy essay, a useful policymaking framework. part threat assessment, and part call- For that, one must turn to the Penta- to-arms, Clarke and his co-author, gon, which defines cyberspace as “a Robert Knake, have penned a useful global domain within the information primer on cyberspace and national environment consisting of the inter- security. It begins with a chapter dependent network of information relating the story of several different technology infrastructures, including cyber battles, including the use of the Internet, telecommunications net- cyber weapons against Iraq in 2003, works, computer systems, and embed- the Russo-Estonian cyber war of ded processors and controllers.” 2007, the Russo-Georgian cyber war Predictably, this new domain of 2008, and the summer 2009 con- has emerged as a key challenge for flicts between North Korea and South U.S. national security. The informa- Korea and North Korea and the United tion revolution has prompted a cor- States. From the historical record, responding revolution in military Clarke and Knake take away five big affairs—a fundamental change in conclusions. First, that cyber war is the nature of warfare at the opera- real. Second, that it happens at the tional level. Enthusiasts saw this speed of light. Third, that cyber war is shift as an opportunity to deepen and global in nature. Fourth, that it skips extend America’s military advantage. the traditional battlefield altogether. Others, however, have viewed it with And fifth, that cyber war as a geopoliti- more foreboding, as an entirely new cal phenomenon has already begun. domain of vulnerability.

Eric R. Sterner is a Senior Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 153 Book Reviews

The authors follow quickly with pret the dynamics of using cyber a review of interagency battles over weapons first, the authors seem to roles and missions, an overview of recommend a “no first use of cyber- suspected foreign capabilities, and an weapons in a non-kinetic environ- accessible assessment of how cyber- ment” posture, lest the United States space works and its known flaws. provoke an adversary to strike at These portions of Cyber War offer a our critical vulnerabilities. Unfor- useful starting point for anyone seek- tunately, Clarke and Knake offer no ing an introduction to the issues and compelling reason why adversaries the players. would withhold use of their cyber- Having laid out the problems weapons just because the United that cyberspace presents for U.S. States has not used them first. national security and a useful back- Indeed, given the inherent uncer- ground for considering policy propo- tainties surrounding cyber conflict, sitions, Clarke and Knake spend the it may be impossible for the United last third of the book discussing the States to convince any adversary dynamics of cyber conflict, and rec- that it has not used cyberweapons, ommending future courses of action. even when it in fact hasn’t. Their assessment is damning; U.S. But here, policy ends and per- vulnerability to a coordinated cyber sonality begins. Bluntly, Cyber War attack has been a concern for over is excessively egocentric—a reflec- two decades, they point out. But tion of Clarke’s perception of himself despite multiple high-level studies, as a national security trailblazer. It is policies, strategies, and funding ini- written in the first person singular; tiatives, three successive presidents Knake’s voice is silent. Nor are there have failed to effectively address it. footnotes or a bibliography, leaving Instead, the U.S. government long the reader with no choice but to take has accepted a “network, defend thy- Clarke’s word when it comes to the self” approach, eschewing regula- motivations and actions of key play- tions the authors believe are needed ers in a shifting, amorphous emerg- for real change. ing battlefield. The prescriptions Clarke and To the vast majority of them, Knake propose are sweeping. They Cyber War is unforgiving. Clarke would prefer to inspect all Internet generally attributes small-minded, traffic before it enters the cyberspace narrow, and self-interested motives “backbone,” to separate critical infra- to any and all who disagree with structure controls (particularly those him. On occasion, these prejudices associated with the electricity grid) stray into the realm of conspiracy from cyberspace, and to aggressively theory; for example, Clarke depicts pursue defense information tech- the current Administration’s contin- nology upgrades in what they call ued opposition to the regulation he a “defensive triad.” In theory, they desires to President Obama’s chief posit, such steps would deter some domestic policy advisor’s marriage attacks by foiling their goals, and mit- to a former Microsoft lobbyist, and igate others that manage to penetrate the fact that Microsoft spends a fair critical U.S. networks. amount on political action commit- Having discussed defense, tees. All this leads Clarke to assert Cyber War moves on to offense. that “the Obama Administration was, While vague about how they inter- quite literally, in bed with Microsoft.”

154 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Its tone, shallowness, and breezi- ness make Cyber War a good read, and Clarke a talking head valued by the media. But these same features undermine the credibility of Combat proven. Yeah, I know the book’s arguments, and serve to diminish its policy impact as deci- what that means. I’ve been sion-makers continue to wrestle with there and have friends that the real and diffi cult questions Clarke and Knake successfully identify and are still there. Each mission is investigate. Nevertheless, if taken about performance, and lives with a heavy grain of salt, Cyber War is a welcome contribution to the con- depend on it. That’s why we temporary analysis of cyberspace build military vehicles the and national security. Sadly, with a way we do. We’re all bit less vitriol and more impartiality, it could be so much more. thinking about getting our friends home.

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Counterinsurgency 2.0 Martin Sieff

Roy Godson and Richard Shultz, Adapt- dynamics of conflict in Afghanistan ing America’s Security Paradigm and Secu- in America’s favor during his tenure rity Agenda (Washington, D.C.: National there. This, in large part, was the Strategy Information Center, 2010). reason why President Barack Obama was forced to relieve McChrystal of command and reassess U.S strat- One of the greatest institutional egy and tactics in that mountainous, weaknesses of the U.S. armed forces, recalcitrant little nation. especially the U.S. Army, has been an As such, Adapting America’s inability to retain the hard-won les- Security Paradigm by Roy Godson sons of conflicts fought over the past and Richard Schultz appears at an half century, especially in the area of opportune time. A sustained study counterinsurgency and the strategic of, and debate over, the very different problems of waging it on behalf of and often confusingly protean nature weak and ineffectual partner govern- of guerrilla warfare and low intensity ments. It took more than three-and-a- conflicts must become an ongoing half years of continued deterioration and central focus of the U.S. mili- in Iraq to finally initiate an effective tary and of the academic institutions counterinsurgency strategy at the and think tanks which serve it. And beginning of 2007. Since then, coun- Godson and Shultz deliver, making terinsurgency has become the new important and sometimes radical fashionable specialty for the Army, recommendations that start us along and this is in general a most welcome that path. development. However, the curse of Perhaps the most important of assuming that solutions learned the these, and the one most likely to raise hard way can be adapted wholesale hackles at West Point and around without regard for greatly changed the Pentagon, is that the security local conditions has continued to problems increasingly generated by afflict U.S. policymakers. the global environment of the 21st The conflict in Afghanistan, for century can no longer be solved by example, has not proved amenable to simply mandating bigger fixes of the same tactics as did the conflict financial investment and support or in Iraq. Gen. Stanley McChrystal of newer and better technologies. At a served with outstanding success in time when the Obama administration Iraq. But for all his intelligence, com- has quadrupled the already serious mitment and applied energy, he was budget deficit that it inherited from unable to significantly reverse the the George W. Bush administration

Martin Sieff is Chief Political Analyst for The Globalist, a former senior foreign correspondent for the Washington Times and former Managing Editor, International Affairs, for United Press International.

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(from $1.7 trillion to $6.8 trillion), environments—a lesson repeatedly this is a timely and sobering point lost and relearned by generals and to make, as well as being an uncon- armies over many centuries. ventional and important insight. The Several caveats to these conclu- Pentagon’s quiet ditching of former sions are necessary, however. First, Defense Secretary Donald Rums- the sensible, complex, integrated feld’s budget-busting fantasies of net- polices that Godson and Shultz advo- centric war also serves notice that cate do not usually produce imme- Godson and Shultz’s welcome return diate or often even rapid results, to the analytic basics of war comes at although improvements from them an appropriate time. can quickly be seen. Patience is Godson and Shultz likewise crucial in overseeing the strategic have been assiduous in learning key direction of these conflicts, and in lessons from the operational level educating home populations whose in Iraq. They took to heart the com- understanding is essential to main- plaints of senior Army officers that tain support for them. Also, while the Central Intelligence Agency was this study should be applauded as a far too slow in providing intelligence seminal contribution to advancing of operational use in the field, and far the necessary debate on developing too diffuse in its focus and assess- effective counterinsurgency strate- ment of the intelligence that the Army gies, it should be seen as an early needed. They are also entirely cor- step in this process, not as a definitive rect to advocate the restructuring of summary of it. military units that take point duty in Nor is Adapting America’s Secu- the field in counterinsurgency opera- rity Paradigm comprehensive in tions. The lessons of Iraq confirm nature. Not all of the security chal- the importance of establishing intel- lenges that the U.S. Army will face ligence dominance, as well as of intel- in the 21st century will be counter- ligence collection down to the local insurgency problems along the lines unit. This proved crucially impor- of Iraq and Afghanistan. Focusing tant to the success of Army units solely or overwhelmingly on the operating in Iraq under Gen. David threat of counterinsurgency, weak Petraeus during the Bush adminis- states and armed groups is like tration’s “surge” of forces there. having doctors specialize only in Likewise essential, according dealing with cancer or AIDS, while to Godson and Schultz, is creating— stripping them of the medical educa- and then maintaining—small corps of tion and medical and surgical tools experts that integrate civilian exper- needed to deal with other forms of tise with professional army officers illness. Conventional war is not going and serving soldiers. Unit cohesion away, as the Israelis and the Geor- and practical cooperation of such gians in particular well understand. hybrid units is notoriously difficult to Nevertheless, Godson and Shultz achieve and maintain, but the potential have done well to shine their spot- results and force-multiplying increase light on this important, continuing in experience and applied expertise and widely misunderstood dimension is well worth the effort. Godson and of contemporary warfare. Because it Shultz also correctly identify the isn’t going to go away either. crucial importance of mastering the smallest and most complicated local

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