september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Seven Years After 9/11:

FEATURE ARTICLE More is Not Always Better 1 Seven Years After 9/11: By Ambassador Michael Sheehan More is Not Always Better By Ambassador Michael Sheehan

Reports 3 From FATA to the NWFP: The Taliban Spread their Grip in Pakistan By Hassan Abbas 5 Preparing the Mujahidin: The Taliban’s Military Field Manual By Imtiaz Ali 7 The Current State of Al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia By Michael Knights 10 Assessing the Strength of Al-Qa`ida in Yemen By Gregory D. Johnsen 13 The 2008 U.S. Elections and Sunni Insurgent Dynamics in Iraq By Michael Gabbay 16 Learning from Adel Hammouda’s Work On Militant Islamist Groups By Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein AFP 19 After Action Report: Working with the Awakening in Central Anbar even years after the 9/11 completely eliminated the terrorist By Captain Elliot Press attacks, there is good news and threat. There remains a small and bad news. First, the good news: determined group of killers. They reside 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity al-Qa`ida has not been able to both here at home and abroad. They 26 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Sattack again inside the United States. No are bent on attacking the United States one could have possibly predicted this and our interests, and unfortunately on September 12, 2001, when we looked they are not going to go away anytime and felt so vulnerable. In the past seven soon. No matter what leaders we elect years, al-Qa`ida has been able to strike or appoint, no matter what policies we the non-Islamic West in only two cities, develop, this small and determined About the CTC Sentinel London and Madrid. Both of these group will be set on attacking us for The Combating Terrorism Center is an attacks were conducted by local cells at least another 20 years. Yet we must independent educational and research with varying levels of connectivity to remember that they are not everywhere institution based in the Department of Social the central or strategic hub of al-Qa`ida. and they are not all-powerful. They have Sciences at the United States Military Academy, No matter how you spin it, and even if limitations—personal, organizational West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses they attack again on the day this article and ideological—and they have proven the Center’s global network of scholars and is published, this is not an impressive their limits by their inability to attack practitioners to understand and confront record for an organization that looked again in the United States since 9/11. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and so powerful on 9/11. It is important to other forms of political violence. recognize our success in mitigating al- Prioritizing our Response Qa`ida’s impact on the world—even in Washington logic would have us believe the midst of several years of bad news that we solve problems by creating The views expressed in this report are those of coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan. new agencies and spending tons of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, taxpayers’ money. I disagree. As proven the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. Now for the bad news: intelligence and by the good work completed under law enforcement operations have not tight budgets at the New York Police

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Department (NYPD), leadership, focus, the threat since 9/11, and it is they who representing at least 10 percent of the creativity, and prudent risk-taking are have crushed the cells attempting to budget, that contributes to defending our more effective tools in the fight against strike us again. U.S. intelligence has nation from terrorist threats. Then, like terrorism than a steady flow of federal been successful in identifying potential most businesses that have to balance a taxpayer dollars into already massive attackers before they can mount an budget, these agencies should put more bureaucracies. attack in the West, and U.S. military resources into the high-value, high- forces have neutralized their capabilities payoff activity, eliminating the low- The most important work in protecting around the globe. Significantly, I am value, low-payoff activity. Of course, our country since 9/11 has been not aware of any attacks that were each agency will scream that everything accomplished with the capacity that was intercepted by defensive measures such they do is critical and to cut anything in place when the event happened, not as detectors, screenings or patrols. would seriously jeopardize our national with any of the new capability brought Defeating terrorism has been all about security, thereby placing the blame for since 9/11. I firmly believe that huge finding and crushing the cells—at home future failure on anyone who dares to budget increases have not significantly and abroad. When it comes to al-Qa`ida, challenge a budget increase. That kind contributed to our post-9/11 security. our best defense is a good offense. of nonsense should not be tolerated. Of course, over time, these gargantuan More is not necessarily better. The costs of an ideal offensive strategy “When it comes to al- are relatively small in terms of I remember what Mike O’Neil, who runs budgetary allocations. The real issue the counter-terrorism unit at NYPD, Qa`ida, our best defense is lies in aversion to the idea of spying told me: “Commissioner, I’d rather have a good offense.” at home and in dealing with unsavory a handful of quality people and get rid intelligence organizations abroad. of the deadwood. The deadwood just The challenge is to create innovative distracts me and the people trying to get and risk-taking programs that operate the job done.” During our time together, budgets will enhance our capability, within the law, have strong oversight, we worked hard to build the right sized but the cost-benefit ratio does not and allow for an occasional failure of unit, not the biggest unit. Dave Cohen compute favorably. The big wins had execution. If we overly constrain the also shrank the Intelligence Division at little to do with new programs. The CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, and NYPD in total numbers while creating a Central Intelligence Agency’s crowning other players such as the NYPD, we will new and more creative organization. He achievement was the takedown of the find ourselves conducting another 9/11 accomplished this by eliminating low- Taliban in Afghanistan, conducted Commission in a few years, wondering value work and focusing the good people only months after 9/11 with the same how another catastrophe could have he had on the task at hand. Meanwhile, people and organization that existed occurred on our shores. even as the NYPD got smaller overall before. What made the difference was and new counter-terrorism functions that the CIA was finally unleashed in The effectiveness of defensive were added, crime rates continued to Afghanistan and around the world. The strategies such as opening up all of drop. It bears repeating: more is not same holds true for the Federal Bureau our containerized shipping, strangling always better. of Investigation: most of the productive our petrochemical industries with work after 9/11 was accomplished within regulatory requirements, and Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan has had the existing infrastructure, but newly entrenching ourselves and our a 30-year career of public service. He has focused on al-Qa`ida and guided by the government institutions behind barriers served with distinction as a U.S. Army Patriot Act. Based on my experiences must be carefully scrutinized. These Special Forces officer, a White House aide for in New York City, I would say that all defenses are often modern versions of two administrations, as a senior diplomat at of the post-9/11 increases in the FBI’s the Maginot Line built by the French the State Department and the United Nations, counter-terrorism business could have after World War I, which was so easily and finally as the head of counter-terrorism been supplied from existing resources bypassed by the Nazi military machine. for the NYPD. As the Deputy Commissioner within the New York office. New Walls around our critical infrastructure for Counter-Terrorism at NYPD, he helped missions could easily have been taken will also be easily bypassed if terrorist reshape the NYPD into what is widely from current units by shifting priorities cells are able to organize a plot and regarded as one of the most effective counter- rather than spending more money. construct a weapon. Getting to a good terrorism organizations in the world. His target is relatively easy; we must stop latest book reflects on much of his career in Thinking Smart about our Strategy the terrorists before they get to that point. counter-terrorism and is entitled, Crush the As we assess the future of counter- Some targets need to be protected, but Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism without terrorism policy and programs, it is we must recognize that not everything Terrorizing Ourselves. Ambassador important to ask ourselves what has can or should be protected; the cost is Sheehan is a Senior Fellow at the Combating worked thus far. Beyond the obvious too prohibitive. Terrorism Center. and important impact of the Afghan takedown, the basic intelligence work Suggestions for the Next President by law enforcement and intelligence The next president should start off his operatives has make the biggest counter-terrorism effort by asking each difference. American police and agency (primarily the CIA and FBI) intelligence agents have been alert to to delineate its top layer of activity,

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From FATA to the NWFP: Kohat: Orakzai Agency; Bannu: North character,”9 video and music shops, Waziristan Agency; Dera Ismail Khan: and at times barber shops due to their The Taliban Spread their South Waziristan Agency; and Tank: practice of shaving beards. Among these Grip in Pakistan South Waziristan Agency). Clearly, targets, most instructive perhaps is the increased disturbances and militancy in regularity of attacks on girls’ schools; By Hassan Abbas FATA is pouring into the neighboring Taliban and affiliated militant groups settled districts of the NWFP. Based on years of neglect, incompetence in historical trends, this development was “Failure to invest in local governance and failure to devise an predictable, and it is surprising why effective policy in the realm of fighting Pakistan did not fortify the defenses of civilian law enforcement religious extremism has provided an the settled areas earlier. The government agencies has played a opportunity for the Taliban and other cannot claim that it was unaware of this extremist groups to expand their emerging threat as only six districts of crucial role in the declining activities and influence in Pakistan’s the NWFP were declared “normal” for capacity of NWFP police.” North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). elections on February 18, 2008.2 Continuing instability in Afghanistan and the progressive loosening of the Suicide Bombings government’s writ in the Federally A total of 324 blasts in Pakistan, destroyed 125 girls’ schools during the Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) including 28 suicide attacks, during last 10 months in Swat area alone.10 has exacerbated the crisis. Pakistan the first eight months of 2008 left more These incidents cannot fall into the also experienced a prolonged transition than 619 people dead.3 A significant category of retaliatory attacks. from General Pervez Musharraf’s rule number of these attacks occurred in the to a democratic dispensation, and this NWFP and the adjacent FATA area. In Law Enforcement Failure proved to be a distraction that opened 2007, the highest number of suicide In many cases, civilians in the NWFP up more avenues for extremist forces to attacks targeted the region—of the 56 reached out to the police force, but to plan and implement their expansionist suicide attacks during 2007, 23 were in little benefit. There is a widely held vision. A weakening of the independent FATA and 21 in the NWFP—including view in the NWFP that the police are judiciary further diminished the unprecedented attacks on mosques either helpless or unwilling to challenge potential of the state as well as society and jirga gatherings.4 Previously, such the Taliban’s expanding influence.11 to check the overall deterioration of law locations rarely came under attack. For Consequently, the Taliban often perform and order in the NWFP. the Taliban, another recent innovation a police role in certain districts (such has been its attempt to recruit young as in Tank) where they even arrest Any effort to stem the tide of girls and women for suicide attacks.5 criminals and parade them through the extremism in the NWFP first requires streets for public display.12 These moves a dispassionate analysis of the ground Nature of Targets serve two key purposes for the Taliban: realities. This article attempts to In comparison to FATA, where they show people that the Taliban can examine such indicators, by explaining Pakistan’s security forces face the brunt perform better than the police and hence how the Taliban have managed to of attacks from Taliban and other al- can govern the area, and they create fear, spread their influence from FATA into Qa`ida-affiliated groups, the types and which has a strong psychological effect the NWFP, and will present some ideas nature of attacks in the NWFP have a on ordinary civilians. Additionally, the on how to reverse extremist trends. different focus: enforcing an extremist Taliban now ask locals in certain settled version of religious ideals. For instance, areas of the NWFP to bring their cases Emerging Trends in NWFP targets included a population welfare and complaints to Taliban religious There are a number of emerging trends office in Swabi,6 dozens of girls’ schools,7 courts rather than before the country’s civil in the NWFP that reveal how the Taliban Swat’s Buthgarh Jehanabad historical courts.13 Failure to invest in local civilian are increasing their influence. site containing rocks engraved with law enforcement agencies has played a Buddha images,8 women with “immoral crucial role in the declining capacity of Security Zones NWFP police. Of the NWFP’s 24 districts, the 2 Zulfiqar Ali, “Only Six of 24 NWFP Districts ‘Normal’ government of Pakistan has declared for Polls,” Dawn, February 5, 2008. Swat,” Dawn, September 12, 2007. eight districts as high security zones, 3 Javed Aziz Khan, “Pakistan Tops South Asian States in 9 “Pakistan ‘Prostitutes’ Beheaded,” BBC, September 7, which means that Taliban activities are Violence,” The News, August 30, 2008. 2008. expanding and the chances of terrorist 4 Ashfaq Yusufzai, “Challenges 2007-2008: Spate of 10 Akhtar Amin, “Militants Destroyed 125 Girls’ Schools 1 attacks have increased. These districts Suicide Bombings Augur III for Pakistan,” Inter Press in 10 Months,” Daily Times, August 21, 2008. are Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, Service, December 24, 2008. 11 “Taliban Destroy Three Police Pickets in Charsadda,” Dera Ismail Khan, Nowshera, Abbottabad 5 Ashfaq Yusufzai, “Pakistan: School Girls Lured to Sui- Daily Times, July 12, 2008; Abdul Sami Paracha, “Taliban and Tank. Five of these districts (or their cide Bombings,” Inter Press Service, July 18, 2008. Besiege Police Station in Hangu: Army Battalion Sent to frontier regions) border different FATA 6 “Tailor’s Shop Blown Up in Bajaur,” Daily Times, Sep- Evacuate Policemen,” Dawn, July 10, 2008. agencies (Peshawar: Khyber Agency; tember 7, 2007. 12 Iqbal Khattak, “New Frontier Police Chief Faces Tali- 7 Reza Sayah, “Pakistan: Bomb Destroys Girls’ School,” ban Challenge,” Daily Times, January 5, 2007. 1 Shakil Sheikh, “Eight NWFP Districts Declared High CNN, July 25, 2008. 13 Akhtar Amin, “Taliban Set Up Illegal Courts in FATA, Security Zones,” The News, July 29, 2008. 8 Hameedullah Khan, “Buddha Images Survive Blasts in NWFP,” Daily Times, June 29, 2008.

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Open Threats to Government approximately 30 people.19 Sectarianism ambushes on convoys have become Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is not new in Pakistan, but its intensity more frequent.25 a relatively new formation under has increased. Shi`a-Sunni tribal the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, confrontation in Kurram Agency is also The new NWFP coalition government now feels empowered to confidently having an impact in the NWFP. led by the Awami National Party (ANP) threaten the NWFP government and and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) issue ultimatums.14 This is happening Peshawar: A Brief Case Study appears to understand the consequences with more frequency since the success A brief survey of developments in of this threat more than the previous of comparatively progressive political Peshawar demonstrates the potential and government led by an alliance of forces in the February 18 elections. ambitions of extremist forces. Although religious parties, but this realization It is evident that government “peace” media assessments that Peshawar, has not yet translated into action. talks offered in April and May of this the capital of the NWFP, is facing an Nevertheless, an anti-terrorist force imminent takeover by the Taliban are of 7,000 men has been raised recently “Sectarianism is not new in exaggerated,20 there is no doubt that to tackle “Talibanization,” marking a extremist militias including the Taliban Pakistan, but its intensity are targeting Peshawar with added zeal “Talibanization can be has increased.” and energy. In late August 2008, a girls’ school was bombed in the Badaber area effectively challenged by in Peshawar District, which was the religious leaders in the first attack of this kind in a provincial year made the TTP more aggressive metropolis.21 Secondly, Mangal Bagh, NWFP who can expose the in its demands, and the government the head of Lashkar-i-Islami, who Taliban’s deviant ideology. now acknowledges this mistake.15 is essentially a warlord operating Rahman Malik, Pakistan’s interior in Khyber Agency,22 is introducing The question is whether advisor, said publicly that the TTP is his “projects” in Peshawar District the Pakistani government “an extension of Al Qaeda” and the two apparently without any hindrance.23 He organizations have close ties.16 There is believed to have sympathizers in the will (or can) provide are also strong indicators that installing security forces due to his anti-Taliban security to those who are Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nafaz- stance, which at best is a political e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in position because his religious ideals are willing to undertake these Swat failed to reduce the effectiveness quite similar to those of the Taliban. challenges.” and control of his son-in-law, Maulana For instance, he has asked men to grow Fazlullah, in the Swat area. Only a beards, wear caps and keep their ankles military operation and the imposition visible (a very conservative Islamic of curfew have placed TNSM cadres on requirement) to avoid beatings. A large good first step.26 Yet, the people of the the defensive. number of people have purchased caps province who voted these forces into to avoid being killed.24 power over the religious parties expected Sectarianism quicker and more significant action. Attacks against Shi`a Muslims have Additionally, the small-arms fire that also increased in the NWFP, especially recently targeted the vehicle of the chief Conclusion in Dera Ismail Khan.17 Peshawar is U.S. diplomat in the city also indicates The prevalent view within Pakistan also in the grip of such attacks.18 In a the increasing threat to foreigners, generally and in the NWFP specifically recent attack in Dera Ismail Khan, a especially to Americans. Khyber is that direct U.S. military operations TTP operative murdered a Shi`a man; Agency, which is adjacent to Peshawar and Pakistani security force action later, a suicide bomber went to the and is the supply route for NATO forces in FATA are a lead cause of Taliban hospital where the deceased man’s body in Afghanistan, has also emerged as retaliation in the settled areas of was taken and blew himself up in the a new center of Taliban activity, as Pakistan. Only recently has Pakistan’s midst of his grieving relatives, killing political leadership started emphasizing 19 “D I Khan Blast,” The News, August 21, 2008; “Editori- that the growing unrest is a direct al: A Sectarian War,” The News, August 23, 2008; “What problem to Pakistan, and not just to the 14 For background on Tehrik-i-Taliban, see Hassan Ab- is Your Name?” The News, September 5, 2008. United States. Training and equipping bas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Senti- 20 Nick Meo, “Pakistani City of Peshawar Could Fall to the Frontier Corps is not a substitute nel 1:2 (2008). Taliban as Fear and Attacks Grow,” Daily Telegraph, Au- for providing adequate resources to the 15 Personal interview, senior government representa- gust 30, 2008. NWFP police. As a recent RAND study tive, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, June 25, 2008. 21 “Militants Blow Up Girls’ School in Peshawar,” Daily stipulates, effective law enforcement is 16 “TTP is an Extension of Al Qaeda: Rehman,” Daily Times, August 26, 2008. critical to defeat terrorists. Times, September 2, 2008. 22 Mangal Bagh has recently relocated to the Landikotal 17 “Gunmen Kill Shia Leader in DI Khan,” Daily Times, sub-district of Khyber Agency. August 9, 2008. 23 Dr. Farrukh Saleem, “Emir Mangal Bagh,” The News, 25 Zahid Hussain, “Taleban ‘Siege’ of Peshawar Threat- 18 Javed Aziz Khan, “TNFJ Leader Assassinated in Pe- August 3, 2008. ens Pakistan’s Grip,” The Times, June 26, 2008. shawar,” The News, August 17, 2008; “Bomber Hits Paki- 24 “Editorial: Mangal Bagh Still Rules Khyber,” Daily 26 Zeeshan Haider, “Taliban Bring Vigilante Law to stan Shia Mosque,” BBC, January 17, 2008. Times, September 1, 2008. Pakistan’s Peshawar,” Reuters, June 27, 2008.

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The nature of Taliban expansion clearly Preparing the Mujahidin: The book addresses controversial shows that the religious worldview of questions frequently raised by critics the Taliban is also instrumental in this The Taliban’s Military Field regarding jihad. For example, it matrix and little is being done to counter Manual strongly denounces the notion that only it. Talibanization can be effectively a Muslim ruler is entitled to wage a holy challenged by religious leaders in the By Imtiaz Ali war, arguing that this is not necessary NWFP who can expose the Taliban’s if a Muslim ruler is a puppet of infidel deviant ideology. The question is the taliban are currently engaged forces; instead, “jihad is a prerequisite whether the Pakistani government in intensifying insurgencies on both for the establishment of an Islamic will (or can) provide security to those sides of the Pakistan and Afghanistan state.” The book instructs Muslims to who are willing to undertake these border. To train new recruits and join groups such as al-Qa`ida and the challenges. Militants cannot be isolated reinforce military lessons in its existing Taliban to fulfill their religious duty of without such measures despite the fact cadres, the Taliban have published the jihad. that as a whole they are few in numbers. fourth edition of their military field The warning of Maulana Fazl-ur- manual, Nizami Darsoona – Da Mujahideeno Rehman, the head of a faction of Jamiat- Da Aghdad La para’ (Military Teachings i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI-F) and a member for the Preparation of Mujahidin).1 The of the ruling coalition, should be taken 158-page hard copy book is written in seriously when he contends that “it’s just Pashtu, demonstrating that its purpose a matter of months before news comes is primarily to assist Taliban fighters that the entire North-West Frontier in Pakistan and Afghanistan.2 The Province has slipped out of control.”27 detailed manual contains information Indeed, without immediate remedial and diagrams of various small-arms, measures, what is happening in FATA ammunition, light and heavy weaponry, today may very well be tomorrow’s communication tools and chemical and reality in parts of the NWFP. explosives formulas.

Dr. Hassan Abbas is a fellow at According to Ashraf Ali, a researcher at Harvard University’s Kennedy School Peshawar University, the significance of Government. Previously, he served in of Military Teachings for the Preparation of the administrations of Benazir Bhutto Mujahidin is that it uses simple and and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. He convincing language to assist “new is also the author of Pakistan’s Drift jihadist recruits” in military tactics and into Extremism: Allah, the Army and religious justifications. Furthermore, America’s War on Terror. the book’s first edition was released in early 2007, and considering that this Figure 1. The front cover of the manual. is already the fourth edition it “speaks to the volume of its popularity among The document supports the use of Taliban fighters.”3 This article will suicide attacks, explaining how outline key points mentioned in each of such martyrdom tactics inflict the book’s 10 chapters. maximum damage on enemy forces. It answers questions such as whether Chapter One: Religious Justifications for Jihad it is necessary to receive parental Chapter one offers religious justifications permission before participating in for jihad. Utilizing verses from the jihad, and offers religious justifications Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet behind suicide bombings. Similarly, it Muhammad, it provides the definition strongly supports the killing, and even of jihad, in addition to its proper the beheading, of spies who provide codes and conduct. It emphasizes that information to the enemy. Much of the the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are information references al-Zakhayr al- absolute jihads, and it is an obligatory `Azzam, authored by Shaykh `Abdullah duty for all Muslims to fight in these `Azzam, the famous jihadist ideologue two countries against what it calls the who is also considered to be Usama bin foreign and “infidel occupant forces.” Ladin’s mentor.

1 The author received a copy of the book from a former Chapter Two: War Tactics member of the Taliban who is based in Peshawar. See The second chapter describes the Figure 1 for a cover image of the manual. various types of war, such as military, 2 Many similar training manuals can be found on Isla- guerrilla, terrorist, spy, propaganda, 27 The comment was made in the National Assembly of mist websites, although they are typically in Arabic. economic and nuclear. It concentrates Pakistan. See Haider, “Taliban Bring Vigilante Law to 3 Personal interview, Ashraf Ali, Peshawar, August 10, on guerrilla and terrorist methods Pakistan’s Peshawar.” 2008. of war since it argues that these are

5 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 most relevant in today’s world. For Chapter four outlines war strategies, detonation with an enemy movement if Afghanistan, it emphasizes guerrilla techniques and planning. It provides triggered from a far distance. war and instructs readers how to be a advice on how and where to set up competent guerrilla fighter. military training camps. In addition to Similarly, it also warns of the various teaching the techniques of ambushes, failures that can occur preventing a It places more importance, however, camouflage and combat in mountains remote-controlled detonation: enemy on a “terrorist war” with the broader and deserts, the chapter also instructs jamming, faulty batteries, out of range, objectives of terrorizing the enemy and its readers how to survive in difficult and improper installation of the bomb forcing them to fulfill jihadist demands. circumstances and how to escape from a or its components. A “terrorist holy warrior,” according to prison in case of arrest or capture. the documents, must live for a longer Chapters Nine and Ten: Explosives period of time among the enemy in Chapter five stresses the importance Chapter nine provides details on locations such as the United States and of navigation and maps in wars and primary, secondary and compound insurgencies. It details how to properly explosives, and how they should “It places more importance, develop and comprehend a war map. be employed in bombs and hand grenades. It lists explosive mixtures however, on a ‘terrorist Chapter six explicitly outlines various and details how to create a detonator. war’ with the broader types of weapons, and how and where It outlines the exact chemical make-up they should be used. With the help of of a homemade bomb, discussing the objectives of terrorizing different diagrams, it explains how to required amounts of specific chemical the enemy and forcing fire various weapons and the proper agents. Furthermore, it explains how firing positions to increase accuracy. and where to acquire hand grenades, them to fulfill jihadist It provides the weights for a multitude demands.” of weapons, their respective target ranges, calibers, and information on “The distribution of the explosives. manual attests to the

Europe. Such “warriors” should be able Chapter seven provides detailed Taliban’s growing strength to avoid detection while operating in information on various communication and organizational an enemy state, constantly changing tools such as the ICOM IC-V8 and their outward appearance. This type Kenwood TH22 radio transceivers, and capabilities. Already in of fighter should be the embodiment of Global Positioning System navigation its fourth edition, there is patience and serenity because he may devices. With the help of user-friendly live in one place for a few years without diagrams and pictures, it identifies the clearly a demand among undertaking any military activity. different components of communications Taliban cadres for the Similarly, he should have full knowledge equipment and their effective use during of his eventual target, and should have a war or insurgency. lessons outlined in the a great understanding of the enemy’s manual.” police and intelligence services. Chapter Eight: Remote-Controlled Detonations The book cautions that in a terrorist Chapter eight provides information war, the enemy’s front-line military on the components needed for remote- such as the F-1, M-46, RGD-5 and RG- forces should not be targeted. Instead, controlled detonations. It highlights 42. It also provides details on personal targets should be the enemy’s military, that the bomb’s placement should be landmines. The chapter outlines the political and economic installations visible to the individual responsible for most effective way a hand grenade or around the world. It offers as evidence triggering the explosion, and outlines mine should be used so that it inflicts the of a “terrorist war” the examples of the the proper spacing of explosives if more greatest number of casualties on enemy September 11, 2001 attacks on the World than one bomb is used. It specifies how forces. It also differentiates between Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the far the individual tasked with triggering the different amounts of explosives for 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in the detonation should be from the bomb; attacks on personnel, vehicles, tanks Tanzania and Kenya. in mountainous areas, the charge should and ships. be detonated from a distance of 1-1.5 Chapters Three to Seven kilometers, while in flat, plain areas, Chapter 10 educates its readers on how Chapter three emphasizes the the distance should be four kilometers. to produce explosives with chemicals. importance of spycraft and intelligence The chemical instructions are specific, work in an insurgency and a war. It With the help of diagrams, the book also advising the proper handling lays down the criteria for recruiting specifies that bridges and parking techniques when dealing with volatile and utilizing spies, explaining how areas are the best places to blow up substances.4 to properly disguise them in the local the enemy’s vehicles. The section also population so that they can gather explains the utility of emplacing an information and intelligence. explosive near an artificial or natural 4 The chapter provides extensive details on chemical landmark so that it is easier to time the formulas.

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Conclusion The Current State of Al- Saudi Arabia does, however, face a Military Teachings for the Preparation potential threat from terrorists outside of Mujahidin serves the purpose of Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia the kingdom, primarily from Yemen. preparing a new breed of jihadists by providing them with simple, yet By Michael Knights Recovery of Capability? instructive lessons of waging war and Since the collapse of high tempo terrorist engaging in insurgency. The distribution on may 12, 2003, the al-Qa`ida activity in Saudi Arabia by the end of of the manual attests to the Taliban’s Organization in the Arabian Peninsula 2004, the government has sought to growing strength and organizational (AQAP) launched three simultaneous maintain public vigilance and prevent capabilities. Already in its fourth car bombing attacks on Western the onset of complacency about the edition, there is clearly a demand compounds in Riyadh, killing 35 civilians terrorist threat. This has been achieved among Taliban cadres for the lessons and short-circuiting the initiation of a by developing a series of strong themes outlined in the manual.5 Furthermore, long-planned terrorist campaign within in its public communications. The first of the document is in hard copy format and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The these themes is the assertion that AQAP written in Pashtu, which distinguishes Saudi government responded quickly is constantly attempting to recover it from other jihadist manuals found and fought a tough counter-terrorism capability, reconstitute networks and on various jihadist internet websites; campaign throughout 2003 and 2004, plan and undertake attacks within the this signifies that its intended audience reducing violence to a residual level kingdom. are committed fighters operating in from 2005 onwards. Five years after the Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas and in 2003 bombings and seven years after One or two major planned attacks have Afghanistan. The importance of Military the September 11 attacks, the state of been foiled in Saudi Arabia each year Teachings for the Preparation of Mujahidin may AQAP is difficult to judge. On the one since 2005. The most recent operation have been best described by veteran hand, the number of major terrorist- to have reached an advanced stage of Pakistani-Pashtun journalist Mukhtar initiated attacks in Saudi Arabia has preparation was the November 2007 Ahmad Khan, who warned that the dropped from 30 in 2004 to a combined plot to undertake an attack on an Eastern 1 manual’s continued existence “reveals total of just six in the years since. Province oil facility by employing an the frightening revival of the Taliban On the other hand, there is a constant assault team working in concert with seven years after their fall by the U.S.- trickle of disconcerting indicators from a tactical rocket attack using weapons led invasion.”6 Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Interior, smuggled in from Yemen. The plot was for example, announced 701 terrorist- foiled on November 25, 2007, just days Imtiaz Ali is a Pakistani journalist related arrests on June 25, 2008, the before an execution date of November working as a special correspondent for sequel to other announcements of 27-28. The assault group involved seven the Washington Post, mostly reporting mass arrests. Various Saudi ministries Saudis and one Iraqi, who the Ministry on Taliban and militancy issues in the release a busy stream of alerts to other of Interior stated was the group’s country’s volatile tribal belt and Frontier government departments and major leader.3 province. Mr. Ali is currently a Yale World Western businesses in the country, Fellow at the University of Yale. and the diplomatic security community Other major plots exposed in Saudi 2 regularly amends its security advice. Arabia since 2005 have demonstrated serious intent but have lacked What is the true state of AQAP five capability. In April 2007, videos years after the May 2003 attacks? released by the Ministry of Interior To scratch the surface of this query, after a series of arrests showed small this article draws upon a range of quantities of light weapons instead sources within the corporate security of the well-stocked caches of AK-47s community in Saudi Arabia, within the from 2005 and before. No grenades Interior Ministry itself, and within the or pipe bombs were recovered from growing academic community focused any of the cells raided in 2007, and on radicalization in the kingdom. explosives in general—homemade or These findings suggest that at present military—have become rare. Ministry Saudi-based AQAP cells appear to of Interior spokesman Major-General be almost exclusively sympathizers, Mansur al-Turki admitted that such internet propagandists, recruiters and groups tend to be unrealistic in their fundraisers focused on foreign jihad. targeting intentions and haphazard in their collection of weapons.4 1 Also of note is that compared to 38 expatriate deaths in terrorist attacks in 2004, there have been four since. 5 Personal interview, former member of Taliban, Pesha- 2 The most recent of which occurred in August 2007, 3 This information is drawn from personal interviews war, August 2008. when both the Australian and UK Embassies issued with government and corporate security analysts work- 6 Personal interview, Mukhtar Ahmad Khan, Washing- warnings about a raised threat during Ramadan and ing in Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi Ministry of Interior ton, D.C., September 5, 2008. Khan covered the Taliban with the U.S. State Department issuing a remarkably contacts. and military issues in Pakistan’s tribal region for more detailed alert about a threat to Westerners in downtown 4 “Saudi Counter-Terrorist Arrests,” Jane’s Terrorism than 10 years. Riyadh in the “14-17 August 2008” period. and Insurgency Center briefing, May 1, 2007.

7 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10

The cascading series of mass arrests seen al-Qa`ida’s core leadership, such an a perceived U.S. occupier. Were Iraq in the kingdom and the extreme rarity attack would require a local militant to decisively collapse as a jihadist of terrorist sieges and “last stands” community to act as a launch pad. The theater, it is questionable whether such indicates that support operatives rather possibility of “blowback” or “bleed out” Saudi recruits—even after in-theater than true militants make up most of the from Iraq looms large in this regard. radicalization—would choose to fight suspects being detained. This category Attacks by Saudi returnees from Iraq— in their homeland rather than another entails Saudi sympathizers who visit either self-guided or commissioned by iconic theater such as the Afghanistan- takfiri5 websites and perhaps propagate Pakistan conflict zone.8 such materials to friends and relatives. More serious support elements may “Yemen-based militants, on Yemen-based militants, on the other assist with the production of jihadist the other hand, present a hand, present a significant threat to videos or provide shelter and succor Saudi Arabia. Saudi-born fighters of to militants. Recruitment pipelines significant threat to Saudi mixed Yemeni descent have played for Iraq and other theaters of jihad Arabia.” key roles in al-Qa`ida since the mid- and fundraising cells also fall into this 1990s. Usama bin Ladin, whose category. These elements are rarely ancestral homeland is Yemen, recruited armed and do not fight to the death extensively from the mixed demographic when cornered, and their hard drives some broader network—are considered to boost the representation of Saudi and phone address books typically plausible by Saudi “securocrats” for and Yemeni foot soldiers in al-Qa`ida’s implicate many other sympathizers.6 a number of reasons. First, the Sinjar ranks. Saudis of Yemeni descent filled Records show that Saudis compose all but one of the positions as “muscle” These kinds of leaderless, isolated the largest single national contingent hijackers in the 9/11 attacks and have and fragile support networks cannot among al-Qa`ida in Iraq fighters (41% been highly active on the Arabian compare to the long-prepared system of 606 profiled fighters). Second, Peninsula, using Yemen as a base.9 of large arms caches and safe houses the same records also hint that the developed by the first head of AQAP, number of Saudis who traveled to Iraq The prospect of establishing bases in Yusuf al-`Uyayri, in the 1990s. Although to be suicide bombers was lower than Yemen has been mentioned prominently it is always possible that such support initially thought (50.3% of the 151 in militant communiqués and in Saudi cells will morph into attack cells, Saudis covered by captured records, government statements since 2006. experience since 2004 has shown that which was less than the 56% average The emergence of the al-Qa`ida-linked such large networks of inexperienced across the sample).7 This means that a Jund al-Yaman Brigades saw Saudi- junior militants tend to be detected larger pool might survive to return. born militants such as Fawaz al- and disrupted easily. Post-2003 Saudi Rubay`i, Hamza al-Q`uyati and Nayif Arabia is generally a harder place to Perhaps the key driver for this fear is the bin Muhammad al-Qahtani become cell build and maintain covert networks. experience suffered by Saudi Arabia in leaders. Literature in Sada al-Malahim, the aftermath of the collapse of Taliban a jihadist publication in Yemen, The Threat from Outside? control in Afghanistan in 2002. The claims the group’s mission is to “expel The potential for an “expeditionary” exodus of around 1,000 Saudi militants polytheists out of the Arab Peninsula,” threat projected inside Saudi Arabia by back to the kingdom transformed the further pointer to the group’s potential militants based outside the kingdom is militant threat in a short period of focus beyond Yemen. In the March 2008 a second theme being developed by the time, witnessing hundreds of hardened edition of Sada al-Malahim, al-Qahtani Ministry of Interior. Although there Arab-Afghan fighters falling into al- explained his reasons for fighting in the is some fear of an attack sponsored by `Uyayri’s terrorist infrastructure as Arabian Peninsula rather than Iraq or attack or support personnel. Saudi Afghanistan, calling for Saudi fighters 5 The term takfiri in this article refers to Sunni insurgent Arabia’s experience in 2002-2004 has groups that justify violence against some Muslims and probably been formative on the views 8 Opinion polling in Saudi Arabia has frequently shown all non-Muslims because their religious beliefs are not of Western as well as Saudi counter- fairly strong opposition to the Iraq war alongside very compatible with the group. AQAP has become a short- terrorism thinking, creating the image strong opposition to AQAP activities in Saudi Arabia. hand way of referring to takfiri cells in Saudi Arabia (and of an exodus from Iraq to mirror that of As analyst Thomas Hegghammer has outlined, Saudis Yemen). the exodus from Afghanistan. In reality, are relatively resistant to any militant movement with a 6 In 2003-2005, contacts in Saudi Arabia frequently the rotation of militants between Saudi “social revolutionary” grudge against the establishment reported gunfire at police checkpoints, and major- ar Arabia and Iraq has been constant, in the kingdom itself. See “Jihad, Yes, but not Revolution: rest operations tended to involve gunfire and seizure of multidirectional and has not had a Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Sau- major weapons caches. Since 2005, announcements of significant negative effect on security di Arabia,” speech given at the conference “The Jihadist arrests have not coincided with increased security force in the kingdom. The majority of Saudi Phenomenon: A Social Sciences Perspective” in Menton, presence or movements, and practically no armed stand- recruits appear to be “mainstream France, October 26-28, 2007. offs or weapons seizures have occurred. The last major classical jihadists” focused on the 9 More recently, 11 of the 23 militants who escaped from firefight was the April 6, 2007 raid on the Jidda hiding “legitimate defensive jihad” against a Yemeni Political Security Organization prison in Feb- place of 22-year-old Walid Mutlaq al-Radadi, listed 12 ruary 2006 were Saudis of Yemeni descent who were of the 15 Saudi-based terrorist suspects on the 36-strong 7 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaida’s Foreign either expelled from Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s or most wanted list issued by the Saudi government in June Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West extradited to Yemen from the kingdom after their return 2005. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). from Afghanistan in 2002.

8 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 to shelter in Yemen and asserting that migrants with tangential connections to radicalization program. Ministry the “liberation” of the land of the two forging, people-smuggling and drugs or officers have been sporadically targeted holy places “starts from here.”10 weapons-trafficking networks that are for the last decade, with deep-seated also utilized by terrorists. feuds developing between security There are signs that operational forces and citizens in some areas, such coordination between Yemeni- and Target: The House of Saud? as in ultra-conservative Burayda. More Saudi-based cells has periodically A third theme being developed by the recently, leading jihadist ideologue Abu been achieved, notably the case of the Interior Ministry is that the Saudi ruling Yahya al-Libi has been more aggressive November 2007 attack cell. In that family and government organizations in criticizing Saudi Arabia’s security instance, a Yemeni militant associated such as the oil and security sectors establishment for betraying various with Hamza al-Q`uyati used Yemeni are increasingly being targeted by smugglers to move rockets into Saudi militants. In terms of AQAP targeting Arabia.11 Al-Q`uyati’s group thereafter strategy, this might be characterized “Saudi-based cells appear undertook rocket attacks on an oil facility as a transition from the focus on the to be almost exclusively in Wadi Hadramawt in Yemen on March “far enemy” (Western presence in the 29, 2008 as well as a Yemeni Central country) to the “near enemy” (the “House sympathizers, internet Security Force base in Sayyun on April of Saud” and its religious, security and propagandists, recruiters 22, 2008. Before his death in an August economic underpinnings). Additionally, 11, 2008 raid in Tarim, al-Q`uyati was by attacking the oil and gas sectors, and fundraisers focused on planning to undertake an attack on a it allows AQAP to target “far enemy” foreign jihad.” Western expatriate target in Riyadh— interests while at the same time striking the cause of the subsequent August 13, the “near enemy,” allowing al-Qa`ida to 2008 U.S. State Department warning in recognize success in both spheres. Saudi Arabia. Four individuals arrested Islamist causes, describing the Saudi in Hadramawt were extradited to Saudi In the hydrocarbons sector, Saudi oil services as “the villainous troops of Arabia in the days after the rolling up of continues to be prominently discussed the tyrants of al-Sauds.”16 The Saudi the al-Q`uyati network.12 as a target.14 In contrast, actual plots government’s active use of clerics to have been thin on the ground since undermine jihadist recruitment in A final category of potential outsiders to the February 2006 car bombing Saudi Arabia has also drawn the scorn threaten Saudi Arabia in the emerging attack on the Abqaiq oil processing of jihadist ideologues, and appears to narrative is the Third Country National facility. The June 25, 2008 Interior have prompted plans to intimidate or (TCN) worker community and Muslims Ministry announcement noted that the liquidate pro-government clerics. In traveling to Saudi Arabia on the annual aforementioned African-led Eastern April 2007, for instance, the Ministry hajj and minor pilgrimages. On June Province cell planned to attack “an of Interior announced the arrests of 25, 2008, the Ministry of Interior oil site and a security target with car 22 individuals involved in plotting the highlighted the role of South Asians bombs.”15 Yet, the ministry did not assassination of pro-government clerics such as Pakistanis, Afghan Waziris and adduce any evidence that the cell had and senior security force officers.17 African economic migrants in recent actually developed any real capability arrests. Maj. Gen. Mansur described a and there were no indications that any Likewise, in the June 2008 announcement, cell largely composed of Mauritanians cells captured in 2008 held weapons, the Interior Ministry alluded to a “plot” in their mid-30s studying for religious let alone explosives. Indeed, while every to target security forces, which related to qualifications whose “concern was Saudi Interior Ministry announcement a planned attack on the Khafji Muhabith to get close to people working in the or alert takes care to stress the threat (General Security Service) offices.18 oil sector in order to find work in to the oil and gas sector, the only real All these activities are energetically oil installations.”13 Although there credible plot since February 2006 was publicized by the government, which is a theoretical threat from TCN the aforementioned November 2007 derives useful propaganda from the communities, Ministry of Interior rocket and breach plot. Expressing insiders are candid that many of the interest in a target is quite different 16 Michael Scheuer, “Abu Yahya al-Libi: Al-Qaeda’s foreigners described as “deviants” from developing a workable plan and Theoretical Enforcer – Part One,” Terrorism Focus 4:27 (terrorists) by the Saudi government executing it. (2007). in recent years have been economic 17 These individuals were detained in a range of Saudi A second target highlighted by the cities, including Riyadh, the Eastern Province tri-city 10 Sada al-Malahim, March 3, 2008. Ministry of Interior is the security forces area and Jidda. 11 Personal interview, Saudi Ministry of Interior contact, and moderate clerics who are accused of 18 Personal interview, Saudi Ministry of Interior con- March 2008. supporting the government’s counter- tact, July 2008. The June 2008 statement also claimed 12 Other indicators included the May 12, 2008 alert on that multiple disrupted cells may have been influenced the Saudi-Yemeni border, when around a dozen sus- 14 Discussions occurred in Abeed al-Bassam’s “Bin Lad- by Abu Bakr Naji’s book, The Management of Savagery, pected militants were sought related to a potential plot to en and the Oil Weapon” (in the February 8, 2007 issue which recommends the weakening of target states strike a west coast Saudi target on the fifth anniversary of of Sawt al-Jihad) to new discussions in the January and through attacks on economic infrastructure and govern- the May 2003 attacks. March 2008 issues of Sada al-Malahim. ment forces to create failed states or even failed cities or 13 Samir al-Saadi, “Terrorist Groups Destabilizing Saudi 15 Al-Saadi, “Terrorist Groups Destabilizing Saudi Ara- provinces that al-Qa`ida affiliates can more easily domi- Arabia,” Arab News, June 26, 2008. bia.” nate.

9 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 portrayal of AQAP fighters as anti- Of the various narratives put forward Assessing the Strength of establishment “social revolutionaries.” by the Saudi government, the most convincing is the assertion that Saudi Al-Qa`ida in Yemen Outlook for AQAP in Saudi Arabia Arabia faces a credible terrorist threat There is no doubt that the Saudi from outside the kingdom, albeit By Gregory D. Johnsen government now publicly exaggerates probably from Yemen rather than from the scale of the known militant problem Iraq or Afghanistan. The latter two on the evening of August 10, 2008, in Saudi Arabia to stave off a return of theaters of jihad attract a certain type of acting on a tip from a local resident, a complacency. This is a stark contrast Saudi militant, a volunteer who chose to Yemeni security patrol approached a to the 2003-2006 period, when the fight outside Saudi Arabia rather than suspected al-Qa`ida safe house in the 1 government was still actively trying to at home, and there are strong reasons to eastern city of Tarim. The patrol came downplay the extent of the threat as it believe that such militants will continue under fire, at which point it retreated, rooted out truly dangerous networks. to patronize iconic theaters of foreign called for back-up and established a The number of counter-terrorist jihad in the future. The Yemeni-based perimeter around the area in an effort arrests is frequently massaged; for militants are another matter; they have to prevent any of the suspects from instance, the 701 arrests announced in chosen to fight in the Arabian Peninsula escaping. This tenuous stalemate lasted June 2008 included arrests previously in preference to other theaters and they throughout the night. Fighting resumed announced by the Ministry of Interior frequently have a historic connection to in the morning, slowly escalating in November 2007 and March 2008. Saudi Arabia. throughout the day. Government forces The number of arrests in the first half brought in two tanks, while the al- of 2008 was approximately 450, with Indeed, Saudi and Yemeni terrorist Qa`ida militants responded with rocket- a proportion released. Likewise, the cells already share a strong co-dynamic propelled grenade attacks. Eventually, ministry occasionally repackages old relationship; it is notable that the the militants were able to slip out of their “most wanted” lists from 2005 to give attack on Abqaiq in February 2006 safe house to a neighboring building, but the impression that they are new lists of was mimicked closely by the September they were unable to escape the security Iraq returnees active in the kingdom.19 2006 car bombings on Yemeni oil perimeter. By the end of the fighting, five Support cells that have undertaken any facilities; the Saudi shooting of four militants, including leading operative form of target identification, however Frenchmen outside Medina in February Hamza al-Q`uyati, were dead while two 2 rudimentary, are often portrayed as 2007 was likewise mirrored by remote more were captured. attack cells, despite a lack of weaponry shootings of expatriates in Yemen in and a lack of resistance when called to January 2008; and indirect fire attacks The raid was widely seen as a much 3 surrender. The ministry is erring on the attempted in Saudi Arabia in November needed victory for Yemen. Yemen side of caution, perhaps understandably 2007 have become a staple of Yemeni claimed that with al-Q`uyati’s death it so. terrorist cells in 2008. The two theaters had killed the mastermind of a string of are thus loosely coupled but the flow terrorist attacks that had plagued the In reality, it would appear unlikely that a may be slowly changing direction. country in recent years. According to strong AQAP network will emerge again Yemen is already beginning to serve the government, al-Q`uyati was behind to rival the infrastructure laid down by as a launch pad for attacks into Saudi every major terrorist attack since he Yusuf al-`Uyayri in the 1990s. Saudi- Arabia. Although the gradual whittling and 22 other militants escaped from a based cells are isolated, and the little down of Yemen’s al-Qa`ida leadership, Political Security Organization prison communication existing between cells— particularly older Saudi-born militants, in February 2006, beginning with the chat room discussions or the sharing of will significantly reduce the prospect failed dual suicide attacks in September documents and videos—represents a of future attacks, the possibility exists 2006 and ending, most recently, with critical vulnerability and the frequent of attacks on iconic Saudi oil targets or the July 25 suicide attack on a military cause of cascading patterns of arrests. exposed expatriates. The overwhelming impression of AQAP 1 This account of the Tarim shootout has been compiled remains that of a destitute movement, as Dr. Michael Knights is the Gulf security from statements posted on the jihadist web forum al- conveyed in the April 2007 issue of Sawt research associate at The Washington Ikhlas, in addition to the following article: “Marib Press al-Jihad, where the editor notes: “None Institute for Near East Policy. He has is Unparalleled in Publishing Details of the Operation of the jihadi fronts were deserted as written extensively on Gulf Cooperation in Tarim, Hadramawt” (Arabic), Marib Press, August 11, much as the jihadi front in the Arabian Council (GCC) security issues and 2008. 20 Peninsula.” Saudi-based cells appear maintains a broad range of security 2 In addition to al-Q`uyati, the dead included Abdullah to be almost exclusively sympathizers, contacts in the Gulf region. Ali Batis, Hasan Bazar‘a, Mubarak bin Hawil al-Nahdi, internet propagandists, recruiters and and Mahmud Baramah. The two captured militants were fundraisers focused on foreign jihad. identified as Ali Muhsin Salih al-‘Akbari and Muham- mad Said Ba`awaydhan. The Yemeni military lost three soldiers. For a good overview, see the excellent reporting 19 These figures and views were derived from close of Muhammad al-Ahmadi, “Yemen and al-Qaeda” (Ara- scrutiny of Saudi government announcements and ac- bic), al-Ghad, August 18, 2008. cess to translated Interior Ministry warning statements 3 Both the United States and the United Kingdom used in 2008. the success of the raid as a pretext to relax travel restric- 20 Sawt al-Jihad, April 2007. tions to the country.

10 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 base in Sayyun.4 The government also crack in the facade of anonymity that birth.15 By the beginning of September, claimed that al-Q`uyati was planning had surrounded the organization. according to most media accounts, further attacks in both Yemen and While he does appear to have been the Yemen had managed to arrest at least Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, given mastermind of the July 25 suicide attack 30 al-Qa`ida suspects since the Tarim what is known about this period of al- in Sayyun,11 it is unlikely that he was as raid. On the surface, these appear to Qa`ida’s operations in Yemen and the prolific as government reports suggest. be significant victories for Yemen at local make-up of al-Q`uyati’s cell, this is Furthermore, the local nature of al- the expense of al-Qa`ida, but closer unlikely to be true.5 Instead, al-Qa`ida, Q`uyati’s cell—five of the individuals, examination suggests they are more while temporarily weakened, remains a including al-Q`uyati, were from al- symbolic than substantive. According security threat within Yemen. Mukalla, while the other two came from to Nasser Arrabyee of Gulf News, five the neighboring towns of Shabwa and al- of the al-Qa`ida suspects that Yemen The September 17 attack on the U.S. arrested in one security sweep “were Embassy in Sana`a, which left more “Yet a closer examination not hiding, but [rather] they were under than a dozen people dead, illustrates lenient house arrest.”16 Likewise, the this threat. The attack, while shocking, of the evidence suggests eight suspects returned to Saudi Arabia was not necessarily unexpected. Days that talk of an acrimonious do not appear to have been arrested after al-Q`uyati’s death, the Soldiers’ recently, but rather held until their Brigades of Yemen posted a statement split within the current extradition would guarantee maximum threatening retaliatory attacks.6 The generation of al-Qa`ida in benefit.17 proof, the statement said in a common Islamist phrase, “will be in what you Yemen may be premature The narrative of a quick and forceful see and not what you hear.”7 Then, or misleading.” reaction meets both of Yemen’s goals on September 9, a teaser was posted at once. First, it allows Yemen to to al-Ikhlas8 indicating that the fifth appear strong and in control of the issue of al-Qa`ida’s Sada al-Malahim security situation to its Western allies journal was due to be released in the Qatin12—suggests a more limited reach and foreign businesses, which have coming days.9 The combination of these than the government’s claim assumes.13 been growing increasingly concerned. two indicators should have triggered Part of this verbal overreach is designed Second, it suggests that the two militants warnings in Yemen, as during the past to deflect criticism by Western allies, who Yemen captured in the Tarim year al-Qa`ida has developed a pattern which have grown increasingly strident raid—Ali Muhsin Salih al-‘Akbari and of linking its attacks to its rhetoric. in publicly questioning Yemen’s Muhammad Said Ba`awaydhan—have commitment to the war on al-Qa`ida. “talked”; the appearance of which, Successes Reveal Al-Qa`ida’s Composition Yemen believes, will turn up the The September 2006 attacks were Yemen has further underscored the pressure on remaining al-Qa`ida cells, most likely planned and organized rhetorical nature of this claim by the helping to flush them out into the open. by Fawaz al-Rabay‘i, who was killed moves it made following the August 11 Despite these choreographed moves, the by Yemeni security forces in October shootout. Almost immediately, Yemen Tarim raid and the events that preceded 2006. Al-Q`uyati, on the other hand, announced that it had arrested a number it help to explain much about al-Qa`ida first reappeared publicly this summer of al-Qa`ida supporters, and within a in Yemen. Most notably, it sheds light in a July 23 videotape released by the week it claimed to have discovered and on the relationship between the “al- “al-Qa`ida Organization of Jihad in dismantled a separate terrorist cell in Qa`ida Organization in the South of the the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Hadramawt.14 Days later, following a Arabian Peninsula” and the “al-Qa`ida Brigades of Yemen.”10 Al-Q`uyati’s visit by Muhammad bin Nayif, Saudi Organization of Jihad in the Arabian appearance in the video was the first Arabia’s assistant minister of the Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Brigades of interior for security affairs, Yemen Yemen.” These two alternate group 4 Ibid. announced that it was extraditing eight identifications had confused many 5 The author dates the “second phase of the war against Saudi militants back to their country of analysts. al-Qaeda in Yemen” to February 2006. For more infor- mation, see Gregory D. Johnsen “Securing Yemen’s Co- 11 For more information on the attack, see “Yemen’s Two Theory of a Split Loses Credence operation in the Second Phase of the War on al-Qa`ida,” al-Qaedas,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, August One theory that has gained strength in CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2008). 21, 2008. recent months is that the two groups 18 6 Posted on www.al-ekhlaas.net, August 19, 2008. 12 Al-Q`uyati was born in Saudi Arabia, but his fam- had split over tactics. This explanation 7 Ibid. ily was originally from al-Mukalla and he seems to have 8 Al-Ikhlas is a prominent jihadist web forum located at made his way back to his ancestral home after escaping 15 Faysal Mukrim, “Yemen Delivers to Saudi Eight Sus- www.al-ekhlaas.net. from prison in 2006. pects in Security Issues” (Arabic), al-Hayat, August 22, 9 The al-Ikhlas website was taken offline, most likely 13 In addition to the local make-up of al-Q`uyati’s cell 2008. by hackers, before the fifth issue could be posted. As a which has not been stressed enough, one should also 16 Nasser Arrabyee, “Five Al Qaida Suspects Detained result, analysts are unable to determine what al-Qa`ida note that the local tip that led to the Tarim raid is a posi- in Yemen,” Gulf News, August 19, 2008. in Yemen is saying in regard to the attack. This makes tive development that has been under-reported. 17 This information was confirmed in personal conver- predicting and analyzing the group’s future activities ex- 14 Husayn al-Jarabani, “Yemen: The Governor of Hadra- sations with Yemeni government officials. tremely difficult. mawt Discovers a New al-Qaeda Cell” (Arabic), al-Sharq 18 This theory has been most forcefully expressed by Ni- 10 This group also goes by the name Jund al-Yaman. al-Awsat, August 16, 2008. cole Strake of the Gulf Research Centre. See, for example,

11 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 held that the original group, which calls The first attacks attempted by a His last will and testament, which was itself the “al-Qa`ida Organization in reconstituted al-Qa`ida in Yemen were posted to al-Ikhlas on March 29, 2008, the South of the Arabian Peninsula,” the failed September 2006 dual suicide the anniversary of the assassination of favored a “lie low” strategy that involved bombings on oil and gas facilities in Qasaylah, also provides some clues. In building up its internal network and Marib and Hadramawt. Months later, the video, Ruhayqa, who is identified recruiting new members, while the in March 2007, Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, only by his kunya, states unequivocally splinter group—the Soldiers’ Brigades of the chief criminal investigator in Marib, that he is carrying out the attack for Yemen—was eager to strike immediately. was assassinated. This would later be the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen. He Further strengthening this theory were the first attack for which the Soldiers’ states that the attack is revenge for reports in the Yemeni press of a split Brigades of Yemen would take credit the death of Fawaz al-Rabya‘i and to between Hamza al-Q`uyati and two of in a statement released in February “expel the infidels from the Arabian his colleagues, Nasir al-Wahayshi and 2008.22 For its part, Sada al-Malahim, the Peninsula.” As he continues to deliver Qasim al-Raymi, respectively the amir bi-monthly journal edited by al-Qa`ida his will, however, he mentions both and second-in-command of al-Qa`ida in in the South of the Arabian Peninsula’s the al-Qa`ida Organization of Jihad the South of the Arabian Peninsula. Yet al-Wahayshi, would later eulogize in the Country of Yemen and the al- a closer examination of the evidence— one of the attackers, `Abd al-`Aziz Qa`ida Organization in the South of statements, videos and attacks— Jaradan, in its second issue, following the Arabian Peninsula. He appears to suggests that talk of an acrimonious his death in August 2007. The overlap use the names interchangeably, which split within the current generation of of individual operatives such as this could mean that they are synonymous al-Qa`ida in Yemen may be premature between the supposed two groups is for the members of al-Qa`ida in Yemen. or misleading. The overlap of rhetoric some of the strongest evidence that The video definitively demonstrates the and individuals is strong enough to the split, if it exists as such, is more a existence of the Soldiers’ Brigades of indicate that the two groups are more tactical ploy than a divisive rupture Yemen as early as late June 2007, well like loose cells of the same organization within the organization before the group first appeared online than separate entities altogether.19 in February 2008. In late June 2007, Qasim al-Raymi To fully appreciate this overlap, it is released two statements, one of which In addition to the rationale of revenge, necessary to reexamine the history was a warning to the government. Ruhayqa’s desire to “expel the infidels of al-Qa`ida in Yemen since it was Within days, these statements were from the Arabian Peninsula” is a common reconstituted following the February followed by a suicide attack on a convoy theme among both al-Wahayshi’s group 2006 prison break. Of the original 23 of Spanish tourists in Marib on July and the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen. escapees, three—Nasir al-Wahayshi, 2. This attack was also later claimed Qasim al-Raymi and Muhammad al- by the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen. It `Umda20—are still at large, according stated that the attack was in retribution “Although al-Q`uyati’s to official government statements. This for the deaths of five individuals at the death is a significant blow information, however, is contradicted hands of Yemeni security forces23; one by a fax sent by Yemen’s Ministry of of whom, Yasir al-Hamayqani, was later to al-Qa`ida, it did not Interior to real estate agents warning eulogized in the first issue of Sada al- them not to rent to any of the 33 at-large Malahim, which was released in January defeat or even cripple the militants listed in the fax. Included in 2008. organization in Yemen.” this list are al-Wahayshi, al-Raymi, and al-`Umda as well as Ibrahim al- The timing of the attack, following so Huwaydi and Jamal al-Badawi, both of closely after al-Raymi’s two statements, whom Yemen has repeatedly claimed suggests some level of coordination. For the latter, it has appeared at the were in jail.21 Likewise, the identity of the suicide top of all 13 of the group’s statements, bomber, at least circumstantially, and has consistently been invoked as a suggests a possible link to al-Raymi. reason for carrying out attacks. It has Nicole Strake, “Al-Qaeda in Yemen Divided, but Danger- The bomber was identified as Abduh also appeared often in issues of Sada al- ous,” The Peninsula, June 2008. Muhammad Sayyid Ruhayqa, a 21-year- Malahim. In the first issue it was quoted 19 The author would like to thank Thomas Heggham- old Yemeni originally from the district by Abu Hammam al-Qahtani, who cited mer for a series of enlightening conversations, which did of al-Rayma, who was living in the it as the most important reason not to much to help clarify thinking on this matter. Of course, eastern Sana`ani neighborhood of travel to Afghanistan or Iraq to fight but 24 any mistakes that remain are solely the author’s respon- Musayk. Like al-Raymi, whose kunya rather to stay in Yemen. Abu Hammam sibility. For more details, see “Yemen’s Two al-Qaeda’s,” Abu Hurayrah al-Sana`ani reflects his is the kunya of Nayif Muhammad al- Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, August 21, 2008. birthplace, Ruhayqa was known by Qahtani, who has been linked by the 20 Al-`Umda, who is also known by the kunya Abu the kunya Abu al-Maqdad al-Sana`ani. Yemeni government to the July 2007 Ghrayb al-Taizi, appears to be the same individual who suicide attack against tourists in Marib. writes under that pseudonym for Sada al-Malahim. 22 Jund al-Iman, “Statement 1,” Soldiers’ Brigades of The hadith commanding Muslims to 21 The fax, of which the author obtained a copy, is dated Yemen, February 24, 2008. The statement misattrib- “expel the infidels from the Arabian May 25, 2008, and in addition to the five names listed uted the date of the attack, placing it in April instead of above it also includes al-Wahayshi’s brother, Fahd, Nay- March. 24 “Interview with One of the Wanted Ones” (Arabic), if al-Qahtani, seven Egyptians and a Jordanian. 23 Ibid. Sada al-Malahim, January-February 2008.

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Peninsula” is also cited in the second A similar occurrence happened in Saudi The 2008 U.S. Elections and issue of Sada al-Malahim in a statement Arabia in April 2005 when a “bonus explaining the group’s thinking. The issue” of Sawt al-Jihad appeared months Sunni Insurgent Dynamics statement, which opens the journal, says after most of the organization had been in Iraq that any infidel entering the Arabian eliminated.27 Peninsula is fair game to be attacked or By Michael Gabbay killed, regardless of whether they call The core of al-Qa`ida’s leadership in themselves a tourist, a diplomat or a Yemen—al-Wahashyi and al-Raymi— more than five years after the U.S.- journalist.25 remain at large, as do a number of other led intervention in Iraq, the current known militants. While it is difficult to election campaign season in the United Al-Qahtani was also linked to al- quantify the remaining strength of al- States presents an opportunity for Sunni Q`uyati’s Tarim cell through passports Qa`ida in Yemen in terms of numbers, Arabs in Iraq to show the American and plans, which were discovered in the it does appear that the organization public their desires for a continued U.S. safe house following the August 11 raid. remains capable of carrying out attacks. troop presence. Like American voters, Subsequent reports in the Saudi media By far the most worrying indicator is the the Sunnis are not of one mind regarding that al-Qahtani had received funding localized nature of al-Q`uyati’s cell. Of the U.S. presence. Events in Iraq during from individuals in Libya and Iran the seven individuals killed or captured the U.S. pre-election period, specifically is a likely distortion by overzealous in the Tarim raid, only al-Q`uyati was with respect to the level and axes of Yemeni officials.26 The preponderance known to security forces. This suggests violence, will help reveal the power of evidence strongly suggests a level a diffusion of strength, which should balance among different Sunni factions of cooperation and even coordination concern Yemen. Already there has been as well as which of the three conflict between what some analysts had pegged discussion on al-Ikhlas about a new way logics—anti-U.S. insurgency, sectarian as two separate groups. forward for al-Qa`ida in the aftermath civil war, or intra-Sunni factional of al-Q`uyati’s death. In one widely struggle—is presently the dominant Al-Qa`ida Remains Viable Threat in Yemen circulated letter of advice, a user on the organizing dynamic among Iraq’s Sunni Although al-Q`uyati’s death is a site wrote that what was happening in population. Regardless of the results of significant blow to al-Qa`ida, it did not Yemen reminded him of the fall of al- the upcoming U.S. presidential election, defeat or even cripple the organization Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia.28 To avoid a this information can help guide U.S. in Yemen. Indeed, eight days after his similar fate in Yemen, he suggested the policy. In particular, the absence of a death the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen selective targeting of security officials.29 large increase in violence may signal that posted its 13th statement to al-Ikhlas. The What is clear is that despite al-Q`uyati’s the time is ripe for formal negotiations statement, which threatened attacks in death, al-Qa`ida remains a significant with Sunni nationalist insurgent groups. retribution for his death, was posted by security threat in Yemen. Overall, the divergent priorities of the the same user in the same manner as the nationalist factions combined with the previous 12 statements. This continuity Gregory D. Johnsen has written for a variety insurgency’s fractious history suggest demonstrates that the group’s electronic of publications, including The American that continued factional struggles infrastructure was not destroyed in Interest, The Christian Science Monitor within the Sunni community will be the the Tarim raid. Instead, there are two and the Boston Globe. Mr. Johnsen has also most likely near-term dynamic. possible explanations. advised the U.S. and British governments on issues related to Yemen. He is currently A Nationalist Taxonomy In the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen’s a Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies The signals that will emerge prior to 13 statements, it has referenced three at Princeton University. the elections will result from power separate brigades, crediting each with struggles and interactions between different attacks. These divisions were three strains of Sunni nationalists— originally dismissed by most as jihadist pro.-U.S. accommodationists, anti- hyperbole designed to give an artificially U.S. expulsionists and anti-Shi`a inflated sense of the group’s strength. It revanchists—all of whom, unlike the is possible, however, that there is some global jihadists of al-Qa`ida in Iraq truth in the claims of three different (AQI), place value on preserving the brigades, which would mean that the integrity of Iraq but have different Tarim raid destroyed one, but left the priorities within that context. other two intact. The second likely 27 The author is grateful to Thomas Hegghammer for the possibility is that an individual escaped reference. Pro-U.S. Accommodationists the raid and has continued to post and 28 Posted on www.al-ekhlaas.net, August 19, 2008. The pro-U.S. accommodationist strain threaten the government on the internet, 29 The suggestion was widely reported in the Arabic consists of Sunnis who have accepted while lacking the necessary tools to act. media. See, for instance, Faysal Mukrim “Al-Qaeda in the need for a continued U.S. presence Yemen is Incited to Target Leader in Security and Intel- in Iraq. Many are former insurgents 25 “Opening,” Sada al-Malahim, March-April 2008. ligence” (Arabic), al-Hayat, August 22, 2008. Strangely, in U.S.-backed militias known as 26 Muhammad al-Malfi, “Abu Hammam al-Qahtani Mukrim refers to the letter as an official al-Qa`ida state- Awakening (sahwa) Councils who have Receives Support from Iranians and Libyans and Invites ment, which it is not. It is not clear whether the sugges- put their hostility toward the United the Terrorists in the Kingdom to his Refuge on the Ye- tion of targeting security officials will be adopted by al- States aside, at least tentatively, and meni Border” (Arabic), al-Watan, August 20, 2008. Qa`ida. are sincerely willing to give the political

13 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 process a chance. Although most would aide seemed to dangle the prospect of the Iraqi resistance covertly.6 The IAI, like to see expanded Sunni political and cooperation if the al-Sadr movement however, has suffered defections from economic power as well as an eventual left the political process.2 its hard line jihadist wing as well as U.S. withdrawal, they place a priority the recent departure of its long-time on Iraqi stability and are willing at Anti-Shi`a Revanchists ally, the Mujahidin Army, from both present to subordinate these goals for The anti-Shi`a revanchists are the IAI-led Jihad and Reform Front the sake of a less violent Iraq. Abu dedicated to the goal of restoring Sunni Azzam, a former leader within the dominance over Iraq. Although the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), appears to revanchists do not explicitly state their “A continued robust fit the mold of an insurgent who has goal of reimposing Sunni rule, they U.S. presence will have been incorporated into the political display a level of hostility toward the process; he has expressed support for Shi`a and adhere to a hard line Sunni a stabilizing effect on a continued U.S. presence and formed Islamism that are irreconcilable with an sectarian tensions and a political party with the intention of Iraq where the Shi`a are ascendant. The participating in upcoming provincial revanchist calculus regarding violence strengthen the Iraqi elections.1 All sahwa councils, however, during the campaign season is unclear. security forces in terms of are not accommodationist, and It depends on whether their strategy conversely some active insurgent groups for attaining central power hinges upon capabilities and as a cross- likely fall into the accommodationist U.S. assistance and on their strength sectarian institution.” category (a possible example is Hamas- relative to the other Sunni factions. Iraq, which broke off from the 1920 Revolution Brigades and is reputedly The Islamic Army in Iraq, which appears linked to the largest Sunni party in to be an amalgam of hard line jihadists and the broader Political Council the country, the Iraqi Islamic Party). and more moderate nationalists, is the for the Iraqi Resistance (PCIR). The The accommodationists clearly have an most prominent representative of the IAI’s participation in the PCIR, which interest in lowering the level of violence anti-Shi`a revanchist faction.3 The IAI’s includes Hamas-Iraq and the Islamic prior to the U.S. elections. refrain that the “Iranian occupation” is Front for Iraqi Resistance (JAMI)— more dangerous than the U.S. occupation Muslim Brotherhood groups suspected Anti-U.S. Expulsionists is a clever rhetorical formulation that of fighting AQI alongside the United The highest priority of the expulsionists essentially asserts—under the guise of States—aroused intense dissatisfaction is the withdrawal of U.S. troops from an ostensibly non-sectarian, anti-Iran from hard line jihadists.7 Iraq. The Association of Muslim slogan—the primacy of the Shi`a threat Scholars (AMS) is the most vocal given that it portrays most of the major Anti-Shi`a Revanchist Strategies representative of this trend and is Shi`a actors as “stooges” of Iran.4 The IAI The anti-Shi`a revanchists appear to the religious authority for the Jihad has also been widely accused by fellow hold the key to the dynamics among and Change Front, a grouping of insurgents of extensive participation the nationalists in the sense that nationalist insurgents, including the in the sahwa. Typically, insurgents they are free to align with either the 1920 Revolution Brigades. The value to reserve a special wrath for those who accommodationists (and thereby the which the expulsionists assign highest turn against them, as witnessed by United States) or with the expulsionists, importance is one of Iraqi sovereignty. the fury that AQI unleashed against while still maintaining their core The expulsionists may have designs the sahwa.5 The fact that the IAI has revanchist agenda; the latter two camps, on central power, but their strategy not retaliated against figures such as on the other hand, are fundamentally unequivocally revolves around defeating Abu Azzam, who have publicly joined opposed and cannot ally. Accordingly, the United States in Iraq first. If they had the ranks of the accommodationists, it is necessary to consider the possible the capability, the pre-election period indicates that the leadership of the strategies for a Sunni revanche. represents a tremendous opportunity IAI’s jihadist wing does not yet see the to weaken American commitment via sahwa councils as inimical to its goals. Although particular Sunni elites could an offensive against U.S. troops. The Moreover, in an effort to contain the come to power via a coup, of which Iraq fact that the AMS has shown signs of dissent of its hardliners, the IAI may be has a fine tradition, such a coup would reaching out to Shi`a leader Muqtada trying to cultivate the impression that al-Sadr’s political organization does not some of the sahwa councils are backing 6 A purported member of the IAI, Abu Abdullah, said: attest to their strength, however; at his “Trust me, the sahwas are ultimately with the resistance, closing speech before the AMS General 2 OSC, “Iraq’s Al-Dari Addresses AMS General Con- heart and mind.” For details, see Sam Dagher, “In Iraq, Congress in Damascus, the leader of the gress, Says ‘Resistance’ in Good Shape,” July 25, 2008; Sunni Insurgents Still Aim to Oust U.S., Shiites,” The AMS spoke positively about nationalists OSC, ”AMS Aide Views Stand on Iraqi Issues, Al-Sadr Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 2008. The IAI repu- in the al-Sadr movement, and an AMS Trend, Rejects US-Iraq Agreement,” August 6, 2008. diated this article but this denial may have been self-serv- 3 Michael Gabbay, “Mapping the Factional Structure of ing as evidenced by the fact that Abu Abdullah’s remarks 1 Elements within the Iraqi government apparently take the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 1:4 (2008). also managed to gratuitously tar the 1920 Revolution Bri- a dimmer view of Abu Azzam as he was recently placed 4 OSC, “Al-Fursan Magazine Publishes Article on Ira- gades and the Rashidin Army—nationalist rivals of the on an arrest list. Richard A. Oppel, “Iraq Takes Aim at nian Occupation of Iraq,” February 2, 2008. IAI—as Ba`athist. Leaders of US-Tied Sunni Groups,” New York Times, Au- 5 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War 7 OSC, “Jihadist Criticizes Islamic Army Political Coun- gust 22, 2008. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). cil with HAMAS-Iraq,” October 12, 2007.

14 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 not imbue the anti-Shi`a revanchists Although the Islamic Army in Iraq A continued robust U.S. presence will with the mass power base required to does not exult in violence to the same have a stabilizing effect on sectarian implement the Sunni fundamentalist degree as AQI, it is fully capable of tensions and strengthen the Iraqi rule they seek, whereas a military fanning the flames of sectarian warfare. security forces in terms of capabilities victory over the Shi`a would. One Its recounting of gang-style killings and as a cross-sectarian institution.10 possible strategy would be to first expel of Shi`a militia members in Baghdad Additionally, there is only so long the the United States from Iraq and then neighborhoods evokes images of revanchists can walk the tightrope of confront the Shi`a in a direct battle. bodies dumped in roadside ditches. balancing the strategic rationale of The spokesman of the Mujahidin Army, Furthermore, although car bombings aligning with the United States against a Salafist group whose rhetoric is often against Shi`a civilians are almost by the principles of their jihadist foot sharply anti-Shi`a, seemed to hope default attributed to AQI, the IAI has soldiers, many of whom undoubtedly for this outcome, saying, “I think that obliquely claimed responsibility for view such a relationship as, quite the enemy [U.S.] will retreat to bases such bombings despite its denials of literally, an unholy alliance. In perhaps and push the forces of the sectarian engaging in this practice. Of particular a subtle effort to provide some religious government into the battlefield.”8 This justification for such an alliance, buried would allow them to align with the within an article on the maxims of war expulsionists. The Mujahidin Army’s “It seems that, in the as applied by the early Muslims, the exit from the Jihad and Reform Front absence of blatantly IAI relates an incident in which the may reflect a decision along these lines. caliph `Umar allowed Arab Christians sectarian power grabs by to fight alongside Muslim forces against Sunni setbacks in the sectarian violence Shi`a actors, continued the ruling Persians in Iraq; this stands of 2006-2007, however, have greatly in contrast to the Qur’anic injunction dimmed the prospects of a Sunni victory factional struggles among against taking Jews and Christians in an unassisted battle against the the Sunnis will be the most as allies more frequently invoked by Shi`a. On the other hand, the support insurgents.11 Given that there are factors of the United States would significantly likely near-term dynamic, working against the revanchists over raise the chances of victory. Revanchist possibly intensifying prior time, the U.S. election campaign period leaders, however, are unlikely to be presents an opportunity to weaken the under the illusion that the United States to upcoming Iraqi elections commitment of the American public via would willingly conspire with them to in 2009.” a flare-up of sectarian violence.12 topple the Iraqi government. Yet, they may believe that they could entrain the Signs and Significance United States into siding with them The level of violence and its axis prior in a civil war if it could be coupled to note is the claim of a joint car bombing to the U.S. election day will yield the intensifying U.S.-Iran conflict; the with JAMI three days after the important clues as to the nature of the explicitly religious nature of a renewed declaration of the PCIR—an attempt to conflict’s organizing dynamics and the Sunni-Shi`a civil war would almost placate the IAI’s hard line jihadist wing balance of power among the Sunnis. The inevitably lead to Iran’s backing of the by implying that JAMI shared its core absence of a serious spike in violence Shi`a side. Faced with the specter of anti-Shi`a orientation and was willing would signify that the expulsionists an Iranian client regime prevailing in to act accordingly.9 are weak; if they had the capability to Baghdad, U.S. support of the Sunnis is mount a sustained campaign against the not inconceivable if, unlike in 2006- This is not to say that the anti-Shi`a United States and its accommodationist 2007, the principal standard bearers revanchists will immediately pursue allies, the pre-election period would on the Sunni side were not the global such an entrainment strategy—they may be the ideal time. Conversely, a sharp jihadists of AQI, but rather nationalist be more concerned with consolidating increase in U.S. casualties would imply groups with aims limited to Iraq. Of their power among Sunnis—but if they that the expulsionists are still strong and course, the resumption of large-scale wish to do so, time is not on their side. that the dynamic of an anti-occupation violence in Iraq would likely hasten a insurgency is very much alive. It would U.S. withdrawal, but a Sunni alliance 9 The IAI claimed that a booby-trapped car was blown also likely signify an alliance of anti- with the United States during the up in a “large gathering place” of “apostate criminal mili- Shi`a revanchists and expulsionists. withdrawal period could prove pivotal tias” in an attack on October 14, 2007 in Adan Square in to the outcome. The Sunnis, moreover, Baghdad in which 15 “apostates” were killed or wound- 10 Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Kenneth could offer the additional incentive of not ed. This attack correlates with a number of media ac- M. Pollack, “How to Leave a Stable Iraq,” Foreign Affairs harassing U.S. forces as they withdrew. counts of a car bombing against Shi`a civilians in Adan 87:5 (2008). The odds are against the success of Square producing a similar number of casualties. The 11 OSC, “Full Translation of ‘Principles of War’ Article such a strategy vis-à-vis the United claim is remarkable not just for the IAI’s virtual admis- from 12th Issue of Al-Fursan Magazine,” August 23, States, but it is probably the Sunnis’ best sion of attacking civilians, but even more so for the in- 2007. scenario for installing an avowedly Sunni clusion of JAMI, a group that claims to only target U.S. 12 It is encouraging that an uptick in high-profile attacks Islamist regime in Baghdad. forces. See OSC, “Islamic Army in Iraq Claims Cooperat- against civilians earlier this year did not lead to an esca- ing With Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi Brigades,” October 20, lating spiral of sectarian violence. “Measuring Stability 8 OSC, “Jihadist Website Posts Interview with Official 2007; OSC, “Xinhua: Four Civilians Killed in Baghdad and Security in Iraq,” Department of Defense Report to Spokesman of Al-Mujahidin Army,” October 16, 2007. Car Bombing,” October, 14, 2007. Congress, June 2008.

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An eruption of Sunni-Shi`a violence with the Iraqi Islamic Party over Learning from Adel would imply that the revanchists were control of the provincial council and ascendant or the possible resurgence police, claimed that the Iraqi Islamic Hammouda’s Work of AQI (the proportion of high-profile Party’s “very dangerous militia,” on Militant Islamist attacks due to suicide bombings may Hamas-Iraq, has been conducting an Movements distinguish between the two); in either assassination campaign against Anbar 14 case, the logic of a sectarian civil war sahwa leaders. To manage intra-Sunni By Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy would be the dominant organizing violence, the United States may need to dynamic of the conflict. A spike in Sunni- abide particular Sunni armed actors as seven years after the September 11, Sunni violence (again not characterized it in essence did with the sahwa councils 2001 attacks, it remains critically by AQI’s hallmark suicide bombings) against AQI. Militias that align with important for Western analysts to study would likely signify a power struggle the United States will have powerful previous works on Islamist movements between expulsionists on one side and advantages over their rivals, as by Arab writers. There are a number of accommodationists and revanchists on evidenced by AQI’s defeats and on the Arabic-language books that can help the other, with Sunni factional dynamics Shi`a side by the recent momentum of provide insight into the thinking of providing the main conflict logic. the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council over today’s Islamist militants. One such the Muqtada al-Sadr movement. author is Adel Hammouda, an Egyptian In terms of implications for the U.S. social commentator, investigative presence, any large-scale increase in If events in the near-term demonstrate journalist and researcher. More than violence, especially if sustained, would expulsionist weakness and that the two decades ago, Hammouda published call into question the basis of the surge’s revanchists are not powerful enough to an Arabic-language book that delved success and would likely cause hard strike, then the opportunity and leverage into the Islamist militant trend called thinking about the continued utility of may finally exist for the United States to the sahwa or Islamist re-awakening. U.S. forces in Iraq. The absence of any initiate formal negotiations with major The sahwa was an attempt to remedy the spike in violence prior to the election, nationalist insurgent groups aimed humiliating defeat of five Arab armies however, would make untenable the at getting them to publicly renounce in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day notions that the United States was insurgency and recognize the Iraqi War through radical Islamist political either aggravating the conflict or government in return for an explicit U.S. action. Hammouda traced the evolution powerless to divert the trajectory from peacekeeping aegis. This would replace of the sahwa trend from radical political an inevitable civil war; it could be said the current proliferation of ad hoc local expression to violent direct action in that the revanchists were biding their truces that allow an ambiguity whereby his book al-Hijra ila al-`Unf al-Tatarruf time, but given the risks of delay that insurgent groups can play a double al-Dini min Hazimat Yunyu ila Ightiyal very fact would signal that they have game: claiming attacks against U.S. Uktubur (Migration into the Violence not yet consolidated sufficient power to and Iraqi targets—thereby leaving their of Religious Extremism from the June make their move. options open for a return to intensified Defeat to the October Assassination). insurgency and civil war—while their Hammouda was prompted to write It seems that, in the absence of blatantly affiliated sahwa councils cooperate with his book in 1987 due to the failure of sectarian power grabs by Shi`a actors, the United States to consolidate local Egyptian intellectual voices to speak continued factional struggles among power; an ambiguity which gives the out against the Islamist militant trend. the Sunnis will be the most likely near- Shi`a-dominated government reason He was dismayed to find that the best term dynamic, possibly intensifying to stall integration of the sahwa councils research on Islamist militant groups prior to upcoming Iraqi elections in into state security forces and perhaps, during the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat 2009. The Sunni insurgency has had a more aggressively, to prey upon them were written by Israeli researchers. fractious history of failed attempts at for sectarian advantage. unification, splinter groups, stillborn Arabic books written about Islamist or riven alliances, and, ultimately, open Dr. Michael Gabbay is a research scientist militants offer a treasure trove of fighting with AQI, whose membership who specializes in the modeling and understanding about the adversary is overwhelmingly Iraqi Sunni. Perhaps analysis of the dynamics of social and on many levels from the tactical to this is a legacy of the Sunnis’ long tenure political networks. He is a Lead Scientist the strategic. It is critical for U.S. atop Iraq, a rule characterized by rival with Information Systems Laboratories, strategists to study these books, such elites accustomed to jockeying for power Inc. as Adel Hammouda’s, to find insights rather than organizing cohesively along from past militant Islamist movements 13 broad communal lines. so that they can be applied today.

The waning of the AQI threat has Hammouda’s Work on Egyptian Militant brought other rivalries to the fore, both Islamist Groups within the insurgency and paralleled Hammouda’s book offers an excellent outside it. For instance, prominent expose into the militants who attempted Anbar sahwa shaykhs, who have tussled to operationalize the theories of Islamist militant ideologue Sayyid 13 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cam- 14 OSC, “Al-Anbar Chieftains Accuse Islamic Party of bridge University Press, 2007). Bringing Al-Qa’ida to Iraq,” April 3, 2008.

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Qutb, who is among the most important sovereignty of man and God (what Qutb ideal time for Islamist radicals, between ideologues of modern Islamist militant called the hakmiyya), there must be no 1971 and 1977. During this time, Anwar theory. Hammouda argued that several competition—God must be absolute. The al-Sadat used Islamist radical groups as militants—including those who plotted trappings of a nation-state, a national a counter-weight to the Nasirists, leftists Anwar al-Sadat’s assassination in 1981— anthem, honoring Egypt’s tomb of the and Marxists who were attempting were attempting to put into practice Unknown Soldier, and saluting the to remove him from power. Al-Sadat Qutb’s theories. Some argue that al- flag were all forms of idolatry because attempted to distinguish himself from Qa`ida deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri is they competed for God’s glory. Readers Gamal `Abd al-Nasir by assuming the an outgrowth of Qutb’s use of Islam to thereafter used Qutb and the Pakistani title of Ra’is al-Mu’minin (President of justify the complete rejection of 20th ideologue Abu al-A`la Mawdudi’s the Faithful) and cloaking himself in century Muslim society as corrupt, reference of the secular state competing religiosity. The environment in Egypt, and the need to withdraw from society with God’s sovereignty to delegitimize and the release of Muslim Brotherhood before forming a vanguard to lead a the modern nation-state. Due to Qutb’s prisoners jailed by al-Nasir, provided militant Islamist revolution. prolific writings that included not only an atmosphere for Sirriyya and others his political manifesto Milestones Along the to experiment with staging a coup Hammouda used his publication Road, but books on Islamic economics, using Qutbist theory as the basis of to criticize Egypt’s ulama (clerical Qur’anic commentary and social an Islamic revolutionary politics. He establishment), who thought that issuing justice, it is highly probable that had became disillusioned with Palestinian written and verbal outrage was enough to Qutb lived, he would have most likely rejectionist groups and, having left counter the direction in which militants written manifestos that transformed Jordan for Egypt, found refuge in the were taking Islam, chastising the clergy his militant visions and theory into Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, where for not deconstructing Islamist militant recommendations for direct action. he would meet Muhammad al-Ghazali, ideologies and actions. The book is Zaynab al-Ghazali, and Supreme critical of 1970s senior Egyptian cleric Among the first terrorists and Islamist Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi. Soon after Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz `Isa for blaming militants to operationalize Qutb was the Sirriyya’s death sentence in October Palestinian Salah Sirriyya, who led a 1975, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood “Arabic books written failed 1974 attempt to storm the Military disassociated itself from him, and the Technical College in Cairo. Sirriyya’s details of the extent of the links between about Islamist militants theories can be reduced to the following Sirriyya and the Brotherhood remain offer a treasure trove of points: murky. Salah Sirriyya’s storming of the Military Technical College in 1974 to understanding about the - Over the centuries, Muslims have lead a widespread military coup was ill- adversary on many levels consistently failed to act on their beliefs, conceived and had no chance for success. choosing dialogue instead. This problem He did, however, inspire those who from the tactical to the is not specific to Palestinians but rather were later involved in the successful strategic.” the result of the general malaise of the assassination of Egyptian President Arab-Muslim world’s failure to act. Anwar al-Sadat. Sirriyya is considered the first person after Qutb’s execution - An Islamic state versus a secular in 1966 to attempt to operationalize Islamist militancy of the 1970s and nation-state has as its objective the Qutbist theories. 1980s on family upbringing and not the spreading of the Islamic message and its theology of militant Islam. Hammouda complete application on all spheres of Qutb in Practice: Shukri Mustafa’s Violent argued that militant Islamist theory life. All instruments of the state (media, Cult needed to be refuted using cogent education, foreign policy, economics Shukri Mustafa entered al-Nasir’s Islamic arguments. At the time, several and military) must be placed in the prisons in 1965, interrupting his questions were being asked by the service of Islam. studies in agriculture at the University Muslim youth (some of whom would of Assuit. He was imprisoned for six later join al-Qa`ida), such as: is using - An Islamic state can elicit help from years for agitating and inciting radical force or evangelism to propagate the non-Muslims for technical aid, but Islamist riots on campus. While in faith legitimate, and what constitutes an cannot accept the leadership of non- prison, Mustafa joined Jama`at al- Islamic state? According to Hammouda, Muslims. Muslimin (GM).1 GM was established by the clergy—caught between Islamist an imprisoned Azhar seminarian, `Ali militants and the state—failed in their The book argued that Sirriyya was the `Abduh Isma`il, as an Islamic enclave basic duty to answer these questions first organized expression of Qutb and in prison used to perfect an Islamic and, instead, ignored them. where the tree of takfir (declaring Muslims lifestyle among inmates and to establish apostate) began to bloom. Prior to the the initial steps necessary in establishing Salah Sirriyya’s Attempt to Storm the Military events of April 1974 and his storming of an Islamic state. Hammouda detailed Technical College the Military Technical College, Sirriyya how this prison group tore itself apart After Qutb was executed in 1966, those participated in Palestinian rejectionist who read his Islamist militant political groups, including being a member of 1 The group’s title is often transliterated as Gamaa al- manifesto, Milestones Along the Road, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Muslimin. The group is not to be confused with the better extrapolated that in the hierarchy and Palestine. Sirriyya arrived in Egypt at an known and organized Jama`at al-Islamiya.

17 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 by what is described as a takfir war with On July 3, 1977, Mustafa’s cult abducted Al-Dahabi’s views contradicted Qutbist other prison groups, such as the Muslim at gunpoint a popular cleric and militant thought, making him a target Brotherhood, and prison authorities. former religious minister, Shaykh of Shukri Mustafa. The Egyptian Among GM’s tactics were to declare Muhammad al-Dahabi. Mustafa’s cult government responded to al-Dahabi’s whole swathes of prison inmates and took responsibility for the kidnapping kidnapping by conducting mass arrests authorities apostate. This became so and issued several demands, chiefly of cult members. Shukri Mustafa himself disruptive that the supreme guide of the release of Mustafa’s followers was finally apprehended at a Cairo the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al- apartment. Al-Dahabi’s murdered body, Hudaybi, was brought in to rationalize “Mustafa’s appeal was however, was found in an apartment in with the GM. Al-Hudaybi would later Giza near the pyramids. The government pen a critique of takfir, entitled Du`a laa his ability to create an dismantled the group, and in 1978 three Quda’ (Evangelicals and Not Judges). The alternative society with a of its main leaders were sentenced seminarian of GM ceased his activities, to death, including Shukri Mustafa. depriving Mustafa of his only source spiritual focus that enticed Mustafa’s appeal was his ability to of empowerment in prison. He would thousands.” create an alternative society with a withdraw into himself until his release spiritual focus that enticed thousands. in 1971, formulating what would become his cult, known as al-Takfir wa’l-Hijra Al-Dahabi’s words should be (Anathematization and Emigration). in Egyptian jails; pardon for those assessed today to confront the current sentenced to prison; and an investigation ideological war. Islamist radicals Mustafa’s extended imprisonment from into the abuses perpetrated by Egypt’s murdered him for his ideas because he 1965 to 1971 found him recreating a internal security apparatus. There are a directly challenged Qutbist militant society modeled on the Islamist prison variety of reasons why Shukri Mustafa’s thought. American strategists must group GM. By 1976, al-Takfir wa’l-Hijra group targeted al-Dahabi, and some of now immerse themselves in what the had 5,000 members ranging in age them can be explained by looking at al- United States once considered obscure from 14 to 70. In 1973, Shukri Mustafa Dahabi’s views on radical groups. Some and unknown criminal cases since they linked up and merged with remnants of of his views are outlined below: provide insights in waging the long war Salah Sirriyya’s group, taking all of his on terrorism. Arabic books provide a followers to the mountains of Assuit to - Some youth feel that social ills can unique and in-depth perspective that begin the creation of a perfect Islamic be solved by force or by withdrawing cannot be ignored as America’s future society. In 1975, Egyptians in the Assuit from society. These youth have to be military leaders are educated. region became alarmed when young provided a relentless exposure to the women disappeared and were presumed reality of Islam, which rejects the path Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is kidnapped. This was followed by of extremes, ignorance and deception. considered an important thinker on militant disappearances of wives, husbands Islamist ideology at the Department of and students. These individuals had - Islam can propagate a rational and Defense and is a frequent contributor to been enticed to join Shukri Mustafa’s calm form of da`wa (evangelism). the Combating Terrorism Center at West cult. Mustafa would claim to Egyptian Point. He currently serves as a Defense authorities and court officials that he - Islamic law must accommodate and Department Counter-Terrorism Analyst. was the caliph of God on Earth. Members serve the needs of the social problems CDR Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the had to sell their worldly goods to join the of the age. John T. Hughes and Brandeis University group. Mustafa authorized only certain Libraries for making this work available followers to trade for the group, who - Islam must be purified from fantasies, for study. He also wishes to express he established as street vendors selling ignorance and pseudo-intellectualism. appreciation to his colleague Mr. Gregory produce and handcrafted goods in Regrettably, the voices of fantasy are Elder for his edits and commentary that Alexandria. Mustafa also utilized child louder than the voices of truth. have enhanced this expose. labor and sent cult members to Persian Gulf countries to send back remittances. - Mosques need to be places that do more Women worked in a collective and had than serve as a prayer hall for the masses, to render Mustafa blind obedience. but as a life-long school to explore Mustafa also imposed a plethora of Islamic thought and intellectualism. forbidden and permissible items. All aspects from the jahiliyya society2— - The imam must reach out to the schools, mosques, food subsidies and youth and engage them in constructive clothes—provided by the government dialogue to steer them away from were prohibited. radicalism through alternative Islamic arguments.

- Egyptians should not focus on just 2 Jahiliyya society was a Qutbist perversion of how the detaining youth, but offer alternative Prophet Muhammad described aspects of Meccan soci- and constructive Islamic thought. ety such as infanticide.

18 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10

After Action Report: Our relationship with the Awakening intricacies. By researching databases, yields timeless lessons that include speaking to our subordinate units Working with the knowing who to trust, finding middle who dealt with the tribes, and meeting Awakening in Central ground, and capitalizing on ideological with the tribal leaders and members, I Anbar commonalities.6 This article will discuss felt confident that I was capturing an each of these lessons in detail and accurate assessment of the tribes and By Captain Elliot Press, U.S. Army illustrate the important lessons learned disseminating products that would from our fight against al-Qa`ida in Iraq help coalition members understand the as a status of Forces Agreement (AQI) and the subsequent defeat of this nuances of the tribal environment. between the United States and Iraq terrorist organization in Ramadi. nears, discussions are heightening about Knowing your Counterparts the withdrawal of coalition forces.1 One The Mission: Defeating Al-Qa`ida in Iraq The first Iraqi that I met in Ramadi was area in Iraq where the United States has When my unit first arrived in Ramadi Shaykh Sattar, the founder of Iraq’s withdrawn a large number of troops is in January 2007, Shaykh Sattar Bizea Anbar Awakening Council. He led the Anbar Province, the strategically vital Fitkhan Albu Risha had already first known Iraqi group that declared area bordering Baghdad in the east and established the Awakening movement American troops as friendly forces. three countries—Syria, Jordan and and it had spread throughout the city. Shaykh Sattar and his brother who st st Saudi Arabia—in the west.2 My unit, The 1 Brigade, 1 Armor Division (1/1 succeeded him, Shaykh Ahmad Albu the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the AD), led by Colonel Sean McFarland, Risha, went so far as to say that an attack 3rd Infantry Division (1-3 BCT) of Ft. conducted operations that targeted against an American was similar to an Stewart, Georgia, was stationed in Anbar attack against the Awakening. During for a 15-month deployment from January “Our mission was to defeat a time when al-Qa`ida maintained a 2007 until April 2008. When we left in al-Qa`ida in Iraq and stranglehold in central Anbar, such April, we were part of a large drawdown comments were bold. in forces from Anbar.3 In conjunction secure the area.” with the Anbari leaders assuming There were other individuals claiming Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), the the desire to bring peace to Ramadi, but drawdown represents a success achieved their strategy was to attract nationalist by both military and security units and AQI and created coalition combat insurgent groups and then “convert” 7 the local population.4 Although many outposts in Ramadi. Col. McFarland, the nationalists to the peaceful side. factors led to this success,5 I primarily along with 1/1 AD’s deputy commander, For instance, one individual went on dealt with the local tribal leadership Lieutenant-Colonel James Lechner, Arabic satellite television soliciting since I was the brigade’s Tribal and also built strong bonds with the local support to fight against al-Qa`ida, with Engagement Officer (TEO). The tribal tribal leadership, which yielded a great free license to engage in attacks against heads largely form the core leadership amount of mutual respect between the Americans as well. Although that person of the Iraqi Awakening movement. tribes and American forces. When our was an acquaintance who never gave unit assumed control of the area in mid- me a reason to distrust him personally, February 2008, we conducted a series he embodies the following maxim: 1 Campbell Robertson, “Maliki Pushes for Troop With- of offensives to purge the city of AQI. individuals who are publicly neutral drawal Date,” New York Times, August 25, 2008. Our mission was to defeat al-Qa`ida in or even portray opposing views may be 2 Anbar is geographically the largest province in Iraq Iraq and secure the area. In doing so, we trustworthy, but do not necessarily play and is populated by a majority of Sunni Muslims. In Jan- would return a sense of normalcy to the a significant role in achieving stability. uary 2007, Ramadi was the most violent city per capita population and set the conditions for The Awakening leaders who risked in the world. Al-Qa`ida in Iraq was claiming Ramadi as economic and political reconstruction their lives against al-Qa`ida in Iraq the capital for the Islamic State of Iraq; with a stronghold to sustain a functioning environment. and the shaykhs’ public support and in Anbar, al-Qa`ida would be able to smuggle foreign recognition of our partnership gave the fighters into Iraq from Syria. As the brigade’s TEO, I supported local people confidence to stand with us 3 Erica Goode, “US to Hand Over Security in Anbar to the mission by studying the tribes, against violence and extremism. the Iraqis,” New York Times, August 28, 2008. A Ma- creating products for our intelligence rine spokesman in Anbar said the number of American assessments, and advising the brigade Finding the Middle Ground troops in the province had dropped from 37,000 in Feb- commander on tribal affairs. Iraq is a Toward the end of our deployment, ruary 2008 to 25,000 in August 2008, a 33% reduction. tribal society and many situations can be an incident occurred at Joint Security 4 Ann Scott Tyson, “US to Hand Over Security Duties explained or improved by understanding Station (JSS) Wallah8 near Ramadi that in Anbar to Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, August 28, the tribes’ structure, background and threatened the accomplishments we had 2008. Provincial Iraqi Control is a joint decision between gained in the area. U.S. service members the Iraqi government and MNF-I to systematically hand 6 Sahwa al-Iraq is the Arabic translation for the Iraqi over security responsibility in a province to the Provin- Awakening. When referencing the Awakening in this ar- 7 Due to the sensitivity of the subject and the disposition cial Civil Authorities under the control of the province’s ticle, it refers to the organization that Shaykh Sattar Bizea of some of the individuals, their names cannot be specifi- governor. Fitkhan Albu Risha of Ramadi began in September 2006 cally referenced. 5 Other factors include kinetic military operations, Ma- that has also been referred to as Sawha al-Anbar, Sahwa 8 JSS Wallah is located in Shaban, an area three miles rine Corps division leadership, and local economic and al-Iraq, the Anbar Salvation Council, the Anbar Awak- north of central Ramadi. Shaban is a small tribal area that political development. ening Movement and the Iraqi Awakening Movement. is nestled within a larger regional tribe, the Thiyabi.

19 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 and their Iraqi counterparts in the Iraqi that our unit wanted to cooperate with Through the Awakening leaders, we police were stationed at JSS Wallah. them to handle the situation in the best met two influential religious leaders Early one morning, a fight broke out possible manner. in Ramadi, Shaykh Abdullah Jallal between a U.S. service member and an al-Faraji and Dr. Thamir Ibrahim al- Iraqi police officer. Allegedly, the officer Through a series of meetings, we finally Assafi. Shaykh Abdullah was the Sunni stabbed the U.S. service member who came to a resolution with the father Endowment representative for Anbar then used his bayonet in self-defense, of the slain policeman and the Shaban and Dr. Thamir was a well-respected killing the policeman. The Shaban tribe. Col. Charlton agreed to prioritize local religious authority. When Shaykh tribal members were devastated by the a project in the Shaban area that the Sattar first created the Awakening, incident. They demanded answers as to tribe had requested. Within a week, the he asked Shaykh Abdullah and Dr. why their tribesman was “slaughtered”9 Thamir to issue a fatwa supporting the and if punishment would be applied to Awakening and its platform.10 The the U.S. service member responsible. “The lesson from this clerics obliged, and in September 2006 The coalition unit at JSS Wallah incident was clear: they issued the religious decree that in reported the incident immediately, part said it was acceptable to oppose and I accompanied our brigade compromise is critical al-Qa`ida, join the Awakening, and commander, Colonel John Charlton, to to achieve the goals of cooperate with coalition forces. JSS Wallah first thing that morning. While surveying the scene, we called a maintaining security and Since Shaykh Abdullah and Dr. Thamir local tribal leader, Shaykh Muhammad stability in an area.” were moderate Sunni clerics, we often al-Thiyabi, to ask for advice. Shaykh found common ground in our ideologies.11 Muhammad is a respected member of During our weekly meetings, we would the Awakening and the most influential discuss international news, sports, tribal shaykh north of Ramadi. I asked emotions in the area subsided. Without and a myriad of the shaykhs’ other Shaykh Muhammad if we could speak the Awakening’s support and Shaykh favorite topics. In the end, however, with him personally; within 30 minutes Muhammad’s mediation through the our engagements always had a purpose. we were sitting with him in his muthif, process, AQI would have exploited the There were times when we would meet the shaykh’s meeting hall. situation to garner support from the with the clerics after we received reports Shabani, risking the close partnership about an imam giving an anti-American After we told Shaykh Muhammad the that we built during our 12 months of sermon, calling for violence and possibly facts, he asked us to give him time to working with Iraqi police. The lesson destabilizing the area. Since al-Qa`ida speak with the family to mediate the from this incident was clear: compromise often uses mosques as a platform to situation. The next day, we went to meet is critical to achieve the goals of spread its extremist ideology and recruit with the slain police officer’s family. maintaining security and stability in operatives, it was important that we all We first went to link up with Shaykh an area. Our unit accomplished this by knew the possible threats to our causes. Muhammad at his meeting hall, this time using a local shaykh as a mediator rather At other times, the clerics would call to surrounded by other Awakening leaders than trying to do it ourselves—our close meet with our brigade commander or his waiting with him. We all convoyed to the relationship with the Awakening made deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Thaddeus family’s house to begin the mediation this possible and yielded the results McWhorter, to request his assistance process. When we arrived, hundreds of needed to avert a potentially disastrous in gaining support for the Endowment’s Shaban tribesmen were outside, some situation. functions. Although Col. Charlton and chanting “death to America” and “the Lt. Col. McWhorter made it clear that we occupiers must leave.” The emotions Support Moderate Muslim Leaders could not provide any material support were running high, but we recognized Many Iraqis whom I met either lived for religious activities, our unit was able that the situation had the potential to a religious lifestyle or held these to repair mosques and schools that were become worse if we did not deal with it concepts close to their heart. Although damaged during combat operations. directly. I met Iraqis who were not Muslim, such as Christian Iraqis, I met no one The assistance we gave to the imams After a few minutes of chanting, who disavowed religion. Although to rebuild after the destruction was Shaykh Muhammad appeared in the religion plays a large role in Iraq, this symbolic of our commitment to the Iraqi crowd and yelled at the tribesmen to should not be intimidating. During my people despite perceived differences let us through. When we approached deployment, I met a few Iraqi leaders in our beliefs. Shaykh Abdullah went the family, they demanded answers who transcended my stereotypical view about what happened. Col. Charlton of the Sunni Muslim cleric and taught 10 The fatwa, or religious decree, was issued apprehen- apologized for the unfortunate incident me that we had much more in common sively. Shaykh Abdullah remarked on more than one oc- and explained to them what he knew at than I had ever thought. By exploring casion that his reservations stemmed from Shaykh Sat- the time. He also ensured the family our similarities, we gained a better tar’s alleged alcohol consumption and disreputable past. understanding for one another and 11 The clerics believed that extremism had no place in 9 The Iraqis were claiming that the Iraqi policeman was a greater acceptance of each other’s Islam and all people have rights that should be upheld. “slaughtered” because the initial bayonet strike was message. By the same token, people have communal responsibili- across his throat, similar to the way an animal is slaugh- ties and should function in society in ways that improve tered. humanity.

20 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 so far as to distribute a message from Recent Highlights in 10 civilians. After the attack, two more Col. Charlton to the local imams to be suicide bombers in another vehicle read before Ramadan. In addition to Terrorist Activity approached the scene, but were shot to wishing the people a healthy and safe death by police before they were able to Ramadan, the message informed Iraqis August 16, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Abu detonate their explosives. The Taliban of the additional measures that would Sayyaf Group gunmen ambushed and claimed responsibility. – Reuters, August be in place to ensure their safety, such killed two Philippine Marines on Jolo 18 as increasing checkpoints and changing Island in the southern Philippines. the curfew. This let Iraqis know in – AP, August 16 August 18, 2008 (YEMEN): Security advance of conditions that, if imposed forces arrested five suspected al-Qa`ida by us without warning, would aggravate August 17, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide operatives in the al-Qattan district of them. Without their support, more bomber on a motorcycle targeted Hadramawt Province. Two Yemeni individuals would have likely opposed a checkpoint manned by the U.S.- troops may have been killed during our efforts and al-Qa`ida in Iraq would supported “Sons of Iraq” in Azamiya the operation. – NewsYemen, August 19; AP, have had a greater base of passive and district of Baghdad, killing 15 people. August 24 active support. The Islamic State of Iraq later claimed credit for the operation. – Reuters, August August 18, 2008 (SOMALIA): A Conclusion 17; AP, August 21 spokesman for Somalia’s Alliance for My unit met its mission of defeating al- the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) Qa`ida in Ramadi and we created the August 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): The pledged that differences among the necessary environment that facilitated Taliban sent a letter to Canadian media Islamist opposition “will end soon” and growth and opportunity for the future. organizations warning that Canadians that “we will continue fighting against Our relationship with the tribal leaders need to “convince your government the Ethiopian forces who invaded and the members of the Awakening was to put an end to the occupation of our homeland aggressively until they a key factor in our success. Along the Afghanistan so that the Afghans are withdraw from our country.” Since way, I learned the value of a “public” not killed with your hands and so that June, Somalia’s opposition groups, partnership while conducting a you are not killed with the hands of the including the ARS and other Islamist counter-insurgency; the importance of Afghans.” The letter threatened more factions, have disagreed over a political finding middle ground and dealing with attacks on Canadian nationals similar deal signed in Djibouti. – Bloomberg, situations through compromise; and the to the one that occurred on August 13, August 19 importance of cultivating relationships in which two Canadian aid workers with moderate Muslims due to the strong were killed in Logar Province. – CTV.ca, August 19, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): role religion plays in Iraqi society. These August 17 Taliban fighters launched a significant valuable lessons are critical as we move attack on Camp Salerno, a major U.S. forward and learn new ways in which August 18, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): military base in Khost Province. During the tribal system fuels modern warfare. A British court found Hammaad Munshi the attack, approximately 30 fighters guilty of distributing information online tried to storm the base, yet were turned Captain Elliot Press is an intelligence about how to make explosives, napalm, back by small-arms fire and helicopter officer serving with the 3-69 Armor detonators and grenades. Munshi, who gunships. Seven Taliban fighters Regiment, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry was arrested when he was 16-year-old, were killed, six of whom were suicide Division stationed out of Ft. Stewart, was convicted along with two other men, bombers. Authorities believe that the Georgia. Prior to graduating from the Aabid Khan and Sultan Muhammad, Taliban hoped a wave of suicide bombers United States Military Academy in 2004, both in their early 20s. – AFP, August 19 would soften the base’s defenses, CPT Press studied Counter-Terrorism allowing Taliban gunmen to storm the and International Security while earning August 18, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): base immediately after. The base was his bachelor in science in Economics. Taliban fighters killed 10 French soldiers hit by a similar attack on August 18. CPT Press has had two deployments to during a major battle that erupted after – AFP, August 19 Iraq during the past three years, totaling Taliban fighters ambushed a French 24 months of deployed time as a platoon reconnaissance patrol in Sarobi district, August 19, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A leader, battalion intelligence officer and Paktika Province. Approximately 100 suicide bomber attacked a group of tribal engagement officer. Taliban fighters engaged the French Shi`a Muslims who were gathered at patrol from three sides. The Afghan a hospital in Dera Ismail Khan in the Defense Ministry announced that 27 North-West Frontier Province, killing Taliban insurgents were killed in the at least 25 people. – BBC News, August 19 ensuing confrontation. – Reuters, August 19; Bloomberg, August 20 August 19, 2008 (TURKEY): A suspected suicide bomber blew himself August 18, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A up after being stopped by police near suicide car bomber rammed his the capital of Mersin Province. As a explosives-laden vehicle into the gate result of the explosion, nine policemen of Camp Salerno, a major U.S. military were wounded. There was no immediate base in Khost Province, killing at least claim of responsibility. One press report

21 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 claimed that “the vehicle was being were killed in the attack. Although it August 22, 2008 (ISRAEL): Khaled Abu tailed by the police who had intelligence is not certain who fired the missiles, Rakaiek, a 23-year-old Bedouin and that a suicide bomber was preparing for press reports suggested that they were resident of Tel Sheva, was indicted in an attack in the city [Mersin].” – AP, launched by U.S. military aircraft. – AP, Beersheba District Court for attempting August 19 August 21 to contact al-Qa`ida with the motive of beginning a terrorist cell to execute August 19, 2008 (ALGERIA): A suicide August 20, 2008 (ALGERIA): A series suicide bombings in Israel. Rakaiek car bomber drove his explosives-laden of synchronized bombings ripped was arrested on July 29 by the Southern vehicle into a line of applicants at an through Algeria, killing a total of 12 District Police and Shin Bet. – ynetnews. Algerian police academy in Les Issers, people. A car bomb exploded outside com, August 22; Jerusalem Post, August 22 Boumerdes Province, killing at least a military command post in the city of 43 people and making it one of the Bouira just 15 minutes before another August 22, 2008 (SOMALIA): According deadliest attacks to hit the country in car bomb ripped through a bus—filled to a report in Somalia’s Garowe Online recent years. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic with employees of SNC-Lavalin, a news source, gunmen loyal to the Maghreb later claimed credit for the Canadian engineering and construction Islamic Courts movement have taken attack. – AP, August 19; BBC News, August 22 firm—in the same city; the latter attack control of the key southern port town accounted for all of the fatalities. It was of Kismayo. One resident, speaking to August 19, 2008 (YEMEN): The al- not immediately clear whether suicide a Bloomberg journalist, claimed that Qa`ida-linked Jund al-Yaman Brigades bombers were in the vehicles. Al-Qa`ida “Kismayo is totally under the control of issued a statement on an Islamist web in the Islamic Maghreb later claimed al-Shabaab [of the Islamic Courts] and forum warning that it would “operate credit for the attacks. – Washington Post, they are walking inside the town with a reprisal operation very soon.” The August 21; BBC News, August 22 their machine guns.” Heavy fighting statement came in response to an August gripped the city beginning on August 11 security operation that left five August 21, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Two 22, causing the deaths of at least 50 suspected al-Qa`ida-linked militants suicide bombers attacked Pakistan’s people. – GaroweOnline, August 22; Bloomberg, dead, including Hamza al-Q`uyati, a main weapons building complex in August 22 senior operative who escaped from a Wah, Punjab Province. Although they Political Security Organization prison were unable to penetrate the main gates August 23, 2008 (IRAQ): A prominent in 2006. – NewsYemen, August 20 of the high security compound, the Shi`a cleric, Haider al-Saymari, was bombers detonated their explosives as gunned down in Basra. According to an August 19, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): workers were changing shifts, killing 67 Associated Press report, “Al-Saymari, Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group militants of them. Pakistan’s Taliban movement 38, was a follower of Iraq’s top Shiite shot and killed a Philippine Marine claimed credit for the attack. – National leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, officer as he rode his motorcycle through Post, August 21; AP, August 23 a moderate. Al-Saymari was known as Lian village in Patikul town of Sulu a critic of extremists and armed groups Province in the southern Philippines. August 21, 2008 (TURKEY): A car in Basra, particularly the Mahdi Army The officer, Captain Abduhari Sulani, bomb exploded as a police bus passed militia of al-Sistani’s rival, radical Shiite was in civilian clothes at the time of the by in the Turkish coastal city of Izmir, leader Muqtada al-Sadr.” It was not attack, and despite his eventual death injuring at least 16 people, including at immediately clear who was responsible due to gunshot wounds, he managed to least eight police officers. Authorities for the assassination. – AP, August 24 kill one of the attackers. – GMANews.tv, suspect that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party August 20 was behind the blast. – AFP, August 21 August 23, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a car August 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): August 21, 2008 (THAILAND): A car dealership in Kirkuk, killing at least five U.S.-led coalition forces launched bomb exploded in Sungai Kolok district people. The attack targeted the leader of an attack on Taliban militants in of southern Thailand’s Narathiwat a group fighting al-Qa`ida in Khalis of Laghman Province, killing more than Province, killing two people. – CNN, Diyala Province; the leader, identified 30 insurgents with small-arms fire and August 21; The Nation, August 25 as Abdel Karim Ahmed Mindil, was airstrikes. There were no fatal coalition killed in the explosion. – AFP, August 23 casualties. – AP, August 21 August 22, 2008 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri August 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A August 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): appeared in a new video posted on an suicide car bomber attacked a police Three NATO soldiers were killed by Islamist website. During the message, station in Swat District of the North- a roadside bomb in Ghazni Province. al-Zawahiri paid tribute to the deaths of West Frontier Province, killing at least – AP, August 21 several al-Qa`ida commanders—most six policemen. The Taliban claimed notably Abu Khabab al-Masri—who credit for the operation. – AP, August 22 August 20, 2008 (PAKISTAN): were recently killed by U.S. airstrikes. Missiles slammed into a suspected “All these men went to their Lord to August 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani militant compound near Wana in South complain to him about the injustices of troops, assisted by helicopter gunships, Waziristan Agency of the Federally the Americans and the betrayal of the claimed to have killed 37 Taliban-linked Administered Tribal Areas. Initial Pakistani government,” al-Zawahiri said. militants in Swat District of the North- reports indicate that five to 10 people – AP, August 22 West Frontier Province. Two soldiers

22 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 were killed during the operation. – AP, that “the Muslim faith disqualifies him found on a computer confiscated during August 23 [the head of the junta] from leading the an August 11 gun battle in Tarim, Muslim nation because he is comparable Hadramawt Province. – Indo-Asian News August 24, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. to an infidel.” – AFP, August 25 Service, August 28 military announced that it arrested an al-Qa`ida operative responsible for the August 26, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide August 28, 2008 (SOMALIA): According 2006 kidnapping of The Christian Science bomber detonated his explosives amid to the Financial Times, Ethiopian Prime Monitor journalist Jill Carroll. According a group of Iraqis attempting to join the Minister Meles Zenawi has signaled that to the statement, the operative, Salim police force in Jalula, Diyala Province, he may withdraw Ethiopian troops from Abdullah Ashur al-Shujayri (also killing at least 25 people. – AP, August 26 Somalia before the country’s transitional known as Abu Uthman), was arrested on government achieves stability. Ethiopia August 11. Carroll, abducted in January August 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): invaded Somalia in December 2006 to 2006, was released three months Antonio Maria Costa, executive director oust the Islamic Courts Union, which after her abduction. Another news of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said were consolidating control over much report further stated that “Shujayri’s that drought and anti-drug campaigns of the country. Somalia’s Islamists associates are said to have included Al have cut opium poppy cultivation 19% welcomed Zenawi’s suggestion, with its Qaeda in Iraq members involved in the this year compared to 2007. He warned, spokesman stating, “We are very happy 2004 abduction of Margaret Hassan, the however, that the Taliban could still to hear the screaming of Meles to pull head of Care International in Iraq. She earn $70 million from the harvest in out his unjust soldiers in Somalia. We was found slain in November 2004.” 2008. – AP, August 26 are also happy the arrogance of Meles – AP, August 24; Los Angeles Times, August 25 splits and breaks.” – Bloomberg, August 29 August 26, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. August 24, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide Consulate vehicle came under gunfire August 29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A bomber attacked a large group of people when traveling through Peshawar, suicide car bomber targeted a security who were celebrating a man’s release the capital of the North-West Frontier checkpoint in Dara Adam Khel in the from detention, killing at least 25 of Province. There were no casualties, North-West Frontier Province, killing them. The attack, which occurred in and the vehicle managed to flee the two civilians and wounding 29 Frontier Abu Ghurayb in Baghdad Province, scene. According to a press report, the Corps soldiers. – AFP, August 28 appeared to target Iraqis who had been consulate official “left her house and cooperating with the U.S. government, was headed to her office when gunmen August 29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): as many of the guests at the party in a blue Land Cruiser blocked the car’s Government airstrikes killed at least included police and military officials, path and opened fire.” – CNN, August 26 22 militants in the Swat valley of the along with men affiliated with the “Sons North-West Frontier Province. – AFP, of Iraq” movement. – Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A blast August 29 August 25 ripped through a roadside café on the outskirts of Islamabad, killing seven August 29, 2008 (MOROCCO): August 24, 2008 (IRAQ): A 13-year-old people. It was not immediately clear Morocco’s state news agency reported girl wearing an explosives vest turned whether the blast was from a bomb, that security services recently herself into the Iraqi police in Ba`quba, or if it was accidental. Authorities do apprehended 15 members of an Islamist Diyala Province, because she did not believe, however, that explosives were militant network that had access to want to become a suicide bomber. involved. – Reuters, August 27 chemicals and electronic components – TimesOnline, August 25 and were planning attacks in Morocco. August 27, 2008 (ALGERIA): Security The group, identified as Conquest of August 24, 2008 (YEMEN): Authorities forces confronted al-Qa`ida-linked Andalusia, is accused of having links to announced the arrests of six alleged militants in the Batna region, sparking al-Qa`ida. – Reuters, August 29 al-Qa`ida operatives in Ebin Province. a gun battle that left five soldiers and – AP, August 24 two policemen dead. – AP, August 30 August 30, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A missile fired from Afghanistan hit a suspected August 25, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The August 28, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A bomb Taliban or al-Qa`ida compound near Pakistani government banned the ripped through a prison bus in Bannu Wana in South Waziristan Agency, militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban District of the North-West Frontier killing at least five people. Unconfirmed Pakistan, freezing its assets and bank Province, killing at least nine people. – reports state that four of those killed accounts. – AFP, August 25 AP, August 28 were foreigners. – AFP, August 30

August 25, 2008 (MAURITANIA): August 28, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemeni August 30, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): One The suspected head of al-Qa`ida in authorities announced that they had of the founders of the Rajah Solaiman the Islamic Maghreb’s operations in apprehended 30 suspected al-Qa`ida Movement, an Islamic militant group Mauritania, El Khadim Ould Esseman, militants who were planning to launch accused of conducting several bombings released a letter from his prison cell attacks in Saudi Arabia. The men, all in the Philippines in 2004 and 2005, to Agence-France Presse, in which he Yemenis, were arrested in Hadramawt was deported to Manila from Bahrain. demanded Muslims not to recognize Province. Police claimed that the Ruben Lavilla, also known as Shaykh the new ruling military junta, saying arrests came as a result of information Omar Lavilla, was arrested in Bahrain

23 september 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 10 on July 24, an arrest that was not September 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The arrested in Afghanistan’s Ghazni reported publicly at the time. In Bahrain, head of Pakistan’s Interior Ministry Province on July 17, after planning to Lavilla was working as an editor of a said that “there are similarities between conduct a martyrdom operation against local magazine and was also working al-Qa`ida and TTP” and that there is Ghazni’s provincial governor. According as an interpreter at the Philippine a “close connection” between the two to an affidavit, when FBI agents and U.S. Embassy. His identity was discovered organizations. He also said that Tehrik- military personnel attempted to take after his request for a loan at a local i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is “a host to custody of her from Afghan officials, bank in Bahrain aroused suspicions. A al-Qa`ida and is their mouthpiece.” Siddiqui managed to arm herself and conflicting report, however, states that – UPI, September 2 fire at the U.S. personnel; she was Lavilla was arrested after applying for a wounded during the altercation. – Boston job at the Philippine Embassy. – Reuters, September 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Globe, August 6; MailOnline, August 6; Guardian, August 30; AP, August 30 Taliban fighters attacked a Canadian August 8; AP, September 4 security patrol in southern Afghanistan, August 30, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): killing three Canadian soldiers. – Reuters, September 4, 2008 (IRAQ): A U.S. Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group militants September 3 military spokesman announced that killed four soldiers on Jolo Island in control of Sunni Awakening groups will the southern Philippines. An unknown September 3, 2008 (PAKISTAN): be handed over to the Iraqi government number of militants were also killed. Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza starting October 1. – CNN, September 4 – AFP, August 29 Gilani may have escaped an assassination attempt, as two bullets “hit the window September 4, 2008 (GERMANY): August 31, 2008 (IRAQ): The Sunday glass” of Gilani’s bulletproof vehicle Authorities announced that on August Telegraph reported that an elite group as it drove through Rawalpindi. An 19 they charged a German man of of British commandos have killed official said after the attack that “the Pakistani heritage with membership or captured 3,500 suspected Iraqi prime minister had not yet landed from in al-Qa`ida. The man, who was terrorists in Baghdad during the last Lahore when the incident took place. arrested in February, was identified two years. – UPI, August 31 The motorcade was on its way to the only as “Aleem N.,” and he allegedly airport to receive him.” – The Australian, traveled “regularly” between Germany September 1, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. September 4 and Pakistan, agreeing to “take part military handed security control of in al-Qa`ida activities.” According to Anbar Province to Iraqi government September 3, 2008 (PAKISTAN): prosecutors, “His duty is suspected forces. U.S. President George W. According to an Associated Press to have been to acquire money and Bush marked the handover by stating, report, “American forces conducted equipment in Germany for military use “Today, Anbar is no longer lost to al- a raid inside Pakistan Wednesday, a and recruit further members as well Qa`ida, it is al-Qa`ida that lost Anbar.” senior U.S. military official said, in as fighters for the organization.” – AP, – Independent, September 2 the first known foreign ground assault September 4 against a suspected Taliban haven.” The September 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): operation took place in Pakistan’s South September 4, 2008 (ISRAEL): Hamas Nine Australian soldiers were wounded Waziristan Agency. – Reuters, September 3; detained the leader of a pro-al-Qa`ida during an overnight battle with Taliban AP, September 3 group in the Gaza Strip. Abu Hafss, fighters in Uruzgan Province. – AP, the leader of Jaysh al-Umma, allegedly September 2; Bloomberg, September 3 September 4, 2008 (GLOBAL): The head supports al-Qa`ida’s ideology but does of al-Qa`ida’s Afghanistan operations, not claim to be linked to the international September 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Shaykh Sa`id Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, terrorist group. – Reuters, September 4 An Afghan official said that 22 Taliban appeared in a new videotape threatening fighters were killed during a clash in more attacks against Denmark. September 5, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide Zabul Province. – AP, September 3 Referring to the June 2 attack on the car bomber targeted the convoy of Shi`a Danish Embassy in Islamabad, al-Yazid politician Ahmad Chalabi in Baghdad. September 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): warned that “the Danish Embassy Although Chalabi escaped unharmed, An Afghan official said that 10 Taliban [attack] and prior operations is but the six of his guards were killed in the fighters were killed during a clash in beginning...if you don’t end your errant explosion. – Los Angeles Times, September 6 Helmand Province. – AP, September 3 ways and aggression.” Al-Yazid was presumed killed by Pakistani airstrikes September 6, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide September 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The in Bajaur Agency in early August, but car bomber detonated his explosives at chief of Pakistan’s Interior Ministry told his death was never confirmed. – Gulf a market in Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, reporters that Pakistani troops almost News, September 5; Reuters, September 5 killing six people. – AP, September 6 captured Ayman al-Zawahiri recently, but “missed the chance.” Rahman Malik September 4, 2008 (UNITED STATES): September 6, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): explained that security forces “traced” Aafia Siddiqui, a U.S.-educated A Taliban suicide bomber disguised as a al-Zawahiri to Mohmand Agency of the Pakistani woman accused of supporting beggar attacked a government building Federally Administered Tribal Areas, al-Qa`ida, refused to appear in federal in Nimroz Province, killing six people. but were unable to pinpoint his exact court. Another hearing has been set for – AFP, September 6 location. – BBC News, September 2 September 22. Siddiqui was allegedly

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September 6, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): jury found three men guilty of a lesser are found.” An Iraqi government More than 100 Taliban fighters attacked charge of conspiring to kill using liquid spokesman responded to the tape, saying, a police post in Nimroz Province, killing explosives; according to a Reuters “The call of Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi to two policemen. Approximately eight report, however, the jury “was not assassinate Iraqi officials, mainly Vice Taliban fighters died during the attack. convinced by the prosecution’s case President Tariq al-Hashimi, is a clear – AFP, September 6 that they intended to blow up aircraft sign of its failure and its defeat in front from London’s Heathrow airport to of Iraqis and their national unity.” – AP, September 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A Canada and the United States.” Of the September 10; UPI, September 11 suicide car bomber attacked a security other five suspects, the jury failed to checkpoint on the outskirts of Peshawar, reach a verdict on four of them, while September 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A killing approximately 30 people. – AP, the fifth was acquitted on all charges. Taliban spokesman announced that the September 6; Voice of America, September 6 Prosecutors plan to seek a retrial for reason they have increased attacks on seven of the men. – Reuters, September 10 Canadian troops is because an upcoming September 7, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): “election is being held in Canada.” The A suicide bomber was shot to death near September 8, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): spokesman said that his suggestion “for an intelligence department in Zabul A NATO airstrike killed 12 Taliban the next prime minister is to withdraw Province. The bomber failed to detonate militants who had attacked a district Canadians from Afghanistan.” – The his explosives. – AFP, September 8 center in Paktia Province. A spokesman Canadian Press, September 10 for the provincial government claimed September 7, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): that “nine of them [the dead] are September 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Two suicide bombers detonated their Chechens and three are Afghans Three international soldiers and one explosives at the police headquarters in and Pakistanis.” – Thomson Financial, Afghan contractor were killed by an Kandahar, killing six policemen. – AP, September 9 Improvised Explosive Device in eastern September 7 Afghanistan. – Thomson Financial, September 8, 2008 (PAKISTAN): September 9 September 7, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): An Missiles pummeled a house and seminary alleged breakaway faction of the Moro run by Taliban commander Jalaluddin September 9, 2008 (SOMALIA): A Islamic Liberation Front along with the Haqqani, or his son, in Miran Shah of member of Somalia’s parliament was Abu Sayyaf Group engaged in a firefight North Waziristan Agency. The missiles, assassinated as he left a mosque in with government forces on Basilan presumed fired by U.S. unmanned Baidoa. The Islamist militant group Island in the southern Philippines. aircraft, killed approximately 25 al-Shabab later took credit for the Authorities claim that there were no people. Pakistani intelligence officials operation. – Voice of America, September 10 casualties on the government side. identified four foreign fighters killed The insurgents withdrew in different in the attack, one of whom has been September 9, 2008 (THAILAND): directions during the firefight. – Sun identified as Abu Haris, al-Qa`ida’s Separatist Muslim-Malay insurgents in Star, September 9 newly appointed chief for Pakistan. southern Thailand’s Pattani Province Pakistani intelligence officials claim shot dead and then beheaded a Buddhist September 8, 2008 (GLOBAL): Al- that a number of Haqqani’s family state official. – Reuters, September 9 Qa`ida released a videotape to mark the members were killed in the attack. anniversary of the September 11, 2001 – International Herald Tribune, September 9; The September 10, 2008 (GLOBAL): The terrorist attacks in the United States. Australian, September 11 U.S. military released a series of letters During the video, al-Qa`ida second- authored by al-Qa`ida second-in- in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri September 8, 2008 (ALGERIA): command Ayman al-Zawahiri directed accused Iran of “cooperating with According to press reports, authorities to al-Qa`ida’s affiliates in Iraq. In one the Americans in occupying Iraq and broke up an al-Qa`ida-linked terrorist letter, al-Zawahiri criticizes the Islamic Afghanistan.” Among other topics, cell that was planning to deploy a female State of Iraq’s media operations, the video celebrated the resignation suicide bomber to attack a military writing, “The media policy for the of former Pakistani President Pervez barracks. – AKI, September 8 Islamic State is using exaggeration, to Musharraf, and criticized the Lebanese the extent of lying.” The letters also militant group Hizb Allah. In addition September 9, 2008 (IRAQ): The head lamented about the poor communication to al-Zawahiri, prominent al-Qa`ida of the al-Qa`ida-affiliated Islamic between al-Qa`ida’s core leadership operative Abu Yahya al-Libi also State of Iraq, Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, and its operatives in Iraq, in addition appeared in the video. – AP, September 8 released an audio message on Islamist to outlining the difficulty of infiltrating websites calling for the assassination of foreign fighters into Iraq. – CNN, September 8, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): all members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, September 11 In the trial of eight men accused of the country’s main Sunni Arab political attempting to blow up aircraft heading party. According to al-Baghdadi, “We September 10, 2008 (PAKISTAN): from London to North America using hereby declare the Islamic Party, with Taliban fighters threw grenades into liquid explosives, the jury was unable all its tendencies, its leadership and its a Sunni mosque in Dir District of to agree to convict the men on the most members, to be an enemy of God and his the North-West Frontier Province, serious of charges filed against them. prophet. It is a sect of apostasy which killing approximately 25 people. As After deliberating for 56 hours, the should be killed wherever its members worshippers fled the grenade blasts,

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the militants opened fire on them. It September 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): CTC Sentinel Staff appears that the Sunni on Sunni violence Taliban fighters ambushed a police occurred because local tribal elders had patrol in Ghazni Province, killing seven Editor-in-Chief recently condemned the Taliban. – The officers. – AP, September 14 Erich Marquardt Australian, September 12 Senior Editor, CTC September 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): September 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Approximately 100 Taliban militants Editorial Board Taliban militants beheaded two police raided a government office in Nasir COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. recruits one week after abducting them Bagh on the outskirts of Peshawar, Department Head in Orakzai Agency of the Federally in the country’s North-West Frontier Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Administered Tribal Areas. – AFP, Province. – CNN, September 14 September 11 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. September 13, 2008 (INDIA): A series Deputy Department Head September 12, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide of explosions ripped through civilian Department of Social Sciences (West Point) truck bomber detonated his explosives areas of New Delhi, killing 21 people. in the Shi`a town of Dujail, Salah al- The terrorist group Indian Mujahidin MAJ Reid Sawyer Din Province, killing at least 31 people. claimed credit for the bombing Director, CTC – AFP, September 12 operation. – Bloomberg, September 15; AP, September 14 Brian Fishman September 12, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide Director of Research, CTC bomber blew himself up outside a Shi`a September 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): mosque in Sinjar, Ninawa Province, A suicide car bomber attacked a convoy Christopher Heffelfinger killing two people. – AFP, September 12 of Afghan doctors working for the FBI Fellow, CTC United Nations in the Spin Boldak September 12, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A district of Kandahar Province, killing suspected U.S. unmanned aircraft killed two doctors and their driver. – AP, at least 12 people in North Waziristan September 14; Reuters, September 14 Contact Agency of the Federally Administered Combating Terrorism Center Tribal Areas. – Washington Post, September 14, 2008 (PAKISTAN): U.S. Military Academy September 12 Security forces attacked suspected 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall militant safe houses in Bajaur Agency West Point, NY 10996 September 12, 2008 (GERMANY): of the Federally Administered Tribal Phone: (202) 425-8578 German authorities arrested a Turkish Areas, killing approximately 32 people. Email: [email protected] man, identified as “Omer O.,” for raising – AP, September 15 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ money and recruiting supporters for al- Qa`ida. The arrest is tied to the case of September 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A female * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 “Aleem N.,” a German man of Pakistani suicide bomber detonated her explosives heritage who was charged with in Balad Ruz, Diyala Province, killing membership in al-Qa`ida on August 19. at least 20 people. The blast targeted – AP, September 13; Reuters, September 13 police officers. – CNN, September 15

support September 12, 2008 (LEBANON): September 15, 2008 (IRAQ): Two car The Combating Terrorism Center would Jordanian security officials announced bombs detonated in Baghdad’s Karrada like to express its gratitude to its financial that al-Qa`ida operatives have district, killing five civilians. – AP, supporters, for without their support and infiltrated southern Lebanon’s `Ayn September 15 shared vision of the Center products like al-Hilwa refugee camp. The officials the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If believe that al-Qa`ida is attempting to September 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): you are interested in learning more about recruit Palestinians in the camp. – UPI, A bomb hidden in a motorcycle exploded how to support the Combating Terrorism September 12 in Shindand district of Herat Province. Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. The dead included the son and three edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at September 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): bodyguards of a district chief. – AFP, West Point’s Association of Graduates at A suicide bomber attacked Afghanistan’s September 15 845-446-1553. governor for Logar Province, Abdullah Wardak, killing him along with three of September 15, 2008 (MAURITANIA): his men. The attack occurred 12 miles Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb west of Kabul. According to Reuters, militants ambushed a patrol of soldiers, “He is the second provincial governor killing 12 of them. The attack ocurred 45 to be assassinated by suicide bombers miles east of the town of Zouerat. – AFP, The views expressed in this report are those of in recent years.” – Reuters, September 13; September 15 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, AFP, September 13 the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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