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CTC Sentinel Objective SEPTEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 10 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC Sentinel OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents Seven Years After 9/11: FEATURE ARTICLE More is Not Always Better 1 Seven Years After 9/11: By Ambassador Michael Sheehan More is Not Always Better By Ambassador Michael Sheehan REPORTS 3 From FATA to the NWFP: The Taliban Spread their Grip in Pakistan By Hassan Abbas 5 Preparing the Mujahidin: The Taliban’s Military Field Manual By Imtiaz Ali 7 The Current State of Al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia By Michael Knights 10 Assessing the Strength of Al-Qa`ida in Yemen By Gregory D. Johnsen 13 The 2008 U.S. Elections and Sunni Insurgent Dynamics in Iraq By Michael Gabbay 16 Learning from Adel Hammouda’s Work On Militant Islamist Groups By Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein AFP 19 After Action Report: Working with the Awakening in Central Anbar even years after the 9/11 completely eliminated the terrorist By Captain Elliot Press attacks, there is good news and threat. There remains a small and bad news. First, the good news: determined group of killers. They reside 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity al-Qa`ida has not been able to both here at home and abroad. They 26 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Sattack again inside the United States. No are bent on attacking the United States one could have possibly predicted this and our interests, and unfortunately on September 12, 2001, when we looked they are not going to go away anytime and felt so vulnerable. In the past seven soon. No matter what leaders we elect years, al-Qa`ida has been able to strike or appoint, no matter what policies we the non-Islamic West in only two cities, develop, this small and determined About the CTC Sentinel London and Madrid. Both of these group will be set on attacking us for The Combating Terrorism Center is an attacks were conducted by local cells at least another 20 years. Yet we must independent educational and research with varying levels of connectivity to remember that they are not everywhere institution based in the Department of Social the central or strategic hub of al-Qa`ida. and they are not all-powerful. They have Sciences at the United States Military Academy, No matter how you spin it, and even if limitations—personal, organizational West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses they attack again on the day this article and ideological—and they have proven the Center’s global network of scholars and is published, this is not an impressive their limits by their inability to attack practitioners to understand and confront record for an organization that looked again in the United States since 9/11. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and so powerful on 9/11. It is important to other forms of political violence. recognize our success in mitigating al- Prioritizing our Response Qa`ida’s impact on the world—even in Washington logic would have us believe the midst of several years of bad news that we solve problems by creating The views expressed in this report are those of coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan. new agencies and spending tons of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, taxpayers’ money. I disagree. As proven the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. Now for the bad news: intelligence and by the good work completed under law enforcement operations have not tight budgets at the New York Police 1 SEPTEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 10 Department (NYPD), leadership, focus, the threat since 9/11, and it is they who representing at least 10 percent of the creativity, and prudent risk-taking are have crushed the cells attempting to budget, that contributes to defending our more effective tools in the fight against strike us again. U.S. intelligence has nation from terrorist threats. Then, like terrorism than a steady flow of federal been successful in identifying potential most businesses that have to balance a taxpayer dollars into already massive attackers before they can mount an budget, these agencies should put more bureaucracies. attack in the West, and U.S. military resources into the high-value, high- forces have neutralized their capabilities payoff activity, eliminating the low- The most important work in protecting around the globe. Significantly, I am value, low-payoff activity. Of course, our country since 9/11 has been not aware of any attacks that were each agency will scream that everything accomplished with the capacity that was intercepted by defensive measures such they do is critical and to cut anything in place when the event happened, not as detectors, screenings or patrols. would seriously jeopardize our national with any of the new capability brought Defeating terrorism has been all about security, thereby placing the blame for since 9/11. I firmly believe that huge finding and crushing the cells—at home future failure on anyone who dares to budget increases have not significantly and abroad. When it comes to al-Qa`ida, challenge a budget increase. That kind contributed to our post-9/11 security. our best defense is a good offense. of nonsense should not be tolerated. Of course, over time, these gargantuan More is not necessarily better. The costs of an ideal offensive strategy “When it comes to al- are relatively small in terms of I remember what Mike O’Neil, who runs budgetary allocations. The real issue the counter-terrorism unit at NYPD, Qa`ida, our best defense is lies in aversion to the idea of spying told me: “Commissioner, I’d rather have a good offense.” at home and in dealing with unsavory a handful of quality people and get rid intelligence organizations abroad. of the deadwood. The deadwood just The challenge is to create innovative distracts me and the people trying to get and risk-taking programs that operate the job done.” During our time together, budgets will enhance our capability, within the law, have strong oversight, we worked hard to build the right sized but the cost-benefit ratio does not and allow for an occasional failure of unit, not the biggest unit. Dave Cohen compute favorably. The big wins had execution. If we overly constrain the also shrank the Intelligence Division at little to do with new programs. The CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, and NYPD in total numbers while creating a Central Intelligence Agency’s crowning other players such as the NYPD, we will new and more creative organization. He achievement was the takedown of the find ourselves conducting another 9/11 accomplished this by eliminating low- Taliban in Afghanistan, conducted Commission in a few years, wondering value work and focusing the good people only months after 9/11 with the same how another catastrophe could have he had on the task at hand. Meanwhile, people and organization that existed occurred on our shores. even as the NYPD got smaller overall before. What made the difference was and new counter-terrorism functions that the CIA was finally unleashed in The effectiveness of defensive were added, crime rates continued to Afghanistan and around the world. The strategies such as opening up all of drop. It bears repeating: more is not same holds true for the Federal Bureau our containerized shipping, strangling always better. of Investigation: most of the productive our petrochemical industries with work after 9/11 was accomplished within regulatory requirements, and Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan has had the existing infrastructure, but newly entrenching ourselves and our a 30-year career of public service. He has focused on al-Qa`ida and guided by the government institutions behind barriers served with distinction as a U.S. Army Patriot Act. Based on my experiences must be carefully scrutinized. These Special Forces officer, a White House aide for in New York City, I would say that all defenses are often modern versions of two administrations, as a senior diplomat at of the post-9/11 increases in the FBI’s the Maginot Line built by the French the State Department and the United Nations, counter-terrorism business could have after World War I, which was so easily and finally as the head of counter-terrorism been supplied from existing resources bypassed by the Nazi military machine. for the NYPD. As the Deputy Commissioner within the New York office. New Walls around our critical infrastructure for Counter-Terrorism at NYPD, he helped missions could easily have been taken will also be easily bypassed if terrorist reshape the NYPD into what is widely from current units by shifting priorities cells are able to organize a plot and regarded as one of the most effective counter- rather than spending more money. construct a weapon. Getting to a good terrorism organizations in the world. His target is relatively easy; we must stop latest book reflects on much of his career in Thinking Smart about our Strategy the terrorists before they get to that point. counter-terrorism and is entitled, Crush the As we assess the future of counter- Some targets need to be protected, but Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism without terrorism policy and programs, it is we must recognize that not everything Terrorizing Ourselves. Ambassador important to ask ourselves what has can or should be protected; the cost is Sheehan is a Senior Fellow at the Combating worked thus far. Beyond the obvious too prohibitive. Terrorism Center. and important impact of the Afghan takedown, the basic intelligence work Suggestions for the Next President by law enforcement and intelligence The next president should start off his operatives has make the biggest counter-terrorism effort by asking each difference.
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