Language, Identity, Politics - the Myth of Two Ukraines

Dr Joanna Fomina

April 2014

Dr Joanna Fomina

April 2014

This study is published within a se- region of residence, political views, ries of policy briefs on Europe and and preferred language. its neighbours in the east and south. In this series we publish pa- Ryabchuk himself already repudi-

Policy Brief Brief Policy pers commissioned or produced by ated this simplistic account some

the Bertelsmann Stiftung in cooper- time ago.2 However, the tale of two ation with regional partners in the Ukraines is still very popular and of- framework of our work in this field ten uncritically reiterated and ex- This policy brief is the product of ploited in political games. One the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s cooper- could watch its new version after ation with the Warsaw-based Insti- the eruption of protests against the tute of Public Affairs (ISP). suspension of signing of the asso- ciation agreement with the EU by The narrative of two Ukraines – the former president Yanukovych. existence of two separate cultural- Many commentators presented the

political communities within one battle for Maidan as a conflict be-

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

- Ukrainian state – has accompanied tween the Russian-speaking East the relatively short history of inde- and Ukrainian-speaking West. Cur- pendent Ukraine from the very be- rently, the same narrative is em- ginning. Articulated by Mykola ployed by president Putin, who jus- Ryabchuk more than twenty years tifies his intervention in Ukraine by ago1 and seemingly logical and the need to protect the “Russian- reasonable, it has become the fa- speaking” population against the vourite narrative of many Ukrainian allegedly nationalistic Ukrainian- and international commentators speaking government and its chau- and analysts. One of these vinistic supporters. Ukraines is pro-European, shares

liberal democracy values, wants to The tale of two Ukraines equates Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, join the European Union, “return to language, national identity, region Europe” and, what is very im- of residence, and political orienta- portant, speaks Ukrainian. The tion of all Ukrainian citizens. The symbolic centre of this Ukraine is available empirical data, presented Lviv. The other is nostalgic about in the text, demonstrates that there the Soviet Union, has close rela- are indeed some correlations be- tions with contemporary Russia, is tween the preferred language, re- hostile towards the West and does gion of residence, and political not share “western” values. The views, the perceptions of the neigh- language of this other Ukraine is bouring states as well as prefer- Russian and its “capital” is Do- ences as to the future of their coun- netsk. Taking on board this narra- try. However, the situation is far tive simply means equating one’s from being as unambiguous and

1 M. Ryabczuk, Two Ukraines?, East European ences, available at: http://www.iwm.at/read-lis- Reporter, vol. 5, no. 4, 1992. ten-watch/transit-online/ukraine-one-state-two- 2 M. Ryabczuk, Ukraine: One State, Two Coun- countries/, accessed on March 10, 2014 tries? With Comments, Institute for Human Sci-

unequivocal as the narrative of two An analysis of the empirical data, Ukraines would suggest. Although indeed, illustrates certain tenden- the political attitudes of the popula- cies: a larger share of “easterners” tions of Lviv and Donetsk differ, it speak Russian, and “westerners” –

does not imply that the preferred Ukrainian. Yet, the linguistic situa- Brief Policy

language determines ethnic/na- tion is more complex. Depending tional identity or geopolitical on how the question about the lan- choices. The language situation is guage is worded we can even exceptionally complex, and the sometimes get diametrically differ- boundaries along which the linguis- ent answers. What is more, the tic dividing lines run are very majority of Ukrainians are at blurred. What follows, the tale of least passively bilingual – even if two Ukraines, even though catchy they do not use one of the lan- and attractive, does not reflect the guages in everyday situations, real diversity (linguistic, ethnic, or they understand it perfectly well. It political) of Ukrainian society. It is not infrequent that while having a

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

cannot justify the claim for the divi- conversation, one person speaks - sion or even federalisation of the Ukrainian and the other – Russian. Ukrainian state. What is more, irre- Besides, especially in central spective of the region of residence, Ukraine, many people speak so- the majority of the population of called “surzhik”, a combination of Ukraine is sceptical of any divi- Russian and Ukrainian. Yet, when sions, including federalisation, of asked about their reliance on their country and believe that surzhik, people may deny it and Ukraine is their only home country. claim that they actually speak either Russian or Ukrainian. Language preference, region of According to census results (2001), residence, and national identity 68% claim that their mother tongue

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, is Ukrainian and 30% – Russian. The claim about two Ukraines can There are also considerable re- be easily invalidated by juxtaposing gional differences. In Lviv Oblast, declarations about national iden- for example, as many as 95% con- tity, mother tongue, and the lan- sider Ukrainian as their native language used in everyday situations. guage, whereas in Donetsk Oblast These indicators are very differ- the figure is only 24%. Notably, ently distributed. A considerably 72% of the residents of the capital larger percentage of the Ukrainian claim that their mother tongue is population speaks Russian than Ukrainian and only 25% that it is claims Russian identity. In other Russian. words, a large share of people who identify themselves as ethnic Yet, when we ask about the lan- Ukrainians are Russophones. guage that respondents find easier to speak, the situation is somewhat

different, and in Kyiv it is diametri- ferred language of ethnic minori- cally different. When we compare ties. For example, Crimean Tartars the census results and opinion predominantly speak Russian in polls, it turns out that a considera- everyday situations.

Policy Brief Brief Policy ble share of Ukrainians consider

Ukrainian their mother tongue, yet Graph 2. Language used in everyday claim it is easier for them to speak conversations at home Russian.

Graph 1. Language preferences of

Ukrainians*

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 *The question was: “What language is it

easier for you to communicate in?” The research results demonstrate Source: IPA opinion poll results, 20133 that the preferred language is not

equivalent to ethnic identity, which

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, What is more, when respondents is particularly clear in the case of were given more options, the lin- the population in the east and south guistic situation looks even more of Ukraine. The juxtaposition of the complicated. Except for the west of poll results regarding language and Ukraine, about 10% of the Ukrain- ethnic identity demonstrates that a ian population admit speaking considerable share of people who surzhik, and about 20% claim that prefer to use Russian in everyday they speak both Russian and life consider themselves Ukrainian. Ukrainian at home, depending on In the east, 72% claim to be Ukrain- the situation. It is also noteworthy ian, yet only 6% claim that it is eas- that Russian is usually the pre- ier for them to speak Ukrainian.

3 The opinion poll was conducted by GfK ysis of the results was published as a report en- through telephone interviews on a sample of titled “Poland – Ukraine, Poles – Ukrainians. A 1,000 adult respondents in June 2013. An addi- Look Across the Border”, Joanna Fomina, Jo- tional 300 interviews were conducted in West- anna Konieczna-Sałamatin, Jacek Kucharczyk, ern Ukraine in order to better analyse the atti- Łukasz Wenerski, IPA, Warsaw, 2013, available tudes of the inhabitants of this region. The anal- at: http://www.isp.org.pl/publikacje,25,638.html

The situation in the south of the Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re- country looks similar.

Graph 3. Declared nationality – regional differences

Policy Brief Policy

sults, 2013

What is more, a dominating majority of Ukrainians demonstrate patri-

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

otic feelings for Ukraine. Only 18% - in the south and 15% in the east do Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 not consider themselves patriots of Notwithstanding any linguistic, po- Ukraine. litical, or cultural differences, the vast majority of Ukrainians con- Graph 5. Do you consider yourself a sider Ukraine their motherland. patriot of Ukraine? Even in the south of the country, 88% believe that Ukraine is their home country. This conviction is even more popular among resi-

dents of the allegedly pro-Russian Politics Identity, Language, east – 93% share this belief, in comparison to the traditionally patriotic west and centre (99%).

Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll results, 2013

In other words, even people who prefer speaking Russian and/or live in the east or south of the country Graph 4. Do you consider Ukraine your still predominantly consider motherland? Ukraine their motherland and have patriotic feelings for their country.

There are some correlations be- democracy in their own country, ir- tween language preferences and respective of whether they were region of residence on the one Russophones or Ukrophones. hand, and national identity and pat- Graph 6. Opinions on democracy as a

Policy Brief Brief Policy riotism on the other, yet the results

by no means justify the “two principle and as practice* Ukraines” theory .

Language and values and attitudes towards democracy

According to the two Ukraines narrative, the Ukrainian-speaking population of Ukraine shares democratic values, and supports reforms

strengthening civic freedoms and

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

- political rights, whereas the Rus- sian-speakers are nostalgic about the Soviet Union and do not mind *The respondents were asked to assess strong and centralised (authoritar- the importance of living in a democratic ian) rule. Does such a division exist state as well as satisfaction with the per- in real life? We can check this on formance of democracy in their own state the basis of the results of the sixth on a scale of 0 to 10. edition of the World Value Survey – an opinion poll conducted in Source: World Values Survey: Ukraine in 2011 and 2012, i.e. dur- http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ ing the presidency of Viktor Yanu- kovych. Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, The respondents were also asked about their support for democratic The respondents were asked to as- and authoritarian forms of govern- sess on the scale of 0 to 10 the im- ment. The juxtaposition of the re- portance of living in a democratic sults demonstrates the internal di- state. They were also asked about lemma of Ukrainians who on one the level of satisfaction about the hand want to live in a democrati- performance of democracy in their cally governed state, yet on the own country. The results demon- other – long for a single strong strate that there are no significant leader who will put their country in differences between Russian- and order. Yet, the difficulty in choosing Ukrainian-speakers regarding de- either a democratic or an authori- mocracy. The majority of Ukraini- tarian form of governance was ans attached considerable im- faced by both Russian and Ukrain- portance to living in a democrati- ian speakers alike. Needless to cally governed state and were very say, it results from dissatisfaction critical of the situation regarding with the successive government

brought to power as a result of (more or less) free elections.

Graph 7. Support for democratic and authoritarian forms of governance

Policy Brief Policy

The claim that Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, although disliked by the Ukrainian-speaking population, enjoyed widespread

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

support and trust from Russian- - speakers is easily refuted on the Source: World Values Survey: basis of these results. These re- http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ sults also demonstrate that we should not jump to conclusions that The views of the Russian- and there are considerable differences Ukrainian-speaking population of in political attitudes between peo- Ukraine do not differ considerably ple according to linguistic dividing regarding their trust towards the lines. authorities. People who prefer to speak Russian in everyday life only Language and region of resi- trusted the government under for- dence and geopolitical choices mer president Yanukovych slightly of Ukrainians Politics Identity, Language, more often – the difference with their Ukrainian-speaking fellow citi- So-called “multi-vector” orientation zens was just eight percentage in terms of geopolitics – assigning points. Slightly fewer people ex- relatively the same significance to pressed trust in the parliament, with relations with the EU and Russia – the difference between the two has been characteristic for both groups being just three percentage Ukrainian politics and the attitudes points. of Ukrainian society for the whole period of independence. It has al- ways been difficult for Ukrainians to make a decided choice between Graph 8. Confidence in parliament and the west and the east. The reasons government for this state of affairs include the geographical position, history, as- Source: World Values Survey: sessments of (unfinished) systemic http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

transformation after regaining independence, and the impact of the mass media.

Policy Brief Brief Policy The already cited IPA opinion poll

(2013) demonstrates that the majority of Ukrainians would like to see their country intensively coop- erating with both the EU and Rus- sia. The dominant group, 42% of respondents, believed that intensi- fication of relations both with the EU and Russia was in the interest The majority of Ukrainians, irre- of their state. However, among spective of the language they those who were able to make an speak, believed that closer ties with

unequivocal choice between the both the EU and Russia were im- the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the portant for the economic develop- - two geopolitical options, the supporters of the EU prevailed. ment of Ukraine. The majority of Twenty-seven per cent believed Russian-speakers and Ukrainian- that closer relations with the EU speakers also believed that inte- were in the interest of Ukraine, gration with the EU is in the interest whereas the unequivocally Rus- of Ukraine. What is significant, sian option was chosen by only however, is that not only did the 17%. majority of Russian-speakers believe that also closer ties with Rus- Graph 9. Opinions on closer sia were in the interest of Ukraine, cooperation with European Union but also almost half of the Ukrain- ian-speakers. Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, Thus, the “multi-vector” option was the most popular choice among the majority of Ukrainians, irrespective of the language they speak. Yet, when people were asked to make a choice between integration with Russia and integration with the EU, regional differences emerged. Pre- dictably the west and the centre tended to choose the European vector of integration, and the east – Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 the Russian one. What is signifi- Graph 10. Opinions on closer cant, however, is that the residents cooperation with Russia of the south were divided in their opinions regarding geopolitical Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 choices of their country – 45%

supporters of the accession of Ukraine to the European Union rs of the accession of supporters of the Ukraine

Brief Policy

accession of

Ukraine to the customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan

Map 1. Supporters of the Western and Eastern direction of integration – regional

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

differences -

73% supporters of the accession of Ukraine to the European Union 41% supporters of the accession of Ukraine to the customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan

Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013

wanted their country to join the EU, and 41% – to join the Customs Un- Graph 12. Supporters of the Eastern ion of Russia, Kazakhstan, and and Western vectors of Ukraine's Belarus. integration – according to linguistic Politics Identity, Language, differences

Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013

Graph 11. Supporters of the Eastern and Western vectors of Ukraine's integration – according to the two Ukraines claim

Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013

IPA research results demonstrate that Poland enjoys a very positive perception across Ukrainian soci-

Policy Brief Brief Policy ety. Neither preferred language nor

region of residence were of significance regarding the perception of how the Polish state functions. Both the population in the east and the west believed that the Polish government takes good care of its An interesting tendency can be ob- citizens and that Poles can fully en- served regarding the differences between the south-east and the centre-west. The latter is much

more supportive of integration with the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

the EU (66%) than the south-east - is of integration with Russia (49%), whereas, irrespective of the preferred language, a larger share of Ukrainians preferred integration with the EU – 45% among Russo- phones and 62% among Ukro- phones – than with Russia (40% joy their rights and civil liberties. and 16%, respectively). Taking into account that Poland is

an EU member state most fre- Language and the perception of quently visited by Ukrainians, to a Poland

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, certain extent these results can be

extrapolated to the whole of the Poland is often perceived by both EU. other EU member-states and its

eastern neighbours as a country Graph 13. Opinions on the situation in that strongly supports the pro-west- Poland – regional differences ern and pro-European orientation

of Ukraine. At the same time, in Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 Russian propaganda, Poland is of-

ten presented as a country that is Graph 14. Opinions on the situation in trying to forcefully make Ukraine Poland – differences according to join the EU. According to the two language preference Ukraines claim, thus, we could ex-

pect that the perception of Poland Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 would be different depending on

the language preferred and the region of residence of the respondents.

Graph 15. Support for the idea of Ukraine as a federal state

Policy Brief Policy

Region of residence and views on federalisation and separa- tism

The narrative about two Ukraines is Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-

sults, 2013 Ukraines Two of Myth the often employed to justify the pro- - posals for the political division of The idea of splitting Ukraine into Ukraine, either federalisation or a two states enjoys even less sup- split into two separate political enti- port. More than 70% of Ukrainians ties, or uniting parts of Ukraine with in all regions do not support sepa- another state (Russia). However, rating parts of Ukraine by creating public opinion is predominantly a state covering the south-east re- hostile to any such changes, both gions. The greatest difference is in the west and in the east. More between the east and the west, than half of the population in all the which is only nine percentage regions – with 53% in the east be- points. ing the lowest score – are critical of

Politics Identity, Language, the idea of the federalisation of

Ukraine. This goes against the grain of popular perceptions about the widespread desire of eastern

Ukrainians to see their region as part of a federation rather than the unitary state of Ukraine. What is interesting, about 20% (with some regional differences) find it hard to answer a question on the federali- Graph 16. Support for the idea of sation of Ukraine. These citizens creating two independent states (the are easy to persuade either one south-eastern oblasts vs. the western way or the other. In addition, many and central oblasts) may simply want greater decentral- isation of the state, and not federalisation.

want their oblast to join Russia – more than 70% in all regions. For- saking Ukraine for the sake of Rus- sia is popular among not more than

Policy Brief Brief Policy 14% of the residents of the south-

east. These results are especially significant in the face of the pseudo-referendum, engineered by the Russian authorities in Cri- mea.

Graph 18. Support for the idea of

separating the south-eastern regions of Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re- Ukraine and forcing them to unite with sults, 2013 Russia?

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

Separatist tendencies are not pop- - ular in Ukraine, irrespective of the region of residence. Only 5% in the east and 13% in the south would like their oblast to create an independent state, separate from Ukraine.

Graph 17. Support for separating one’s native oblast and creating an independent state

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll results, 2013

Finally, despite the fact that the research shows that regional differences between the east and the west are not that significant and do not justify the claim about two Ukraines, this narrative has become relatively popular also within Ukrainian society itself, especially

in the east and south. One third of Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re- Ukrainians living in the east and sults, 2013 south believe that the differences Joining Russia is almost equally between the two parts of Ukraine unpopular. The vast majority of are so significant that they may re- Ukrainians, irrespective of how sult in the division of Ukraine in the close to Russia they live, does not

future. This conviction is consider- separate independent states on Ukraine’s ably less popular in the centre and territory, or make those regions unite with especially in the west – this opinion other states?” is shared by 16% and 10%, respec- Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re- tively. It appears that the impact of Brief Policy

the Russian media is key here to sults, 2013 understanding these regional differences. The Russian media have Crimea – poles apart? been promoting the idea of the “nationalistic” west that is so different Once we have seen that the differ- from the east of Ukraine. As a re- ences between the populations of sult, the belief in some insurmount- the east and the west of Ukraine able differences between the east- are not that considerable, the ques- erners and westerners is twice as tion arises whether Crimea is poles popular in the east as it is in the apart from the rest of Ukraine. It is west of Ukraine. Yet, it is significant often emphasised that Crimea only

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

that despite such propaganda, the joined Ukraine in the 1950s and - majority of Ukrainians, including has never become really Ukrainian the east and south, deny that a two- in spirit. Crimea is also the native state solution is possible. land of the Crimean Tartars, who make up 16% of the peninsula’s Graph 19. Belief that the split of population, according to the 2001 Ukraine is possible due to census. irreconcilable differences between regions* The Crimean population, compris- ing a considerable group of ethnic Russians who settled there during the communist times as well as

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, families of the Black Sea Fleet members, is indeed much more fa- vourably oriented towards Russia than towards the EU. According to the results of an opinion poll, conducted in Crimea in May 2013, sim- ilarly to the east of the country, 53% of the Crimean population would rather see Ukraine join the union * The question was: “Do you believe in the with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Bel- existence of deep political contradictions, arus than the EU (supported by language and cultural barriers, and eco- 17%), if they had to make a single nomic disparity between the citizens of the choice. It is also noteworthy that western and eastern regions of Ukraine one third of the population did not that in future may result in the separation support any of the two options. of these regions and/or the creation of

Graph 20. Support for joining the What is more, the majority of the European Union and the Customs Crimean population supported the Union with Russia* status quo – autonomy within Ukraine. Twelve per cent wanted to

Policy Brief Brief Policy have Crimean Tatar autonomy –

the percentage is close to the share of Crimean Tatars in the population of the peninsula, whereas annexation by Russia was supported by less than one-fourth of the population.

Graph 21. Opinions on the status of Crimea (in %)

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the * The questions was: “If Ukraine was able

- to enter only one international economic union, which entity should it be?”

Source: International Republican Institute, 2013

Yet, as the results of the poll demonstrate, the population of Cri- mea neither felt that Russian speakers were in a disadvantaged situation, nor the majority wanted Source: International Republican Institute, Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, Crimea to change its country alle- 2013 giance. The official motivation be- hind Russia’s military intervention An even more recent opinion poll and the following annexation of Cri- shows that although a rather con- mea was the protection of its Rus- siderable share of the Crimean sian-speaking population, allegedly population would like to see suffering discrimination under Ukraine and Russia join into one Ukrainian rule. However, an opin- state, it is not the majority of the ion poll, conducted in Crimea in population. According to the results May 2013, demonstrates that only of the poll conducted in February six per cent of the population 2014, several weeks before the ref- claims that the status of the Rus- erendum, only 41% believed that sian language was one of the three Russia and Ukraine should unite issues most important to them per- into one state. sonally.

It is likely that Russian media prop- What is more, support for economic aganda has convinced more peo- integration with the Russian-led ple of the threats following the customs union is not tantamount to change of central government in separatist tendencies and the de-

Ukraine, and thus the support for sire to become part of Russia. Brief Policy

separating Crimea from Ukraine and joining Russia has increased. Conclusions Yet, it is hard to believe that Crime- ans have changed their minds en It goes without saying that Ukrain- masse within such a short period of ian society is diverse in terms of time – according to the results of language and culture as well as at- the Crimean referendum presented titudes and opinions regarding the by the Russian side, more than future of their state. However, all 90% voted for joining Russia. explanations based on the divisions according to language prefer- The analysis of the turnout dynam- ences are considerable simplifica-

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

ics during the referendum, the re- tions and do not reflect the real sit- - sults of earlier opinion polls, the uation, but rather impose precon- fact that Russian citizens were al- ceived notions, which are largely lowed to take part in the referen- unfair to Ukrainians and dangerous dum, the boycott of the referendum in terms of the future of the Ukrain- by Crimean Tartars (12-16% of the ian state. Ukrainians may not agree population) and the turnout in some on many issues, yet, Ukrainian so- places exceeded 100%, all point to ciety does not consist of two mono- the fact that the results of the refer- liths or two internally coherent cul- endum have been considerably tural-political communities. There- manipulated. What is more, there fore, the widely-used category of was no space for balanced infor- “Russian speakers” is largely irrel-

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, mation campaign showing pros and evant as an explanation of socio- cons of joining Russia. The referen- political divisions within Ukrainian dum was prepared within three society. weeks during a considerable political crisis in the country with the To sum up: presence of Russian troops in the peninsula. A referendum under the . Both ethnic Russians and barrel of a Kalashnikov can hardly Ukrainians often choose to be called free and fair. speak Russian. Many Ukrain- ian patriots with strongly pro- All in all, the public opinion poll re- western views may speak Rus- sults show that Crimea is not signif- sian at home and in everyday icantly different from the rest of situations. Ukraine and even the territorially . Both Russian- and Ukrainian- modified version of the two speakers were strongly critical Ukraines’ claim is not justified. of the former president Viktor

Yanukovych and the govern- Poles enjoy their rights and ment of the Party of Regions. civil liberties. . The majority of Ukrainians be- . The majority of Ukrainians, ir- lieve that close cooperation respective of the language

Policy Brief Brief Policy with both the European Union they speak or the region they

and Russia is in the interest of live in, do not share separatist their state. Yet, when they sentiments. They do not sup- need to make a single geopo- port either the idea of creating litical choice, the majority pre- two states or separating their fer the European vector of inte- region or oblast from Ukraine gration, irrespective of the lan- and making it independent or guage they speak. joining Russia. . Whereas, when people are . Support for close economic co- forced to make a single choice operation with Russia is not between European integration tantamount to the desire to join

and the Russia-led customs the Russian state in any region

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

- union, regional differences re- of Ukraine. surface. The population in the . Even in Crimea, less than one west and centre prefer the EU quarter of the whole population and the east prefers the Rus- would like to see their region sian model of integration. Pub- join Russia. The majority sup- lic opinion in the south is di- ported the status quo – Crimea vided. being part of Ukraine and hav- . Irrespective of the region of ing an autonomous status. residence or the preferred lan- . The overwhelming majority of guage, the majority of Ukraini- Ukrainians, irrespective of lan- ans would like to live in a dem- guage or region of residence,

ocratic state. consider themselves patriots of Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language, . After several of years of Viktor Ukraine and see Ukraine as Yanukovych’s rule, the major- their motherland. ity of Ukrainians, irrespective of their preferred language, Dr. Joanna Fomina is a sociologist were critical of his presidency in the European Studies Unit of and the government of the the Polish Academy of Sciences Party of Regions. and IPA associate expert. . A decisive majority of Ukraini- ans also have a very positive perception of the situation in Poland. Irrespective of the preferred language or region of residence, Ukrainians believe that the Polish state takes good care of its citizens and

Policy Brief Policy

the Myth of Two Ukraines Two of Myth the

Language, Identity, Politics Politics Identity, Language,

Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung Instytut Spraw Publicznych (ISP) Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 ul. Szpitalna 5 / 22 33311 Gütersloh PL - 00-031 Warszawa Phone +49 5241 81-0 Phone (+48 22) 5564260 Fax +49 5241 81-81999 Fax (+48 22) 5564262 www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de www.isp.org.pl

Gabriele Schöler Dr Agnieszka Łada Senior Project Manager Head of the European Programme Program The Future of Europe Senior Analyst [email protected] [email protected] Phone +49 (0)5241 81 81 205 Phone (+48 22) 5564288