From Terror to Public Diplomacy: Jibril Rajoub and the Palestinian Authorities’ Uses of Sport in Fragmentary Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Middle Eastern Studies

ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

From terror to public diplomacy: Jibril Rajoub and the Palestinian Authorities’ uses of sport in fragmentary Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Yair Galily

To cite this article: Yair Galily (2018) From terror to public diplomacy: Jibril Rajoub and the Palestinian Authorities’ uses of sport in fragmentary Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Middle Eastern Studies, 54:4, 652-664, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2018.1438272 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1438272

Published online: 22 Feb 2018.

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From terror to public diplomacy: Jibril Rajoub and the Palestinian Authorities’ uses of sport in fragmentary Israeli– Palestinian conﬂict

Yair Galily Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel

Modern confrontations are very much clashes of mindsets. Alongside the armed oppositions, battles for public opinion often take place. In the fragmentary struggle between Israelis and Palestinians, sport is becoming a noteworthy battleground for international public opinion. The aim of the current article is to look at the Palesti- nian Authorities’ (PAs) efforts to promote their political agenda using international sports federations. It is argued that political leaders, such as Jibril Rajoub, use the international sporting arena, especially organizations such as the IOC (International Olympic Committee) and FIFA (the Fed eration Internationale de Football Association) as public diplomacy instruments to promote their objectives by attracting public attention to their political agenda. In the case presented here, the Palestinian attempts were not very efficacious, either in raising responsiveness to their political goals or in suspending Israel from FIFA; nonetheless, this case highlights the ways in which conflicts have changed and the importance of images in the modern communication epoch. It is also argued that the case presented here is exceptional. In the past, there have been cases in which international organizations have suspended countries from international sports associations (examples include South Africa during the Apartheid era and Yugoslavia during the third Balkan war); however, the current case showcases a political actor that is directly involved in a conflict and uses the international sports arena to battle its adversary. Accordingly, the paper will conceptually and historically trace the way in which the PA in general, and Jibril Rajoub in particular, have shifted efforts toward the sporting arena in order to promote global awareness of the Palestinian case.1 In reac- tion to their tremendous defeat by the Israel military, Palestinians turned away from the armed struggle and toward civil resistance and defiance. The two uprisings (‘Inti- fadas’), in 1987–1993 and 2000–2005, elicited a broadly sympathetic reception from the international community and were followed by the creation of movements such as the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement in 2005.2 The BDS movement is a campaign, in addition to other activities initiated by the Palestinians in the United Nations (UN), Interpol, and other international and regional organizations, that seeks to put pressure on Israel to adopt its stated aims, which include ‘ending its occupation and colonialization of all Arab lands’, ‘recognizing the fundamental rights

CONTACT Yair Galily [email protected] © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 653 of the Arab–Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality’,and‘respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes’.Themod- ern ideological attacks on Israel began in earnest at the 2001 UN Conference Against Racism in Durban. Driven by non-governmental organizations in the Middle East and throughout the world, and the continuous flow of charges of human rights violations and comparisons of Israel to apartheid South Africa and even to Nazi Germany, the campaign affects the history and national aspirations of the Jewish people, ignores and often denies the legitimate right of Israel to defend itself from terror and carry out the normal functions of a sovereign state. In November 2007, the first Palestinian BDS conference convened in Ramallah and established the BDS National Committee as the Palestinian coordinating body for the international campaign. In his capacities as both chairman of the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) and chairman of the Palestinian Olympic Committee, Rajoub, a well-known political figure and a central actor in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, abandoned his previous posi- tions, which included being a member of the Fatah3 Revolutionary Council (until August 2009) and the deputy secretary of the Fatah Central Committee (2009–2017), national security advisor (NSA) to Yasser Arafat (with rank of brigadier general), and head of the West Bank Preventive Security Forces (1994–2002). In February of 2017, Rajoub was elected as secretary of the Fatah Central Committee. This article will present Rajoub’s understanding of the power of sport as a tool to promote his political agenda and the efforts he has made to use such understanding and opportunities to further promote the Palestinian case, both nationally and internationally.

The battle over public opinion It has been argued frequently that political actors’ image in the international arena plays a significant role in their ability to achieve their goals.4 This understanding had led many leaders and nations, but also political figures, to invest considerable resources into public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, which serves political actors’ attempts to impact their international image, is constituted of the relationship between policy-makers, the media and the public. The media plays a significant role in determining public opinion regarding foreign affairs, and public opinion affects foreign policy-making.5 Therefore, gaining favorable media attention could help political actors achieve public support and attract attention and sympathy. Soft power, as it appears in political actors’ culture and values, is an important aspect in a country’s image creation process in the international arena and in the attraction it projects. Sport, which can be seen as a part of a state’s soft power, can also serve as a public diplomacy tool.6 The aim of the current article is to focus on a less studied fighting zone, which emphasizes the important role the ‘Image War’ plays in today’sconflicts – the battle over political actors’ legitimacy in the international sporting arena. This study examines an attack on a country’s image through sports, the ways in which that country reacts, and the success of both sides in presenting their arguments in the media. The article looks at a four-year period, during which the PFA attempted to suspend Israel from FIFA (on 24 March 2015) and pressure FIFA into taking action against Israel over teams that play in the C Area (also referred as settlements),7 as well as Israel’s response to this move in another round in May 2017. 654 Y. GALILY

Public diplomacy and soft power Dramatic changes in the international relations arena, the communication revolution, globalization and the need to promote one’s policies through public opinion resulted in a new type of diplomacy –‘public diplomacy’. Its practice became substantial during the Cold War, when many campaigns tried to raise public opinion to support nuclear weapon proliferation and ideological struggles around the world. Public diplomacy entered a new phase after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, when the United States could not adequately respond to terrorism by itself and was dependent on the cooperation of other countries.8 Gifford Malone described public diplomacy as the direct communication with foreign publics in order to affect their thinking and eventually impact governments and policies.9 The context in which contemporary international relations take place is not characterized solely by interaction among states. Access to global communications has empowered a wide range of political actors.10 Accordingly, Benno Signitzer and Timothy Coombs expanded the definition of public diplomacy by recognizing new actors in the international relations arena; they referred to public diplomacy as the way in which state actors and NSAs try to directly or indirectly impact public attitudes and opinions, which in turn influences governments’ foreign policies.11 Political actors attempt to promote their preferred messages and frames to the international media in order to create a favorable image. The ability to transmit these frames to the foreign press is highly significant, as information obtained through the media is likely to influence how publics and governments perceive the events, especially in the case of foreign news, where the public has less knowledge and experience.12 Eli Avraham and Eran Ketter argued that the international images of places are important, since they have an impact on people’s decisions about where to live, travel, invest or study, or which country to support during a conflict.13 Public diplomacy scholars have argued that a place’s image affects public opinion, which in turn influences foreign policies toward different political actors.14 There are many elements beyond political actors’ control that can affect their image.15 The technological revolution created a new reality in the ability of political actors to promote their messages; global networks and the Internet have become the main sources of information around the world. The Internet, in particular, has enabled individuals and actors to share information across the globe instantly at a low cost. It also helps to coordi- nate actions, and unite people even when they are located at a great geographical distance. It has improved the ability of NSAs to communicate with the public, including foreign audiences.16 In terms of asymmetric conflicts, this change led to a rebalancing strategy usually used by NSAs, which forces states to adjust to the new age of modern conflict and the digital age.17 Joseph Nye developed the concept of soft power, understanding that a country’s culture plays a part in its image and attraction in the international arena.18 The essence of soft power is its ability to shape different actors’ preferences, influence decision-making and thus affect policies. This ability derives from the intangible assets of an actor, such as its culture, political values, institutions, legitimate policy, and moral authority. Soft power is more than just persuasion or the capability to change one’s opinions (since preaching is not necessarily the best way to convert public opinion); it is also the ability to attract other MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 655 political actors and achieve sympathy – an attractive image encourages other actors to become closer and collaborate. Attraction was found to have a greater impact than coer- cion or constraint. In times when the policies of one actor are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, its soft power is strengthened.19

Sport as an apparatus of soft power National and international sporting events can contribute to the domestic and international image of a state through their potential to unify, create national identity and pride, encourage foreign investments and increase tourism. Sport enables countries to compete with each other and gain international prestige by means other than military force or eco- nomic power. For most countries, national identity evolves naturally over time, based largely on a shared language, history and cultural touchstones. As Jonathan Grix and Bar- rie Houlihan assert – and see also Tamir Sorek, Karl Jaksa and Haggai Harrif – sport, as a cultural phenomenon can be employed by governments in the pursuit of both domestic and international policy objectives. Domestically, states have used sport to bind individuals around collective, national experiences of sporting success and engender both a ‘feel- good factor’ and a cohesive identity akin to Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’.20 Indeed, sport increasingly crosses cultural and political boundaries in a way that few other activities can. Many nations around the world use sport as a vehicle to bring the country together (the UK, Germany, Israel, South Africa, Qatar, to name just a few – but also China and Russia, as will be argued later). For many nations, sports are a major component of national identity. Often, these countries are defined as much by their sporting pastimes as they are by their politics, economy and geography. National sports act as a common thread, woven through society to connect citizens to one another. Such sports differ from nation to nation; in Canada, hockey is dominant. New Zealanders relish rugby, while India’s most widely followed sport is cricket. In China, table tennis is a significant part of the national fabric. American football fervor is ubiquitous in the United States, and, while soccer is prevalent worldwide, every nation exhibits its own distinct iteration of the game.21 As stated, soft power enables political actors to be perceived as attractive in the international arena. Sport can be considered as a soft-power tool, since it can highlight a country’s culture and values and influence the ways it is perceived by publics around the world.22 Hence, sport has become a foreign policy tool; it can be seen as part of the soft- power strategy of political actors. In that regard, a growing number of scholars have recently documented Qatar’s engrossment with global sport and its efforts to gain global recognition via sport. Note- worthy works from the last period include Mahfud Amara’s study of political discourses surrounding Qatar’s hosting of the 2006 Asian Games;23 Campbellon Qatar and the importing and naturalization of foreign athletes;24 Dorsey’s studies of national, regional, and global politics and policy with regard to Qatar;25 and Brannagan and Giulianotti’s noteworthy work on soft power and soft disempowerment in Qatar’s preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals.26 Other authors have recently examined how investing in sporting success is used as a domestic and foreign policy tool.27 At the same time, however, states might occasionally create, or enlarge, a negative global image by hosting sporting events; in those cases, soft-power strategy can have a 656 Y. GALILY negative effect on that country’s image. China and Russia have tried to promote their images by hosting the Olympic Games, even though the international media often con- centrated on those countries’ misdeeds during the preparation and throughout the games.28 During the 2008 Summer Olympic games in China, the international media heavily covered protesters marching with demands to free Tibet, as well as allegations of environmental organizations regarding air pollution around the city of Beijing and the area.29 While Russia was hosting the 2014 Olympic Winter Games, President Putin linked gay people to pedophilia. Two days before the start of the games, gay rights activists held rallies against the Russian government in 19 cities around the world, which attracted a great deal of international coverage and foiled the Russians’ efforts to enhance their image.

Trying to score: Palestinians, Israel and FIFA Of all the senior members of the PA, Jibril Rajoub, who serves as head of the Supreme Council for Sport and Youth Affairs, as well as the president of the PFA and as Palestinian Olympic Committee president, has been singled out by Israel as a bitter enemy. Ever since his appointment to this position in 2010, Rajoub has launched a persistent political struggle against Israel at international sporting institutions. The 2008 campaign that resulted in the Palestinian national team being allowed to play a home game in the West Bank, after FIFA insisted it was too dangerous, was a noteworthy accomplishment. This achievement was almost entirely attributable to Rajoub, who had to convince FIFA, one of the only international bodies to recognize Palestine’s existence, that it was safe to host an international side. Just a year earlier, in 2007, FIFA forced the Palestinians to forfeit a World Cup qualifier to Singapore because it had failed to assemble a full team after Israel denied permits to 18 players and officials from Gaza. Palestinian players need Israeli permits for most travel, either to cross Israel from Gaza or to enter or leave the West Bank, an obstacle that Rajoub claims has often kept players from key matches. For many, Rajoub has again moved from being a dialogue partner to being a dangerous provocateur.30 Rajoub was sentenced to life in prison in Israel in 1970 for throwing a grenade at an Israeli army truck. He was released in the Jibril Agreement, a deal between the Israeli government and the terrorist organization the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by Ahmed Jibril. On 21 May 1985, Israel released 1150 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for three Israeli soldiers who had been taken hostage by the PFLP. In 1994, Rajoub was allowed to return to the West Bank following the signing of the Oslo Accords. He served as head of the Preventive Security Force until 2002 and Yasser Arafat appointed him as his NSA in 2003. During his term, he was accused of using force to quash political dissent and harass political opponents of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian National Authority, including with the use of torture.31 However, according to Shlomi Eldar, Rajoub was a welcome guest in Israel.32 He would hold working meetings with defense ministers, senior Israel Defense Forces and Israel Security Agency officials. He was also the bearer of a VIP card that awarded him free passage at border crossings. He was invited to peace-related conferences and conventions and was a favorite inter- viewee with the Israeli media since he was considered to be the best and most authorita- tive Palestinian public diplomacy representative. His acquaintances in Israel are divided over the question of whether bombing his headquarters in Beitunia, a small town in the MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 657

West Bank west of Ramallah, during the second intifada in 2000 is what brought about the change in his mindset, or whether this is an issue of internal strategic political struggles ahead of the succession battle over PA leadership in the post-President Mahmoud Abbas era. Either way, Rajoub, who, from 2015 to 2017, has been fighting for his political survival within the Palestinian leadership, was a member of the Geneva Initiative delegation, has become persona non grata in Israel. His VIP card has been withdrawn. A highly charged struggle rife with bitterness and suspicion has ensued between Rajoub and Israel’s political establishment. On 24 March 2015, the PFA submitted a formal request to suspend the Israeli Football Association (IFA) from FIFA. This request came after numerous events and attempts during the past few years to deal with the complex relations between the Palestinian and Israeli federations. Earlier, during the 2013 FIFA Congress, Rajoub, who was then also a member of the Central Committee of the West Bank’s ruling Fatah party, requested to discuss issues concerning the football situation in the PA. Rajoub dedicated his speech to the difficulty of free movement of Palestinian football players and recommended sanctioning those who do not comply with FIFA’s Statutes.33 As a result, FIFA established a task force led by FIFA’s former president, Joseph S. Blatter. The outcome of the task force meetings, held in Sep- tember 2013, was that the IFA and the PFA agreed on certain parameters that would facili- tate the movement of players, officials, and equipment into, out of, and within the PA. Those parameters were approved by the FIFA Executive Committee during its October 2013 meeting.34 During the 2014 FIFA Congress, it was proposed that an independent individual or committee be appointed to monitor the progress made and to submit a report to the Executive Committee in December 2014. Both Israelis and Palestinians accepted the proposal. While accepting the congress proposal, Rajoub had raised more allegations against Israel:

Although the PFA had accepted the established arrangements for the sake of goodwill and had fully cooperated with all parties involved, unfortunately the mechanism had produced no real change on the ground due to the timid stance assumed by the IFA against racism and dis- crimination in areas under its jurisdiction.35 Rajoub also noted a number of instances in which players from the PA and other countries had been denied permission to travel to tournaments in and out of the PA. He also pro- claimed that, in the previous months, Palestinian players had been injured, arrested and even killed by Israeli forces.36 In June 2014, Costakis Koutsokoumnis, president of the Cyprus Football Association, was appointed as an observer for the implementation of Circular 1385 (which sets out the parameters concerning the movement of players and ofﬁcials into, out of and within Pal- estine). Koutsokoumnis had visited Israel and the PA three times prior to submitting his report, in December 2014. The report expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved, while emphasizing that the ultimate objective was full implementation of the circular. The Executive Committee decided to invite other Israeli and Palestinian bodies involved in approving movement requests to take part in a working group alongside the PFA, IFA and FIFA, in order to ensure full implementation of the mentioned circular. 658 Y. GALILY

On 24 March 2015, a week after the Israeli elections and two months before the FIFA 2015 annual congress, the PFA submitted a formal request to suspend IFA from all international football games. The PFA request included the following accusations: (1) Israel was restricting the movement of players and equipment into and out of the Palestinian territo- ries; (2) the IFA was discriminating on racial bases; and (3) six Israeli clubs were playing on occupied Palestinian territory. In response, and as part of its attempt to remove the Palestinian request from FIFA’s agenda, the IFA claimed that the conflict between Israel and the PA is political and that PFA attempts to blend politics and sport contradict FIFA’s policy. Further- more, the IFA did not violate any of FIFA’s statutes and had cooperated and would continue cooperating with each FIFA initiative in the matter of movement of Palesti- nian athletes. As evidence, Koutsokoumnis’s report did not criticize IFA and it con- cluded that IFA had done everything within its power to provide movement of Palestinian athletes and equipment. In addition, like other football associations around the world, IFA was unable to address political and security issues. The government of Israel, the military and other Israeli authorities had greatly improved the issue of the movement of Palestinian athletes, and the few incidents of refusal were the result of security matters. The IFA emphasized that the game of football needs to connect people rather than divide them, and that the sports world had understood that boycotts are not the solution, and had avoided it for decades. According to Koutsokoumnis, the IFA has fought to end racism and to bring Jews and Arabs together. The IFA’s various offers to hold friendly matches between Palestinian and Israeli groups, among all ages, were denied by the Palestinians. Israel’s efforts to counter this Palestinian attempt to remove the Palestinian request from FIFA’s agenda, were aimed at various arenas. On the international/political aspects, the Israelis had worked to raise support among different foreign affairs offices, Olympic committees and football associations worldwide. The IFA established a forum composed of famous Israeli athletes and world-renowned Jews who have used their personal and professional networks in order to influence the federation’s presidents. The IFA conducted meetings with officials from FIFA and UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) in an attempt to affect the decision-makers on the matter at hand. On the legal aspects, the IFA had tried to lead to a procedural pre- vention of the request during the Congress,atthesametimeaspreparingthelegal basis in order to appeal in case the request achieved majority support. To intensify the campaign, and to attract international attention, the IFA used local and foreign media, sports channels and general news outlets, and social networks, and initiated campaigns by Jewish communities around the world while trying to present the Israeli arguments. Following days of negotiations and discussions between the delegations and political echelons, the PFA decided to withdraw its proposal at the last minute during the FIFA 2015 congress in Zurich. An international committee was established in order to examine the Palestinian claims. As well as presenting this unique case study, in which a political actor used the sporting arena in an attempt to gain attention for its political claims, this article also seeks to examine the success of the Palestinians in harming Israel’s image in the international arena, and the success of the Israelis in preventing it. MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 659

In 2015, former South African minister Tokyo Sexwale was appointed head of the monitoring committee responsible for addressing a number of Palestinian complaints, including issues over freedom of movement for football players and the Israeli football teams based in settlements. Palestinian leaders demanded that the Israeli federation be suspended from world football unless it ordered the six teams – Beitar Ironi, Beitar Ironi Ariel, Beitar Givat Zeev, Beitar Maaleh Adomim, Hapoel Oranit and Hapoel Bikat Hayarden – to be relocated. The PFA argued that the presence of six Israeli football clubs playing inside settlements in the occupied West Bank, which are considered illegal under international law, is also in breach of FIFA statutes. Israel argued that FIFA rules are unenforceable as there is no permanent border. In a report published in September 2016, Human Rights Watch stated that ‘by allowing the IFA to hold matches inside settlements, FIFA is engaging in business activity that sup- ports Israeli settlements, contrary to the human rights commitments it recently affirmed’.37 The Israeli government has argued that the settlements in question were built in Area C of the occupied West Bank, where Israel has full security and administrative control under the Oslo Accords, and should not be deemed illegal. However, the UN Security Council passed a resolution in December 2016 that reaf- firmed the illegitimacy of the settlements on occupied Palestinian land. Sexwale met heads of both the Palestinian (Rajoub) and Israeli (Ofer Eini) federations in Zurich in March 2017, but no agreement was reached. Sexwale offered three possible options for solving the ongoing disagreement: first, discussions should be encouraged between the IFA and the PFA; second, FIFA warns the IFA; and third, retaining the current state of play and giving the Israeli federation the chance to remedy the situation involving the six clubs. Rajoub and the PA believed none of the three options met Palestinian prospects.38

The aftermath: 2017 FIFA Congress in Bahrain ‘This is a new FIFA. We are new people here, we act with facts not with words. Facts and actions speak louder than words…But what matters in the end is the decision taken and implemented.’ With these words, FIFA’s newly elected president, Gianni Infantino, inaugurated the football organization’s67thCongressinBahrain.Duringa melodramatic session of the congress, streamed online, Infantino also obstructed a vote on a separate Palestinian proposal to force Israel to exclude the settlement teams. Palestinians subsequently wanted to take FIFA to court over Infantino’sblock- ing maneuver. The statement read: ‘Following the report by chairman of the Monitor- ing Committee Israel-Palestine, Tokyo Sexwale, the FIFA Council considered that at this stage it is premature for the FIFA Congress to take any decision.’ The confronta- tion in Bahrain followed extraordinary political negotiations within FIFA by Israel in the days leading up to the congress. This included a phone call to Infantino by the Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, the lobbying of FIFA council members by Israeli diplomats, and even alleged pressure via the White House. All of this proved successful in again postponing any FIFA action on Israel.39 IFA President Ofer Eini said, ‘Intense, smart and productive work that was carried out over long months and peaked in the last few days has paid off and the Palestinian attempt to embarrass Israel and take actual steps against it was unsuccessful.’40 660 Y. GALILY

Meanwhile, on national grounds Over the years, political leaders have used sports as an instrument to unify a nation and to provide the people with a sense of nationalistic pride. The case of Palestine in that regard is no different. However, in the case of the Palestinians, the picture is more complicated. While fighting the battle on international sporting soil, the intranational rhetoric is different and raises serious concerns over whether values of friendship and honor, let alone sportsmanship, are at all part of the debate. The fact that most, if not all, rhetoric is in Ara- bic makes it difficult to follow the oratory, although using the international press and agencies can help see a broader picture. By looking at a few examples, one can appreciate how the PA is addressing one of the darkest moments of Olympic history. The glorification of the massacre by Palestinian terrorists of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, made with reference to Amin al-Hindi, a leader of the Black September terror organization that was behind the attack, was praised by al-Hayat al-Jadida on 20 August 2010:

Everyone knows that Amin al-Hindi was one of the stars who sparkled at one of the stormiest points on the international level – the operation that was carried out at the [Olympics] sports stadium in Munich, Germany, in 1972. That was just one of many shining stations.41 Another example of the PA and Fatah naming sporting events after terrorists occurred on 26 September 2013 when the independent Palestinian news agency Maʿan announced a table tennis tournament sponsored by Jibril Rajoub and named after Dalal Mughrabi. Mughrabi had led the most lethal terror attack in Israel’s history, known as the Coastal Road massacre, in 1978, when she and other Fatah terrorists hijacked a bus on Israel’s Coastal Highway, killing 37 civilians, 12 of them children, and wounding over 70. Maʿan wrote:

The Beit Iba Youth Sports Club ﬁnished its preparations for hosting The Martyr (Shahida) Dalal Mughrabi Women’s Table Tennis Tournament … The tournament that will be sponsored by Chairman of the Olympic Committee Jibril Rajoub and by the Palestinian Table Tennis Associa- tion … The tournament is intended for three groups: Women, young women and girls.42 Rajoub did not just glorify terrorists by naming sporting tournaments and events in their honor; he also prohibited peace-building sports activities between Palestinians and Isra- elis, actively countering the spirit of FIFA and the Olympics as set forth in their mission statement. For example, following the 2014 Gaza Warfare, Rajoub condemned a successful peace-building event between Israeli and Palestinian youth sponsored by the Peres Cen- ter for Peace as a ‘crime against humanity’. On his ofﬁcial Facebook page, on 6 September 2014, he stated, ‘I demand that all individuals and institutions distance themselves from such activities, especially because their recurrence would arouse disgust and aversion toward all members of the [Palestinian] sports community.’ Similarly, he addressed the issue previously on PA television, stating:

Fascists can learn a lesson from this state [of Israel]. This government – there is none more brazen in human history … We’ll suspend their [FIFA] membership and this way we’ll screw them … I won’t agree to any joint game between Arabs and Israel.43 Over the years, Palestinian Media Watch, an Israeli research institute that studies Palesti- nian society from a broad range of perspectives by monitoring and analyzing the PA MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 661 through its media, has documented hundreds of cases of honoring, justifying and glorify- ing terrorism through sporting events. Their 2017 report shows that Rajoub has not just glorified Palestinian ‘martyrs’ (suicide bombers or gunmen killed during attacks on Isra- elis), but has done so explicitly in his capacity as an Olympic official.44 The objective of Olympism, declared the Olympic Charter, ‘is to place sport at the service of the harmoni- ous development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity’. These last few examples show that the PA and Rajoub not only fight on the international sporting arena, but also on local grounds. The conflict between the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, resulted in the split of the PA in 2007 and led Rajoub to address the issue frequently. Keeping in mind that he has not abandoned his military agenda while dealing with sport, he addressed the PA television on 30 September 2014, stating:

The weapon of the Resistance, Brother [Hamas], your weapon, the weapon of the Resistance, is sacred to us. We will not harm it, go after it, or keep track of it. But could you store it away? At the moment of truth, we will all enlist together, we will all ﬁght together.

Conclusion As a recent study carried out by Reut Ber and Moran Yarchi together with me suggests, the Palestinians only had limited success in raising attention to their 2015 claims against Israel through the attempt to suspend Israel from FIFA – the issue did not receive extensive coverage by the foreign press (only 36 articles were found in the six newspapers examined for this study over a period of about three-and-a-half months), and the coverage was only slightly pro-Palestinian (almost neutral) in terms of the ability of both sides to present their arguments in the coverage.45 The findings suggest that in terms of receiving international attention on one hand, and creating greater empathy toward the Palestinian people through raising their claims against Israel on the other, a political attack through the sports arena (or, more specifically, FIFA) was not found to be very successful for the Palestinians. While the 2017 round discussed here showed a similar outcome, the (sporting) fights are far from over. At the same time, it is possible that the Palestinians had other goals rather than raising international awareness, and may have been more successful in those arenas. Public diplomacy scholars claim that, in some cases, political actors engage with international publics and try to use the advantages of public diplomacy in an attempt to impress their domestic audiences by showing their own public they are working hard on promoting their political goals in the international arena.46 It is possible that part of the goals of the Palestinian leadership in their attempt to suspend Israel from FIFA was to prove to their own people that they are doing everything they can to promote the Palestinian cause in the international arena. Indeed, as Jon Dart recently pointed out, athletes have shown support for the Palesti- nians, including footballer Christian Ronaldo by wearing a Palestinian scarf, Joey Barton tweeting his criticism of the Gaza bombing, and English cricketer Moeen Ali wearing a pro-Palestine wristband.47 The most visible expression of sport-related support for Palesti- nians was instigated by Freddie Kanoute in response to Israel hosting a UEFA tournament in 2013. Securing backing from a number of high-profile footballers, many signees later withdrew their support; this situation seems to support Roger Walters, from the band Pink Floyd, who claimed many individuals are reluctant to publicly criticize Israeli policy for fear of being labeled anti-Semitic.48 662 Y. GALILY

In the current case, it appears that the power of traditional diplomacy had played a more salient role – through more traditional means (such as informal talks), Israel was able to raise the support of FIFA’sofficials. If so, although we tend to place great importance on the role of public diplomacy in our digital age, the current case study shows that traditional diplomacy still plays a crucial role in international relations. As Christina Neu- mayer and Jacob Svensson asserted, social media and digital activism is being increasingly used by the Israeli government to distribute pro-Israel materials, with its ‘public diplomacy’ efforts training activists and leading a coordinated response to BDS activity.49 Another possible explanation, rather than Israel’s traditional diplomacy efforts, could be the nature of FIFA; as an organization, FIFA declares it does not deals with politics, but rather uses sports to unite people. This policy may lead FIFA officials to find a different solution to the Palestinian claims raised by the PFA, and avoid voting on the suspension of Israel from the organization. In the current case study, the Palestinians were not successful at raising awareness to their political goals or in suspending Israel from FIFA. However, their attempt emphasizes the ways in which conflicts have changed and the importance of images in the information age we live in. Conflicts today are very much battles of ideas and the information designed by the media. Alongside the military confrontations, an Image War is taking place in which each side tries to justifies its ideas, beliefs and actions.50 Studying different areas, such as sports, that political actors use in their attempt to promote their narrative and fight their adversaries in the international arena can help us to gain a better understanding of the Image War. Future studies will look at other arenas in which this battle of ideas is taking place.

Disclosure statement No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Noticeably, this isn’t the ﬁrst time the Palestinian tried to raise global awareness. The attack by the terror group, Black September, at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, ended in the massacre of 11 Israeli national team members and one German police ofﬁcer. This event had enough ‘meat on the bone’ to receive 16 hours of live television coverage, which allowed Black Septem- ber to auspiciously transmit news of the event to a wide audience by merely using the Munich Olympic Games as their ‘stage’ to carry out an attack of terror. 2. A. B. Bakan and Y. Abu-Laban, ‘Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign’, Race & Class Vol.51, no. 1 (2009), pp.29–54; J. Dart, ‘Showing Israel the Red Card. Activists Engaged in pro-Palestinian Sport-Related Campaigns’, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics Vol.9, no. 3 (2017), pp.521–39. 3. Formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. 4. M. Kunczik, Transnational Public Relations by Foreign Governments in The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2003), pp.399–424; J. S. Nye Jr. and W. A. Owens. ‘America’s Information Edge’, Foreign Affairs Vol.75 (1996), pp.20–36; J. Wang, ‘Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited’, Public Relations Review Vol.32, no. 2 (2006), pp.91–96. 5. S. N. Soroka, ‘Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy’, Harvard International Journal of Press/ Politics Vol.8, no. 1 (2003) pp.27–48. MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 663

6. Y. Galily, M. Yarchi, T. Samuel-Azran, and Rona Cohen, ‘Friend or Foe? Perceptions of Qatar in the Israeli Online General and Sports Press’, Journal of Intercultural Communication Research Vol.45, no. 5 (2016), pp.437–48. See also D. Reiche, ‘Investing in Sporting Success as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Qatar’, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics Vol.7, no. 4 (2015), pp.489–504; T. Samuel-Azran, M. Yarchi, Y. Galily, and I. Tamir, ‘Promoting Terror or Sport? The Case of Qatar’s International Image’, American Behavioral Scientist Vol.60, no. 9 (2016) pp.1101–15. 7. Settlements are communities established by Israel on land occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War. Under the 1993 Israel–Palestinian Oslo peace accords, the issue of settlements was to be deferred until final status talks – a reason why Israel objects to pre-conditions and UN resolu- tions on the matter. 8. J. Nye, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 9. G. D. Malone, ‘Managing Public Diplomacy’, The Washington Quarterly Vol.8, no. 3 (1985). 10. C. Archetti, ‘Journalism in the Age of Global Media: The Evolving Practices of Foreign Corre- spondents in London’, Journalism Vol.14, no. 3 (2013), pp.419–36. 11. B. H. Signitzer and T. Coombs, ‘Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences’, Public Relations Review Vol.18, no. 2 (1992), pp.137–47. 12. G. Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1997). 13. E. Avraham and E. Ketter. ‘Will We Be Safe There? Analysing Strategies for Altering Unsafe Place Images’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy Vol.4 , no. 3 (2008), pp.196–204. 14. Malone, 1985; see also E. Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol.616, no. 1 (2008), pp.55–77. 15. Avraham and Ketter, 2008. 16. Gilboa, 2008; see also G. Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena. The New Challenges (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace [USIP] Press, 2006). 17. A. Ayalon, E. Popovich, and M. Yarchi, ‘From Warfare to Imagefare: How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts with Extensive Media Coverage’, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol.28, no. 2 (2016), pp.254–73. 18. J. S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 19. R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs Vol.77, no. 5 (1998), pp.81–94. 20. J. Grix and B. Houlihan, ‘Sports Mega-events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012)’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol.16.4 (2014), pp.572–96. See also on the Israeli case the work by T. Sorek, ‘Arab Football in Israel as an “Integrative Enclave”’, Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol.26.3 (2003), pp.422–50. And H. Harif, ‘“It is important that we beat the Gentiles”: The National Significance of Israel’s Soccer Matches Against the USSR, Summer 1956’, Sport in Society Vol.12.8 (2009), pp.1038–53. 21. K. L. Jaksa, ‘Sports and Collective Identity: The Effects of Athletics on National Unity’, SAIS Review of International Affairs Vol.31.1 (2011), pp.39–41. 22. Reiche, 2015. 23. M. Amara, ‘2006 Qatar Asian Games: A “Modernization” Project from Above?’, Sport in Society Vol.8, no. 3 (2005) pp.493–514. 24. R. Campbell, ‘Staging Globalization for National Projects: Global Sport Markets and Elite Athletic Transnational Labour in Qatar’, International Review for the Sociology of Sport Vol.46, no. 1 (2011), pp.45–60. 25. J. M. Dorsey, ‘Qatar 2022 – a Mixed Blessing’, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog (2013). http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.co.il/2011/07/, last retrieved 10 July 2017. 26. P. M. Brannagan and R. Giulianotti, ‘Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: Qatar, Global Sport and Football’s 2022 World Cup Finals’, Leisure Studies Vol.34, no. 6 (2015), pp.703–19. 27. Reich, 2015; Samuel-Azran et al., 2016; Galily et al. 2016. 28. Samuel-Azran et al., 2016. 29. W. Manzenreiter, ‘The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues Vol.34, no. 1 (2010), pp.29–48. 664 Y. GALILY

30. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/israel-palestine-soccer-rajoub-provocation- players-entry.html. 31. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1881756.stm. 32. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/israel-palestine-soccer-rajoub-interview- suspension-fifa.html. 33. 63rd FIFA Congress, 2013, p. 41. 34. FIFA Circular no.1385, 2013. 35. Circular no.1385. 36. 64th FIFA Congress, 2014, p. 23. 37. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/25/israel/palestine-fifa-sponsoring-games-seized-land. 38. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/fifa-delays-stand-israeli-settlement-football-teams- 170510040009344.html. 39. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/fifa-has-three-options-deal-israeli-settlement-clubs- only-one-legitimate-821972348. 40. http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/world-news/the-israeli-connection/win-for-israel-in-fifa- anti-israeli-resolution-rejected-by-congress-28401. 41. Official PA daily, al-Hayat al-Jadida, 20 Aug. 2010. 42. http://www.fbioyf.unr.edu.ar/evirtual/blog/index.php?entryid=61923. 43. Rajoub on Official PA TV, 1 July 2013. 44. http://www.palwatch.org/STORAGE/special%20reports/ The%20Rajoub%20File,%20Special%20Report%20for%20FIFA.pdf. 45. R. Ber, M. Yarchi and Y. Galily, ‘The Sporting Arena as a Public Diplomacy Battlefield: The Palesti- nian Attempt to Suspend Israel from FIFA’, The International Journal of Communication Vol.23, no. 2 (2017), pp.218–30. 46. See, for example, N. J. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons for its Future from its Past’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy Vol.6, no. 1 (2010), pp.11–17. 47. J. Dart, ‘Israel and a Sports Boycott: Antisemitic? Anti-Zionist?’, International Review for the Sociol- ogy of Sport Vol.52.2 (2017), pp.164–88. 48. P. Gallagher, ‘Roger Waters: Pink Floyd Star on Why His Fellow Musicians Are Terrified to Speak Out Against Israel’, The Independent, 19 February 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ people/roger-waters-pink-floyd-israel-boycott-ban-palestine-a6884971.html, retrieved 17 May 2017. 49. L. Grave-Lazi, 2016. ‘Training Activists in the Social Media War Against BDS’, The Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Training-activists-in-the-social-media-war-against- BDS-459329, retrieved 17 May 2017. 50. S. van Evera, ‘Assessing US Strategy in the War on Terror’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol.607, no. 1 (2006), pp.10–26.