Program: MSc Crisis and Security Management Student: Sara Zolak Student Number: S1623818 Date: January 13th, 2019 Subject: Antisemitism, and the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands Word Count: 23.998 (Excluding references, bibliography, and footnotes) Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Myriam Benraad Second Reader: Dr. Joery Matthys

“All political thinking for years past has been vitiated in the same way. People can foresee the future only when it coincides with their own wishes, and the most grossly obvious facts can be ignored when they are unwelcome.” George Orwell

ACKNOWLEGEMENT

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Myriam Benraad. Thank you so much for your calm guidance and intelligent recommendations. Dr. Joery Matthys, thank you for your comments, and for being the second reader. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Alex P. Schmid for introducing me to the topic of antisemitism as a research subject. It has changed my perspective in many respects. It is something hard to let go now.

Furthermore, I would like to express my appreciation to both the Orthodox and Liberal Jewish Community in Rotterdam, and especially to Chawa and Albert – thank you for your time and cooperation. Paul van der Bas, you were very kind and helpful – thanks.

My special gratitude goes to my dear mother Andrée Louise. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to study, and for giving me all that you never have had.

~ Thank you

In remembrance of Mireille Knoll …

1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 2 1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ...... 6 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 6 1.3 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH ...... 6 1.4 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 9 1.5 READING GUIDE ...... 13

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 14 2.1 ANTISEMITISM ...... 14 2.2 ISLAMISM ...... 18 2.2.1 DA’WA: THE CALL FOR ISLAM IN THE NETHERLANDS ...... 21 2.3 ISLAMISM AND ANTISEMITISM ...... 24 2.3.1 SCHOLARLY DEBATE ...... 25 2.3.2 ISLAMIZED ANTISEMITISM ...... 33

3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ...... 36 3.1 THE FIRST PHASE: ANTISEMITISM AND STATISTICS ...... 37 3.1.1 FINDINGS ...... 38 3.2 THE SECOND PHASE: JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN ROTTERDAM ...... 41 3.2.1 FINDINGS ...... 42 3.3 THE THIRD PHASE: INFLUENCE OF ISLAMISTS ...... 44 3.3.1 OPERATIONALIZATION ...... 44

4 ANALYSIS: ISLAMISTS IN ROTTERDAM ...... 46 4.1 DATA GATHERING ...... 57 4.2 OPERATIONALIZATION ...... 58

5 INTERVIEW FINDINGS ...... 61 5.1 RELIGIOUS PRACTICES ...... 61 5.2 PERSPECTIVES ON DUTCH SOCIETY AND THE WEST ...... 62 5.3 THE MEDIA ...... 63 5.4 PALESTINE AND ISRAEL ...... 66 5.5 ZIONISM ...... 69 5.6 US GOVERNMENT ...... 70 5.7 HOLOCAUST ...... 72 5.8 SOURCES ...... 72

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ...... 74 6.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS ...... 74 6.2 CONCLUSION ...... 78 6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 79

7 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 81

8 APPENDIX A ...... 114

1 1 Introduction and Research Question

Since the year 2000 there is a clear rise of antisemitism, not only worldwide, but also in Western European states. Although, antisemitism is as normal in everyday life in the Middle East –today this, what Bassam Tibi (2010a) calls a Genocidal phenomenon, is (re)entering through the Muslim diaspora and is becoming more prominent in Western Europe as well. Radical Muslims are a recent group of perpetrators of antisemitic terrorist attacks in Europe. They justify their acts on religious grounds (Wistrich, 2002; Tibi, 2010). More often we hear of brutal Islamists antisemitic violence. In March 2018, Mireille Knoll, an 85-year-old Holocaust survivor was brutally murdered in her home in Paris by her 28-year old neighbor who she had known her whole life. Sadly, these kinds of threats against Jews are apparent all across Europe, in France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and also in the Netherlands (Ariel, 2018; BBC, 2015; Chazan, 2018; Derksen, 2018; Mamou, 2018). As a result of the Brussels Jewish Museum attack in 2014, more severe security measures are undertaken to protect Jewish institutions and religious places in the Netherlands. For example, the Anne Frank House and the Jewish Historical Museum in Amsterdam are under permanent protection - but also Jewish schools and Synagogues (van Weezel & Broer, 2014). In a short period of time, three assaults were carried out against the same Jewish restaurant in Amsterdam. Subsequently political parties initiated The Jewish Accord,1 in order to combat antisemitism, and to take action for the safety of Jews living in Amsterdam (NOS, 2018; Derksen, 2018). According to archives and historical literature the first Jews arrived in the port cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Middelburg) of the Netherlands in the late 16th century. The first Jewish community was registered in 1602 in Amsterdam (Joodserfgoed Rotterdam, 2016). In the beginning of the 18th century this became the largest Jewish community in Western Europe. Due to the French Enlightenment at the end of the 18th century it became possible for Jews to integrate socially and politically in Dutch society – at 2 September 1796, the National Assembly of the Batavian Republic decided unanimously a decree that provided Jews with equal rights. In the same year the exclusion of Guilds membership was reversed. These changes provided

1 One of the few parties that did not sign the accord was Islamic party Denk.

2 many new chances and possibilities. Accordingly, Jews obtained prominent position in political and social life (Visser, 1996; CIDI, 2010). In September 1939 the Second World War started. The following year, on the 10th of May in 1940, Germany invaded the Netherlands. Four days later, Rotterdam was bombed and destroyed, which resulted in the capitulation of the Netherlands. The occupation of Nazi Germany ended at the 5th of May in 1945. The armed resistance was only small during these five years of occupation, and a relative large number of Dutch men had joined the Germans on the Eastern front (CIDI, 2010). Large-scale deportations started in 1942, the first on the 14th of July. From then on, Jews were systematically transported via Camp Westerbork. Most were sent to Auschwitz, others to Sobibor, Bergen Belsen, or Theresienstadt (Joodserfgoed Rotterdam, n.d.). The Dutch police was involved in the razzia on Jews (CIDI, 2010). With the last deportation in September 1944, a total number of 102 deportations were carried out. Approximately 107.000 Jews were deported and only 5.200 of them had survived the War (NIOD, n.d.). Between 1940 and 1945 Dutch Jews were obligated to hand in all their valuables to the Liro,2 which was a bank located in the Sarphatistraat in Amsterdam. The Liro was authorized to “manage” Jewish assets (Onderzoeksgids Oorlogsgetroffenen WO2, n.d.). In practice, Jewish assets were stolen. Additionally, Dutch Jews paid their own train tickets to the concentration camps, as well as the gas that killed them in the gas chambers of the extermination centers (Lipschits, 2001). The Dutch Railways (NS) made approximately two and half million euros from the transport of Jews3 (Historiek, n.d.). Moreover, after the War, the Holocaust Survivors were generally not warmly welcomed. In Amsterdam they were not allowed to return to their homes (Damen & Pen, 2015). Stateless Jews were refused at the borders, and some were even detained in Camp Westerbork. Due to the failing of the post-war right of restorations, many survivors never retrieved their material belongings. However, they did have to pay back taxes. As a result, and with collusion of the Dutch government, over 45 billion euros was stolen from Jews during and after the war.4 Additionally, Jewish parents who had survived the war had to fight for their temporarily abandoned children. Only after long struggles were Jewish Orphans able to return to the Jewish community - this is known as the Jewish child robbery (Koops,

2 Short for Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co 3 Today’s value 4 Contemporary value

3 2017). The Dutch historian Isaac Lipschitz called the post-war period a “little shoah,”5 the horrific experiences of the Jews were downplayed, and their reentering into Dutch society was hard. After the war, antisemitism in word and writing was more violent than it had been before 1940 (Lipschits, 2001). A 2017 report of Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel (CIDI), argues that even today Jews are significantly overrepresented as victims of discrimination (Mestrum & Bas, 2018). Many Jews are concerned with antisemitism, especially by Dutch individuals with a migrant background. Around 90% argued that the government should do more to combat antisemitism, and to bare hate-speakers from speaking in public. Nearly 40% said that they not always dare to tell to be Jewish (Jager & Waterman, 2017). Not only violent attacks are a security issue, antisemitic rhetoric also flourishes in the Netherlands (Mestrum & Bas, 2018). Slogans such as: “Khaybar Khaybar, ya yahud, Jaish Muhammad, sa yahud”6 in combination with Hamas and Hezbollah support during pro-Palestine or anti-Israel demonstrations are not uncommon (Het Parool, 2009; EAIG, 2013; Hoogwerf, 2017; Marije, 2017). Antisemitic speeches “disguised as criticism of Israel,” but also plain antisemitic rhetoric is regularly provided a podium. For example, in 2017 in debating center De Nieuwe Liefde in Amsterdam. Dyab Abou Jahjah7 was invited as a speaker. He concluded in regard to legitimate forms of resistance against Israel: “throwing all Jews into the sea, as we wanted to do in the Arab world in the 1940s, is not feasible”8 (WNL, 2017). Another example is Rapper Appa,9 who has many (mainly young) followers, and is regularly invited to speak in public. During a protest speech on the Dam in Amsterdam, during the 2014 Gaza-War, he shouted to the crowd “Fuck the Zionists” and “Fuck the Talmud.” He further argued that Israel is an illegal rouge state; he compared Israel with Nazi Germany; he used classic conspiracy theories, like Zionists rule the world; and he even characterized Zionists as “Greedy hyenas who are out for our money and our blood”10 (Het Parool, 2015; RTL Nieuws, 2015; Gazaoui, 2015; Walsum, 2017; Brassé & Pelle, 2014).

5 De kleine sjoa 6 “Jews, remember Khaybar, the army of Muhammad is returning” 7 He is a Belgium author and politician of Lebanese origin. 8 Alle Joden in de zee gooien zoals wij dat in de Arabische wereld wilden doen in de jaren 40, is niet haalbaar 9 Rachid Appa El Gazaoui. 10 Zionisten zijn hebberige hyena's die uit zijn op ons geld en bloed.

4 In Dutch Politics the same kind of anti-Jewish expressions are made. NIDA,11 a political party in Rotterdam inspired on the teachings of Islam, claimed (while referring to freedom of expression) that Israel is an equivalent of the Islamic State. They tweeted “We argue: Zionism = ISIS”12 and summed up the supposedly similar characteristics between the Islamic State and Israel (NIDA Rotterdam, 2014). Abderrazak Khoulani, a member of the City Councilor in The Hague and co-founder of the Partij van de Eenheid13 (Party of Unity,) made a comment on social media, referring to a group of Israeli students who visited the Dutch Parliament in 2017, as “Zionist terrorist” and “child murderers and occupiers” of the future14 (IJssel, 2017; PvdE, n.d.). Tunahan Kuzu, the National Party leader of Denk (Think,) equated Israel with Nazi Germany during a speech in the House of Representatives (Brussen, 2018). Selçuk Öztürk, member of the House of Representatives for Denk, spoke about “the long arm of Israel” and argued, “Jews would try to influence the House of Representatives” (Luden, 2017). Of course not all, and not only, Muslims are perpetrators of antisemitic acts or speech. However, and despite the fact that it is only a small number of Muslims that use violence against Jews or Jewish institutions, studies in Western Europe show that Muslims have a far less positive attitude towards Jews than non-Muslims. Although a lot of antisemitic rhetoric is used during anti-Israel events - research has demonstrated that there is almost no correlation between conflicts in the Middle East and antisemitic violence (Due Enstad, 2017). However, there seems to be a correlation between religiosity and antisemitism (Jikeli, 2015a). While churches are emptying, Muslims in the Netherlands are becoming more religious (SCP, 2018). Accordingly, it is necessary to understand what the underlying rationales are for these anti-Jewish perceptions and how Islamists might influence the expansion of antisemitism in the Netherlands. In other words, this study hopes to produce a more complete understanding of antisemitic attitudes, and the authority of Islamists in the Netherlands.

11 Nida means to “call upon God.” 12 Wij zeggen: #Zionisme = #ISIS #Vrijheidvanmeningsuiting 13 Partij van de Eenheid is a party inspired by standards and values of Islam. 14 Zionistische terroristen in wording gewoon keurig op bezoek bij de SGP. Dit zijn de toekomstige kindermoordenaars en bezetters.

5 1.1 Research Objective

The goal of this study is to understand and explain how Islamists influence the rise and expansion of antisemitism in the Netherlands, and more specifically in Rotterdam. This study will therefore research whether Islamists have influenced young Dutch Muslims. Additionally, how these youngsters argue in antisemitic ways, and how they defend their reasoning. Moreover, this study wants to investigate whether they adopted Islamist antisemitic views. Furthermore, this study wants to understand, when antisemitic rhetoric is used, for example in relation to Israel, what the driving factors are. Differently put, do they identify themselves with Arab Palestinians - regardless of their own tribal, ethnic, religious and sectarian identity or are they against a Jewish state? If so, who convinced them, were it Islamists, and how? Respectively, this demands an in-depth description of these arguments.

1.2 Research Questions

The central research question examines: How have Islamists in the Netherlands influenced the rise in and the expansion of antisemitism, more specifically in Rotterdam?

In order the answer the research question, this study will use data triangulation, including desk and field research. Secondary analysis will be used to investigate the rise of antisemitism. Additionally, interviews will be held with prominent Jews from the liberal and orthodox community. In order to research the influence of Islamists in the expansion of antisemitism, interviews will be conducted with young Muslims who argue to be very religious.15

1.3 Societal Relevance of the Research

Before the Second World War some 140,000 Jews lived in the Netherlands, including Jews who had fled Germany due to rising Nazism and increasing Jew-hatred. Approximately 102,000 Jews were killed during the Shoah. Jews are today only a

15 For the reason that there seems to be a correlation between religiosity and antisemitism (Jikeli, 2015a).

6 small minority in the Netherlands, around 0.3% of the population (LJG Amsterdam, n.d.). Nevertheless, antisemitism is a severe threat to Jews and Dutch society. There is an increase in (violent) antisemitic acts; Jewish institutions are desacralized; Jews are intimidate, their properties are vandalized; and antisemitic rhetoric can be found in public, in politics, and on the Web (Heck, 2018; Rijken, 2018). To guarantee the safety of the Jewish community in the Netherlands, and in order to maintain a healthy open society, it is critical and urgent to gain an in-depth understanding of the roots and rationales behind these antisemitic perceptions. Because today some of the worst kind of antisemitism is spreading - which grows through the Islamic diaspora in Europe and due to the influence of Arab and Muslim states (Tibi, 2010a). In the 1950s Western Europe had approximately 50 thousand Muslims living within its borders - today around 26 million. Europe is becoming a continent of immigration. It is receiving more immigrants than the traditional immigration states like the United States of America and Australia. The relationships between immigrants and native population are changing. Muslims live more often in enclaves (Tibi, 2007; Pew Research Center, 2017). This is also true for the Netherlands (Ellian, 2018). Many Muslims live in their own societies, which Islamists seek to influence. They try to upraise the discontent, and in their indoctrinations courses, they spread the idea of a Cosmic War between Jews and Islam (Tibi, 2010a; Tibi, 2007). Despite the fact that many European Muslims are not followers of Islamism (According to Bassam Tibi, depending on the country, approximately 3% to 10% of Muslims constitutes Islamists,) Islamists present themselves as “the voice of Islam.” They control mosques, organizations, resources and infrastructure, and propagate their antisemitic rhetoric (Tibi, 2010; Tibi, 2007). This also seems to be the case in the Netherlands; a growing number of mosques are under the influence of Salafism. This growing Salafism tries to establish itself in more moderate mosques as well. This is alarming since Islamists, in a compelling way, try to inflict Muslims with intolerant, isolationist and anti-democratic ideas (WODC, 2017; NCTV, 2017). In 2010, a study, by Roex, van Stiphout & Tillie, showed that 11% of Dutch Muslims agreed that under certain circumstances their religion allowed them to use violence16 (2010, pp. 246-248). The visibility of Salafism is additionally stimulated due to its prominence in public debates. Salafi preachers regularly engage in public debates and are subsequently able

16 Er zijn situaties waarin het voor mij vanuit mijn religie acceptabel is dat ik geweld gebruik.

7 to share their principles and views with a broad audience (WODC, 2017; NCTV, 2017). Some of these preachers encourage greater social involvement and a stronger political-religious engagement of Dutch Muslim youth in regard to conflicts in the Middle East (AIVD & NCTV, 2015). These Islamist organizations additionally, distribute and publish literature; they control youth organizations; they are connected to Islamic schools; they have Islamic centers; they are active on the Web; they organize courses; etcetera (Roex, van Stiphout, & Tillie, 2010). This is dangerous and disturbing because youngsters are easily acceptable to propaganda of Islamism. Meaning that they are also easily acceptable to Islamists antisemitism, which in turn can translate into increasing verbal and physical aggression against Jews (Tibi, 2007; AIVD & NCTV, 2015). Hence, it is important to grasp the roots and rationales of antisemitic hostilities. Antisemitism is not only a danger to Jews; it is a danger to every person living in Dutch society. Freedom and equality are inevitable and fundamental principles of an open society, and Islamists seek to undermine it. Today attacks are carried out against Jews and Jewish institutions. Tomorrow, anyone who looks like a Jew could become a target. Perhaps anyone with Jewish friends becomes a target. Or maybe those who support the state of Israel are the next targets. To make this point even more clear, the scholar Bassam Tibi, who is a Muslim himself, provides a good example. He writes, among other things, critically about Islamism and Islamist antisemitism. Due to his scholarly work he is often threatened, even to a point that he had to go into hiding (Meyer & Schmidt, 2006; Tibi, 2010; Tibi, 2007). In short, antisemitism is a crime against humanity, and it is a very dangerous phenomenon. It is a danger to democratic notions, to (religious) pluralism, and to robust citizenship. Islamist antisemitism can easily turn against other groups that are not regarded “ideologically pure” - against women, homosexuals, or reformist Muslims (Small, 2013). In other words, it is not only a security threat to Jewish communities and individuals; it is a threat to the entire Dutch society. It begins with Jews, but it will definitely not end there: the perils are real, the threat is clear, and they concern us all.

8 1.4 Academic Relevance: Literature review

A great deal is written and said about antisemitism in the Middle East. In many states antisemitism is widely propagated and accepted in society (Pew Research Center, 2006; Tibi, 2007). In Western societies it is not. Islamists are therefore more likely to disguise or hide (doublespeak) their antisemitism from the outside world (Tibi, 2010; Tibi, 2007; Wistrich, 2002). Nevertheless, it appears that the number of violent antisemitic incidents in Europe is much higher today, compared to the 1990s (Jikeli, 2015a). The problem, however, is that very few scholars, and institutes, are dealing with contemporary antisemitism in the West. Accordingly, there is only little research conducted on antisemitism and the Muslim population in Europe. Even less research has been conducted on Islamists antisemitism in Europe. Since, there exists hardly any research on the subject, especially in regard to the Netherlands, it is useful to take a brief look at studies that handle the topic of antisemitism and Islam in neighboring countries. Pew Research Center published in 2006, a “13 nation attitude survey.” This study showed that there were almost unanimous unfavorable attitudes among Muslims against Jews, in Jordan (99%), Egypt (98%) and Pakistan (94%). Muslims in Europe had a more positive view compared to the Middle East. Nevertheless, according to this study the majority of European Muslims hold negative perceptions of Jews. Only 15% of the respondents in Turkey, 28% in Spain, 32 % in Great Britain, 38% in Germany were favorable of Jews. France was the only exception with 78% of the Muslims holding positive views (Pew Research Center, 2006). Moreover, the study of Johannes Due Enstad argues that individuals with Islamic backgrounds are prominent perpetrators of antisemitic violent incidents in Western European countries. His research on antisemitic violence in Europe between 2005 and 2015, also stresses that there is only little correlation between violent acts against Jews in Europe and conflicts in the Middle East (2017). Although he recognizes that these conflicts could provide individuals that already hold antisemitic attitudes and are prone to violence, a ground to carry out attacks. Additionally, the size of the Muslim or Jewish population within countries did not seem to play any role. He concludes that antisemitism is more widespread among Muslims than among non- Muslims – and that the level of religiosity plays a role in anti-Jewish attitudes (Due Enstad, 2017).

9 In 2014, Ruud Koopman compared religious fundamentalist attitudes of hostility towards out-group, between native Christians and Muslims (of Turkish and Moroccan origin). The study was conducted in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Sweden and could not confirm the assertion that fundamentalism is a marginal phenomenon among Muslims in the West. Up to 75% of the Muslim respondents was of opinion that Muslims should “return to the roots of the faith; that there is only one interpretation of the Qur’an which is binding for all believers; and that religious rules are more important than secular laws”17 (Koopmans, 2014, p. 51). In the Netherlands 40,4% among Muslims, compared to 8,4% among Christians, agreed with the statement: “Jews could not be trusted.” And 54,4 % of Muslim respondents believed that the West is out to destroy Islam (Koopmans, 2014). Koopmans also emphasized an earlier study by Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder, from 1997. This study demonstrated that in Germany amongst young people of Turkish origins almost half believed that Islam was under threat by Western and Zionists enemies. Moreover, they believed that Zionism in general, is a threat to Islam (2014). Surveys from other European countries also confirmed that anti-Jewish attitudes are stronger amongst Muslims than amongst non-Muslims. In Belgium, two survey studies by the Youth Research Platform (JOP) confirmed that antisemitic views, among students at secondary schools, were especially high amongst students with Islamic backgrounds (approximately 50%). The first study in 2011 entitled Young in Brussels18 showed an overwhelming percentage of Muslim students that held antisemitic viewpoints. Many agreed with the following statements: Jews want to dominate everything (56.8% agreed,) most Jews think they are better than others (47.1% agreed,) If you do business with Jews, you should be extra careful (47.5%,) Jews incite to war and blame others (53.7% agreed.) The study claimed that anti- Jewish perceptions seemed to be link to “being Muslim.” And that it is likely that anti-Jewish attitudes are fostered by theological Jew-hatred; by the Middle East conflict; and due to the influence and the encouragement of the environment in which Muslim youth resides (Elchardus, 2011). The second study, carried out in 2013 in the cities of Antwerp and Gent, confirmed the previous findings (Elchardus, 2013). Furthermore, it stressed that these youngsters hold a high level of antisemitism,

17 In the Netherlands 44,6% of Muslim respondents agreed with all three statements. 18 Jong in Brussel.

10 regardless of their personal, educational, and social – economic characteristics (Elchardus, 2013, p. 213). In 2013 a Dutch study entitled “Antisemitism on Secondary Schools,” researched antisemitic attitudes and Holocaust diminishment among students, by means of surveying secondary school teachers. The outcome of the study suggested that both are vastly more common in schools with a higher percentage of students of Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds.19 Additionally, the number of insults against Jews was significantly higher in schools that had many students of Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds (Wolf, Berger, & Ruig, 2013). Günter Jikeli’s study of 2015, had as purpose to provide a deeper understanding of anti-Jewish attitudes among young male Muslims, with various religious, ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds in France, the UK and Germany (2015b). He concluded: “The majority of interviewees displayed resentments against Jews in at least one way or another. Negative attitudes toward Jews were often openly exhibited, at times aggressively so, including calls for violence against Jews and intentions to carry out antisemitic actions” (Jikeli, 2015b, p. 116). He had categorized four typologies of anti-Jewish hostilities. The first category constituted classic antisemitic attitudes. The second category contained anti-Jewish attitudes with reference to Israel. The third category regarded hostile attitudes to Jews with reference to Islam, ethnic or Muslim identity. The fourth category entailed anti-Jewish hostility without rational. The outcome of the study showed that most respondents used a combination of categories to argue why they do not like Jews (Jikeli, 2015b). However, the level of antisemitism increased when the individual was more fundamentalistic in his religious views. Nevertheless, there was little or no correlation between antisemitic attitudes and perceived discrimination; legal restrictions of Islamic Faith; or demographic variables; and socio-economic variables (Jikeli, 2015c; Jikeli, 2015a). In short, despite the fact that there are only few studies in regard to anti-Jewish attitudes among Muslims in Netherlands, it appears that generally speaking, Muslims have a far less positive perception of Jews than non-Muslims. Furthermore, these studies suggest that there is little correlation between anti-Jewish perceptions and socio–economic backgrounds. However, it is likely that there is a link between the level of religiosity and antisemitic attitude. This research will therefore contribute to a

19 These are the two largest non-western population groups in the Netherlands.

11 more in-depth understanding of the influence of Islamists regarding antisemitism in the Netherlands. First and foremost it must be made clear that Muslims are not a homogenous group, that notions of Islam differ between communities, and that many western Muslims are not radical Muslims. Yet, research shows that a large part of European Muslims holds negative feelings towards Jews (Jikeli, 2015; Koopmans, 2014). Since there is only little data available that explains where these tendencies come from, it is of academic interest to investigate the role of Islamists. It is necessary to research what the underlying bases of these hostile perceptions are and where they come from. It is essential to investigate whether antisemitic views are shaped due to the influence of Islamist authorities. When antisemitic attitudes are linked to the Palestinian conflict, then it is important to understand how these perceptions are shaped. Many Islamists seek to politically involve Muslim youth in this matter. It is therefore interesting to investigate why youngsters are acceptable for this issue. What convinces them? Especially since there are many, and much bloodier, tribal conflicts in the Middle East. It is important to find out how these perceptions are constructed and what the argumentations are behind these judgments. Moreover, there is no research carried out in the Netherlands that investigates how individuals can become acceptable to antisemitism when it is propagated by Islamist authorities. Importantly, this study is not interested in making generalizations about Dutch Muslims, but rather to gain a better understanding of the reasons behind antisemitic sentiment amongst a part of the Muslim youth. Antisemitism is very dangerous form of hatred and has to be taken seriously. In the words of Robert Wistrich, antisemitism is the world’s oldest hatred (2010). It transforms and adapts over time. So in order to combat it, we must first of all understand it. It is important to obtain an in-depth understanding of all forms of antisemitism, and therefore it is also important to understand the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands.

12 1.5 Reading Guide

This chapter elaborated on the topic of interest and clarified the intention and relevance of the study. The second chapter will provide a theoretical framework, which will focus on the essence of antisemitism, Islamism and a scholarly debate regarding the origins of Islamist antisemitism. Chapter three will elaborate on the methodology of this study. Thereafter, chapter four will provide the analysis of Islamism in Rotterdam, which is followed in chapter five by the presentation of the interview findings. The last chapter presents the discussion on the findings, which will be followed by the conclusion and research limitations and recommendations. At the final pages of this study one can find the Bibliography and Appendix A.

13 2 Theoretical Framework

To answer the central research questions, it is necessary to rely on a rich and intelligent theoretical framework. This provides rationales and insights, which ensures a strong theoretical grounding. Since the objective of the study is to explain the rise in and expansion of antisemitism due to the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands, it is necessary to gain acumen into the topic of interest. Hence, it is of importance to gain a better understanding of the concept of antisemitism. Therefore, the study firstly explains what antisemitism entails, and will provide some insight into (new) varieties of antisemitism. Moreover, it is impossible to understand possible Islamist antisemitic perceptions amongst youngsters without examining Islamism. Accordingly, Islamism and Islamist antisemitism will be discussed. Subsequently, some context in regard to the Netherlands will be provided. Furthermore, it is critical that terms are used in a very clear manner. Therefore this study will clearly distinguish between Islam and Islamism, between radical Muslims and Muslims. Hence, clear conceptualizations of the terms relating to the study will be specified. In short, the theoretical framework exists out of three parts. Firstly, it covers antisemitism. Subsequently, Islamism will be discussed. Lastly, Islamists antisemitism and an overview of the academic debate will be provided.

2.1 Antisemitism

Since this study is concerned with antisemitism, it is of importance to create an understanding of the components that this subject matter involves. It is necessary to explain why this study speaks of antisemitism instead of discrimination against Jews, or merely Jew-hatred. Due to its complexity it is important to clarify the different stages that antisemitism went through, the grounds of antisemitism and the various aspects that it regards. Before we can fully comprehend what antisemitism entails, it is helpful to define the concept. Due to its complexity there are many different definitions, ranging from very short ones that describes antisemitism as “Hostility towards and discrimination against Jewish people” (Wright, 2015,) to more broad definitions: “Antisemitism is the negative perception of Jews, manifestations of which

14 range from verbally expressed antipathy to physical violence toward Jewish individuals, their properties, institutions, communities, and the state of Israel” (Juergensmeyer & Roof, 2011). For the purpose of this study the comprehensive working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) will be applied: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities” (2016). Today antisemitism is a widely known term, but its underlying phenomenon dates back many centuries, when Christianity was institutionalized and spread across much of the Mediterranean region. European animosity against Jews, and prejudice against Judaism, was religiously motivated. Christianity aimed to become the universal religion and most Jews refused to convert to Christianity, hence they were portrayed as rebels against God and blamed for the killing of Jesus Christ. Consequently they were stereotyped as the Anti-Christ and expelled or prosecuted until the late 18th century (Britannica, 2018). In other words, this first phase of antisemitism was generated by Christianity and had a religious fundament. Since many Jews (under force) had converted to Christianity, a second phase was needed in order to continue demonizing the Jews. From the 19th century on, antisemitism was based on racial grounds - on racial otherness. Moreover, the compound anti-Semitism is the English translation of the German word Anti-Semitismus, a term coined in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr (Zimmermann, 1986; Howatson, 2011). “Anti-“ refers to the Greek word antí, which means: against or opposite (Hoad, 1996). The word “Semite” is derived from the Hebrew name of Shem who was, according to the Old Testament, one of the three sons of Noah. He is regarded as the ancestor of the people that speak one of the related Semitic languages - including Arabs, Jews, Arameans and Assyrians (Britannica, 2018; Hornblower, Spawforth, & Eidinow, 2012). Marr introduced the term antisemitism into politics for referring to a campaign in Central Europe against Jews, attributing racial or biological aspects to adherents of a religion. The term “Semites” may also refer to other ethnic groups in the Levant, but Marr explicitly used it to specify Jews. This new racial dimension was a product of the rise of a (pseudo-) scientific racism in the 19the century, which in turn influenced the National Socialists Movement after the First World War. It was only during this period that the term received its ominous political weight. Adolf Hitler underlined in his

15 correspondence with Herr Adolf Gemlich, in regard to the “Jewish question,” the necessity for antisemitism to be of rational and scientific basis: “Antisemitism as a political movement may not and cannot be defined by emotional impulses, but by recognition of the facts. The facts are these: Jewry is absolutely a race and not a religious association. [….] Neither does the Mosaic faith members belong exclusively to just one definite religion” (1919). In other words, the new term antisemitism marks a further development of an older anti-Judaism, adding a nationalistic and racial dimension to the religious one (Zimmermann, 1986; Britannica, 2018). During the Second World War Nazi Germany had found the answer to the Jewish question in the Holocaust, through the total extermination of the Jewish race. Approximately, six million Jews were killed by systematic annihilation (Juergensmeyer & Anheier, 2012). Since 1948, with the declaration of independence of the State of Israel, new antisemitism made its re-appearance and refers to hatred and prejudice against Zionism and Israel (Hogg & Levine, 2010). This new antisemitism is first a mixture of the previous forms of Western antisemitism. These previous forms are referred to as classical or traditional antisemitism. Some of the characteristics are for example scapegoating - Jews were blamed for everything, they were behind all troubles in the world (real and imagined). They were often accused of poisoning water sources, and of being child murderers. This is better known as the Blood Label, which entails that Jews supposedly murder Christian children for their blood to make Matzo Bread. All kinds of stereotypes and negative attributes were additionally ascribed to Jews (Mlodzianowska, 2012). For example, the portraying of Jews with long hook noses; depicting them as half man half beast; or picturing them as individuals that like to suckle on the teats of pigs (Hood, 2013). Another characteristic of this classic antisemitism regards Jewish conspiracy theories. Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876,) who described Jews as an exploiting sect, as blood sucking people, and as parasites, claimed for example that Jews were behind capitalism and communism (Wistrich, 2010). Another example is the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The Protocols was a forgery by the Russian secret police in the beginning of the 20the century, which argues that Jews plan for world domination (Wistrich, 2010; Mlodzianowska, 2012). After Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, these forms of classical antisemitism were not sustainable anymore, so a third phase arrived. This new phase does not attack Jews as individuals; it rather attacks Jews as a collective and more specifically the

16 State of Israel (Small, 2013; Lewis, 2005). This new phase is disguised in a modern form of political and ideological terms that elaborates on this ages-old hatred (Lewis, 2005). The political appearance of antisemitism is overtly expressed through the protest and decline of the Jewish right to self-determination. It involves delegitimizing the State of Israel. Additionally it entails the denying of any Jewish historical and religious connection between the State of Israel and the Jews. Lastly, it involves demonizing Israel – and ascribing it all world’s evils (Cotler, 2009). The ideological presentation of antisemitism goes under the veil of “humanitarianism.” It expresses itself by arguing that Zionism is a form of racism, or that Israel is an apartheid state – accordingly this demands the dismantling of Israel. Another feature is comparing Israel with Nazi Germany. All these characteristics regarding Israel are criminal indictments. Accordingly, Israel that is composed out of racism, Nazism, and apartheid has no moral ground and right to exist. This narrative advocates people to resist this occupying state. As a result, “the masking of this antisemitism as if it were part of the struggle against racism, apartheid and Nazism” will thereby transform “an antisemitic indictment into a moral imperative with the imprimatur of international law” (Cotler, 2009, p. 8). Another aspect of new antisemitism that frequently is applied is the way in which it is combined and blended with anti-Zionism (Small, 2013). And despite the fact that anti-Zionism is not an equivalent of antisemitism; it is nevertheless often used so to disguise it (Lewis, 1976). The problem subsequently is, that it is hard to tell what we are dealing with. Hence, how can we tell whether we are concerned with antisemitism or rather with anti-Zionism? According to Abraham Foxman, the head of the Anti-Defamation League “anti-Zionism constitutes antisemitism if Zionism is the only nationalism being opposed” (TOI Staff, 2014). According to the historian Bernard Lewis (1916-2018), one can recognize antisemitism by its characterization of two particular features, namely: when Jews are judged by different standards than others, and secondly when Jews are accused of being cosmic or satanic evils (Lewis, 2005).

17 2.2 Islamism

Islamists are adherents of Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, Political Islam, and Radical Islam, which are all different words for the same ideology. These words can therefore be used interchangeably. More importantly, it is of necessity to make a distinction between Islamism and Islam. Islam is a faith, a spiritual way of living. Islamism is a political ideology, which religionizes politics. Accordingly, there is a difference between the general Muslim population and Islamists or radical Muslims. For the first, Islam is nothing more than a faith and regard religion as a private matter. For the latter, Islam is a concept for political order - it is a unity of state and religion (Tibi, 2010a). Accordingly all Muslims use the same books, the Qur’an, the Hadith (the oral traditions) and the Sira (the biography of the prophet), they nevertheless decide and therefore they believe that they must be used differently. Since this study regards Islamists, it is of importance to explain what they encompass and how they organize. Respectively I define Islamists as adherents of Islamist movements, which are religious movements, or religious groups of people, who work together to advance their shared desire for Islam to direct all aspects of life, including the social and political sphere - anywhere and anytime. In addition, this study will include Salafi and Wahhabi movements as Islamist movements. For this reason it is necessary to make a distinction between what I will call political and apolitical Islamist movements.20 It is important to make this division because their ideologies and therefore their worldviews differ in certain respects (Tibi, 2009). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, and their common hatred for Jews, I will place all these movements under the umbrella of Islamism, either political or apolitical. Accordingly, political Islamist movements are movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and its offspring who actively engage in politics. While these movements refer to the ways of Islam, they use modern concepts that have no origin in Islamic scriptures. They are, unlike apolitical Islamists, no traditionalists; hence

20 Scholars like Bassam Tibi and Ahmad Moussali argue that one cannot regard Salafis and Wahhabis as Islamists since they differ in too many respects – their ideologies and worldviews (Moussali, 2009; Tibi, 2008). Moreover, salafism has changed over time, but also comes in many different forms; therefore it is impossible to simply include the whole spectrum of salafism as Islamism. For this reason, and for the purpose of the study, I will make use of a simplistic distinction between political and apolitical Islamists (–which both can be violent or non-violent).

18 they embrace modern technologies and innovation. Apolitical Islamists are orthodox Salafis or Wahhabis21 (Moussalli, 2009). While for political Islamists the pursuit of power and therefore engaging in politics comes at the first place – apolitical Islamists consider party politics to be a manifestation of polytheism. They reject any form of innovation (bid’a). They want to live life in the same manner that the prophet did (Durie, 2013; Addi, 2009). Furthermore, political Islamists may be linked to political lobby groups through which they try to influence governments. Apolitical Islamists rather isolate themselves and seek to influence other Muslims through, for example, education22 (Tibi, 2009; Durie, 2013). They desire a strict application of Sharia and submission towards these religious laws regards a compulsory nature (Moussalli, 2009). The political Islamists, in contrary believe that, during this age of transition, thus from the Modern world order to the Islamic world order, they are allowed (and it is even necessary) to engage in (Western) civilization and politics (Durie, 2013). Despite many differences, both have comparable ideas for the role of Islam. Both political and apolitical Islamist movements are a rejection to the decline of the Muslim world. Both are anti-Western and against secularism. Both want to follow the footsteps of the prophet Muhammad and view themselves as “true believers”. Both oppose religious diversity. Both believe that they are engaged in a Cosmic War against the Jews. They both desire a great Islam, and want life to be ruled by Sharia (Moussalli, 2009; Tibi, 2008). Political Islamists however, are much more flexible in the means to envision this Islamic world order. There are two distinct ideas regarding how to establish this Islamic world order. Accordingly, we can divide both political as apolitical Islamists into two separate schools of methods: the Jihadist Islamists23 and the non-violent Islamists.

21 Salafis are followers of salafism, which refer to a particular Islamic thought that emphasizes the need to return to the principles and ways of “the Salaf.” The Salaf (al-salaf al-salih) are the pious predecessor of Islam, often understood as the first three generations of the Muslim community. Wahhabism is a separate arm of Salafism, which regards itself as the true Salafism (Moussalli, 2009). They reject kalam (this means that they reject the use of rhetoric and debate to create an understanding of Islam). They claim that the earliest Muslims simply accepted the scriptures (the Qur’an and Sunnah) on the literal level and accordingly did not engage in any kind of interpretation (Durie, 2013; Addi, 2009). 22 Apolitical Islamists do not accept popular sovereignty, since sovereignty ought to be in the hands of Allah; hence they reject the democratic system of the ballot box (Tibi, 2009). 23 The jihadists Islamists believe that the only way to achieve their goal is through violence. Hence, Jihad is simply a means to get to the Islamic world order. Accordingly “taking action against the West” is perceived as a battle for Islam. The Islamists Jihadists carry out attacks, because they believe that the West is weak enough to win this final Jihad (Tibi, 2007; Tibi, 2008). The first Jihad started with

19 They both have the same purpose, to make Islam great again, but they have different ideas about how to achieve this. However, the past 20 years many Islamists changed their methods (Tibi, 2008; Tibi, 2010). Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheik Qaradawi explains “The conquest of Rome – the conquest of Italy, and Europe – means that Islam will return to Europe once again. Must this conquest necessarily be though war? No. There is such a thing as peaceful conquest. […] The peaceful conquest has foundations in this religion, and therefore, I expect that Islam will conquer Europe without resorting to the sword or fighting. It will do so by means of da'wa and ideology” (Qaradawi, 2007). Accordingly, these non-violent Islamists see much more possibilities in Da’wa and much more promise in institutions. Da’wa can best be explained as the organizational infrastructure of non-violent Islamists. This infrastructure exists out of all kinds of methods, such as: instruments for propaganda, resources, recruiting - anything to win the hearts and minds of Muslims (Hirsi Ali, 2017). Hence non-violent Islamists have faith in Father Time (Wistrich, 2010; Lewis & Wistrich, 2010). In the unmistakable words of the Egyptian activist and television preacher Amr Khaled:“The Muslims keep having children, while the Europeans don't. This means that within 20 years, the Muslims will be a majority, which may have an exceptional influence on the decision-making. This makes other groups very angry, and they consider this to be very dangerous. These are the enemies of Islam, as we know full well. […] If the 30 million Muslims manage to ignore these provocations, and to channel their anger in support of the Prophet Muhammad and of Islam into becoming walking propaganda machines” (Khaled, 2008). Moreover, non-violent political Islamists foresee great opportunities in democratic institutions, through which they can move upwards – and bring change in a suitable way. In order to function in Western democracies and institutions, Islamists apply iham or deception of unbelievers (Tibi, 2008).24 Islamists had discovered, that by using non-violent measures and deceit, they could achieve much more than through

Mohammed in the 7th century. The second Jihad started with the Ottoman Empire and Constantinople in 1453. During both Jihads, parts of Europe were conquered (Lewis & Wistrich, 2010). 24 Shi’a Muslims often had to apply taqiyya in order to survive in majority Sunni lands. This entailed a denial of religious beliefs towards the prosecutors. Islamists learned this part of the Shi’a belief and adopted this convenient tool to deceit the unbelievers in regard to its true ambitions – an Islamic Sharia state (Tibi, 2008).

20 Jihad.25 However, behind this façade shelters another face, another speech, and another idea about Islam26 (Hirsi Ali, 2017; Dankowitz, 2006). Altogether, Islamism started first in Sunni Islam, and subsequently in Shi’a Islam. Today there are many different Islamist movements and organizations and they are present and institutionalized all over the world (Tibi, 2008). There are political and apolitical Jihadist or non-violent Islamists.

2.2.1 Da’wa: the call for Islam in the Netherlands

Hassan al-Banna, the founding father of the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, believed that he could achieve the brotherhoods goals by means of expanding social networks; by operating through legitimate state institutions to voice their political goals; and through da’wa27 (el-Helbawy, 2016). To achieve these objectives the Brotherhood make use of a gradual strategy that involves a bottom-up policy. This strategy of slow but steady advancement requires the effort of step-by- step influencing individuals’ identities till they are in line with the perceived values (el-Helbawy, 2016). This is set in motion by reaching out to society in order to disseminate the Brotherhood’s ideas and ideology among the general population. This is done, for example, through grassroots activities, media campaigns, sermons in mosques, and public lectures. Correspondingly, these Islamist preachers seek to be identified, allegedly by its targets, as good Muslims. Respectively, at first they will keep their affiliation with the movement a secret; they will argue that they operate for the sake of Islam (Ayyash, 2016; el-Helbawy, 2016). In the 1960s many affiliates of the Muslim Brothers like Said Ramadan28 immigrated to Europe. This European network of the Muslim Brothers can be described as a diffuse network of individuals and organizations that strive for the (re-)

25 For example, take a look at the Hamas Covenant of 1988 and the recent Covenant of 2017, the difference in language is apparent. 26 One of such (former) celebrated people is Tariq Ramadan, a lecturer at Oxford University. Ramadan held a guest professorship at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam and from 2006 till 2009 he held a consulting position (regarding matters of integration) in the municipality of Rotterdam. He presents itself as a reformist Muslims, however, he appeared to be a man with two faces - depending on his audience. Moreover, Tariq Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the first (political) Islamist Movement (Fourest, 2008; Tibi, 2008; Dankowitz, 2006; Ekiz, 2018). 27 The Islamic call. 28 He is the son of Hassan al-Banna and father of Tariq Ramadan.

21 Islamization of the Muslim community, in which Islam is assigned to direct daily life. Moreover, by gaining influence in civil society they try to pave the way for a greater role for Islam in the entire Western society (ANP, 2011; Clingendeal, 2013). In the Netherlands there exists a diffuse network with sympathizers of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their main goal is in line with Hassan al- Banna’s thought, namely spreading their ideology and increasing its sphere of influence. According to the AIVD, their sphere of influence in Dutch society is indeed expanding. In order to spread their ideas among the Muslim community and in order to strengthen the position of Islam in Dutch society they employ various activities for which they have financial resources at their disposal coming from the Middle East, particularly from the Gulf States (2011). In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood is involved in a variety of activities that side with the Palestinian case and accordingly they sympathize with Hamas, a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood established in 1987. The AIVD stresses that the brotherhood is actively organizing meetings, which focuses on da’wa activities and tarbiyya, which are only accessible to persons belonging to a small circle of confidants of the organizations29 (ANP, 2011). It enables the Brotherhood to impose the norms and values of the brotherhoods ideology on a person’s identity, which embeds the religious, social and political dimension (Ayman, 2016). As in other European countries, individuals and organizations based in the Netherlands deny any affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Importantly, the AIVD warns, in the long term these activities could pose a realistic threat to the democratic legal order in the Netherlands (ANP, 2011). Like the Brotherhood, orthodox Salafi organizations in the Netherlands firstly propagate da’wa in all facets of life, mainly focusing on the Dutch Muslim community. Like the brotherhood, they do not only involve young people and elderly in their activities, they also attune to children. Hence, every target group asks for a different approach. In regard to youngsters, the mosque for example, often also functions as a place for after-school care and homework assistance. In addition these institutions often organize youth events, youth camps, and sports competitions. By means of da’wa they strive to eventually establish the ideal society (Roex, van

29 Da’wa is the call for Islam. Tarbiyya or socialization is a core concept in the Brotherhoods ideology. It is a process that redefines one's views, perceptions and ways of life to match the brotherhoods worldview and principles. Tarbiyya is “the proper way to influence individuals and to change them for the better” (Ayman, 2016, p. 84)

22 Stiphout, & Tillie, 2010). Since 2002, apolitical Salafists have exposed themselves publicly as more moderate Muslims. However, according to the AIVD this moderate appearance is nothing more than policies of deception. They present themselves as moderate adherents towards the outside world, which in reality they are not. Moreover, since the nineties there has been an evolution of the jihadist faction within Salafism in the Netherlands as well (NCTb, 2008). More recently, a rise and increasing influence of salafism has been observed in the Netherlands. This is especially apparent in a number of mosques in which Salafi influences has manifested, as well as in the amount of lectures that are administered throughout the country. Moreover, this growing influence and expansion of salafism in the Netherlands is accompanied by means of professionalization of Salafi organizations. They make extensive use of social media (NCTV, 2018). Furthermore “A segment of the Salafist movement advocates and legitimises active intolerance and anti- democratic activities, and consequently poses a threat to national security. There are also individuals within the Salafist movement who legitimise terrorist violence, typically veiled in religious terms.” (NCTV, 2018). In the Netherlands over 30 organizations receive foreign funding, mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – which most likely is accompanied by foreign ideological influence (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2018). At least eight Islamic organizations in Rotterdam requested foreign funding.30 However, Salafi organizations are today much more aware of government's supervision, as a result they are more cautious in the distribution and announcing their activities to the outside world (NCTV, 2018). These Salafi movements are supervised, because they clash with the foundations of the Dutch democratic legal order, as Salafi preachers call for isolationism, intolerance, and the rejection of the Dutch legal constitution. They have anti-Western ideas and present an image that claims that the “enemies of Islam,” meaning Jews and Christians or the West, are threatening Islam. Accordingly, like political Islamists, orthodox Salafists offer individuals (especially youngsters) who are in search of themselves an alternative identity. “One of the reasons why the redemption offered by the Islamists is so attractive to people with a Muslim cultural background is that it rests on religious ideas and cultural motives they are familiar with,” argues former

30 Moskee Nasuha; Stichting Tunesische College voor Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling; Moskee de Middenweg; Islamitische Universiteit Rotterdam; Stichting Rahma Relief; Al Nour Foundation; Essalam Moskee; Stichting Islamitische Minaret Centrum Rotterdam (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2018).

23 Salafist Ahmad Mansour who currently fights against antisemitism and radicalization (Neugroschel, 2017). These movements feed feelings of exclusion, and accordingly provide them with a ground to hold upon in this complex modern Western society. They provide these susceptible individuals with a safe haven, a place where they feel safe and accepted amongst brothers and sisters. They listen to them, and integrate them into their communities. They provide them with a sense of belonging, that they are chosen ones and part of a religious revelation. They may have felt a sense of marginalization emanating from western society. Subsequently this divine feeling of superiority - what others are ignorant of, will compensate this. (NCTb, 2008; Neugroschel, 2017). Additionally, NCTV reports that Jihadism in the Netherlands has grown significantly. With the collapse of the Caliphate “Jihadist now no longer have a compelling reason to travel to that part of the world, and their focus has shifted to da'wa, or spreading the jihadist message.” Moreover, there are international jihadist networks operating in the Netherlands, some with links to ISIS or al-Qaida, which still intend to mount attacks in Europe (NCTV, 2018).

2.3 Islamism and Antisemitism

Islamist antisemitism is the most dangerous mutation of antisemitism that exists in the world today (Tibi, 2010b; Milson, 2013). This Islamized antisemitism includes, next to classic antisemitism, both ideological as political forms of antisemitism. It involves all forms possible (Kotzin, 2013). It is such a horrific variety, due to the volume and magnitude of its call for the destruction of Jews. It can be state sanctioned, as in Iran. It can be a fundament in charters or covenants, like in the case of Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaida. The call for destruction can be preached in Mosques, during Friday sermons, and presented as a religious obligation. Additionally it can be demanded by means of religious sanction, like fatwas or by a writ of execution (Cotler, 2009). As

Ismail Al-Wahwah, during a Friday sermon in Australia, explains:” It is a delusion to think that there can be peace and coexistence with the Israelites, with the Jews. It is a delusion to think that we can share one state or two states, and that the Jews can be our neighbors, as suggested by some self-proclaimed, yet deluded, "scholars." […]

24 There is only one solution for that cancerous tumor: It must be uprooted and thrown back to where it came from” (Al-Wahwah, 2015). The difference with all former forms of antisemitism is that it presents itself on religious grounds. It aims to justify itself by reference to Islamic scriptures. These references supposedly reveal the evil nature of Jews and obligate followers of the prophet to fight against them. Accordingly, in name of Islam, they call for the annihilation of Jews. Yet, for that it is possible to understand this variety of antisemitism, it is important to discuss the scholarly debate on the origins of Islamist antisemitism.

2.3.1 Scholarly Debate

The scholarly debate regarding the origins of Arab and Muslim antisemitism can be divided at separate levels. The first distinction is in regard to the Palestinian conflict, between those who claim that antisemitism is a result of the conflict and those who think differently. A second distinction focuses on Islam, between scholars who argue that antisemitism is alien to Islamic history and culture, and those who assert that antisemitism is inherent to Islam. Yehoshafat Harkabi (1921-1994) was a scholar who believed that antisemitism was the consequence of Zionism and the Palestinian conflict. Consequently, he asserted that antisemitism would vanish when the Palestinian conflict is settled. He claimed that antisemitism was the result of politics, exerted by governmental and elite propaganda. Accordingly, he argued that it had no genuine bedrock in popular thinking. Nevertheless, since the conflict became a reality, and subsequently Arab and Muslim antisemitism became palpable, antisemitism would become one of the characteristics that would define and bear the conflict (Webman, 2013; Wistrich, 2002; Küntzel, 2013). Bernard Lewis argued that antisemitism in Arab and Muslim countries, was due to the large scale of indoctrination of generations of Muslims. He believed that antisemitism was mainly literary, political, intellectual and ideological. Like Harkabi, he claimed that it was imposed from above and that it had no popular ground. He argued: “For Christian anti-Semites, the Palestine problem is a pretext and an outlet for their hatred; for Muslim anti-Semites, it is the cause. Perhaps, if that cause is removed or significantly diminished, the hostility too may wane- not disappear, but at least return to the previous level of prejudice” (Lewis, 1986, p. 259.) Juliane Wetzel claims that, in contrary to former

25 forms of antisemitism, this variety is based on a genuine problem, namely that of the unjust treatment and offense against the Palestinian people. This implies that antisemitism can only be defeated when the conflict is solved. Hence, antisemitism is merely a reaction to the policies of the State of Israel (Küntzel, 2013). Nevertheless, these theories fail to explain why every peace offer, and withdraw from Israel, has been answered with aggression against Jews in and outside Israel. Moreover, before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, many attacks were already carried out against Jews in and out side of the region of Palestine (Dershowitz, 2003). Accordingly, there are scholars who argue that there is an obvious connection between antisemitism and the Israel conflict, however they disagree in regard to the nature of this link. These scholars argue that as long as antisemitism is prevalent the conflict will not and cannot be resolved. They argue that unlike the irrational nature of German antisemitism, Islamist antisemitism is driven by a reason of interest (Küntzel, 2013). Nevertheless, these scholars differ in arguments regarding the incentives that caused Islamic antisemitism. Scholars like Jeffrey Herf and Matthias Küntzel argue that the rise of antisemitism is the result of the contributions of Nazism and Islamism. Küntzel additionally stresses the importance of the Middle East conflict in generating antisemitism. He argues that the Nazis succeeded in spreading, throughout the Arab world, a pronounced antisemitic interpretation of the Palestinian conflict. He furthermore argues how Nazism has influenced Islamism. The Hamas Charter of 1988 offers an example; it has many similarities with the antisemitic discourse of the Nazis (Küntzel, 2009). Moreover, in Küntsel’s book Jihad and Jew-hatred he demonstrates that Hitler was the source of inspiration for the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America in 2001.31 Islamists believe, just like Hitler did, that New York is the center of world Jewry and that Jews rule America (Küntzel, 2013; Küntzel, 2009). Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers assert in their study Nazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews, how the Nazis, with the help of the local

31 The idea of burning skyscrapers in Manhattan arose during the Second World War. Hitler was obsessed with his desire to kill all Jews everywhere. Especially in New York, since he regarded it as the center of World Jewry. He fantasized about how New York would fall down in a sea of flames. How the skyscrapers would burn and collapse into each other. He thought of the Amerikabomber, a cargo plane that would carry small planes. These small planes would be steered by suicide bombers in order to transform New York in clouds of fire. In 2001 on the 11th of September the United States was attacked and the famous Twin Towers of New York went down in flames. The attacks were coordinated from Germany, and carried out by Islamists Jihadists (Küntzel, 2009).

26 population, had designed to exterminate and annihilate the Jews in the Middle East. Like Küntzel, they assign a great contribution to the close collaboration between the Mufti of Jerusalem Mohammad Amin al-Husseini, the Muslim Brotherhood and Nazi Germany (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2010). They argue that with the rise of National Socialism, German antisemitism became much more apparent. The Grand Mufti had quite a prominent role in spreading antisemitism. In 1929, he fused European antisemitism, Arab nationalism, and Islamism into one peculiar body (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2010). He was very eager to collaborate with the Nazis, and offered his services as soon as Hitler had came to power in 193332 (Lewis, 2005). In former Yugoslavia, he directed a Waffen-SS brigade of (mainly Bosnian) Muslim men. However, he is most notorious for the large impact he had in poisoning the hearts and minds of the Muslim population with antisemitic ideas and thoughts33 (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2010). Hitler was subsequently widely celebrated in the Arab and Muslim world, and his popularity only intensified as the war continued. He was praised and seen as a blessing, send by Allah. In 1938, several articles placed him at the same level as the prophet Muhammad. “For months the embassy has received notifications from various sources pointing out that throughout the country, clerics are coming forward and speaking to believers about old secret prophecies and dreams indicating that God has sent the twelfth imam to the world in the form of Adolf Hitler,” and especially his views on Jews were appreciated: “One way to encourage this development would be to clearly focus on Muhammad’s struggle against the Jews in the past and the Führer’s struggle in the present“ (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2010, p. 30- 31). Jeffrey Herf especially emphasizes the important role that Nazi propaganda had played in the region. In his study Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World he states that the Nazis used Jew-hatred from early Islamic scriptures, and combined it with European antisemitism. Accordingly this mixture was propagated amongst the public.

32 In Jerusalem he issued a fatwa that included a punishment for those Muslims that would sell the holy land (Palestine) to Jews. They were considered unbelievers since Palestine was entrusted to Muslims (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2010). 33 For this reason he was popular with the Muslim Brotherhood who supported him (Küntzel, 2016). The Muslim brotherhood had received, due to their similar perspective for Jews, financial aid from the Nazis since the 1930s. They effectively published a translation of Hitler’s book Mein Kampf (My Struggle) under the title My Jihad (Mazel, 2013). Later on, in the 1940s, they called upon the people to execute jihad against the Jews (Küntzel, 2016). Mein Kampf is still today a bestseller in the Middle East.

27 Moreover, he asserts that antisemitism and the idea of the “Jewish question” continued to prevail after the fall of Hitler34 (Herf, 2009). The influence of German National Socialism on Arab and Muslim antisemitism may be obvious, and parallels between both Islamism and Nazism are plain, especially in regard to their shared and obsessive goal to exterminate all Jews. However, there is a major difference, since Nazi behavior against Jews originated from a racist point of view, which endured on history of Christian antisemitic notions. The Nazis wanted to exterminate all Jews, so also those Jews that converted to Christianity, or those who were not religious at all (Juergensmeyer & Anheier, 2012). The struggle of Islamists against Jews has a different ground. A Jew that converts to Islam will become a Muslim and will no longer be regarded as a Jew (Kedar, 2015). Suha Taji-Faruki accordingly debates the idea that contemporary Islamist rhetoric has a base in European antisemitism. She especially emphasizes Islam’s anti-racist heritage, since it focuses on Jews as adherents of a religion and not Jews as a race (Webman, 2013). Robert Wistrich agrees with Küntzel that in many respects Islamism has analogies with German National Socialism. He asserts that Islamism is a third totalitarian ideology (Webman, 2013). Furthermore, he argues that it is not accurate and too optimistic to believe that antisemitism is implied from above as a political weapon that will be abandoned when it is no longer of use. He argues that the goal is not simply to morally delegitimize Israel as a national entity and as a Jewish state in the region, but that the aim is to dehumanize Judaism and Jews as a people as such (Wistrich, 2010; Küntzel, 2013). The reason why Israel must disappear is not so much a self evident truth for religious fundamentalist, but it is a principle accepted by the majority of the Arab world – and antisemitism is an integral part of it, a means to incite, to terrorize and to manipulate. However, despite the fact that antisemitism is a relatively new phenomenon amongst Arabs and Muslims, Wistrich argues that anti- Jewish feelings can be traced back to early Islamic scriptures, as the Qur’an and Sunnah. He emphasizes the downplaying and the lack of recognition regarding the realities in which Jews lived under Islamic rule. That is of humiliation, misery. Jews often had to deal with popular violence. A lot had to do with their legal status as

34 In 1946 Hassan al-Banna stated that the Grand Mufti who had fought on Hitler’s side against Zionism, and for that reason was praised as a hero, would continue the struggle against the Jews (Herf, 2009).

28 dhimmis. The alleged tolerance of these “protected people,” whose religions were recognized under Muslim rule, has to be understood within a framework of discrimination, which underlined the superiority of Muslims35 (Wistrich, 2002). Despite the fact that it were native Christians who brought European notions of antisemitism to the Middle East, Wistrich argues that the image of the Jew portrayed in the Qur’an is not harmless either36 (Wistrich, 2002). Accordingly, the idea of a “Jewish threat” existed since the birth of Islam and hence long before the establishment of the independent State of Israel. Israel is subsequently a calamity for the Arab states – which they see as a direct threat to Islam. Accordingly, the Islamists regard the Jews, as an “eternal enemy” who are ought to destroy Islam. Hence, Islamists blended religious Jew-hatred with notions of European racist and political motifs of antisemitism (Wistrich, 2002). Joshua Muravchik argues that the sprout of anti-Jewish attitudes in the Middle East came in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to Zionism, and as a reaction to the rise of Arab-nationalism. The Nazis accordingly stoked it thoroughly (2014). Mordechai Kedar in contrary argues that it has nothing to do with Zionism or Israel. To defend his stance he refers to the Tel Aviv evacuation under the Ottoman rule and to the massacres of 1920, 1921 and 1929 in Hebron. At that point there was no Israel, no occupation, and the community of Jews in Hebron were not Zionists – they were Jews. The problem of current Jew hatred is first with Jews as religious adherents before it is with Israelis or Zionists. He asserts that what is happening today is a Jihad, a holy war for Islam, which is waged against anyone who threatens Islam, and Jews are regarded as a threat to Islam (Kedar, 2015). Hence, like Wistrich, Kedar and Bat Ye’or place a more prominent role to Islamic culture and heritage: antisemitism is religiously motivated, and the status of Jews as Dhimmis plays an important role in that matter. Kedar emphasizes the purpose of Islam as a religion, which, he asserts, came to replace Christianity and Judaism. This consequently explains why Israel cannot be accepted. The reason for this, he argues, is that Muslims are in cosmic war against the Jews since the moment Jews rejected Muhammad as their prophet. According to him, the relationship between Muhammad and the Jews is fundamental

35 Jews were for example not allowed to ride horses; they had to wear distinctive clothes (the origins of the yellow badge had not its origins in Medieval Europe but in Baghdad); and they were not allowed to build new places of worship (Wistrich, 2002). 36 Since it also tells how the prophet Muhammad viewed the Jews as “enemies of Islam” and depicting them as corruptors of the Holy Scripture. He brands them as malevolent spirits and attributing the traits of “cowardice, falsehood and greed (Wistrich, 2002).

29 to understand the hatred for Jews and the adoption of European forms of antisemitism among numerous Muslims today. Muhammad, born in 570 CE in Mecca, as part of a clan entitled Hashim,37 received his first revelation from Allah through the archangel Gabriel in 610 CE. From that moment on, Muhammad wants to bring the messages of Allah.38 The tribesmen in Mecca were however not interested in his message. They rejected him as a prophet and accused him of forgery. They argued that Muhammad had copied legends from the first religions and thought Islam was nothing more than a replica of Judaism and Christianity. This brought frictions, because for Muhammad the religions of Judaism and Christianity were incomplete and Islam was the final true religion39 (Kedar, 2015). In 622 CE, due to growing tensions, Muhammad and his followers (relatively few) fled to Medina (Rodinson, 1985). There he applied a different strategy to spread his message. Jewish tribes that did not desire to convert to Islam were attacked. Men were slaughtered. Children and women were taken as slaves. Muhammad had become a commander of an Army, and held many bloody expeditions (Rodinson, 1985). Accordingly, in the Qur’an and in the Sira (the biography of the Prophet) Jews are not always presented in a positive way. There are many negative accounts and allegations40 (Lewis, 2005; Lisnyansky, 2018). Today, Islamists want to follow the footsteps of Muhammad and treat the Jews in the same manner, since Muhammad is the example of how Muslims should behave. Hence, when Muslims shout “Khybar, Khybar, ya Yahud, Jaish Muhammad, sa Yahud,” they refer to the revival of the times that Muhammad and his army slaughter the Jews at Khaybar. Accordingly, Kedar argues, that the issue of Islam with Judaism is first and foremost a religious matter. Islam came to nullify Christianity and Judaism, it came to erase and replace all religions (Kedar, 2015). Then in 1948, the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel provided a ground for antisemitism. Jews had

37 A branch of the Quraysh tribe, which was the dominant tribe in Mecca 38 He first approached the Jews to join him as he considered them to be allies due to their monotheism. However, the Jews refused appeal, because they already had a God38 (Lisnyansky, 2018). Accordingly, he brought the message to the tribe of Quraysh (Rodinson, 1985). 39 The Qur’an says: “The religion of Allah is only Islam,39” so how could it possible be a copy of Judaism or Christianity? Accordingly, he had to prove that Islam was valid and legitimate, so he created a situation in which it appeared that Judaism and Christianity were not. He argued for example that Abraham was not a Jew or Christian, but one who believed in Allah. Hence, the religion of Allah is Din al-Haqq, the religion of truth, and Judaism and Christianity are Din al-Batil, empty religions or religions of falsehoods (Kedar, 2015). 40 More than against Christians (Lewis, 2015). However, there are also many positive references of Jews (Lisnyansky, 2018).

30 occupied Islamic land, because Palestine belonged to Islam. Land that once was under Islamic rule will always stay and be part of Islam. Consequently, many Arab and Muslim countries will never recognize Israel as a Jewish State since this goes against the basic principles of Islam. Jews are Dhimmis who may live under Islam, but not above (Kedar, 2015; Kedar, 2017). Bat Ye’or especially assigns weight to the dhimmi status of Jews under Islam. Unlike some scholars like Maria Rosa Menocal, who speaks of a Golden Age of Jewish and Muslim relations and interfaith tolerance, Bat Ye’or argues that it is historically untrue that life under Islamic rule can be characterized as religiously tolerant. Her studies The Dhimmi and Islam and Dhimmitude explain how the system of dhimmitude was opposed on Jews and Christians. She calls attention to the notion that Jews and Christians in order to survive had to abide by discriminatory, degrading and oppressive rules (Webman, 2013; Ye'or, 1999). She claims that Dhimmitude (a system that governs subjected population) exists only in the context of the ideology of Jihad. Muslim theologians and jurists constructed the religious and legal structure of Jihad, the war for conquest, in the 8th and 9th century. They based it on the words and acts of the prophet Muhammad. The concept and the doctrines that were established accordingly, arranged the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. For Jews this meant that if they did not wanted to convert to Islam they had three options: exile, 41 die, or live as dhimmis. This dhimmi status entailed submission to the rule of Islam. According to the doctrines, the ummah (the Islamic community) is elected above all others. The right to rule the world therefore only belongs to them. Hence this rule is based on the doctrines of Jihad. Jihad in turn can be expressed in different ways: through propaganda, through corruption (money), and if possible by means of violence. Individuals that oppose the establishment of Islamic rule are regarded as enemies of Islam (Ye'or, 1999). According to Bat Ye’or, the principles of the doctrine of Jihad and dhimmitude still prevail amongst Islamists.42 Ever since the doctrine

41 The status of dhimmi was only available for Christians or Jews since they both were regarded as “people of the book” (Ye’or, 1999). However, dhimmi status has been granted to other religious followers as well (fore example the Hindus) in the history of Islam (Bostom, 2015). 42 As an example, Bat Ye’or points to the Hamas Charter of 1988 that calls upon these ideas. In the 19th century Muslim and Arab countries may have adopted European antisemitic traits and “since the 1930s, Fascism and Nazism had a strong ideological and political alliance with the Arab-Muslim people which was based on a common antisemitism” (Ferretti, 2017), the struggle against the Jews and Israel, however, comes forth from the doctrines of Jihad and the principles of dhimmitude.

31 came into existence they started and still organize the relationships of the Muslims with the Jews (Ye'or, 1999). Scholars like Ibn Warraq and Andrew Bostom mainly focus on antisemitism within Islamic scriptures. They argue that Islam is inherently antisemitic. In the course of the years Muslims may have adopted European notion of antisemitism, however this does not mean that Islam, and Islamic history is not antisemitic (Warraq, 2016; Bostom, 2015). Bostom asserts and points at sacred scriptures (especially from the Qur’an) and statements of Islamic scholars that antisemitism was present in Islam from the earliest stages on. He suggests that it is a false notion to claim that antisemitism, as it was for Christians, is not part of the birth pangs of Islamic religion. He additionally points to mass violence carried out against Jews who lived under Islamic rule, across space and time. Consequently, he argues that antisemitism is rooted in the foundational texts of Islam (Bostom, 2015). Menahem Milson in contrary argues that a distinction must be made between contemporary Arab antisemitism, and attitudes of Jews that were present before modern times. Both issues are interrelated, but since the historical contexts are totally different they cannot be treated as one and the same. He argues that the rise of Islamism in 1979, contributed in the dissimilation and indoctrination of antisemitism. Resulting in an increased and intensified dimension of antisemitism in the Arab and Muslim world (Milson, 2013; Milson, 2010). Bassam Tibi also argues that Jew-hatred existed in the history of Islam, however, he claims it was not antisemitism. According to him Christians brought antisemitism to the Arab and Muslim world in the 19th century. Accordingly, there were two stages of antisemitism. The first stage was related to Arab nationalism and the second relates to Islamism. First it was due to the impact of French thought and the decline of Muslim empires.43 In 1913 the French thought was replaced with a German phase, and this marked, according to Tibi, the turning point for antisemitism in the Middle East. However, antisemitism only became authentic in the Arab and Muslim world with Islamism, since they believe to be in a Cosmic War with Jews. From then on, European antisemitism was no longer an import product; it rather became part of Islamism itself. It was adopted, it was modified, and it mutated into

43 The Christians had brought European antisemitic ideas to the Arab world, and only later Muslims started to embrace them as well. Accordingly, a secular form of antisemitism started in the pan-Arabia at the end of the 19th century. Nevertheless, it was not yet very present in society. This changed under the impact of the Germans.

32 the most dangerous current threat to Jews and Israel (Tibi, 2007; Tibi, 2010b; Tibi, 2010a). Nevertheless, this does not explain why pan-Arab nationalists also embraced antisemitism. According to Sylvia Haim, European antisemitism was not easily adopted in the Middle East; it took a while before it was accepted. For the reason, that Islamic doctrines decided how life had to be organized between Muslims and non- Muslims (Webman, 2013). In short, the roots and origins of antisemitism in the Arab and Muslim world are disputed. Some scholars argue that antisemitism predates the creation of the State of Israel and Islamism. They argue that the roots were already established in the 7th century. Others assert it is inherent to Islam, which in turn is challenged by those who argue that antisemitism is alien to Islam. Accordingly, there are scholars who contribute a great role to Nazism and Islamism. Some even claim that antisemitism is the result of the Palestinian conflict, and was triggered by Zionism. Hence, there is no scholarly consensus respecting the origins of Islamic antisemitism.

2.3.2 Islamized antisemitism

Islamists believe to be in a Cosmic War with Jews. This war is first and foremost a religious war. Their struggle is based on the idea that Jews ought to destroy Islam. They believe that Jews, like themselves, want a world order. Israel is the starting point of their conquest (Tibi, 2010a). Moreover, in their rhetoric the words “Jews, Zionists and Israelis” are used interchangeable, as if they represent one entity. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,44 which is widely distributed throughout the Middle East, serves as a proof of this Jewish conspiracy (Tibi, 2010a; Kedar, 2015; Lewis, 1986). This idea is for example maintained in the Hamas covenant of 1988, article two, which argues: “They (Jews) were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies … in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. […] They were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, making financial gains and controlling resources. [...] They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the

44 A forgery created by the Russian intelligence in the beginning of the 20th century - it regards a Jewish plot for world domination. There are over 30 editions of the Protocols in the Middle East.

33 establishment of their state. […] There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it” (1988). Islamists accordingly accuse Jews of all evil ideas and notions brought to the world (Wistrich, 2010). In addition to the implementation of European notions of antisemitism, Islamists have Islamized antisemitism. One of the leading figures of Islamist antisemitism was Said Qutb. Qutb saw Jews as part of an overall problem and wrote a very influential book entitled “Our Struggle with the Jews.” He defined the Jews as an inherent enemy of Islam. He considered Jews to be adversaries since the 7th century, and he advocated that Jihad is a world revolution that will liberate the entire globe from Jews by means of extermination. This book, which is filled with genocidal antisemitism, is still part of the educational agenda of Islamism and is widely spread throughout the world (Tibi, 2010a). Some religious characteristics of Islamist antisemitism are the calling of Jews as descendants of apes and pigs. This refers to God’s punishment opposed on Jews, who had violated the Sabbath, as mentioned in some verses of the Qur’an. Referring to the prophet, and the attempts that were made to poison him, accordingly would expose the “evil nature” of Jews. As an Egyptian Cleric explains “The Jews of today are the Jews of Khaybar, who tried to poison the Prophet Muhammad. They are the Jews of Banu Nadhir, who tried to kill the Prophet Muhammad. They are the Jews of Banu Qaynuqa', who tried to lift up a Muslim woman's dress. Jews will be Jews”

(MEMRI, 2012). Another prominent antisemitic feature is referring to the promise of the stones and trees. This refers to the hadith that argues that before Judgment Day Muslims will kill the Jews. The Jews will hide behind stones and trees, but the stones and trees will shout “Oh Muslim, oh Servant of Allah, a Jew is hiding behind me.

Come and kill him” (MEMRI, 2017; Milson, 2013). Today Islamists are out to destroy Israel and to exterminate Jews. They quote, selectively, passages from the Qur’an and the Sunnah.45 They use these references to give ground to their reasoning, to show the “true nature” of Jews, and to argue that it is a religious duty to fight them. They additionally use European antisemitic notions, like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the Blood Label to bring more weight to their arguments. They deny that the Holocaust ever happened, or they downplay it, claiming that it is a Jewish conspiracy. Whenever they do not deny that the Holocaust happened, they glorify it – arguing that it such a beautiful humiliation (Milson, 2010).

45 The Hadith and Sira: the sayings and biography of the prophet Muhammad.

34 To fight for their cause they use all means to spread their rhetoric of hatred. Everywhere they possibly can, they will encourage that: […] Allah has chosen you to fight the people He hates most – the Jews. Allah said: "You shall find the worst enemies of the believers to be the Jews and the polytheists." And “killing a single Jew is the same as killing 30 million Jews. Therefore, the reward of our martyrs is great, and your reward is also great (Hammad, 2008). As a result of their efforts a new form of antisemitism is threatening the world today. Islamists have Islamized antisemitism.

35 3 Research Design and Methodology

In order to answer the central research question, an explanatory case study is deployed, since this provided the possibility to investigate and explain this complex social phenomenon (Yin, 2003). The topic of this study is antisemitism and the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands. The case in this study is Rotterdam. The unit of analysis is society. The strength of case studies is that they are able to deal with a great variety of evidence (Yin, 2003). This case study was therefore built on multiple sources of data. To obtain a full picture, data triangulation was deployed. Data triangulation is a process that uses more than one method and different sources to collect, secure and cross check the data. This study was conducted in three phases, using different sources of information, which involved quantitative and qualitative data (Bryman, 2012). The first phase answered the question whether there is a rise in antisemitic incidents over the past ten years in the Netherlands from the years 2007 to 2017. In order to gather this information quantitative desk research was employed en formal statistics were consulted from 2007 to 2017. This made it possible to obtain an overview of figures on antisemitism over the years. The second phase investigated whether the moderate and orthodox Jewish communities in Rotterdam, confirmed an experience of rising hostilities. The qualitative interviews with respected persons form each community enabled to collect rich and detailed data (Mortelmans, 2009). These interviews additionally provide the opportunity to find out whether Islamists were identified as perpetrators, and, or, as actors that incite antisemitism. Subsequently, the third phase, explained how Islamists in the Netherlands influenced the expansion of antisemitism in Rotterdam. An obvious way to investigate the influence of Islamists in the spread of antisemitic attitudes would be by researching into their antisemitic propaganda distribution. However, there are several reasons why I chose a different method to investigate this topic. Firstly, many Islamist sources are in foreign languages even if it regards Dutch organizations.46 Since I do not speak any of these languages, I would need to rely on available secondary

46 For example the Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (Dutch Islamic Federation) communicates mainly in Turkish.

36 sources. Another option would be to infiltrate in this world of Islamism, however for the purpose of this study that would be an unrealistic goal. Furthermore, the option to conduct interviews directly with affiliates of Islamist movements brings the problem of doublespeak. However, according to the government of the United Kingdom membership of, association with, or influence by Islamist movements can be considered as a possible indicator of extremism (Gov.UK, 2015). Individuals or organizations in Rotterdam that are involved with, or connected to Islamists or Islamist movements are accordingly for the purpose of this research considered to be possible indicator of extremism as well. Subsequently, it was important to establish an overview of main organizations and individuals in Rotterdam that can be linked to Islamist movements. Followed by field research in the form of qualitative in-depth interviews with young Muslims. Since earlier studies demonstrated a link between the level of religiosity and antisemitism, only youngsters who regard themselves as very religious were selected. Accordingly, the interviews served to find out whether antisemitic rhetoric could be identified, and if so, whether they argued to discuss these matters with affiliates of Islamism. Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data was carried out after all data was collected. Both qualitative interviews were analyzed by means of bottom-up, or inductive, thematic analysis. This process within qualitative data enables to identify themes. These themes in turn are used to address and present the issue. Since the study is interested in the influence of Islamists regarding antisemitism, this analytical method enabled a more focused and a more detailed analysis of certain aspects of the data, which allowed it to be interpreted and to be explained (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

3.1 The First Phase: antisemitism and statistics

In order to find out whether there has been an increase in antisemitic hostilities, quantitative secondary data was consulted. Formal rapports and discriminations figures were used from the Center Information and Documentation Israel (CIDI). Yearly reports from the CIDI’s antisemitism Monitor were collected from 2007 to 2017. The annual rapports were downloaded from the website. The reason why figures from the CIDI were consulted instead of solely State figures is due to pragmatic reasons. There are no annual figures regarding antisemitism available that

37 can be analyzed systematically since the year 2007. The Dutch police, for example, only started reporting on different forms of discrimination since the year 2014. Since this study needs to cover a bit broader spectrum, it is reasonable to use the figures from the CIDI. The CIDI is systematically recording antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands since the year 1983, which provides good quality of data for secondary data analysis (CIDI, n.d.). A limitation is, that it is likely that not all incidents in the Netherlands have been reported. To obtain a better impression, some figures of the Dutch Public Prosecution (OM) are used, as well as the annual data available by the Dutch National Police, including from the Rotterdam Police Department. Additionally, data from a gathering organized by the Jom Hasjoah Beraad Rotterdam at 14 November 2018, at the Rotterdam Police Department is used. Carlijn Casteleijns, OM Prosecutor provided information on OM statistics in regard to antisemitism. Moreover, CIDI employee Paul van der Bas was contacted to gain additional information.

3.1.1 Findings

First this research attempts to answer whether there is a rise in antisemitic incidents over the past ten years in the Netherlands, from the years 2007 to 2017. In order to find out whether there has been an increase in antisemitic hostilities, quantitative secondary data has been consulted. The Dutch Public Prosecution Service (OM) registered the following numbers of discrimination offenses regarding antisemitism (2017). The figures (see table on the next page) of the OM show a fluctuation in the amount of antisemitic incidents on annual basis. Most of the offenses happened around sport events and are mainly carried out by football supporters. In 2017, from the 41% of incidents around 42% of them were during sport events (Casteleijns, 2018). However, one can clearly see that antisemitism is highly overrepresented. Especially when one takes into account that Dutch Jews only account for 0.3% of the Dutch population (LJG Amsterdam, n.d.).

38

The Dutch Police trends demonstrate a more stable figure (see bar graph below) regarding antisemitic incidents (Mink & Bon, 2017; Walz & Mink, 2018; Bon & Mink, 2016; Tierolf, Hermens, Drost, & Ens, 2015).

However when one takes a look at the percentage of antisemitic incidents in Rotterdam one can clearly see a different picture. It is evident that antisemitic incidents reported by the police department in Rotterdam have been (2014 as

39 exception) at the lowest the same as the national average, and in 2017 even 100% higher than the national average. This is worrisome since Rotterdam only counts a very small number of Jewish residents. Rotterdam counts around 638.000 registered inhabitants, and has approximately 800 inhabitants that are Jewish by religion or race. The number of Jews in Rotterdam that wear a Kippah, and can therefore much easier be identified as adherents of Judaism, counts only 10 to 15 individuals. Taken these figures into account, the number of incidents against Jews is accordingly extremely high. The figures of CIDI show primarily an increase in antisemitic incidents (see the trends below). According to CIDI, in general more incidents are reported when tensions between Israel and Palestine rise. However, CIDI does not register information on the perpetrators.

Taken these figures into account, it is legitimate to say that there is an increase in antisemitism in the Netherlands. Additionally it is necessary to bear in mind that these figures might not be complete. Figures are influenced by the awareness among victims of the possibilities to report discrimination, by the trust that people have in the hotlines, and in general the willingness to report incidents of antisemitism.

40 Accordingly, it is necessary to find out whether Jews in Rotterdam experience an increase in antisemitism. Therefore, the members of the liberal and orthodox Jewish communities in Rotterdam were consulted.

3.2 The Second Phase: Jewish communities in Rotterdam

Rotterdam has a rich Jewish history. In 1610, the first Jews came from Antwerp to Rotterdam - they had gained permission from the local government to settle in the city. In 1930, 10.515 Jews lived in Rotterdam. During the Second World War the first deportation was carried out during the night of 30 July in 1942 at Loods 24 (Shed 24) in Rotterdam. Around 2.000 Jews received a call to report themselves at Loods 24, and 1.100 people responded and were transported. A large amount of poor Jews lived in the Jewish quarter in the center of Rotterdam, this part was totally destroyed due to the bombings of 14 may 1940. The war had completely disrupted and destroyed Jewish social life. After the war, in 1950 the community only counted 780 Jews (Joodserfgoed Rotterdam, n.d.). Today, Rotterdam has two Jewish communities that are active: a liberal community in Hilligersberg and an orthodox community in Blijdorp (Joodse Gemeente Rotterdam, n.d.; LJG Rotterdam, n.d.). From the 1960s onwards, al lot of newcomers have settled in Rotterdam, which are mostly non-western migrants with diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Rotterdam has compared to other Dutch cities quite a large population of people with Islamic backgrounds. In 2016, 13,7% of the municipal population said to be Muslim (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2018; Roodenburg, 2016). The amount is probably higher since illegal immigrants that are staying in the municipality are not included (Engbersen, Staring, Leun, Boom, Heijden, & Cruijff, 2002). Accordingly, Rotterdam has quite a lot of Islamic institutions, including Salafi institutions - this made Rotterdam a suitable place to conduct the research (Roex, van Stiphout, & Tillie, 2010). The second phase researched whether the moderate and orthodox Jewish communities confirmed rising anti-Jewish hostilities in Rotterdam. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with two prominent persons from both communities - since it is presumable that they know what goes on amongst Jews in their

41 communities. Furthermore, these interviews mainly served to confirm or dismantle the data that was collected in the first phase, and to some extent in the third phase. Both communities were contacted through the contact-information provided at their websites and both responded within a few days. Additionally, a gathering organized by the Jom Hasjoah Beraad Rotterdam at 14 November 2018, at the Rotterdam Police Department, provided the opportunity to ask question amongst the mainly Jewish public, accordingly this was used as additional data. The questions from the semi-structured interview were not fixed. In order to investigate whether the moderate and orthodox Jewish communities in Rotterdam confirmed the experience of rising hostilities, the interviews focused on the following topics: rise in antisemitism; perpetrators of antisemitism; causes of antisemitism, and forms of antisemitism.

3.2.1 Findings

The orthodox Jewish community (JGR) has about 250 members. Not all members are orthodox Jews or religious Jews (JGR, 2018). The liberal community (LJG) is smaller and compasses around 150 members. After interviewing two representatives of both the liberal and orthodox community, the following results can be presented. Representatives of both the orthodox (respondent 1) and liberal (respondent 2) Jewish community in Rotterdam confirmed an increase in antisemitism over the past 10 years. Both representatives argued that some Jews for security reasons do not wear a Kippah or Star of David, since they fear provocations and violence. Despite the fact that only a small number of Jews wears a Kippah, they all encounter harassments (LJG, 2018; JGR, 2018). Due to the severity and threat of antisemitism, both communities are under 24 hours security protection. During opening hours the Marechaussee (Dutch Military Police) is present to secure the surroundings (LJG, 2018; JGR, 2018). Respondent 1 stressed that due to the necessity of security measures they are somewhat restricted in their freedom as a community – they are limited to religious affairs. Regarding the identification of the main perpetrators of contemporary antisemitism, respondent 1 argued “extreme right, extreme left and extremist Muslims.” Respondent 2 argued that he did not wanted to disregard Islamic antisemitism, but he had noticed that “Jews” are used for political aspirations of all

42 kinds of political groups. That it suits the political right and Christians to put the focus at the Muslim community. He stressed, that classical antisemitism is very much alive as well. In regard to antisemitism amongst the Muslim population he argued that incidents between Muslims and Jews often happen at primary schools, where Jewish children are bullied for being Jewish (LJG, 2018). Respondent 1, also acknowledged that there is not one sole perpetrator of antisemitism, however, she did stressed that with the open border policies of the European Union, members of the orthodox community do express their concerns. They are especially worried about immigrants coming from Islamic countries where antisemitism is propagated, since it is hard to change people’s minds. Additionally, they fear for the likelihood that through satellites they remain in contact with their homelands. Accordingly, despite living in the Netherlands they (including second and third generations) are likely to be influenced by foreign views (JGR, 2018). Moreover, some Dutch Jews from the orthodox community, especially young people, are considering leaving the Netherlands. They do not feel that there is a future left for them (JGR, 2018). Respondent 2 in contrary argued that he does not hear voices saying that they consider leaving the Netherlands, and if he does, it is not for security reasons (LJG, 2018). However, respondent 2 did stress that especially elderly Jews do not necessarily have faith in the police and therefore do not report antisemitic incidents. They lost faith in the government after what happened during WWII. They do not know whom to trust (LJG, 2018). During the gathering of the Jom Hasjoah Beraad, especially elderly Jews expressed their worries and fears for a second Holocaust. An older man, for example, expressed his feelings of helplessness and fear for situations in which individuals shout “Hamas Hamas alle Joden aan het Gas” (Hamas, Hamas, all Jews on Gas). Furthermore, respondent 1 emphasised that social media contributes to an atmosphere of animosity. She explained that people write things down more easily, like “Hitler should have finished his Job, but we will finish it instead,” when they are anonymous (JGR, 2018). Another problem Jews from the orthodox community encounter is that they feel generalized. They feel the consequences, and are blamed for everything that happens in and around Israel. Moreover she stressed that people often do not see the difference between Jews in the diaspora and Jews living in Israel, and often do not even distinguish between these two either. Especially how Israel, Jews and Zionism

43 are used interchangeably, and how under the guise of anti-Zionism, Jew-hatred is preached. That most Jews do not feel free to support Israel – since many people expect you to condemn Israel. Hence people are afraid to tell they are Zionists. Therefore, it is necessary to explain to people what Zionism exactly means, since they shout it, but do not know what it means (JGR, 2018).

3.3 The Third Phase: Influence of Islamists

This study wants to investigate the influence of Islamists. Influence is a non-coercive technique, procedure, manipulation or device, that relies on the social psychological nature of the target as the means to create or change him/her beliefs or behavior - these attempts are carried out by the specific actions of influencing agents (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 475). In order to find out whether Islamists are actively spreading or influencing antisemitic rhetoric, it is first necessary to identify conceivably Islamist movements and individuals operating in Rotterdam. Therefore this study has established an overview of the main organizations and individuals in Rotterdam that can be linked to Islamist movements. This is done through secondary and primary data analysis, such as reports on Islamists, journalist accounts, and through the investigation of the individuals’ and organizations’ social media accounts and or websites. Google is used as search engine. Search combination like Muslim Brotherhood, Islamism, Salafism, extremist Muslim, radical Muslim, fundamentalist Muslim, Hamas, Hezbollah, Radical Islam and Rotterdam have been entered. Furthermore Google was used to find out whether Islamic organizations were involved with antisemitic rhetoric, or whether they were engaging with individuals that are known for speaking antisemitism. Search combinations were made, that involved the particular name of an Islamic organization or an individual, in combination with, Jew, Zionist, Israel, Palestine, antisemitism, and Jew-hatred.

3.3.1 Operationalization

In order to find out which organizations or individuals could be regarded as Islamists. It was first necessary to define Islamists, which are members or followers of Islamist

44 movements. Islamist movements are religious movements, or religious groups of people, who work together to advance their shared desire for Islam to direct all aspects of life, explicitly social and political life - anywhere and anytime. According to the UK government “membership of, association with, or influence by the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered as a possible indicator of extremism” (Gov.UK, 2015). Since the Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist Movement, this study will regard involvement with any Islamist movement as a possible indicator for extremism and hence antisemitism - since this is a core aspect of Islamism (Tibi, 2010). As mentioned earlier, Islamists often engage in doublespeak, they present themselves differently to the outside world. They present a moderate, democratic, inclusive, embracing diversity, and tolerant appearance that endorse western values and morals. However, their ultimate goal for Western Europe is less tolerant, anti-democratic and polarizing (NCTb, 2008). Since antisemitism is a core aspect of Islamism it is not unlikely that it might be propagated through Islamic institutions (Tibi, 2010). For this reason individuals and organizations in Rotterdam that are involved with, or connected to Islamists or Islamist movements are for the purpose of this research considered to be possible indicator of extremism.

45 4 Analysis: Islamists in Rotterdam

This part provides a description of the Islamist organizational structure in Rotterdam. Some important organizations and individuals will be discussed. The table (on page 56) provides an overview of organizations in Rotterdam that can be linked to Islamism or that often engage with affiliates of Islamism. The scope of Islamist ideology is a complex matter since many Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, consists of both transnational networks, which in turn are linked to the Netherlands, and national organisations in and outside the Islamic world, to local networks in Rotterdam. Moreover, these movements are generally unclear and impenetrable, and commonly covert. This is for the reason that some parts of these Islamist movements, are involved or engage with Jihadist Islamists. In other words, some individuals of certain Islamist movements, and even some movements participate in or support violence and terrorism. Many of these Islamists affiliates, may present themselves as representatives of the Muslim community and obtain great influence in all kinds of organizations. These can include charities, mosques, and social institutions – which can even result in a consultant kind of relationship with Dutch governmental organizations, and municipalities in which they pretend to represent the common interests of the Muslim community. The governmental Report on the Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom argues: “these organizations sometimes characterised the UK as fundamentally hostile to Muslim faith and identity; and expressed support for terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas” (2015). However, since Islamists are against western societies it is likely that they will argue the same against Dutch society, that it involves a hostile environment against Muslims. In order to find out which organizations and individuals are (supposedly) affiliated to Islamism, it is logical to look first at Islamists Umbrella Movements at the European level and how they are translated to the national and local level. Hence, it is useful to take a look at some prominent Islamist organizations in Europe and their Dutch relatives. The Federation of Islamic Organizations Europe (FIOE) is the umbrella organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe (Sandee, 2007).

46 47 The Dutch Federation of Islamic Organization (FION) was until 2010 the Dutch branch of FIOE, established by Yahiya Bouyafa. The intellectual leader of the Brotherhood is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who was until recently47 the head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR). Which is the theological body of the FIOE. Al-Qaradawi is also perceived as the spiritual advisor of Hamas48 (Kern, 2011). Despite the fact that al-Qaradawi supports harsh punishments against homosexuals and apostates, he defends the Holocaust and calls for the killing of Jews, he has often been presented to the western world as a moderate Muslim (Harris, 2014; al- Qaradawi, 2009). The Union of Good (headed by al-Qaradawi) is an organization that incorporates over 50 charity organizations that support and fund Hamas, including it’s terrorist activities (Sandee, 2007). In the Netherlands it involved the foundation al- Aqsa Nederland in Rotterdam (NCTV, 2016; Sandee, 2007). Today some of the activities of Al-Aqsa,49 whose funds were frozen after Dutch authorities linked them to financing terrorist organizations, are adopted by ISRAA in Rotterdam and by Foundation Jerusalem from Ali Sonlu, which is called today Kudüs Vakfi (which means foundation Jerusalem in Turkish). Both foundations argued to support the Palestinian cause by fundraising actions for amongst others, orphanage, infrastructure, and educational projects (Abels, 2003; Sandee, 2007; gmbwatch, 2010; Kudüs Vakfı , n.d.). In general we see that in Rotterdam there exists a disparate but overlapping network of organizations and individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas or other Islamist groupings (See Appendix A). However, it is not clear to what extent (and if at all) they spread antisemitism. However, there are organizations and individuals who associate with individuals that are actively engaged in spreading antisemitism. Islamic Centers and Mosques are areas in which Islamists engage to spread their ideology during lectures, events or courses. Some Islamic institutions in Rotterdam that have been engaged with Islamists are Centrum de Middenweg, Essalam Mosque, Masjid al-Noor and Masjid Ghausia. Centrum de Middenweg for example, invited for the event “next level street poetry” Muslim Belal. Muslim Belal is a “performance poet,” who affiliates with the Muslim Brotherhood. He

47 He stepped down in November 2018. 48 Both the US government and European Union have made the decision to classify Hamas, not solely its military wing, as a terrorist organization. 49 Al-Aqsa is the Arabic name for Jerusalem.

48 composes nasheeds (an Islamic song without instruments) that promotes a fundamentalist view of Islam. For example, one of his nasheeds expresses support for Dr. Aafia Siddiqu or “Lady al-Qaida” (Westrop, 2013; Ontdek Islam, n.d.; Quiggin T. , 2017). Another example is the invitation of Fadel Soliman to the Essalam mosque. Soliman advocates, amongst other things, sex slavery, polygamy and wife beating (Osborne, Rashty, & Faulkner, 2016). During his lecture at Essalam he argued that Jihad is about fighting the oppressor, and that it is an obligation to fight the oppressor. He stressed that no one can be blamed for defending himself against being wronged. He argued that there is no blame on you if you apply an “eye for an eye,” but that the blame is on the oppressor. Moreover he stressed that God does not force Muslims to forgive, God recommends forgiveness, but he allows fighting the oppressor (Essalam

ICC, 2015: 28:40). But also during Eid al-Fitr Festivals, Islamists are invited to spread their ideology. This was for example the case during an al-Fitr promoted by Ontdek Islam where Wajdi Ghunaim was invited as a guest speaker (Moslimakhadija, 2005). Ghunaim is an Islamist that argues that Palestinian suicide bombers “who explode themselves to kill the Jews,” are committing jihad. Moreover, he argues that they are freedom fighters and stresses: “because there is no way to struggle and fight the Jews except that way. Allah bless those martyrs” (Merley S. , 2008; Goldmann, 2010). Another Islamic organization that invites Individuals that spread antisemitic rhetoric is Ettaouhid. The youth department of Ettaouhid invited Ahmad Abuznaid50 to give a lecture on the Palestinian conflict. Ahmad Abuznaid, director of the Dream Defenders, is a supporter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). He posted pictures of himself embracing Rasmea Odeh (PFLP member) who was convicted in a 1969 for the bombing of an Israeli supermarket that killed two men (Home Land Security News Wire, 2016). He also argued that terrorist “Leila Khaled is a freedom fighter and she taught us how to fight” (Canary Mission, n.d.). During this lecture51 he discussed the parallels between the US and Israel: both are for example colonial settler states, both desire(d) to replace the native indigenous population, both engage(d) in ethnic cleansing, both are racists. He concludes that Israel is a state that engages with apartheid, colonialism, ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses (Abuznaid, 2016; Canary Mission, n.d.). Other speakers at youth

50 PLO ambassador to the Netherlands and co-founder of Dream Defenders 51 Which can be found on the YouTube channel of the youth department of Ettaouhid.

49 events of Ettaouhid are the rector of the Islamic University of Applied Sciences Rotterdam, Ahmet Akgündüz and Sheikh Said el-Mokadmi. Akgündüz is infamous for his conspiracy theories and his discriminatory rhetoric against Jews, women, Kurds, and Alleviates (JCVE, 2014; Pieters, 2015; Poll & Markus, 2017). Sheikh Said el-Mokadmi is a prominent figure of the Jamaat Tabligh in the Netherland (an organization affiliated to al-Qaida) (Vlaams Parlement, 2010; HBVL, 2010). Furthermore, some notable and influential individuals in Rotterdam that can be linked to prominent Islamists are youth imam Yassin Elforkani,52 who stated to be a fan of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Mischke, 2016). Al-Qaradawi is the fervent antisemite, with a weekly show on al-Jazeera, and who prays to God “not spare a single one of them [Jews]. Oh Allah, count their numbers, and kill them, down to the very last one” (Stalinsky, 2010). Also imam Azzedine Karrat from the Essalam mosque (funded by the al-Maktoum Foundation in Dubai) and who works at the Islamic University of Applied Sciences Rotterdam (also funded with foreign money) is linked to al- Qaradawi. He attended at least two gatherings, in 2014 and 2016, at ECFR where he met with al-Qaradawi and Muslim Brother, and ICCI imam, Sheik Hussein Halawa (Merley S. , 2009). Additionally, Karrat admires Islamists Sheikh Mohamed El Hassan Ould Dedew, Nourdin ali Khan and Tariq Ramadan (Karrat, Tariq Ramadan , 2017; Hastings, 2017; Karrat, Sheikh Mohamed El Hassan Ould Dedew, 2016).

Another individual who closely collaborates with the Muslim Brotherhood is youth Imam and founder of the Islamic platform “Ontdek Islam” (Discover Islam,

52 Mainly operates in Amsterdam but often can be found in Rotterdam. Especially at Centrum de Middenweg.

50 connected to FION) Jacob van der Blom. Van der Blom is the former director of the Essalam mosque, and he is active as a secretary in Europe Trust Netherlands; co- founder of the Blauwe Moskee (Blue mosque) in Amsterdam; and leader of the National Platform for New Muslims (LPNM); and he is the director at the by foreign funded Islamic Center the Middenweg in Rotterdam. Van der Blom is a great admirer of al-Qaradawi. Moreover, through Ontdek Islam, which promotes all kinds of activities (from youth camps, to field trips to Kuwait and Cairo,) he actively engages with individuals who are known for their discriminatory speech, against women, homosexuals and Jews. For example in 2009 Muslim Brother and founding member of Muslim American Society Jamal Badawi was invited, who justifies suicide bombings and jihad (OntdekIslam, 2009; Ikhwan Info, 2015; David Horowitz Freedom Center, 2018; Quiggin T. , 2018; gmbwatch, 2012). Another example is the American born Muslim Scholar Kalid Yasin, a preacher that is known for spreading conspiracy theories and his repulsion of homosexuality (Het Parool, 2009; AIJAC, 2018). Some other examples are antisemitic preacher Salah Sultan, the Egyptian preacher Fadel Soliman, and the antisemitic Malaysian preacher Hussein Yé (Osborne, Rashty, & Faulkner, 2016; Ontdek Islam, 2010; Stand for Peace, 2014; MEMRI, 2006; Simon Wiesenthal Center, 2017). Since Rotterdam has a growing number of Muslim residents, political parties strive for their voice. According to Lorenzo Vidino, Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood are engaged in directing people’s voting behaviour through their network of mosques and Islamic institutions (2010). According to Vidino, “the (Muslim) Brothers have managed to establish clientelistic relations with political forces, either at the national or the local level, in which the Brothers promise to mobilize their resources in support of the party in exchange for financial and political rewards “ (2010, p. 107). In Rotterdam, there are two parties that can be identified as such, namely the more recent political parties of NIDA and Denk. They are actively promoted amongst the Muslim population through Islamic institutions and Islamic youth events (Engelbart, 2016; ISN, 2017; ISN, 2016; ISN, 2015; NIDA, 2015; NIDA, n.d.; Brendel, 2018; Verbeek, 2018; NIDA, 2017). Moreover, both parties and party members can be linked to Islamist organizations.53

53 See Appendix A

51 Another area where Islamists are active is in Palestinian activism. The first Palestinians in Europe Conference in Rotterdam was held in 2007. Organized by the Palestinian Return Centre (PRC), affiliated to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (ITIC, 2011). The conference argues to advocate human rights and “the right of return.” However, this conference does not advocate a two state solution and some prominent speakers at the conference do not advocate a peaceful solution either. The right of return that is advocated likely entails the end of Israel - it would mean the replacement of Israel with a Palestinian state.

Speakers at the conference were, amongst others, the Hamas activists and Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Muhammad Sawalha. Invited, but barred entrance into Europe, was Ikrema Sabri. Sabri is a Sheikh who denies the holy ties between Judaism and Jerusalem (MEMRI, 2012). Since the Dutch government had refused granting Ismail Haniya, today’s leader of Hamas who wishes death to Israel, a visa, he addressed the conference through a live stream (MEMRI, 2018). Also Hamas affiliate Bassam Naim spoke through a live stream. Abdil Abdullah General Secretary of the Conference of Palestinians in Europe, who is affiliated to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, was present, as well as Majed Al-Zeer. And from the Netherlands Palestinian activists Amin Abou Ibrahim, better known as Amin Abou Rashed, and Ibrahim al-Baz were involved in the organization of the event (PRC, 2009; Groen, 2007; Monster, 2011).

52 Amin Abou Rashed and Ibrahim al-Baz are both big players in regard to Palestinian activism in the Netherlands. Abou Rashed,54 who lost his right arm during a fight against Israel, has close ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (PRC, 2009; gmbwatch, n.d. b; gmbwatch, n.d.). The other Palestinian activist is Ibrahim al-Baz, who was arrested in France in 1979 for transporting explosives for al-Fatah. In Rotterdam al-Baz and his wife Nawal al-Baz, are actively engaging in Palestinian activism (Brendel, 2010; CIDI, 2007). In 2017, despite various objections, the Palestinians in Europe Conference were held again in Rotterdam. The Mayor of Rotterdam Ahmed Aboutaleb gave permission for the event by calling upon the notion of freedom of expression. However, he did not gave permission to hold a silent march as a protest against the Palestinian manifestation, for the reason that the local police had not the capacity to secure the (mainly Jewish) participants of the planned march (Koelé, 2017). At this conference, Amin Abuo Rashed provided the opening speech. Nourdin el-Ouali55 together with Muhammad Akarri (son of Ibrahim Akkari) spoke at the conference on NIDA’s behalf. Abou Jahjah, known for his antisemitic rhetoric, provided additionally a speech at the conference. Party leader of Denk Tanahan Kuzu, and Majed al-Zeer, who favours the elimination of Israel, were also present (ITIC, 2015; Damen, 2017; PRC, 2009). Moreover, on the streets of Rotterdam there is quite some activism that can be linked to Islamism and antisemitic individuals. In the summer of 2017, for example, during a demonstration in front of Rotterdam Central Station, demonstrators called for the killing of Jews by shouting “Khaybar, Khaybar ya Yahud, Jaish Muhammad, sa Ya’ud” (De Telegraaf, 2018). At this gathering were present, amongst others, Movement X of Abou Jahjah, the Islamic political parties of NIDA (including party leader Nourdin El Ouali) and the Party for Unity (Partij van de Eenheid) (Koningsveld, 2017; van der Graaf, 2017).

54 He was, amongst many other things, the initiator of the Dutch contribution to the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in 2011. During which NIDA party leader Nouddin el-Ouali was spokesman for the Dutch crew, and others involved in the Dutch contribution were ISRAA, Ettaouhid, FION and Muslim Brother affiliate Ibrahim Akkari (Brendel, 2018b). 55 Additionally, in 2016 el-Ouali provided, together with the Hamas affiliate and activist Zaher Birawi and Ibrahim Akkari training for Palestinian activists at the Islamic Centre the Middenweg (Brendel, 2017).

53

In May 2018, Youth for Palestine and Students for Justice Palestine organized a “youth march of return” in the centre of Rotterdam. Among the organizers were NIDA Young Adults and Amin Abou Rashed (van Schie, 2018; Rotterdam voor Gaza, 2018). During this day were also present, Movement X of Abu Jahjah, who called for “the great march of return,” to “end apartheid” and to “stop colonialism” (RTV Rijnmond, 2018). Abu Jahjah the chairman of Movement X advocates that in the struggle against Israel all means are legitimate (Joods Actueel, 2017). Moreover, many of these organizations and individuals like imam Karrat and van der Blom engage with other religious (Jewish and Christian) organization and present a very liberal and tolerant view. However, behind closed doors they apparently also engage with individuals who express a less tolerant sentiment. This falls in place with how most Islamist organizations in the West work. Also the AIVD argued that not all Islamists are recognizable as such (NCTb, 2008). Islamist movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, try to establish good relationships with western politicians, journalists and mainstream society. Accordingly they present themselves as legitimate spokespersons and advocates for the interests of the Islamic community. However, their ultimate goal (which is not openly proclaimed) is to

54 impose an ultra-orthodox Islamic pillar in Western Europe (NCTb, 2008). Since antisemitism is a core aspect of Islamism it cannot be neglected that intolerance against Jews, which might be disguised as criticism of Israel, might be propagated (Tibi, 2010). Since certain institutions and individuals in Rotterdam voluntarily associate with Islamist organizations and individuals, who use ideas to legitimize intolerance, anti-democratic activities and polarization, it is logical to assume that both are likely to share common grounds and goals, which in turn might be advocated in their own surroundings. Hence, since, membership of, association with, or influence by Islamist movements can be considered as a possible indicator of extremism, individuals or organizations that are involved with, or connected to Islamists or Islamist movements are accordingly for the purpose of this research considered to be possible indicator of extremism as well (Gov.UK, 2015).

55

56

4.1 Data Gathering

In order to gain insight in the possible influence of Islamists in the expansion of antisemitism in Rotterdam, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were held with youngsters with Islamic backgrounds and who regard themselves as very religious. The time available to conduct the study only allowed a small amount of interviews. Additionally, Guest, Bruce and Johnson argue that 12 interviews are sufficient to acquire data saturation – at least when participants are selected in accordance with predetermined criteria (2006). In order to meet rigorous and trustworthiness, and to gather thick, rich data, fourteen youngsters with an Islamic background have been interviewed. Roughly taken youngsters between the ages of 10 to 25, are in a development phase that is primarily characterized by looking for their own identity, forming their own standards, values and views. During this development phase, the brain area that is responsible for rational thinking evolves more slowly than other areas of the brain. The process of development in combination that the brain is still in growth makes young people very susceptible to “influence.” They are therefore extra vulnerable or “susceptible” to radical thinking. Because youngsters are yet not capable to reflect in a nuanced way, they are more easily drawn to extreme and radical ideas. These ideas provide a clear structure and rules regarding what is considered to be good and what is not. Subsequently, this provides a clear manner on how to behave and organize life, which can bring youngsters a sense of calm (Renty, 2015). Since this study investigated the possible influence of Islamists, it was a logic choice to research young people with Islamic backgrounds. To establish a good correspondence, the study used homogenous purposive sampling to search for individuals who were relevant for the research question. Purposive sampling enabled to focus on particular characteristics that were of interest for the study (Bryman, 2012). Therefore the sample group of this study entailed: (1) fourteen youngsters between the age of 15 and 21 years; (2) who are born in the Netherlands;56 (3) and who identify themselves as strictly religious Muslims. Six interviewees were girls; five of them wear a headscarf and are therefore visible Muslim. Eight boys were

56 Two interviewees came to the Netherlands as children and were therefore included.

57 interviewed. What must be noted is that the sample is not representative for the rest of the Muslim population. The interviews were conducted in Rotterdam during the day, over a time period of five days. The interviews were held in the city Center district of Rotterdam, in the public library, which is a peaceful and comfortable place, and was therefore a suitable place to conduct the interviews. The respondents were approached on the street randomly. They were told that the study wanted to investigate diversity of opinions among young religious people. In order to win their cooperation, the interviewees were asked if they are willing to share their views anonymously, and in the spirit of freedom of speech. They were asked to share their concerns and experiences with hostilities and discriminations locally and nationally, and their views in regard to political issues in general. The interviews were 30 to 60 minutes long.

4.2 Operationalization

In order to investigate the possible influence of Islamists in the expansion and shaping of antisemitic views, it was first necessary to discover antisemitic attitudes among the interviewees. To identify antisemitism among the respondents the following definition was used: antisemitism “is the negative perception of Jews, manifestations of which range from verbally expressed antipathy to physical violence toward Jewish individuals” (IHRA, 2016). In order to make this definition and construct observable, the study used the conceptual framework developed by the IHRA (see p.59) (2016). By using this framework it was possible to measure whether the interviewee contained antisemitic attitudes, simply by recording what kind of antisemitic expressions the interviewee made. In order to obtain the information, questions were posed regarding issues that are linked to antisemitism. Since some Islamist preachers encourage greater social involvement and a stronger political-religious engagement of Dutch Muslim youth in regard to conflicts in the Middle East, the semi-structured interviews were focused on the following topics: the Media; Israel and Palestine; the US government; and the Holocaust. Since this study applied the semi-structured interview method, the questions were not fixed.

58

To research whether Islamists possibly influenced attitudes, youngster who expressed antisemitic feelings during the interview were asked whether they often discussed these issue, with whom, and where. But also questions regarding media habits and information provision, like “where do you obtain your information; what media do

59 you reconcile for information?” were asked. All these sorts of questions helped to discover the influencing agents. How can one tell whether the influencing agents were Islamists? After the interviews, the data was analyzed. If the particular source corresponds with an organizations or individuals that were identified as affiliates of Islamist movements, then it can be assumed that the interviewee’s antisemitic views were likely shaped by Islamists. If the respondent expressed antisemitic feelings and for example argued that she often discussed issues regarding Jews or the Palestinian conflict in the Mosque, then we can also assume that it is likely that Islamists have indeed influenced the interviewee’s views. Accordingly, in-depth interviewing made it possible to obtain a lot of information about life styles, value systems, media habits, reference groups, and opinions. This in turn was helpful to discover agents of influence. Accordingly, the in-depth interviews made it possible to observe influence, despite the fact that it was measured indirectly.

60 5 Interview Findings

In this sections the findings of the 14 in-depth interviews will be presented. The interviews were conducted in Dutch in the Central Library in Rotterdam. All quotes that are used in this section were translated into English, the original Dutch quotes can be found in the footnotes. First it is useful to sketch a portrait of the religious practices and the general perspectives on Dutch society and the West. Thereafter the following themes, Media, Palestine and Israel, US government, and the Holocaust will be discussed. Lastly, the sources of information provision will be discussed.

5.1 Religious Practices

All interviewees argued that religion plays a very important role in their lives, and regarded themselves very religious. There was some diversity between religious practices. Five from the six girls that were interviewed were visible Muslim through the headscarf. The only girl that did not wear a headscarf was considering wearing one. In regard to mosque attendance, only two individuals argued that they did not go to the mosque, while one of them desires to go but finds it hard to combine it with his studies. Most interviewees argued that they go once or twice a week to the mosque. One interviewee said to go twice a month, while another interviewee argued to go four times a week. Most interviewees said to pray four to five times a day. Most interviewees argued that Islam cannot be reformed or modernized. Several interviewees argued that they found religion very helpful, since it provides structure and guidance, it tells you how to behave. Sabrin explained:

“Like the Bible, we have the Qur’an, and that means, that you must do what it says […] I stay strictly to what it says, because that is the safest thing to do […] I think it (Islam) is not something which can be modernized. Because, it is something from the past, and which tells your present”57 (2018)

57 “Net als de bijbel hebben wij de Koran en dat wil zeggen: wat erin staat moet je ook doen […] Ik hou me strikt aan wat er daar staat, want dat is het veiligste [...] ik vind niet dat het iets is (Islam) dat gemoderniseerd kan worden, want het is iets van het verleden, en het vertelt je jouw heden.”

61

Additionally, half of the interviewees mentioned the importance of the hereafter. These respondents believed that life on earth is a kind of exam. One interviewee even stressed the necessity to make preparations for the afterlife. Many follow or have followed Qur’an studies and are or were engaged in site activities as well. The most argued to be occupied with religion the entire day. The majority argued that they regarded Islamic rules more important than secular rules. Only one interviewee argued that he preferred secular rules due to the freedoms that it provides. Moreover, one interviewee emphasized that there is no such thing as a radical or moderate Muslim – there are only Muslims he argued. Almost all interviewees were second- generation Dutch civilians, however, only one interviewee argued that his Dutch nationality was more important to him than his Afghani nationality. However, all interviewees argued that religion is more important than nationality.

5.2 Perspectives on Dutch Society and the West

Additionally, it is also important to note that almost all interviewees argued that the Netherlands is tolerant of religions, and that they personally never encountered any form of discrimination. One interviewee argued to have encountered discrimination, since he and his friends were rejected for a job application while a Dutch girl, a classmate, was hired. Another boy (who wears a small beard) argued that he is discriminated by the police, by ethnic profiling. Moreover, a Somali girl who wears a khimaar argued that she occasionally, during the summer, gets remarks. However, she stressed that it regards individuals from Suriname, Holland, but most often they are other Muslim women. According to her, they are shameful for not wearing modest clothes. But she stressed that many Muslim women, however, admire her for her modesty. Furthermore, a Kurdish girl and a Shia Muslim argued that they did not openly identify themselves as Shia, or Kurdish, since this would cause troubles with other Muslims. Moreover, some interviewees argued that they sometimes had the idea that non-Muslims give them dirty looks. However, despite that most interviewees never encountered any form of harassment personally; they said to hear it on the news

62 and in politics. Some referred to Geert Wilders, party leader of the Party of Freedom (PVV). All interviewees referred to terrorist attacks, which according to most, are not carried out by Muslims. One girl emphasized that she felt lucky to live in the Netherlands and not in an intolerant country, like France. Another girl also mentioned France as a country that smears Islam. She referred to Charlie Hebdo. In regard to “who” wants to slander Islam, many argued the West in general, others emphasised America. One girl claimed, that other religions want to defame Islam. Almost all argued that it is the media that distorts the truth.

5.3 The Media

Regarding the Media, most interviewees argued that western Media distort the truth and ought to slander Islam. Some argued that they normally doubt the trustworthiness of news covers, and especially in regard to terrorist attacks. Almost all interviewees argued that Muslims do not carry out these attacks. They generally claimed that terrorists are not and cannot be Muslims, since Islam is a religion of peace and does not allow killing. Some stated that these attacks are conspiracies. That it is the West or America who are behind them in order to slander Islam. Others argued that they did not know who were behind the attacks, only that they are sure that they are not Muslims. One interviewee claimed that the United Nations or other rich people might be bribing the media. Moreover, especially in regard to the 9/11 attacks in 2001 in America, many argued that the perpetrator was not al-Qaida. They claimed that the media distorted the truth. Ayaan, recalled the first time when she heard about 9/11 during a class reading comprehension.

“At primary school I attended a school with mainly Dutch children. That (school) was in the place where I lived, as I said, I lived in a place where there are many Dutch people. And they all knew that I am a Muslim, so what did they do? They (classmates) said to me: Yes, it's your (Muslims) fault [...] So I went to my mother, and I said: ‘Mom is that really true? They told me this at school.’ Then my mother said, ‘well, you know what I think. I think that the American president from back then, staged it. I absolutely do not think we did that. And I really think that that 9/11 happening is an

63 excuse to start that War on Terror.’ IS, I absolutely do not believe that we, that it originated in Iraq. I really think that America has something to do with it. Because, coincidentally it is America, that is constantly occupied with this matter. I really think they have smashed those two planes into the Twin Towers themselves. To slander our name, I think.”58

In regard to the terrorist attacks in Europe, she argued:

“I think Europe is just a bad copy of America.”59 (Ayaan, 2018)

Another interviewee stressed that different views on the 9/11 attacks are not accepted in Dutch society. If one believes that it is an inside job, people straight away brand you as an extremist he argued. Another interviewee stressed that he couldn’t care less about who were behind the 9/11 attacks. Yet another interviewee argued that he first needed proof before he could believe the claims that are made. Only one interviewee stated that individuals who regard themselves Muslims carry out attacks. However, he does not acknowledge them as such. Furthermore, a third of the interviewees claimed that America or the West is behind the attacks in the Middle East. Illias, in contrary argued that attacks, the wars in the Middle East, and chemical bombs are all fake - that we are deceived (2018). Furthermore, most interviewees claimed that the media does not show a representative picture regarding the Palestinian conflict. Most felt that the media stands behind Israel, and is putting the blame on the Muslims.

58 Op de basisschool zat ik echt op een school waar alleen maar Nederlanders op zaten. Dat was dan wel in de plek waar ik dan woonde, zoals ik al zei, ik woonde op een plek waar heel veel Nederlanders zijn. En ze wisten allemaal dat ik Moslim was, dus wat deden zij, ze zeiden tegen mij “ ja het is allemaal jullie schuld, die leerlingen dan. En ik ging daarmee naar mijn moeder, en ik zei “mam is dat echt zo? Dat hebben ze tegen mij gezegd op school”. Toen zei mijn moeder, nou weet je wat ik denk: ik denk dat het gewoon gefaked is, door die Amerikaanse president destijds. Ik denk absoluut niet dat wij dat hebben gedaan. En ik denk ook echt dat dat 9/11 gebeuren, een excuus is om die War on Terror geode te starten. IS, ik geloof absoluut niet dat wij, dat het in Iraq is ontstaan. Ik denk echt dat Amerika er iets mee te maken heeft. Want toevallig is het Amerika die zich daar continu mee bezig houdt. Ik denk echt dat die twee vliegtuigen zelf door die Twin Towers zijn geramd. Om onze naam gewoon zwart te maken denk ik. En Europe, ja Europe, vind ik Europa gewoon een slechte kopie van Amerika eigenlijk.

59 Ik vind Europa gewoon een slechte kopie van Amerika.

64 “I think it is terrible what is happening, whit a country that exists for only 70 years, and now wants to takeover another country and that the media portrays that as a positive thing. That is also terrorism. You kill people to takeover their land, and the media covers this totally different than how the media for example covered what has happened in Paris. Both are terrible, I do not make a distinction between what happens in Paris or in the East. However, I do see a difference how the media reflects both situations.”60 (3, 2018)

Regarding the reason why the media would do this:

“As I said, because, they do not want Islam.”61 (3, 2018)

Another interviewee argued that his mosque teacher had encouraged his class to show a positive image of Muslims towards the media, and therefore not to express negative feelings toward Jews in Dutch society.

“My teacher literary said: If you’re out on the streets as a Muslim, and shout, for example, ‘cancer Jew,’ then you create an image of yourself, but not only of yourself but also of your community, so just keep it to yourself if you are against the Jewish religion. Because we are already under attack, so it is better to present a good image of yourself and your people towards the media.”62 (Faisko, 2018)

60 Ik vind het wel erg wat er op dit moment gebeurt met een land die sinds 70 jaar lang bestaat, die nu een ander land wilt gaan overnemen en dat dat in de media positief wordt gezien. Dat is ook terrorisme, je maakt mensen dood om grond over te nemen, en hoe dat in de media komt is heel anders dan wat er bijvoorbeeld in Parijs is gebeurd. Snapt u? Het zijn allebei even erg, ik maak sowieso geen onderscheid tussen wat in Parijs gebeurt of in het Oosten gebeurt, weetje. Terrorisme hoort gewoon niet erbij, maar ik zie wel duidelijk verschil over hoe media dat voortbrengt.

61 Zoals ik al zei, omdat, ze willen geen Islam.

62 Mijn leraar, hij zei letterlijk: als je op straat gaat zeggen als een Islamiet, ik neem even het woord “kanker Jood,” dan breng je een beeld niet alleen naar jezelf, maar over heel jouw groepering, dus hou het gewoon in je als je tegen het joodse geloof bent. Want we staan al best wel onder vuur, dus het is beter om een mooi beeld van jouzelf en je volk naar de media te brengen.

65 5.4 Palestine and Israel

Almost all interviewees mentioned that the Palestinian conflict is something that they care about. One girl even said to be dying from the inside. Many argued that they find it awful how Palestinians and Palestinian children are murdered for no reason.

“During History class I learned a lot more about it, and I think it is a massacre, it doesn’t make sense. And with those Jews and Zionists, and all that bullshit. I do not hate anyone, but it is unfair to see footage of children throwing stones and men with guns firing at them.”63 (Bilal, 2018)

Many feel that the Palestinians are treated unfairly, and that their land is taken from them. Most interviewees argued that the geographical land of Palestine has been for centuries from the Palestinians, and that the Jews just took their land. One interviewee explained that the Palestinians had welcomed the Jews into their land, but then became rebellious and wanted a land of their own. Adil clarified how Palestine was invaded:

“The state used to belong to Palestine, then the Israelis invaded, and I believe, they occupied 80% of the land. And now they pretend, or they blame Palestine, that they are the cause of this (situation). While it is their fault, and then I am talking about uuuuh what are they called … Zionists.”64 (2018)

Four boys and one girl explicitly argued that they do not call Israel, Israel, but Palestine. According to them Israel has no right to exist. Muhammad explained:

“All of Palestine is for the Palestinians … If I say Israel, I do not mean the Jewish people. I mean the Arabic Jewish people have the same rights just like the Muslim

63 Tijdens geschiedenisles ben ik er wel meer achter gekomen, en hoe ik het nu bekijk. Ik vind het gewoon een slachtveld het slaat gewoon nergens op. En met die joden en zionisten en al dat bullshit. Ik haat niemand, daar niet van, maar het is wel oneerlijk als je video’s ziet van kinderen die met stenen zitten te gooien en mannen met wapens die daarop zijn aan het vuren.

64 Het is zo van, vroeger was, de staat was eerst van Palestina zelf, en toen kwamen de Israëliërs binnenvallen en die hadden, volgens mij, 80% van het land in bezit genomen. En dan doen ze nu alsof Palestina soort van, ze schuiven de schuld aan Palestina, dat hun de oorzaak zijn van dit. Terwijl het gewoon hun schuld is. En dan praat ik over de uuuh, hoe heten ze ook alweer .. Zionisten.

66 Arabic people in Palestine. But if we talk about Zionists, or people that are born for example in Russia, and who say, ‘now, we have rights here’ - what rights do you have? Like your parents and your grandma and grandpa, you have never even seen Palestine and now you say you have rights? […] We have no problem with Jews, but with the occupiers and Zionists. And there are also Zionists, who are Arabs, we also have a problem with them”65 (Muhammad, 2018)

In regard to Jews, whether they only care about themselves, Sabrin stressed:

“Well, you can see that in Israel, they care about their own. Because my cousin recently went to Israel with school, she just finished I believe the University of Utrecht and now she is a journalist, and she saw that in many houses there were black slaves. People who are collared were slaves. So she said that what the media shows you is not the reality of the world today.”66 (2018)

She additionally, stressed that there are no equal rights in Israel. People with a darker skin, or people from other backgrounds are discriminated.

“They only want Israelis or (Jewish) people, because even people with a different religion they do not accept as well. My cousin also said: I stayed that week in fear”67 (Sabrin, 2018)

65 Palestina is allemaal voor de Palestijnen. En als ik Israël noem, dan bedoel ik niet de Joodse mensen, dan bedoel ik de Arabische Joodse mensen die hebben wel dezelfde rechten als de Arabische Moslims in Palestina. Ze hebben dezelfde rechten, maar als wij gaan praten over de zionisten en de mensen die in Rusland zijn geboren en die zeggen “nu, wij hebben rechten in Palestina,” - wat voor recht heb je? Je hebt Palestina nooit gezien en jouw ouders en je oma en je opa hebben het ook nooit gezien, en dan kom je zeggen dat je recht hier hebt?! […] Wij hebben geen problemen met de Joden, maar met de bezetters en de zionisten en er zijn ook mensen die zionistisch zijn die Arabisch zijn. Daar hebben wij ook een probleem mee.

66 Wat in Israël is, dat kan je wel zien, ze geven wel om hun eigen mensen. Want een nicht van mij is kort geleden moest ze van haar school, ik geloof ze zat in Universiteit Utrecht, maar ze is klaar nu want ze is journalist, dus ze ging naar Israël, en ze merkte ook echt van: in veel huizen waren zwarten slaven. Mensen donker gekleurd waren slaven. Dus ze zei van ja wat de beelden van de media jou laten zien zijn niet echt de échte beelden van de wereld.

67 Ze willen alleen maar Israëlische, of want mensen uit een andere geloof, die accepteren ze ook niet! Mijn nicht zei ook “ik verbleef die week met angst”.

67 Another girl, Lamia, argued that World War Three will breakout when Israel has conquered all of Palestine, and that according to Islam this signifies the End of Days (2018). Another interviewee argued that the land belongs to Palestine since the Qur’an says so. Another interviewee stressed that in Judaism, Jerusalem is the most important city in the world. However, in Islam, Jerusalem belongs to Palestine.

“In their religion Jerusalem is sort of the most important city in the world. While in our religion it actually belongs to Palestine. That is why they fight, they want Jerusalem and another city, I forgot how it is called, to have in their possession - and what is written in their religion that that becomes reality.”68 (Adil, 2018)

Ismael argued that it is greed and power that makes Israel wanting more of Palestine (2018). The majority of the interviewees, however, argued that the conflict is about religion.

“Because back in the day it was Jewish land. Today it is from the Muslims. So now it has to become Jewish again”69 (3, 2018)

And:

“Firstly, because they took the land from the Palestinians, and secondly because of religion. Because Judaism and Islam are two different things.”70 (Ayaan, 2018)

Ahmed instead argued that the Palestinian conflict is not about religion. His grandmother had told him that before WWII, there were many Jewish people that lived in Palestine. He argued that after WWII, almost all European Jews came to Palestine and that this is the cause of the conflict (Ahmed, 2018). Sefra stated that the

68 In hun geloof is dat Jerusalem soort van, ja dat het de belangrijkste stad is van de hele wereld. En in ons geloof hoort dat eigenlijk bij Palestina. En daardoor vechten ze ook, ze willen Jerusalem en nog een andere stad, ik kom er even niet op, willen ze soort van in hun bezit hebben, en ja dat wat in hun geloof staat dat dat ook echt werkelijk is.

69 Want vroeger was het Joods land. En nu is het van de moslims. En nu willen ze dat het weer Joods wordt.

70: Eén, omdat ze het land van de Palestijnen hebben afgepakt, en ten tweede om de religie. Want het Jodendom en de Islam is gewoon twee hele andere dingen.

68 situation in Palestine is not as bad as the media portrays it. She argued that she knows a few people who have been to Palestine and they told her that the situation is not so bad and dangerous at all (Sefra, 2018). Furthermore, only one interviewee argued explicitly that both Israel and Palestine have the right to exist, and that Jerusalem should be split in half. However, most do not see a solution for the conflict, Bilal explained:

“If someone had a solution then it was probably already resolved. It is the same if I come to your house and I say, “This is my property.” Then you say, “Okay, you can have the garden.” Next I take the living room and the WC, and the whole house. You just cannot!”71 (2018)

In regard to Hamas, Muhammad argued that Dutch people might find it a terrorist organization, but it actually is a Palestinian party. He argued that to Muslims, the PVV (the Party of Freedom) is a terrorist party. He additionally argued that Israel threatens world peace; he referred to the Munich Olympic Massacre. He argued that this would not have happened if Israel had not imprisoned people. Another interviewee argued that the Israeli government threatens Islam, but Jewish people do not. Most of the interviewees believed that the Palestinians want peace, but that Israel does not want peace.

5.5 Zionism

Moreover, five interviewees claimed that Zionism threatens Islam. One interviewee explained that this was the reason that extremism came into existence. Moreover, two interviewees explicitly mentioned, that they had a problem, or even hated Zionists - but not Jews. Another interviewee argued that Zionism does not threaten Islam, because Muslims have a strong faith, which could not easily be taken from them. Only if people really got scared they might convert to Judaism, but she thought that

71 Als iemand wist hoe het opgelost zou kunnen worden dan was het denk ik al opgelost. Het is net als ik bij u thuis kom en ik zeg “ik vind dat dit mijn bezit is” en u zegt “weet je wat, jij mag de tuin hebben.” Daarna neem ik de woonkamer over en de WC en heel het huis over. Dat kan gewoon niet!

69 was very unlikely. In general the interviewees expressed hostility against “Zionists” instead of against “Jews.” Faisko for example, has a Jewish friend, and explained:

“I do not think that all Jews are Zionist, and all Muslims are terrorists […] Often you hear people say, when they know that he (his friend) is Jewish, that he is also a Zionist, I think that is stupid”72 (2018)

Bilaal claimed that in essence it is impossible for Zionists to be Jewish:

“They (Zionists) are also not Jews, because if you take a look at the Torah and the way they are treating people; beheadings - and if you look at it this way, it is really sickening, and unacceptable. They just try to manipulate.“73 (2018)

Another interviewee compared Zionists with Islamists terrorist and argued that they both misuse religion to obtain a podium, this would accordingly explain why they both have become so influential. However, he claimed that the terrorists have a bigger podium than the Zionists. He additionally stressed that America has a gigantic Zionist lobby.

5.6 The US Government

In general can be said that almost all interviewees were not in favour of America. A few interviewees argued that they did not have anything against America either, but that they also not favoured it. A great part of the interviewees claimed that Israel and America work together, especially regarding weapons supplying and armed conflict. Half of the interviewees claimed that there is a Jewish or Zionist lobby in America. Muhammad stressed that the Zionist movement in America always have had power.

72 Ik zie het niet als alle Joden zijn Zionisten en net als alle Islamieten zijn terroristen […] Vaak hoor je wel eens van mensen dat ze weten dat hij Jood is dat hij ook gelijk Zionist is, maar dat vind ik nergens op slaan.

73 Dat zijn ook geen Joden, want als je kijkt naar de Thora en de manier waarop je men gaat behandelen, onthoofden en dat is toch, als je het zo bekijkt, dat is toch ziekelijk, dat kan toch gewoon niet. Ze willen gewoon manipuleren.

70

“They actually make the decisions and not America itself.”74 (Muhammad, 2018)

Two interviewees believed that there is a Jewish lobby in America because Jews are good with money or economics. Ayaan, explained how she found out:

“Jews are very good in economics, they are very handy in it, so I think so [...] A while ago I visited Belgium, and we walked by some jewellery stores, and we went inside, and all the owners appeared to be Jews. So that raised a flag, because people say that Jews are good with economics: yes now I am really convinced that they are.”75 (Ayaan, 2018)

In general can be said that almost all of the interviewees were not in favour of president Donald Trump. One interviewee argued, that she did not understand why president Trump discriminates against all women and Muslims, and stressed that he has to give rights to all human beings. Another interviewee argued that Trump is not the right president and stressed that the embassy move to Jerusalem made many Muslims angry. She explained that it is a very important Islamic city. Many of the interviewees however thought that the embassy move was very hurtful for Muslims. One interviewee argued that Jerusalem should not only be for the Jewish people but for all three religions. Moreover, only one interviewee argued that he did not mind the embassy move, and said that Trump can do whatever he likes. Another interviewee claimed that President Trump’s decision to move the embassy signified the first sign of the End of Days. He explained that it is written in the Qur’an. First there will be small signs, and subsequently more prominent signs. The embassy move is a small sign. Then he stressed that the End of Days cannot go as Hitler did it, because that would be too easy76 (Ilias, 2018).

74 Zij maken zelf de beslissingen, en eigenlijk niet Amerika zelf.

75 Joden zijn heel erg goed in economie, zij zijn daar heel erg handig in, dus ik denk op zich van wel […] Ik was een tijdje terug was ik in België en toen liepen we langs een paar juweliers en toen en toen waren we naar binnen gegaan en het scheen allemaal van Joden te zijn. En toen was er ook een lampje bij mij gaan branden, van dat ze zeggen dat Joden goed zijn in economie: ja daar geloof ik nu wel echt in.

76 Some Muslims, especially Islamists, believe that there will be a battle between Jews and Muslims at the end of time.

71 5.7 Holocaust

Only one interviewee, said to be very interested in WWII, however she really wondered why Hitler, who according to her was actually an innocent boy, turned against the Jews. In regard to the Holocaust, she argued:

“Many things still make me wonder. I mean, only a hand full of Nazis murdered 6 Million Jews - could those 6 million Jews not revolt? Because, they were with a lot of people!”77 (Ayaan, 2018)

Accept for Ayaan, nobody explicitly argued that they had any doubts regarding the Holocaust. There was one interviewee who argued that he thought that it must have been horrible, and argued that it probably was worse than what is happening today in Palestine. Another interviewee believed that what is happening today in Palestine is the consequence of what the Jews have experienced during the Holocaust. In general, most interviewees did not seem to have much knowledge on WWII. Moreover, most of the interviewees were also not aware of the size of the Jewish population. One interviewee stressed that there are more Jews today than before, referring to the Holocaust. Some believed that there are over 75 million Jews. One interviewee emphasized that she thought that the Jewish and Christian population would soon become much larger than the Muslim population, for the reason that so many Muslims are killed today.

5.8 Sources

In general can be said that most interviewees argued to discuss the above subjects with more than one source. Not all interviewees argued to discuss the matters in religious places, however, the majority who attended religious places did. Moreover, most interviewees argued often to discuss religious and political matters at home or

77 Ik vraag me nog steeds heel veel dingen af, ik bedoel zes miljoen joden zijn er vermoord en dat gebeurde allemaal door een paar Nazi’s, konden die zes miljoen Joden dan niet in opstand komen ofzo, want dat waren wel heel erg veel mensen.

72 with family members. Additionally some argued to discuss these topics with friends or at school. A third of the interviewees argued to obtain some information from foreign news. Only three interviewees argued to consult the Internet regarding all matters discussed above.

73

6 Discussion and Conclusion In this next section the findings of this study will be discussed. Thereafter some concluding remarks will be provided. Lastly, the limitations of this study and some recommendations will be presented.

6.1 Discussion of the findings

Whether Islamists have been responsible for the rise of and expansion of antisemitism in the Netherlands, and more specifically in Rotterdam, to a certain extant the answer is “Yes.” In regard to whether there is a rise in antisemitism over the past ten years, the statistics of CIDI clearly showed that there has been a rise in antisemitism over the past ten years. The statistics of the OM and National Police clearly demonstrated that antisemitism is overrepresented in the Netherlands. Additionally, the Police figures on antisemitic incidents in Rotterdam showed that since 2014 the size of antisemitic incidents is locally higher than nationally. Hence, it is legitimate to say that there has been a rise in antisemitism in the Netherlands, and more specifically in Rotterdam. Whether both Jewish communities in Rotterdam also experienced a rise in antisemitism over the past ten years was confirmed by the interviews - both the orthodox as the liberal community argued to have experienced a rise in antisemitism. Additionally, both communities acknowledged that they encountered antisemitism form extremist Muslims. Both communities are under 24-hour security since the Islamist attack in Brussels. Especially members of the Orthodox Jewish Community are concerned about increasing Islamist antisemitism,78 mainly due to the open border policy. Moreover, many Jews do not openly identify themselves as adherents of Judaism or as supporters of Israel or Zionism, since they fear harassments. Both communities stressed that Jews that can visibly be identified as Jewish often encountered antisemitic incidents. Accordingly, the orthodox community stressed that some Jews are considering leaving the Netherlands for Israel. Which is a natural

78 The orthodox community exists out of religious and non-religious members. The religious members are not all orthodox Jews.

74 response for those who do not believe to have a future in a society were they are not able to freely be, or to adhere a system of belief, whether this is Judaism or Zionism. In regard to whether Islamists have been responsible for the expansion of antisemitism, the interview findings showed that Islamists probably have influenced a number of interviewees. Most interviewees who attend Islamic institutions argued that they often did discuss matters like the Israel – Palestine conflict, terrorist attacks and the media – and many expressed forms of antisemitism. Strikingly one interviewee claimed that his mosque teacher had encouraged his class not to express negative feelings towards Jews in society. Instead of arguing that there is no rational to be against Jews, the mosque teacher recommended to keep negative thoughts to oneself, in order to present a more positive image of Muslims to the outside world. This clearly demonstrated that negative perceptions on Jews are at least not debunked in all Mosques in Rotterdam. Additionally it shows that youngsters are instructed how to represent themselves in Dutch society, regardless of their true perspectives. This is inline with how Islamists try to infiltrate into western societies, in which they gradually will push their agenda. In order to do so, Islamists educate themselves on the culture of Dutch society, what the principles are. They tell people what they want to hear (Hirsi Ali, 2016). They apply iham (or taqiyya) in order to act carefully and prudently, which additionally entails that at times they must lie and deceive (Tibi, 2008). Moreover, another interviewee, who argued to obtain his information mostly from al-Jazeera, a broadcast channel from the Muslim Brotherhood, expressed clear Islamist antisemitism. Hence, individuals are not necessarily influenced through Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands. What additionally demonstrated that Islamists might have influenced some of the interviewees was the mentioning of the End of Days, which supposedly was caused by or linked to Israel and Jerusalem. This is a typical form of Islamist antisemitism, for which they refer to the Hadith that argues that at the End of Days the Muslims will fight the Jews (MEMRI, 2017). One of the interviewees, who mentioned the End of Days, was an interviewee who attends Masjid al-Noor, a mosque that is identified to affiliate with Islamists. Another interviewee, who also attended Masjid al-Noor confirmed that terrorist attacks and the Palestinian conflict were topics of discussion in the Mosque. Both interviewees believed in conspiracy theories regarding Islamist terrorist attacks. However, both said to have a Jewish classmate and argued that not all Jews are bad. One argued that

75 it is the Israeli government who is doing wrong; the other interviewee claimed that not all Jews agree with Israel and accordingly not all Jews are evil. However, most Jews do support Israel – and are subsequently regarded to be evil. There were additionally two interviewees who are member of the Islamic youth association Yusra, which is part of Mili Görüs. One of the interviewees is member of the commission of Yusra and argued that religion and politics are always separated, and that they do not discuss political matters. However, she did argue that the Palestine refugee problem was sometimes discussed, in order for youngsters to create their own opinions. The other Yusra member, in contrary claimed that all kinds of political issues, such as terrorist attacks and the Palestinian conflict (and not solely refugee problems) are discussed at the youth association. It appears that the commission member clearly, for whatever reason, wanted to hide the aspect that political matters are discussed within their association. However, a great part of the interviewees discussed matters with family (mostly parents) and friends. It was notable that it appears that family members also have quite some influence in spreading conspiracy theories regarding the attacks as well regarding the state of Israel and Jerusalem. This actually coincides with earlier studies that argued that anti-Jewish attitudes are fostered by the Palestinian conflict and by theological Jew-hatred, which appears to be mainly encouraged by the environment (family, friends and media) in which the Muslim youth resides (Elchardus, 2011). Furthermore, all interviewees who claimed to use mainly Internet as a source of information, believed in a Zionist threat and a Jewish lobby. Importantly, not all interviewees expressed forms of antisemitism. The vast majority however did (11 out of 14) regardless of the sources of information provision that they said to consult. The interviews demonstrated that antisemitism was mainly projected against Jews as a collectivity rather than against Jews individually. Like the comments of amongst others NIDA, Denk, and rapper Appa, many interviewees made similar remarks. For example, resembling Zionists with terrorists or arguing that it is greed that drives Israel. In general can be said that most interviewees clearly made a distinction between Israel, Zionists and Jews when making their arguments. Some of the interviewees appeared to be aware that they could not argue that “all” Jews are committing atrocities, or that all Jews are bad. However, it appeared that many thought that if one argues “Zionists” or “Israel” that many things could be said. This

76 is in line with what is called new antisemitism, which refers to hatred and prejudice against Zionism and Israel (Hogg & Levine, 2010). In correspondence, more than one third of the interviewees clearly named Zionists as enemies of Islam. This is very problematic since the vast majority of Jews are Zionists. Additionally, almost half of the interviewees argued conspiracies and stereotypical allegations. Mainly, regarding the existence of a Jewish or Zionist lobby in the United States. Moreover, the interview findings clearly demonstrated that the Israel Palestine conflict is something most care much, and know very little, about. Many interviewees felt that Israel has no right to exist –since they misused Palestinian generosity after WWII or because they invaded and occupied Palestine after WWII. This mainly corresponds to the political appearance of antisemitism, which is overtly expressed through the protest and decline of the Jewish right to self-determination. Moreover, one interviewee referred to slaves in Israel and the lack of rights for others than Jews and Israelis. This again is more in line with the ideological appearance of antisemitism. Many argued that Israel is the sole aggressor who deliberately uses violence against innocent civilians. Additionally, it appeared that most interviewees believed that the West is on all accounts on Israel’s side and against the Palestinians since they are, like themselves, Muslims. Some interviewees were rather apposed to Israel on theological grounds. However, none of the interviewees referred explicitly to Israel as an apartheid state or used the words genocide or colonialism. Besides forms of antisemitism, the interview findings additionally demonstrated that most interviewees argued that they thought that the West is ought to slander Islam. This again is in line with earlier studies that demonstrated that many feel that the West is against Islam, or that Zionism is a threat to Islam. A new finding is that almost all interviewees did not acknowledge Islamists terrorist attacks to be committed by Islamists, including the 9/11 attacks. Instead, many argued that America or the West carried out these attacks in order to defame Islam. Moreover, the findings demonstrated that there is little trust in free press, because it is against Islam. Despite the fact that none of the interviewees ever encountered any form of aggression or other forms of marginalization within Dutch society, they do believe that the West is against Islam and Muslims, which is quite a contradiction. Many regarded criticism of Islam (as a system of ideas,) satire, and reporting of events, as instruments of defamation – instead of the right to freely express oneself. Nevertheless, all these outcomes are in line with Islamist anti-Western ideas. Islamists

77 present an image that claims that the “enemies of Islam,” meaning Jews and Christians, or, the West, are threatening Islam. Accordingly they try to accomplish a typical “us” (Muslims) versus “them” (the West) estrangement (Tibi, 2012). Another quite remarkable finding was the fact that all interviewees argued that religion is more important to them than nationality. Which accordingly, makes these interviewees first of all Muslims, and for many only after their second nationality (which most preferred,) a Dutch citizen. Accordingly this again contributes to the “us versus them” divide – and will gradually polarize Dutch society. In short it, it appears that antisemitism is mainly shaped by (inaccurate) assumptions regarding the Palestinian conflict, and additionally due to the assertion that the West (Europe, the US and Israel) is against Islam. Moreover, Zionism and Zionists are used as words that contain hostile meanings. However, most views lacked factual argumentation and were mainly based on sentiments of injustice, but also on plain bigotry. Additionally, these interviewees demonstrated that there is quite a gap between proudly “being Muslim” and “being a Dutch citizen,” which accordingly divides society firstly into “Muslims” and “non-Muslims.” However, it seems that not only Islamists contribute in the shaping of anti-Jewish and anti-Western perceptions, but also family and friends play a role.

6.2 Conclusion

Concluding, this research has demonstrated that the research answer can be confirmed to be true, at least to some extent. The research clearly showed a steady rise in antisemitism. Additionally, Islamists have been identified as perpetrators of antisemitism. It is legitimate to argue that to a certain extent Islamist ideology already influenced some youngsters with Islamic backgrounds. Additionally, the study demonstrated that not all mosques counter anti-Jewish feelings, but rather recommend not explicitly expressing them in Dutch society. Moreover, there are religious places that are likely contributing in the shaping of antisemitic and anti-Western sentiments. Although it is likely that Islamists influenced some of the interviewees, the findings additionally showed that family, friends, and the Internet played a part in shaping views. Hence it is plausible to assume that a hybrid structure is dominant in influencing and shaping intolerant, isolationist and dogmatic views. The anti-Western

78 stances amongst many youngsters, the belief that the West is against Islam, and that Zionists are a threat to Islam, but also the lack of trust in free press and expression - are severe problems for an open society. In order to live together in harmony we must create awareness of togetherness and awareness of a unified nation. But this can only succeed if we create understanding and appreciation of Western freedoms, values and standards. It is necessary to protect our free and open society. It is essential to defend our Jewish population. And it is of importance to safeguard innocent and conscientious Dutch Muslims from Islamists. In order to do so, we must be honest and frank about Islamic history, future and present. About good and bad aspects, and the path that Islamists walk today - even if some Muslims may find this unpleasant. Because “there are moments in life when keeping silent becomes an fault and speaking an obligation. A civic duty, a moral challenge, a categorical imperative from which we cannot escape.” (Fallaci, 2002: p.17). At least not, if we believe in the future of reason, if we have faith in pluralism, and in the strength of our Western standards. It is of necessity to recognize sentiments that aim to carefully polarize society apart – and combat these perils before they are too ingrained.

6.3 Research Limitations and Recommendations

The study used only a limited sample size, and is conducted in a single area; therefore this research is not generalizable. Most interviewees argued to discuss the topic of interest with more than one source; hence it is not possible to conclude with absolute certainty that Islamists have influenced the interviewees. Additionally, some interviewees were reluctant to name the Mosque they attended. Hence, the outcome that Islamists have contributed to a certain extent in the expansion of antisemitism cannot be claimed to be factual but is rather most likely. Moreover, it is not certain to what extent all interviewees truly expressed what they thought, or fully expressed their feelings and opinions. In regard to the Palestinian conflict not all interviewees were willing to discuss the matter in-depth. However, this could also be due to a lack of knowledge on the topic.

79 Nevertheless, the interviewees were more than willing to speak about terrorist attacks and the media. Further research into these matters is recommended especially with an eye on the sustainability of a healthy Dutch society. Especially since this study showed that the interviewees found it problematic to acknowledge that there are indeed Islamists that conduct terrorist attacks in name of Islam. It is necessary to be critical, to freely and openly discuss problems in society, hence it is recommendable to further research the anti-Western sentiment and rationales regarding basic Western freedoms and values that are of necessity to maintain an open society. Many interviewees claimed that Zionists are enemies of Islam. This is problematic because, when one argues that one does not hate Jews but Zionists, one actually hates the vast majority of Jews. And when one claims that Zionists are comparable to terrorists, one actually says that the vast majority of Jews are similar to terrorists. Moreover, there are many Jews in the Netherlands that are Zionists; accordingly they are hated, compared with terrorism, and regarded as enemies of Islam. It appeared that most (not all) of these interviewees used the title “Zionist” in unaware manner, as if they actually do not know what the word entails. Otherwise, it is plain antisemitism under the umbrella of anti-Zionism – which is exactly in correspondents with the idea of new antisemitism (Hogg & Levine, 2010). Hence, it is recommendable and certainly necessary not to neglect this aspect but to further research this severe matter.

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8 Appendix A

Organizations and individuals in Rotterdam that can be linked to Islamist movements

(Youth) Imam Jacob van der Blom Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • FION • Jamal Badawi • Secretary at Europe Trust • Kalid Yasin (ECFR) Netherlands • Salah Sultan (antisemitic rhetoric) • International Union of Muslim • Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (ECFR) Scholars (IUMS) • Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah • Sheikh Salman al Awdah Affiliated Organizations • Salman al Awdan, • Ali al-Qaradaghi (antisemitic rhetoric). For • Founder of Foundation Ontdek example he wrote in 2015 an article entitled Islam “Global Terrorism – An Analytical Study” with • Founder Platform voor Nieuwe the subtitled “The Torah and Violence.” Moslims (Platform for Converts) • Fadel Soliman, promotes sex slavery, polygamy • Co-founder Blauwe Moskee* and wife beating and provides online lecture (Blue Mosque Amsterdam) series (Bridges Foundation) for Muslim • Islamic Center the Middenweg* youngsters (Osborne, Rashty, & Faulkner, 2016) • Board member Stichting • Hussein Yé (antisemitic rhetoric). Islamitische Organisaties • Abdullah Hakim Quick. He argues that Rijnmond (SPIOR) Christians and Jews are filthy and is an advocate • Board member Contactorgaan for the execution of homosexuals (Allen, 2010). Moslims en Overheid (CMO) • Nooh al-Kaddo (ICCI) • Former director Essalam Mosque Rotterdam*

* Foreign funding (Simon Wiesenthal Center, 2017; Burr & Ehrenfeld, 2014; Ontdek Islam, 2010; Ontdek Islam, 2010; Osborne, Rashty, & Faulkner, 2016; Stand for Peace, 2014; gmbwatch, 2015; Allen, 2010; Harry's Place , 2010; MEMRI, 2006)

Imam Azzedine Karrat Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Yusuf al-Qaradawi (ECFR) • Islamists Sheikh Mohamed El Hassan Ould Affiliated Organizations Dedew (Mohammed Al-Hassan Al-Dedew al- Shanqiti) • Essalam Mosque Rotterdam * • Tariq Ramadan • Islamic University Rotterdam* • Nouman Ali Khan • Nooh al-Kaddo (ICCI)

• Jacob van der Blom

* Foreign funding (Karrat, Tariq Ramadan , 2017; Hastings, Nouman Ali Khan & Friends, 2017; Karrat, Sheikh Mohamed El

114 Hassan Ould Dedew, 2016; Hastings, Nouman Ali Khan & Friends, 2017)

Activist Amin Abuo Rashed Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Hamas • Sameh Habeeb (antisemitic rhetoric and • Al-Aqsa Netherland conspiracy theories) (Burns, 2018). • Majed Al-Zeer. General Director of the Palestinian Return Center linked to Hamas Affiliated Organizations (gmbwatch, n.d.). • Ibrahim Akkari • Palestijnse Gemeenschap in • Yusuf al-Qaradawi Holland (Palestinian Community • Ikrima Sabri, he is a Sheikh who denies holy in the Netherlands) (PGNL) ties between Judaism and Jerusalem (MEMRI, • Foundation Palestinian Platform 2012). for Human Rights and Solidarity • Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas) he denies Israel’s right (PPMS) to existence (MEMRI, 2018). Moreover he • Het Palestijnse Huis argues: "The constants and the strategy of • ISRAA Hamas do not change according to • Ettaouhid circumstances. Hamas will stay faithful to jihad, • Palestinian Return Centre (PRC) to resistance, to guns, to Palestine and to • Palestinians in Europe Jerusalem" (ADL, 2011). Conference • Ibrahim al-Baz • The European Campaign to End • Mohammed Cheppih the Siege on Gaza • Unie van Europese Turkse Democraten (UETD) • He lost his arm while fighting (Merley S. , 2008; ITIC, 2015; PRC, 2009; gmbwatch, Israel. n.d. a; gmbwatch, n.d. b; PRC, 2009; Breemer, 2010; • Gaza Freedom Flotilla 2011 NIW, 2018; Brendel, 2016)

Yahiya Bouyafa Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Chairman and founder of FION • Europe Trust Nederland • Nederlands Instituut voor Humane Studies (Dutch version of EIHS)

Affiliated Organizations

• Landelijke Moslim Organisaties (LMO) • Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën Nederland (RMMN) • Maroc Relief • (former) Chairman Contact Groep Islam (CGI) • Islamic University Rotterdam*

115 * Foreign funding (Merley S. , 2008; Groen & Kranenberg, Bouyafa met argusogen bekeken, 2009; Sandee, 2007) Bouyafa has been engaged by the Dutch Ministry of Integration as a partner to promote integration and counter- radicalization within the local Muslim community. Moreover, he is linked to a large number of Muslim organizations that sympathize with the Brotherhood (Vidino, 2010).

Ibrahim al-Baz Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) • Abuo Rashed • Al-Fatah • Ikrima Sabri he is a Sheikh who denies holy ties between Judaism and Jerusalem (MEMRI, Affiliated Organizations 2012). • Palestinian Return Centre (PRC) • Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas) he denies Israel’s right • Palestinians in Europe to existence (MEMRI, 2018). Moreover he Conference argues: "The constants and the strategy of • PPMS Hamas do not change according to • Palestina Komitee Nederland circumstances. Hamas will stay faithful to jihad, to resistance, to guns, to Palestine and to Jerusalem" (ADL, 2011).

• Ibrahim al-Baz and his wife (PRC, 2009; Groen, Oud-moefti spreekt niet, is Van Agt Nawal al-Baz, active with pro- beloofd, 2007; Al-Baz, 1991). Palestine activities that are notorious for their affiliation with Hamas. Ibrahim is convicted in France for transporting explosives for terrorist activities of al-Fatah (Wreede, 2002).

Political Party NIDA Affiliated Organizations

• Twitter: ISIS = Israel/Zionism • Unie van Europese Turkse Democraten (Dutch AK party) • PPMS (Amin Abou Rashed) • Palestinian Return Centre

Party Members Organizations Individuals • Ahmed Yildrim • Unie van Europese Turkse Democraten (UETD) (AKP) • Alia Azzouzi • Ettaouhid • Tariq • Policy advisor at Ramadan Rotterdam

116 Municipality

• Former board member of Stichting Islamitisch Primair Onderwijs Rijnmond (SIPOR) • Mustafa Dogan • NIF- Youth • Nederlands Islamitische Federatie (NIF) aka Mili Görüs • Bas van Noppen • Vice chairman of • Jacob van der Center the `Blom Middenweg* • LPNM • Ontdek Islam • Nourdin el-Ouali • Center the • Zaher Birawi, Middenweg* which is a • Spokesman Gaza Palestinian Flotilla 2011 activist • Speaker at Middle affiliated to East Monitor Hamas and the (affiliated to Muslim Hamas) in 2016 Brotherhood • Speaker at European (ITIC, 2017) Palestinians • Ibrahim Conference 2017 Akkari • Palestinian Return (Europe Trust Centre NL) • ISRAA • Abu Jahjah (antisemitic rhetoric) • Abu Rashed

• Mohammad Qasam Hussain • Chairman of the • Raza Saqib municipality quarter Mustafai. “Present at the mass protest against Charlois Rotterdam • Iftekar Ali Palestinian genocide by Zionist Israel!” Christi • Founder youth (Ghausia commission Mosque) Ghausia “Aanwezig bij de massale protest tegen • Chairman Palestijnse genocide door de zionistische Foundation Israël!” (Mohammad Qasam Hussain, 2014) Shamma

* Foreign funding (Brendel, 2017; Abou Jahjah, 2014; Cauwer, 2018; Schie, 2018; Walling, 2018; Isitman, 2018; Chishti, 2014; MEMRI, 2012).

Political Party DENK Affiliated Organizations

117 • For example: Tunahan Kuzu, the • Diyanet National Party leader of Denk • UETD (Think,) equated Israel with Nazi Germany during a speech in the House of Representatives (Brussen, 2018). Selçuk Öztürk, member of the House of Representatives for Denk, spoke about “the long arm of Israel” and argued, “Jews would try to influence the House of Representatives” (Luden, 2017). Party Members Organizations Individuals • Tunahan Kuzu • Islamitische • Amin Abu Stichting Rashed Nederland (ISN) • Jamal Rayyan • Diyanet (newsreader at al-Jazeera) • Selcuk Öztürk • Islamitische Stichting Nederland (ISN)

• Diyanet

• Umar Chaudry • FEMYSO • Pres. Erdogan • Ibrahim el- Zayat • Hussein Jamakovic • a (former) DENK trainee and ISIS supporter wrote an e-mail to some right-wing media in which he accused them of being "dirty right- wing cancer Jews” (Engelbart, DENK-stagiair (en ISIS-fan) gaat los op DDS, Telegraaf, WNL: ‘Krijg de kanker, vieze extreemrechtse kanker joden!, 2018; Geenstijl, 2018). * Foreign funding (Brendel, DENK trekt Moslimbroeder en Erdogan- fan aan voor externe betrekkingen, 2015; Chaudry, n.d.; Merley S. , 2008; Geenstijl, 2018; Brendel, Nederlandse Moslimbroeders en AKP-fans vinden elkaar in Erdogan-verering, 2016)

Stichting Sociaal en Cultureel Centrum Nederland* (SSCCN)

Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • SSCCN, is financed by foreign • SSCCN Chairman Kamis Gacha (Europe money from Kuwait and Saudi Trust Netherlands) Arabia Affiliated Organizations

• Ontdek Islam • Blauwe Moskee* in Amsterdam

* Foreign funding (Brendel, Moslimbroeders krijgen Saoedische steun voor nieuw centrum in Rotterdam, 2013; Groen & Kranenberg, Bouyafa met argusogen bekeken, 2009)

Mosque Masjid Ghausia

118

Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • • Imam Iftekhar ali Chishti Affiliated Organizations • Mohammad Qasam Hussain (NIDA) (Chishti, 2014) • OntdekIslam • Abdelhakim Er-Rahhali (NIDA) • Blauwe Moskee* in Amsterdam • Azzedine Karrat • Raza Saqib Mustafai, who is the founder of Idarat ul-Mustafa. He argues amongst other things that “When The Jews Are Wiped Out... The Sun Of Peace Would Begin To Rise On The Entire World” (MEMRI, 2012).

* Foreign funding (Koops, 2016; Masjid Ghausia, 2015; Brendel, Moskee van bloemen gooiende imam ontving antisemitische haatsjeik, 2015)

Nederlands Islamitisch Multicultureel Centrum Masjid Al-Noor Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Tarik Chadlioui/ Tarik Ibn Ali (radical Muslim and suspect of terrorism, Sharia4Belgium) Affiliated Organizations involved in fundraising for the establishment of Masjid al-Noor (HLN, 2018). • Sadaqa-TV (Ahamd Salman) • Imam Ahmad Salam: he refused to sign a statement that forbids child abuse. He is the man who once refused to shake hands with former minister Rita Verdonk. He is also the father of Suhayb Salam of the alFitrah mosque in Overvecht. The mosque maintains ties with a charity foundation from Kuwait. Until recently, this institution was on the US sanction list for alleged support of al-Qeada. Imam Salam is additionally linked to Haitham al-Haddad, who is known for his anti-Jewish statements like “Jews are the enemies of god” (Westrop, Are British Salafists Gaming the System?, 2015; Tieleman, 2016) .

(Halkes, 2015; Brendel, U-vraagt-wij-draaien-sjeik Tarik Chadlioui struikelt over Spaanse speurders, 2017; Leefbaar Rotterdam, 2015)

Essalam Mosque Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Fadel Soliman, promotes sex slavery, polygamy • Muslim Brothers (gmbwatch, and wife beating. He provides lectures online 2010) through the Bridges Foundation in which he • International Union of Muslim recommends these practices. During his lecture Scholars (IUMS) in the Essalam Mosque in Rotterdam he refers to his Bridges Foundation. Moreover during this Affiliated Organizations lecture he also argues that Jihad is about fighting the oppressor. That it is an obligation to fight the • Ettaouhid oppressor. He stressed that no one can be blamed for defending himself against

119 wrongdoing. He argues that there is no blame on you if you apply an eye for an eye, but that the blame is on the oppressor. Moreover he argues that Allah does not force Muslim to forgive, God recommends forgiveness, but he allows fighting the oppressor (Essalam ICC, 2015: 28:40). Moreover he argues, in regard to the “character of ISIS fighters,” that they are very brave, all of them have good intention, they want to illuminate injustice, they have big good moral values, and they all want to sacrifice for their believe, the problem is they believe blindly in their leaders Fiqh (understanding of the religion) they are deceived and became destructive people instead of constructive (Essalam ICC, 2015: 55:00 – 55:50) (Osborne, Rashty, & Faulkner, 2016; Stand for Peace, 2014; Essalam ICC , 2015).

• Nooh al-Kaddo (was active in the mosque until 2018) he is affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood in Ireland. He is the director of the Islamic Cultural Center of Ireland (ICCI), which also houses the European Council for Fatwa and Research. Additionally, he is the director of the al-Maktoum foundation (gmbwatch, 2010).

• Funded by the al-Maktoum (McGarry, 2018; Merley S. , 2009). Foundation (Sheik Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktoum) from the United Arab Emirates

• Imam Azzedine Karrat • Former Director Jacob van der Blom

Internationale Steun Rechtstreeks Aan Armen (ISRAA) Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals

• Muslim Brotherhood • Zaher Birawi, a Palestinian activist affiliated to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (ITIC, Affiliated Organizations 2017) • Imam Khalil el Moumni (former imam at Ansr • The are linked and ask people on Mosque Rotterdam, he is for example known for their website to support “Services his statement that homosexuality a contagious and Research Center Palestine” disease that is a danger to society (Hansen, Diensten en Onderzoeks Centrum 2002). Palestine (Docp), who in turn identify Israel as 70 years of ethnic cleansing, war crimes and apartheid, racism (Stichting docP , 2018).

• Ibrahim Akkari (founder) • Charity organization for

120 Palestine. The website addresses Israel as an apartheid regime.

Stichting Ontdek Islam (Discover Islam)

Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals

• FION • Nourdeen abu Bilal Wilderman (Famous Dutch • Engages with the Muslim convert and Chairman of PLNM) Brotherhood and anti-Semitic • Remi Soekirman, he is founder of the Institute preachers. for Islam Studies - Dar-al-'Ilm, where he is a lecturer in Islamic Studies as well. He engages Affiliated Organizations with Islamist individuals like Khalid Yasin (antisemitic rhetoric), Haitham al-Haddad • Platform voor Nieuwe Moslims (Bendel, 2015). (Platform for Converts) (PLNM) • Centrum de Middenweg* • • Jacob van der Blom (founder) (Ontdek Islam, 2010; Ontdek Islam, 2010; Carel • A religious platform that Brendel, 2011; Brendel, Fawaz-affaire illustreert schisma organizes activities such as youth tussen “goede” en “slechte” salafisten, 2017) camps, special day’s for converts etcetera. • *Foreign Funding

Stichting Ettaouhid

Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals

• • Said el-Mokadmi, part of Jamaat Tabligh in the Affiliated Organizations Netherland (an organization affiliated to al- Qaida) (Vlaams Parlement, 2010; HBVL, 2010) • Ahmad Abuznaid, director of the Dream • Centrum de Middenweg* Defenders. He is a supporter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), he posted pictures of himself embracing Rasmea Odeh (PFLP member) who was convicted in a 1969 for the bombing of an Israeli supermarket that killed two men (Home Land Security News Wire, 2016). He also argued that terrorist “Leila Khaled is a freedom fighter and she taught us how to fight” (Canary Mission, n.d.). • Ahmet Akgündüz, rector at the Islamic University of Applied Sciences Rotterdam (discriminatory rhetoric against Jews, women, Kurds, Alleviates and for his conspiracy theories) (Pieters, 2015; Poll & Markus, 2017). • Azzedine Karrat

• An Islamic social cultural (Abuznaid, 2016; Canary Mission, n.d.; organization, which also has a JongerenCommissie Vereniging Ettaouhid , 2016; JCVE, youth department. 2014). • *Foreign Funding

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Islamitisch Centrum de Middenweg (Islamic Center the Middenweg) Islamist Organizations Affiliated Individuals • Europe Trust NL • Azzedine Karrat Affiliated Organizations • Zaher Birawi (Palestinian activist, affiliated to • Ontdek Islam Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood) • Landelijk Platfrom Nieuwe (gmbwatch, 2012; ITIC, 2017) Moslims (LPNM) • Yasin el-Forkani (fan of Al-Qaradawi) • Remi Soekirman, he is founder of the Institute for Islam Studies - Dar-al-'Ilm, where he is a lecturer in Islamic Studies as well. He engages with Islamist individuals like Khalid Yasin (antisemitic rhetoric), Haitham al-Haddad (Bendel, 2015). • Muslim Belal is a “performance poet,” who affiliates with the Muslim Brotherhood. He “composes nasheeds [an Islamic song without instruments] that promote fundamentalist Islam, one of which expresses support for the (antisemetic) Aafia Siddiqui” (Westrop, UK Charity Commission Permits Hamas Charity, 2013).

. • Is bought by a Qatar Charity. (Centrum de Middenweg, 2018; Ontdek Islam, n.d.) • Vice chairman Bas van Noppen (associated to NIDA party, LPNM, and was member of the board of Stichting Islamitisch Primair Onderwijs Rijnmond - SIPOR) • Director Jacob van der Blom

Organizations that can be associated with Islamism

• Nederlands Islamitisch Federatie (NIF) • Youth Associations of Milli Görüs in the Mili Görüs and NIF Youth. Netherlands, including in The Hague, Schiedam, Rotterdam and Deventer, distribute citations and translate lectures by Yildiz. Also 'training camps' are organized to his Turkish institute. Nureddin Yildiz is a controversial imam (Turkey) Through a mosque organization in the Netherlands who supports the armed jihad (Kouwenhoven, 2018). Yildiz: Is author of 35 books on Islamic practices. Moreover, he is very popular on Islamist media and he has millions of followers. He was a member of the National Turkish Students’ Union, an Islamist student group that also had among its members Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He argues that: “Jews are

122 the greatest enemies of Muslims. Some say some of the Jews can be innocent. I cannot believe that. I believe in the Qur’an. It is not possible to know the devil without knowing the Jew. Jews are traitors. They kill children” (Bekdil, 2018)

• Stichting Turks Islamitich Culturele • Diyanet (Turkish Presidency of religious Federatie (STICF)/Turkish Islamic affairs). (Bergman, 2018) Cultural Federation

• Islamitische Stichting Nederland • Umbrella organization of the Turkish (ISN)/ Hollandia Diyanet Vakfi) Government. Provides (religious) (Dutch Diyanet) education to 147 associated mosques. • Mosques in Rotterdam: HDV Anadolu, HDV Gültepe, HDV Kocatepe, HDV Laleli, HDV Mevlana, HDV St. Multicultureel Centrum Rotterdam Oost, HDV Ulu , HDV Merkez

• Hizmet Hizmet is the movement of Fethullah Gülen. The core of Gülen’s network involves around his educational institutions. Moreover, this Hizmet movement is characterized in very different manners. Some argue that it is a modern, and spiritual movement, which in essence strives for peace and interreligious dialogue. Others argue it is a movement with a double agenda. An Islamist movement that is geared towards the indoctrination of young people (and children) – and which aims to establish an Islamic regime. Additionally, Fethullah Güllen, the spiritual leader, has been involved with antisemitic rhetoric. For example in his book “Fasıldan Fasıla – 1,” he argues: "The Jewish tribe is very intelligent. This intelligent tribe has put forth many things throughout history in the name of science and thought. But these have always been offered in the form of poisoned honey and have been presented to the world as such. For instance, Karl Marx is a Jew; the communism he developed looks like a good alternative to capitalism at first sight, but in essence it is a deathly poison mixed in honey," (Basaran, 2016; Kirmaci, 2009; Doğan & Rodrik, 2012; Sharon-Krespin, 2009)

Organizations and Foreign Funding

• Stichting Tunesisch Samenwerking en • Requested foreign funding from Saudi Ontwikkeling Arabia • Moskee Nasuha • Requested foreign funding • Stichting Rahma Relief • Requested foreign funding and is connected to Stichting cultureel centrum Nederland (Foundation Cultural Center

123 Netherlands) which received money from Kuwait and is allied to Europe Trust NL. • Islamitische Universiteit Rotterdam / • Is Financed by the Islamic Development Islamic University of Applied Bank Saudi Arabia. Is founded by Yahia Sciences Rotterdam Bouyafa. • Ahmet Akgündüz, rector at the Islamic University of Applied Sciences Rotterdam (discriminatory rhetoric against Jews, women, Kurds, Alleviates and for his conspiracy theories) (Pieters, 2015; Poll & Markus, 2017). • Azzedine Karrat lecturer at the Islamic University. • Ibrahim Akkari: served on the board of the Islamic University Rotterdam (Sandee, 2007).

• Stichting Islamitische Minaret • Foreign funding from Kuwait Centrum Rotterdam • Al Nour Foundation • Funded by Qatar Eid Charity •

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