Safety First Magazine

Safety Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine Subscription Form Edition January 2013 Contents: q The Golden Rules for Pilots Moving from PNF to PM q Airbus Crosswind Development and Certification q The Smoke/Fumes/Avncs Smoke Procedure q Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention q Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue

Issue 15 2 Issue 15 | JANUARY 2013 Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | JANUARY 2013 23

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Safety First Issue 6, July 2008 Issue 3, December 2006 Subscription Form – A320: Runway Overrun – Dual Side Stick Inputs To be sent back to

The Airbus Safety Magazine – FCTL Check after EFCS Reset on Ground – Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Damage AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICE For the enhancement of safe flight through – A320: Possible Consequence of VMO/MMO Exceedance – Pitot Probes Obstruction on Ground Fax: 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29 Mail to: [email protected] increased knowledge and communications – A320: Prevention of Tailstrikes – A340: Thrust Reverser Unlocked – Low Fuel Situation Awareness – Residual Cabin Pressure Safety First is published by the All articles in Safety First are present- Contributions, comment and feed- – Rudder Pedal Jam – Cabin Operations Briefing Notes Name ...... Flight Safety Department of Air- ed for information only and are not back are welcome. For technical bus. It is a source of specialist safe- intended to replace ICAO guidelines, reasons the editors may be required – Why do Certain AMM Tasks Require Equipment Resets? – Hypoxia: An Invisible Enemy Surname ...... ty information for the restricted use standards or recommended practices, to make editorial changes to manu- – Slide/raft Improvement of flight and ground crew members operator-mandated requirements or scripts, however every effort will Issue 2, September 2005 Job title/Function ...... who fly and maintain Airbus air- technical orders. The contents do not be made to preserve the intended – Cabin Attendant Falling through the Avionics craft. It is also distributed to other supersede any requirements mandated meaning of the original. Enquiries Bay Access Panel in Cockpit – Tailpipe or Engine Fire Company/Organization ...... selected organisations. by the State of Registry of the Opera- related to this publication should – Managing Severe Turbulence tor’s aircraft or supersede or amend be addressed to: Issue 5, December 2007 Address ...... – Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP) any Airbus type-specific AFM, AMM, Airbus Material for publication is FCOM, MEL documentation or any – New CFIT Event During Non Precision Approach ...... obtained from multiple sources Product Safety department (GS) – Runway Excursions at Takeoff other approved documentation. 1, rond point Maurice Bellonte and includes selected informa- – A320: Tail Strike at Takeoff? ...... tion from the Airbus Flight Safety 31707 Blagnac Cedex - France Contact: Nils FAYAUD – Unreliable Speed Issue 1, January 2005 Confidential Reporting System, Articles may be reprinted without E-mail: [email protected] Post/Zip Code ...... incident and accident investiga- permission, except where copy- – Compliance to Operational Procedures – Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR Reception Problems Fax: +33(0)5 61 93 44 29 tion reports, system tests and right source is indicated, but with – The Importance of the Pre-flight Flight Control Check Country ...... flight tests. Material is also ob- acknowledgement to Airbus. Where – The Future Air Navigation System FANS B tained from sources within the Airbus is not the author, the con- – A320: In-flight Thrust Reverser Deployment Telephone ...... airline industry, studies and re- tents of the article do not necessarily Issue 4, June 2007 – Airbus Flight Safety Manager Handbook ports from government agencies reflect the views of Airbus, neither Cell phone ...... – Operations Engineering Bulletin Reminder Function and other aviation sources. do they indicate Company policy. – Flight Operations Briefing Notes – Avoiding High Speed Rejected Takeoffs Fax ...... Due to EGT Limit Exceedance E-mail ...... – Do you Know your ATC/TCAS Panel? (Mandatory for both digital and paper copies) A320 © Airbus S.A.S. 2013 – All rights reserved. Proprietary documents. – Managing Hailstorms Winter operation in Yakutsk, Siberia By taking delivery of this Brochure (hereafter “Brochure”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following guidelines: – Introducing the Maintenance Briefing Notes

3 No other intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this Brochure than the right to read – A320: Dual hydraulic Loss Please send me the digital copy* P it, for the sole purpose of information. – Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems This Brochure and its content shall not be modified and its illustrations and photos shall not be repro- 3 Operations Based on GPS Data Please send me the paper copy* P (Please note that paper copies duced without prior written consent of Airbus. will only be forwarded Safety First, #15 February 2013. Safety First to professional addresses) is published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point 3 This Brochure and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed Maurice Bellonte - 31707 Blagnac Cedex/ to any third party subject to payment. * Please tick the appropriate case France. Editor: Yannick Malinge, Chief Product This Brochure contains sensitive information that is correct at the time of going to press. Safety Officer, Nils Fayaud, Director Product Safety Information. Concept Design by This information involves a number of factors that could change over time, effecting the true public Airbus Multi Media Support Ref. 20130248. representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document or Computer Graphic by Quat’coul. Copyright: with respect to the information described herein. GS 420.1329 Issue 15. Photos copyright Airbus. Photos by ExM Company, Baldur Sveinsson. Airbus S.A.S. shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of this Brochure and Printed in France by Airbus Print Centre. of the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S. has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 3

Yannick MALINGE Chief Product Safety Officer Editorial

Firstly, let me wish you all a Happy and Safe New year as we enter into 2013.

Our first magazine of this year presents to you a variety of articles covering a broad range of topics from good maintenance practices through to an insight Contents into the crosswind certification of our aircraft. The Airbus Safety Magazine

It is sometimes true that we get what we hope for. It is even truer that we often get what we work hard to achieve. All industry Safety professionals have been working hard and successfully, to reduce the rate of accidents Information ...... 4 and major incidents. We have collectively reached the point where it is now difficult to see obvious and clear trends and “easy to fix” things with the tools we use today. Whilst a surface examination looks good, we also know that not far under that surface lie many threats and risks. We simply The Golden Rules for Pilots cannot allow the system to “relax”, nor can we ever afford to become Moving from PNF to PM ...... 5 complacent. David OWENS

So how should we proceed? We must now dig deeper. We must “dig” into the growing volume of data that is available to us through our various Airbus Crosswind data gathering programmes, be they LOSA, FOQA, FDA, FOA, ASIAS Development and Certification...... 8 or whatever, and seek out the clues and the threads of information that will Frank CHAPMAN lead us to being able to prevent a future accident from happening.

Such an approach represents three challenges. Firstly, the ability to col- late, understand and act on so much data across the industry will require The Smoke/Fumes/Avncs Smoke Procedure...... 12 dedicated professionals with knowledge and determination to get at the answers. Secondly, and importantly, the industry wide collective challenge Peimann TOFIGHI-NIAKI to face up to and address issues, which may appear to be minor in themselves, but that may end up developing into major threats over time or when combined with other “minor” threats. Finally, but not least, even if Post-Maintenance Foreign significant progress has been made over the years, we have to find ways of Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention...... 15 further improving the sharing of lessons learned across boundaries. François LEFEBVRE

We cannot go backwards, nor can we ease up for even a minute in our joint efforts to drive Safety to the next level. Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue...... 18 David HILL May I therefore wish you all a successful year in your pursuit of increasing levels of Safety, in your area of our business during 2013.

Yannick MALINGE Chief Product Safety Officer 4 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

Nils Fayaud Director Product Safety Information Information Magazine distribution Safety Information on the Airbus websites If you wish to subscribe to Safety First, please fill out the subscrip- On the AirbusWorld website we are building up more safety information tion form that you will find at the for you to use. end of this issue. The present and previous issues of Please note that the paper copies Safety First can be accessed to in the will only be forwarded to profes- Flight Operations Community- Safe- sional addresses. ty and Operational Materials portal-, at https://w3.airbusworld.com Your articles Other safety and operational exper- As already said, this magazine is a tise publications, like the Getting to tool to help share information. Grips with…brochures, e-briefings We would appreciate articles from etc…are regularly released as well in the Flight Operations Commu- operators, that we can pass to other nity at the above site. operators through the magazine. If you do not yet have access rights, If you have any inputs then please please contact your IT administrator. contact Nils Fayaud at: Flight Safety e-mail: [email protected] Hotline: +33 (0)6 29 80 86 66 fax : +33 (0) 5 61 93 44 29 E-mail: [email protected]

19th News SAVE THE DATE Bangkok, 18-21 March 2013

Another year has nearly passed since The Flight Safety Conference provides For any information regarding invita- our last Flight Safety Conference in an excellent forum for the exchange tions, please contact Mrs. Nuria Soler, Berlin. All the Airbus people who were of information between Airbus and its email [email protected] present enjoyed very much the oppor- customers. To ensure that we can have This year we will be looking at several tunity to network with our customers an open dialogue to promote flight interesting topics including the role of and to share ideas and news. It was the safety across the fleet, we are unable to training in leveraging safety, unstable most successful conference yet both accept outside parties. approaches, runway excursions and we in terms of the numbers of people and The formal invitations with informa- will also include some more traditional airlines attending and in the feedback tion regarding registration and logistics, reminders of issues that simply do not we received. as well as the preliminary agenda have want to go away. th The 19 Flight Safety Conference will been sent to our customers in December As always, we welcome presentations take place in Bangkok, Thailand, from 2012. th st from our operators. You can participate the 18 to the 21 of March 2013. as a speaker and share your ideas and experience for improving aviation safety. If you have something you believe will benefit other operators and/or Airbus and if you are interested in being a speaker, please provide us with a brief abstract and a bio or resume at [email protected] The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 5

David OWENS Senior Director Training Policy

The Golden Rules for Pilots Moving from PNF to PM

1. Introduction On the 4th of November 2010 Qantas GOLDEN flight QF32 experienced an uncontained engine failure shortly after takeoff from Singapore Changi RULES Airport. FOR PILOTS

This type of incident is so rare and unpredictable that it does not have an allocated procedure attached to XKP12371 it. The crew of the A380 was able to cope with this event by applying a set of simple basic rules, which are referred to as the Golden Rules for Pilots.

2. QANTAS QF32 Australian Transport Safety Bureau Figure 1 (ATSB) Preliminary Report Released A380 in 3 December 2010 : Qantas livery

On 4 November 2010, at 0157 Universal Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the landing gear and flaps. The crew reported that, Coordinated Time (UTC), an Airbus A380 while maintaining 250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level, they heard two aircraft, registered VH-OQA (OQA), being almost coincident ‘loud bangs’, followed shortly after by indications of a failure of the No 2 engine. operated as Qantas flight 32, departed The crew advised Singapore Air Traffic Control of the situation and were provided with radar vectors from runway 20 centre (20C) at Changi to a holding pattern. The crew undertook a series of actions before returning the aircraft to land at Airport, Singapore for Sydney, New South Singapore. There were no reported injuries to the crew or passengers on the aircraft. A subsequent Wales. On board the aircraft were five flight examination of the aircraft indicated that the No 2 engine had sustained an uncontained failure of the crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc. Sections of the liberated disc penetrated the left wing and the (a total of 469 persons on board). left wing-to-fuselage fairing, resulting in structural and systems damage to the aircraft. 6 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

In various interviews and statements the crew recognise that Crew Resource Management (CRM) gave them the ability to manage this challenging event. They have spoken of “Synergy in Action”, the goal of CRM, and effective teamwork. They had plenty of fuel and therefore time and options. They acknowledge the impressive performance of the aircraft and their training and knowledge.

3. The Golden Rules On the flight deck of QF32 that day Captain David Evans:

“From a training point of view it doesn’t matter what aeroplane you are flying, airmanship has to take over. In fact, Airbus has some Golden Rules which we all adhered to on the day – aviate, navigate and communicate – in that order.”

Royal Aeronautical Society, 6 December 2010 Figure 2 QF32 n°2 engine after it sustained an uncontained failure of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc

So, what are the Golden Rules? Tasksharing should be adapted to MONITORING role, which is why When should they be used and why? the prevailing situation (i.e. task- Airbus will be changing its docu- sharing for hand flying or with the mentation over the next year to fully The following four Golden Rules Auto Pilot engaged, task sharing for reflect and highlight the importance for Pilots are applicable to all nor- normal operation or for abnormal / of Pilot Monitoring (PM). Wherever mal operations and any abnormal or emergency conditions) and tasks you see PNF, think PM! emergency situations: should be accomplished in accord- Both pilots must remain focused on Fly, navigate and communicate ance with the following priorities: q their task as PF or PM, not allow any- q Use the appropriate level 3.1.1 Fly thing to distract them. This is what we of automation at all times The Pilot Flying (PF) must focus mean by appropriate tasksharing. q Understand the FMA on flying the aircraft by controlling Both pilots must maintain their Situ- at all times and / or monitoring the pitch attitude, ational Awareness and immediately bank angle, airspeed, thrust, sideslip, q Take action if things resolve any uncertainty as a crew. do not go as expected. heading etc. to capture and maintain the desired vertical and lateral flight 3.1.2 Navigate path. Navigate can be summarized by the 3.1 Fly, navigate and communicate The Pilot Not Flying (PNF) must as- following three statements of situ- In this order and with appropriate sist the Pilot Flying (PF) by actively ational awareness: tasksharing. monitoring all flight parameters q Know where you are Just as the crew of QF 32 stated, the and actively directing the attention number one priority in any event of the PF to any excessive deviation. q Know where you should be and at all times is to fly the aircraft; Actively monitoring is a key mes- q Know where the weather, this is the first Golden Rule. sage, we want to emphasize the terrain and obstacles are. The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 7

3.1.3 Communicate To sum up: q By PM taking action, again we want to emphasize the PM func- Effective crew communication in- q Monitor your FMA cludes communication between: tion and its essential role in flight q Announce your FMA safety: q The PF and the PM q Confirm your FMA • Questioning, and if that The flight crew and q q Understand your FMA. is not enough air traffic control Finally, if any problems occur, refer • Challenging, and if that q The flight crew and the cabin to the Golden Gule number 4. is still not enough crew or any other crew on-board • Taking-over. q The flight crew and ground crew. 3.4 Take action if things Effective communication enables do not go as expected the sharing of goals and intentions Never assume that any crewmember and enhances situational awareness. If the aircraft does not follow the is aware of a particular threat, error To ensure positive communication, desired vertical or lateral flight or deviation and remember that inca- the flight crew must usestandard path or the selected target, the pacitation may be subtle; act before phraseology and applicable callouts. crew should react without delay: it is too late. q By PF changing the level of automation: 3.2 Use the appropriate level of automation at all times • From managed guidance to selected guidance, or To fly the aircraft the crew must comply with `Golden Rule number • From selected guidance 2. On highly automated and inte- to manual flying; or grated aircraft, several levels of automation are available to perform a given task. The appropriate level of automation depends on the situation and task; taking into account the forecast or actual weather, any mal- function or crew incapacitation. Pi- lot judgment prevails for the choice of automation level, including the 4. Conclusion choice to fly manually. q Understand the implication of the intended level of automation Fly, navigate and communicate: 1 q Select the intended level In this order and with appropriate tasksharing q Confirm the aircraft responds 2 Use the appropriate level of as expected. automation at all times This leads us to Golden Rule number 3. 3 Understand the FMA at all times 3.3 Understand the FMA at all times 4 Take action if things do not go Any action on the FCU, or on the as expected MCDU/KCCU, should be confirmed by crosschecking the corresponding annunciation or data on the PFD or ND. At all times, the PF and PM should Apply these Golden Rules, use them always and support each other. be aware of: The rules have been proven to make a difference. Just like the crew of Qantas QF 32, remember to always… q The armed or engaged modes Fly the Aircraft …….. Fly the Aircraft…… Fly the Aircraft q The guidance targets set q The aircraft response in terms of attitude, speed and trajectory, etc q Any mode transitions or reversions. 8 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

Frank CHAPMAN Experimental Test Pilot

Airbus Crosswind Development and Certification

1. Introduction 2. History This article is one of a series in which Historically, there were two methods age wind values were taken over the we in Airbus try to create a bridge of of computation. For early certifica- previous two minutes and the gust information across the gap that exists tions, ATC tower winds were used values over the previous 10 min to assess the level of crosswind ex- period. Although ICAO considers between the manufacturers world of perienced at take-off and landing wind gusts only if the peak value certification and the operators day to by flight test crews. This was done exceeds the two minute average by day environment. with an old fashioned anemometric 10 kt, some airport weather services recording system, registering wind provide gust values lower than 10 values at a nominal 10 metres above kt. This method is still used for the At first glance, the issue of cross- ground level. This method evolved broadcast of ATC tower winds. With wind certification for a large transport into using aircraft generated cross the new flight test methodology, aircraft may seem simple. The fol- wind data by calculating the 10 m however, a much more representa- lowing is an extract from the EASA high wind using the difference be- tive assessment of the aircraft capa- CS25.237(a) requirements: tween the True Air Speed (TAS) vec- bility is achieved. A 90 deg cross component of wind tor and the IRS computed Ground Speed (GS) vector during a 20 sec- velocity, demonstrated to be safe for ond period (+_10 sec) around take- With the early Airbus certifications, take-off and landing must be estab- off and landing. However, as natural we provided ‘Average plus Gust’ lished for dry runways and must be at IRS drift creates inaccuracy, this had values in our FCOMs. However, it least 20 kt or Vs MLW (1 g stall speed to be taken into account. The drift was felt by many that this format at Max Landing Weight) whichever is value had to be periodically meas- complicated the decision making process. Therefore, following a pe- greater, except that it need not exceed ured in order to correct IRS Ground riod of study beginning in 2004 we 25 kt. Speed. With the advent of Differen- tial GPS (DGPS) and more recent have now moved to a ‘Single Value, on-board instrumentation systems, Gust Included’. This effectively means that a direct comparison of However, the subject is far more com- the GS vector is now calculated using the maximum demonstrated value plicated than this short sentence may highly accurate data and, therefore, this correction is no longer necessary. (provided by us, the manufacturer) lead you to believe. So how do we can be made against the maximum deal with crosswinds during flight test value communicated by the Tower and certification and what are the im- In the early days of certification, or ATIS, including the gust if an- plications for operators? when using tower winds, the aver- nounced. The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 9

off and landing. However, this may 3. Maximum influence the final choice of dem- 5. Take-Off Demonstrated onstrated crosswind value provided Technique Crosswind and will almost certainly impact Engine manufacturers design the procedure for applying take-off choice plays a large part in the ini- power. Manufacturers can choose to Definition tial procedural approach to setting automatically limit engine regime take-off thrust and, as mentioned Today, maximum demonstrated for certain Ground Speeds if neces- above, may be crosswind limiting. crosswind figuring in the FCOM is sary, in much the same way that they derived from the maximum cross- sometimes automatically avoid cer- Significant lateral control should be wind that has been encountered tain rpm ranges to avoid fan blade avoided during the take-off run in during the complete certification flutter for example. However, there order to prevent extension of spoil- process and recorded in a particu- is always a slight compromise, in ers which will have a detrimental lar manner that has been agreed in order to ensure that take-off perfor- effect on performance and may in- conjunction with the authorities. It mance is not significantly reduced duce some directional disturbance. is not necessarily the maximum as a result. Limitations are imposed With strong crosswinds there will aircraft crosswind capability of for the A380 and A340 500/600, for be a natural tendency for the air- the aircraft. It is purely based upon example, where the engine limita- craft to roll away from the wind at data recorded within the aircraft tions are more penalizing than the lift-off and this can be compensated during the period of the certification demonstrated crosswind limitation for by a smooth lateral input as the process. Furthermore, it is often ob- and this is published in the FCOM aircraft becomes airborne. served to be significantly different limitations section. from the wind provided by ATC.

4. Flight Test Methodology Firstly, wind data as experienced by the aircraft is collected for a period of +-10 sec either side of the take- off or landing. Then, we need to correlate this data to the established reference height of 10 metres. This is done with a mathematical correction to the data, which varies with height to compensate for the boundary layer type effect near the surface. A conservative proportion of the Figure 1 gusts observed are then added to Take-off from Keflavik, Iceland. Note how the wind lifts the right wing. the maximum steady crosswind Maximum reported crosswind at the time was 56 kt in gusts wind value obtained. With this (gust added) value, we check that we have sufficient control authority in an Extract from A330/A340 FCTM information on take-off roll equivalent steady wind case, based (all Airbus programs share the same philosophy): upon empirical flight control response data. If this is validated, we For crosswind take-offs, routine use of into wind aileron is not recommended. In strong propose the value to the authorities crosswind conditions, small amounts of lateral control may be used to maintain wings for certification and inclusion in the level, but the pilot should avoid using excessive amounts. This causes excessive spoil- AFM, for take-off and for landing. er deployment, which increases the aircraft’s tendency to turn into wind, reduces lift, On take-off, however, there is anoth- and increases drag. Spoiler deflection starts to become significant with more than half er effect, which can have a big influ- side stick deflection. As the aircraft lifts off, any lateral control applied will result in a ence on crosswind limitation and/or roll rate demand. The objective is for the wings to be maintained level. take-off procedure: that of engine intake airflow distortion. This is This philosophy applies to the entire Airbus fleet. Although the lateral covered in a separate analysis and stick displacement threshold for spoiler deployment varies a little be- many tests are carried out to ensure tween types, the objective of avoiding unnecessary spoiler deployment we provide a suitable operating en- however remains valid. velope for our engines during take- 10 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

decrab is marked due to the wing- For the A380, and in the near future 6. Landing sweep/dihedral effect, through the for the A350 XWB, there is no ap- Technique single aisle and long range Fly By parent induced roll when kicking Wire (FBW) aircraft where lateral off drift in the flare due to flight The wings level technique is rec- compensation is similarly required control law compensation. The ommended. In particularly strong and to the A380 where flight con- flare laws in these two types have crosswinds kicking off around two trol law compensation provides a been adapted to produce a pure third drift as a minimum is nor- pure yaw response to rudder pedal yaw demand when applying rudder mally sufficient to ensure that the input. to reduce drift prior to touchdown. Of course, the flight control sur- lateral stresses are not excessive Where small amounts of lateral con- faces are providing the lateral input on the undercarriage at touchdown trol are eventually required, avoid for you, behind the scenes, in order (max residual drift 5 deg at touch- excessive bank angles (max bank to prevent the natural lateral stabil- down), whilst at the same time angle 5 deg). Aim for a positive ity of the aircraft from producing ensuring minimum risk of a down- touchdown and do not be tempted the induced rolling effect. How- wind drift away from the runway to finesse the touchdown or float ever, this is transparent to the pilot centreline. This has been applied for any considerable time. This will who is looking down the runway to to all aircraft from the A300/310, inevitably lead to a downwind drift ensure he lands his aircraft in the where roll/yaw coupling during away from the centreline. right place without excessive drift.

Figure 2 "Crabbed" final approach to Keflavik, Iceland. Picture taken from the south taxiway with Extract from A380 FCTM information on lateral and directional control the runway easily visible. Maximum reported (all Airbus programs share the same philosophy): crosswind at the time was 56 kt in gusts

FINAL APPROACH In crosswind conditions, the flight crew The recommended de-crab technique is to use the following: should fly a "crabbed" final approach wings • The rudder to align the aircraft with the runway heading during the flare level, with the aircraft (cockpit) positioned • The roll control, if needed, to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. on the extended runway centerline until the The flight crew should counteract any tendency to drift downwind by an appropriate lateral(roll) flare. input on the sidestick. In the case of strong crosswind during the de-crab phase, the PF should be prepared to add small bank angle FLARE into the wind to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. The flight crew can land the aircraft with a partial The objectives of the lateral and directional de-crab (i.e. a residual crab angle up to about 5 deg) to prevent an excessive bank. This technique prevents control of the aircraft during the flare are: wing tip or engine nacelle strike caused by an excessive bank angle. Therefore it is wise to know what the • To land on the centerline maximum bank angle is during the flare phase for the type you are flying so as to ensure no such strikes. • To minimize the loads on As a consequence, this can result in touching down with some bank angle into the wind, therefore, with the the main landing gear. upwind landing gear first. The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 11

One further point is worth mention- wheel loading and braking be suf- ever. As ND wind on A320 Fam- ing, because we see repeated cases ficiently high and this can be caused ily/A330/A340 is derived from IRS in Flight Operational Quality Assur- by the crosswind itself or by lateral data, indications may be significant- ance (FOQA) data in which less than stick input. Furthermore, autobrake ly different from reality. This is due optimum crosswind touchdowns are systems do not always provide a to the lack of correction for the IRS made: the response to rudder pedal useful aid in this regard, as they will drift, mentioned earlier. On A380 input at the decrab is positive for all apply braking regardless of whether (and in the future for A350 XWB), our aircraft. However, due to pure one main-wheel bogie alone has the use of GPS Ground Speed for aerodynamics and inertia it takes a released brake pressure due to an- the ND wind display provides a reasonable time from the input be- tiskid operation. more reliable additional source of ing made to the aircraft reacting. If In all cases, brakes and reverse information. Ultimately, it is the we were hand-flying in crosswinds should be applied smoothly. If there Captain who is called upon to use every day, we would become very is any concern with directional con- his judgement and skill, based upon well tuned to the aircraft response trollability then reduce or cancel all the data and knowledge available and make a perfect crosswind land- reverse as necessary and reduce to him. ing every time (I wish!). However, braking until control is regained. Remember also that if your aircraft there appears to be a tendency, Then smoothly re-apply brakes and has a degraded flight control system borne out by operational Digital reverse if necessary. through MEL clearance or in flight Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data, failure, then a more severe crosswind towards a late initiation of the decr- limitation may apply. Similarly, an ab. This is perhaps natural, since the 8. Operational engine out condition will imply a risks associated with an early decrab limited ability to correct for drift in are perhaps more severe. However, Implications one direction. Again a more restric- practice, as always, is the key. Any With the FCOM provided maxi- tive limitation may exist. opportunity in the simulator, even mum demonstrated crosswind value if not truly representative of the fly- and the tower provided current wind ing the real aircraft is invaluable, as value, the decision making process 9. Autoland the response time to rudder input is not always easy for the pilot on Certification should be representative. approach in limiting wind conditions. Runway condition is also a Certification of autoland and its as- factor critical to maintaining lateral sociated wind limitations is done 7. Effect of control once on the ground and has based upon a statistical analysis of Thrust Reverse to be considered. Companies may autolands carried out during flight provide operation recommenda- test and certification. These values Of course, touchdown is not the tions, but the topography around should be treated as hard limits for complete story, as the roll-out is the touchdown zone can sometimes the autoland system. Although, in an equally important phase of the lead to significant variations of actu- theory, if the tower winds indicate crosswind landing. This is where al winds experienced. Local knowl- that you are within the autoland ground based dynamics come into edge is very useful and often incor- crosswind limit you can continue to play, even though there are still porated in specific airfield briefs. It make your autoland, common sense varying degrees of aerodynamic is perhaps natural, therefore, that would indicate that you take care, as controllability during the decelera- many pilots glance at the ND wind- in reality the winds could be beyond tion phase. speed indication during approach to the autoland system capability. As help them in their decision making always, be ever ready to take over When selecting reverse thrust with a process. There is a catch here, how- manually should the need occur. given crab angle, the reverse thrust results into two force components: q A stopping force aligned along 10. Conclusion the aircraft direction of travel (runway centerline) The maximum demonstrated cross- tions of the day, he should take all wind is just that: a demonstrated information available to him in the q A side force, perpendicular to the runway centerline, which further value that was observed during decision making process. Tower increases the tendency to skid certification based upon the weath- wind may be the starting point, but sideways. er conditions that we were able to it is not the whole story. Ultimately find during the flight test campaign. the responsibility rests with the Unequal weight distribution on the Companies may define their own Captain and if there is any doubt, main landing gear during touch- limitations based upon their own discontinue the approach. As al- down and braking also produces a experience. For the line Captain, ways, the anticipation of what is yawing moment. This can be desta- asking himself whether he can land coming is the key to a successful bilizing should the asymmetric or take-off in the crosswind condi- outcome. 12 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

Peimann TOFIGHI-NIAKI Senior Engineer, A320 Family/A330/A340 Standards Flight Operations Support and Safety Enhancement

The SMOKE/FUMES/ AVNCS SMOKE Procedure

1. Introduction Until 2002 the Quick Reference the crew from having to flip back with a LAND ASAP message. In the Handbook (QRH) contained six and forth through the QRH pages frame of this procedure, the LAND independent smoke procedures. and from repeating actions in case of ASAP message requests crews to be The crew had to decide which one switch to another suspected smoke prepared for a diversion. to apply according to the suspected source. The “Immediate Landing” term, smoke source: CARGO, LAVA- The first three sources of smoke - found in the QRH paper procedure, TORY, CREW REST COMPART- CARGO, LAVATORY, CREW REST means: “Accept exceptional circum- MENT, AVIONICS, AIR COND, COMPARTMENT- , which are easier stances such as a tailwind landing, CABIN EQUIPMENT. to trace, have kept their own dedicated ditching, off airport landing etc” In practice, it is often difficult to procedures. discriminate between the last three This article will describe how the 2.2 The Difficulty to Identify sources of fire: AVIONICS, AIR Airbus SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS COND, CABIN EQUIPMENT. SMOKE procedure was developed. the Smoke Source The procedures applicable to these It will then explain its philosophy, As stated in the introduction, Air- sources were therefore merged into thereby providing guidelines into the bus decided to classify the known the single SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS decision making process from the sources of smoke into two different SMOKE procedure, thus relieving early stage of the procedure. categories:

q The smoke sources that are easier to locate, because they have an ECAM and/or a local warning, and for which there are available means of fire treatment: 2. Procedure • CARGO Development • LAVATORY 2.1 The Shortage of Time • CREW REST COMPARTMENT The procedure takes into account In a smoke situation, timing is critical. three decisive challenges common to Studies show that a fire may become q The smoke sources that are more non immediately identified sources uncontrollable in as little as 8 minutes difficult to locate, which may, or of smoke: and that, in this case, the fight crew may not, be covered by an ECAM q The shortage of time may have as little as 15 minutes to alert and that are considered more difficult to deal with: q The difficulty to identify bring the aircraft on the ground. the smoke source For this reason the SMOKE/ • AVIONICS • AIR COND q The need for two ways cockpit/ FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE ECAM cabin crew communication. and QRH paper procedures both start • CABIN EQUIPMENT The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 13

As stated above, these three smoke In a smoke situation this message sources call for the single SMOKE/ alerts the crew to anticipate the di- FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE proce- version. SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE dure. The procedure is then designed LAND ASAP around the following action blocks: Aplyp immediately VENT EXTRACT ...... OVRD note 1 Immediate Actions q CAB FANS ...... OFF The QRH SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS q AT ANY TIME Items Galleys ...... OFF SMOKE paper procedure is to be ap- q Diversion Decision SIGNS ...... ON plied whenever the source of smoke CKPT/CAB COM ...... establish is suspected to be AVIONICS, AIR q Troubleshooting. IF REQUIRED: COND, CABIN EQUIPMENT or in case CREW OXY MASKS ...... On/100%/EmERG of doubt about the smoke origin. If 3.1 Immediate Actions another smoke warning is triggered (e.g. LAVATORY SMOKE), the flight The first action block of the proce- crew must apply the dedicated exist- dure is referred to as the “Immedi- ing procedure. ate Actions” (fig. 1). They have been designed to be quick, simple, and reversible. They are actions that will not make the situation worse, and prevent recir- 2.3 The Need for two Ways culation. They protect the crew and Cockpit/Cabin Communication ensure communication. Immediate Establishing good two ways commu- Actions must be applied without delay and prior to any further assess- nication with the cabin crew is essen- ment from the flight crew. tial in a smoke situation. In case of smoke in the cabin, the cabin crew should inform the flight crew of the situation as soon as possible and should follow up on smoke dissipation. Vice versa, in case of smoke in the cockpit, the feedback from the cabin crew may prove use- Figure 1 ful to identify the smoke source. Immediate Actions Communication between cockpit and cabin is important in many situations. Figure 2 However, in a smoke/fire/fumes situa- At anytime items tion it is so important that Airbus added the CKPT/CABIN COM… ESTAB- LISH action step in the procedure.

3.2 AT ANY TIME Items 3. Procedure The “AT ANY TIME” items must be applied if the smoke becomes Philosophy the greatest threat or if the situation The trigger of a smoke alert is either becomes unmanageable (fig. 2). an ECAM message, or a visual or As the name suggests, the flight olfactory perception of smoke (by ei- "Attme any i " items crew can apply the “AT ANY ther cabin or cockpit crew). As soon TIME” items at any stage of the as an alert is triggered, for which A t ANY TIME of the procedure, if smoke/fumes procedure, provided that they have there is no dedicated procedure, the becomes the GREATEST THREAT: at least completed the immedi- flight crew must apply the SMOKE/ smoke fumes removal ...... conSider ate actions. These items must be FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE proce- elec emer config ...... conSider known by memory. dure without delay. Both ECAM and Refer to the end of procedure to set elec emer config It is important to keep in mind QRH paper procedures are totally that the smoke removal procedure compatible with one another. A t ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation does not stop the smoke source but becomes unmanageable: As mentioned in 2.1, the procedure rather aims at removing the smoke immediate landing ...... conSider starts with a LAND ASAP message. from the cockpit. 14 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

The electrical emergency configu- 3.4 Troubleshooting isolating different systems and as- ration aims to shed as much equip- Once the diversion is initiated, the sessing smoke dissipation. ment as possible. On the A330/A340 troubleshooting may be carried on The different smoke sources listed Family, it is important to note that in in an attempt to identify and fight for troubleshooting in the procedure electrical emergency configuration, the origin of the smoke. The iden- appear in the most probable to least smoke removal cannot be performed. tification will be undertaken by probable order. Therefore if considered necessary, the smoke removal procedure must be applied before the electrical emergency configuration is set. Figure 3 Diversion Finally, if the situation becomes un- Decision Making Anticipate manageable, if the flight crew is not Diversion able to maintain the control of the aircraft until an airfield is reached, then an immediate landing is to be considered. note 2 YES NO As mentioned in 2.1, The “Immedi- Q1 ate Landing” term, found in the paper Q1: is the smoke source SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE pro- immediately obvious, cedure, means: “Accept exceptional ISOLATE accessible and circumstances such as a tailwind extinguishable? landing, ditching, off airport landing NO etc”. Q2 3.3 Diversion Decision Making Q2: Was the smoke source isolated? The crew should consider the follow- YES ing two questions, which constitute the core of the SMOKE/FUMES/ AVNCS procedure: initiate END of proc q Is the smoke source immediate- Diversion ly obvious, accessible and extinguishable? q If this is the case, can it be isolated? If the answer to these two questions 4. Conclusion is YES, then this is the end of the procedure. In 2002 the SMOKE/FUMES/ The SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS pro- AVNCS procedure replaced three On the other hand, if the answer to at cedure starts with an alert to antici- different smoke procedures appli- least one of the two above questions pate a diversion and is then designed cable to smoke sources that were around four action blocks: is NO, then the diversion must be difficult to locate: AVIONICS, AIR initiated. In case of doubt a diversion Immediate Actions COND, CABIN EQUIPMENT. The q should be initiated (fig. 3). q AT ANY TIME Items other sources of smoke - CARGO, Diversion Decision Making LAVATORY, CREW REST COM- q Troubleshooting. PARTMENT- , which are easier to q Task Sharing For Cabin Crew trace, have kept their own dedicated The general action flow calls for the Airbus has developed a precise task shar- procedures. Immediate Actions to be performed first, followed by the decision on ing for cabin crew, which can be found The SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS pro- whether or not to divert. The trouble- in the Operator’s Cabin Crew Operating cedure had to integrate the need to Manual (CCOM), or in the “Getting To Grips act quickly, the difficulty to identify shooting actions are performed last. with Cabin Safety” publication, available the smoke source and the necessity to As implied by the title, the AT ANY on Airbus World. The task sharing identi- involve both cockpit and cabin crews. TIME items should be performed fies three main roles within a cabin crew Equally, the challenge was to design immediately whenever the smoke/ working team, each having a specific task a single procedure that would cover fumes becomes the greatest threat or to best prevent any escalation of the event. the largest number of situations while whenever the situation becomes un- keeping it as simple as possible. manageable. The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 15

François LEFEBVRE Head of Quality Basics and FOD

Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention

Post-flight investigation revealed 1. Introduction that the aircraft’s Primary Electrical Power Distribution Centre (PEPDC), A Foreign Object Damage (FOD) is q Aircraft parts located at the rear of the cockpit, was partially burnt. any damage attributed to an object, q Personal Objects (phones, referred to as Foreign Object Debris pencils, cigarettes, ...) Figure 1 (FOD), that is not part of an aircraft. A short circuit q Tools (mainly hand tools FODs are usually associated to ex- caused by a like screwdrivers, wrenches, contact pin burnt ternal causes like runway debris or lights, drilling tools, ...) an A380 power bird strikes, but they can also be distribution centre Protections (plastic, foam, ...). caused by foreign objects inside the q aircraft, in which case they are re- The common point to all these fam- ferred to as internal FODs. ilies of objects is that they may all affect the safety of operations, de- Internal FODs generally result from pending on where they are located The root cause for the short circuit maintenance or outstanding work on-board aircraft. was a contact pin, which had migrat- on aircraft, and may be divided into ed through the ventilation grid of the This article will illustrate, through a several families: equipment (fig. 1). few examples, how foreign objects q Debris (swarfs, chips, may impact safety and will give some Here are three examples of differ- paper, rubber, ...) recommendations on how to imple- ent foreign objects that were luckily ment an efficient prevention program found before any damage could be q Hardware (consumables created: like rivets, nuts...) to minimize FOD occurrences. q Gloves, earplugs, metal clamps and a plastic cap were discovered in the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) compartment. It was determined that these objects could have lead to an APU shutdown (fig. 2).

Figure 2 Foreign objects 2. Examples of FODs found in an APU compartment There are many ways in which a for- fect of internal foreign objects: on eign object can impair safety: a small a landing A380, the crew perceived metallic part may lead to an electric an electrical burning smell. They arc inside an electric cupboard, a were then unable to stow an engine plastic sheet may clog a bleed pipe or and experienced problems with a fuel pump etc... the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). Here is an in-service incident, Then, at power-off, the Ram Air which illustrates the potential ef- Turbine (RAT) deployed. 16 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

q A wrench was found in the hori- q Critical zones: characterized by zontal stabilizer. This FOD could a major FOD risk. The zones are have lead to a blockage of the el- closed and a clear safety impact evator servo control (Fig. 3 & 4). has been identified. There is a high risk of migration of foreign objects to adjacent areas e.g. avi- Figure 3 onic or electrical bays, tanks, ser- A320 horizontal vo-valves or pipes. stabilizer Once the zoning has been defined, decisions have to be taken regarding: q The visual identification of these zones, through standardized FOD logos, ground markings, etc q The rules to be applied within these zones, linked to access rights, work rules, tool usage and Figure 4 carriage of personal objects. Wrench left in The communication channels to A320 horizontal q stabilizer be used, to ensure that the rules are widely known and understood by all stakeholders.

3.2 Introduction of Housekeeping and Cleanliness Rules Introducing proper housekeeping and cleanliness rules will help mini- mizing the number of foreign ob- 3. FOD Prevention jects. The 5S standard (ref A) has Herewith are six recommendations been originally developed by the au- to implement an efficient FOD pre- tomotive industry. This international vention program: standard calls for a reduction of the number of tools and other objects to q Define FOD risk zones be used in the work areas and con- q Introduce housekeeping/ tains simple rules related to house- cleanliness rules keeping and cleanliness. q Manage hand tools A good practice to avoid FODs, is to install code protected lockers in the q Introduce FOD declaration, recording and feedback vicinity of FOD risky areas, where personnel entering these zones may q Train for FOD awareness leave non-useful tools and personal q Involve the management. objects like mobile phone, money, keys etc (Fig. 5). A further good practice is to define a dress code includ- 3.1 Definition of FOD Risk Zones ing work-wears without pockets, but An aircraft may be divided into three with a dedicated belt and bag to carry classes of FOD risk zones: a limited number of personal objects Figure 6 Non-sensitive zones: character- like a pen or handkerchief (Fig. 6). Dedicated dress q code against FODs ized by a low risk of FOD e.g. Figure 5 primary parts, sections/products Code protected l without zones closure. ockers in the vicinity of FOD risky areas q Sensitive zones: characterized by a moderate FOD risk. The zones are closed, but the impact of foreign objects is assessed as limited, notably concerning the migration of these foreign objects to other areas e.g. cabin overhead bins. The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 17

3.3 Management of Hand Tools 3.4 FOD Declaration, That training should be given to all Managing hand tools is key to avoid Recording and Feedback the people working on the aircraft, having screwdrivers, lights, wrench- q The declaration, recording and whether direct employees or external es, drill bits, etc. remain in the air- communication about lost tools staff, as well as to their managers. It craft. Several solutions should be should be broadened to encom- would be advisable as well to give considered: pass all families of foreign objects. people working in support functions, All foreign objects should be de- q Equipping tool boxes/cabinets on the ground floor, a basic FOD clared and recorded. FOD trends with shadow boards, one form per awareness course. tool, allows to easily detect miss- should be analysed to identify why ing tools (Fig. 7). they are left in the aircraft and per- tinent mitigation means should be 3.6 Involvement q Introducing inventory rules at the defined. Last but not least, these beginning and end of each shift mitigation means should then be of the Management ensures that no missing tool goes actively promoted to all stakehold- The implementation of an efficient undetected. ers to ensure a good implementa- FOD prevention program needs the Limiting access to tool cabinets q tion. active involvement of the manage- by badge ensures that only the au- thorized user of that cabinet will ment at all levels of the hierarchy. utilize the enclosed tools. 3.5 Training for FOD Awareness This requires a constant effort over The training allows to: time to ensure that habits change du- q Setting RFID chips on individual rably. It is up to the management to tools will allow for an efficient q Make people aware that foreign tracing. objects left in an aircraft may im- clearly indicate that fighting FODs pact safety, thereby obtaining their is a priority, and to put in place the q Tools kitting consist in having small tools boxes or mallets pre- adherence to FOD mitigation pro- needed mitigation measures. pared with only the tools needed cedures. for a specified job, not more! q Inform personnel on how to follow these procedures. q Means should be put in place to declare lost tools and to analyse the data so as to come up with answers to reduce these occurrences. These solutions should then be promoted to the shop floor. The implementation of a lost tool process highlights the message that leaving a tool in an aircraft is not 4. Conclusion acceptable. The personnel declar- Internal foreign objects may take q The management of hand tools ing a loss is expected to do his/her many forms, but they all poten- The declaration, analysis best to relocate the missing effect. tially represent a threat to safe q of recordings and feedback of Tools identification, through laser aircraft operation. q mitigation means against FODs etching for example, will ease the This threat should be mitigated The training for FOD awareness missing tool list cross-checking by implementing a sound Foreign q when a tool is found. It will also Object Damage (FOD) program, q The involvement of allow to identify the owner of the which calls for: the management. tool. q The definition of FOD risk zones All above recommendations are cur- q The introduction of house- rently being implemented by Airbus keeping and cleanliness rules on its manufacturing sites.

References A: q “5S for operators: 5 pillars of the visual workplace” Writer: Hiroyuki HIRANO Figure 7 Editions: B&T – ISBN: 978-1563271236 Tool box with shadow boards to easily detect missing tools 18 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

David HILL Head of Maintenance Programs Engineering - Structures Customer Services

Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue

1. Introduction Corrosion, if left to propagate, can inspections on specific parts of the significantly reduce the strength aircraft. The efficiency of the CPCP of the aircraft structure and com- is dependent on Operators monitor- promise safety. Corrosion can ing and reporting findings to en- also affect the aircraft systems and sure the correct type of inspection induce failures in components such and interval are selected to prevent as landing gear (corrosion initiated propagation of corrosion. 3. Types of Corrosion crack propagation) and fuel systems To reduce corrosion, good main- (corroded bonding and electrical tenance practices have to be put in There are several types of corrosion: connectors, micro-biological con- place to keep the aircraft clean (in- q pitting tamination) to name a few. terior and exterior), to ensure the To help and enable operators, Air- drain paths are clear and to maintain q galvanic bus has established a Corrosion the surface protections (paint, plat- q crevice Prevention and Control Program ing, water repellents, etc). q exfoliation (CPCP). The CPCP defines regular q intergranular.

3.1 Pitting Corrosion 2. What is Corrosion? Pitting corrosion is a localized form of corrosion by which cavities or "holes" Essentially, corrosion is the combination of damaged or missing protective are produced in the material. Pitting coatings causing exposed metals and fluid ingress or contact between metallic corrosion damage is difficult to detect, and non metallic structure (e.g. aluminium to carbon fibre). A chemical reac- predict and design against. tion sets up a positive and negative electrical charge (cathode and anode, like Corrosion products often cover the pits. a battery) and the subsequent chemical reaction ‘dissolves’ and breaks down Many small, narrow pits with minimal the metal. overall metal loss can lead to degrada- tion of the structural strength and initiate cracking. Damaged / missing protective Aluminium or non-metallic structure treatment, Paint, Sealant, TPS*, etc.

Fluid ingress Sealant

Aluminium skin Corrosion

Figure 1 A simplified Figure 2 *TPS – Temporary Protection System (fluid repellents – Dinitrol, etc) illustration of corrosion Example of pitting corrosion The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 19

3.2 Galvanic Corrosion When a galvanic couple forms between metals, one of the metals in the couple becomes the anode and corrodes faster than it would all by itself, while the other becomes the cathode (the battery effect) and corrodes slower than it would alone. In the case of a metallic and non-metallic (Carbon or composite material) couple, then the metal part will corrode and potentially cause deformation damage to the non-metallic part, also reducing the strength of the assembly. For galvanic corrosion to occur, three conditions must be present: q Electrochemically dissimilar metals must be present Figure 3 Example of galvanic corrosion of a galley storage q These metals must be in electrical contact, and container caused by a well known brand of soft drink q The metals must be exposed to an electrolyte.

3.3 Exfoliation Corrosion Exfoliation corrosion is corrosion that can occur along aluminum grain boundaries. These grain boundaries in both aluminum sheet and plate are oriented in layers parallel due to the rolling process. The delamination of these thin layers of the aluminum, with white corrosion deposits between the layers, is evident as the surface protections appear distorted, revealing the white deposits.

Figure 4 Example of exfoliation corrosion

3.4 Crevice Corrosion Crevice corrosion is a localized form of corrosion usually associated with a stag- nant solution on the micro-environmental level (toilet floor beams, bilges, etc). This occurs in crevices (shielded areas) such as under gaskets, washers, insulation material, fastener heads, surface deposits, disbonded coatings, threads, lap joints and clamps. Crevice corrosion is initiated by changes in local chemistry within the crevice.

Figure 5 Example of crevice corrosion

3.5 Intergranular Corrosion This type of corrosion is at the grain boundaries of the metal alloys and can be encountered in alloy castings, stainless steel alloys and 2000, 5000, and 7000 series aluminium alloys. Intergranular or intercrystalline corrosion (IGC) is the preferential attack of the grain boundaries or closely adjacent grains without significant attack of the grains themselves. The material can become susceptible to corrosion attack or crack propagation if under tensile stress. Research and design have reduced this phenomena significantly.

Figure 6 Example of intergranular corrosion 4. Where is Corrosion found? Corrosion can be found all over the aircraft, however, the evolution in technology, runway de-icer, cargo spillages, food/ materials, design and manufacturing processes has greatly improved resistance to drinks, human waste, etc are susceptible. corrosion. Greater use of titanium, corrosion resistant steels, aluminium-lithium So, areas around and underneath galleys alloys, composite materials, carbon, protective coatings and sealants have all con- and toilets, cargo bay bilges, exterior of tributed to significantly reduce the level of corrosion experienced a few years ago. the aircraft, fwd/aft wing spars, landing Typically, structure exposed to corrosive products (particularly when the protec- gear bays, flight controls, exterior skins, tive coating is damaged or missing) such as water, salty/humid environments, and fuel tanks are all to be considered. 20 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

5. Possible Consequences of Corrosion

Figure 7 Figure 11 Corrosion of a galley foot fitting may lead Corrosion of electrical bondings, vital for aircraft Figure 12 to the failure of the security of the galley systems safety (lightening strike, static electricity Corrosion between the interlaying surfaces (or toilet) monument and could cause discharge, etc), could cause them to become of aerial connections could lead to loss the monument to detach ineffective of communication

Figures 13 & 14 Missing/damaged protective treatments (Paint, Figure 8 primer, sealant, plating’s, etc) will all allow ingress Accumulation of corrosive "products" below of fluids/corrosive products to cause corrosion a leaking toilet could reduce the thickness of damage, hence weakening the structure the structure (hence the strength). Aside from the potential health concerns, this may lead to structural failure (decompression)

Figure 16 Pitting corrosion caused the failure of a landing gear bogie beam Figure 9 Figure 15 Corrosion through accumulation of dirt, Water ingress to a landing gear debris and fluids in the bilge area pin led to pitting corrosion, which attacked the chrome plating and blocked the lubrication, could lead to the seizure of the landing gear

Figure 10 Micro-biological growth in the fuel tanks may lead to bacterial build up in the boundary between the fuel and accumulated water in the Figure 17 tanks. The micro-biological growth could affect Stress induced corrosion along the fastener Figure 18 the structure and/or block fuel filters/pumps holes Cargo bay spillages damaged a cargo floor beam The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | January 2013 21

6. Corrosion Prevention 6.2 Role of the operators The task of the operators is to ensure and Control Program (CPCP) the aircraft remain at the optimum Cracks and loss of strength initiated by corrosion and pressurization cycles can level of performance and safety by: lead to major structural failure. After a series of incidents involving old, high q Inspecting the aircraft structure flight cycle aircraft, new regulations where introduced by Airworthiness Authori- and systems in accordance with ties in the early 1990’s requiring manufacturers to develop structural inspections Airbus instructions to clearly identify and control corrosion. q Ensuring the bilge drains are To enable operators to do this, Airbus has established a Corrosion Prevention and clear, the galleys and toilets are Control Program (CPCP) for all aircraft maintenance programs. These structural clean and leaktight, the cargo inspections are determined by design analyses, in-service experience and regula- bays are free from spillage and tions. Implementation of these Inspection Programs is mandatory. the non textile flooring is in good condition q Maintaining the protective treatments 6.1 Three Levels of Corrosion Figure 19 Applying temporary protection Level 1 Corrosion q For the purposes of assessment, cor- schemes (TPS), such as Dinitrol, rosion is classified into the follow- as applicable ing three levels: q Reporting findings to Airwor- q Level 1 Corrosion - Any cor- thiness Authorities and Airbus. rosion of primary structure that does not require structural reinforcement or replacement (minor 6.3 Role of Airbus surface corrosion requiring minor The task of Airbus, as manufacturer, restauration and reapplication of is to: protective treatments, etc) (fig. 19). q Lead continuous improvement q Level 2 Corrosion - Any corro- Figure 20 Level 2 Corrosion q Monitor trends sion of primary structure that requires a structural reinforcement q Introduce corrective actions or replacement and which is not q Adjust the maintenance program considered as level 3 (fig. 20). accordingly. q Level 3 Corrosion - Corrosion of any primary structure which may be determined to be an urgent fleet airworthiness concern. 7. Conclusion The regulations state that corrosion Corrosion may become a safety is- shall be controlled to level 1 or bet- sue, as illustrated by past in-service ter and to ensure that corrosion does incidents. not exceed the limits of Level 1 be- The Airbus Corrosion Prevention tween two successive inspections. If and Control Program (CPCP) has level 1 limits are exceeded there are been established to prevents its several options: propagation. Operators and Airbus q Decrease the inspection have each specific responsibilities threshold/interval to ensure the CPCP is as effective q Consider a more detailed as possible. The capacity of Airbus inspection level to meets its obligation is largely de- pendant upon an efficient reporting q Apply Temporary Protection System more frequently of findings yb operators. q Embody preventive modifica- tions where appropriate. REMEMBER Clean it, CPCP is, therefore, Inspect it, Drain it, self regulating. Seal it, Report. 22 Issue 15 | January 2013 Safety

Articles Published in

Issue 14, July 2012 Issue 10, August 2010 – Thrust Reverser Selection Means Full-Stop – A380: Flutter Tests – Transient Loss of Communication due – Operational Landing Distances: to Jammed Push-To-Talk A320 and A330/A340 Families A New Standard for In-flight Landing Distance Assessment – A380: Development of the Flight Controls - Part 2 – Go Around Handling – Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss – A320: Landing Gear Downlock – Do not forget that you are not alone in Maintenance – Situation Awareness and Decision Making

Issue 13, January 2012 Issue 9, February 2010 – A320 Family / A330 Prevention and – A320 Family: Evolution of Ground Spoiler Logic Handling of Dual Bleed Loss – Incorrect Pitch Trim Setting at Takeoff – The Fuel Penalty Factor – Technical Flight Familiarization – The Airbus TCAS Alert Prevention (TCAP) – Oxygen Safety – A380: Development of the Flight Controls - Part 1 – Facing the Reality of Everyday Maintenance Operations Issue 8, July 2009 – The Runway Overrun Prevention System Issue 12, July 2011 – The Take Off Securing Function – Airbus New Operational Landing Distances – Computer Mixability: An Important Function – The Go Around Procedure – Fuel Spills During Refueling Operations – The Circling Approach – VMU Tests on A380 Issue 7, February 2009 – Automatic Landings in Daily Operation – Airbus AP/FD TCAS Mode: A New Step Towards Safety Improvement Issue 11, January 2011 – Braking System Cross Connections – What is Stall? – Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2 How a Pilot Should React in Front of a Stall Situation – Fuel Pumps Left in OFF Position – Minimum Control Speed Tests on A380 – A320: Avoiding Dual Bleed Loss – Radio Altimeter Erroneous Values – Automatic NAV Engagement at Go Around 2 Issue 15 | JANUARY 2013 Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | JANUARY 2013 23

Previous Safety First Issues Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine

Safety First Issue 6, July 2008 Issue 3, December 2006 Subscription Form – A320: Runway Overrun – Dual Side Stick Inputs To be sent back to

3 No other intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this Brochure than the right to read – A320: Dual hydraulic Loss Please send me the digital copy* P it, for the sole purpose of information. – Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems This Brochure and its content shall not be modified and its illustrations and photos shall not be repro- 3 Operations Based on GPS Data Please send me the paper copy* P (Please note that paper copies duced without prior written consent of Airbus. will only be forwarded Safety First, #15 February 2013. Safety First to professional addresses) is published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point 3 This Brochure and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed Maurice Bellonte - 31707 Blagnac Cedex/ to any third party subject to payment. * Please tick the appropriate case France. Editor: Yannick Malinge, Chief Product This Brochure contains sensitive information that is correct at the time of going to press. Safety Officer, Nils Fayaud, Director Product Safety Information. Concept Design by This information involves a number of factors that could change over time, effecting the true public Airbus Multi Media Support Ref. 20130248. representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document or Computer Graphic by Quat’coul. Copyright: with respect to the information described herein. GS 420.1329 Issue 15. Photos copyright Airbus. Photos by ExM Company, Baldur Sveinsson. Airbus S.A.S. shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of this Brochure and Printed in France by Airbus Print Centre. of the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S. has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. Safety Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine Subscription Form Edition January 2013 Contents: q The Golden Rules for Pilots Moving from PNF to PM q Airbus Crosswind Development and Certification q The Smoke/Fumes/Avncs Smoke Procedure q Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention q Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue

Issue 15 2 Issue 15 | JANUARY 2013 Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 15 | JANUARY 2013 23

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Safety First Issue 6, July 2008 Issue 3, December 2006 Subscription Form – A320: Runway Overrun – Dual Side Stick Inputs To be sent back to

The Airbus Safety Magazine – FCTL Check after EFCS Reset on Ground – Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Damage AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICE For the enhancement of safe flight through – A320: Possible Consequence of VMO/MMO Exceedance – Pitot Probes Obstruction on Ground Fax: 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29 Mail to: [email protected] increased knowledge and communications – A320: Prevention of Tailstrikes – A340: Thrust Reverser Unlocked – Low Fuel Situation Awareness – Residual Cabin Pressure Safety First is published by the All articles in Safety First are present- Contributions, comment and feed- – Rudder Pedal Jam – Cabin Operations Briefing Notes Name ...... Flight Safety Department of Air- ed for information only and are not back are welcome. For technical bus. It is a source of specialist safe- intended to replace ICAO guidelines, reasons the editors may be required – Why do Certain AMM Tasks Require Equipment Resets? – Hypoxia: An Invisible Enemy Surname ...... ty information for the restricted use standards or recommended practices, to make editorial changes to manu- – Slide/raft Improvement of flight and ground crew members operator-mandated requirements or scripts, however every effort will Issue 2, September 2005 Job title/Function ...... who fly and maintain Airbus air- technical orders. The contents do not be made to preserve the intended – Cabin Attendant Falling through the Avionics craft. It is also distributed to other supersede any requirements mandated meaning of the original. Enquiries Bay Access Panel in Cockpit – Tailpipe or Engine Fire Company/Organization ...... selected organisations. by the State of Registry of the Opera- related to this publication should – Managing Severe Turbulence tor’s aircraft or supersede or amend be addressed to: Issue 5, December 2007 Address ...... – Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP) any Airbus type-specific AFM, AMM, Airbus Material for publication is FCOM, MEL documentation or any – New CFIT Event During Non Precision Approach ...... obtained from multiple sources Product Safety department (GS) – Runway Excursions at Takeoff other approved documentation. 1, rond point Maurice Bellonte and includes selected informa- – A320: Tail Strike at Takeoff? ...... tion from the Airbus Flight Safety 31707 Blagnac Cedex - France Contact: Nils FAYAUD – U@nreliable Speed Issue 1, January 2005 Confidential Reporting System, Articles may be reprinted without E-mail: [email protected] Post/Zip Code ...... incident and accident investiga- permission, except where copy- – Compliance to Operational Procedures – Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR Reception Problems Fax: +33(0)5 61 93 44 29 tion reports, system tests and right source is indicated, but with – The Importance of the Pre-flight Flight Control Check Country ...... flight tests. Material is also ob- acknowledgement to Airbus. Where – The Future Air Navigation System FANS B tained from sources within the Airbus is not the author, the con- – A320: In-flight Thrust Reverser Deployment Telephone ...... airline industry, studies and re- tents of the article do not necessarily Issue 4, June 2007 – Airbus Flight Safety Manager Handbook ports from government agencies reflect the views of Airbus, neither Cell phone ...... – Operations Engineering Bulletin Reminder Function and other aviation sources. do they indicate Company policy. – Flight Operations Briefing Notes – Avoiding High Speed Rejected Takeoffs Fax ...... Due to EGT Limit Exceedance E-mail ...... – Do you Know your ATC/TCAS Panel? (Mandatory for both digital and paper copies) A320 © Airbus S.A.S. 2013 – All rights reserved. Proprietary documents. – Managing Hailstorms Winter operation in Yakutsk, Siberia By taking delivery of this Brochure (hereafter “Brochure”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following guidelines: – Introducing the Maintenance Briefing Notes

3 No other intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this Brochure than the right to read – A320: Dual hydraulic Loss Please send me the digital copy* P it, for the sole purpose of information. – Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems This Brochure and its content shall not be modified and its illustrations and photos shall not be repro- 3 Operations Based on GPS Data Please send me the paper copy* P (Please note that paper copies duced without prior written consent of Airbus. will only be forwarded Safety First, #15 January 2013. Safety First to professional addresses) is published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point 3 This Brochure and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed Maurice Bellonte - 31707 Blagnac Cedex/ to any third party subject to payment. * Please tick the appropriate case France. Editor: Yannick Malinge, Chief Product This Brochure contains sensitive information that is correct at the time of going to press. Safety Officer, Nils Fayaud, Director Product Safety Information. Concept Design by This information involves a number of factors that could change over time, effecting the true public Airbus Multi Media Support Ref. 20122260. representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document or Computer Graphic by Quat’coul. Copyright: with respect to the information described herein. GS 420.1329 Issue 15. Photos copyright Airbus. Photos by ExM Company. Printed in France by Airbus S.A.S. shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of this Brochure and Airbus Print Centre. of the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S. has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. Safety Safety The Airbus Safety Magazine Subscription Form Edition January 2013 Contents: q The Golden Rules for Pilots Moving from PNF to PM q Airbus Crosswind Development and Certification q The Smoke/Fumes/Avncs Smoke Procedure q Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention q Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue

Issue 15