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David Arellano Gault CASE STUDIES METHODOLOGY in SOCIAL SCIENCES: ELEMENTAL BASES Modern Man Likes to Pretend That His Thinking Is Wide­ Awake

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David Arellano Gault CASE STUDIES METHODOLOGY in SOCIAL SCIENCES: ELEMENTAL BASES Modern Man Likes to Pretend That His Thinking Is Wide­ Awake -----~--- ------------------- Las colecciones de Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE represen­ tan un medio para difundir los avances de la labor de investi­ gación, y para permitir que los autores reciban comentarios antes de su publicación definitiva. Se agradecerá que los co­ mentarios se hagan llegar directamente al (los) autor(es). •:• D.R. © 1998, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Econó• micas, A. C., carretera México-Toluca 3655 (km. 16.5). Lomas de Santa Fe, 0121 O México, D. F., tel. 727-9800, fax: 292-1304 y 570-4277. •:• Producción a cargo del (los) autor(es). por lo que tanto el contenido como el estilo y la redacción son responsabilidad exclusiva suya. BJ CID E NúMERO 46 David Arellano Gault CASE STUDIES METHODOLOGY IN SOCIAL SCIENCES: ELEMENTAL BASES Modern man likes to pretend that his thinking is wide­ awake. But this wide-awake thinking has led us into the mazes ofa nightmare in which the torture chambers are endlessly repeated in the mirrors ofreason. When we emerge, perhaps we will realize that we have been dream­ ing with our and eyes open, and that the dreams ofreason are intolerable. And then, perhaps, we will begin to dream once more with our eyes closed Octavio Paz lntroduction ase study methods have been stereotyped as a weak instruments among social esciences. Researchers that use case studies as a mechanism to approach reality are charged as having deviated from "strong" academic disciplines (like the ones that use quantitative methods basically). However, case studies continue to be used in social sciences. And one impor­ tant problem is that in social sciences like public administration, public policy, and organization theory, the research process has usually been defined with so much degrees of freedom that the validity and reliability of the studies are very low. This method has often been used without basis, without facing the necessity of more systematic ways for designing a case study and defining clear research paths. Under this conditions, usually case studies become insulated "opinions", without capacity of defending themselves against competing interpretations. The search for plausible interpretations, which can be confirmed, at least through the explicit path given by the researcher, must be the most important goal of any "good" case study research. In this document I propase to systematize case study method for research proposes in social sciences like public administration, polícy analysis, and organiza­ tion theory. A first step is to build a place for the method, to link it to its base: in­ duction methods. The second step is to advocate the necessity for a research proto­ col, where we place in advance the validity and reliability criteria, and the specific bases for interpretation, before launching any project that seeks valid outcomes. The basic assumption of the document is that case study methods have an important place in social sciences, with the condition that we understand its limits and its particular advantages. Case studies are part of the inductive logic, so we are not dealing with testing but with the search for plausible probability. In this sense, case studies cannot test hypothesis or intent to generalize outcomes. It is an instru­ ment to develop hypothesis, to propose plausible solid interpretations, and to search for the "understanding" of complex phenomenon. A rellano D./Case studies methodology in social sciences: elemental bases. 1.- The prob/em ojinduction 1.1. Sorne dejinitions One of the most widespread misconceptíons in the study of logic is the belief that the construction of deductive arguments goes from the general to the specific, and that the construction of inductive arguments goes from the specific to the general. Actually, an argument is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible that it con­ clusion is false while its premises are true. An argument is inductively strong if and only if it is improbable that its conclusion is false while its premises are true, and it is not deductively valid. The degree of inductive strength depends on how improb­ able it is that the conclusion is false while the premises are true (Skyrms, 1966, p. 7- 13). Inductive Iogíc has severe problems to justif)r probability regarding an interpre­ tation, because inductíve arguments are not bad or good, simply are weak or strong. The methodological discussion about case study analysis appears to be firmly attached to the more general discussion of the problem of induction. Hume ( 1964 [1886)) describes the problematic process where one observes that the event "A" is attended by event "B" on one occasion or severa! occasions, as a situation where it is impossible to logically follow from there that it wíll be attended by it on any other occasion. Severa! forms of solution have been sought for this problem, although there is no consensus about unique scientific posture that would lead successfully any process of induction. I will describe rapidly these severa! solutions and I will concentrate in two of them, those that I think that summaríze (by taking extreme positions) the current debate on the issue (pragmatism and falsification). 1) Induction ís dispensable; it is not needed, and should be replaced, with its mission accomplished by a fundamentally variant process of inquiry which works simply by way of the elimination of untenable alternatives. Falsification (Popper) 11) Induction (while needed) cannot be justified. Skepticism (Ancient Pyr­ rhonians) 111) Induction need not be justified: it requires no justification, either (1) on the ground that induction is a perfectly natural process that does not rest on any discursive considerations at all, but on a purely instinctive or in­ tuitive basis. lntuitionism (Hume, Academic Sceptics). Or (2) because all justifications must stop somewhere and induction is part of the rock bottom. Analytic Rationalism (Strawson, Ayer). 2 Are llano D./Case studies methodology in social sciences: elemental bases. IV) Induction can and should be justified, and such justification is forthcorn­ ing through. A) grounds of logic-conceptual necessity by way of the: 1) considerations of strictly dernonstrative necessity. Necessitarian Aprior­ ism (Pierce). 2) con~iderations of hypothetically dernonstrative necessity with regard to goal-attainrnent ("transcendental argurnents," "this or-nothing argurnen­ tation"). Conditional Apriorism (Pierce-Late, Reinchenbach). 3) purely theoretical considerations regarding the modus operandi of prob­ ability as a quasi-dernonstrative device. Probabilísm (Laplace, Carnap). a) ernpirical-inductive grounds. inductivisrn (Braithwaite, Blacke) b) rnetaphysical grounds. uniforrnitaria deductivisrn (Mill, Russell) e) rnethodological grounds. pragrnatisrn (Rescher). (Rescher, 1980. p.187.) In the next part we will begin the discussion with this last argurnent of prag­ matisrn. 1.2. Induction as cognitive systematization (Based on Rescher, 1980) The methodological problern of induction resides in those processes where questions arise and the inforrnation in hand is not sufficient or where the situation is a very cornplex and intricate one. The crucial thing about induction is its rnovement beyond the evidence in hand, frorn inforrnatively lesser data to relatively larger conclusions. Induction is an instrument for question-resolution in the face of irnperfect inforrna­ tion. The goal is not the best possible answer but the best available answer, the best we can rnanage to secure in the existing conditions. "The terrn 'induction' is derived from the Latín rendering of Aristotle's epa­ goge - the process for moving to a generalization frorn specific instances. Gradually extended over a wider and wider range, it has ultirnately come to embrace all non­ demostrative argurnentation in which the prernises do (or purporting to) build up a case of good supportive reasons for the conclusion while yet falling short of yielding it with the dernonstrative force of logical deduction (seeing that it always rernains logically possible with inductive arguments to adrnit the premises and deny the con­ clusion)" (Rescher, 1980, p.l 0). Induction is not so much a process of inference as one of estimation, its con­ clusion is not so much extracted from data as suggested by them, and the task is to accornplish this in the least risky, the rninimally problernatic way, as determined by 3 A rellano D./Case studies methodology in social sciences: elemental bases. plausibilistic best-fit considerations. Induction leaps to its conclusion instead of lit­ erally deriving it from the given premises by drawing the conclusion from them through sorne extractive process. "Conclusions are not derived from the observed facts, but invented in order to account for them" (Hempel, 1966). The necessity of induction arises when the body of explicitly given informa­ tion does not suffice to determine any one of the possible answers to our question as correct. Induction, on the present approach, is seen as a family of methods (where we include the case method analysis) for arriving at our best estímate of the correct answer to questions whose resolution transcends the reach ofthe facts at hand. The task is to provide an answer qualified to serve as our truth-surrogate in factual contexts. Induction must conform to the usual rules and requirements for estimates since in general: J. Character requirement. Estimates must have exactly the same character as their estimanda. 2. Uniformity requirement (reliability). A process of estimation must be consistent in the sense of uniformity, it must yield similar results in in­ formational similar circumstances. 3. Coordination requirement (data sensitivity). Our estimates must corre­ late positively with the structure oftheir data-base. 4. Correctness-in-the-limit requirement (consistency ). 5. Accuracy requirement (validity). An estimation process should in gen­ eral yield estimates that are close to the true, insofar as this is verifiable. Pragmatist idea is that systematic analysis leads to optimality and plausibil­ ity. Induction seeks to present the best available answer to our questions. The "best available" is in relation to reduction of implausabilities, and this is achieved by sys­ tematization.
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