Reagan’s Presidential Leadership

A close analysis of the Washington

Marina van Meer 30-06-2015

Universiteit van Amsterdam Faculty of Humanities Master of Arts in History: American Studies Thesis supervisor: Dr. H.B. Beukenhorst Index

Index Introduction 3 Chapter 1: The leadership style of an American President 9 Presidential leadership 9 The power of persuasion 13 The impact of personality 17 Persuasion versus personality 23 Chapter 2: The Build-up versus the outcome of the Washington Summit 26 The Build-up 28 The Outcome 32 Chapter 3: The Washington Summit 41 Steps towards the Washington Summit 43 The internal leadership of the Washington Summit 47 The external leadership of the Washington Summit 61 The balance of leadership 65 Conclusion 69 Bibliography 74

2 Introduction President won a second term as president with a large majority of the votes in 1985 after a first successful term. In 1981 Reagan came to the presidency with a sweeping and specific set of policy goals. In domestic affairs, he set out to revitalize the economy, reduce taxes, balance the federal budget, and reduce the size and scope of the federal government.1 He managed to achieve some of his campaign promises, which resulted in a much more positive attitude of the American people towards the US government. The American people rewarded his achievements with a second term as president. During the second term of Reagan’s Presidency many changes took place in the international arena of politics. Some of the changes were that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the Iran – Iraqi War ended and Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. It was also during this period that Reagan paid more attention to foreign policy, rather than focusing mainly on domestic policy. Due to the fact that Reagan had won a second term as president he was determent to fulfill more of his campaign promises, especially on foreign policy. During his first election campaign Reagan had vowed to rebuild the American military and confront the Soviet Union and its allies with new vigor and purpose. He promised to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength.2 During his second term Reagan paid attention to these vows and made an attempt to succeed. It was also during Reagan’s second term as President that the success of the Reagan Presidency came in jeopardy. After many successes and reforms during the first term, the was shaken up by a large scandal in 1986. A scandal that was comparable to the impact of the Watergate Affair during the Presidency of , a scandal that almost cost Reagan his Presidency. This scandal would later be called the Iran-Contra Affair and became public knowledge with a feeling for bad timing. In 1986, Reagan had a summit meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik. During this summit the ideas and groundwork for the INF Treaty were discussed, but Reagan and Gorbachev did not reach an agreement. The meeting was so bad that Reagan had walked out on it. The high level summit turned into a failure for

1 http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/essays/biography/1 2 http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/essays/biography/1

3 the Reagan Presidency. The failure of the Reykjavik summit had only just settled when another blamage hit President Reagan. The Iran-Contra Affair erupted and almost made Reagan resign as President. The whole plot of secret arm sales was uncovered in October 1986 when a cargo place leased by the CIA and laden with supplies for the Contras crashed in a hail of gunfire in Nicaragua.3 The Iran- Contra affair was investigated thoroughly and focused, among other things on the awareness of Reagan of the events that had taken place during the whole affair. The failure of the Reykjavik Summit and the explosion of the Iran-Contra Affair left Ronald Reagan in a complex situation. In a short time, Reagan had failed both foreign and domestic affairs and had almost lost his Presidency. The failures of Reagan on domestic and foreign affairs in a very short period of time led to many questions during that period by politicians, media, Americans, and international leaders among many others. Some of these questions were if President Reagan was to blame for the disasters? Could Reagan have acted differently? How was it possible that such failures could take place under the watch of a President? Reagan’s leadership, knowledge, personality, advisors and administration were questioned. The confidence in the Reagan presidency had reached a low point, especially domestically. Over the years many ideas and views have been created about the presidency of Ronald Reagan, about what kind of President he was. What kind of “role” did he play, what kind of leadership did he poses and display, how did he use his power? The Reykjavik Summit and the Iran-Contra Affair are only two examples of the many occasions that questioned Reagan’s Presidential leadership. To create an understanding of President Reagan’s is difficult and ambiguous. Journalists, historians and politicians attempted to create their understandings and opinions about the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Roughly these opinions can be divided in two approaches: the ones highly praising Reagan and the ones criticizing Reagan. Like journalist and historian Lou Cannon, he described Reagan as a “monarchial president who depended upon his aides for information and otherwise took them for granted. He was forever moving from one performance to another without seeing anything except his

3 John Ehrman and Michael W. Flamm, Debating the Reagan Presidency, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2009, pp. 149

4 script.”4 It is Cannons believe that Reagan was disengaged as president and as manager of his administration. On the other hand, Robert Collins claims that President Reagan that “on the large matters that counted most […] Reagan was firmly in charge. It was he who ultimately called the shots that mattered, often over considerable opposition form within the circle, from Congress, and from the public at large.”5 It is Collins believe that Reagan decisions were crucial for the determination of the course of policies and affairs. Cannon and Collins are only two examples of a possible understanding of Ronald Reagan.6 The two examples show that the understanding of Reagan’s informal presidential power is open to different interpretations. The formal power of the President of the United States is written in the American constitution and set by boundaries according to the constitution. Therefore the formal power is not as open to interpretation as the informal power of a President. A single definition or interpretation of the informal power is not possible. Informal power of the President of the United States can be seen in his personal skills, his leadership and, or his management abilities. Many scholars gave their vision on Reagan’s leadership style and whether the effect of personality is important. Among these scholars are Richard E. Neustadt and Fred I. Greenstein. Their ideas and assessment of Presidential leadership and personality will be used to assess Reagan as Presidential leader. However, the Reagan Presidency contains too many events to include them all in order to create an understanding of Reagan as presidential leader. Therefore one important event during the Reagan Presidency will be singled out to understand Reagan’s leadership as President. The important event to understand Reagan’s leadership is the Washington Summit in 1987. This event is important for several reasons.

4 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p. 381 5 Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture during the Reagan Years, (New York: Columbia University 2007) p. 53 6 Other historians and journalists with a opinions about Reagan as President are Christopher Hitchens, Neither Icon nor Hero: Ronald Reagan was never short of a cheap jibe, of a falsehood that would buy him some time, in Ottawa Citizen June 9, 2004; Coral Bell, The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s, (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing 1989) and Gary Wills, Reagan’s America, (Garden City N.Y: Doubleday, 1987), who agree with Lou Cannon. George F. Will, Reagan’s Echo in History, in Newsweek June 14, 2004; Gil Troy, The Reagan Revolution: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press 2009); William E. Pemberton, Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan, (New York: M.E. Sharpe 1997) and Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination, (New York: Simon & Schuster 2005) agree with Robert M. Collins

5 Since the Second World War the relation between the Soviet Union and the United States had been tense. The last thing one would have anticipated when “Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, was the he would use his eight years in the White House to bring about the most significant improvement in Soviet- American relations, as John Lewis Gaddis said it.”7 The improvements took mostly place when Gorbachev took office in 1985. He was willing to speak and meet Reagan. The eagerness of both men to speak to each other resulted in four summits: the in 1985, the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, the Washington Summit in 1987 and in 1988 the . During these summits Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the improvements of their relationship, how to reduce tension and how to reduce nuclear weapons. The Washington Summit stands out compared to the other three summits. It was during the Washington Summit, which took place between December 7 and December 10 1987, that the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. It was the first time during the that a treaty to reduce nuclear arms was signed. It was also the first summit that did not take place on neutral grounds. After the partly failed summit of Reykjavik and after the disastrous Iran-Contra Affair, Ronald Reagan was taking a risk with a summit on his own territory. Reagan’s presidency would probably not survive another affair. Therefore the Washington Summit needed to become a success. Because of the pressure on Reagan as presidential leader, because of the first summit on American territory and because of the singing of an actual treaty the Washington Summit stands out as an excellent example to analyze Reagan’s leadership.

The aim of this thesis is to clarify the leadership of President Ronald Reagan. The focus is on one of the crucial events in his presidency, the Washington summit of 1987. By focusing on a crucial event we can analyze the specific role Reagan played before, during and after the event and from that find out more about his leadership style. How did Reagan use his power to influence his advisors, the media and the outcome of events during the period as described? Or was Reagan influenced, controlled or managed by the press and his advisors? To clarify

7 Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press 1992, p. 119

6 Reagan’s informal power it is important to start with a model to analyze Reagan’s informal power and leadership skills, followed by a historical timeframe. In the first chapter the models of Neustadt and Greenstein will be analyzed to create an understanding of successful leadership. To understand Reagan’s leadership the idea of Greenstein will be used. Greenstein created three questions to asses the qualities of a leader. According Greenstein it is “essential to assess the context in which the event under consideration took place” following by the necessity “to establish precisely what outcome is to be explained” and “the relevant personal qualities of the individual whose impact is being explored must be identified and compared with those of other actors.”8 These three questions do not provide a model for the understanding of Presidential leadership qualities. To analyze the leadership skill of Reagan a framework will be created based on the models of Richard Neustadt’s ‘power of persuasion’ and Greenstein’s model of six essential skills every presidential leader needs. The second chapter will focus on the context around the Washington Summit. It is of importance to understand the major events before the Washington Summit, like the Iran-contra affair and the Reykjavik Summit. These two events will lead to understanding of Reagan’s leadership before the Washington Summit. Furthermore, these events also construct a historical timeframe. Within this time frame one can place the Washington Summit and understand its importance. This understanding is important to construct a view of Reagan’s role as Presidential leader and of the other actors involved during the Washington Summit and its preparation. Thereby emphasizing the use of Reagan’s informal power on his advisors and the media. This chapter will also include process of realization of the INF Treaty. The third chapter will focus on the Washington Summit itself in 1987. This chapter will include an analysis of the Washington Summit thereby focusing on the role of Reagan and of his advisors and the media. A distinction will be made between the formal meetings during the Summit and the informal get-

8 Fred I. Greenstein, The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis, in: Political Psychology, 1998, Vol. 19, no.1, p. 4

7 togethers of Reagan, his advisors and Gorbachev. This chapter will be followed by a conclusion that will show a comparison of Reagan’s role during the preparation of the Washington Summit and during the Washington Summit itself. A clarification of Reagan’s role and power will be included as well. The conclusion aims for a clarification of Reagan’s role during the Washington Summit and how he used his power. By clarifying his use of power I hope to shine a light on how Ronald Reagan managed his presidency and how he was managed.

8 Chapter 1: Leadership style of an American President

Presidential Leadership Over the course of centuries the United States has had 44 Presidents in the White House. Some spent more time in the White House than others. All Presidents developed their own ideas on how to be President, how to use power and how to lead. Of course the most well known power of the President of the United States of America is his powers as described in the Constitution of the United States. The President’s formal power, as explained in the second article of the Constitution entails that the President holds the executive power, that he is the commander in chief of the Army and Navy and that he has the power to appoint people in his administration.9 The formal power of the President is clear and well explained and has boundaries. However, the informal power of the President is less clear. The informal power of the President cannot be found in the Constitution or any other official document. Over the years, the question of what the informal power of a President entails and how a President can execute it has been an interesting question for scholars, academics, politicians and others alike. The assessment and analysis of informal power knows many different aspects and interpretations and is often linked to Presidential leadership. However, the informal power and the style of leadership differ per President. In this chapter I will not analyze the President as an institution. The whole Presidency as an institution is far too large to analyze, because the Presidency as an institution would mean that all the President’s aids, secretaries, advisors, senators, congressmen and others alike had to be included in the analysis as well. Therefore the focus will lie on the President and not the Presidency, because the Presidency would include the complete executive branch. As Richard E. Neustadt says: “if we treat the Presidency as the President, we cannot measure him as though he were the government. Not action as an outcome but his impact on the outcome is the measure of the man.”10 This statement explains the importance to understand the separation of the Presidency as an institution from

9 For more detailed information about the formal power of the President of the United States see article two of the Constitution of the United States, which can be found at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html 10 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, pp. 4

9 the individual power of the President and therefore his individual leadership style. Informal power and personal leadership style are intertwined and will be analyzed together. Over the decades many scholars attempted to research and analyze the leadership style and informal powers of an American President. There is not one right conceptualization of a Presidential leadership style. Every analysis has its own challenges, like every Presidency has its own challenges. No President has all the good fortune and political skills to successfully meet every challenge of the Presidency. However, no President would let himself be stopped by difficulties. Each President managed to find his own way to lead the United States of America. To understand Presidential leadership most scholars research multiple Presidents. In this particular case, however, President Ronald Reagan is the only one that matters for this research. He was the oldest President to enter the White House and he was left with the consequences of the Carter Administration. The question arises what kind of leader Ronald Reagan was? What was his leadership style? Many scholars researched the Reagan Presidency and reached different conclusions. The scholarly ideas of Reagan’s Presidency can roughly be divided into two categories: the scholars calling Reagan the master of his Presidency and the scholars calling Reagan the puppet of his administration. One of the scholars advocating that Reagan was the master is Gil Troy. In the book The Reagan Revolution: A Very Short Introduction, Troy argues, “Ronald Reagan clearly was no dummy. During his years in Hollywood he had developed a thoughtful worldview, rooted in texts, validated by his experiences. Gibes about his intelligence said more about his opponents’ prejudices than about Ronald Reagan’s shortcomings.” 11 Throughout his life, Reagan paid attention to many politically engaged subjects, including the Cold War. According to his supporters he was attributed the quality of being interested and informed about the issues. According to Gil Troy Reagan “is a lot sharper than people give him credit for.”12 Lecturer and former journalist Richard Reeves partly agrees with Troy. Reeves analyses the Reagan Presidency in his book President Reagan:

11 Gil Troy, The Reagan Revolution: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press 2009), p. 19 12 Ibid, p. 15

10 The Triumph of Imagination. According to Reeves “amazing things, good and bad, happened in the 1980s because President Reagan wanted them to happen. He knew how to be President. The job does not pay by the hour. Presidential naps don’t endanger the country or the world. And Reagan’s ignorance of detail and his many blunders did not change the way people felt about him as a leader.” Ronald Reagan was a President who looked at the bigger picture and ideals and left the details to his staff. During his staff meetings Reagan made it crystal clear what he wanted to get done and left it to his staff to work out the details of his ideas and ideals. Richard Reeves claims “no one ever called Reagan an intellectual, but he did see the world in terms of ideas. He was an ideologue with a few ideas that he held with stubborn certainty.” Those ideals made him a successful President, but not an exceptional one. “Reagan was a politician, a good one, not a revolutionary.” Both Troy and Reeves find Reagan as President ideological and overall successful in mastering the Presidency. Opposite of mastering the Presidency is the claim that Reagan was a puppet of his own administration. Former White House correspondent of The Washington Post, Lou Cannon, followed Reagan for over three decades. Cannon put all his extensive research of Ronald Reagan together in the biography President Reagan: The Role of a lifetime, describing almost every move Reagan made during his Presidency. It is Cannon’s believe that “Reagan did not fit the neat ideological stereotype that was presented in alternative forms by movement conservatives and liberal activists. He was an American original, both in form and substance. […] Reagan was simultaneously an ideologue and a pragmatist.”13 It is Cannon’s belief that the prevailing view in Washington became that what the people most often saw was the work of his staff, his cabinet, his political advisers, or his wife. This low opinion of Reagan deprived him of credit for some of his accomplishments but also spared him the blame for his shortcomings. And it helped Reagan remain an elusive figure, for all his popularity.14 Journalist and historian Gary Wills approaches Reagan’s Presidency in a different way, but also claims that Reagan was a puppet of his administration. He

13 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 153 14 Ibid, p. x

11 suggests that the Reagan Presidency can be understood to analyze Reagan as a person and to understand where Reagan came from. According to Wills, Reagan embodies a powerful complex of American fantasies; it was more than an ideology. Reagan had to be understood as a synecdoche. Wills describes it that “even as President, Ronald Reagan is old and young – an actor, but with only one role. Because he acts himself, we know he is authentic. As a professional, he is always an amateur. “He is the great American synecdoche, not only a part of our past but a large part of our multiple pasts. Is he bright, shallow, complex, simple, instinctively shrewd, plain dumb? He is all these things and more.”15 It is Wills’ overall belief that Reagan was acting during his Presidency. Reagan lived in his own bubble and was therefore a chess piece in the real world of American politics. In order to create a more detailed understanding of the Reagan Presidency and his leadership style a framework must be created. This framework should lead to a more structured analytical approach of Presidential Leadership and create more depth to the master versus puppet debate on the Reagan Presidency. For this thesis the framework is exceptionally important to understand the leadership style of Ronald Reagan during the Washington Summit in 1987. Several academics have created frameworks to understand Presidential leadership. A leading academic in this field is Richard E. Neustadt. 16 He developed his theory of Presidential power in the 1960’s, using the Presidential public records of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower as case studies in support of his theory. With the second revision of his book Ronald Reagan was also included in the analysis. However, the original theory remained unchanged as Neustadt finds it still relevant and applicable to later Presidents.

15 Gary Wills, Reagan’s America, (Garden City N.Y: Doubleday, 1987), p. 1 16 Richard E. Neustadt has been an inspiration for many academic. He is often quoted by other scholars and has written many publicized articles. Scholars that have used Richard E. Neustadt: John W. Sloan, Meeting the Leadership Challenges of the Modern Presidency: The Political Skills and Leadership of Ronald Reagan, in: Presidential Studies Quarterly 1996, Vol. 26 no. 3; Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New strategies of Presidential Leadership, CQ Press 1993; Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership form John Adams to Bill Clinton, Cambridge: The Belknap Press 1997

12 Another important scholar is Fred I. Greenstein. He wrote The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style form FDR to Barack Obama on Presidential leadership style over forty years later after the publication of Neustadt’s book. Greenstein has also written en published many articles on Presidential leadership in several journals before he wrote the book The Presidential Difference.17 Using Neustadt as an inspiration, Greenstein created his own theory. His theory, as well as Neustadt’s theory, are both relevant to create an understanding of the leadership style of Ronald Reagan during the Washington Summit. However, a general understanding of both theories is required before they can be applied to the specific events during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. The specific event in this case will be the Washington Summit in 1987.

The Power of Persuasion Richard E. Neustadt was a former White House advisor during the Presidency of Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Besides his work as advisor he was also an historian. Throughout his career he became an authority on Presidential power. Neustadt’s first book was Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter. Over time he revised this book several times until its final version was published in 1990 as Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. In the last version of the book he added chapters on the most recent President, but his general analysis of Presidential power remained the same. According to Neustadt there were two ways to interpret Presidential power. “One way is to focus on the tactics, so to speak, of influencing certain men in given situations: how to get a bill through Congress, how to settle strikes, how to quiet Cabinet feuds, or how to stop a Suez.”18 The approach to focus on the tactics emphasizes the role of the President as the master in a given situation. The President is in control and applies his chosen tactics in a predictable situation to manifest his power. This approach on Presidential power focuses on pro-active leadership. It is meant to understand how a President acts in a

17 For articles by Fred I. Greenstein see Political Studies Quarterly, Political Sciences Quarterly and Political Psychology 18 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, pp. 4

13 situation that he can prepare for or is repeatable, like getting a bill through Congress or protocols. The other way to interpret Presidential power is “to step back from tactics on those “givens” and to deal with influence in more strategic terms.” 19 This approach focuses on the nature and sources of influence: where does influence come from? Out of which components does influence exist? This second approach focuses on the idea that a President can master and control influence in any situation, preferably an unpredictable situation. This approach asks for reactive leadership of the President. The President cannot predict, nor prepare for this kind of leadership like in the first approach. During a crisis or an attack like 9/11 for example, a President has to rely on his control of influence in any situation. In Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, Neustadt focuses on this second approach and explains the strategy of Presidential influence using different situations from different modern Presidents to structure his analysis. The main question Neustadt asks is how the President can use his informal power effectively in any situation and to gain the best results. Especially since “a President, these days, is an invaluable clerk. His services are in demand all over Washington. His influence, however, is a very different matter. Laws and customs tell us little about leadership in fact.”20 Laws and customs are a part of the formal power of the President. His informal leadership and therefore his informal Presidential power are merely about influence. Neustadt uses the term power as a synonym for influence, influence on the conduct of others. However, having influence is not a given fact. Presidential influence will not obtain results by merely giving orders without discussion. Therefore, according to Neustadt, influence is the power to persuade. When the power to persuade is executed successfully it leads to influence, which in turn leads to Presidential power. “The Presidential power is the power to persuade.”21 Furthermore it is important to consider the essence of a President’s persuasive task. “The essence of a President’s persuasive task is to convince men that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their sake

19 Ibid, p. 4 20 Ibid, p. 7 21 Ibid, p. 11

14 and on their authority.” 22 Meaning that anyone who is persuaded by the President does not feel overruled. The essence is that aides, advisors or anyone for that matter accept the President’s request, while believing it is in their best interest to act upon the President’s request. His aides are led to believe that they act upon their own interest and power, while they actually act upon the President’s request. It is a power of the President that he does not directly execute because of a law; he executes his power, his will through persuasions and personal beliefs. The power of persuasion must be executed correctly to be successful. Therefore the President can use the advantages that come with his position. The advantages help to a successful execution of a request and therefore lead to a stronger Presidential power to persuade. According to Neustadt there are five advantages that lay behind the execution of requests. These five advantages will enlarge the success of the persuasive power of the President. The first advantage favoring compliance with a Presidential request is the assurance that the President has spoken the request. That way there is not doubt about the request and is it impossible to ignore without consequence. Secondly, in complying with a President’s request is the clarity of the meaning of the request. To emphasize the meaning of the request it is important to publicize it. When the request becomes public knowledge there is no doubt about the intention. Moreover, the publication of the request creates more pressure on the order-taker to carry out the Presidential order, since everybody is watching. It is also important to know exactly what the Presidential request entails in order to obey or disobey the order. When the request obeyed and will be carried out one must also look at the actual ability to carry out the request. The ability to carry out a request is the fourth advantage. It is important to ensure that the order-taker has all the needed resources and powers to carry out the Presidential request. The final advantage of the request relies most on the informal and personal influence of the President. Neustadt calls it “the sense of what the President wants is his by right” or belief. The request must create a sense that it is the President’s right to

22 Ibid, p. 30

15 request the execution of his orders.23 These Presidential advantages combined will enlarge the President’s power of persuasion. According to Neustadt the power to persuade is the key to Presidential power. In any situation or decision by the President influence plays a role. His decisions will increase or decrease his influence and therefore his leadership. In Neustadt’s words: “Governmental power, in reality not form, is influence of an effective sort on the behavior of men actually involved in making public policy and carrying it out. […] In short, his power is the product of his vantage points in government.”24 Neustadt developed his theory during the end of the 1950’s and has ever since been one of the leading scholars on Presidential power. However, Samuell Kernell claims Neustadt was not the first one with the idea of Presidential power is the power to persuade. “Nearly a decade earlier, Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom had describe the politician in America generically as “the human embodiment of a bargaining society.” They made a special point to include the present in writing that despite his possessing “more hierarchical controls than any other single figure in the government … like everyone else … the President must bargain constantly.”25 Bargaining is a way of persuading and Kernell claims that Neustadt elaborated and expanded on the ideas of Dahl and Lindblom. Neustadt’s expansion of the theory into the power of persuasion made him a landmark. Neustadt might be considered a landmark in the field of Presidential power, his ideas however, were not perfect. Many criticized his theory. Some of the critics are by Stephen Skowronek and Peter W. Sperlich. Skowronek finds Neustadt’s theory refreshing, however it knows some limitations. A critique by Skowronek is the simple periodization of Presidential history. Skowronek claims that “Neustadt set the modern incumbents apart form their predecessors with a mere caricature of the past. The notion of a prior age when Presidents did not have to be leaders is nothing more than a conceit of modern times.”26 It is Skowronek belief that the question of how different modern Presidents are in

23 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, p. 23 24 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, p. 150 25 Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Congressional Quarterly inc. 1993, p. 3 26 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: leadership form John Adams to Bill Clinton, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 5

16 their leadership compared to Presidents from earlier periods is never really explored by Neustadt. Peter W. Sperlich has different critiques on Neustadt. However, he does agree with Skowronek that Neustadt is refreshing and has contributed to the understanding of Presidential power. “The fundamental weakness in Neustadt’s system is a lack of attention to psychodynamics, especially to the non- instrumental motivations among the recipients of Presidential requests.”(424) Sperlich claims there is a tendency by Neustadt to depict the President as a lonely fighter and the people he deals with are all seen as enemies and opponents, not as genuinely willing to help the President. A second weakness lies in the “failure to appreciate the potentialities of the environments in which those ‘others’ have to operate. […] A President can free himself from bargaining if he knows ho to create and sustain supportive norms and ideologies.”(424) Sperlich claims that Neustadt underemphasizes the role of aides in the success of Presidential leadership. Another scholar who contributed to the study of Presidential leadership is Greenstein. He came up with his theory about half a century after Neustadt and shares Sperlich’s critique on Neustadt. Therefore, Greenstein created his own idea on Presidential leadership, using the critiques on Neustadt. Greenstein’s approach on Presidential leadership is based on personality, background, conduct and political style. Greenstein also partly incorporates the role of Presidential aides. Greenstein shined a new light on the approach of Presidential leadership styles.

The Impact of Personality Fred I. Greenstein is an historian who studies American politics. He wrote several books and articles on Presidential psychology and Presidential leadership. Greenstein is convinced that personality has an influence on the decisions and leadership style of a President, however it can be difficult to systematically and theoretically study this kind of personal influence. In his attempt to create a systematic approach he came up with several necessities to understand Presidential influence and leadership. In his book The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style form FDR to Barack Obama Greenstein approaches

17 Presidential leadership based on six qualities related to the execution of the Presidential job. In every chapter of his book he describes a modern President using the same method. He starts with a precise account of the background, political style and conduct of the President. In the case of Ronald Reagan, Greenstein starts chronological. Greenstein touches upon Reagan’s time in Hollywood, but pays much more attention to Reagan’s political career. Greenstein argues that “Reagan’s political style was molded by his enthusiasm for FDR, his union experience and his background as an actor.”27 During his time as Reagan continued to shape his political style. It was during his time in Sacramento that he adapted to his role as political leader. It is Greenstein believes that Reagan adapted to his role as governor “by relying on aides to furnish the details of his programs, concentrating his own efforts on negotiation and public communication.”28 When Reagan became President in 1981, he continued the same style as he did during his time as governor. As the spokesman-in-chief and principal negotiator of his Presidency, Reagan was unsparing in his efforts. When it came to the administration’s internal workings, however, Reagan had a distinctly hands-off manner.29 Greenstein supports these claims with examples from the Reagan Presidency. Greenstein mentions, among other things, the financial problems, the relation with the Soviet Union and the Iran Contra Affair. In the short overview of Reagan’s career it becomes clear that Greenstein focuses on Reagan’s political style and less on the political facts of the Presidency and Reagan’s life. After this overview Greenstein projects the six essential qualities of successful Presidency on the modern President in question. The first quality is the skill of the President as a public communicator. This quality is very important to the outer face of Presidential leadership. Public communications include television and radio addresses, public speeches and interviews. It was one of Reagan’s strongest skills as President. Greenstein claims that Reagan carried out

27 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style form FDR to Barack Obama, p. 147 28 Ibid. p. 149 29 Ibid. p. 150

18 “his rhetorical responsibilities with a virtuosity only exceeded by FDR.” 30 Opposite of the outer face of leadership stands the inner quality, which Greenstein calls organizational capacity. This quality refers to the President’s “ability to rally his colleagues and structure their activities effectively.” 31 Greenstein claims that the organizational side of the Reagan Presidency was mainly a source of warnings. The organizational side of the Presidency was not Reagan’s strong suit. Reagan appeared to have had “no general views about Presidential organization, but his Presidency was a laboratory for examining the impact of a President’s advisers on his performance.”32 Greenstein mentioned the Iran-Contra affair as a terrible example of Reagan’s organizational capacities. The Iran-Contra affair was an example of what not to do when you lead the organization when you are President. The third and fourth qualities involve the President’s talents as a political operator. Greenstein calls it “his political skill and the extent to which it is harnessed to a vision of public policy.” Reagan did have a strong vision, according to Greenstein. However it was clear that Reagan only committed to a couple of verities, namely a strong military, low taxes and less government involvement in the economy. Reagan had a selected interest, but when Reagan was interested, he was very successful in carrying out his vision. To carry out his vision, Reagan needs his political skills, as Greenstein calls them. Greenstein claims that Reagan possessed exceptional political skills. He was active in selling his policies. Het was decisive in setting the directions of his administration’s program. And Reagan also had impressive negotiating skills.33 The fifth important talent is the President’s cognitive style, which the President uses to process all the information and advice he is given. In the case of Ronald Reagan Greenstein claims that “there was more to Reagan’s intellect that met the eye. […] Reagan was not well endowed with logical abilities, he was gifted at interpersonal relations and strategic use of verbal and body language.”34 Reagan’s leadership was better served by his temperament than his intelligence.

30 Ibid, p. 155 31 Ibid. p. 5 32 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 156 33 Ibid, p. 156 34 Ibid, p. 157

19 Which leads to the final and most important quality of Presidential leadership: the emotional intelligence of the President. This is the President’s “ability to manage his emotions and turn them to constructive purposes, rather than being dominated by them.” In the case of Ronald Reagan, Greenstein claims that Reagan’s “emotional qualities were well suited to the role in which he was cast by the American people.”35 Reagan did not often show disruptive emotions that could intrude into his leadership. The six qualities mentioned above are essential to understand Greenstein’s vision on Presidential leadership qualities. Greenstein points out that it is not his aim to compare Presidents based on their qualities, since they all have their faults and virtues. Each President must be assessed on its own talents, as he did with Ronald Reagan. The six named qualities are a framework to understand Presidential leadership. Greenstein does point out the strengths and successes of each President, as well as their failures and limitations with regard to the six qualities. With these qualities he gives a general overview of Presidential leadership per President. However, there is some critique on Greenstein’s vision. Stanley A. Renshon finds that the six qualities mentioned by Greenstein a lot. Since the explanation of the usefulness of these qualities is hard to give within the context of the book because there is so much to cover in such little space. “A number of questions about the qualities themselves cannot be addressed.” 36 Renshon uses President Eisenhower’s cognitive style as an example and claims that Greenstein describes Eisenhower’s cognitive style as intelligence. According to Renshon, intelligence is not the only ingredient of cognitive style as described by Greenstein. Renshon also claims that Greenstein does not elaborate on the connection between the six qualities. Another critique is that Greenstein does not apply his vision on a particular event during a Presidency. An application of his vision on a certain event would be a welcome addition to his ideas. It would lead to a better support of his theory. The next chapter will attempt to apply Greenstein’s vision on a particular event, namely the Washington Summit. The Washington Summit will

35 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 157 36 Stanley A. Renshon, ‘The Presidential Difference Leadership Style form FDR to Clinton by Fred E. Greenstein’, in: Presidential Studies Quarterly, March 2001, Vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 169

20 be the event of which the theory of Greenstein will be applied to understand the leadership style of Ronald Reagan.

In addition to this analysis of Presidential leadership, Greenstein expands his theory by analyzing the effects of the influence of personality and leadership on the outcome of a particular event. He refines his theory by applying it on a particular event. He asks himself three questions, which have to be answered to understand personal influence on a certain occasion. Firstly it is “essential to assess the context in which the events under consideration took place.” Certain events demand a certain approach, while others leave room for different responses depending on the person in charge. Secondly it is a necessity “to establish precisely what outcome is to be explained.” Outcomes of events are often large and can be approached from many angles. Therefore it is important to single out an aspect of the outcome that is to be explained. The need is to specify a precise result of an event. Finally, “the relevant personal qualities of the individual whose impact is being explored must be identified.”37 The last question can be answered by using the six Presidential qualities of Greenstein’s theory as explained above. By using these three questions as a framework one could analyze the influence of personal qualities on events. Based on the decisions of a person, in this case the President, one can attribute political qualities, leadership style and influence to someone. In his article Greenstein uses the example of the End of the Cold War. His main focus is on Ronald Reagan and and the impact of their personality. Secondarily Greenstein also includes the impact of the Secretaries of State of both countries. By using the framework of the three questions Greenstein assesses the impact of personality on a particular event. Greenstein shortly described the context surrounding the End of the Cold War. He focuses on the first term of Ronald Reagan. During the first term the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union was troubled for several reasons. The most important reasons were the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the nuclear build-up in both countries and Reagan’s idea of a weapon’s defense system, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Secondly Greenstein attempts to

37 Fred I. Greenstein, The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War, p. 4

21 answer the question of what outcome exactly is to be explained. However, he does not succeed in providing a complete answer. Greenstein describes several changes and improvements of the relation between Reagan and Gorbachev and their countries. Examples are the four summits, which took place in the second half of the 1980’s. Greenstein however fails to explain what exact outcome is to be explained concerning the impact of personality on the end of the Cold War. While in the beginning of his article he emphasizes the need for a specification of the precise result that is to be explained. Greenstein states “in the case of the end of the Cold War, it is not helpful to ask in general whether the personal qualities of the American and the Soviet leaders of the late 1980s contributed to the improvement in relations between their nations.”38 It is evident that personality had an impact on the end of the Cold War. However, as Greenstein points out, to capture the entire end is a far too big and complex event to explain. Greenstein could have picked one particular event in which personality had an impact on the end of the Cold War and emphasize the result and importance of that event. An example of a specified event to explain the impact personality could be one of the summits. In the case of this thesis it is important to consider what outcome of the Washington Summit is to be explained. Many outcomes are possible, like the relevance of the INF Treaty, or the influence of Congress on the outcome, and so on. The outcome that is to be explained is how did Ronald Reagan fulfill his leadership duties during the Washington Summit? I will answer this question in the following chapters. Following on the need to establish precisely the outcome that is to be explained is the third question. This last question focuses on the relevant personal qualities of the individual whose impact is to be explored. Out of the three questions, the question about personal qualities is the most important one. Greenstein argues that if another person had been in the position of the leader at that time events would have turned out differently, because each individual behaves differently and therefore alters the course of events. To identify personal qualities Greenstein indirectly uses an analysis he described in The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama and which is described above. The six qualities are essential for a leader to be successful.

38 Fred I. Greenstein, The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War, p. 4

22 These six qualities combined are the personal leadership style of a President. Each individual has a different personality and is therefore a different kind of leader, which leads to different impacts on events. Greenstein describes several qualities of Reagan that had an impact on the end of the Cold War. Although Greenstein does not describe them as systematic as he does in his book, the personal qualities are the same. It is Greenstein’s aim to shine a light in the possibility to research the impact of personality on historical events. In his article he uses the example of the impact of personality on the Cold War. This example is only partial relevant for this thesis. The theory to understand impact has more relevance, since the aim of this thesis is to clarify the leadership style of Ronald Reagan during the Washington Summit in 1987. Greenstein’s framework exists of the questions to understand the context of an event, the establishment of the exact outcome that is to be explained and the identification of the impact of personal qualities. These three questions will be applied on the Washington Summit in the next chapter.

Persuasion versus Personality There are many possible approaches to the leadership style of a President. It is impossible to create one analysis or framework in which Presidential power and leadership can be understood. Neustadt and Greenstein both provided a different approach on Presidential leadership. Neustadt’s biggest claim on Presidential leadership is based of the President’s power to persuade. This informal power, when executed well, leads to more influence of the President and therefore more power. Neustadt leaves out the importance of personality on successful leadership. For Greenstein however, personality is an important pillar of his approach on Presidential leadership. Greenstein bases his analysis of Presidential leadership and power on six qualities essential to a President for successful leadership. Adding to this analysis Greenstein wrote an article on how to analyze the impact of personality on an event during the Presidency. Greenstein does not focus on the informal power as Neustadt does. Both scholars created a completely different approach to the informal leadership style of a President. Both scholars did not manage to create a complete analysis. Neustadt focuses almost completely on the power of

23 persuasion. He leaves out the influence of Presidential aides in the administration and personal characteristics of a President, while the character and background of a person are a large part of the evolvement and creation of political ideas and personal leadership style. For example, Ronald Reagan was known for his great communicative skills and used them to enlarge his influence on the public, as well as his aides. Neustadt barely mentions Reagan’s communicative skills. Greenstein on the other hand, describes Presidential leadership skills systematically. However, he does not use specific examples to support his explanation of how a President has one of the six political skills. Greenstein mentions that Ronald Reagan is a great communicator. However, Greenstein does not elaborate why Reagan would have been an amazing communicator. This quality will be analyzed in the next chapter. However, it will only be one element to eventually understand how Reagan displays his leadership style during the Washington Summit. Another difference between the approaches of Neustadt and Greenstein is their use of sources. Neustadt mainly uses the public record, including newspapers and Presidential papers, since biographies were mostly not yet available. In addition to the public record, Neustadt also uses secondary literature. Greenstein uses less of a variety of sources. He mainly relies on memoirs, biographies and some secondary literature. The basis of Neustadt’s argument is more solid because of the variety of sources also involving analyses by other academics. Overall the approach of both analyses on the informal Presidential power and leadership show the possibility of how to understand Presidential leadership. Greenstein expands in a way on Neustadt’s theory of the power of persuasion. Greenstein adds a character and systematically approached skills to the side of informal leadership of the President. While Neustadt’s theory forms a basis for the idea of Presidential leadership. Neustadt created a theory that was new in his era and is still relevant today. Neustadt and Greenstein will be combined to create an understanding of the leadership style of Ronald Reagan during the Washington Summit. The systematic approach of Greenstein will be applied into much more detail, using examples to support the analysis.

24 Neustadt’s theory of persuasion will be used as well, based on examples during the Washington Summit. In the next chapter the motivation of Ronald Reagan to organize the Washington Summit will be explained based on his leadership style, which again will be based on his decisions. It is important to address the question as made up by Greenstein. The first is the context in which the Washington Summit took place. Within the context the political events leading to the Washington Summit will be described, followed by the consequences of these events. These consequences are the outcomes of events that needed to be explained to put the Washington Summit into context. The historical context will be followed by the impact of Presidential qualities on the events. These Presidential qualities will be the informal power as described by Neustadt and the six personal qualities as described by Greenstein.

25 Chapter 2: The build-up versus the outcome of the Washington Summit

Leadership can be interpreted in different ways, as was shown in the previous chapter. Neustadt and Greenstein each have a different approach towards Presidential leadership style. The most important pillar of Neustadt’s theory is the Presidential power to persuade. This is part of the informal power of the President. Greenstein on the other hand, assesses the success of Presidential leadership based on six important qualities relating to personality. Both claim that their theory is applicable to all Presidents. In this thesis, however, the theory will only be applied on President Ronald Reagan. Reagan as an important President of the United States and it is difficult to place him. However, to apply the theory of Greenstein and Neustadt on every event of the Reagan Presidency would be far too complex and extended. Therefore the focus will be on one important event of the Reagan Presidency, namely the Washington Summit. This event was the only summit in the Presidency of Ronald Reagan where a treaty was signed and the first summit between Reagan and Gorbachev that was not on neutral grounds. Also, the summit in Washington was an opportunity for Reagan to show the American people that he was still a skillful leader after the difficulties during the Iran-Contra Affair and the Reykjavik Summit. In this chapter the importance of events before the Washington Summit will be explained to create a context in which the Washington Summit can be understood. The Reykjavik Summit and the Iran-Contra Affair are the events that will provide the political setting in which the Washington Summit can be placed. These events will be an illustration of Presidential leadership, or the lack thereof, that was shown by Reagan. Fred Greenstein created an interpretation of context as will be used for this chapter. In the words of Greenstein: “It is essential to assess the context in which the events under consideration took place. Some political contexts virtually dictate a particular political response and preclude other possibilities. No conceivable American leader could have taken a wait-and-see stance after Pearl Harbor. But other situations are

26 unstructured and leave room for leaders with varying predilections to differ in their actions.”39 Greenstein does not give an example of a situation in which leaders can vary in their actions. However, the reaction and action of the President influence the outcome of an event. Presidential responses are guided by the outcomes of previous events. The outcome of previous events often creates a course of actions towards the upcoming events. The context involves Reagan’s changing policy towards the Soviet Union during his Presidency and his leadership during the Reykjavik Summit and Iran-Contra Affair. As said, the context will be created by events prior to the Washington Summit and will shine a light on the importance of the Summit to understand Reagan’s leadership style. After clarifying the context of the Washington Summit Greenstein’s second question will be answered referring to the necessity to establish the exact outcome of the Washington Summit that is to be explained. In his article, Greenstein uses the example of the impact of personality on the end of the Cold War. Events can be analyzed on many different aspects. Greenstein stated “in the case of the end of the Cold War, it is not helpful to ask in general whether the personal qualities of the American and the Soviet leaders of the late 1980s contributed to the improvement in relations between their nations.”40 It is evident that personality had an impact on the end of the Cold War. However, as Greenstein points out, to capture the entire end is a far too big and complex event to explain. Therefore Greenstein could have picked one particular situation in which personality had an impact on the end of the Cold War and emphasize the result and importance of that event. In this thesis the focus will not be on the impact of personality, but on the leadership style of Ronald Reagan. But again, Reagan’s leadership is far too large and complex to analyze. Therefore the outcome that is to be explained is how did Ronald Reagan fulfill his leadership duties during the Washington Summit. This chapter will show the road of Ronald Reagan’s leadership towards the Washington Summit. The events leading up to the Washington Summit will show different elements of Reagan’s leadership style. These different elements

39 Fred I. Greenstein, The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis, in: Political Psychology, 1998, Vol. 19, no.1, p. 4 40 Ibid, p. 4

27 show the relevance of the Washington Summit as a case to analyze Reagan’s Presidential leadership style.

The build-up In politics one event never stands on itself. The Washington Summit is such an event. Preceding the summit are the Reykjavik Summit and the Iran-Contra Affair. The results and consequences of these events will explain the importance of Reagan’s leadership style and relevance of the Washington Summit. The political events with relevance to the Washington Summit will be described in chronological order and will each show different outcomes and aspects of Reagan’s Presidential leadership style. Starting with the Reykjavik Summit. On October 9th, 1986 President Ronald Reagan arrived in Reykjavik, Iceland to meet Michael Gorbachev on the 11th for a two-day summit. Reagan used his extra day in Reykjavik to prepare the last details for the Summit, consulting his staff and Secretary of State that traveled with him to Reykjavik. The American intention of the Reykjavik Summit was to explore the reduction of nuclear missiles and to create a basis for a treaty that was to be signed during a future summit in Washington DC. During the Reykjavik Summit Reagan and Gorbachev met several times in small groups to continue the discussion that had started in Geneva. This discussion involved the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty and the reduction of several different types of missiles. In advance, Reagan and his team prepared the Summit not expecting much from Gorbachev and his team. The week before the Summit, Shultz sends Reagan a memorandum concerning the Reykjavik Summit. Shultz wrote “we need to aim to produce substantive progress (but no agreements per se) at Reykjavik that will enhance the chances for a successful summit in the U.S. We will work across the full agenda, but the reality is that our work will not be seen as effective without some progress on two big issues: and human rights.”41 Shultz focused on the improvement of the relation between the US and Soviet Union to eventually reduce arms when Gorbachev would come to Washington. According to Jack F. Matlock Jr., a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, Reagan had a clear idea of what he wanted to gain from the meeting in

41 George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, Memorandum to the President, October 2, 1986, p. 1

28 Reykjavik: “an understanding regarding one or two major agreements that would permit Gorbachev to come to the United States for a full-fledged summit.”42 Reagan’s aim for Reykjavik stroked with Shultz’s ideas. It was Reagan who showed interest in the meeting, he had a vision according to the description of Fred Greenstein. Greenstein believes that “vision is a term with a variety of connotations. One is the capacity to inspire, […] and the possession of a set of overarching goals. […] Vision also encompasses the consistency of viewpoint.”43 In the case of the Reykjavik Summit Reagan showed that, according to the definition of Greenstein, he was able to create an overarching goal. The overarching goal was to create an understanding in order to have a summit in Washington. Following Greenstein’s idea of vision, Reagan also showed that he had a consistent viewpoint, which was the overall improvement of the relation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, before and during the Reykjavik Summit, Reagan showed he had a vision, a prerequisite of effective leadership according to Greenstein. However, at the first meeting on October 11th, Shultz could not have been more off with his approach and ideas. Gorbachev almost immediately started of the meeting by introducing a new proposal. The proposal positively surprised the Americans, because Gorbachev moved towards the US positions on the major points. Richard Reeves, a lecturer, historian and former journalist, gives a well- written summary of Gorbachev’s proposal. This summary includes the American ideas, which Gorbachev conceded to. Concerning strategic arms, Gorbachev proposed an agreement on a reduction of 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States. All types of strategic offensive weapons would be subject to reduction within limits to be discussed. It was also the aim to find a solution to limiting the deployment of sea-based and long-range cruise missiles. Secondly, Gorbachev’s proposal discussed the medium-range missiles. He proposed an agreement to complete the elimination of the Soviet and US medium-range missiles in Europe. Separated talks would start to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Asia. The last part of the proposal concerned the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic

42 Jack F. Matlock jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: Howe the Cold War ended, New York: Random House, 2004, p. 213 43 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 228

29 Missile (ABM) Systems. This agreement would state that both powers would not use their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. The Soviet Union and United States would both abide to all of it provisions throughout that period. During this period it would be prohibited to test all space-based elements of anti- ballistic missile defenses in space.44 This new proposal by Gorbachev positively surprised Reagan and his staff. Reagan and his staff expected the summit to be preparatory meetings for a possible deal during the next summit to be held in Washington. Gorbachev’s proposal was surprising, because it met most of the American ideas for a future treaty. With this proposal by Gorbachev the Reykjavik Summit seemed a done deal, since it mostly stroked with Reagan’s ideas. Only the details of the proposal had to be discussed. However, as the meetings progressed it became evident that the final part of the proposal was problematic. Gorbachev demanded that Reagan would severely limit his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and would not deploy it. Reagan was unwilling to limit SDI, because he felt that he had made a pledge to the American people that “SDI would contribute to disarmament and peace, and not be an offensive weapon,” as he said during the meeting on Sunday morning in Reykjavik. 45 Reagan believed that SDI could contribute to the disarmament when the SDI research would be shared. “If everyone had access to the relevant technology, it would be a threat to no one.”46 However, Reagan was not willing to abandon SDI, or to break his promise to the American people. As Reagan said in his own words: “ I wasn’t going to renege my promises to the American people not to surrender the SDI. […] The SDI was an insurance policy to guarantee that the Soviets kept the commitments Gorbachev and I were making at Reykjavik. We had enough experience with Soviet treaty violations to know that kind of insurance was necessary.”47 Reagan seemed to believe that SDI and his promise to the American people were more important than an arms deal. One could

44 Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination, (New York: Simon & Schuster 2005), p. 343 For more information on the Reykjavik Summit see Ken Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty- eight Hours that Ended the Cold War, New York: Broadside Books, 2014 45 Memorandum of Conversation, Sunday October 12, 1986, United States Department of State, p. 9 46 Ibid, p. 9 47 Ronald Reagan, , London: Hutchinson 1990, pp. 677

30 wonder if Reagan’s argument for rejection is true, but there is no proof of the falseness of his argument. By the end of the second day it became clear that both leaders were holding their ground and were unwilling to give in. SDI was the breaking point in reaching an agreement. Reagan was convinced that SDI was more important than reaching an agreement with Gorbachev on the reduction of missiles. During the Summit Reagan’s manner was confident and convincing. He trusted his staff and his own negotiating qualities. Afterwards Reagan wrote in his diary: “the price was high but I wouldn’t sell & that’s how the day ended. All our people thought I’d done exactly right. I’d pledged I wouldn’t give away SDI & I didn’t but that meant no deal on any of the arms reduction.”48 This showed Reagan’s confidence, but he also understood the consequences of his actions. Reagan was eager to end the Cold War by eliminating missiles, however he was not willing to give up SDI. Because of Reagan’s unwillingness to give up on the research and possible deployment of SDI no deal was made during the Reykjavik Summit.49 If Reagan had been willing to confine his SDI research only to laboratories, without giving up the whole project, the Reykjavik Summit could possibly have led to a deal to reduce arms. This deal would be based on Gorbachev’s proposal as described before. The Reykjavik Summit was often described as a failure by the press. Jack F. Matlock, who was a note taker during the summit, claimed that the summit was not the biggest success. During the summit no agreement was reached, because of SDI. Both Reagan and Gorbachev were not willing to let go of their contradictorily positions. Even so, during the meetings Reagan and Gorbachev agreed on the major points of the reduction of missiles. Much progress was made in preparation of the next summit to be held in Washington. In 1986, Reagan was mostly upset about not being able to cut a deal, but was content that he did not give up SDI.

48 Ronald Reagan (ed. Douglas Brinkley) , New York: HarperCollins 2007, p. 444 49 Reagan’s unwillingness to give up SDI is also supported by, among others, Jack F. Matlock in Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War ended p. 234-236, and Richard Reeves, The Triumph of Imagination p. 352-353

31 After the dust of the Reykjavik Summit had settled down, another event came up. In the beginning of November 1986, a Lebanese magazine published a story concerning the liberation of American hostages in exchange for weaponry in Iran. The first reaction of the White House was ‘no comment,’ since it was not clear at all what the exact scale of the affair was or would become. In short the Iran-Contra affair, as it was later called, existed of the following three main events. The first was that the Reagan administration had violated US law and policy by dealing with terrorists and by going against the arms embargo that was imposed upon Iran in 1983. The US had sold arms to Iran in return for the release of American hostages. Secondly, the NSC staff had overcharged Iran for the weapons that were sold and the extra money was diverted to the Contras. The diversion of money was in violation of the 1984 Boland Amendment, which banned aid or assistance by the United States to the Contras. Finally, the Reagan administration had arranged for private donors and foreign nations to channel funds to the Contras.50 All these actions were not mentioned to Congress as is required by law and it is unclear if the happened with the direct knowledge of President Reagan. During the questioning by investigators “Reagan first stated that he had approved the transfer in advance. Then he said he had not. Finally he said he could not recall,” according to Michael Flamm.51 During the whole affair the question of what Reagan knew or did not knew remained unanswered. While the affair got a lot of attention in the media, Reagan attempted to convince the American people of his understanding of the story, but failed. Reagan’s story mainly denied that illegal actions had taken place. On November 13, 1986, Reagan first spoke about the affair to the American people via an official nationwide televised address. In that speech Reagan said the following: “The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterly false.

50 John Ehrman & Michael W. Flamm, Debating the Reagan Presidency, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009, p. 143 For a detailed account of the Iran-Contra Affair see A Very Thin Line by Theodore Draper, New York: Hill and Wang 1991 51 John Ehrman & Michael W. Flamm, Debating the Reagan Presidency, p. 147

32 The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not.”52 In this speech Reagan fully denies any of the news that had been circling around. However, on November 19 1986, remembered saying the following to President Reagan: “Mr. President, you are not fully informed. You must not continue to say we made no deals for hostages. You have been deceived and lied to. I plead with you, don’t say that Iran has let up on terrorism.”53 This was the first time Reagan was told that he was wrong concerning the Iran-Contra affair. According to his diary, Reagan found it very difficult that his National Security Advisor John M. Poindexter had misinformed him. On November 24, Reagan was to hear from Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan that there was a ‘smoking gun.’ The gun was the information that, as he describes in his diary, “on one of the arms shipments the Iranians paid Israel a higher purchase price than we were getting. The Israelis put the difference in a secret bank account. Then our Colonel North (NSC) gave the money to the “Contras.” This was a violation of the law against giving the Contras money without an authorization by Congress. North didn’t tell me about this. Worst of all John Poindexter found out about it & didn’t tell me.”54 Reagan was surprised by this information. The fact that Reagan was surprised was a sign of his disengaged management style. Reagan did not bother to ask his staff about important details. Reagan’s next step, as advised by Meese, was appointing a special commission chaired by former senator of Texas John Tower. This commission was to independently investigate the whole situation, including the role of every actor involved in the affair. It was President Reagan who took several steps to prevent even further damage caused by the Iran-Contra Affair. It was Reagan who decided that it was necessary to go public with the information about the affair and who discussed the situation with the leaders of Congress. Outside the White House people saw Reagan going public with the whole affair and believed it was his idea. Behind closed doors, however, it is less clear if Reagan initiated the idea or if one of his

52 Transcript of the speech given by Ronald Reagan on November 13, 1986, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/111386c.htm 53 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, p. 828 54 Ronald Reagan (ed. Douglas Brinkley) The Reagan Diaries, p. 453

33 advisors had pushed him to go public with the affair. What was clear was that the Secretary of State George Shultz initially told Reagan that he was wrongly informed and that it was Poindexter who had kept the information from the President. It was also Shultz who gave Reagan an ultimatum, as Reagan wrote in his autobiography. Reagan wrote: “After the furor that had been going for more than two weeks, Don Reagan told me that George Shultz, who by then had gone public with his unhappiness of the Iran affair, wanted to see me to lay down an ultimatum: Either I fire John Poindexter, or George would quit. […] George said Poindexter had misled me an others in the administrations about the weapons shipments.”55 Reagan could not afford to lose Shultz, especially since Reagan respected Shultz as “a man of the highest integrity.”56 The leadership Reagan displayed in November of 1986, during the start of the affair was distant. He accepted information his administration provided him, but never questioned it or asked for details. Reagan had a hands-off and distant management style and the Iran-Contra Affair is a good example of that style. Reagan’s relation with his NSC staff was distant and left a lot of space for his staff to work freely, without the involvement of the President. The work of the NSC staff was one of the most important reasons the Iran-Contra Affair happened. It was because of Reagan’s disengaged leadership style the Iran-Contra Affair could arise and could explode. There is no way of proving if the situation would have been different if Reagan had been a fully engaged manager who wanted to be in control of everything. Over the whole course of the Iran-Contra Affair Reagan showed disengagement. When the affair became public, Reagan’s disengaged management style became apparent to the public as well. The Iran-Contra affair was also a result of Reagan’s vision as described by Greenstein. In 1984, Congress voted to restrict all aid to the contra’s. But, according to Michael W. Flamm, Reagan told his former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane “I want you to do whatever you have to do to help these people keep body and soul together.”57 With this statement, Reagan made clear that he wanted to keep on supporting the contra’s in Nicaragua at any cost. McFarlane and his team kept this in mind with the intention to execute the

55 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p.529 56 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p.529 57 John Ehrman & Michael W. Flamm, Debating the Reagan Presidency, p. 144

34 Presidential order. However, Reagan failed to check the execution of his order to McFarlane, which is how the Iran-Contra Affair came into existence. In February of 1987, the Tower Commission finished its investigation. One of the main findings of this investigation was “that the President’s detached management style had permitted the original Iran initiative to degenerate into an arms-for-hostages deal and the he [Reagan] had “no knowledge” of the diversion of funds until informed by Meese in November 1986.”58 Although it will never be entirely clear if the investigation of the Tower Commission was completely accurate, since the President appointed the Tower Commission. Because it was a presidential commission and not a committee appointed by Congress, one could assume that the Tower Commission was not fully objective. What became clear is that Presidential leadership of Ronald Reagan in this affair is questionable. The Iran-Contra affair jeopardized the Presidency of Ronald Reagan in several ways. Firstly it was questionably if Reagan’s Presidency would survive the affair, since illegal actions had taken place on his watch. Secondly he lost the trust of the people. It did not help Reagan that the people did not believe the words he spoke in speeches, on television or radio. One of his strongest assets, his ability to communicate, turned against Reagan.59 For example, in March 1987 Reagan gave a speech on the results of the Tower Commission investigation. In this speech Reagan spoke about and reflected his own role in the affair and his management style. He started with recalling his previous speech in November 1986 on the affair. In that particular speech he claimed that the American people did not trade arms for hostages. In his speech in March 1987 he says: “My heart and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to

58 John Ehrman & Michael W. Flamm, Debating the Reagan Presidency, p. 152 59 Reagan’s quality as a strong communicator is claimed by Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama, p. 155, Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination, (New York: Simon & Schuster 2005), p. 27 and William E. Pemberton, Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan, (New York: M.E. Sharpe 1997), p. 112

35 the original strategy we had in mind. There are reasons why it happened, but no excuses. It was a mistake.”60 Reagan admitted that mistakes were made, but not on purpose. According to Reagan he was solely guided by his beliefs and the information he had at that point. The same works for Reagan’s leadership during the whole affair. In managing the administration Reagan was guided by his beliefs, not what was necessarily best. Although Reagan claimed that his management style “worked successfully for me during 8 years as Governor of California and for most of my Presidency. The way I work is to identify the problem, find the right individuals to do the job, and then let them go to it. I've found this invariably brings out the best in people. […] When it came to managing the NSC staff, let's face it, my style didn't match its previous track record.”61 However, Reagan does admit his style is not perfect and might need changes in this particular case. The American people seemed to accept Reagan’s apologies and changes he made to improve his credibility.62 However Reagan’s popularity polls had never been so low during his Presidency as during the Iran-Contra Affair.63 During the whole year of 1987 the Iran-Contra affair was a shadow on the Reagan Presidency. James Mann, a former journalist and Washington reporter, summarizes the situation of Reagan in 1987 very compact. The “Iran-Contra had shattered the President’s popularity an threatened the collapse of his presidency. With the Democrats in control of Congress, Reagan had little hope of winning approval for any significant initiatives in domestic policy.”64 Reagan needed a success that would restore his power, popularity and trust. He could give convincing speeches, like the speech in Berlin on the Brandenburg Gate on June 12, 1987. In this famous speech Reagan spoke mainly about freedom and the relation between the East and the West. The most famous line of this speech is

60 Address to the Nation on Iran-Contra (March 4, 1987) http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/speeches/speech-3414 61 Address to the Nation on Iran-Contra (March 4,1987) http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/speeches/speech-3414 62 The improvement of Reagan’s credibility is described by R. Reeves in President Reagan: The Triumph of imagination, p. 365 63 For Reagan’s popularity during the Iran-Contra Affair see Richard Reeves, The Triumph of Imagination, New York: Simon and Shuster 2005, p.365, 371 and Richard A. Brody and Catherine R. Shapiro, ‘Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan’, in: Political Behavior, vol. 11, no. 4 (Dec. 1989), p. 353-369 64 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the end of the Cold War, New York: Viking 2009, p. 227

36 “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”65 Although Reagan’s speech in Berlin was impressive and gained a lot of attention, it did not make a concrete change. As James Mann said Reagan was “eager for something tangible, some foreign-policy achievements that would extend beyond the realm of rhetoric. High profile meetings with Gorbachev would serve this purpose.”66 Reagan was eager for the restoration of his power, trust and success and the Washington Summit could be the perfect moment to restore his Presidential leadership.

The Outcome. In November 1987, President Ronald Reagan could look back on one of the most troublesome years of his Presidency. The Iran-Contra Affair exploded and almost led to the resignation of Reagan as President. The Reykjavik Summit had been worrisome as well, since Reagan and Gorbachev had not been able to make a deal. It was Reagan’s intention to strengthen the relation with Gorbachev in Reykjavik, in order to make a deal in Washington during the following summit. However, since the Reykjavik Summit did not go well, it was the question if and when there would be a next summit. An important consideration during the Reykjavik Summit was the role of George Shultz. Shultz was one of the few official who traveled to Reykjavik with Reagan and who had direct contact with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. It was also Shultz who did most of the preparation for the meetings between the two leaders. Shultz wrote a memorandum explaining his expectations of the Reykjavik Summit, based on his meetings with Shevardnadze, in order to help Reagan with his preparations for the summit. Before Shultz even had conversations with Shevardnadze to prepare the Summit, it was Reagan who set out the lines. It was Reagan’s vision that was leading in the American approach of the summit. According to Fred Greenstein, vision also “refers to preoccupation with the content of policies, an ability to assess their feasibility, and the possession of a set of overarching goals.”67 It was Reagan who showed that he had such a

65 Ronald Reagan, Address from Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, June 12, 1987, http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/speeches/speech-3415 66 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, p. 227 67 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 228

37 vision, however, his vision was not very detailed or specific. Within the grand vision of Reagan, Shultz was able to work out the details. Reagan made sure that Shultz worked out the details by using his power to persuade as described by Neustadt.68 It was Reagan who spoke to Shultz making clear what his intentions were and he clarified the content of his request. When Gorbachev presented his proposal at the Reykjavik Summit Reagan was able to do the negotiating, because he had persuaded Shultz to prepare everything and brief Reagan on it. These briefings enabled Reagan to show his political negotiations skills, because he was aware and informed. Reagan trusted his staff to have the knowledge and work out details and inform him accordingly. By managing his staff to execute their job well, Reagan showed his organizational skill as described by Greenstein. Greenstein described organizational capacity as “a President’s capacity as an organizer includes his ability to forge a team and get the most out of it, minimizing the tendency of subordinates to tell their boss what they sense he wants to hear.”69 During the Iran-Contra Affair, starting at the end of 1986, Reagan again had a lot of trust in his staff. As explained, Reagan claimed to not have known about the falsified information. Reagan believed that he rightly used the information he was given. Reagan trusted his staff to do the right thing. He was not on top of their work, nor checking it. Reagan did not use his ‘power to persuade’ as explained by Neustadt, because he had no knowledge of any policies that needed his persuasive power to work effectively. . In not doing so, Reagan was not the leader in control of the situation. The Iran-Contra Affair is an example of his hands-off management style towards the NSC-staff. It demonstrated the opposite of one other characteristic of effective leadership according to Greenstein, namely organizational competence. The Iran-Contra Affair was an organizational failure. Reagan’s advisors could easily take advantage of his disengaged management style. Reagan gave his advisors a lot of leeway, which in the case of the Iran-Contra Affair was a disaster. The Iran- Contra Affair is also an example of another aspect of Reagan’s leadership. During his Presidency Reagan had been a convincing public speaker. Fred Greenstein

68 For an explanation of the Power to Persuade by Richard Neustadt, see chapter 1, p. 5-9 69 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 226

38 names public communications as one of Reagan’s best assets.70 One of his nicknames was the ‘Great Communicator.’ However, during the Iran-Contra Affair Reagan lost his touch as a public speaker. The Iran-Contra Affair, as well as the Reykjavik Summit are important to understand different elements of Reagan’s Presidential leadership style. The Reykjavik Summit and the Iran-Contra Affair show different sides of Reagan’s leadership style. The Reykjavik Summit focuses on his relation with Shultz and his negotiating skills. Also, the Reykjavik Summit showed that Reagan was not able to go into detail on the topics that were discussed, Reagan left that to his staff. The faith and trust that Reagan had in staff was also very visible during the Iran-Contra Affair. This trust showed Reagan’s distant management style. Reagan does not seem to organize or structure his administration and its activities. These elements of Reagan’s leadership style would also be visible during the Washington Summit. The Washington Summit started on December 8, 1987 with the arrival of Gorbachev in Washington. The main goal of the summit was the signing of the INF Treaty. Other subjects that were discussed during the Washington Summit were regional conflicts, human rights and the possibilities of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the ABM Treaty. The Washington Summit was important because it would be the first summit between Reagan and Gorbachev on American soil, not a neutral place. Also this would be the first summit where a treaty was to be signed, the first treaty between the superpowers of the Cold War. These reasons were important to Reagan, because a successful summit could help restore his leadership. The leadership skills of Reagan shown during the Reykjavik Summit and the Iran-Contra Affair all came together in the Washington Summit. A thorough analysis of these skills will be shown in the next chapter. The leadership skills that Reagan would present during the Washington Summit would show his strengths he had shown before. But the Washington Summit was also a perfect stage for Reagan to show if he had learned from his mistakes he made in the past. Reagan’s power and influence needed a successful summit. As Richard Neustadt expresses it, “the greatest danger to a President’s influence […] is not the show of incapacity he makes today, but his apparent

70 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 155

39 kinship to what happened yesterday, last month, last year. For if his failures seem to form a pattern, the consequence is bound to be a loss of faith in his effectiveness “next time.”71 Therefore the Washington Summit is important to understand Reagan’s leadership style. The next chapter will analyze Ronald Reagan’s leadership duties during the Washington Summit. This analysis will be based on the context given in this chapter and based on the leadership theories of Richard Neustadt and Fred Greenstein as presented in chapter 1.

71 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, p. 46

40 Chapter 3: The Washington Summit

The Presidency of Ronald Reagan entered a difficult period from October 1986 until November 1987. It started with a failed Reykjavik Summit. Even though Reagan had been prepared for the meetings, Gorbachev had surprised everyone in Reykjavik with a new proposal to reduce arms. Reagan mostly agreed with Gorbachev’s proposal, only during the further negotiations Reagan was not willing to give up SDI. Following the Reykjavik Summit, the Iran-Contra Affair became public. This affair almost destroyed the Reagan Presidency. During the affair Reagan showed a hands-off management style and he lost his touch in convincing the public with his speeches. Both events are important for the Reagan Presidency in 1987. Both led to the feeling for Reagan that he needed a success to save his Presidency. Reagan wanted a success that would regain the trust of the American people, of Congress and of his administration. Reagan wanted to show that he was still a good, skilled, and capable leader. The Washington Summit could be the perfect event for Reagan to demonstrate he was still a capable leader. The Washington Summit included high profile meetings between two world leaders in Washington DC and the signing of a treaty that could relax the Cold War tension. The summit would be the center of national and international political attention. With all the attention on the Washington Summit, Reagan would have the opportunity to show his Presidential leadership skills. How did Reagan execute his leadership skills during the summit? Did Reagan successfully lead the Washington Summit? To understand successful leadership, one must define when a President is a successful leader. To analyze whether Reagan was a capable and successful leader I will use the ideas of Richard Neustadt and Fred Greenstein on Presidential leadership. As explained in chapter one, Greenstein is an American politics historian who also studies political leadership. It is Greenstein’s belief that good leadership is based on six qualities. The six skills of leadership for the President are the ability to publicly communicate, his organizational capacity, his political

41 skill, his political vision, his cognitive style and lastly his emotional intelligence.72 These six personal qualities are a framework to understand Presidential leadership. On the other hand, former White House advisor and historian Richard Neustadt has a different approach on Presidential leadership. According to Neustadt Presidential power is the power to persuade. A President is a good leader when he is able to execute his power to persuade well. The strength of his power derives from his ability to ask the execution of requests by others. To have his request executed the President had several advantages. These advantages are the assurance that the President has spoken the request, followed by the clarity of the meaning of his request and what the request entails. The fourth advantage is the ability to carry out the request with available resources. The final advantage is the creation of a sense that it is the right of the President to request the execution of his request.73 Greenstein and Neustadt each have a different approach on Presidential leadership and both lack certain elements to create a complete framework to understand Presidential leadership during the Washington Summit. 74 Nevertheless, Greenstein and Neustadt complement each other. Greenstein came up with his framework decades after Neustadt. Greenstein complemented shortages in Neustadt’s theory, as is explained in chapter 1. Both approaches on Presidential power are important to understand Reagan’s execution of Presidential power during the Washington Summit. The models of Greenstein and Neustadt are a way to answer the third part of Greenstein analysis of the effects of personality, which he explains in his article The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War. Greenstein claims it is important that “the relevant personal qualities of the individual whose impact is being explored must be identified.”75 The personal qualities of Reagan will be identified by Greenstein’s model of six personal leadership qualities and by applying Neustadt’s theory.

72 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 155 73 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, p. 23 74 See Chapter One for critiques on Neustadt and Greenstein. 75 Fred I. Greenstein, The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis, p. 4

42 This chapter will show a chronological journey through the Washington Summit and will identify the leadership skills of Ronald Reagan according to the models of Neustadt and Greenstein. The chronological journey of events will be followed by an assessment of the usefulness of the models to create an understanding of the enigma of Reagan’s leadership. The events of the Washington Summit that will be explored are the official meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev, which is the internal part of Reagan’s leadership. Reagan’s public speeches and interviews during the event as published in the official Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan will be explored as the external side of Reagan’s leadership.

Steps towards the Washington Summit Following the Reykjavik Summit, Secretary of State George Shultz stayed in close touch with his colleague . Both met several times to continue the conversation and negotiations from the point they left in Reykjavik. President Reagan was not very involved in these meetings. He was more concerned with Gorbachev setting a date for the next summit to be held in Washington. In his autobiography, Reagan wrote, “almost two years after Gorbachev had accepted my invitation to Washington, he was refusing to set a date for our next summit, largely because of the dispute over the SDI, which continued through the summer and into the fall of 1987.”76 Reagan mentioned the disagreement between him and Gorbachev about SDI. However, Reagan did not attempt to solve it. He held his ground, as did Gorbachev. Reagan left the disagreement for Shultz to solve. To continue the negotiations on the INF Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Shultz and Shevardnadze had several meetings. In April 1987, Shultz had a three-day meeting with Shevardnadze in Moscow. These meetings were also in the presence of Gorbachev. At April 15, Shultz was able to announce that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that “intermediate- range missiles would be destroyed within a period of four to five years and that an INF Treaty must contain provisions for very strict and intrusive

76 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p. 687

43 verification.”77 This was a step forward in the negotiations for a next summit and to sign the INF Treaty. Among others, The New York Times emphasized Shultz’s positive feeling about his three days in Moscow. It was Shultz who was in the spotlight and it was also Shultz who was able to provide the inside information of the meetings, not Reagan. The New York Times only briefly mentioned Reagan’s positive reaction on the outcome of the talks, saying the talks “hold promise for a medium-range accord in the not-too-distant future.”78 In September 1987 Shultz and Shevardnadze had another meeting in Washington to further negotiate the INF Treaty. Shultz felt confident that “the meetings with Shevardnadze would be productive. All the basic elements needed for an INF Treaty were in hand and simply needed to be put together to form a whole.”79 According to the memoir of Shultz, Reagan was not present at the meetings with Shevardnadze and both their teams. Reagan was briefed afterwards to stay informed. It was Shultz who negotiated. However, Reagan did make his sentiments known by giving Shultz his decisive opinion. During the meeting in September, Reagan made very clear to Shultz that he would not be budging on SDI. Several meetings between Shultz and Shevardnadze took place in the months that followed. During a final meeting before the Washington Summit, at the end of October, Shevardnadze presented a letter from Gorbachev to Reagan. Gorbachev finally agreed to come to Washington for a Summit to sign the INF Treaty. Reagan was content with the acceptation of Gorbachev for a summit in Washington. According to Lou Cannon “Reagan was particularly pleased by the announcement of agreement on an INF Treaty” that was to be signed in Washington.80 Reagan commented on the letter from Gorbachev in his diary on October 30. Reagan felt that the letter was “statesmanlike and indicated a real desire for us [Reagan and Gorbachev] to work out any differences. The outcome of the letter and meetings was a summit to start here on Dec. 7. Purpose to sign INF Agreement and set in motions START Treaty to reduces ICBM’s by 50 % and

77 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 693 78 David K. Shipler, “Shultz calls pact on mid-range arms in Europe possible,” New York Times, April 16, 1987 79 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 984 80 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 694

44 to finalize that at a summit in Moscow next spring.”81 Shultz and Shevardnadze largely negotiated the INF Treaty. Reagan had laid out the basic lines for the treaty and left the important details to Shultz. Shultz said that whenever he went off to meet Shevardnadze, the President made clear in no uncertain terms what he wanted the Secretary to accomplish.82 It is not specified how Shultz had to reach an accomplishment. Therefore, Shultz could make his own decision regarding details.

The preparation of the Washington Summit largely existed of negotiating the INF Treaty. Over the course of the preparation, Reagan contributed in his own way, but was that effective? The different aspects of his leadership will be explained, according to the models of Neustadt and Greenstein. Shultz largely conducted the negotiations of the INF Treaty, not Reagan. Reagan was often not present during the meetings of Shultz and Shevardnadze and lacked the interest in dealing with the details of the treaty. However, as mentioned by Shultz, Reagan did inform Shultz about his intentions before the meetings took place. Reagan was using his power to persuade Shultz to act according to the wishes of the President, which is an example of Neustadt’s theory on Presidential leadership. Reagan persuaded Shultz to solve the disagreements of the INF Treaty. Reagan made sure that Shultz understood his request and was able to carry out the request, without feeling overruled or surpassed. Reagan’s persuasion of Shultz can also be interpreted as strong organizational capacity, a pillar of Greenstein’s theory on Presidential leadership. Organizational capacity means the ability of a President “to rally his colleague and structure their activities effectively.” The organizational capacity also includes the President’s “ability to forge a team and get the most out of it, minimizing tendency of subordinates to tell their boss what they sense he wants to hear.”83 Reagan structured Shultz’s activities by giving him instructions for his

81 Ronald Reagan (ed. Douglas Brinkley), The Reagan Diaries, p. 543 82 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 9, 1987, 2.30–3.15, p. 14 83 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 5 & 226

45 meetings with Shevardnadze. Reagan made absolutely clear that he did not want Shultz to give in on SDI, something Reagan felt strongly about. By not budging on SDI, Reagan forced Shultz to find another solution to this obstacle. It was an effective use of his informal Presidential power as explained by Neustadt. As said, Reagan was not willing to give up SID for the INF Treaty, therefore Reagan almost forced Shultz to find another solution. Following the model of Neustadt, Reagan made absolutely clear what the meaning and content of his request was. Reagan also took into account that Shultz was able to carry out his request to keep SDI. Lastly, Reagan made sure that Shultz felt that Reagan had the right to request this from Shultz. The fact that Reagan was not willing to let go of SDI showed, what Greenstein calls, vision and the absence of it. The vision of a President, according to Greenstein, is “the preoccupation with the content of policies, an ability to assess their feasibility, and the possession of a set of overarching goals.”84 Reagan’s idea on SDI showed that he was not able to assess the viability of an actual space shield. The idea of SDI showed on the one hand that Reagan had a grand vision as described by Greenstein. On the other hand, Reagan failed to make a realistic estimate of the feasibility of the project. His overall vision on SDI was not very realistic. Reagan’s determination on SDI also showed a limitation of, what Greenstein calls, the cognitive style of a President. The cognitive style is with “which the president processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes his way.”85 Greenstein said that Reagan “genuinely believed that it would be possible to produce an invulnerable space shield.”86 Naturally, an invulnerable space shield to protect the United States would be impossible, however Reagan looked at it differently. Even when his advisors told Reagan that SDI was unrealistic, Reagan held on to it. Reagan did not seem able to understand the actual facts about building a space shield to protect the whole United States. Following the model of Greenstein: Reagan lacked the intelligence to oversee and understand the limitations of SDI. Another element of Reagan’s leadership skills that can be seen during the preparations is a distant management style. During the preparations, Reagan did

84 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 228 85 Ibid, p. 6 86 Ibid, p. 157

46 not mention the positive outcome of the meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze in April 1987 when a partial agreement was reached. Reagan did not mention it in his autobiography, nor in his diary. It also remains the question if Shultz discussed the meeting in detail with Reagan, before heading for Moscow. James Mann mentioned that Shultz cleared the meeting beforehand with Reagan “the details of what he would say.”87 However, there is no record of this. In this case it was unclear if President Reagan was informed and if he had instructed Shultz. The absence of instructing Shultz on the meeting can be seen as shortcoming in Reagan’s organizational capacity as Greenstein calls it. During the preparations of the Washington Summit Reagan seemed more occupied with the bigger picture of the actual Summit taking place in Washington with the signing of the INF Treaty. Reagan was not interested in the details of the negotiations, he had instructed Shultz to take care of that. However, not focusing on the details did not mean that Reagan lost control over the situation. Reagan was in control of the bigger picture, the actual outcome of the negotiations. He had given Shultz a goal, which was negotiating a treaty, while keeping the possibility to develop SDI. Reagan was effective in delegating the details and persuading his staff to work out his requests. Reagan successfully applied Neustadt’s model of the power of persuasion. Reagan was also effective in achieving the bigger picture he had in mind. The bigger picture can also be interpreted as vision in the way Greenstein explained it. However, Reagan was less effective in processing and analyzing all the information that came to him, Greenstein calls it Reagan’s cognitive leadership skill.

The internal leadership of the Washington Summit On the morning of December 8, 1987, Michael Gorbachev arrived at the White House for the third summit with Ronald Reagan. The summit started with an official welcoming ceremony in the with speeches from Reagan and Gorbachev. In his welcoming speech Reagan expressed the hope that both nations could strengthen their relationship and discuss the “fundamental issues

87 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, p. 243

47 of political morality that touch on the most basic of human concerns.” 88 According to Reagan, the fundamental issues that needed attention were the arms reduction, but also human rights and regional conflicts. These issues were discussed during the various meetings behind closed doors. During the meetings various staff members, depending on the issue, would assist Reagan and Gorbachev. Besides the meetings, the most obvious event of the Washington Summit would be the signing of the INF Treaty by both world leaders. In his diary of 7 December the day before the start of the summit, Reagan described a meeting with his National Security Advisor Colin Powell who was briefing him on the upcoming summit. According to Reagan’s writings “Colin warned that Gorbachev may suggest a zero-zero agreement on short range tactical nuclear weapons – that can only happen after we agree to parity on conventional weapons.”89 This was the first moment Reagan had a conversation on the content of the upcoming summit that he describes in his diary. That same morning, during a staff session he mentioned the summit came up, but he did not write about the contents, nor did historians mention the content of that meeting in particular in their writings. Judging by Reagan’s diary, the content was of little interest to Reagan. The absence of interest by Reagan seemed odd, since Reagan had wanted this summit for a long time, but it fitted the pattern. Reagan’s absence of interest in content and details had also been visible during the Iran- Contra affair and during the preparations for the Washington Summit. There is no evidence of a specific reason why Reagan did not show interest in the content and details. It was to be expected that the summit, starting the next day, would be on Reagan’s mind, but this seemed not the case. It was Powell’s belief that Reagan’s preparations for the summit were inadequate. “Every time Powell sought to brief the President, Reagan lost focus. Once the President insisted on talking about a set of cufflinks he was going to give Gorbachev rather than discussing briefing materials on the substance of the summit,” according to Christopher O’Sullivan.90

88 Writer unknown, USSR-US Summit: Washington, December 7-10, 1987, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1987, p. 9 89 Ronald Reagan (ed. Douglas Brinkley), The Reagan Diaries, p. 555 90 Christopher D. O’Sullivan, Colin Powell: A Political Biography, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, inc. 2009, p. 56

48 Reagan’s attitude towards the summit was the opposite of that during the preparations for the Reykjavik Summit in 1986. As described in chapter 2, Reagan used several days and had multiple meetings and briefings to prepare for the Reykjavik Summit. For the Washington Summit, where a treaty would be signed, Reagan lacked the interest in preparing himself. There is no specific reason why Reagan did not prepare himself. James Mann suggested that Reagan was preoccupied with the personal and ceremonial aspects of the summit.91 The first meeting of the Washington Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev took place after the official welcoming at the White House. For a brief time, only the interpreters joined Reagan and Gorbachev. They briefly discussed the issue of human rights and immigration and emigration. Reagan was able to lead the discussion, since it did not go into great detail. Both leaders agreed that human rights were not the main subject of this summit and agreed to postpone the discussion. They postponed this discussion, because Reagan and Gorbachev did not agree on the matter, as Reagan reflects later in An American Life. “We didn’t come to any agreement on this issue, but I enjoyed the debate and I think he did too. We agreed to disagree.”92 After the short one-on-one, Reagan suggested to invite the ministers to join the meeting. At that point the meeting turned to the main reason why Gorbachev came to Washington, namely the final negotiations for the signing of the INF Treaty. The negotiations continued where they were left at Reykjavik. Gorbachev asked Reagan “why was the US side moving away from the 10-year period discussed at Reykjavik? So much had been agreed there [Reykjavik] and then the US side retreated. Why?”93 Reagan did not answer this question, his Secretary of State George Shultz did. The memorandum does not clarify whether Reagan was unable to answer the question. It is possible that he left the discussion of the content to Shultz, because Shultz also did negotiations concerning the INF Treaty with Shevardnadze and, to a lesser extent, with Gorbachev. Shultz had more detailed knowledge on the subject, because he had also done the preparatory meetings for the Washington Summit.

91 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, p. 267 92 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p. 698 93 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 8, 1987, 10.45-12.30, p. 6

49

The first morning of the Summit tested Reagan’s leadership skills right away. What kind of leadership skills did Reagan show or lack during the first morning of the Summit? According to Greenstein, Reagan possessed exceptional political skills and had impressive negotiating skills. According to Greenstein, political skill involves the ability to active sell policies within the political community as well as promulgating them to the public. Political skill also involved the skill to negotiate, to convince and to compromise. 94 During the short one-on-one at the beginning of the meeting, Reagan showed his political skill. Reagan was able to discuss different subjects with Gorbachev and to structure his arguments according to his vision. Even though Gorbachev did not agree with Reagan, Reagan had made his point clear and achieved the promise of postponing the discussion, a compromise. However, when the meeting continued after the short one-on-one Reagan’s political skills were not visible at all. As described before, Reagan did not seem very involved in the negotiations concerning the INF Treaty. He was more concerned with having a summit in Washington. It was Shultz who negotiated in the line of Reagan’s ideas on foreign policy. During this meeting Reagan used his capacity as an organizer to surround himself with a team that would get the most out of the meeting. A team that would minimize tension during the meeting and would do, say and work according to the ideas of the President.95 Because Reagan excelled in showing organizational capacity, he did not need his political skill during the meeting, since Shultz spoke according to the vision of Reagan.

The same day, after lunch, both leaders signed the INF Treaty in the presence of the press. Reagan and Gorbachev each gave a short, positive speech underlining the importance of the signing of the treaty. Reagan expressed that “we can only hope that this history-making agreement will not be an end in itself, but the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other issues, urgent issues before us: strategic offensive nuclear weapons, the balance of

94 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 156 95 Ibid, p. 226

50 conventional forces in Europe, the destructive and tragic regional conflicts that beset so many parts of our globe, and respect for the human and natural rights that god has granted to all men.”96 Reagan focused on the possibility of additional successes that might be achieved in the future. All the possible achievements Reagan spoke about, concerned foreign policy. He did not emphasize the impact of this treaty, nor for future achievements for the American people. This vision showed Reagan’s aim for more successes in foreign policy. Following the signing of the INF Treaty a second meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. More participants on both sides were present during this meeting. President Reagan was of course present on the American side, as well as vice-president George H. Bush, Chief of Staff Howard Baker, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, National Security Advisor Colin Powell, Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock and of course a note taker and interpreter. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were of course present at the Soviet side, as well as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Sergei Akhromeyev, two Secretaries of the Central Committee Communistic Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and a note taker and interpreter. The afternoon meeting started with a speech by Gorbachev. Gorbachev emphasized the importance of moving forward towards a mandate for negotiations between the two alliances and that it was important to get all cards on the table. Gorbachev concluded his speech that “the final document of the Summit should express a common view that would make it possible to give momentum to the negotiating process.”97 James Mann and Lou Cannon both mentioned the opening speech of Gorbachev during the second meeting. Both claim that Gorbachev started his speech with an overview of the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and his .98 George Shultz also mentioned Gorbachev talking about efforts of reforming the Soviet system at the beginning of the second meeting of the day. “Gorbachev initiated a discussion of the

96 Writer unknown, USSR-US Summit: Washington, December 7-10, 1987, p. 13 97 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 8, 1987, 2.30–3.15, p. 3 98 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 696, James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, p. 270

51 problems in the Soviet Union and his efforts, thought perestroika, to reform the Soviet system. […] This opening would allow a promising opportunity to learn more about Gorbachev’s ideas.”99 However, the memorandum of the afternoon meeting does not mention Gorbachev talking about the domestic situation in the Soviet Union in his opening speech. Only at the end of the meeting did he touch upon the current situation in the Soviet Union, he did not explain the improvements that had taken place according to Mann and Cannon. Gorbachev mainly spoke about arms-control issues.100 Reagan reacted to this speech by saying “he did not think anyone on the US side did not favor more disarmament. The US side thought the main priority should be to move forward in START.”101 This was a general, undetailed reaction of the President. It was Shultz who continued a more detailed reaction on Gorbachev by saying that “the US side would like to see the mandate being worked on in Vienna finished as soon as possible” and that “both sides should proceed on to deal with the asymmetries.”102 Gorbachev and Shultz continued to discuss the ongoing negotiations on the reduction of several weapons, including chemical weapons. It was Shultz who took the lead role in this discussion, Reagan only interrupted a few times to make a remark. When discussing chemical weapons Reagan commented that “any country with a fertilizer plant could make chemical weapons.”103 This remark did not have much to do with the content of the ongoing discussion, except it was on the same topic. At this point Reagan lacked the ability to focus on the discussion and also seemed to lack the necessary information to talk about this subject, since Reagan was not saying much during the meeting. Shultz later wrote in his biography “I was concerned. I could see that as far as the president was concerned, this meeting was a total anticlimax. He was not up for it, nor was he concentrating now.”104 Reagan’s main focus of that day had been the signing of the INF Treaty.

99 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1010 100 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 8, 1987, 2.30–3.15, p. 2-4 101 Ibid, p. 4 102 Ibid, p. 4 103 Ibid, p. 6 104 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1010

52 The second remark Reagan made, that was not in line with the discussion, was telling an anecdote about the differences between an American and a Soviet student and their future. Gorbachev reacted by saying that the President might consider not asking Jack F. Matlock to collect more anecdotes. George Shultz changed the subject right after Gorbachev’s reaction. Shultz asked if the working groups could start on the subject of conventional and chemical weapons and strategic arms. At that point, the meeting came to an end and Reagan, Shultz, Powell and Baker went into the Oval Office to review the day, but mainly the afternoon meeting.

Judging by the reaction from Powell, Baker and Shultz, the atmosphere in the Oval Office was not very positive. Shultz was “disturbed and disappointed”105 about the President’s role in the afternoon meeting. According to Richard Reeves, Howard Baker said: “We can not let this happen again, let Gorbachev get away with something like that.”106 Meaning that Gorbachev could not take the lead in a meeting like he had done that afternoon. Reagan was not in control of the meeting. Powell had observed the meetings during that day and felt the following about Reagan’s role: “On diplomatic questions he would turn to Shultz and say, ‘well George, you might want to say a word about that.’ On military matters, he turned to Carlucci: ‘Frank, I’m sure you would like to address that point.’”107 According to the reactions of Shultz, Powell and Baker, Reagan had failed. According to Edmund Morris, who wrote Reagan’s official biography, Reagan was remorseful afterwards and said, “I wasn’t very good this afternoon, was I?”108 Reagan had not been the tough, well prepared, negotiating President he had ought to be. Assuming that Reagan truly was remorseful might explain why Reagan did not mention the disastrous meeting in his diary. His only mention of the afternoon meeting in the Cabinet Room was that it was “not nearly as good a meeting as this morning’s.”109

105 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1011 106 Richard Reeves: President Reagan, p. 438 107 Christopher D. O’Sullivan, Colin Powell, p. 57 108 Edmund Morris, Dutch, p. 631 109 Ronald Reagan (ed. Douglas Brinkley) The Reagan Diaries, p. 555

53 The disengaged attitude of President Reagan during the afternoon meeting was an example of his cognitive leadership style as explained by Greenstein. The cognitive style is part of Greenstein’s theory on Presidential leadership stands for how a President “processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes his way” and works with it.110 In the situation above, Reagan did not process the information during the meeting, nor had he done that during the preparation of the summit. Therefore he could not fully participate in the meeting. Reagan limited himself by not grasping the importance and details of the discussed subjects. Because of the limitations of his cognitive style, Reagan also failed to make good use of his political skills. According to Greenstein, Reagan was an excellent negotiator. During this meeting, however, Reagan was not suited to negotiate at all, since he had not educated himself about the issues. There is evidence of a specific reason why Reagan had not educated himself. It is possible that Reagan, as said before, was more interested in the ceremonial and personal facets of the summit.

The following day, December 9, Reagan started by going over the talking points and the carefully crafted agenda that Powell and his team had created overnight. Reagan was advised by Powell to stick to these talking points that were written on small cards. These cards were considered Reagan’s script for the meeting and make Reagan do well in leading the meeting. Powell’s reason for these cards was that Reagan was “a former move actor, he was superb when he played the part from a written script.”111 After Reagan’s preparation, the day of the summit started with a short one-on-one between Reagan and Gorbachev. Reagan agrees to another summit in Moscow in 1988. After the brief one-on-one Reagan and Gorbachev had a meeting in the Oval Office, where they were joined by Shultz, Carlucci, Baker and Powell for the American side. On the Soviet side Shevardnadze, Dobryin and Politburo member Yakovlev were sitting at the table. Reagan started the meeting by saying that the day before had been a proud day. Reagan was genuinely proud on the achievement of the INF Treaty. The success of the INF

110 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 6 111 Richard Steins, Colin Powell: A Biography, London: Greenwood Press 2003, p. 66

54 Treaty, although not ratified yet by Congress, inspired Reagan to achieve more. During this meeting Reagan started with a summary of the position of the United States on the importance of stability and the need of SDI and the ABM Treaty. After the speech, Reagan asked Shultz to go into more detail about the ABM Treaty. It is not clear if Reagan did not have such detailed knowledge to explain the ideas on ABM himself. During his speech, Reagan emphasized the importance of SDI and that he was not willing to let it go. However, Reagan did change his attitude towards Gorbachev by inviting the Soviet Union to develop their own SDI or to share in the knowledge of the United States. This was Reagan’s way of acknowledging Gorbachev’s request to renounce the program. It was also an example of Reagan negotiating. Reagan believed that the SDI was of the utmost importance for US protection, therefore SDI could not be abolished. By inviting Gorbachev to take part in a form of SDI, Reagan created a feeling of compassion and at the same time he did not gave up his beliefs. Reagan did not explain the details of the idea on sharing SDI. He invited Shultz to do that. Shultz proposed that both sides would respect the ABM Treaty and after the time of non-deployment from the ABM Treaty both nations could freely pursue their defense programs. The most important part of the proposal was that Shultz proposed that the two nations meet regularly to ensure confidence, strategic stability and predictability.112 It was during this meeting that Gorbachev renounced his firm objections against SDI. It was Gorbachev who suggested “the two sides seek a solution, which enable the US to develop SDI, but would do so in a way, which did not make SDI an obstacle to progress in the reduction of strategic arms.”113 Gorbachev still objected to SDI in principle, but understood that both nations had a different idea on guaranteeing peace. After the agreement on SDI the conversation continued on the possibility of a START agreement. Shultz took the lead in clarifying the point of view of the United States. Both nations agreed that START had to be linked to the ABM agreement. During the remaining time of that afternoon meeting, Reagan and

112 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 9, 1987, 10.55-12.35, p. 4 113 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 9, 1987, 2.30–3.15, p. 7

55 Gorbachev discussed regional issues, like the situation in Afghanistan. Both leaders agreed that Afghanistan had to be independent from both nations. Reagan asked Gorbachev to stop supporting Afghanistan. Gorbachev agreed that it was in the interest of both nations that Afghanistan would be a neutral country. No final agreements were made concerning Afghanistan or other regional issues that were briefly discussed. On that note Reagan and Gorbachev were reminded by Shultz that and Raisa Gorbachev were waiting. During the meeting on December 9 Reagan and Gorbachev did not go into detail about the principles of a possible START agreement. Nor did they at another moment during the summit. As Reagan said in his autobiography, “our teams met literally around the clock and made substantial progress in defining the principles for the START agreement Gorbachev and I wanted to sign in Moscow in the spring.”114

The morning meeting had been a much bigger success than the afternoon meeting of the day before when it concerned the role of Reagan. Reagan was prepared and serious and showed really effective leadership. Morris claimed that Reagan was “rejuvenated, aggressive, humorous” during the meeting.115 During this meeting, Reagan showed that he was able to manage his advisors and show why he was the President. In the speech during the meeting Reagan said that Shultz would explain more details of what Reagan had mentioned. It had been Reagan’s intention to let Shultz clarify the details, a fine example of organizational capacity as explained by Greenstein. Reagan had prepared himself for the meeting by gaining and processing the information his advisors gave him. With this information Reagan was able to negotiate and have discussions during the meeting. When the conversation turned to details Reagan knew which advisor to turn to, to answer. In his diary, Reagan mentions the conversation about START and SDI and the regional problems that were discussed. In Reagan’s opinion, Gorbachev and himself agreed on putting their teams to work to create a deal that would lead to a 50% cut in Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). In the discussion on SDI,

114 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p. 701 115 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A memoir of Ronald Reagan, p. 631

56 Reagan showed his political skills. He spoke, listened, negotiated, provided a solution and eventually reached an agreement with Gorbachev. During the conversation on SDI, Reagan acknowledged the opinion of Gorbachev on the matter. It could be argued that the acknowledgement towards Gorbachev showed Reagan’s emotional intelligence as Greenstein calls it. The emotional intelligence of a President is his ability “to manage his emotions and turn them to constructive purposes, rather than being dominated by them and allowing them to diminish leadership.”116 Reagan showed compassion for Gorbachev’s situation and used this feeling to convince Gorbachev of the ideas he mentioned in his speech.

On the last day of the Washington Summit, December 10, Reagan and Gorbachev had a short conversation in the Oval Office about regional issues. It was Gorbachev who initiated to continue the discussion of the day before on regional issues. Since the teams of both sides were discussing and progressing on START, there was no need for both leaders to discuss disarmament as well. Gorbachev spoke at length about different regional conflict areas, like Afghanistan, Nicaragua and the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan only gave a short reply to Gorbachev on Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Reagan felt that he should reply into detail when the meeting resumed during the working lunch at the White House. However, Reagan wanted to point out that the United States was looking for a peaceful settlement in all conflicts. He stressed that each involved party or group should be able to participate in that solution, without being forced to silence. The discussion on regional issues continued during the working lunch. Reagan and Gorbachev argued which agreements on regional issues should be expressed in the joint statement at the end of the summit. It was Shultz who joined the conversation about the regional issues and the joint statement. “Shultz remarked that he and Shevardnadze thought it would not be wise to go into detail on each regional issue. Were we to do this, we would argue over the language and people in the areas affected would not take it well. Shultz added “we should build on the rising quality of our regional issues discussions to work

116 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 6

57 together in practical ways.”117 Shultz continued to talk about the progress of the working groups on the joint statement. Gorbachev proposed that the joint statement would state that “after the Summit we would begin work to consider practical, concrete measures with the parties concerned” and that the statement would include the regions that were discussed. It was Shultz who replied that the “Joint Statement noted the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States should have as its goal to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom, and security.”118 On that note Gorbachev was satisfied and he continued to ask Reagan about a proposal concerning North Korea he had given Reagan at the beginning of the summit. However, it was Powell who answered the question regarding the proposal, not the President. According to the memorandum of the conversation, Reagan only showed he agreed with Powell on that matter, Reagan did not say anything. The rest of the working lunch Reagan remained quiet. The conversation stayed on regional conflicts, with special attention for the situation in the Gulf region. It was Frank Carlucci who discussed the approach and the presence of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Gulf Region with Gorbachev. Reagan only gave two reactions with regard to this subject. The first reaction was that he agreed with what was said by Carlucci and Gorbachev. His second reaction was a remark about a poster of an American and Soviet soldier. This remark was not in line with the serious conversation of Carlucci and Gorbachev, which was about the consideration of the Americans and Soviets “talking with each other regarding defense doctrines such as military sufficiency.”119 Reagan’s story was in line with the subject only on the part that both were speaking about the military. During this final meeting of the Washington Summit, Reagan seemed unfocussed and detached from the serious conversation. The team surrounding Reagan, like Shultz and Carlucci were having the conversation with Gorbachev, while Reagan mostly listened.

117 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 10, 1987, 12.40-2.10 pm., p. 3 118 Ibid, p. 4 119 Ibid, p. 7

58 It was also during this final day of the Washington Summit that the teams of the United States and Soviet Union almost worked around the clock to clear the last details for the joint statement and worked on START. According to Shultz, the biggest problems for the joint statement were that there was no way “to pin down a top limit on ballistic missiles and the problem of how to handle the ABM-related issues […] was unresolved as well. […] We wanted to be sure that any agreed language would not curtail the pursuit of the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative.” 120 The final obstacles were eventually cleared during the last meeting in the Family Dining Room, where Reagan and Gorbachev had their lunch meeting. Shultz, Carlucci, Powell and their Soviet opposites were not continuously present during the meeting. It was their job to smoothen the last details of the joint communiqué. According to Chief of Staff Howard Baker, it was not an easy job to work out the last details. In an interview for the University of Virginia in 2004, Baker looked back on the final hours of the Washington Summit. By the end of the luncheon meeting, Baker got a note that the final statement was not ready and that the luncheon had to be stretched. Baker’s idea of stretching the meeting was asking Reagan if he maybe could tell some stories.121 According to the memorandum of the luncheon meeting, Reagan told some stories at the end of the meeting, stories that had very little to do with the earlier discussed subjects.122 According to the interview with Baker, Baker gave Reagan the advice to tell stories after the note from George Shultz. During the whole summit, there is no record of Shultz speaking through somebody else to Reagan. In this situation, it was Baker who advised Reagan on the ongoing situation. During the farewell ceremony at the White House, Reagan and Gorbachev both emphasized the success of the summit and the importance of the signing of the INF Treaty in their speeches. When Gorbachev left, the joint statement of the Washington Summit was released. The joint statement included all the major subjects that were discussed by Reagan and Gorbachev during the summit. The

120 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1015 121 Final Edited Transcript of Interview with Howard Baker, August 24, 2004, Miller Center of Public Affairs: Presidential Oral History Program, p. 12 122 Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, December 10, 1987, 12.40-2.10 pm., p. 10

59 signing of the INF Treaty is the most notable and historic event of the summit. An explanation of the INF Treaty was followed by a reaffirmation of commitment to the destruction of nuclear arms in the future and the importance of a stable and friendly relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.123

This final day of the Washington Summit had not been flawless. Reagan was not very strong during the official meetings. During the final meeting of the Washington Summit, Reagan showed two faces of himself. During the first part of the meeting Reagan was involved and he had educated himself about the issues. He was able to show his political skills when talking to Gorbachev. During the second part of the meeting Reagan was unfocused, detached and quiet. He seemed to have lost his political skill of earlier and slipped back into his disengaged attitude. He left the conversation to his advisors, who could answer Gorbachev with details. Again, one could argue that Reagan was a disengaged manager, who did not understand the ongoing conversation. The other side is that Reagan was a disengaged manager who had strong organizational skills and therefore Reagan was in control of the ongoing conversation. In his diary, Reagan mentioned an agreement he had reached with Gorbachev, without his advisors. Reagan described in his diary that the National Security Council (NSC) “urged me to hit Gorby [Gorbachev] with the need to halt arms flow to Nicaragua & to urge him to get Vietnamese out of Cambodia. I got him to agree on Nicaragua when he & I took a walk across the Lawn,” when walking to the luncheon meeting.124 This seems to show that Reagan did have skills to persuade Gorbachev, and that he was educated about the issues. Although it is not clear in how far the NSC had pushed him to discuss this matter and provided the necessary information. However, as Lou Cannon rightfully points out, there was another side to this story. Reagan asked Gorbachev to end Soviet support of arms in Central America. “Gorbachev responded by suggesting that both sides end shipments of arms to Central America, including U.S.

123 For the complete joint statement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev see Writer unknown, USSR-US Summit: Washington, December 7-10, 1987, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1987, p. 64-75 124 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, p.556

60 weapons to El Salvador. This, Reagan was unprepared to do.”125 Cannon does agree that Gorbachev responded positive to Reagan’s idea, but was only prepared to end shipments if Reagan did so as well. The arms shipments did not end until 1989, when George H. Bush was President. It was the Bush administration that negotiated a deal to end the war in Nicaragua, not Reagan.126 Reagan claimed to have made a deal with Gorbachev, and claimed that it was his persuasiveness that convinced Gorbachev. Reagan might have thought, while writing his diary, he had been persuasive and showed strong leadership skill, but the opposite was true. Overall the Washington Summit had been successful and Reagan and his team had many reasons to be satisfied. Reagan’s final words in his diary on December 10 on the Washington summit were “well at least it’s over, they’ve departed, & I think the whole thing was the best summit we’d ever had with the Soviet Union.”127 George Shultz was also very positive about the outcome of the summit. In his autobiography he wrote “The results were a tribute to the persistent effort of Ronald Reagan to stick by his basic objectives, to maintain our strength and the cohesion of our alliances, and to be willing to recognize an opportunity for a good deal and a change situation when he saw one. […] I went to sleep in Brussels feeling exhausted but quietly triumphant.”128 In the overall opinion of Reagan and Shultz on the summit nothing was mentioned about the missteps and awkward moments during the summit. Shultz gave Reagan a lot of credits for the success of the summit. It is questionable if Reagan deserved the credits Shultz gave him. The effectiveness and skillfulness of Reagan’s internal leadership is far from perfect.

The external leadership of the Washington Summit The Washington Summit had several high profile meetings behind closed doors, the internal affairs during the summit. It was during those meetings that important and often classified matters were discussed. The sensitivity,

125 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 698 126 February 1989: The Central American Presidents sign an agreement committing Nicaragua to democratic change and early elections in return for the disbanding of the contras. 127 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, p. 557 128 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1015

61 importance and success of the Summit mostly took place behind closed doors, unavailable for the press and the public. However, the American people, but mostly the press did want their share of information on the summit. Therefore President Reagan met with the media a couple of times to discuss the Washington Summit. Besides meeting with the media, Reagan also gave a couple of public speeches on the progress of the Washington Summit. The meetings with the press and public show Reagan’s external leadership skills. The meetings with the media on the Washington Summit started on December 7 with an informal press meeting. During this short meeting Reagan answered a couple of questions about the upcoming summit. Although the meeting with the reporters mainly turned into a short speech by Reagan emphasizing his positive expectations of the summit. Reagan remarked that the signing of the INF Treaty would be one of the highlights of the Summit. Reagan expressed his faith in the treaty and the summit by saying that “I have always said that I’d rather have no treaty than one that doesn’t add to our security and that of our allies, and the INF treaty meets that test. […] For the first time, we will reduce nuclear weapons rather than just limit their building.”129 Reagan was rather convinced about the success and importance of the treaty. He also emphasized the importance of the treaty for the security of the United States and their allies. In this particular meeting Reagan did not pay any attention to the importance of a solid relationship with Gorbachev, he was only concerned with his own interest. Reagan showed a vision that was in the interest of the American people according to the model of Greenstein. On the first day of the Washington Summit, December 8, Reagan held a welcoming speech in honor of Gorbachev. During this speech Reagan emphasized the importance of the connection and friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The emphasis on the friendship between the nations was the opposite of Reagan’s words a day earlier when he spoke to reporters. Reagan did mention the hope of achieving another agreement in either of his speeches. This was an important similarity. Reagan felt strongly about achieving another agreement and emphasized it well in his speeches, which were carefully

129 Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan 1987, Volume II, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 1449

62 written. The two different approaches of Reagan showed versatility and a careful consideration of whom he was speaking to. The first was a conversation with reporters. These reporters would use his words to inform the American people on the Summit. The second speech was addressed to Gorbachev and to the present press. One could argue that the public communications showed Reagan’s emotional intelligence, as described by Greenstein. Reagan was able to put his emotions into his speeches and public appearances, which made them even more convincing. Reagan’s emotional stability rarely showed signs of insecurity, anger or other disruptive emotions. Because of this strength Reagan was even more convincing in public. In the speech after the Signing of the INF Treaty, Reagan addressed the American and Soviet people. Reagan emphasized the importance of solid agreements and freedom and friendship. Besides emphasizing those themes, Reagan also acknowledged the difficulties that might be ahead. With this speech Reagan showed that he valued his relation with the Soviet Union. Reagan’s interest in friendship corresponded with his lack of interest in the INF Treaty in the period right before the Washington Summit. In the period when Shultz was working in the INF Treaty, Reagan showed more interest in when Gorbachev was coming to Washington than in the ongoing negotiations on the INF Treaty. During the Summit, as now shown by Reagan’s speeches, Reagan had interest in the relations between the nations. Over the course of the Washington Summit Reagan gave many speeches and met a couple of times with the media. All these speeches and media moments had in common that Reagan emphasized the importance of personal relations and the urge of moving forward to a safer place. It was only after Gorbachev left that Reagan gave a longer speech to the American people, which went more into detail about the summit. Reagan started the speech by marking the historic value of the Summit and the importance of the relationship with the Soviet Union. Within this speech Reagan explained why the Summit was an asset for the United States and their people. According to Reagan the people had always supported his ideas on foreign policy and because of this support it became possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union. In this speech Reagan

63 summarized the successes of the Presidency on matters of foreign policy and national security. “Your support over these last seven years has laid the basis for these negotiations. Your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength, to liberate Grenada, to strike hard against terrorism in Libya, and more recently to protect our strategic interests and bolster our friends in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of helping freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik I refused Soviet demands that we trade away SDI, our Strategic Defense Initiative that could erect a space shield against ballistic missiles, your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their President on matters of national security.”130 These strong positive remarks emphasized Reagan’s vision on foreign policy, vision as described by Greenstein. Also, this part of the speech showed Reagan’s ability to include the American people and show them that the United States is a powerful, respectable country willing to help others in order to become a safer place. Reagan made clear that his clear vision of foreign policy would be worth nothing without the support of the people. Reagan’s own words his foreign policy vision was “building a safer peace as we advance the cause of world freedom.”131 The televised speech for the American people by President Reagan at the end of the Washington Summit only remarked on the positive events of the summit and mostly on Reagan’s role. In this speech Reagan did not mention the disastrous meeting on the first day of the summit. Also, Reagan did not mention the role of his advisors. Shultz was only mentioned in his role for gaining support for the INF Treaty. Shultz was never mentioned for his negotiating role. With this speech Reagan created a positive image of himself for the American people. The image of President Reagan being good at his job, fierce in protecting the American values, initiator of many successes and always considerate of the American people. Reagan had not lost his touch as a public speaker. His skills as

130 Transcript of Address to the Nation on the Soviet-US Summit meeting (December 10, 1987), http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/speeches/speech-5867 131 Ibid

64 public communicator and emotional intellect were an asset for his external leadership. Reagan had failed as a speaker during the Iran-Contra Affair, but during the Washington Summit Reagan was convincing and strong in his public speeches. According to Greenstein and many others, public communication was one of Reagan’s strongest skills as a President.

The balance of leadership In 1987 the Washington Summit was one of the highlights for President Reagan, especially in the field of US-Soviet relations. During the Washington Summit the long negotiated INF Treaty was finally signed and was considered a milestone in the Cold War. The summit was an excellent opportunity for Reagan to display his Presidential leadership style. After the rough year of 1986, Reagan needed to show he was still a capable leader. Over the course of the Washington Summit Reagan showed many different sides as Presidential leader. The different aspects of Reagan’s leadership style were categorized according to the models of Richard Neustadt en Fred Greenstein. In the process of preparations for the Washington Summit Reagan was preoccupied. According to Lou Cannon this had to do with the “domestic attention that was focused on the prolonged congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair.”132 The period of preparations for the Washington Summit showed Reagan’s disengaged management style. Reagan had displayed this kind of leadership before, namely during the Iran-Contra Affair. He had not been interested in details, nor in educating himself about the issues. Reagan’s cognitive ability, as Greenstein calls it, was not present. All the information concerning the summit was not of interest to Reagan. However, Reagan did show an interest in creating the bigger picture, which had to be achieved. This bigger picture included a successful summit where a treaty would be signed and where SDI was still in place. Reagan firmly believed in a treaty that would live up to the American standards and which he fully supported. Reagan had a strong vision in foreign policy. Vision, as explained

132 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 694

65 by Greenstein, “refers to preoccupation with the content of policies, an ability to assess their feasibility, and the possession of a set of overarching goals.”133 When it came to the details of the summit, Reagan used the model of presidential power as explained by Richard Neustadt. Reagan made sure that Shultz and Baker were aware of the content and meaning of his request. Also, Reagan created a sense that it was his right to request the execution of his orders and that Shultz and Baker could carry out the requests in order to prepare a successful summit. By making sure that he staff was informed on his ideas, Reagan executed his organizational capacity, as explained by Greenstein, well. Overall, Reagan was in control during the preparations of the Washington Summit. With his vision that created the bigger picture to be achieved, Reagan was able to persuade his advisors to act accordingly. In achieving the bigger picture Reagan also showed that he was capable of applying the power of persuasion as explained by Neustadt. Reagan delegated and requested the execution of his orders effectively. Reagan executed his power to request that his orders would be carried out, in order to realize his vision.

During the Washington Summit itself Reagan showed strong leadership, but he also failed at certain points. One of Reagan’s strongest assets as leader was his ability to communicate. During the public speeches of the Washington Summit Reagan was clear and convincing. He emphasized the importance of the INF Treaty and the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Cannon summarized the public appearance of Reagan and Gorbachev clearly. “In their public appearances both leaders had conveyed an impression of confidence and good will that signaled that their nations were moving away from the perils of the Cold War and the specter of nuclear confrontation. Their political fortunes had been bolstered in the process. Reagan continued his climb in public approval after the dark days of the Iran-Contra inquiries.”134 Reagan needed the strong public appearances after the difficult time of the Iran-Contra Affair. During the affair Reagan had lost his touch as a public speaker. During the Washington

133 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, pp. 228 134 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 698

66 Summit Reagan showed he still was an excellent and convincing speaker in public and that he could convey his vision to his audience. During the official meetings of the Summit, which took place behind closed doors, Reagan was not very consistent in his appearances. Reagan was often distracted during the meetings and did not contribute to the content of the ongoing discussions. Reagan did love a good story in the middle of a meeting. On the first day of the summit, Reagan told two stories during the afternoon meeting. Those stories were not in line with the ongoing conversation and it made Reagan look like an embarrassment for the United States. Reagan’s advisors had to manage the meeting. It was mostly Shultz who negotiated during the meeting. During the first day, Reagan lacked the cognitive ability to process all the information and act accordingly. Also, Reagan had not been effective in requesting and delegating orders to his staff. Reagan did not apply the power of persuasion as described by Neustadt. In order to persuade his staff, Reagan would have to make sure he made the request, which he did not. Reagan was quiet, did not say anything that involved showing his leadership skills. After the failure of the first day, where Reagan had not been in control of the meeting, the second day was better. Reagan had prepared himself by going through the notes Powell made for him. Reagan was able to lead the conversation. During a discussion on SDI Reagan showed why he was the President. He was showing his political skill as described by Greenstein. However, when it came to small details on the ABM Treaty, Reagan still turned to Shultz. Reagan’s cognitive style was not one of the strong assets. During the whole summit, Reagan did not react to the small details, he left that to his advisors. Nevertheless, Reagan had shown his leadership, the discussions of the day had been fruitful and progress was made. On the final day of the summit the teams on both sides worked around the clock to finish the final joint statement. Reagan had given his thoughts on the joint statement, and again left the details to Shultz and his team. Reagan again showed he was able to apply his organizational capacity. According to the model of Neustadt, Reagan had also applied the ‘power of persuasion’ in this situation. Reagan’s ability to have others carry out his requests by making sure that the clarity and content of his request were executed gave his staff a lot of power.

67 Reagan delegated his ideas and orders to his staff. Reagan did not always check how his staff carried out his requests, except that they followed Reagan’s ideas in general. Overall, the Washington Summit was a very successful summit, but not necessarily because of Reagan’s effective Presidential leadership. During the Summit Reagan was very strong during the public events, such as the public speeches and the meetings with the press. As communicator Reagan was in control, convincing and strong. Concerning the internal leadership, Reagan had to rely on his staff. Reagan barely had knowledge of contents and detail. Especially during the first day of the Summit, Gorbachev was in control of the meeting and discussed mostly with Shultz. Reagan did not show his cognitive skill, nor did he execute the Presidential leadership model of Neustadt. The success of the summit cannot be fully attributed to Reagan’s skills as leader. Shultz’s skills as negotiator and ability to work around Reagan and still make Reagan look good as Presidential leader was a large part of the success. Even so, Reagan did show much more leadership skills than he had done during the Iran- Contra Affair.

68 Conclusion

For years the Presidency of Ronald Reagan has been of interest for many historians for several reasons. Many wondered what kind of President Reagan was. It is fair to say that many interpretations of Reagan’s Presidency are possible. Some claim that Reagan single-handedly won the Cold War, like historian Robert Collins. Collins claimed, “it was Reagan who undertook the multifaceted military, economic, diplomatic, and rhetorical offensive that rocked the Kremlin back on its heels. It was Reagan who initiated the negotiation from strength that brought about the first real arms reductions in the history of the Cold War.”135 Others say that Reagan failed as a President, because he was puppet of his administration and the Iran-Contra Affair took place on his watch, like Lou Cannon. Cannon claimed that Reagan stuck to his ideals and based his decisions on his beliefs. He did not bother to read the documents his staff had prepared for him. About 90 percent of the documents on Reagan’s desk were left untouched. (…) Reagan’s detachment from his own administration was particularly evident when scandal struck. His aides were often expert at “cutting our losses,” as they euphemistically described forced resignations of administration officials who had become embarrassments, but Reagan detested confrontations, particularly over personnel.136 The aim of this thesis is not to clarify if the Presidency of Ronald Reagan must be seen as successful or not. The aim here was to shine a light on the enigma of Reagan’s Presidential leadership during one particular event, namely the Washington Summit. This summit took place after Reagan’s most troublesome year as President and was a turning point in the Cold War history. The enigma of Reagan’s leadership can be analyzed according to many models and theories. In this case the models of Richard Neustadt and Fred Greenstein were most suitable to attempt to answer if Ronald Reagan was an effective and good leader during the Washington Summit. As explained in chapter 1, Neustadt based his theory of successful leadership on how well a President can persuade the people surrounding him. The power of persuasion is

135 Robert M. Collins, Transforming America, p. 237 136 Lou Cannon, President Reagan, p. 145

69 based on the idea that a President can persuade people by requesting the execution of his orders, which will enhance his influence. This theory leaves out the importance of personality, which is one of the most important pillars of Greenstein’s theory. Greenstein models claims that Presidential leadership can be analyzed based on six qualities. As explained, these qualities are organizational capacity, political skill, vision, cognitive style, emotional intelligence and public communications. The six qualities are embedded in the Greenstein’s idea of analyzing the effects of the influence of personality on the outcome of an event, as explained in the first chapter. The Washington Summit will be explained according to the three questions of Greenstein, starting with the context of the Washington Summit, followed by the outcome that is to be explained. And finally the most important question is the relevant personal qualities must be identified and their contribution to Presidential leadership must be explained. In the second chapter the context and the outcome are analyzed. The context of the Washington Summit is explained by two main events that were of great influence on Reagan’s leadership before the summit. Those events were the Reykjavik Summit in 1986 and the Iran-Contra Affair. During both events Reagan had failed as a leader. As explained in chapter two, the Reykjavik Summit was a failure for Reagan because Gorbachev took a different approach that Reagan and his staff were not prepared for. However, Reagan did show his leadership skill according to the models of Neustadt and Greenstein. Reagan showed his power to persuade as explained by Neustadt when he gave Shultz the task to work out the Reykjavik Summit and inform Reagan on the process. This was also in line with the organizational capacity according to the model of Greenstein. One of the reasons the summit failed was because of Reagan’s political skill as described by Greenstein. During the meetings Reagan could not negotiate an agreement with Gorbachev that was to the satisfaction of both leaders. Reagan was not able to convince Gorbachev. Furthermore, Reagan was surprised by the new proposal by Gorbachev, which had not been anticipated. This new proposal threw Reagan off his game. Overall, the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit had not been successful, partly due to Reagan’s political skill. Nevertheless, Reagan had shown his

70 leadership skill according to the models of Neustadt and Greenstein during the preparations of the Summit. The Iran-Contra Affair was a leadership failure on a whole other level. According to the model of Greenstein, Reagan failed on the organizational capacity. Greenstein called the Reagan Presidency “a laboratory for examining the impact of a president’s advisers on his performances.”137 The Iran-Contra Affair was an example of Reagan advisors taking advantage of Reagan. Reagan had given his advisors a lot of trust and did not interest himself in the ongoing actions of the Iran-Contra Affair. Reagan was disengaged and did not attempt to take control of the organizational failure. Furthermore, Reagan also failed as a public speaker. Fred Greenstein claimed that public communications was one of Reagan’s best assets.138 However, during the Iran-Contra Affair Reagan lost his touch as a public speaker. Reagan was not able to convince or persuade the American people with his speeches. According to both models Reagan had failed in his public communications, because he did not show political skill according to Greenstein’s model. By not persuading his audience, Reagan also did not master the power of persuasion as defined by Neustadt. According to Neustadt, the Iran- Contra Affair was “the textbook case of how a President failed to guard prospective influence, failed to probe his power stakes, failed to manage those thing het must to himself.”139 Following the leadership failures of the Reykjavik Summit and the Iran- Contra Affair, Reagan could use a success. Since his biggest failure had a lot of domestic influence, Reagan aimed for a success in foreign policy. In 1987 Reagan had a chance to restore his leadership as President during the Washington Summit. The Washington Summit was exceptional, because it was the first summit where a treaty was signed and it was not on neutral grounds. During the Summit, Reagan showed strong leadership during the public events, such as the public speeches and the meetings with the press. As communicator Reagan was, convincing and strong, but this was surely not true during the Iran-Contra Affair. Concerning the internal leadership, Reagan relied on his staff. Reagan barely had

137 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style form FDR to Barack Obama, p. 156 138 Ibid, p. 155 139 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, p. 291

71 knowledge of contents and detail. Especially during the first day of the Summit, Gorbachev was in control of the meeting and mostly discussed the range of subjects with Shultz. Reagan did not show his cognitive skill, nor did he execute the Presidential leadership model of Neustadt. In other meetings Reagan showed his political skill, which involved negotiating. But Reagan was even better in showing his organizational capacity in making sure that his advisors worked according to his grand vision. Reagan’s aim to realize his idea of vision, as described by Greenstein, was strong and successful.

We have seen the context of the summit, which involved Reagan’s leadership qualities. We have assessed the leadership qualities of Reagan during the preparations of the summit and the summit itself. In order to analyze Reagan’s leadership we used the models of Fred Greenstein en Richard Neustadt. Did Neustadt and Greenstein create successful models of Presidential leadership to grasp the enigma of Reagan’s leadership? Starting with Richard Neustadt’s model of the power of persuasion focuses on the informal power of the President. This model does not include the power of any aspects of personal qualities as described by Greenstein. The model of Neustadt is suitable to understand how Reagan managed his advisors, the press and others. Neustadt’s model might even work better in a situation of analyzing Reagan’s policies. However, during the Washington Summit and its preparations, Neustadt’s theory was of limited value. Neustadt only focused on one element, while a close reading of the events at the Summit exposed many more relevant elements and aspects. Greenstein explored some elements that were left out by Neustadt. To Greenstein, personal qualities are important to execute presidential leadership. When a President successfully shows the six qualities he would be the perfect Presidential leader. However, Greenstein does not give a fixed unambiguous explanation of his six qualities. All qualities are globally described and are open to interpretation to be able to apply them to all Presidents. In the case of Reagan and the Washington Summit, Greenstein’s model provides an entrance to recognize Reagan’s leadership skills and decide if he possessed the qualities. The

72 model of Greenstein leaves plenty of room for interpretation and to apply it accordingly. To understand the enigma of Reagan’s leadership during the Washington Summit both models provide a certain clarity concerning some aspects of Reagan’s leadership. Neither of the models provides a full theory to assess the leadership of Reagan. It is almost impossible to answer the question if Reagan was a good and effective leader; there is always space for additional information and interpretation. The assessment of Reagan leadership during the summit, assessed with the models of Greenstein and Neustadt is not conclusive. Future models might consider engaging a definition of engaged and disengaged management style. Also, the incorporation of the sometimes leading role of advisors should be included. However, it does not mean that the models are useless because of their inconclusiveness. The models of Neustadt and Greenstein are important to shine a light on a possible assessment of Reagan’s leadership. Both models have enlightened the enigma of Reagan’s Presidential leadership. The Washington Summit and its preparation have shown that Reagan was often persuading his advisors to work out the details of his grand vision. Reagan also managed well to organize his administration to work for him. The close assessment of the Washington Summit as an example of Reagan’s Presidential leadership has enlightened that Reagan might not have been as disengaged as often argued. Reagan was in control, because he was in control of his advisors. As Reagan said himself to Howard Baker, according to Richard Reeves: “See, they underestimated me again. The thought that they could persuade me, they could beat me, and by staying the course, I brought Gorbachev and the Soviets to the table. I got the INF Treaty.”140

140 Richard Reeves: President Reagan, p. 445

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