Financing the Fremont Qampaign

Financing the Fremont Qampaign «^r "V" T*E suppose it is generally understood that party organiza- \ J\ I tions cost money, and that Presidential elections, espe- • T cially are expensive. Painful as the confession is, we are bound in truth—and from knowledge—to say that James Buchanan was elected President, and this great and then happy and glorious republic ruined, simply because Messrs. Wendell, Forney, and Bel- mont, raised $50,000 more money, to be expended in Pennsylvania, than William A. Hall, Truman Smith and the writer of this article, could procure for the same object."1 "The writer of this article," Thurlow Weed, Republican boss of New York State, speaking "in truth—and from knowledge," was not alone in emphasizing campaign funds as a significant determinant of the presidential election in 1856. Republican Congressmen, hoping to find campaign ammunition in i860, conducted an investigation into the use of money in the preceding canvass. Indeed, at the time of nomination of the major party candidates in 1856, the significance of campaign finances was recognized. At the Cincinnati convention which nominated Buchanan, John Slidell, "the master spirit" in managing the Pennsylvanian's fortunes, had given assurances that the "haut commerce' would contribute to the campaign chest.2 And at the Philadelphia convention, which put Fremont at the head of the Republican ticket, "friends in New York, and Ohio, and every- where" promised money to carry Pennsylvania for the Pathmarker.3 Though, as can be seen, campaign funds figured prominently in the presidential election, one would do well to avoid Weed's monistic interpretation of that factor in deciding the result. Recent students of the campaign have stressed other determinants in addition to money. Professor Roy F. Nichols has interpreted the October vic-

1 Albany Evening Journal, Sept. 21, 1861, quoted in Charles Wright, The Prospect (Buffalo, 1862), 20. 2 George F. Milton, The Eve of Conflict (Boston and New York, 1934), 240; Louis M. Sears, John Slidell (Durham, N. C, 1925), 122. 3 Russell Erret to S. P. Chase, Aug. 2, 1856, quoted in Charles B. Going, David Wilmot: Free-Soiler (New York, 1924), 493. 25 26 JAMES A. RAWLEY January tones, which heralded Buchanan's election in November, in this way: "The Democrats had won by appealing to the nationalistic and metropolitan attitudes, in which conservatism, order, and oppor- tunity were the treasured concepts." "They had likewise spent money," he adds.4 Professor Allan Nevins, following a detailed account of the campaign, summarizes a variety of factors: Whig votes cast for Buchanan and Fillmore, the weak Republican organization, Fremont's political inexperience, the truce effected in Kansas.5 No doubt, the Democracy had the advantages: an established party presently in power, an experienced candidate, a nationalist appeal in contrast to the sectional strength of the Republicans, and wealthy men like August Belmont, banker and New York agent for the Rothschilds, and merchants who feared disunion in the event of a Republican victory. Granting the multiplicity of factors, this paper proposes to analyze that single factor—campaign funds—in influencing the November outcome. The financial support given Fremont through the Repub- lican National Committee may now be stated with some precision by reference to the Account Book kept by the National Chairman, Edwin D. Morgan.6 Morgan, the first National Chairman of the Republican Party, had come to prominence as a New York merchant. Of New England stock, he had vigorously launched his career as an importer in New York in 1836 at the age of twenty-five. Calculated audacity and unbounded energy had brought him instant success. He conducted business operations in an area extending from Cuba to Canada, from Boston to St. Louis, making his name known in the eastern half of the United States. Entering politics in 1849, he served as an alderman in New York City for not quite a year, and went on to Albany for four years as a State Senator. In 1853 he was named chairman of the Whig State Central Committee, and with the fusion of Whigs and Republicans in 1855, ^e became chairman of the Republican Party

4 Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 1948), 47. 5 Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (New York, 1947), II, 511. 6 Morgan's Republican Account Book No. 2 recently came to light among papers kept by his family. It is at present in the personal possession of the writer. Its scope is the "Republican Party in acct with E. D. Morgan," from July 11, 1856 to Oct. 1, 1857. Account Book No. 1 was not found, but its scope is apparently negligible, for fund raising did not begin in earnest until the late summer of 1856. 1951 FINANCING THE FREMONT CAMPAIGN 27 in New York. The movement to nationalize the new party included Morgan among its leaders. The Pittsburgh convention on February 22, 1856, which, broadly speaking, accomplished that aim, desig- nated him as the first National Chairman, a post he held continu- ously until 1864 and again from 1872 to 1876.7 Doubtless those who chose him anticipated that Morgan could raise funds. He stood in the front rank of the New York merchants— the nation's wealthiest business community. Reputedly a million- aire, he could be counted on to give liberally of his own means. The New Yorker possessed other advantages: the large electoral vote of his own state to be reckoned with, the Seward-Weed alliance which he represented, and the fact that New York City was the financial and publishing capital of the nation. The fund-raising task confronting Morgan after Fremont's nomination in June, 1856, took its shape from the structure of the Repub- lican Party. Newly built with fragments from several political faiths, the party both attracted and repelled voters. By taking a positive stand against the expansion of slavery into the territories, it had sectionalized its appeal, alienating support below the Mason and Dixon line. Nor could it own to its name in all northern states. In many places the party bore the title "The People's Party," an avoidance of a historic label which survived the campaign of i860. Although historians speak of the nationalizing of the party in 1856, one might more accurately speak of federalizing it. For during the campaign the state organizations carried the brunt of the battle in a more profound sense than has been true in subsequent elections. The wariness of voters to commit themselves to a new party was best understood at the grass roots. There was performed the ardent labor which infused the canvass with a spirit and drama unknown since 1840. The national organization in New York City, truly a skeleton, served as a clearinghouse for problems arising in the states. From the Trinity Building headquarters, speakers and campaign literature were dispatched in considerable volume. Advice and gossip flowed in and out.8 But, importantly, through the hands of the National

7 See James A. Rawley, "Merchant in Politics: Edwin D. Morgan," manuscript doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1949. 8 For the preceding information, see Rawley, "Merchant in Politics." 28 JAMES A. RAWLEY January Chairman, campaign funds were allocated to pivotal states. Unre- corded and perhaps large sums were raised in the states for local use. Albert J. Beveridge concludes his summary of Republican fund raising in the North with the statement: "If the amounts reported in some newspapers form a basis for judgment, more than a million of dollars was given."9 Certainly decentralization made more difficult the National Chairman's task. The primary allegiance owed to state organizations is suggested in a letter written by J. W. Bunce of Hartford, Connecticut, to Morgan: "I wish I had the 500.00 Dolls to spare. You should have it for the cause. A few of us must pay largely at home, to have the needful work done."10 Fund raising by both the Democratic and Republican Parties com- menced on a limited scale in mid-August. By that time the Demo- cratic National Committee had collected only $4,ooo.u Morgan had received only $100, and had called a meeting of the National Com- mittee for August 20 to raise $50,000 for Pennsylvania and "as much more as is necessary for any western State or States."12 Greeley was complaining to James S. Pike: "We Fremonters of this town [New York] have not one dollar where the Fillmoreans and Buchaniers have ten each. . . . Each State [Pennsylvania and New Jersey] is utterly miserable, so far as money is concerned. . . ."13 At the time of the Committee caucus $1,200 came in, and by September 2 the National Chairman had collected $3,485—less than the Democrats had obtained a fortnight earlier.14 The Maine election in September gave impetus to fund raising. The Democracy had sent speakers and $2,500, apparently about half the national treasury, to the bellwether state. The Republicans likewise recognized the significance of the state election in which Senator Hannibal Hamlin was running for governor. Late in July, 9 Albert J. Beveridge, Abraham Lincoln, i8og-i8s8 (Boston and New York, 1928), II, 381. 10 Bunce to Morgan, Aug. 7, 1856, E. D. Morgan Manuscripts, New York State Library, Albany, N. Y. (NYSL). 11 Milton, 240. 12 Republican Account Book; E. D. Morgan to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 13, 1856, Morgan Manuscripts, NYSL. 13 Greeley to Pike, Aug. 6, 1856, quoted in James S. Pike, First Blows of the Civil War (New York, 1879), 346. 14 Republican Account Book. The Congressional Executive Committee, headed by Lewis Clephane, early reported that it had no funds and was in debt. Clephane to Morgan, Sept. 8, 1856, Morgan Manuscripts, NYSL. 195* FINANCING THE FREMONT CAMPAIGN 2g when, according to the Account Book, only $100 had been collected, Morgan replied to a letter from Weed: "Fully agreeing with you as to the importance of carrying Maine at its September Election I will give the necessary check to Senator Hamlin trusting to our luck for collections."15 On August i Morgan sent $2,000 to Hamlin; one month later he sent $500 to William Pitt Fessenden; and on Septem- ber 15 he sent $200 to James W. Nye for Maine. Thus the Republican National Committee's contribution to Maine, $2,700, may have exceeded that of the Democratic National Committee.16 This was not the only time that Morgan advanced funds for party emergencies. Hamlin's election by a generous majority, together with victory for the entire Republican slate, heartened the Republicans and dis- mayed the Democrats. "All Hail Maine/' Morgan rejoiced to Gideon Welles.17 From this time on the campaign gathered momentum. "Can't you hold an election in Maine once a week till November?" inquired Greeley whimsically of Pike. "We need it badly; for I tell you the fight is hot and heavy in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois."18 The Tribune editor had named three pivotal states; he had omitted the fourth principal one—Indiana. It was these states which should properly be the recipients of the financial aid dispensed by the Na- tional Committee. Elections for state offices were scheduled in Penn- sylvania and Indiana in October; all eyes turned upon them. The Maine defeat for the Democracy was followed not long after by disunionist threats from various southern statesmen, fearful of a Fremont victory. Both Democrats and Republicans became active in New York City, endeavoring to raise money to swing the impending elections. The Democrats established headquarters in the New York Hotel; the money they raised at this decisive time bears the name in political history of the New York Hotel Fund. The Congressional Committee headed by John Covode made this Fund a particular object of their inquiry in i860. In collecting the Fund, John Slidell, who had helped engineer Buchanan's nomination with promises of 15 Morgan to Weed, July 30, 1856, Weed Manuscripts, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. 16 Republican Account Book. 17 Morgan to Welles, Sept. 11, 1856, Gideon Welles Manuscripts, Vol. 39, Library of Congress. 18 Greeley to Pike, Sept. ai, 1856, quoted in Pike, 348. 3O JAMES A. RAWLEY January New York money, was especially active, moving about in the mer- cantile community to urge the importance of Pennsylvania's state contest. Late in September he reported to Buchanan, ". . . we have said that every dollar contributed for Pennsylva would economize ten in New York/'19 The exact amount of the New York Hotel Fund is uncertain. The Covode Committee put on the witness stand Augustus Schell, a member of the Fund committee, and by appoint- ment of Buchanan collector of customs for the district of New York. On March 28, i860, Schell testified that he would furnish the Com- mittee a list of subscribers to the Fund, but the following day he declared, "I am unable to state the names of the real and actual contributors of the money." Subsequently, George Plitt, treasurer of the Democratic State Central Committee for Pennsylvania, testified that he had destroyed all his records.20 Though unable to secure documentary verification, the Covode Committee did receive oral testimony from Schell that some $30,000 or $40,000 was raised, and that part had been spent in Pennsylvania and part in New York City and State.21 Plitt told the Committee that he had received $18,500 from the New York Hotel Fund through Augustus Schell.22 The New York Hotel Fund allotment did not constitute the whole of the Democratic contribution to Pennsylvania. Asked how much he had disbursed in the State in 1856, Plitt informed his interrogators, "I think it was over $70,000. . . ."23 Ten thousand dollars had come from W. C. N. Swift of Massachusetts. A relative of Mrs. Plitt, Swift had been given assurance of Navy contracts.24 Demo- cratic jobholders in Pennsylvania were assessed, and if one may credit a rumor partially supported in fact, Stephen A. Douglas contributed $80,000 to the state.25 Wild tales were told about the amount of money spent in Penn- sylvania. August Belmont, whose wife was Slidell's niece, reputedly !9 New York Evening Post, Sept. 20, 1856; Sears, 134-135. 20 United States Congress, House Report No. 648\ 36th Congress, 1st Session, 472-473, 476, 550; hereafter cited as Covode Report. 21 Ibid., 472-4.73. 22 Ibid., 546-548. These figures have been accepted by that lifelong student of the Democ- racy of the Fifties, Roy F. Nichols; see his Disruption of American Democracy, 46-47. 23 Covode Report, 550. 24 Ibid., 551; Nichols, 46-47. 25 Ibid., 47; Milton, 243 and note 42. 1951 FINANCING THE FREMONT CAMPAIGN 3 I contributed $50,000 at this time; and Republican estimates of the Democratic total soared as high as $ 150,00c).26 Some Democrats held an equally flattering opinion of Republican efforts to raise money. It was said that Republican "money flowed like water" in Bu- chanan's home state.27 Actually, the Republican contribution was small. In the midst of the activities of the New York Hotel Committee, Morgan held a meeting to raise funds for Pennsylvania. "It rained pretty hard last night and yet I succeeded in getting 30 to 40 pretty good men and got subscribed $8,000," he informed Gideon Welles on September 30.28 Both parties appealed to the merchants; the Republicans in- vited Speaker N. P. Banks to address the business community, and the Democrats brought in John B. Floyd, ex-Governor of Virginia.29 The Republican Account Book, listing donations from New Yorkers, as well as persons from without the state, totals $26,626.14 for the period up to and including October 14. Not all of this sum, of course, went into Pennsylvania; on the 10th Morgan declared, "We have raised near $17,000 in this city [New York] since the conversation with Mr. Goodrich—all but a few hundred for Illinois has gone to Penna."30 During the last week before the October elections, the National Chairman was confronted with a crisis when ex-Governor Ford of Ohio exceeded the authority given him to subsidize Pennsylvania newspapers. Ford secured the support of twenty-three newspapers at a cost of $9,050. This sum was more than Morgan had funds for; he appealed to Boston for aid, but the Bostonians adhered to an inde- pendent course, sending their money directly to Pennsylvania and ignoring Morgan and Weed, who was in Pennsylvania. The states' rights attitude of the Massachusetts managers at last yielded before a barrage of letters and telegrams from Morgan. The incident illus- trates the weakness of the central organization, and the federal structure of the Republican Party in 1856.31 26 Philip S. Foner, Business and Slavery (Chapel Hill, N. C, 1941), 135-136. 27 S. A. Douglas to J. Buchanan, Sept. 29, 1856, quoted in Milton, 242. 28 Morgan to Welles, Sept. 30, 1856, Morgan Manuscripts, NYSL; Republican Account Book. Between September 30 and October 14, Morgan collected $17,882. 29 Morgan to Banks, Sept. 19, 1856, Morgan Manuscripts, NYSL; Foner, 131-133. 30 John Goodrich of Stockbridge was National Committeeman from Massachusetts, George Morey the active Boston agent. Morgan to Goodrich and Morey, Oct. 10, 1856, Morgan Manuscripts, NYSL. 31 Letters, Oct. 7-13, 1856, ibid. 3^ JAMES A. RAWLEY January New York City's contribution to the critical state before Oc- tober 14, in so far as it has been documented, seems to have been about equal from Democrats and Republicans—less than $20,000 on each side. The Republicans did not have the aid of the patronage nor the rumored largesse of Douglas and Belmont. The New York Evening ^Post^ an ardent Fremont champion, charged that the Democracy had made a levy of three per cent on the salaries of every officer in the New York Customs House and one dollar on every laborer at the Navy Yard. "It is generally supposed that not less than a quarter of a million dollars were expended in Pennsylvania alone. . . ."32 It seems safe to conclude that the Democracy spent more in Pennsylvania than did its rival. The Republican National Committee's contribution to Indiana, the other principal October state, apparently was negligible; indeed, no entries were made in the Account Book against the state's name. October 14, election day, turned the scale for the Democracy: both Pennsylvania and Indiana were lost by the Republicans. The margins were slight, about 3,000 and 6,000 votes respectively. ". . . The October elections gave us a cold chill," Greeley re- called. "Yet we fought on with much resolution, though with little hope."33 Morgan on the morning after the defeat acknowledged: "This is a trying moment for those of us who are here in the midst of the Buchanan rejoicing, as our friends feel bad. Tomorrow they will feel some better, and there is on my part disappointment but not despond ency—.' '34 The three weeks before the national election date, November 4, held the final chance to raise enough funds to carry Pennsylvania. Predicting a "regular hand to hand contest," Morgan redoubled his efforts to obtain contributions. But "our friends" were wary, and a large part of his efforts centered in a fund to be used contingent upon Fremont's election.35 Nearly one third of the contingent fund was pledged by Morgan himself, when he inaugurated the fund with a promise of $25,000. The other contributors were prominent New Yorkers: M. H. Grin- 32 New York Evening Post, Oct. 21, 1856. 33 Horace Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life (New York, 1873), 354. 34 Morgan to John Goodrich, Oct. 15, 1856, Morgan Manuscripts, NYSL. 35 Morgan to Philip Dorsheimer, Oct. 20, 1856; Morgan to Gideon Welles, Oct. 22, 1856, ibid. 1951 FINANCING THE FREMONT CAMPAIGN 33 nell, $20,000; R. M. Blatchford, $i2,500; and Thurlow Weed, $12,500. An even more curious and lukewarm contribution was the $10,000 from the San Francisco merchant, A. A. Selover, and others, to be used in case Buchanan's majority in Philadelphia did not exceed 3,434 votes. This figure represented the majority the Demo- crats had attained in Philadelphia against the Union state ticket in October.36 Aside from the contingent fund of $80,000, the National Chairman received some outright donations. In the week ending October 29, Morgan sent $12,000 to Pennsylvania, and he did not anticipate sending more. By election day the Republican National Committee had raised for all purposes $44,285.64. Post-election contributions slightly increased the fund to $45,966.32.37 It was not enough to win the election. An exact comparison between Republican and Democratic campaign funds cannot be drawn, for the Democratic Account Book is not available, and all money spent in the campaign did not pass through the hands of the National Chairmen. One recent student notes the estimate that the Democrats spent $500,000 in Pennsyl- vania.38 Plitt's figure, over $70,000, cited before the Covode Commit- tee, represents a minimum, yet considerably more than the Republi- cans gathered through their national organization. Perhaps Thurlow Weed was right; possibly the Democratic margin was $50,000. Two large questions remain. What were the sources of the Repub- lican National Committee's campaign funds in 1856? And how was the money spent ? An analysis of the Republican Account Book discloses the fact that almost no money was contributed by state organizations, with the exception of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. The inadequacy of the state committees placed the financial burden almost entirely upon private individuals. And these persons with few exceptions lived in New York City. The wisdom of choosing a New York merchant as National Chairman, really national fund raiser, seemed justified by the event, however small the fund was. Where else in the nation could the $45,966.32 have been scraped together?

36Lindley Smyth to Morgan, Nov. n, 1856, ibid. 37 Morgan to L. Smyth, Oct. 29, 1856; Morgan to J. Schoolcraft, Oct. 29, 1856, ibid. 38 Nevins, II, 506. 34 JAMES A. RAWLEY January The list of principal donors is not long and seems worthy of cita- tion. Those persons who gave $1,000 or more, together with the dates and amounts of their contributions, were:

Joshua Carew August 20 $1,200 John Carter Brown September 8 500 October 28 500 Greeley and McElrath September 10 1,000 October 8 500 E. D. Morgan September 10 1,000 October 8 1,000 Thurlow Weed September 23 1,000 John A. King September 27 500 October 6 1,000 Hamilton Fish October 6 1,000 Phelps Dodge & Co October 7 500 November 1 500 R. M. Blatchford October 8 1,000 October 9 125 M. H. Grinnell October 11 1,000 October 31 1,000 W. A. Hall September 2 500 October 11 250 October 14 466 George Morey October 13 1,000 (for Massachusetts) October 14 1,000 Lindley Smyth October 14 1,000 (for Pennsylvania) December 11 959-O4 George Shaw October 16 1,000 Daniel Paine October 16 500 October 21 1,000 "Mr. Bogue from Hart- ford & New Haven" October 23 2,500 H. B. Claflin October 8 500 October 24 500 James S. Wadsworth October 29 i>5°° $26,000.04 1951 FINANCING THE FREMONT CAMPAIGN 35 It is perhaps worth noting, in addition, that the abolitionist, Gerrit Smith, gave $500 on October 28. The other question, how the money was spent, is largely answered by a reminder of the party's activities in Pennsylvania. Certainly $30,635, probably more, went to the Keystone State. That is to say, over two thirds of the funds raised by the Republican National Com- mittee was used in a single state. Other states fared poorly: Maine received $2,700; Illinois, $700; New Hampshire, $400; and New Jersey, $365. Indiana, on which so much anxiety was lavished, apparently received no cash directly from the National Committee, although speakers who were sent into the state doubtless drew ex- pense money in part used in Indiana. No other state was subsidized. Costs of documents, printing, and subventions of newspapers, ex- cluding Ford's expenditures, amounted to a probable $1,875.97. As an offset to this low figure, one should remember that many newspapers, in addition to unsubsidized editorial support, furnished without charge printing facilities for the Republican cause. The Com- mittee paid traveling expenses for some speakers, but the exact amount is inestimable owing to the terse character of Account Book entries. A part of the money raised in 1856 defrayed administrative expenses: rent, postage, cartage, telegraph, etc. Finally, in enumerat- ing the uses of the campaign fund, one must note the unexplained payments to two North American Party leaders, F. H. Ruggles, $300, on August 21 and William F. Johnston, $500, on October 23.39 In conclusion, it should be restated that campaign funds alone did not decide the issue in November, 1856. But it does seem clear that the Republican National Committee raised an unimpressive sum of money, contrasting with an unspecified though larger amount on the part of the Democrats. The focal point of campaign strategy became Pennsylvania, where the Republican managers directed the bulk of their money. In the face of the evidence gathered from the Re- publican Account Book, one cannot but conclude that in a critical aspect of their first national canvass the Republicans were out- matched by their rivals. &{ew York University JAMES A. RAWLEY 39 The foregoing is based upon the Republican Account Book.