A Scientific Metaphysical Naturalisation of Information
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1 A Scientific Metaphysical Naturalisation of Information With a indication-based semantic theory of information and an informationist statement of physicalism. Bruce Long A thesis submitted to fulfil requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences The University of Sydney February 2018 2 Abstract The objective of this thesis is to present a naturalised metaphysics of information, or to naturalise information, by way of deploying a scientific metaphysics according to which contingency is privileged and a-priori conceptual analysis is excluded (or at least greatly diminished) in favour of contingent and defeasible metaphysics. The ontology of information is established according to the premises and mandate of the scientific metaphysics by inference to the best explanation, and in accordance with the idea that the primacy of physics constraint accommodates defeasibility of theorising in physics. This metaphysical approach is used to establish a field ontology as a basis for an informational structural realism. This is in turn, in combination with information theory and specifically mathematical and algorithmic theories of information, becomes the foundation of what will be called a source ontology, according to which the world is the totality of information sources. Information sources are to be understood as causally induced configurations of structure that are, or else reduce to and/or supervene upon, bounded (including distributed and non-contiguous) regions of the heterogeneous quantum field (all quantum fields combined) and fluctuating vacuum, all in accordance with the above-mentioned quantum field-ontic informational structural realism (FOSIR.) Arguments are presented for realism, physicalism, and reductionism about information on the basis of the stated contingent scientific metaphysics. In terms of philosophical argumentation, realism about information is argued for primarily by way 2 of an indispensability argument that defers to the practice of scientists and regards concepts of information as just as indispensable in their theories as contingent representations of structure. Physicalism and reductionism about information are adduced by way of the identity thesis that identifies the substance of the structure of ontic structural realism as identical to selections of structure existing in re to combined heterogeneous quantum fields, and to the total heterogeneous quantum field comprised of all such fields. Adjunctly, an informational statement of physicalism is arrived at, and a theory of semantic information is proposed, according to which information is intrinsically semantic and alethically neutral. 3 This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. Chapter 5 of this thesis is published as Long, 2014. I was the sole author and researcher on that paper, but grateful to the feedback from two anonymous reviewers and my supervisor, Professor Paul E. Griffiths. Other elements of the thesis (mostly from Chapter 6) were published as Long, 2018, for which paper I was also the sole author and researcher. My thanks to two anonymous reviewers and the editor of Erkenntnis, Professor Michael Esfeld. Bruce Long 4 Acknowledgements My thanks and gratitude to Professor Paul Griffiths, whose diligence in reviewing the penultimate draft demon- strated his high degree of professional acumen as a su- pervisor and as a philosopher of science, and whose per- sistence and patience was generally conducive to my suc- cess in submitting and gaining a result where no revisions were required by the (also excellent and much appreci- ated) examiners. Thanks also to Mr Christopher Newton of the HDRAC team at The University of Sydney for his patience and assistance during the submission process. Contents I Introduction 11 1 Metaphilosophy and Methodology - Scientific Metaphysics . 14 2 Physicalist, Structuralist Realism about Information . 20 3 Semantic Information: It's the Same Information . 25 4 Key (Scientific-contingent) Metaphysical Arguments: CICS, OSIR, and FOSIR . 27 II A Scientific Metaphysical NOSR for Information: Developing Field-Ontic Structural Informational Real- ism 31 1 Scientific Metaphysics of Information 33 1.1 Introduction . 33 1.2 Physicalism and Structure . 34 1.3 A Systematic Approach to Defining Ontology . 37 1.3.1 An Outline of a Logic of Information Dynamics with Op- erator Definitions . 41 1.4 Anti-Platonism about the Nature of Information . 47 1.4.1 No Information in Abstract Spaces . 49 1.5 Conclusion . 53 2 Towards a Metaphysics of the Nature of Information 55 2.1 Introduction . 55 2.2 Defeasibility of Scientific Theorising . 56 2.3 Reductive Physicalism About Information and Informational non- eliminative ontic structural realism . 62 2.3.1 Brief Introduction to Naturalised Encoding and Repre- sentation, Pseudo Sources, and Pseudo Information . 68 2.3.2 Summary . 71 2.4 Initial Insights from Physics and Molecular Bioscience . 72 2.5 Conclusion . 80 5 6 Contents 3 Introducing Field Ontic Structural Realism (FOSIR) 81 3.1 Introduction . 81 3.2 A QFT Field Ontology as the basis of OSIR . 83 3.2.1 The Heterogeneous Quantum Field as The Set of All Quan- tum Fields . 85 3.2.2 Against Probabilism and Formalism-Driven Ontological Descent . 87 3.3 Ontic Structural Realism by Fields . 90 3.3.1 Causality as Continuous Transmitted Field Fluctuations . 111 3.4 Other Field Ontological Alternatives . 117 3.4.1 Why not Nominalism about Information? . 117 3.4.2 The Analytic A-priori: Fields as Trope Bundles and the Spacetime Manifold . 121 3.4.3 Modal Innatism in the Quantum World as the basis of Ontic Structural Realism . 126 3.4.4 Many Worlds Interpretation of QM . 131 3.5 Establishing OSIR and FOSIR - Some principles . 133 3.6 Conclusion . 134 4 The World is the Totality of Heterogeneous Information Sources137 4.1 Introduction . 137 4.2 Natural Systems are Information Sources . 138 4.2.1 Configurations and Sources . 139 4.3 Stochastic Sources Have Ontic Priority Before Statistics . 142 4.3.1 Quantum Field Theory and Bounded Field Regions as Information Sources . 147 4.3.2 The View from Black Hole Physics . 153 4.4 Armstrong's Eleatic Principle and Information . 158 4.5 The Question of Infinite Information . 164 4.6 Conclusion . 171 III Intrinsically Semantic Information, and Further FOSIR- CICS Source Ontology Development 173 5 Information is Intrinsically Semantic, but Alethically Neutral 175 5.1 Introduction . 175 5.2 Logical Probabilities and Situation Theory . 178 5.2.1 Devlin's Abstract Infon . 178 5.2.2 Carnap and Bar Hillel : Abstract Information Content . 180 5.3 Dretske's Information Semantics . 185 5.4 Semantic Intrinisic Indication . 189 5.4.1 Accidental/Coincidental Covariance of Structure is not Transmission . 190 5.4.2 Configurational ι-indication . 192 5.4.3 Representation . 196 Contents 7 5.5 Non-Alethic Intrinsically Semantic Information . 198 5.6 Pseudo-sources and Virtual Sources . 199 5.7 Weakly, Strongly, and Intrinsically Semantic Information . 200 5.8 Conclusion . 204 6 The QFT-Structure Identity Thesis 207 6.1 Introduction . 207 6.2 Nonuniformity and Heterogeneous Fields . 208 6.2.1 The Symbol Grounding Problem . 211 6.3 Reduction to I-Regions of The Universal Quantum Field . 213 6.3.1 The Contingent Defeasibility of Theoretical Physics . 214 6.3.2 QFT and Scientific Realism . 217 6.4 How Does FOSIR Relate and Compare to (Other) Informational Structural Realisms . 225 6.5 Defeasible Field Ontic Structural Informational Realism: FOSIR 229 6.6 Content of Structure . 234 6.7 Ergodic Stochasticity Entails I-Structure . 244 6.8 Conclusion . 246 7 An Informational Statement of Physicalism 249 7.1 Introduction . 249 7.2 Situating Physical Structure Vs Formal Structure . 250 7.3 A New Informational Statement of Physicalism . 252 7.3.1 Causal Continuity . 252 7.3.2 Informational Ontological Closure . 257 7.4 Some Anticipated Responses/Problems (to elements of the metameta- physics of FOSIR-CICS source ontology) . 260 7.4.1 Eliminativism and Pluralism . 260 7.4.2 Triviality and Token Physicalism . 265 7.4.3 Reductionism . 267 7.5 Conclusion . 268 IV Conclusion 271 7.6 Conclusion . 273 V Appendices 279 8 Contents List of Acronyms CICS Causally Induced Configuration of Structure (Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p27) EI Eliatic Information Principle or (§4.4 p162) FOSIR Field Ontic Structural Informational Realism IS1 Statement of Ontic structural Informational Realism (§3.5 p134) IS2 Statement of Field Ontic Structural Informational Realism (§3.5 p134) I-CICS I-existential statement of causally induced configuration of structure H1 The CICS argument (Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p28) H2 The structure-QFT identity argument (Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p27) H3 The Source Ontology or ontic structural informational realism (OSIR) ar- gument by IBE and indispensability (Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p27) H4 The field-ontic structural informational realism (FOSIR) argument (Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p27) H5 The intrinsic semantics argument (Intro. §4 p27, Intro. §4 p27) I- Predicate/prefix denoting objective mind, language, computation, and the- ory independence (informationally independent and objective.) (Intro. §1.3 p37) IA Indispensability Argument (Intro. §1 p16) IBE Inference to the best explanation (Intro. §1 p16) PNC Principle of Natural Closure PPC Primacy of Physics Principle QFT Quantum Field Theory QM Quantum Mechanics SIE Structural Informational Eliatic Principle (§4.4 p160) TWSI The Theory of Weakly Semantic Information (§5.7 p200) TSSI The Theory of Strongly Semantic Information (§5.7 p200) List of Figures 1.1 If Qualia track phenomenal states, then this has to be realised by information channels reducing to causal pathways. Accidental covariance does not constitute the transmission of information, and the statistical likelihood that the phenomenal space possi- bilities and quale `states' track the complex possibilities in the phenomenal space accidentally is diminishingly small.