WIDER Research Paper 2006-77 Institutionalism Ancient
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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Reinert, Erik S. Working Paper Institutionalism ancient, old and new: A historical perspective on institutions and uneven development WIDER Research Paper, No. 2006/77 Provided in Cooperation with: United Nations University (UNU), World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) Suggested Citation: Reinert, Erik S. (2006) : Institutionalism ancient, old and new: A historical perspective on institutions and uneven development, WIDER Research Paper, No. 2006/77, ISBN 929190855X, The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63562 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Research Paper No. 2006/77 Institutionalism Ancient, Old and New A Historical Perspective on Institutions and Uneven Development Erik S. Reinert* July 2006 Abstract This paper argues for an ‘ancient’ institutional school, predating Thorstein Veblen’s ‘old’ institutionalism. In this view, going back as far as the thirteenth century, institutions tended to be seen as specific to a mode of production. Here both institutions and development itself are context-specific and activity-specific. Much clearer than today the arrows of causality of economic development go from the mode of production to the institutional setting, not vice versa. In order to understand development, institutions can also usefully be divided into Hayekian institutions that facilitate equilibrium and Schumpeterian institutions that enable the dynamics of development and structural change. Keywords: institutions, structural change, uneven development, ancient institutional school JEL classification: B15, B52, O10, O30 Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2006 * The Other Canon Foundation, Norway & Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Institutions for Economic Development: Theory, History and Contemporary Experiences, directed by Ha-Joon Chang. UNU-WIDER acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). ISSN 1810-2611 ISBN 92-9190-855-X (internet version) Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank Ha-Joon Chang, Sophus Reinert, and Francesca Viano for constructive comments and criticism. The usual disclaimer applies. The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. www.wider.unu.edu [email protected] UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland Camera-ready typescript prepared by Adam Swallow at UNU-WIDER The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. Publication does not imply endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of any of the views expressed. Introduction As a result of the inability of mainstream economics to tackle prominent problems of the global economy, some of its basic assumptions are increasingly being questioned. In this context, the standard emphasis on methodological individualism is gradually being eased in favour of studying the institutional structures necessary for economic development: the social, cultural, and political norms and habits economists had come to take for granted. This ‘institutionalist’ approach is most often traced back to the work of Thorstein Veblen in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. My essay shows how an acute awareness of the importance of institutions, and more specifically of a certain kind of institutions, in fact has been explicitly present in the history of economic thought and policy at least since the Renaissance. Therefore, in addition to the ‘new’ institutional economics of Douglass North and the ‘old’ institutional economics of Veblen and Commons, there existed an ‘ancient’ tradition of institutional economics which, among other things, informed the policies responsible for the European miracle in the early modern period. In light of this ‘ancient’ institutionalism, I wish to explore its relevance for economic development. Whereas today’s literature tends to discuss institutions independent of the type of productive structure they support, both the ‘ancient’ and the ‘old’ institutional schools saw institutions as an integral part of a particular production system. Different technological systems, or modes of production, were seen as requiring different institutions, and an institution per se could not change the technological system. Whereas institutions like property rights and universal suffrage today often are seen as promoting economic development, I wish to show that the arrows of causality historically have been considered going in the opposite direction. In fact, the institution of insurance came about after the need for it developed out of risky long-distance trade, and modern democracies, in any meaningful sense, were the fruits of literate urban artisan and working classes rather than of feudalism. It is therefore not entirely clear that the Masaai are poor and stuck in subsistence agriculture because they lack property rights. Perhaps, I would argue, they lack property rights because they are poor and stuck in subsistence agriculture. In other words the problem lies in their mode of production – subsistence agriculture rather than e.g. manufacturing – and not narrowly in an institutional arrangement in a restricted sense. An institution that suits one production system may not suit another. It can for example be argued that the sequential usufruct of land found in pastoral societies1 is much better suited to that particular mode of production than are capitalist property rights. Precisely because institutions and mode of production of a society obviously evolved together, institutions cannot be meaningfully studied separately from a technological system which needed and created them. Today one side of the equation – institutions in isolation as instruments favouring development – has too often been emphasized, skewing our understanding of economic and institutional development. 1 Sequential usufruct means that, rooted on traditional usage, different groups use the same land at different times of the year. Property rights in the capitalist sense do not exist. The system can best be compared to ‘time-sharing’ of apartments as practiced in many holiday resorts today. 1 ‘The discipline of daily life acts to alter or reinforce the received habits of thought, and so acts to alter or fortify the received institutions under which men live’ says Veblen (1961: 314). In this paper I argue that a conscious element should be added to this theory: there are, I will argue, enabling institutions that are deliberately created in order to induce change, as integral parts of the dynamics of evolving systems of production. This was one of the principal arguments of the great Enlightenment philosopher Denis Diderot in his Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville: by studying the recently discovered Tahitian society, Diderot argued, one could observe how these Polynesian islanders had consciously developed social and political institutions supportive of their desired polity. They had not tailored institutions to the needs of a static society, but rather to a dynamic system with the prospects of future growth and development (Muthu 2003: 54-55). Some institutions, I will argue, are created pro-actively in order to promote change (e.g. patents, scientific academies), others appear through a more re-