Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 83:789–804 Springer 2008 DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9665-8
Alessandro Lanteri An Experimental Investigation of Emotions Chiara Chelini and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem Salvatore Rizzello
ABSTRACT. Elaborating on the notions that humans Some psychological mechanisms, like emotions possess different modalities of decision-making and that and intuition, previously not incorporated in stan- these are often influenced by moral considerations, we dard choice theory are instead central to our capacity conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley to cope with and thrive in a complex social and Problem. We presented the participants with two stan- natural environment, and they constitute a basis on dard scenarios (‘lever’ and ‘stranger’) either in the usual or which an interdisciplinary approach to decision- in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected making could be fruitfully developed. We also by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger believe that, by means of such enrichments, eco- scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. nomic theory may aim at a deeper and more Furthermore, when asked to express general moral nuanced understanding of individual behaviour in opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about the direction of increased realisticness, and that such half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the improved understanding requires, on some occa- responses they had previously given. sions, to pay a more than cursory attention to the role played by moral considerations. KEY WORDS: experiments, intuition, moral emotions, In this article, we elaborate on such ideas by moral judgement, moral reasoning, trolley problem addressing two modalities of ethical judgements – moral emotions and moral reasoning – and how do they affect decision-making. We do so with an Roughly 30 years of studies of human behaviour and experimental investigation of the two standard cognition have taught us that decision-making is variants of a moral dilemma generally known as the ‘‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so’’ (Simon, trolley problem. 1961, p. xxiv) and that most behaviour is automatic (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999), emotional (Damasio, 1999, 2000; Elster, 1999), instinctive (Camerer et al., The trolley problem 2005; Rubinstein, 2007), or otherwise inspired by some mental ‘short-cut’ or heuristic (Kahneman, The moral philosopher Philippa Foot (1978) was 2003; Simon, 1955, 1978), and not carefully thought the first to suggest a challenging moral dilemma – over. Simplified procedures of these kinds are largely the so-called ‘trolley problem’ – in which a decider successful, but occasionally they may fail in ways that is faced with two simple alternatives, both of which are both systematic and predictable (Gilovich et al., result in tragedy. The scenario is roughly as follows: 2002). In the last 15 years, we have also witnessed the a trolley is running down its track, but nobody is in development of a conspicuous stream of research control. Along the track stand five people who are investigating the role of mental short cuts (and unavoidably going to die unless the trajectory of the failures thereof) in moral judgements (Baron, 1994, trolley is altered. By flipping a switch it is possible to 1995, 1997, 1998; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Haidt, lead the trolley to a different track, where unfortu- 2007; Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Hauser, 2006; Messick nately a single person is standing and is then con- and Schell, 1992; Schelling, 1984; Sunstein, 2004). demned to die. Though a case can be made for or 790 Alessandro Lanteri et al. against both hitting the lever and not hitting it, there demonstration of our failure to apply that principle seems to be no obviously superior option to choose, under certain circumstances. whence the dilemmatic dimension of the situation. Following the lead of Immanuel Kant, the Nonetheless, most people agree that flipping the adherents to deontic ethics believe instead that we switch is permissible. ought to act out of the principles of rational duty: to When it is compared to an experiment with a behave, that is, in a way such that we would want slightly changed setting, however, the case becomes to become a Categorical Imperative for everyone to less straightforward (Thomson, 1976, 1985, 1986). follow. One such imperative is to never treat anyone Suppose the same trolley is hurtling down towards (including oneself) as a means, but always as a moral five people, but in the absence of sidetracks it is only end in himself. The stranger thrown on the tracks is possible to block it by dropping a heavy weight in treated a mere means towards the goal of saving front of it. There happens to be a stranger nearby someone else and this ought not to be done. who is considerably overweight: enough for his mass However, can we maintain that, in the original to be sufficient to halt the trolley, if he is pushed on scenario, the single person killed by our pulling of the track.1 In this case his life would be lost. Most the switch is taken as an end in himself? people, even those who tolerated the sacrifice of We want to do good and save the five and we one person to save five in the previous case, now certainly do not want the one to die, so even when hesitate. the ‘special disfavour of fortune’ or the ‘niggardly But why? provision of a step motherly nature’ prevent the Either they are inconsistent, and thus their actualization of our intended achievements, our seeming reliance on intuition proves faulty, or the good will, ‘‘like a jewel, would still shine by itself, as two situations differ in a morally relevant sense.2 something that has its full worth in itself’’ (Kant, One difference may be that killing the one is a 1784, p. 394). It follows that ‘‘people cannot be side-effect to the attempt to save the five in the first morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for case, while in the second case the killing of the what is due to factors beyond their control’’ (Nagel, stranger is a crucial and deliberate step towards the 1993, p. 58). That there is a trolley running towards rescuing of the five. According to the ‘doctrine of five people is not our fault. We know, however, that double effect’ (Aquinas, 13th century) the deliber- pulling the switch will kill someone, and operating ate causation of harm in order to promote some the switch is fully and exclusively under our control. other good is morally inferior to the promotion of It is too fragile an argument to suggest that it is not some good, whose indirect consequence is to cause our fault that someone dies after we pull the switch. harm as a side-effect. This suggestion, however Kant (1784, p. 394) specifies that chance does not disputable on different grounds (e.g. Kagan, 1989; affect moral judgement only insofar as good will is Unger, 1996), amounts to a trade-off between not mere wishing, but involves ‘‘the summoning of good and bad deeds. What principle does guide all means insofar as they are in our control’’ (ibid.). such trade-off? Moreover, we would not rationally want ‘pull the Since it is impossible to save everybody, the switch’ to become an imperative rule followed by socially maximising conduct is whatever saves five everyone, lest we are prepared to accept our death to lives. Many philosophers believe this to be the cor- be delivered when we least expect it through some rect source of moral decision-making; these are the hurling trolley that a passer-by diverted towards us to advocates of consequentialism, the ethical doctrine protect someone else. It is therefore not admissible, that we ought to undertake whatever course of for deontologists, to pull the switch. action brings about the greatest benefit to the largest Consequentialists would both pull the switch and number of people. Most subjects faced with the push the overweight person. Deontologists would trolley experiment, nonetheless, refuse to push the do neither. However, are common people either of overweight person and would feel uneasy if they those? were told that such is the only moral choice in the Some of us, though perhaps a few, certainly are. It trolley problem. This might be taken as a prima is nonetheless clear to many commentators that facie argument against consequentialism; or as ethics should move beyond the logical derivation of Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 791 what ought (not) to be done following from some rule of thumb, which is consistently applied, but not abstract principle and get a better grasp of the psy- easily understood. chological background of human decision-making (e.g. Anscombe, 1958). How do we make sense of the trolley problem? Moral intuition and the trolley The doctrine of double effect suggests that ‘pulling the switch’ is admissible under some important Some additional variants to the trolley problem were conditions. First of all, the real goal of one’s action proposed, in which the trolley in the initial situation ought to be morally good. Second, the immoral can be diverted to a track that loops back to the five action ought not to be a goal in itself, but merely a people, but a man on this track will actually stop it side-effect even if its undesirable consequences are and die, therefore becoming an active part of the known in advance. Lastly, the immoral action ought plan to save the five and no longer just a side- to be proportionate to the other immoral effects, casualty. In another version, the trolley can be which would obtain in absence of the original good diverted by means of colliding another trolley into it; action. The three conditions are met in the standard both trolleys will then be derailed into the yard of a version of the problem: pulling the switch aims at sleeping man, who will thus be killed. On occasions saving five lives and it is a good deed, while the like these, the doctrine of double effect could pro- death of someone else is unintended and propor- vide specific guidance, but people do not seem to tionate to the main goal. In the stranger variant, follow its prescriptions. Instead, as the moral phi- however, the active pushing of someone on the losopher Peter Unger (1996, p. 92) suggests, the track reverses the situation: a morally bad action – responses to the new problems are partly dependent i.e. killing the overweight person – now brings on whether the subject has already encountered the about the good side-effect of saving five people and standard version, because of a desire to express is not acceptable according to the requirements of consistent moral opinions. He also points out how, the doctrine of double effect. by means of introducing intermediate alternatives to The distinction between main aim and side-effect
First, when serious loss will result, it’s harder to justify more indulgence than actions (another instantiation moving a person to, or into, an object than it is to of the ‘indirect harm bias;’ Royzman and Baron, move the object to, or into, the person. Second, when 2002). The consequence is that a number of lives serious loss will result, it’s harder to justify changing was lost to this line of reasoning. This approach may the speed of a moving object, or changing its rate of seem to be in contradiction with the doctrine of motion, than changing the object’s direction of double effect (in terms of proportionality), and motion. Third, when there’ll be big loss, it’s harder to indeed the delivery of DPT vaccine has been justify speeding up an object than slowing down an object. Fourth, it’s a lot harder to justify taking an restored, just like Sabin is nowadays once again object at rest and setting it in motion than to justify preferred to Salk. The loss of lives to side-effects taking an object in motion and increasing its speed … (although known with fair statistical certainty) is [Fifth] it’s harder to justify imposing a substantial force considered admissible in the attempt of saving a on an object than it is to justify allowing a force already greater number of lives. Cases like these may keep present (just about) everywhere, like gravitation, to someone struggling to find a solution, but not always work on the object. there is room for correction. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981) Are these factors morally relevant? Are our intu- administered an experiment to two groups of sub- itions granted? Perhaps, Singer suggests, these intu- jects. The setting is a case of a disease expected to kill itions rely on some proxy of genuine moral factors, 600 people. The first group of subjects was faced with but when relentlessly exported to alien contexts they alternatives A and B, the second group with C and D. are no longer suitable. Thus, Unger concludes, responses to the trolley problem are rather dependent If program A is chosen, 200 people will be saved. on psychology than on ethics proper. If program B is chosen, there is 1/3 probability of saving 600 and 2/3 probability of not saving anyone. Moral intuition and psychology If program C is chosen, 400 people will die.
The mayhem of intuitive feelings is far reaching. If If program D is chosen, there is 1/3 probability that intuition is such a biased process, one may believe it nobody dies and 2/3 that everybody dies. would always be better to sit down and carefully deliberate. Besides the inefficiency of such proposal This is a case involving human lives and the (because deliberation is very costly, both effort- and attempt to save them, we certainly would not want it time-wise), careful reasoning may even be ineffec- to be deliberated upon by gut feelings. Since it is tive. Even thorough analyses often rely on intuitive evident that program A is identical to C and B to D, hunches, and they may prove unable to reach a we are confident that either A/C is better than B/D satisfactory solution. or vice versa. Why then 72% of the first group For one instance, in the 1970s British and would choose A, while 78% of the second group Japanese health authorities decided to suspend the would choose D? Are such intuitions sound? This is provision of DPT vaccines on the basis that they an instantiation of ‘framing’. Subjects do not ques- could, as a side-effect, cause the death of a little tion the real effect of each policy, but take it at its number of patients, smaller – it should be noted – face value. In this case, it is normal to see the granted than the number of patients who would have died in safety of 200 people as a gain and the certain death of the absence of such vaccine. Similarly, polio vaccine 400 as a loss. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also Sabin is more effective than Salk; yet, the first may pointed, we are more risk averse with respect to cause polio in patients. Despite this risk the number gains than to losses. The words employed in setting of lives saved by Sabin remains significantly higher the problem to the two groups determine different than Salk. Many specialists, nonetheless, have pre- perceptions, so that in the first case subjects are ferred the less effective treatment on the grounds of unwilling to promote the same risky program they an intuitive judgement that procuring harm is worse support in the second case. It is also noteworthy that than not avoiding harm. Omissions are treated with none of the responses seems to be particularly Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 793 problematic and there seems to be a significant that have been identified as correlates of emotional confidence underlying the choice of plan A and plan arousal. The same areas remain inactive in moral- D. Intuition operates very fast, it is often uncon- impersonal decisions – i.e. something that is some- troversial, and it does not always render due justice how distant, like the lever scenario or a case of to subtle differences. keeping the money found in a lost wallet – and in non-moral ones – e.g. a choice between different means of transportation given some time constraint. Moral heuristics The areas of the brain associated with working memory (i.e. middle frontal gyrus and parietal lobe) As we shall see in greater detail below, the responses instead were less active in the moral-personal sce- of the participants in our trolley problem experiment narios, but became activated in both the moral- do account for the distinctions in the two situations. impersonal and the non-moral decisions. Given the time constraints imposed on the decision Also response times differ across scenarios. The and their lack of formal philosophical training, fastest responses were judgements of inappropriate- however, it is rather implausible to imagine that our ness to moral-personal decisions, signalling that they subjects were rationally considering an actual appli- are virtually automatic because they elicit ‘‘prepo- cation of the doctrine of double effect (or any other tent, negative social-emotional responses’’ (Greene ethical doctrine). It is more likely that they were et al., 2004, p. 390). The slowest responses, on the employing some sort of heuristic following from that other hand, were judgements of appropriateness to principle or – which in the light of the previous the same decisions, signalling that the subjects had to discussion seems more probable – that the doctrine override the instinctive emotional response. Moral- of double effect originates in some measure from impersonal and non-moral decisions’ reaction times such rule of thumb. were in between (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2107). All Indeed moral judgement does not escape these differences reflect on people’s responses and automatic processes: we face situations and promptly can be responsible for seeming inconsistencies across deliver a good/bad intuitive evaluation of alterna- scenarios. tives as part of our perceptions; explanation comes Looking at the problem from a different angle only afterwards, if at all (Haidt, 2001). There is an may suggest that the questions and answers which expanding body of experimental evidence showing puzzle philosophers may not amount to inconsis- that people make choices for (at least in part) tencies proper, but reflect real differences – perhaps unknown reasons, and then make up reasonable differences which are not easily accessible to arm- justifications, while remaining unaware of the gap chair philosophical speculation – in the perception between their real motivation and their ex-post and processing of information concerning scenarios, rationalisation (T. Wilson, 2002). alternative conducts, and their moral significance. In The immediate responses may be traced to moral other words, we express a warning that the associ- emotions as opposed to moral reasoning. Through ation between the lever and the stranger variants of the analysis obtained with functional magnetic the trolley problem may be somewhat artificial: the resonance imaging (fMRI) from subjects involved two scenarios are cognitively and emotionally dis- with both ethical problems of various kinds and tinct and our brain treats them very differently non-ethical ones, it can be observed that the brain although both scenarios reproduce a choice context areas activated differ significantly (Greene et al., in which a moral violation must be committed in 2001, pp. 2106–2107; see also Greene and Haidt order to ensure the maximisation of aggregate wel- (2002) and Greene et al. (2004)). When facing fare. We may certainly imagine more cases, either moral-personal decisions – i.e. something that is ‘up abstract as here or actual as they would be in a real close and personal’ in the fashion of the overweight business decision, in which similar morally difficult stranger scenario, or the pushing of someone off a choices ought to be made and we would like to sinking lifeboat – those brain areas react (i.e. medial bring our experimental results below to bear on the prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, issue at large. Yet, we may not be fully entitled to and superior temporal sulcus/tempoparietal junction) directly comparing predominantly emotional and 794 Alessandro Lanteri et al. predominantly reasoned decision-making simply (Chelini et al., 2007). One heuristic could be la- because they could be constructed to apply to sce- belled SAVE THE MOST: people who follow this narios that resemble each other in any number of heuristic would push the stranger and pull the lever, respects. in order to save the highest number of people. The Aside from this warning, we subscribe to the prescriptions of this heuristic are in line with con- notion that ‘‘moral thinking is driven largely by sequentialism. Another heuristic could instead be social-emotional dispositions built on those we called DO NOT TOUCH. Participants who employ inherited from our primate ancestors’’ (Greene and this heuristic would refrain from both pulling the Haidt, 2002, p. 519). For instance, in an evolutionary lever and pushing the stranger. This heuristic is perspective it makes sense to regard an emotional similar to the prescriptions of Kantian ethics. The aversion to damaging other humans as a fitness- latter two heuristics, therefore, may not so much improving trait that confers upon its possessors some discriminate among types of situations, to which one advantage in grouping successfully (D. Wilson, responds with certain behavioural scripts, but they 2002). Such ‘‘adaptation would have arisen at a time promote a stable principle of conduct from which when the scope of aggression was limited literally to a agents elaborate actions to be defined case by case. stone’s throw’’ (Cohen, 2005, p. 12), while there was Since choice situations are complex along a variety no need to avoid harming other humans at long of dimensions, heuristics may enable quick decision- distances, as this was not even, technologically making either by suggesting when to act in some speaking, a possibility. Beside emotions, we are also way (ME HURT YOU) or to always act in certain characterised by a capacity for elaborate abstract ways (SAVE THE MOST and DO NOT TOUCH). reasoning. Human moral judgement may thus We now turn to the experimental results, which be supposed to be ‘‘a complex interplay between allow us to investigate which heuristics, if any, (at least) two distinct types of processes: domain participants employ. We also examine whether specific, social emotional responses and domain- question ordering has any effect on the heuristics neutral reasoning processes applied in moral con- employed. Finally, we elicit the general moral texts’’ (Greene and Haidt, 2002, p. 519). opinions of participants and compare these with Moral emotions seem to import eminently in the previous responses. case of personal moral violations, while reasoning applies to impersonal violations. Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt (2002) characterise a personal vio- The trolley experiment lation as: physical harm to a specific person in such a way that is not determined by a pre-existing con- On the 9th and the 13th November 2006 we con- dition. Conversely, impersonal violations occur ducted a series of experiments with a total of 62 when there is a mediating object between the agent undergraduate students of law at the University of and his action, which on occasions seems to release Eastern Piedmont in Alessandria (Italy). The students the agent from responsibility. We should thus expect were summoned for a class in the Seminar of people to employ what Greene and Haidt call a Political Economy, which is not compulsory in their 4 ME HURT YOU heuristic. Such heuristic may be curriculum, and which grants them 3 credits (out of employed to quickly discriminate among situations a total of 180 credits over 3 years required for and viable conducts, and should result in refraining graduation – i.e. 5% of the annual credit load), from personal violations. For the sake of the trolley provided that they attend a total of three experi- problem, this amounts to pulling the switch and not ments and a concluding lecture. The credits consti- pushing the overweight stranger.5 This heuristic tute the compensation for participants.6 resembles the doctrine of double effect. Participants were informed that they had to Since moral characters and opinions can be answer truthfully and fill in its entirety a question- variegated, we also remind that the two leading naire aimed at understanding their moral opinions, moral schools of thought would each suggest a dif- which had been prepared in a way that there existed ferent conduct in the trolley problem, and that each no right or wrong answers. They knew the experi- may be translated into some heuristic as well ment would last about twenty minutes, and they Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 795 were guaranteed full anonymity. On both days, The passer-by is aware, however, that by pushing roughly half of the participants took part in either of him, the stranger will be killed. two treatments: the one (Standard Treatment) fea- tured the lever-pulling scenario first, followed by the [Question 5] Under these circumstances, is it overweight stranger scenario; the other featured the morally obligatory for the passer-by to push the same scenarios in reversed order (Reversed Treat- stranger? ment). At the end of each scenario, the participants [Question 6] Under these circumstances, is it were required to answer several yes or no questions. morally acceptable for the passer-by to push the stranger? Scenario 1 [Question 7] If the passer-by does not push the stranger, is he intentionally killing five people? (As in the previous scenario) A trolley without [Question 8] If the passer-by pushes the stranger, passengers and without conductor is travelling at full is he intentionally killing one person? speed down a track. On the track there are five In the lights of the previous scenarios, our subjects people, who will surely be killed if the trolley keeps were also asked to answer four additional questions, riding on the actual path. There is also a side-track, which we employed to check for consistency. on which there is one person. A passer-by could pull a lever next to the track, [Question 9] Is there a difference, in terms of and this way deviate the trolley onto the side-track. moral responsibility, between intentionally kill- The passer-by realises that, if he does not pull the ing someone and letting someone die? lever, the five people will be killed. If he pulls the [Question 10] If you answered affirmatively, is lever instead, the five people will be saved. The intentionally killing someone morally worse than passer-by is aware, however, that by pulling the lever letting someone die? the person on the side-track will be killed. [Question 11] Is there a difference, in terms of legal responsibility, between intentionally killing [Question 1] Under these circumstances, is it someone and letting someone die? morally obligatory for the passer-by to pull the [Question 12] If you answered affirmatively, is lever? intentionally killing someone legally worse than [Question 2] Under these circumstances, is it letting someone die? morally acceptable for the passer-by to pull the lever? [Question 3] If the passer-by does not pull the Results and discussion lever, is he intentionally killing five people? [Question 4] If the passer-by pulls the lever, is he The overall results (Figure 1) are not very much intentionally killing one person? unanticipated. About 95% of the subjects say that pushing the stranger is not a moral obligation, and 53% Scenario 2 say that it is morally unacceptable to do so. About 24%, instead, believe that pulling the lever is morally com- (As in the previous scenario) A trolley without pelling, and 87% consider it at least morally acceptable. passengers or conductor is travelling at full speed About 85% in the lever-scenario and 90% in the down a track. On the track there are five people, stranger-scenario believe that abstention from action who will surely be killed if the trolley keeps riding does not amount to intentional murdering the five on the actual path. A passer-by stands next to the people on the track. By and large (90%), however, they track, and he could push a very fat stranger on the consider pushing the stranger as a deliberate murder; a trolley’s path, halting its ride. smaller proportion (42%) also say that pulling the lever The passer-by realises that, if he does not push the amounts to an intentional killing of one. stranger, the five people will be killed. If he pushes When we observe the responses of two Treatments the stranger instead, the five people will be saved. separately (Figures 2, 3) some interesting differences 796 Alessandro Lanteri et al.
no yes 100% 12,90% 9,68% 90% 80% 53,23% 70% 58,06% 60% 75,81% 85,48% 90,32% 50% 95,16% 87,10% 90,32% 40% 30% 46,77% 20% 41,94% 10% 24,19% 4,84% 14,52% 9,68% 0% Lever Stranger Lever Stranger Lever Stranger Lever Stranger
obligatory acceptable int. kill 5 int. kill 1
Figure 1. Responses, by scenario.
no yes 100% 5,71% 8,57% 90% 80% 54,29% 70% 65,71% 71,43% 60% 85,71% 91,43% 50% 97,14% 94,29% 91,43% 40% 30% 45,71% 20% 34,29% 28,57% 10% 2,86% 14,29% 8,57% 0% Lever Stranger Lever Stranger Lever Stranger Lever Stranger
obligatory acceptable int. kill 5 int. kill 1
Figure 2. Responses, standard treatment. can be pointed out. It is not easy to predict result of moral reasoning. We also expect hard-wired whether altering the sequence in which partici- moral-emotional behaviour to be more robust – that pants encounter the scenarios affects their responses is less sensitive to contingent variations in experi- and, if so, how.7 Indeed, when the lever scenario mental conditions – which can import on reasoning is put second, fewer participants are willing to instead. Subjects in both treatments, indeed, respond operate on the switch than when it is put first, similarly to the emotional stranger scenario. but the responses to the stranger scenario remain Whereas in the Standard Treatment 34% of the unaffected. subjects see room for moral compulsion and 94% for If some moral emotions are evolutionarily sound moral acceptability in pulling the lever, the figures and hard wired into our species, we should expect a scale down to 11% and 78%, respectively, for the very large majority of people to follow them so that Reversed Treatment. These differences are espe- we observe a pattern of dominant behaviour con- cially important because they show that there is no sistent with the emotion, while perhaps there will be straightforward way to behave in the lever scenario a display of greater variety of moral outlooks as a and that the responses elicited among the participants Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 797
no yes 100% 11,11% 90% 22,22% 80% 40,74% 51,85% 70% 60% 85,19% 88,89% 92,59% 88,89% 50% 88,89% 40% 77,78% 30% 59,26% 48,15% 20% 10% 11,11% 7,41% 14,81% 11,11% 0% Lever Stranger Lever Stranger Lever Stranger Lever Stranger
obligatory acceptable int. kill 5 int. kill 1
Figure 3. Responses, reversed treatment. are crucially affected by the scenario sequence. On moral violations, thereby including intentionality, the other hand, the stranger scenario is over- more salient and thus more likely to be attributed. whelmingly considered as a situation in which Even if we allow for the possibility that such dif- inaction is morally superior to action. ference only emerges as an ex-post justification, it is One major discrepancy of clear moral conse- not immediately clear what else it would be an quence can be identified between the two scenarios ex-post justification for. that accounts, at least in some measure, for these We now turn to a more fine-grained analysis of observations. The personal moral violation (i.e. heuristics at the individual level, by means of which pushing the stranger) is consistently considered we may point out additional and more specific intentional by a larger percentage of participants than differences. the impersonal violation (i.e. pulling the lever). However, a discrepancy can be spotted here, too. In the Standard Treatment the percentage is lower than Response heuristics in the Reversed Treatment. Subjects in both treat- ments largely consider unintentional the death of Since we don’t ask our subjects to act directly, nor to five by means of not pulling the lever (86% in the state how they would act if they were involved with Standard Treatment and 85% in the Reversed the decision first hand, and because experimental Treatment), but the murdering of the person on the subjects usually suggest a third person to act more side-track is considered intentional by 59% in the frequently than they would, we cannot easily say Reversed Treatment and by just 29% in the Standard who is employing which heuristic – nor if anybody Treatment. Our results, therefore, confirm that the is employing any heuristic at all. We can, however, stranger and the lever scenarios are perceived dif- presume that some patterns of responses point ferently. They further show that the lever scenario decidedly towards the belief in one rule. We thus may be perceived in more than one ways, depending calculate the support for heuristics restrictively: for instance on whether the participants have already namely, we consider the set of responses that can encountered the stranger scenario, while the stranger only result in an application of the heuristic at this scenario is not thus affected by ordering. stage (Table I). The SAVE THE MOST heuristic thus The difference in the attributions of intentionality requires that a subject answers affirmatively to can be regarded as a turning point. Perhaps the question 1 and to question 5 (i.e. she affirms it is emotional activation of the stranger scenario makes morally obligatory to pull the lever and to push the participants more alert to personal moral violations. stranger). For the DO NOT TOUCH heuristic, we It makes, as it were, the three features of personal require that a subject answers no to question 2 and to 798 Alessandro Lanteri et al.
TABLE I TABLE II Restrictive heuristics, by treatment Extended heuristics, by treatment
St Treat Rev Treat Total St Treat Rev Treat Total
SAVE THE MOST –– – SAVE THE MOST 15 (43%) 11 (40%) 26 (42%) DO NOT TOUCH – 4 (15%) 4 (6%) DO NOT TOUCH 23 (65%) 23 (85%) 46 (74%) ME HURT YOU 7 (20%) 1 (3%) 8 (13%) ME HURT YOU 32 (91%) 20 (74%) 52 (84%) N 35 27 62 N 35 27 62 question 6 (i.e. she states it is morally unacceptable stranger). The extensive DO NOT TOUCH heuristic both to pull the lever and to push the stranger). We requires that a subject answers no to question 1 and consider as instances of the ME HURT YOU heuristic question 5 (i.e. she states it is not morally compul- those in which a subject answers yes to question 1 sory to pull the lever nor to push the stranger). and no to question 6 (i.e. she declares that it is Finally, we consider extensive ME HURT YOU morally obligatory to pull the lever but morally heuristics those in which a subject answers yes to unacceptable to push the stranger). question 2 and no to question 5 (i.e. she declares that We also check for consistency, by means of the it is morally acceptable to pull the lever and not answers given to questions 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10. For morally compulsory to push the stranger). This test is instance, when a subject holds the SAVE THE MOST much less demanding, because some responses are heuristic, he should either believe that pushing the obviously compatible with more than one heuristic, stranger and pulling the lever do not amount to an and in fact a rather common pattern of responses intentional murder (q3, q4, q7, q8); or, if he does allows for both types of intervention – push the believe that the killing is intentional, he should at stranger and pull the lever – but does not consider least believe that the intentional killing of someone is either as obligatory, and is thus compatible with all not morally worse than letting someone die (q9, of the three heuristics under consideration. q10). Lacking these conditions amounts to some While roughly 40% of the participants give answers kind of inconsistency. A similar consistency-check compatible with the SAVE THE MOST heuristic, we was conducted on the other heuristics as well. again observe a difference between the treatments for The first observation is that nobody restrictively the other heuristics. The subjects in the Standard supports the SAVE THE MOST rule and, though there Treatment are more inclined to allow the ME HURT are indications that some participants never approve YOU heuristic (91%) than the DO NOT TOUCH one of altering the path of the trolley (DO NOT TOUCH), (65%), but the results are twisted in the Reversed most of them intervene selectively (ME HURT YOU). Treatment, with 85% participants who seem accep- However, these are not evenly distributed, and in tant of the DO NOT TOUCH heuristic and only 74% fact are strongly clustered between the two treat- who agree to the ME HURT YOU one. Even the ME ments. The ME HURT YOU heuristic is more com- HURT YOU heuristic, therefore, which has been mon in the Standard Treatment, with 7 instances.8 proposed as a plausible account of how people face In the Reversed Treatment, on the other hand, there moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem may not is but one subject supporting the ME HURT YOU be unavoidably the rule preferred by the most heuristic, and four supporting the DO NOT TOUCH participants (see also Chelini et al., 2007). heuristic. We now allow for an extended definition of heuristics, as the set of responses that are merely Moral opinions and consistency compatible with an application of each heuristic (Table II). For the extensive SAVE THE MOST heu- If scenario ordering affects the responses in terms ristic we require that a subject answers affirmatively of attributed intentionality and of required and to question 2 and to question 6 (i.e. she affirms it is accepted conducts, does it also influence more morally acceptable to pull the lever and to push the general moral and legal opinions? Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 799
no yes 100% 14,29% 11,11% 3,33% 8,33% 90% 20,00% 25,71% 25,93% 23,08% 80% 70% 60% 50% 96,67% 91,67% 85,71% 88,89% 40% 80,00% 74,29% 74,07% 76,92% 30% 20% 10% 0% St. Tr. Rev. Tr. St. Tr. Rev. Tr. St. Tr. Rev. Tr. St. Tr. Rev. Tr. Moral Difference (q9) Morally Worse (q10) Legal Difference (q11) Legally Worse (q12)
Figure 4. Opinions, by treatment.
No, this does not seem to be the case. There is a Analysing response patterns at the individual level remarkable uniformity of responses to the questions (Table III), however, does not reveal major differ- (9–12) we employed to verify consistency across and ences. In both treatments, about 55% affirm that within treatments (Figure 4). there exist both moral and legal differences between Given the noticeable differences in the preceding killing someone and letting someone die, with the responses, such homogeneity of moral opinions is former being worse (YES –YES –YES –YES), about quite unexpected. How does it come about? 20% declare that the difference is only legal (NO – Perhaps the earlier questions were formulated in YES –YES), and a further 15% suggest that the moral such a way that there were several different ways to difference does not make the intentional kill worse respond, even for participants who held a common than the alternative (YES –NO –ANY). moral outlook. This would be the case if those We do not know, however, whether the partic- answers did not differ significantly – but they do ipants in our experiment had developed their moral – therefore we do not find this explanation persua- and juridical opinions before answering questions sive. It is also possible that the ordering effect plays 1–8. Perhaps the elicitation procedure is such that, out in a morally meaningful way that is clear to our when asked questions 9–12, almost everyone students but eludes us, and we can only suspend our judgement on this possibility. Finally, it has been TABLE III suggested, both in connection with individual pref- Patterns of opinions, by treatment erences in general (Licthenstein and Slovic, 2006) and specifically with moral judgements (Haidt, Questions 9, 10, 11, 12 St Treat (%) Rev Treat (%) 2001), that preferences and opinions are constructed in the process of elicitation. This account seems to YES –YES –YES –YES 54.29 55.56 suggest that, perhaps participants are quite clear YES –YES –YES –No – – about their opinions, in an abstract sense, but when YES –YES –NO 2.86 3.70 it comes to a specific application, their responses YES –NO –YES –YES 11.43 3.70 need not follow from those opinions and may YES –NO –YES –NO 2.86 7.41 instead be intuitively uttered or otherwise altered by YES –NO –NO 2.86 3.70 NO –YES –YES 17.14 22.22 emotional activation. Conversely, it may also mean NO –YES –NO –– that participants elaborate their moral opinions in a NO –NO 8.57 3.70 way that is at least in part disconnected from TOTAL 100.00 100.00 previous responses. 800 Alessandro Lanteri et al.
100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 90,00% 83,33% 80,00% 70,00%
60,00% 51,43% 53,33% 47,37% 50,00% 45,16% 37,04% 40,00% 27,42% 30,00% 16,67% 20,00% 9,68% 10,00% 3,23% 4,84% 0,00% 0,00% St. Tr. Rev. Tr. Total Weight YES-YES-YES-YES YES-YES-NO NO-YES-YES NO-NO Tot.
Figure 5. Inconsistent opinions, by treatment. constructs the same preferences. If such is the case, is allowed or obliged to do, account for almost 30% however, the participants may now give answers that of all the answers. About 10% of all answers are contradict answers previously given to the two inconsistent with the opinions that the difference is scenarios. only juridical and not moral. More generally, it is And they do. Figure 5 reports the relative fre- remarkable that 45% of all subjects are inconsistent in quencies of four response patterns in which incon- one way or another. sistencies were observed, as well as their weight on the total number of observations. How can one be inconsistent? First, we consider Concluding remarks inconsistent suggestions that not pulling the lever and not pushing the stranger differ in terms of Should a carmaker introduce a safety system to intentionality. Either one is intentionally killing five guarantee additional protection to pregnant ladies in people when one does nothing or not. However, it the passenger seat in the event of a side crash or cannot be plausibly argued that the intentionality of should it modify the windshield so that it better some deaths resulting from inaction depends on the protects both the driver and the passenger involved alternatives to inaction.9 We also count as inconsis- in any accidents? In addition, should it recruit low- tency any combination of responses implying that it income people to drive the cars into potentially is ok to do something bad or that it is obligatory to harmful, voluntary accidents in order to test its choose an option not different from the alternative. innovations? Should the R&D department of a large For instance, for the YES –YES –ANY patterns, in pharmaceutical company develop a new drug to which intentionality makes a death morally worse, cure a relatively minor disease killing a few patients we consider inconsistent the responses suggesting every year and for which there exists no therapy, or that pulling the lever amounts to an intentional should it invest in a (or yet another) new drug to murder and yet it is admissible, unless not pulling the reduce the risk of heart failure in a much larger lever is also considered an intentional kill. For the number of patients? Also, should it be entitled to NO –ANY patterns, conversely, we define incon- endangering some people’s or animals’ lives when sistent any suggestion that an act is morally obliga- testing the new drug? In the presence of limited tory. How could this be the case, if it does not differ resources and uncertain returns to investments these from abstention in a moral sense? are clearly financial/economic decisions. However, Opinions that there are moral and legal differ- they are quite obviously also moral ones. On the one ences between intentionally killing someone and hand, they concern the allocation of scarce resources unintentionally letting someone die, but which are towards competing ends with different social costs inconsistent with previous responses about what one and benefits, which may not be easily traded-off Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 801 against each other and which may have differing Indeed the experiment we discussed does not degrees of risk and uncertainty. On the other hand, make a compelling case for normativity: while many they concern the commission of a moral violation in subjects tolerate the pull the switch option, it is not order to maximise aggregate welfare, and bear evident that they consider it a moral dogma. Con- consequences on questions such as whether know- versely, virtually all participants do not consider ingly letting the few die in the attempt to save the pushing the overweight stranger as a moral obliga- many is morally admissible or whether deliberately tion, but quite a number consider it acceptable in killing the few in order to save the many is accept- spite of the acknowledgement that it amounts to an able. In this article, we are concerned with the latter intentional murder (perhaps some of them believe it kind only. admissible, under some circumstances, to deliber- We elaborate on the notion that humans employ ately kill someone). Even if our results pointed more different modalities of decision-making both along evidently towards normative conclusions, we would the cognitive/affective and along the controlled/ still feel entitled to questioning the ethical authority automatic axes (Camerer et al., 2005). We also of first year Law students. With due caveats of which believe that these are often influenced by moral we are aware, we therefore propose this research as considerations, either in their emotional or reasoned an essay in positive cognitive-moral theory: our versions. Our experimental study of the trolley results uncover some novel and interesting facts problem allows us to explore some of the effects of about human decision-making in morally loaded moral cognitions and emotions on decision making, contexts. as well as some effects of their interplay. Specifically, Human capacity for moral conduct might stem our results substantiate the main finding that previ- not so much from some reasoned principle, but from ously aroused emotions affect moral reasoning, but our biological profile. Human criteria for moral the vice versa does not hold. As in the real world assessment might thus derive precisely from that people cannot choose in what order they face (and capacity, instead of from some higher value handed thus learn how to react to) ethically delicate situa- down to lay people by means of moral theories. As tions, we believe it important to explore the scope shown in many experimental researches (including and relevance of moral heuristics in a broad sense. ours above), we are capable of quickly answering What we consider as a common weakness in the moral questions although we might ignore exactly discussions of the trolley problem we came across in why. Afterwards we can reason about the situation the literature is their lacking of hard data. To be sure, and try to make up a story that justifies our intuitive it is possible to speculate on alternative setups of the answer. Such justification, if successful, is likely to dilemma in the fashion of a thought experiment, or become some sort of rule that we keep following, to gather circumstantial evidence in class and at reinforcing through time our conviction that we are seminars. Yet, the systematic and rigorous testing on doing the right thing. The doctrine of double effect substantial numbers of subjects allows much sounder might be interpreted like such justification. On the (and richer) analyses. By means of this article, we other hand, the general moral opinions we entertain also wish to contribute a set of observations that may may be inconsistent with our moral judgements and be taken as a reference for those interested in the the justifications we assemble for them, perhaps attempt. because they, too, are intuitively generated. The results of the trolley experiment presented Humans probably have a set of hard-wired moral above are consistent with previous suggestions that, emotions immediately triggered by some features in when damage follows, indirect agency is often a choice situation – for instance, among others, considered admissible while direct agency is not personal-moral features. These do not seem to be (Greene and Haidt, 2002). The data also confirm the susceptible to ordering effects. The more reflective broad acceptance of the ME HURT YOU heuristic set of cognitive tools that we employ for impersonal- and allows for alternative heuristics, which we moral (and non-moral) choices, on the other hand, labelled SAVE THE MOST and DO NOT TOUCH. Our can be ‘disturbed’ by previously activated emotions. goal, however, is not to proclaim any of these as Though this is the most plausible explanation we can morally sound procedure, nor as desirable ones. conjure to account for our data, at the present stage 802 Alessandro Lanteri et al. we can only advance it as a speculation and as a participants’ response see Alspach and Bishop (1991), proposal for further testing for our colleagues in the Benton and Daly (1991), Crespi and Morris (1984), neurosciences. We therefore wish to add to the McFarland (1981), and Willits and Ke (1995). 8 difficulty of answering the questions such as those Two out of 7 ME HURT YOU restrictive-heuristics about the automobile and the pharmaceutical com- are inconsistent because the subjects later claim that panies by emphasising that the way in which ques- there are no moral differences between intentionally murdering someone and letting someone die, so that it tions are framed is likely to bear direct consequences seems somewhat arbitrary to suggest it is morally com- on the nature of answers. When arguing in favour or pulsory to pull the lever, but morally unacceptable to against either response and before dismissing the push the stranger – the first not being an intentional counterpart’s outlook on the matter, therefore, one murder and the second being intentional. may want to stop and ponder about the modality 9 Four participants in the Standard Treatment and 1 in through which she has come to an answer. the Reversed Treatment show this inconsistency. These inconsistencies are associated with at least another inconsistency so that whether we count them or not does not alter the data in Figure 5. Notes
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