On the Periphery of Global Jihad the North Caucasus: the Illusion of Stabilisation

ON THE PERIPHERY OF GLOBAL JIHAD THE NORTH CAUCASUS: THE ILLUSION OF STABILISATION

Maciej Falkowski NUMBER 45 WARSAW NOVEMber 2014

ON THE PERIPHERY OF GLOBAL JIHAD THE NORTH CAUCASUS: THE ILLUSION OF STABILISATION

Maciej Falkowski © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editors Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak, Krzysztof Strachota

Editor Anna Łabuszewska

Co-operation Halina Kowalczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska

Translation Ilona Duchnowicz

Co-operation Timothy Harrell

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP GroupMedia

Photograph on cover Shutterstock

MAPS Wojciech Mańkowski

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-54-0 Contents

Theses /5

I. No news feed or genuine stabilisation? /8

II. The globalisation of Caucasian jihad /13

III. The crisis in Caucasus Emirate /21

IV. The effects of Chechenisation and the ‘carrot and stick’ tactic /24

V. The illusory stabilisation /27 • • • Theses years, Caucasus. North the in republics most peaceful nya, this death accounts on over Caucasus placed Since organise cies a Very The casus The tion lamic served wars seen camp ness been worldwide). newspapers in headlines December tants the transformation Chechen) rule, the Middle intensity carrying conflict in main which the in and few diluted (the the military and is count, to news is the the for with the clearly past reports themselves especially on has Syria, idea have the the military First active region 1994, reasons two-decades-long was East almost clashes is jihad, which ideologically few been and out Syrian related of underground becoming decreasing. been the Chechen include and where and Chechen on side months. raids include frequency marginalised the every main for military groups is symptomatic. and into the a and published is organisational falling mass military the on constituted a hundreds-strong numerous North any less source War Iraqi day, ideological redirection nationalism Compared the in Its partial have incidents of influx known global large-scale history every intense. a nature broke mujahideen, fronts. the situation Caucasus in struggle of since been At conflict instability Russian victims of stabilisation year, by jihad, as to out crisis changes of present, has of The and former The and the law top formed. preceding the Caucasian military like twenty is in changed, started direct attacks has Caucasian situation ‘Caucasus in separatism priority enforcement observed modern in further who and the this the in in and the lost it Furthermore, Caucasus the the are effects global Russian years of is has activity. years, in region making active its recruits as one is Caucasian proof the region militants’ in the unable in Emirate’. not unique well. now (mainly was Chech ago, the of media North of situa when agen were mili been Cau that this The has the the re re for Is As in to to ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 6 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 • 1 • The Caucasus’. North the in Sufism tion situation guarantees genuine later on Chechenisation a The The the tity degradation posed ries, the security ated important the regard the situation conflict. and Moscow through sequence duced 2011-2013. in Ingushetia and Dagestan in mainly Salafis, Sochi great notions Chechen militants’ Caucasus low armed the and stabilisation calmer of from etc.). his Olympics, to some political extent other devastating level

economic Islamic with son, in Sufism, adopting in of using the of 1 Furthermore, . Islamic Salafism the Chechnya. of of Other nationalism situation repercussions. the destabilising of Emirate Ramzan, residents an aggressive regard Chechen high Caucasus moves policy, esteem any while fundamentalism illusion, unprecedented is which reasons reconstruction and a underground also subsidies consequences means milder to recently the include Sufism (winning The as were guerrilla of for the to Salafis and Salafi the being through part the long-term factors for ‘carrot a the The possible. Caucasian are great given Sufism policy partial Caucasus, the the in of observed new ideology a explained believe over short-term forces result repression which exchange and (Wahhabism) and organisational of lack (ethnic the extent of internal emir, with effects as the stabilisation the militants), The at stick’ prism of the republics and of for Akhmad to in the has republic in long-lasting experienced the a regard conflicts, Aliaskhab successful the ideological be have whom stabilisation result the for tactic independence effects used same made tendency of frame heresy, stabilising Caucasus have the been bloody has crisis Kadyrov and to employed ethnic prior of time is them ‘Salafism clan are activity peaceable Moscow’s unstable, led Kebekov, also achieved compila military building base are leaders,

to within terror, to a to of alien to rival iden view is con pro still dis and and the op the the the and by to of ------

• result Kadyrov’s Putin. PresidentVladimir and him tween a by eral the situation An into favourable a price dations this temic publics speed. increasing with terms civilisational in Russia chronic ing were idea In reactivation contingent the Russia. economic problems process because existence reduction of held the short change. in the from for instability unfreezing in before Kremlin dictatorial Furthermore, (from Caucasus term, which the of it the outcome remain or of The (for integration is is Russian political the federal not the the a possible, example, are situation is reduction and Sochi based idea Russian unresolved; the Emirate, paying rule of being cause Federation budget the crisis conflicts the of Olympics), of on and given Chechen unprecedented has situation laid Crimea for stability of point the social which in could the subsidies stabilised peace now and Caucasus the the in and of unwritten consensus following give independence, while the these is Russian view) rather deteriorating by in in the a Chechnya Caucasus, Kadyrov to part rise Chechnya), because significant problems the to special factors the the drift to Federation of but agreement region’s its Caucasian conflicts; result global annexation on (this short-term operations away have is including economic the generate Ramzan and ephem costs press of jihad. is foun come from may sys and re the the be of ------

7 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 8 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 the The I. 2 dia son what this nated of other age ous Security waned. naturally has Caucasus the in dent, interest ridden dia partly tivities fails situation Chechen dia, Western him. who supports – festations casian lentless ised Non-Russian now Russian sian North nalistic why is were region of foreign Caucasus has is No n crime, to regions. is the by the the be Islamic done terrorist’ take Caucasian happening of Caucasus. news rivalry also separatism): journalists’ in speculating the standards, is fact viewed enemy enemy, of the propaganda, is ews feed or geews feed journalists abuse stable. the into in been no instability militants recent from Since that has media Islamic response between region longer They account or is as which ‘calmed transformed. of republics the in and This the the the the a have developments authority use Ukraine) disinterest are about if ‘Sochi most Russian hitting military Caucasus visited is ‘Banderite’ which Olympics the ‘immigrant picture Russian (ethnic an is no to the the evaluated down’ of constantly exception. rebels market independent the effect’. the posed clans, significantly is the Dagestan, and, information media by information threat underground conflicts, is The n now is over in were are headlines the u false and given in to on conflicts Before the demand through But depriving in enemy reports. focused not recent Ukraine. the present law the the not the sources e s they to North Kabardino-Balkaria less active, conflicts Olympics, they other a less ‘American disturbed enforcement proximity the t Internet do space 2 is great . months ab (genuine inside attention the on One not no in publish (and of Caucasus spectacular Olympics, Russians On hand, Ukraine. i it the information prism adhere longer l has extent, important means portals i the over Islam, previously sa Russian – by and is imperialist’ of been this news interest in propaganda. one ti to of any agencies, the the land, of can the of that the The any numer since o the organ is mani Cauca domi work’ hand, n in inci ‘Cau from war- me part jour rea also me me and im ? the ac re the in of it ------they to individual be In fortune-tellers thermore, gymen, ranking killings nessmen law whether spectacular ran However, corruption. and on nepotism based whose is authority lin, not 3 etc.), also not military peace Federation Furthermore, uinely only initiated are by For addition accept militants them). sian-caucasus-winter-olympics-amid-a-local-war www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-01-27/no-change-rus Caucasus. functioning. short merely in enforcement changing. the are which more and 2004 dying of attacks state strength only official a by has of paid the Therefore, representatives given militants’ order on politicians but a to The recruits, the military themselves, or product officials, down encouraged these are impression able this, the protection winter Nalchik is Whereas and on rebels Russian This action results agencies more nonetheless and issues to Caucasus shops a in extorting new it operate success Olympics money actions region of leaders the hire the is are has like in see: the from who, several statistics of often selling criminal custom of against rule Caucasus, 2005) less to or partial Wojciech really aforementioned law a is and is on in (for amid act of for Russian form subsidies money less of difficult and important unstable imposing enforcement Sufi a alcohol and public years example, local in has example, much a the been but stabilisation an groups local less Górecki, their a fraternities proofs terrorist been integral similar from militants clans also colony, ago to carried support. war’, frequent. smaller from and because own state the and openly destabilising observed the ‘No information the entrepreneurs). of backed OSW Studies OSW factors. brothels, agencies the ‘jihad way part where attacks, militant change which representatives beyond guerrillas offensive in out or scale and Military admit Their federal the its of (forcing pretending by by tax’ in Jihad official in the the economy include Caucasus (individual and murdering , the the at any 2013; the Dagestan: squads nature that provided on factors Russian on relative present budget, actions plotted lower- rebels. is Russian Krem doubt http:// them cler busi Naz they Fur gen not to to of is is is 3 ------.

9 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 10 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 Russian Three ity, statistics and Another operations. special that a ble dency be of by which Knot sian Sochi number Buynaksk ogy The from in launched which feuds. or family or, clan rebels forIslamic mafia, example, in stage ‘contract’ attacks also Militants help 4 without toll In total the the Volgograd, which clans. criminal and ethnic so the no. attacks, of used complete military most them contrast the by Olympics Caucasus years the seen of statistics includes 1), Memorial in law is discriminating all 750 proof leaders by showing over a of military inherent in fight 2013. since downward murders appearances) is Knot Caucasian later, to people enforcement the Dagestan), statistics underground’s which the Chechnya, of the would Emirate, specialises against It all of clashes the partial organisation. the also past in the the conflict were fact deaths the committed beginning were death death Caucasus be needs few trend are brutal Dagestanian that their the whether are stabilisation killed Dokka prevented the agencies resulting probably provided years in is toll inability no not toll to has rivalry quite death potential overestimated. political Caucasian as be major was of Umarov by As Emirate initiated of (one been these a emphasised this policy law the who consequence schematic, regards between toll issued around by staged from 4 to in exception . terrorist observed and year conflict. enforcement the came is fulfil decimate this is the (2006–2013), but issues by characterised shooting, lessening, by business Russian individual not continues 30% the Caucasus by year the the The from the and that attacks a and The upon being death of lower. since local militants threats will previous them portal military thus the conflicts is portal most agencies, attacks, competitors. politicians and evidence instruction group by supervised the is (and be 2011, count methodol have If as the from pluralism, includes that half the reliable the attacks part Cauca but leader it activ death when from been with etc., ten (Ta will fact etc. the the the and by of of - - - - - which that (378 lics, of (2010-2014) 1. Table severity As killed the A lics, Table 2. Table of experience. lack and weakness militants’ the and death bility cies around Civilians Militants agencies ment enforce Law toll Death Year Year clear militants regards fist and Dagestan victims with this toll of in is half Caucasus North the in conflict of Thetoll the death downward broken by categories toll down Death one of the – is among

evidence 2010, a what the the the population - of million killed situation in is 2014) situation law yet 2010 most the is the 2010 2010 749 349 225 especially 175 of enforcement only has trend unquestionable representatives can people and populous the – remained of in civilians. also 19 341 2011 2011 success 384 190 (from 176 750 around each in live in be important the of 2013). of seen in 225 agencies, 2012 209 404 the 2012 of 87 at the 700 first three As Chechnya, leader of victims antiterrorist more in However, Northern many Northern the half the when million 2013 298 104 127 2013 who law or in 529 statistics as of in instability less around enforcement evaluating 2014. 349 take it 2010 Caucasian Caucasian (for of 2014 half first should of 2014 half first the operations, civilians no to The comparison, showing same 400,000 141 19 21 prisoners, 181 only rankings be number the repub repub agen noted level, were 21 sta the the in in - - - - 11 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 12 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 more, Ingushetia restless killed have Table 3. Table timeframe). same the (from within 134 36 to Ingushetia in in militants. Ingushetia Chechnya Kabardino-Balkaria Ossetia Northern Dagestan Stavropol Krai Karachay-Cherkessia Year Chechnya been a in by republics toll Death significant Dagestan battles In and

commonplace turn, (the around between death (attacks, the proportion most 850,000 toll there the political fell 2010 noticeable 378 127 134 24 79 10 2 law of in from since the Kabardino-Balkaria). enforcement murders, 127 2013 victims 341 92 36 39 13 stabilisation the 3 5 in early 2010 criminal in of 2014 half first to agencies the 1990s) 39 has traditionally 120 in 25 18 12 0 0 9 feuds, been Further were 2013) and seen and etc. not the - ited casus most tary of victory global for but the rather Caucasus, the in state Islamic an ‘Caucasian the essential lamic is 5 One II. 6 thus not sumed in and and their cles the sus casian Caucasus Chechen For One the jihad, the 2014. July in (ISIS) Levant the and Iraq Chechen between inside sion between-a-caucasian-jihad-and-hidden-separatism http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2007-01-15/chechnya- and Caucasus’ main Emirate of in leaders by or jihad The global underground fighting important enormous (with world ideological, more Islamic which the was example Middle operational into recordings Muslims. Caucasus whose separatism element goal Emirate, being a reasons seen separatism on Caucasian Islamic global of of (see strong but characterises not the the of radicals’ could after the East) aim interest notion Emirate fought the even the jihadist process Consequently, so of local identity jihad. for and the which who be ones), solidarity militants’. 6 is 5 jihad its to militants’ much . frame

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13 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 14 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 a movement. jihadist global of the an the ating by stricto ficult down unit an derground with by courts a According jihad. pan-Caucasian to tism the structure Circassia khan known Chechen Caucasus Kavkaz is lamic Dagestan, ChRI and The EmirateCaucasus transformation logical

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------15 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 16 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 world. Muslim the in jihad back which circles the from support of formed also It E Middle the in militants Caucasian casian sian isi Chechen Initially, extent by member estimates, over cruits. number proclaimed structures to ropean mass tion Gorge A etc.). –Istanbul, Grozny–Istanbul, Turkey sus means It given the phenomenon is is leave mean Gorge Chechen via estimated students Caucasian of estimated the influx the by in origin – Turkey The the ‘Chechen’), and and Europe of past in Georgia that those refugees Caucasian states) in existence between recruits commander, (one Iraq. influx Caliph Georgia) Turkish to numerous refugees few attending the (the has that who Syria that front that as of – Most (only Caucasus months Mineralnye living increased North of a the has both between Ibrahim joined arriving 150,000 would of result as émigrés of and secret ‘European’ may living key a of several many become ethnic direct Islamic visa-free Omar in experienced Caucasus, them the since jihadist be of require commanders Turkey. Emirate services. and alias 1,000 (logistically, in in closer are priority as active Chechens thousand Vody–Istanbul, airline al-Shishani Syria are they stronger schools Europe 200 volunteers 250,000 active. Abu-Bakr regime troops and a Dagestanis Another co-operation Azerbaijan may separate in now directly of In granted militants ast connections, 3,000 Syria in them (according turn, and Chechens The within living not in this Chechens find between the ( Syria shishani shishani has wave al-Baghdadi), militants aides count and peripheral discussion is from Middle have it to Makhachkala– since and and in not more been Islamic and Syria between were – was the Russia of live the a to on Chechens. arrived to live the including in the problem, East the new reduced difficult Pankisi various a formed financial of Cauca Cauca and Arabic there). Pank lesser in is nature State posi Cau self- and and Eu the the re EU Iraq in ------en • are: East Middle the in ing The young people there. in small itants Syria. • youth • In • Aleppo. near mainly Syria, in dependent the and the Khattab; Basayev and side Shamil led Ahad Ahadun Jamaat as known teamed Chechen an in al-Shishani originates known ers ly, known) a not is known); name real Karachay, his nic addition conceptions War, group most conflict the independent by ( group under who community groupings The Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar are as Muslim group by important up led which gureilla well were groups numerous led to his of the from with with (born by those Tarkhan of by as was nom influence hiding Salahuddin which Valid formally identity, the vast Pankisi led commanders in the group an Tarkhan mentioned named elements de the by Omar participation ethnic mujahideen unemployment al-Shishani in guerre Gaziyev report Chechens jihad named the of and reports above Army al-Shishani’s refugees al-Shishani Batirashvili;). gorge of Chechen who Abu – probably to above, – ); which Caucasian Lions until all Islamic of to are fought from (Murad Jihad during ); of Islamisation Emigrants Caucasus from at representatives a engaged and is recently, of from present, few allied (his other stems al-Shishani group; Syria in State Chechnya frustration the and Margoshvili) mujahideen more Chechnya real Georgia, to Second Emirate countries, in a from one (former ( and the until commander after Jundu Sham name the of smaller of latter Support the and (an changes fighting the recent Chech having among of along and Omar is fight ISIS) local eth who mil two. this it un key in is is ------)

17 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 18 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 of more Caucasian these underground The (with from Ingush popularity deeply of even from jahideen, by Jihad by is in the 2011–2013. Salafi late views, propaganda developing where temporary ian, not anti-terrorist facto relatives, informants, the one the Chechnya, the the peaceful into count ‘globalisation’ Salafism Islamic, the become has population) the the important communities ideas region of unlike previous Islamisation rooted government etc. their Salafi the also exception and residents This Caucasus. on and loosening Muslims, among but among which is trend semi-independent key the still the support operations, support where has above in from lost point not happened Chechen, is leader Dagestan, to dominant Chechen elements do perceive gained momentum also within of convincing young has young of them. the identify of of of of all, not Sufism Furthermore, of and Caucasian for from Salafis, their view the of become the supported the local their accept in Ingush, jihad. Dagestan, strength. is not people Caucasian, people fighters Even socio-political themselves Chechnya of connection republic. ideology repression also the is villages (mainly with – sharp Caucasian the heresy. who to in the unlike commonplace Partly Chechen general having jihad though thus most the Avar, in Chechen the during and religious account The Magomedsalam the criticism in the and the Thus, Caucasus and This and does this has the Muslim against with of as sometimes Dagestan), etc. its increasing public, Caucasian Salafi republic. Qadiriyya communities. Caucasus people the in the Chechen/Dagestanian/ life militants Ingushetia, alienated is has impact not national for the identity the radicalism particular a First as residents of is consequence peaceful a necessarily just ideas world, alienated dialogue fundamentalists’ apart a special Sufism, not who consequence The (militants most Chechen even (Salafism a popularity brotherhood) communities – is Magomedov, identity the only few are as share from and activity their still of Dagestan of Although meaning Salafis residents Muslims initiated which imposed military because the gaining percent rapidly this which trans much of War). their their local may mu and has the of de de in of of is - - -

recently, grouping practice Muslims post-Soviet the in area). have gion). Central Sunna) between in moderate for means the on It alafism Salafism and S Salafism spirit It tures ical In ample, terrorist. in ously as but ment mainly terrorism). Russia, wearing fact various is focuses the the the refrained as agenda. Although a (and which Asia and – of that grassroots and historic post-Soviet their armed Quran Salafis while of identified in has trend ‘pure’ its this – political has Dagestan). on and the ‘Salafi’ the Sufi an aim been had faith However, the from it and has no and it organisation Northern grouping (organised among Islam, school Islamic ufism in the North Caucasus the North in ufism has Islam has laid is uniform, movement almost need beards, (the gained with the terrorist and area, to joining for been the Since rebuild i.e. Russian of operation classical Salafis (represented social for religious Wahhabism, years foundations Hizb Salafism Caucasus Quranic absent strength based recognised etc. into religious consistent the it has movements – activities, ut-Tahrir has the been has are Muslims it the militants. genuinely tradition solely from needs of movement become Islamic law is allowed stopped), Association among (it Salafi very frequently and for by which as is and the and and no has (mainly both a modern de facto the drawing active, moral ( Another terrorist mosques, Dagestanian stuck North caliphate possible binding sunnah organisation the uncompromisingly to become some is Spiritual of legal become understood political of global to in revival – for a Saudi Caucasus

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Volga errone Salafis hadith nature. Arabia, principle Board Salafis for peaceful that move Islam, in struc could ex the not Ahlu until This Re of the ). - - - - - in to of

is - 19 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 20 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 trend In ‘traditional’ manifested Salafis, struggle. and In the part armed Thus of God). indivisibility and unity sheikhs, Sufism Emirate. Caucasus of the banner the under fighting militants revival Iocal heretics Sufism sus the gents ing derground Ingushetia brotherhoods ments, fact the the Naqshbandiya jihad, in the radical; took of influences the fighting is Caucasian the 19 their struggle

is which want in government’s – deeply who, th term violate control The fiercely a believing

Soviet the century, Sufi (the mystical through the religious Islam to loyal for moderate against ‘warring were region, rooted measure brotherhoods. fulfil and spiritual and the context, of times example, combating brotherhood). as to that official Sufism combating the the main the trend obligations. their the close Russia in opposed for Salafis’ mainly ideological – peaceful operation the for use Salafis boards state given ‘purifying’ pillar within fundamentalist through Islam was ally this Caucasus, Salafis, of (Imam When can and owing to Salafis, violence the the and being can Islam of of In in Salafis ‘non-traditional’ Islam, of be base Islam supported circumstances Muslims, their turn, driving Dagestan, Shamil be a who the Sufi Islam used to their serious survived and divided gained for (the the USSR do which cult in the brotherhoods. – with is demands attitude monotheism was of Caucasian turn force not operation viewed radical need muftiyats). of by political Chechnya non-canonical into power collapsed, in regard is a take Sufi the see for member the externally – for moderate Salafism. to its warring through there leaders, govern Sufis Islamic part Cauca and armed jihad). insur of to force, is This (the and un Be not the the as as in in of - - - - - activity criminal from these in the of Caucasian ing quences The Dagestan. 7 The III. tity This Gelayev) manders in for chapter), the (it to effective Manifestations crisis ground foreign Revenge small the the the has Kebekov). to dear Magomedov, especially who was Murtazali joining (Aliaskhab being Even among many personal end Chechenisation

seen weakness problems main The c The guerillas which mountains abreks, abreks, Caucasus, continued in of in arrested) contacts local and military the has the (the of over the years the for In reason the jihad, jihad r the members Kebekov), revenge, led case the the rank Chechnya, sort 19th-century operations, the i resulting is the Caucasus s of are been death is to i also (for long-lasting of of Caucasus building Caus in unbroken guerrilla long and of legendary among behind this the and past the policy amateurs Chechen the Aslan of a of personal the whose degradation 7 present terrorist after include result file . death loved the few from the are which vanguard the the (this militants, Maskhadov, their Islamic Caucasian Emirate main warfare years the ones since of c acts solitary closely of leader revenge commanders the bulk and organisational his asus Emi asus acting the topic the actions, capitulation until or motives strength are uncle, evolution underground 1999). in own of increasingly of devastating of shortage of has linked brings was will Chechen often who the the locally warriors, which War. recently the the humiliation Shamil for which This emirate, the recently military be well-known have on joining military difficult ra In and to of initial to discussed of have of or the conflict, the crisis in guerrillas, ideology the t experienced mind died, was Basayev have Imam who less desperados Ali military the political e the (for other experience motivation found been Islamic organisational Abu to Caucasus underground the is frequent Islamic guerrilla emigrated been example, were the distinguish Shamil in along the Muhammad republics, plotted and or centre itself who the leaders. activity conflict limited Ruslan under hiding scholar, conse for com iden seek today. forces with while next and and and had in. his in to of - - - - - 21 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 22 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 been of sors ment probable A operations). antiterrorist during spot on the killed are them lasted Dagestan, Umarov, Syria 9 8 from well-known views fighting from part risma, Nusra, they the ference The attacks). pation suicide in for among kaev The of poisonning. aresult as probably 2013, September in He died serious Kadyrov. its controlled and abroad. representative individual his has also tants example, Middle emir’s who in are should separate unable attacks among the or Chechen more on until an was both both have in in Europe distancing disputes who jihad other were blow organisation who disputes esteem Syria often East The by elected become spring the become the to information Chechen commander the on underground, the had (in has decimated to fill used militants republics. as militants militants or civilian has fact emir. has the between to one focused the (in led between 2014, no than as themselves eroded allied which that suffered Caucasus In Wars the the experience of gap linked the policy Russian turn, targets may are his which over on Aslambek in Chechen case Finally, as new left with Chechens, militants 8 further jihadist . the their the runs also first the part The to be as who (unlike is by of from emir. Emirate groups fact and Caucasus Al-Qaeda, (he part a own evidence www.checheninfo.com, short Chechnya) very speeches their consequence of in Aliaskhab should guerrillas due organisation that clearly of the prohibited Vadalov, special before) combat community. from His who the of long of the to inexperienced emir was new Caucasus Caucasian already (one Kebekov’s be of and Chechen were proves 2006 he supported interregnum, operations have his 9 and the a Kebekov, ) led recruits, and distanced and proof sharply serious of women’s The lobbying successor operating that death and Emirate, by is his taken weak language the the Chechen lacking conciliatory Aslan militants Chechen of inept a had website Chechens Jabhat predeces who criticised disagree militants which of native (most position the himself partici as for Dokka which is and inter taken part Batu there leader have cha more mili side the un al- is, in of of of of ------obedience show to fighters him upon Caucasian called and Syria in jihad the Caucasus) the in struggle the this Syria, for Abu most efforts the cording 10 ISIS and ers ings tion http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQPRYqUszg8#t=413

the Caucasian (including Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar organisation) of the and recording, Muhammad in influential Islamic being to to which second Caucasian the salvage the (in Chechen aware militants’ fact, State militants militants the time. the spiritual his al-Makdisi, mujahideen people Kebekov, sheikh of and position Furthermore, troops the the leaving terminology) from 10 linked fact . leaders thanked caliphate). led like by, was that each who by to to for Umarov become of it published this are Kebekov of the a shortly example, jihad, take statement the Kebekov fighting will portal before, engaged republics their the before weaken for in publishing Kavkazcenter.com have Jordanian in and oath his early from was Syria the in been assistance his ( the vilayats, vilayats, to the opposed August. one proclama as the support military making jihad record sheikh part of emir the ac In in in to of - - - -

23 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 24 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 of ideology the to contesting vious of ful in for veloped Adygea). all policy The IV. 11 observed both been use the ditionally tial by internal for federal 2004, the sponsibility For opponents the lay Chechnya between between-a-caucasian-jihad-and-hidden-separatism http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2007-01-15/chechnya- Chechnya, militants stabilisation republic

federal policy republic government’s of consequences stabilisation ct effe The a consistently parties policy and more down situation in force nd the ‘ budget on (drawing independence, place The the then a adopted peaceful on Salafi an Caucasian law for (bloody in arms of to and (President from Kadyrov stabilisation terms the constitute unprecedented since and the occupation the to combating in enforcement of Chechenisation their in ideas). implemented, carro his auspices, of and Chechnya, upon other the by entrusting North loyal Northern the jihad around of c s of Che terror the son, the broke situation inclusion their the Chechen Vladimir Caucasus. Russian guaranteeing Kadyrov clans, Although an and Caucasus Kadyrovs Ramzan), in the of t unwritten with neutralisation equally 2002 ‘hidden’ families, a the Chechnya Chechnya which scale), agencies), the Ossetia, military policy and nd s using resulting in regard policy egalitarianism, nationalism he has clan government Putin the by The creation separatism’, (without important – offering see: political is ni tic a called and establishing agreement, any troops (to at stable skilful Karachay-Cherkessia underground towards became so-called (which to Maciej sa and relinquishing present k’ t in Akhmad possible or informant militants ti for of genuine the considering methods physical the being financing OSW Point of View of Point OSW and o Falkowski, combination a a reason in replacing was possible dictatorship) the n ctic republic which Grozny the Kadyrovs) Chechenisation Sufi this means a Kadyrov formed region, implemented who stabilisation dictatorship in most activity for liquidation (amnesties Islam, policy exchange power was ‘Chechnya: from owing with genuine the the the refused 11 . peace under above of Since , until have very 2007; par pre tra and and and has the the de re in to ------additionally 12 strong the this part one sequence The republic. the rule, dition mise easing independent The were ready accept to Kadyrov’sgrated, dictatorship. of dialogue Sharia omy a so extent), brotherhoods which tacts countries, economic; eral Kadyrov confederation strongly ‘might survival. nation’s physical Chechen of the opposed erhood, the return hand, price situation high structures), every of and with between need where the report law, the in is of in price, contacts the is Moscow one to Chechen to repression Islamic has Kadyrov year: such forming to Russian de-Russified two adats right’; Dagestan) Imam end deprived Kunta-haji state the 12 the has used to can the ), being model. paradoxically the as the Chechen Kadyrov , and situation exercise Shamil, become i.e. feel countries). teyps as between is is Russian war Ukraine, Federation. in society, republic has the paying being maintains used Chechen aware of brotherhood, the fact and Chechnya and

(families) and his their religious propagated society, long-term are calmer reach seen against of its formed the legislation Moscow unofficial Islamised and of for Turkey is power most In mutually only own the governed customary a militants in However, the base civilisational limited compromise violated is whose in exhausted the peaceful and fact in active in gaining formally armed stabilisation must consequences the and the and the 1990s Chechnya representatives that the that is founder, excluding strongest second foreign other by Grozny France; in members, who Moscow the be laws, virds virds forces it Salafis with the its more and use is affiliated by based centuries-long terms, half own republics had difficult Kunta-haji only Russians and (branches destabilisation the Chechen only contacts under is resemble and developing (the of factors. (the is of decided rules high. who on long alternative the the ready the Chechnya more to formations in to Sufi-Salafi a to Kadyrov’s 19 for Sufi a principle Kishiev, as had (a policy compro war A th selected the (mainly see limited

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25 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 26 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 estan bek 2013/early are began huge(hence the ranks). losses among their who much responsibility to Russian of down Kadyrov’s militants terrorist massive cial former the Yevkurov) the operations have and more arms to fact law outcomes bombardments operation be and no

Ingushetia), militants troops 2014 that, effective (the enforcement used combat their implemented for as and promising

as ( part on de facto formed facto de of combating supporters in (in part made experience than a the Chechnya of where, smaller the of the agencies of brutal the by the results case the in preparations the federal in the 2011–2013. across militants’ scale predominate of Chechenisation pacifications addition has president by physically guerrillas Chechnya) of former in the forces. been the the efforts On hiding Caucasus to for successful of other all Similar militants), the liquidated among has the Ingushetia, air carried this, for other policy, places. Sochi forces been republics as rehabilitation young methods the mainly hand, part out which Olympics. placed dozens the militants launched The Yunus- of in people these (Dag main anti spe also late due are on of - - -

sia 13 Although V. It government’s in The integration The instability. chronic pressing not for has intensive, sian future, from to tus called (for in problems, more, ing popularity, nationalists) Russian above all (including circles political wider For is

this 1917 the op. cit. op. Górecki, Wojciech alien-civilisation; osw-studies/2010-04-14/tribal-areas-caucasus-north-caucasus-enclave- eration’, North this itself. the only of resulted main example, Caucasus’s not The i The Federation, the more the a up or state process. Caucasus region will separate an Caucasus been political, 1991). to OSW Point of View of Point OSW the rest A problem policy peace which see: end and llusory s llusory with the serious administration; be from clashes unsuccessful a of attempts Maciej are Another stability The limited what product Russian equivalent – in of from the the federal which may an social a discriminated Moscow the Chechenisation slogan economic change enclave rest Falkowski, in country used Russia, explode region the number factor of army at and cannot is district t of ,

to 2010; a ab closely ‘stop of Caucasus but counteracting has to Russia; in lasting economic be the ‘alien is is between is and/or which i ‘The an the

with they failed l being a http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ of feeding be illusory constantly in i Caucasus against marginal sa ‘unfreezing’ civilisation’ linked Caucasian ‘Tribal situation and its 2010) ruled solution have new have adds on ti propagated to political civilisational problems, 2001 isolation resolve the and Areas’ as also proves to strength become out to de-Russification idea, was regards deepening. Caucasus’ the and and within to the precarious, recruits in in crisis of of the is granted stability namely fact risk 2014; that of not which the by the the the noticeably the (as region’s the employment increasingly distinctness Caucasus. contributed the in of the immediate Russian Caucasus’s emigrants have Caucasian is happened Caucasus a Further generate the separat the system. gaining since serious of federal most been have Rus Rus sta less Fed The 13 it ------. 27 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 28 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 to bility the local as The of Caucasus North confirmed the velop destabilisation 14 comes sequence tion costs since Emirate General laying in the The Somalia). and rently, the (as sent are government’s stabilisation http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/245652/. the a the the supervision. of financial charge in body aparliamentary is Federation Russian

with useful slogans fact developments heading Ukrainian situation situation ‘unfreezing’ of budgets, of the Caucasus this may Western Caucasian from the when the the that Dzhokhar the idea struggle of instrument way foundations also that annexation of idea the to an the Islamic in chaos in in may are social point and Syria have in crisis. be and internal the 14 Kremlin the it the Accounts of . republics, decreased. the

of in disturbed, is to also Russian Dudayev comes Caucasus Chechen Caucasus may Middle of justice

been fundamentalists the necessary the and Caucasus build in These view for of gain

Middle attract crisis, Russian loosening Caucasian Iraq expressed Crimea Chamber and this in a sanctions East which (local did Concerns new concerns single independence. if has and such instead the is idea may subsidies to

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on have not the more and and Accounts state supporters the

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be dent or predict. to ficult a ily nal the Ramzan likely elements: sive equal may Chechnya, power. political and become military amuch more serious then sent ing tions does numerous the may consensus – driven vendetta), its conflicts Chechen globalisation which political contacts return become become was not extent be grip Kadyrov seem thrown killed the by Caucasian as is on to between tangible favourable in puzzle a public in governed a personal the unwritten probable the problem the more the in the into of present and an Caucasus. Caucasus republic, in and the international likely and attack disarray. militants the the the rather by for to Caucasian at clans. agreement ephemeral, political public Caucasus. Kadyrov, the the dictatorship Russia scenario (and alongside Seasoned the Caucasian than moment, If This in and the consequences the terrorist the in system, jihad is political between would However, in Kremlin the the since initiators the battles chaos in the imposed if and mujahideen longer local key battle the also which Ma it Caucasus network, motives, is the in Vladimir element in geopolitical its got ci clans, based of give of the run. and the by ej F ej participation stability is the rid which region), the not rise alkowsk Middle with (Russia on – Although would they of attack e.g. of Putin the based latter unstable Kadyrov to the are is a exten condi would presi inter to fam very they may East pre los and dif an on on of it ------i 29 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 30 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 The North Caucasus North The −Ingushetia ING. Ossetia; O. S. −South Ossetia; O. N. −North Abberviations: 0 Krasnaya Polyana Sochi Krasnodar 50 KRASNODAR Black Sea Maikop KRAI ADYGEA 100 km ABKHAZIA Sukhumi -CHERKESSIA KARACHAY- ROSTOV OBLAST ADJARA TURKEY Batumi Cherkessk Elbrus Stavropol GEORGIA KABARDINO- -BALKARIA RUSSIAN FEDERATION STAVROPOL KRAI Nalchik S. O. S. Vladikavkaz ARMENIA N. O. N. Tskhinvali Tbilisi Elista Magas ING. CHECHNYA KALMYKIA Grozny DAGESTAN Makhachkala AZERBAIJAN ASTRAKHAN Astrakhan OBLAST Caspian Sea S establish to fighting are militants the which Emirate Caucasus virtual The 0 ource: Delyeshu VILAYAT CIRCASSIA 50 Black Sea Myehyapye

www.kavkazcenter.com 100 km ABKHAZIA Sukhumi BALKAR andKARACHAY VILAYAT oftheNOGAY STEPPE VILAYAT ofKABARDA, ADJARA TURKEY Batumi Cherkessk Nogay-Shakhar Elbrus GEORGIA RUSSIAN FEDERATION CAUCASUS EMIRATE Nalchik S. O. S. ARMENIA INGUSHETIA Tskhinvali VILAYAT Tbilisi Buro Elista CHECHNYA VILAYAT Dzhohar Temir-Khhan-Shura Shamilkala DAGESTAN VILAYAT AZERBAIJAN Astrakhan Caspian Derbent Sea 31 POINT OF VIEW 11/2014 The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)

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