MILITARY REVIEW VOLUME XXXIV JUNp·1954 NUMBER 3 CONTENTS

DEFENSE BY FIRE ______3 Lieutenant Colonel Marshall H. Armor, Jr., Artillery PETAIN'S ApPROACH TO FAME ______14 Leslie Anders PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE IS A MUST! ______19 Captain Paul B. Nelson, Jr., Infantry AIRBORNE FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION ______21 Lieutenant Colonel George T. Metcalf, Artillery THE CONDUCT OF BRIEFINGS ______..:___ 31 Lieutenant Carl M. Guelzo, Transportation Corps " ECONOMY OF FORCE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY ______35 Major Sam Long, USAR COMMAND POST EXERCISE OF A FIELD ARMY ______43 Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Weaver, Infantry MOLEHILL TO MOUNTAIN ______50 Major Reginald Hargreav.es, British Army (Ret.) HERMAN GORING ANSWERS THE $64 QUESTION ______56 Brigadier General William W. Quinn OUR VANISHING MILITARY PROFESSION ______59 Commander D. J. Carrison, United States Navy MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ______~ 63 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ______73 A New Mobility ------____.______~______73 The German Command on the Western Front in 1944 ______88 Soviet Army Tactics ------______96

Artillery F.UZBS ______~ ______~_ 100 BooKs OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER ______108 MILITARY REV··IEW STAFF

EDITOR IN CHIEF

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD L. DURFEE

NORTH AMERICAN EDITION

Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL GREY DRESSER Assistant Editor: MAJOR JOHN J. EARLEY

SPANISH·AMERICAN EDITION

Editor: MAJOR RUI(ERT AMY Assistant Editors: CAPTAIN ANTONIO V. MUNERA, CAPTAIN TOMAS H. GUFFAIX

BRAZILIAN EDITION

Editor: MAJOR SERGIO A. PIRES, BTazilian Anny Assistant Editor: MAJOR HELlO FREIRE, Brazilian Anny

Production Officer MAJOR JAMES A. TRENT

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Direcior of the Bureau of the Budget 2 July 1953.

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. in the English, Spanish, and Portuguese langua~es. Entered as second..class matter August 31. 1934, at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under the Act of March 3, 1879 .. Subscription rates: $3.50 (United States currency) a year in the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere: $4.50 a year in aU other countries. Individual revrints. except for copyrighted material. are authorized. provided credit is given 'the "MILITARY REVIEW." Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Kansa •. .. DEFENSE BY FIRE

Lieutenant Colonel Marshall H. Armor, Jr., Artillery Instructor, Command and General Staff College

"THE assaulting infantry must be in so that they can be thrown in at once the enemy's positions simultaneously with as the attack progresses. . . . the last rounds -of their artillery . . . in spite of loss from stray 'shorts' and in­ Despite the striking resemblance to jury from their own shell splinters..•." current Soviet doctrine,'" the foregoing In a document published near the end quotations are, in fact, from a German of the war, the Generalissimo spelled document captured in World War I, "The out in some detail his instructions to the Attack in Position Warfare," published Armies on the conduct of offensive action. 1 January 1918 by Von Hindenbu~'s Su­ He emphasized speed: preme Headquarters. Even though Von Hindenburg (or Lu­ The break-through battle consists of dendorff, his alter ego) forbade massing "devouring" the series of hostile positions, troops to the density of the Soviet steam­ for the most part in the face of heavy roller, the similarity of German to Soviet opposition by the enemy. It must be car­methods in the attack is emphasized by I'ied thl'ough mpidly. . . .The enemy other sources: must not be permitted to recover from his surprise. His countermeasures must The German attack is characterized by: be rendered useless by the rapid pl'ogress surprise, violence, rapidity of execution, maneuver (and) depth of penetration of fhe attack. ... sought . .., Marshal Foch wrote in 1918, He prescribed narrow frontages: as Commander in Chief of the allied armies. IJ'he~'e it is merely a question of seiz­ illg an enemy's front line system . . . Attack En Masse a division may cover as much as 8,800 He continued: YUI'ds and more. If, however, it is in­ l'iolcllce is obtained by the intensity tellded .to penetrate the enemy's position of the bombal'dmellt, all calibers and all in depth, narrower division fronts must sorts of shells being employed·, simul­ be allotted. ... taneously over a depth of from 1, to 5

He prescribed depth in the formation: ·See Soviet Military Doctrine, by Raymond L. Garthofl', The Rand CorporatIOn. 1953. especially In attacks on a large scale, fresh for­Chapter 4. "The Principle of the Offense. and De­ fense:' Chapter 6. "Forms of Offensive Maneuver," ma tions will be held close up in readiness and Chapter 19. "Employment of Ground, Forces'"

Conduct of a successful defense against the Soviet amled forces in a future war may require something. more than flexibility of method and materiel, efficient fire control, and rapid, reliable communications 44 4 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 kilometers, and by the attack en masse viets-defeated in World War I-may of the infantry which, during the artil­ have learned their offensive tactics from lery preparation, is aS8embled about 200 the Germans who beat them, just as they to 300 meters from the first lines. that learned their politics from a German. are to be taken. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this During its forward movement the infan­ article to outline the development of try is first protected by the rolling bar­ French defensive tactics and technique ill rage of the artillery and then by the ac­ World War I, and to demonstrate their companying artillery and minenwerfer application in the Battle of Champagne­ fires. Besides, it makes great use of its Marne where, east of Reims, the last own fire, and especially of its Ught ma­ great German offensive was ground to a chine guns. ... sudden stop_ . The depth of penetration is obtained Comparison of the French defense with by the rapid and resolute march of the what we do today may provide some indi­ troops on the objectives which have been cation as to the adequacy of present determined upon in advance and situated United States methods and means, if we at great distance. Its effect is promptly should be attacked by the Soviet Union. to dillol'ganize a defense which is not en­ We have the advantage of knowing what til'elll constituted by taking away from it, to expect. The French did not, and in con­ in its objectives, the essential points of sequence they were surprised tactically its organization . ... at the beginning of World War I by the Besides, the violence of the bombard­ destructive power of German artillery. ment is such that from the beginning all They were perhaps only a little less sur­ conw!uliication between the Command and prised by the comparative skill with which the troops is impossible; so that any de­ the German machine guns were employed. cision taken at this moment to maneuver In consequence of their failure to ap­ the troops of OCC:lIpation cannot be realized. preciate fully the effects which artillery and machine guns were to have on opera­ History May Repeat tions, the French held initially to the It was against such attacks as Marshal pattern of defense which had served them Foch describes that the French held the well for more than a century-a line of greater length of the western front itt riflemen stood shoulder to shoulder and, World War 1. (In July 1918, for example, when possible, t!lok cover in a trench. the French held 353 miles of the 530-mile The line of men at close interval had bllttle line.) In any foreseeable future war, the advantage of producing a dense bar­ attacks in similar pattern may be encount­ rier of small-arms fire across the front, ered again-with Soviet troops behind the however, overriding disadvantages soon approaching bayonets. The similarity of became evident. The first was the ability methods suggests, indeed, that the So- of the German artillery to smash the trench and-in concert with the weapons Lieutenant Colonel Marshall H. Armor, of attacking infantry-to pin down the Jr., is a graduate of the Advanced Course defenders under such vast volumes of fire of The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla­ that their machine guns and rifles were homa, in 191,9. He served in Korea with the '52d Field Artillery Battalion, 21,th useless. The second signal disadvantage Infantry Division, and subsequently in was the ability of an attacker who was the Training Division, GS Seotion of GHQ, successful in seizing any portion of the FEe. He was graduated from the Com­ trench to secure the rest of it with rela­ mand and General Staff College in 1959, where he is now an instruotor. tive ease br flanking action. DEFENSE BY FIRE 5 Multiple trench lines, one behind an­ A main parallel, the most forward other, were a partial solution to both trench. problems. By exploiting his machine guns, A support parallel, about 200 yards be­ the defender was able to increase the in­ hind the main parallel. terval between riflemen in each of several A redoubt parallel, forward of the ar­ trenches, while still maintaining an ade­ tillery. quate density of fires to the front. Fur­ A number of intermediate pamllels ther developments led to creating, with~n might be located between the support and the trench system, strong points capable the redoubt parallels. A second parallel of all-around defense, and to digging the might be loca:ed about 30 yards behind line with irregular trace, thereby creating the main parallel. Additionally, the po­ bastions from which flanking fires could sition might be cut obliquely by one or be delivered. more branch parallels, or bretelle lines, (suspender straps), to compartmentalize Trench Warfare the system and to provide switch posi­ As the hostile artillery improved in tions. (See Figure 1.) technique and increased in caliber, how­ The disposition of machine guns was ever, a series of trenches became as vul­ not determined specifically by the loca­ nerable to crushing bombardment as 'a tions of the paraiIels, however. The ma­ single trench had been, Trenches could chine guns were emplaced to use the ter­ not be concealed completely from enemy rain to best advantage, and they might observation and aerial photography! and even be outside the sector of th~ir parent were, therefore, easy targets. By 1918, unit if better flanking fi~es could be ob­ therefore, the machine guns of the de­ tained there. A typical emplacement is fense-increased from two to eight per shown schematically in Figure 2. battalion-were moved out of the trenches The machine-gun position was manned to carefully-concealed, well-covered posi­ by a combat group-from squad to platoon tions and were echeloned in depth. Local size. The ('ombat groups of a company defenses were' established around them, formed a strong point, IifInd the strong and their lines of fire were arranged to points of a battalion made up a center intersect-as the ideal-in a continuous of resistance_ curtain across the front. Behind the initial battle position-the The trenches were not abandoned, how­ First Position-a Second Position was or­ en'!', for without them, men could neither ganized in similar manner. The distance Illove nor live within the battle position from the main parallel of the First Posi­ -the position of resistance. But by 1918, tion to the main parallel of the Second the trenches were of secondary impor­ Position was usually from 3 to 5 miles. t :mce; they were routes of communication and firing positions for the riflemen and Conduct of Defense C'l'enadiers whose principal function was The defense was conducted by fire and to protect the machine guns. by maneuver (counterattack), but fire A distinction was made in nomenclature was of the greatest importance. The ""tween approach trenches, which ran principal consideration-implicit in the 1,,'rpendicular to the fronts, and the par­ building of a defense around flanking ma­ ~ I/I'ls. Either might be a fire trench if chine-gun fires-was creating a barrier of -,rganized for rifle fire, or a communica­ fires in front of the main parallel. The ':on trench if organized to permit move- efficacy of the barrier, it was recognized, lent in defilade. A battle position com­ depended upon its density and its depth. p'ised at least three parallels: Density of fires being determined by the • G MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954' number of weapons present and firing, could be filled by the cross-fires of welI­ the French preferred one battalion of in­ sheltered machine guns. With tl;le artil­ fantry lor each 1,100 yards of front, and lery of two divisions in support, one di­ three battalions of artillery for each 2,200 vision could hold as much as 6,600 yards yards-counterbattery not included. -infantry strength then becoming the Since as much as two-thirds of the limiting factor. available artillery might be assigned Since fires reach maximum effectiveness counterbattery missions, it is evident that only when the enemy is compelled to re­ the requirement for cannon reached as­ main under them for a period of time, the tronomical numbers. French sought the greatest possible depth So great was the emphasis on adequate to the zone of fires forward of the main

Nor ro SCALE ENEMY

I fIGURE I. ! artillery support, that the first limitation parallel. The zone comprised, as it must, on the width of the French division sec­ three bands: a band of artillery fires, a tor was imposed not by the infantry band of combined artillery and infantry strength but by the availability of ar­ fires, and a band of infantry fires. The tillery. A normal organization required minimum acceptable depth of the band one and one-half battalions of artillery of combined fires was 550 yards. for each infantry battalion defense area The best location for the band of com­ -1,100 yards of front. Thus, a division bined fires, terrain permitting, was con­ occupying a 4,400-yard sector had reached sidered to be on a reverse slope. Thereby, the maximum capability of its 6 organic the defending infantry avoided annihila­ artillery battalions when it employed only tion by direct and observed indirect fire, 4 of its 9 infantry battalions. but still protected the essential observa­ Accordingly, a division sector wider tion to their rear. (See Figure 3.) than 4,400 yards could be defended ade­ When the situation permitted, lookouts quately only if the division artillery was were disposed on the forward slope neal" reinforced, or if the terrain was such the crest. Their pOSitions were frequently that gaps in the barrier of artillery fires connected by a lookout parallel. DEFENSE BY FIRE 7 A withdrawal by either side might per­ to give outposts the order to hotd against mit the establishment also of an outpost a weak attack and to withdraw before a position, occupied by as many as three strong attack. . . .In other words, the battalions on a division front. The gen­ estimatt'ng of the force of the attack can­ eral mission of the outpost garrison was not be delegated to the outposts-it is -th.e . to give warning of the approach of enemy, duty of the command to judge, in advance, and to provide time for preparation by whetHer it risks more in ordering the out­ the troops in the position of resistance. post to hold or to withdraw. The additional specific mission of the The formula which consists of giving outposts was either to withdraw when at­ the outposts the order to hold as long as tacked or to remain in place as islands they can, and then withdraw, is not any

NOT TO SCALE ENEMY

LEGEND

AUTOMATIC RIFLE

MACHINE GUN

RIFLEMAN

GRENAOIER

.l!. LOW WIRE ENTANGLEMENT TUNNEL Id.. LOOKOUT of resistance to canalize the enemy's ad­ better. For the obligation -of holding as vance. long as possible brings in the military French regulations prescribed that the hono}' of the executants. Now, we know to specific mission be spelled out in orders, so a certainty that we have done all that is that no decision as to standing or with­ possible only when it is too late to get drawing would be left to the outpost com­ away. Practically speaking, we have sim­ mander. Colonel LeMoine-one-time pro­ ply the choice 'of leaving too soon or of fessor of the Ecole Supih"iel!1'e de Guerre . leaving too late. The command has no right Course in General Tactics-explained the to subject its subordinates to such a con­ doctrine in this way: flict of duties. To distinguish between a weak attack and a powerfUl attack is very difficult fM' A typical use of outposts to disorganize b oops that are taken under fire by the as­ the enemy attack was prescribed by the sailant. Very often we can tell only after French First Army in an order dated 20 the event, after we have seen the 1'esult July 1918. The order said in part: ol/tained . ... Disassociation of the front of the at­ C01!sequently, it is generally fallacious tack in the sense of its width will result ·8 MILI·TARY REVIEW JUNE 1954

b'om th~ inequaliti~8 of ?'e8i8tanc~ en· These barriers of fire could be erected countered by the attack, : , ,We shall se· only as a result of careful prior planning. CU1'e this result by maintaining in the In fact, wrote Colonel LeMoiti'e: outpost position . . . some islands of re· Since the organization of fire is the sistance which will have the mission of p1'incipal means of action of the defen­ accepting combat with no idea of with­ sive, calcUlating and organizing the plan8 drawal, and which must hold to the last fOl' fires will be the principal role of the extremity. The presence of these islands will create gaps in the fl'ont of the at­ Command. tacking forc~ which will bl'ing about the Types of Fires desired dislocation. Planning for the use of artillery ul­ The order directed the outpost gar­ timately included all of the types of fires rison to establish outposts proper for we employ today, and more. surveillance well forward, and supports . Enemy reinforcements and supplies ap­ which, the order said: proaching for the attack eame first under the harassing and prohibitive fires of the Must not be spread out, but must be defending artillery. These were executed grouped by companies or half-companies according to daily programs drawn up so that the troops are well in hand; they by division and higher commanders, as should. when it is possible. occupy de­ were also the plans for daily destruction fensive points organized for prolonged l'e­ fire on enemy installations. sistance even aftel' being surrounded. As the enemy began his artillery prep­ The position occupied by these supports aration for the attack, or even as he ex­ was designated: the line of resistance of ecuted his own routine fire plans, the de­ fending artillery replied with retaliation the outposts. fire, delivered on the hostile trenches and Thus. in a manner comparable to pres­ billets, and usually accompanied by coun­ ent technique, the ultimate development in terbattery fire. The principal purpose of World War I defense employed security retaliation fire was to boost the morale echelons to delay. deceive. and disorganize of friendly infantry. the approaching enemy. It placed the en­ If the enemy showed himself, he was emy under an ever-increasing density of struck by concentration fire-the preat'­ fires as he approached the battle position, ranged fires of a large number of bat­ I and barriers of wire held him longer in teries, delivered on call to any of the the barrier of fires. When he closed at several areas identified by number on last with the main line of resistance, he fire control. maps. had been disorganized and decimated by Then. as the enemy held himself in final the fires of the defense. If. nevertheless, readiness for the attack, the artillery, he penetrated the position, or did not trench mortars, and other weapons within sooner recoil, he was struck in flank by range poured out their counterpreparation counterattack. fires which the German recipients called Meantime, a barrier of artillery and annihilation fires. mortar fires in his rear cut off his with­ In the original concept, the counte..­ drawal, and barriers of combined fires preparation was intended merely to de­ blocked his movement to the front or stroy the enemy's departure trench, but flanks. He was sealed in a box barrage ultimately included all installations useful while fires in support of the counterat­ for the attack. Light artillery and mor­ tack burst upon him. tars, and machine guns within range, DEFENSE BY FIRE 9 struck parallels, approach trenches, and ing barrage normally moved forward on possible assembly points. Heavy howitzers a time schedule, paced to the expected rate and mortars fired on command and ob­ of infantry advance. servation posts, dugouts, trench junctions, If friendly fires coulp. give the enemy and suspected concentration areas. Heavy infantry pause while the barrage rolled guns pounded enemy batteries and i1:istal­ away from them, defending tro(}ps could lations deep in the hostile real'. take cover while the barrage passed over­ head, but spring up in ample time to man Defensive Barrage. their battle posts. . i Finally, as the surviving enemy in­ Like the infantry defense in depth, fantry climbed from the ruins of their built arou~d machine guns, the artillery

ESSENTIAL OBSERVATlON~

ENEMY ~V

TRENCHES TERRAIN CROSS SECTION

I.....~---- 2 TO 3 MILES -----I.~I

q////- BAND OF ARTILLERY FIRES

~"'~ BAND OF INFANTRY FIRES iOOOOOOo BAND OF COMBINED FIRES NOT TO SCALE HEIGHTS EXAGGERATED trenches and neared the friendly lines, fires of the defense-and the rolling bar­ they met the French barrage. (In French, rage of the attack-were largely World ban'age means barrier.) Light artillery, War I developments. using time and percussion fuzes, together French regulations of 1913 had mini­ with trench mortars and infantry weapons, mized the importance of artillery, and had established a dense barrier of fires. just even relegated counterbattery fire to a forward of the defended position. Each role of minor importance: battery fired on a front of about 200 The seeking of superiority over the en­ yards. Meantime, heavier weapons ex­ emy artillery has no purpose other than tended the barrage toward the hostile to try to act with the greatest force trenches, took reinforcements under fire, against the attack objectives of the in­ and continued to batter their counterprep­ fantry. arl!tion .targets. A principal object of the defensive bar­ Accordingly, very little attention was ralfe-aside from inflicting casualties­ given to the manufacture or employment was to separate the attacking infantry of heavy artillery before the war. When from their own rolling bar~age. The roll- the conflict began the French had only 10 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954

308 mobile pieces larger than 75-mm. sumably of four guns each) and 609 heavy Within a month, however, they were mov­ and super-heavy batteries. Ammunition ing guns out of coastal fortifications for allocated: 4,700 rounds for each field gun Use at the front. By early 1915, they were battery; 3,420 for each field howitzer bat­ forming special counterbattery group­ tery; 1,365 for each heavy howitzer bat­ ments, and the following year at Verdun, tery; 725 for each super-heavy battery. alone, the French had 570 cannon of At 0010 hours on 15 July, the artillery IS5-mm caliber and larger. preparation began; 10 minutes of general Reprisal and harassing fires were the surprise fire on all targets; 75 minutes' first new artillery development of~ the counterbattery; 90 minutes' destruction war, appearing in 1914. The defensive bar­ fire on infantry positions, counterbattery rage had been known before, it being per­ and interdiction; 15 minutes' counterbat­ haps the first use ever devised for artil­ tery; 30 minutes' counterbattery and de­ lery in the defense. During the Battle of struction fire. Verdun, however, the barrage was devel­ At 0350 hours the preparation ended. oped to the pdint where all artillery, from The rolling barrage began-standing for trench mortars to heavy guns, took part. 6 minutes, bounding 200 yards, standing At Verdun also, the counterpreparation S minutes more. was born and the importance of interdic­ But allied intelligence had predicted the tion fires was learned. attack, and general reserve artillery had Concentration fire-whereby in further reinforced the defending armies. From development modern artillery wields its prisoners captured on 14 July, the French greatest destructive power-appears to Fourth Army Commander, General Gou­ have had its beginnings in about 1916. raud, had learned not only the time of the attack but also the time set for the begin­ The Champagne-Marne Battle ning of the artillery preparation. By 15 July 1918, when the Battle of Champagne-Marne began, the defensive Defense in Depth technique for all arms had reached the General Gouraud had reduced the troops zenith of W orId War I development. Part in his First Position to platoon-size out­ of that battle was fought east of Reims posts, and ordered them to hold at all where the front was an old one. Its costs in order to canalize the German at­ works hag! been improved progressively tack. He established his main defense in for many months and five successive posi­ an intermediate position, between the tions had been constructed. The Allies First and Second Positions, and held mini­ expected an attack in July, and the Ger­ mum reserves in the latter. mans had planned one. The attack was to The plan was not without its repercus­ envelope Reims with double pincers for sions, however. A French legislator the purpose of broadening the Marne threatened to investigate "the scandalous salient and seizing a railroad line through abandonment, without fighting, of ground Reims. Three field armies were to attack which it had cost so much to conquer." on a 70-mile front: First and Third as­ With the French XXI Corps, holding saulting the French Fourth Army east some 12 miles of the Fourth Army sector of Reims; the German Seventh Army driv­ and presumably typical, there were 504 ing against the French Fifth and Sixth artillery pieces, half of them heavy. There Armies in the Marne salient west of . was an average of 42 cannon· for every Reims. In 'support of the attack there mile of front-one for every 42 yards. were 1,047 light artillery batteries (pre­ At midnight, 10 minutes before the ...... DEFENSE BY FJRE 11 scheduled starting of the German prep­ At 0350 hours, three German armies aration, the French counterpreparation attacked. Against the French Fourth came crashing down all aCJ:oss the front. Army, the German First and Third A German lieutenant, attacking in the Armies :flung 14 divisions, with 6 more Marne salient to the left of the Fourth divisions immediately behind them, and Army, wrote later: 5 others in reserve. , Here is a pictul'e of our situation: The But the German preparation, fired on infantry without shelter lying down in the the evacuated First Position, had pro­ Jaulgonne Forest, where the underbrush duced little effect. The defenders were was so thick that all movement was impos­ • farther back. The attacking force, already decimated by the French counterprepara­ sible, with a very few trees offering tion, was further disorganized and canal­ Some protection against bUllets. In front lized by the outpost islands of resistance. of us, a tremendous hostile artillery fire, And of the 20 tanks accompanying the at­ Not a point was spared; here was a con­ tack, 10 were destroyed before they tinuous fire by a heavy battery, the effect of which in the wood was frightful and reached French lines. shattered our nel'ves; over there was a Barrage Rolled On clearing, where every few minutes a rain The German rolling barrage rolled on, of shells from a light battery transformed leaving behind the infantry which the it into a field of shell holes; to the right, French fire had held back, while French a narrow valley received big shrapnels guns smashed marching columns of re­ which came over like a lot of comets. The serves and destroyed artillery accompany­ mel! all yelled, and ran here and thel'e ing the attack. By noon, the Germans trying to find some place Unde1" cover. reached the French main line of resistance. Then again a whistling sound came, but There, under the crossed fires of well­ this time the explosions were duller; they sheltered machine, guns, of rifles, mortars, wae gas. "Put on masks.1' Now nothing and artillery, the attack stopped-dead. coltid be seen; darkness Iwas complete. The following day the attack against Despair took possession of many. They Fourth Army' ~as called off. Said the felt abandoned., If only daly would come, diary of Army Group German Crown the" men were crying. Prince: Pinally, came a hoarse, command from the company commander, aware of the In fmnt of the Seventh Army south gl'ftvity of the situation and of his duty: of the Marne, and in front of the First "F,)rwm"d; has eve1'ybody his rifle?" We and Third Armies, it appeared that the adt'anced through valleys raked by fire sacl'ifice in men and materiel that would which were, however, the ronly ways of result were the attack continued, would ref/ching the river. The engineers were a ' not correspond to the probable gain. little farther on. Their commander had The German failure of 15 July under­ diNappeared. There were very few of scored the words of Colonel Schirmer, Ger­ th, Ill. The infantry themselves carried the man artillery officer, who wrote afier the bods for some 200 meters which separated war: th, III from the river. A new artillery bar­ !·Me. Everybody scattered. Several were Little by little the experiences of the killed, and a machine gun was destroyed war foro.d all higher leaders and leaders alongside of the boats. "Forward! Let's of_,troops to the conviction that in addi­ UI.I away from here! There are other ti~n to making the hostile positions ripe bOllts farthel' down." fOl' assault, the fighting down of the op­ 12 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954

posing artillery was a prerequisite for the but the rate of fire is slower. Tonnage of success of the attack. shell delivered an hOur is about the same for mediums and lights. Conclusions Capabilities and limitations seem to It is evident that the defensive doc­ indicate, therefore, that the number of ar­ trine the French evolved in World War I, tillery battalions required for adequate took cognizance in fact, if not in name, of close support is not so much dependent the Fundamentals of Defense by which on the width of sector defended, as it is .we are guided today. There was, however, dependent on the width, depth, and density significant difference in emphasis. of the enemy's attack formation. Their experience on the western front, where they were opposed by an enemy with How Many Battalions? tactics similar to those the Soviets now How many battalion concentrations employ, forced upon the French the real­ must be fired simultaneously; how many ization that success in defense-except at must be fired an hour to cut the hostile prohibitive cost in men-demands that the human steamroller down to a size our in­ enemy be prevented from achieving fire fantry and armor can handle? The answer superiority and that he be prevented from determines the number of battalions we closing en masse with the main line of must have within range. Although varia­ resistance. They recognized also that the ble, that number is not likely ever to be bulk of the preventing fires must come as small as four on a division front. from behind the battle position, for it is the battle position that the enemy is best Ordinarily, of course, additional fires able to neutralize with his own fires. are made available to divisions by corps and higher artillery echelons. Including Accordingly, the French took the availa­ the divisional weapons, the type field army bHity of artillery as the first limitation on the width of a division sector, based on the has some 1,300 cannon in its field artil­ rule that there should be three battalions lery battalions. Of these, more than half for each 2,200 yards of front-counter­ are light howitzers either organic or, battery not included. normally, attached to divisions. The 600 other pieces reinforce close support fires, Less Needed Now increase the depth of combat, and assume ReqUirements today are probably some­ the principal offensive share of the artil­ what less, but are also less subject to de­ lery duel-the fighting down of the hostile termination by a simple linear rule. The artillery. In any future war, the latter range and flexibility of modern weapons, chore may be somewhat more difficult than the efficiency of fire control methods, and it has been heretofore. the reliability of rapid communications The Soviets, in World War II, normally permit the maneuver and massing of ar­ used about 300 artillery pieces for each tillery fires to an extent not contemplated mile of front in offensive operations, and in World War I. Nevertheless, a light bat­ in major attacks employed as many as talion must fire five volleys-90 rounds­ 580 for each mile-an average of slightly to neutralize troops without cove,' in a less than one for each 3 yards of front. At single 250-yard square. Without risking Berlin alone, Colonel Ely reports in his damage to the howitzers, it can fire no book, The Red Army Today, they had SODle more than 20 such volleys-I,800 rounds 22,000 pieces-more than double the total -in an hour. A medium battalion can the other allies had in their assault on neutralize a larger area with five volleys, the West Wall of Germany. DEFENSE BY FIRE 18 Recognizing a century before World mass the fires of weapons that are not War I that fire must be fought with fire, there.. Napoleon once said: One must have as On some future day some division com­ much artillery as the enemy. The principle mander may visualize with care the de­ has not changed, although the ratio is not fensive areas to be occupied by his front­ as high now that power is measured in line battalions, and find them strong, and terms of massed projectiles, rather than few enough in number to leave him an ad­ of massed guns. equate reserve. He may then improve his antitank defenses, prepare positions in Not One-for-One depth, and dispose his reserve judiciously. Superior fire control and target locating He may then take another look at the hos­ teehniques, with an occasional assist from tile masses poised to strike in a hurricane aircraft not fighting counterair, will en­ of fire, and he may tell the corps com­ able our artillery to do the job with less mander: I have enough infantry :Nnd than gun-for-gun. But the means provided armor fm' defense of my sector, but you must be adequate to the mission; no sys­ and I together have not enough at"Wlen/. tem, however flexible and efficient, can He might be right.

Is there a threat to our peace? Down in our hearts we all know that we live' constantly under the threat of this cloud brought about by the weIl-known aims and declared ambitions of Soviet leaders and organized Communists. tempered timewise by the successes or failures of other expediencies short of war. A con­ gressional subcommittee made a study of Communist strategy over 5 years ago-more than 2 years before the outbreak of the Korean conflict. Reporting to the Congress. the subcommittee summed up the current aims of Soviet foreign policy: "Soviet foreign policy, like their defense policy, begins with the assumption of inevitable war. It is the particular function of the Soviet Foreign Office in the grand strategy of the world revolution to play an intermediate role between that of the Red Army on the one hand ~nd the Communist Parties on the other, in creating the conditions necessary fol- Communist victory ... (in foreign policy) as in all other activities, they assume that the world revolution is the foundation of a morality hoth different and superior, in which the end justifies all means."

Assistant for Civil pefense Barnet W. Beel"s ~ Petain's Approach to Fame

Leslie Anders Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers

The views expressed in this article fate of the introvert. Yet, this plodding are the author's and are not neces­ and painstaking soldier had the independ­ sarily thoiie of the Department of the ence of mind to differ with prevailing Army or the Command and General military doctrines and the moral courage Staff Col/eue.-The Editor. to stand openly-and almost alone­ against the tide of opinion. It was just after the turn of the cen­ T HE late Marshal Henri Philippe tury when the French General Staff as­ Petain-who died at the age of 95 in the signed Petain to an instructorship at the summer of 1951-outlived his own genera­ small-arms school at Chiilons. Originally tion a great many years., In fact, very expecting no difficulties with the soft­ few of those French politicians denounc­ spoken newcomer, the staff at Chiilons was ing the national hero as a "traitor" in suddenly shocked to hear him expounding 1944 had any firm recollection of Petain's a concept of small-arms employment dia­ claim to renown. metrically opposed to views long held by True, there were many who could recall the French officer corps. Until this time, his 1925 expedition to Morocco to clean it had been agreed that the most efficient up the awkward situation created by the use of small-arms fire lay in scattering Riff Rebellion. Perhaps not quite so many it all along the front. Setting his face remembered that it was the sheer force of against this concept, Petain argued un­ this man's character that restored the compromisingly for concentration of fire morale and dependability of the French power. So well did he argue his case with Army after rasher generals had bled it his startled colleagues that his embar­ white in 1917. And, come to think of it, rassed superiors-anxious to restore har­ he was the Petain of Verdun, whose on mony on the faculty-offered the heretic les aura sang in French hearts for many a post of his choosing elsewhere. years after that frightful struggle. Before long, the Army tried him aga'in History almost overlooked petain. At as an instructor, this time as a teacher of the beginning of the fateful year of 1914, infantry tactics at the Ecole Superieure he was a colonel of infantry, commanding de Guerre. During several years in the a line regiment garrisoned at Arras. Then classrooms of this famous staff school, 58, he had been a Regular Army officer Petain won a complete hearing for his for over 35 years and was on the verge personal views on modern warfare. In his of retirement. Indeed, he had already lectures he indulged his advocacy of picked out the little house (at St. Orner) directed and concentrated fire of all weap­ in whkh he would spend' his "declining" ons to the fullest. It was largely as a years. result of Petain's arguments that the Among the proverbially agile-minded French Army in 1910 accepted the prin­ French, the large and taciturn Petain ciple of infantry-artillery liaison. never gained much of a reputation as a However, Professor Petain developeJ great thinker. Such indeed is the hard other ideas which earned him few friends P~TAIN'S APPROACH TO FAME 15 among those holding the power of promo­ gressiveness of the 1900s. Under its pro­ tion over him. To an officer corps pas­ visions, briefly stated, the French were to sionately devoted to the principle of' the react to a German invasion of Belgium impetuous and irresistible offensive brutale by throwing their First; Second, and Third a Qutrance, Petain frankly preached his Armies 'into Alsace-Lorraine and the defensive heresy: "the salutary fear of • Fifth Army into eastern Belgium. That enemy fire"; the conservation of man­ this might amount to rushing into a Rhine­ power; the essential superiority of the land sack-which the Germans could defensive; and the efficacy ,of well-timed close on the French by driving south and counterattacks once the ,aggressor has east from Paris-apparently never oc­ worn his ranks thin. curred to the author of Plan XVII. To the vast majority of French officers, this was nothing less than an invitation Theory to Practice to disaster. Besides, many protested, it At the outbreak of World War I, Colo­ did not accord with the national person­ nel Petain took up his mobilization as­ ality. Petain's generation had seen the signment as commander of the 4th Brigade rise of united Germany and the disas­ of the 51st Reserve Infantry. Division. ters which overwhelmed defensive-minded His new command at Vervins was a part French armies in the Franco-Prussian of General Charles Louis Lanrezac's Fifth conflict of 1870-71. The next time the Army, then preparing for its share in the Germans attack-French officers continu­ execution of Plan XVII. Action came ally told each other-we Frenchmen will quickly, as Lanrezac drove forward to also attack, and the sheer impetuosity and meet the oncoming Germans somewhere' in courage of our onslaught will so stagger Belgium. Doubtless with misgivings, Pe­ the methodical Germans that they will not tain double-timed his brigade down the be able to carry through their rigid ~nd Meuse Valley to Dinant, where he ordered complicated plans. Not for Frenchmen quick preparation of field fortifications, this creeping into fortified places and wait­ On 23 August, his patrols began exchang­ ing for the German to draw' his noose of ing shots with the advance guard of the siege-lines around them. Not for French­ German XII Corps. men what General Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre scouted as the "strategical offensive Entrenchments Bypassed and tactical defensive." The Germans did not get to make a fair test of Petain's entrenchments, however. Plan XVII A high-level misunderstanding between And Joffre, who became Commander in Lanrezac and the commander of the Brit­ Chief Designate (Vice-President of the ish Expeditionary Force led to the pre- Petain, in spite of the obsession of. his brilliant colleagues with the offensive doctrine, saw that massive and heedless infantry attacks nl'cessitated an intolerable wastage of life on the modern battlefield

C•. I/seil Superieur de la Guerre) in 1911, cipitate withdrawal of the British and the hud prepared a plan to meet the next Ger­ uncovering of the Fifth Army's left flank. man aggression against France. Plan XVII Instead of fighting it out at Dinant, there­ represented the last stage of the recas~ fore, Colonel Petain was or/lered to inn; of French strategy from the defen­ abandon his lines and join in the great si \'e-mindedness of the 1870s to the ag­ strategic retreat of General Louis Felix 16 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954

Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps (see sketch The retreat resumed, and the 4th Brigade map on Page 17). eventually pulled back across the Serre River toward Laon. Plan XVII Fails '! In this situation there was plenty of By this time, Plan XVII had been re­ work for cool heads. On 31 August 1914, vealed in all its futility. Rushing a!!ross orders were published at Fifth Army pro­ the fields and along the Toads that led to moting Colonel Petain to general de bl';­ Dieuze, Morhange, Altkirch, and Mul­ gade and assigning him to command the house, the red-trousered French infantry­ demoralized 6th Division, then engaged in men were cut down in long bloody swaths. falling back toward the line Laon-Sois­ Machine guns, barbed wire, and the entire sons. Collecting the division after some armory of modern weapons had created exertions, Petain managed on 2 September an age of military technology in which to construct a 2'1:!-mile position on the Pickett's Charges were out of place. When south side of Mont-sur-Courville, At­ the front stabilized, a few weeks later, tacked here by the German IX Corps, the nearly half the French Regular Army had 6th Division yielded, and by sundown 3 been killed, wounded, or captured. September, had beaten an orderly retreat On the bleak morrow of Plan XVII's of 12 miles, crossing the Aisne at Verneui!. downfall, Petain hurried his troops south­ On the evening of 5 September, the divi­ ward along roads clouded with late-sum­ sion reached Louan, about 9 miles from mer dust. At sundown, 24 August, the 4th the Seine. Brigade marched into the little Belg'ian town of Mariembourg, The next day Petain The Tide Turns passed through Scourmont, France, at the General -Petain's long retreat ended, for head of his haggard rear-guard battalion. on the morning of 6 September, Joffre is­ At this point, however, Fifth Army or­ sued his celebrated "die on the spot" order dered his unit to detached service with the to the armies of Fmnce. The Generalissimo III Corps to bolster a deteriorating front -who had been gathering divisions from south of Guise. The evening of 29 August the shattered eastern sectors to create a found Petain's force entrenched between local numerical superiority along the the 1st and 5th Infantry Divisions, 2% decisive Marne front-was ready to try miles south of Guise on the road to Marie, conclusions with the invader. Doing its Retreat Resumed part, the 6th Division wheeled about to The German X Corps (Second Army) face the onward rush of the Germans, Then, all of a sudden, the troops of the immediately charged the French positions German right wing above Paris found in this area. Although Petain's gunners themselves facing a dangerous flanl< offered the invader a torrid reception, the thrust from a newly-formed French army French III Corps was unable to pull it­ near Compiegne; consternation reigned at self together sufficiently to make a stand. the field headquarters of the Germans, MI'. Leslie Andel'S is the authol' of "Rail­ and urgent orders for a general retreat roading on the Mandalay Line," which ap­ were soon forthcoming for the units in pea1'ed in the September 1958 issue of the the overextended sectors along the Marne. MILITARY REVIEW, A graduate of the Col­ lege of Empol'ia in Kansas, he holds a Under a curtain of shell-fire, Petain's Maslel' of Al'ts degree in h~stOl'y from the division almost painlessly recaptured a University of Missoul·i. Smce 1951, Mr. village east of Provins. Now the chase Andel'S has been a historian in th~ His­ was on, with the French cavalry leading tOl'ical Division, Office of the Chtef of Engil1eel'S, the way. Spearheads of the British Expedi­ PillTAIN'S APPROACH TO, FAME 17 "\ tionary Force and the French Fifth and survived their foolhardiness joined their, Ninth Armies swept back into ChiUons, seniors in Joffre's limbo. Epernay, and Chateau-Thierry. Abandon­ ing the Marne, the Germans relaxed their Prestige Increased grip on thl! line Reims-Soissons-Com­ Simultaneously, the prestige of the piegne and retreated to new trench-posi­ colorless leader of the 6th Division was tions on the high ridges north of the increasing. The, elderly brigadier was Aisne on 14 September. The Battle of the earning a name for his personal gallantry, Marne, which saved France, 'passed into efficiency, and economy in lives. Recog­

, \ BELGIUM \ SAINT OMEi\' • BRUSSELS _ \. ~I /, . \ ENGL 5H CHANNEL 1\1,·&1\ '­ \ t>\&cs& : GERMANY I '--\ /'\ \ I , J ~ ~ LUXEMBOURG I ...... /. .... --I

, • MORHANGE \, _ !OIEUZE , 'ROVINS- THE WESTERN THEATER OF WAR, "( I J AUGUST·SEPTEMBER 1914 I' __ .. • ETR.fAT OF "flAIN'S UNITS I ~ MUL~OUSE ,===',;;s....__..~===<.. MIlK \ ALTKIRC.He

history as Petain's men started digging nized as a tough and skilled master of in along the Aisne north of Reims. the strange new art of modern position wa'rfare, Petain became on 15 September Petain Vindicated a major general (general de division). In Joffre, the imperturbable author of Plan mid-October he succeeded to command of XVII, reacted to his disillusioning expe­ the XXXIII Corps of General Louis de rienc'e with a relentless purge of the Maud'huy's Tenth Army and was pro­ Frellch officer corps. Those who had been claimed an officer of the Legion of Honor. the most conspicuous in their adherence The following spring he rose to command to the doctrine of the offensive Ii outrance of the Second Army. but the slowest to readjust to reality were The rest of Petain's career being rather quic k to pay for their shortcomings. Two well known, it remains to us here to of the five original army commanders ponder briefly the causes for his swift were, removed from their posts, and seven rush from obscurity across the threshold of the twenty-one corps commanders were of everlasting fame. Part of the secret reliroved. Scores of lesser officers who lies, of course, in certain qualities of his 18 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 character, praised in great detail on 27 for himself that massive and heedless in­ September 1914, in an Order of the Day, fantry charges on the modern battlefield which otherwise made scant mention of necessitated an intolerable wastage of life. general officers. The Commanding General In his common-sense way he had perceived of the 6th Division, in the words of the what James Longstreet saw at Fredericks­ citation: burg: "... the advantages conferred on •.. has by his tenacity, his calmness the defensive by entrenchments and by under fire, his 1constant foresight, his con­ nineteenth-century developments in fire stant intervention at difficult moments, power." ' obtained from his division a magnificent His capacity for reducing military re­ efJol't dUl'ing foul'teen da1/s, resisting re­ alities to simple terms, his ability to thrust peated attacks by day and night, and, the off those delusions captivating more so­ fom·teenth day, in spite of losses sustained, phisticated French officers, and the bitter repulsing victoriously a flO'ious eneml/ at­ courage he habitually displayed in defense taclc. of his unpopular teachings-these consti­ But this ~carcely teUs the entire story. tute at once the core of Petain's distinctive The' fact ig that in spite of the obsession contributions to French military history of his more briJIiant coUeag-ues with of­ and the sure basis for his swift ascent to fensive doctrines, Petain had seen clearly fame when the occasion arrived.

I am all for using plenty of artillery and mortarH to save the IiveH of the infantry. I SI)ent the whole of World War II convincing infantry and tank commanders that it was the smart thing to do. At the same time, I was well aware that the United States could not provide all the ammunition I wanted. We have to share the steel with the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Merchant Marine. We also hav~ to build bridges, railroads, depots, and air baseH in countrieH 5,000 miles across the oceans. You cannot build your battle techniques on dreams of unlimited artillery ammunition. The field com­ mander simply must know the ammunition situation for each major operation. Qr he is I)ractically certain to run short just when it hurts the worst.

Lieutcnant Gencral Willist()n B. Palmer .IIf" Personal Reconnaissance is a Mustf

Captain Paul B. Nelson, Jr., Infantry Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry Division

The views exp1'essed in this article get that tank company moving and notify (!I'e the authm"s and are· not ncces­Div Arty that the medium battalion is to SIIl"ily those of the Department of the reinforce the fires of Sloan's DS battal­ Al'mll or the Command 'and Geneml ion," Then, turning to his G2, the Gen­ Siaff Col/ege.-The Editor. eral continued, "Thomas, I want you to determine ..." , And so another decision had been reach­ "T HIS is 421 right here, General. ed based on accurate information. This hill to the west of Chondok-san." But how accurate would the information Thl'n the G3's finger moved to the left. v:iven the General have been if no one "The only really dangerous approach is J had thought to make the necessary per­ from over here, and Sloan's got Fox Com­ sonal reconnaissance ahead of time? How puny on the end of this ridge line over­ true a picture would he have received looking Chobak-kol and the valley. We if the G3's briefing had begun with that call stop enemy armor colI} when it starts too-often-heard phrase "based on my map in by plugging the rear of the valley reconnaissance.. ."? Maybe the same with one of Ryan's tank companies, and conclusions would have been reached; but, then give 155 support to Sloan's rig'ht then again, maybe not. All maps are sub­ to help him chop up the main effort that's ject to a degree of inaccuracy. Korean apparently after Hill 421." maps are subject to even more inaccura­ "You're sure this hill's the key to hold­ ciea than is normally the rule, and no inA' ou'r left, Simpkins?" the General map reconnaissance can ever provide that ash·d sharply-he had been off on the really critically important element of a right when this new attack jumped off. thorough reconnaissance-contact 'with "No doubt at all about it, General! I've the e:riBting situation at fh'st hand. This made a personal helicopter reconnais­ can be provided only by a personal recon­ san,'c of that sector and was up there naissance! again this morning on the ground. Sloan's cOlllpanies are all well-disposed and more The Human Element than holding their own so far, but loss Some commanders and staff officers of that hill would mean loss of the only seem to have forgotten that a good recon­ de""nt supply route to our units further naissance considers more than just what wp"l, It's simply got to be held!" can be put on an overlay. Many com­ "Fair enough, Dan! If your personal pletely overlook-or, at least, apparently rC(,Clnnaissance says it's important, we'll do not know how to gauge-the most im­ 811"ho1' solid on that one. Tell Ryan to portant element of them all: the men that Pl'l'sonal contact with the situation at first hand, plus a complete u11derstanding of the human and geographical aspects of an operation, m'l' ti,e critically important elements of a thorough J'econnaissance 20 MILITARY REVIEW JUN:E 1954 /tave to do the fighting. Men have won effort. Not only will you learn the an­ more battles than have machines. swers to questions such as those mentioned How are your subordinate leaders stand­ in the process, but you will also inspire ing up? Are they able to relax when they more than a few by your concern. A lead­ oc~asiona:lly get the chance, or are they er's demonstration of interest in his men driving themselves toward breakdowns? has turned many an unsure and badly­ Are they accomplishing their missions in worried man into one who believed that the most efficient fashion, or are some what he ~as doing was important-into losing more men than they should? one dedicated to doing what had to be How have they reacted to their casual­ done. And how often the efforts of such ties? Have they become callous to the a man have produced victory when all the point that they do not bother to search best that our technology could provide has for the most economical way to accomplish failed! an assigned mission? Have they' been Terrain is, of course, examined with shocked to the point that their present the view of checking observation and fear of losing more lives endangers their fields of fire, but look a little beyond respective commands because they can no this while you are about it. Periodically longer act in a decisive manner~ Have check the cross-country trafficability of they been so shaken by the loss of their the soil, pencil in on your map those subordinate leaders that they are now unmarked roads that you encounter, prac­ trying to do everything themselves? tice mentally calculating how long it And how about the men? Do they have would take you to climb up the various that little spark that marks the members hills you pass-and then remember your of a really good unit, or are they strange­ conclusions when planning future opera­ ly silent and lethargic? How do they act tions. Consider how the terrain in which when you talk to them? Pleased and you are operating will influence ammuni­ rather surprised that you are taking the tion resupply and casualty evacuation. time and effort, or are their answers to Soak up all the knowledge you can of your questions the bare minimum demand­ your area of operations whenever you are ed by your seniority? Do they talk of afforded the opportunity. their heroes and leaders proudly. or must Always make a point to remember the you pry out the names of such people? Do staff level at which you are operating. they go about their duties with a snap If you are the representative of a divi­ and a will, or with a sort of ill-concealed sion staff. do not tell platoon and com­ I'eluctance? Does the condition of their pany commanders how to employ their equipment suggest men that care, or does units and weapons. Look instead at their it testify to manifest indifference? over-all layouts to ensure that they ful­ ,Take the time you need to inquire into fill the needs of the division's plan. Then, the welfare of the men; the dividends you when you determine that they do-as accrue will more than repay you for the will usually be the case-devote the re­ mainder of your time to those generally Captain Paul B. Nelson, Jr., a frequent more important factors: the human and contributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, geographic aspects of the situation. served, from 1945 to 1948, with the 11th Airborne Division in Japan. He completed Personal reconnaissance is a MUST if a It yenrs of graduate work at Vanderbilt commander is to obtain the most accurate University and attended the advanced information. Personal reconnaissance pro­ course at The Infantry ScllOol, Fort Ben­ vides that necessary contact with the ea:ist­ ning Georgia. He is presently assigned ing situation at first hand upon ~hich to Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry Division in Korea. sound military decisions can be based. -, Airborne fire Slippprt Co-ordination"

Lieutenant Colonel George T. Metcalf, Artillery Instructor, Command and General Staff College

The view8 eXp)'e8Bed in this article tile territory, and is operating under a uI'e the author's and are not neces­ high degree of decentralized control ini­ sa1'ily thoBe of the Department of the tially. Communications range from non­ A~'my or the Command and General existent among the airborne forces at Sta./f College.-The Edito)'. the outset of the assault to limited for a considerable period afterward. 2, Indiyiduals of an airborne unit are IN 1952, the then Commanding General scattered in landing, and time is required of the Eighth Army in Korea was reported for assembly of the unit, reorganization, to have said "The great weight and flex­ and initiation of a reasonably co-ordinated ibility of fire power available to United ground attack to seize its assigned objec­ States combat commanders can never be tive. It is during this reorganization period employed in sufficient quantity or speed. that airborne units are most vulnerable Every effort, however, must be made to to enemy attack-particularly armored at­ reach this optimum. Steel is cheaper than tack. Twenty to forty minutes may be re­ lives and much easier to obtain." quired for assembly and establishment of Much has been written, and numerous communications within a parachute infan­ tests conducted concerning the most ef­ try battalion; up to 1% hours within the fective methods of utilizing our available regiment (depending upon landing times fire power. Some progress is being made and priorities); perhaps 2 to 2% hours regarding the co-ordination of fire power within a division; and 3 or more hOfrrs in support of conventional ground combat for a corps. Communication is essential for operations. The same cannot be said, how­ the application and co-ordination of fire ever, for joint airborne operations where support. a much more complicated problem is pre­ 3. Enemy reaction to the airborne land. sented. ing in his vital rear areas is usually Why is the application and co-ordina­ rapid. Enemy forces within the airhead tIOn of fire support a more complex and are surrounded and fight for survival as difficult problem in airborne operations? they attempt to break out. Enemy reserve For purposes of illustration and further and rear area forces, outside the air­ d}scussion, consider the following: head, may attack rapidly to annihilate the 1, The entire assault airborne force is airborne force while it is least capable of placed in immediate contact with the .en­ defending itself. As a result, the numer­ emy in a very short period of time, is ous smaller airborne units, shortly after 'pread over a relatively large area in hos­ landing, may find themselves fighting in

.vow is the time to establish the jointly-agreed doctrine and tech­ niques for applying and co-ordinating the fire support which is needed to ensure successful completion of future, joint airborne operations 22 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 several directions-and with little 01' no deficiency must be compensated for, inso­ information as to the whereabouts of far as possible, by external fire support other friendly or enemy forces. Calls for means such as air support, naval gunfire, fire support will inevitably reflect imme­ and-where the airhead is within support­ diate and critical needs. In the absence of ing distance--by long-range artillery of information, these requests cannot be ex­ advancing friendly forces. pected to consider the location of other friendly elements. Means of Fire Support 4. There is an initial absence of em­ It is unlikely that the majority of air­ placed ground supporting heavy weapons borne operations conducted in any future capable of responding immediately and ac­ war will be supported by naval gunfire. In curately to fire support requests from certain instances, however, where the ob­ heavily engaged airborne units-and the jective area is located in proximity to main effort is everywhere. navigable waters and where sea suprem­ 5. Throughout the initial airborne as­ acy permits, this valuable and powerful sault, there is a constant stream of low­ means of fire sup'port can and should be flying troop carrier aircraft continually exploited to the maximum. Naval aircraft, arriving over the airhead. This stream including carrier based planes, can, of shifts rapidly as additional assault ele­ course, be utilized at ranges far in excess ments, supplies, and equipment are de­ of ranges within the capability of sup­ livered to various dl'OP and landing zones porting surface ships. which have been predesignated to imple­ Tactical air support will always be es­ ment the desired scheme of maneuver (see sential. It may be provided by Air Force Figure 1). units, and naval forces, or a combination There are innumerable other differences of the two. between initial airborne assaults and con­ Artillery and similar supporting weap­ ventional ground or amphibious assaults. ons, landed with the airborne assault eche­ However, those enumerated above should lon, constitute the real backbone of close serve to impress the military reader and fire support for the airborne force once stimulate his thinking toward solution of they are in position and sufficient com­ the fire support problem. munications and observation have been Fire support must be provided; it must established to permit delivery of requested be controlled; and it must be co-ordinated fires. In addition to the types of fire sup­ to ensure effectiveness against the enemy port already mentioned, we may also have and safety to our airborne elements. A atomit; support, guided missile support, principal characteristic of learly link-up long-range rocket support, and strategic airborne operations is the absence of the air force bomber support. These additions fire support of heavy artillery and similar will further complicate the fire support supporting weapons in the airhead. This plan. When available, they must be inte­ grated closely with the -over-all plan for Lieutenant Colonel George T. Metcalf is support if their individual and collective the author of "Offensive Partisan War­ potential is to be utilized to the maximum. fare," which appeared in the Ap1'il 1952 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW. Since World War 11, his assignments have included Missions duty with the G1 Section, First Army; the The following are the principal types A1'my Advisory Group to China; and GHQ, of missions executed by tactical air, naval FEC. He has been an instructor at the Command and General Staff College since gunfire, and artillery in supporting air­ his graduation from that College in 1951. borne operations: AIRBORNE FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION 23

Tactical Air Support 8. Close support of assault a-irbol'ne 1. Air defense for the concentration and forces. marshaling areas, rear area resupply air­ Naval Gunfire (when it can be -.em­ field,s, and the airhead. ployed) . 2. Column cover for the troop carrier air 1. Preassaultbombardment of the objec­ columns of the assault airborne force, as tive area, and other critical areas and well as those for the follow-up air-landed for diversion purposes. forces and air resupply ·operations. 2. Flak suppression, particularly in the 3. Flak suppression along the air cor- vicinity of the objective area.

A DROP OR LANDING lONE WHICH IS THE DESTlNA· TlON FOR ONE OR MORE AIR SERIALS. IN A CORPS OPERATION. 30 TO 40 DIFfERENT DROP IONES OR LANDING IONES MIGHT BE EMPLOYED.

EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS AN AIR SERIAL OF FROM 45 TO 60 AIRCRAR. fOR A CORPS-SIZE OPERATION (3 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS) OVER 2.000 AIRCRAfT WOULD «II BE REQUIRED. AND THE AIR COLUMN WOULD BE 3 TO 4 HOURS IN TIME LfNGTH.

A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING A CORPS Alr{HEAD, WITH ITS WIDELY SCAnEREO DESTINATION DROP AND LANDING ZON~, AND ARRIVING lROOP CARRIER SERIALS. THE SEQUENCE OF SERIALS IN THE AIR COLUMN IS DICTATED BY THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER CONTEMPLATED. SERIALS DESTINED FOR DIFfERENT COMBAT TEAM AND DIVISION AREAS MAY BE INTERMINGLED IN THE AIR COLUMN. ridor as required and in the vicinity of the 3. General and close support. ohjective area. 4. Interdiction, both inland and sea­ 4. Reconnaissance, photo and visual, wa·rd. during both the planning, and operational Artillery (after establishment· in the phases of the airborne operations. airhead or when provided by advancing 5. Counieroir, t~t gain and retain air link-Up forces). stlperiority in the'vICinity of the air cor­ 1. General support, to include counter­ ridor used by the troop carrier air ele­ battery, interdiction, harassing and neu­ Illents and in the objective area. tralization fires, and flak suppression, 6. Preassuult bombardment of the im­ 2. Direct (close) support, to assist in­ mediate area of the contemplated airhead, fantry units in seizure and defense of Ii" well as other critical areas and for their objectives. division purposes. 7. Interdiction of the objective area, in­ The Principles Involved cluding armed reconnaissance missions, to Previous discussion has outlined the prevent or delay enemy reinforcements major differences. related to fire support '

A portion of one company of the 187th Cqmbat landing by parachute in Korea. This photo indicates the dispersion of troops which will result and the problem of as­ sembly, communication, and reorganization on the ground. A corps airborne assault would place 40,000 to 50,000 troops in the airhead by parachute and assault aircraft landings. De­ pending on mission, enemy, and terrain, the airhead would be 10 to 30 miles in diameter. tion-will standardize and simplify op­ ting" of naval gunfire can be accomplished erating procedures and resolve many by artillery or other observers of the air­ pl'l)blems concerning the application of all borne force who have been given necessary tYlles of support. Liaison personnel should training. An air liaison officer and a naval be mutually interchanged between sup­ gunfire officer should accompany each di­ pOI-ted' and supporting elements, and be vision and corps headquarters. The com­ continuously available throughout the munications requirements for these 'ac­ operation. Where there are limitations on companying air and naval personnel must th> number of qualified personnel avail- be provided: Liaison representatives from 26 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE-1954 the airborne force should be provided to Adequate communications facilities appropriate Air Force and Navy support­ must be operable in the AOIC to perinit . ing echelons. immediate and simultaneous communica­ tion with battalion and higher unit head­ Centralized Co-ordination quarters which have already landed, flight There is a requirement for an organiza­ leaders of aircraft flights on air alert, tion (oJ: system) to be in existence, serial leaders of troop carrier serials throughout the airborne operation, hav­ transporting airborne elements, fire sup-­ ing a personnel and communications ca­ port ships of supporting naval forces, and pability which permits centralized control the Field Army-Tactical Air Force JOe and coordination of fire support with the \lnd Tactical Air Direction Center located maneuver of airborne elements. adjacent thereto (see Figure 3). A dupli­ The major problem is how to meet cate, alternate AOIC should be provided this requirement during the initial stages which would be ready to take over in of the airborne assault prior to the es­ emergency. The alternate would be on a tablishment of ground communications standby "listening" basis until needed. throughout the airborne force. Afte?' the Into the AOIC would flow information airborne force has landed ana ground concerning locations of units already communications have been established, landed in the airhead, located enemy current doctrine dictates that the organ­ forces, the time each troop carrier serial ization should take the form of the fire passes the initial point and the bearing support co-ordination system outlined in and altitude taken for the final run-in to Department of Army Training Circular the destination drop or landing zone, the No.9, Co-ordination of Fire Support, status and armament of close support air­ dated 25 May 1953. Briefly, that system craft over the airhead on air alert, aerial provides for a Fire Support Co-ordina­ reconnaissance reports, location of naval tion Center (FSCC) at battalion and fire support ships, and similar informa­ higher levels in which are represented all tion. When fire support is needed-in ex­ fire support agencies. cess of that immediately available on the What form should the organization ground in direct support of the requesting adopt for the assault? Where would it be unit-request would be made to the AOIC. located? How would it operate? What are The AOIC would assign fire support the personnel and communications require­ missions to supporting elements, issue or­ ments? ders as required restricting fires in cer­ One solution is to plan for and provide tain areas, inform requesting units of fire a temporary Airborne Operations-Intelli­ support to be provided and direct any nec­ gence Center (AOIC). In a corps early essary implementing action, assign ap­ link-up airborne operation, for example, propriate frequencies or channels for di­ it is envisioned that an aircraft will or­ rect communication between requesting bit over the airhead from the beginning and delivering agencies, disseminate in­ of the actual airborne assault. In this air­ formation concerning the tactical situa­ cridt will be representatives of the corps tion, co-ordinate fires to be delivered near commander, each airborne division com­ boundaries between adjacent units, and mander, the supporting tactical air force, forward requests to JOC for air support the supporting naval force (if naval gun­ required in excess of that available from fire is available), the troop carrier air aircraft on air alert. In a situation where force, and the army commander of the long-range fires of advancing ground ele­ field army designated to effect link-up, ments could be employed in support of the AIRBORNE FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION 27 airborne assault, they would also be co­ mander's representative located therein. ordinated by the AOIC. He would exercise operational control, for Immediately upon landing, each bat­ the airborne force commander, over the talion or higher headquarters would estab­ close support delivered. He would ensure lish direct communication with the AOIC, that this support does not endanger and report location and any enemy activity friendly elements on the ground, incom­ detected. Subsequently, requests for fire ing troop carrier serials, other aircraft or' support beyond that which 'is available naval elements in the area, or would de­ from organic or direct support means termine that the benefits to be gained would be transmitted directly to the AOIC. justify the degree of risk involved. He r ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I AIR ALERT~-~ AIRCRAFT ~~ i~;1 ~...---- ~~I El ~ f\xxxx nl ~ ~ ...... INCOMING TROOP ~ I CARRIER SERIALS ~(-- nI FRIENDLY LlNK·UP FORCE AIRHEAD U SUPPORTING NAVAL FORCES. IF AVAILABLE

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OF PROPOSED AIRBORNE OP~RATIONS INTElliGENCE CENTER (AOIC) RAblO CHANNELS INDICATED WILL BE UTILIZED TO RECEIVE AND TRANSMIT INFORMATION AND TO DIRECT OPERATIONS. THEY WILL t!QI BE USED TO CONDUCT fiRE SUPPORT MISSIONS EXCEPT IN EMERGENCY. APPROVED FIRE SUPPORT MISSIONS WILL 8E CON­ DUCTED OVER SEPARATE CHANNElS BY DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE RECEIVING AND DELIVERING AGENCIES.

~

Ag regimental and division headquarters would also determine the means to be em­ landed and entered the communications ployed for an approved tequest after con­ net, requests would be forwarded through sultation with representatives in the these headquarters. AOIC. Applicable time, area, and similar Control of organic and direct fire sup­ safety restrictions should be announced. pOI·t would be preplanned in most in­ For air missions approved, the tactical stances and would be co-ordinated within air representative would allocate the nec­ th0 unit concerned. Emergency situations essary close support aircraft, communicate may arise, however, which would make it appropriate target and other informa­ n(·eessary to negate this preplanned con­ tion to the flight leader thereof, and di­ trol. In such cases, restrictions, as ap­ rect him to the area concerned to establish P' opriate, would be established by the contact with the Forward Air Controller AvIC. (FAC) designated to direct the air strike. Co-ordination of a request for fire sup­ From this point on, the air strike would ptlrt received by the AOIC would be a be conducted in the normal manner. The r. sponsibility of the airborne corps com­ flight leader would report back to the tac­ 28 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 19M tical air representative in the AOIC at ecution of all missions on a definite pre­ the conclusion of the strike. arranged schedule. Fire support applied For an approved naval gunfire mission, inside the bomb or no-fire line subsequent the representative of the supporting Navy to the assault must be on an "on-call" basis forces in the AOIC would communicate the to ensure safety to friendly airborne forces necessary target and other information to and appropriate priority in attack of tar­ the fire support ship concerned, requesting gets. the ship to contact the naval gunfire liai­ Bomb Line Selection son officer with the requesting unit. The bomb line warrants careful selec­ The mission would be conducted by di­ tion. It must encircle the airhead. Usu­ rect communication

I think no one can doubt that another war, if it comes, will be a war of movement. The Maginot Line type of thinking has been heavily discredited by past events. When I speak of mobility I refer to the mobility of forces-not the mo­ bility of weapons themselves. A completely mobile force is one which is en­ tirely free of the shackling infl uence of prepared positions such as bases, forts. and landing fields. A completely mobile forre is one which carries its base facilities with it as a component part of its own structure.

Admiral William M. Fechteler THE CONDUCT OF BRIEFINGS

Lieutenant Carl M. Guelzo, Transportation Corps

The views expressed in this Q1·ticle The briefing, on the other hand, is are the author's and are not neces­ designed to acquaint the listener with a sa1'ily those of the Department of the specific situation (often unrelated to any Army or the Command and General activity which may' precede or follow) Staff College.-The Editor. involving procedure, mission, function, or other elements of background material in as short a space of time as is commensu­ T HE division G3, as he' steps to the rate with a full and sufficient understand­ operations map to outline u;pit positions ing upon which to base decisions and for a forthcoming attack, would probably actions of immediate importance. be the last to admit that he was engaging Briefings may be conducted simply to in a formal educational activity. His notes inform an interested group of pertinent are few, his preparation certainly nowhere recent events which have a direct bearing nl'al' as extensive ,as that required for a on the conduct of daily or special opera­ class in map reading or tactics, and no tions. Or, briefings may be held to provide written examinatibn is scheduled at the a sufficient informational background conclusion of his ipresentation. However, drawn from past actions and future pro­ the fact remains that although he did not babilities to enable those affected to form consciously adapt ihis talk to any of the and implement plans, actions, or orders. formally defined methods of teaching, he The keynote of the briefing, however, is did utilize a popular but little discussed not simply informational in nature, but method of instruc~ion: the briefing. informational with ~he expectation of A briefing, although perhaps not so definite resulting action. The major pur­ rigidly classified and extensivelY described pose is dynamic. as other more formal methods of presenta­ A certain amount of material may be tion, is at least: closely related to the presented during the course of a brief­ lecture and conference methods. The ing that is purely informative in nature l~cture and conference are used to impart and largely historical in content. How­ facts, ideas, or opinions to students which ever, the briefing can also be used, to they mayor ma}; not be called upon to excellent advantage in ensuring that all.af­ u,e immediately. We like to think of the fected members of a command are equally more formal methods of instruction in grounded in various essential elements of d~finite increments of time filled by the information vital to an understanding of u~e of familiar presentation techniques. current and future operations. Not only They are employed to impart information. background material, but orders and di­

The'simple, brief, precise, and factual presentation-whether it be a statement o~ a mission OJ' an explanation of a vital phase of a cur­ :ent or futur() operation-is the ultimate goal of a military briefing 132 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE· 1954

: rectives as well may be promulgated dur­ dividual copies, handed to each member of ing the pl'esentation. the group upon which notes can be made, I Briefings are normally conducted on rel­ are useful supplements to large-size wall atively short notice and within strictly charts. The simple aids, easily usable and ,prescribed time limitations, Preparation explainable in the short time normally : involves, necessarily, condensation of con­ available for briefings, are the most ef­ . siderable amounts of material into presen­ ficient and effective, tations frequently lasting but a few min­ utes. Preparation must be thorough and Orientation complete, although not as extensive as that Briefings, as the term implies, are usu­ required for the normal classroom situa­ ally comparatively short. The long, de­ tion. The subject matter of the briefing tailed' presentation, often called a briefing, must be given primary attention with only is in reality simply a closely related sufficient additional background material cousin-the orientation. The briefing is considered that is necessary to provide the always informative and frequently direc­ person conducting the briefing with as tive in nature. Listeners at a briefing are much information as he will require to usually expected to take some specific ac­ answer a limited number of questions on tion or produce a prescribed result based the basic or immediately related topics. on the content of the presentation. The When missions, functions, procedures, orientation, on the other hand, is pri­ marily informative and almost never di­ and related administrative topics are dis­ cussed, preparation must include a more rective. The content of the orientation is detailed study of the material than is in­ directed toward providing an informa­ tional background upon which understand­ tended to be presented orally. Presenta­ ings rather than actions will be based. In­ tion of orders and directives requires a sufficient background study to enable the directly, the orientation may produce briefer to discuss not only the basic direc­ concrete results, but the intent is explana­ tive itself, but also the w/iais and whys tory rather than dynamic. and possibly the hOlDS. The director of operations at a large port installation might brief his troop Training Aids movement personnel on the handling of an Simple training aids are invaluable in incoming troop transport; but the troop presenting briefings. Complex charts and movement personnel would orient visitors diagrams, maps of too small a scale, on the mission, operations, and function graphs and printed material too small for of their unit. In the former instance, a convenient reading at a distance, or specific results and actions are expected training aids of an awkward size detract and even directed; in the latter instance, rather than add to the presentation. If information upon which a better under­ maps or other diagrams must be used, in- standing of the over-all personnel move­ ment task of the port is presented which Lieutenant Cal'l M. Guelzo is a graduate may, only incidentally, result at some un­ of the Univel'sity of Pennsylvania. Aftel' specified future date in concrete action. serving in K01'ea with the 3d Infantry Division, and at the 2d T Major Port in An orientation is, then, an oral pres­ the Far East, he l'etlll'ned to the United entation of unspecified length to acquaint States and became educational advisor in an audience with a procedure, operation, the Technical Training Department of the or organizational structure so that a better Transpol'tation School. He is now assigned to the Tel'minal Services Bl'anch, Trans­ understanding may be produced· of the pOI·tation Section. Al'my Fm'ces, Fal' East. topic presented and its relationship to· al­ I THE CONDUCT OF BRIEFINGS 33 I lied matters. No..specific results or actions briefing. The short, clear, concise state­ Ilre expected or directled except as may oc­ ment of the problem or the actions ex­ cur indirectly throu~h a deeper realiza­ pected is far more, to be desired than the tion of the importanfe of the basic sub­ presentation which buries its basic, es­ ject. sential content in a mass of unnecessary The Principles explanatory material. The audience at a The need for rapid and thorough prepa­ briefing is in attendance not to be en­ ration and the timel limitations usually tertained or to pass time, but to be in­ involved render strict observance of the formed on a specific topic, mission, pro­ principles of good speech and instruction ject, or action in as short a space of time more vital in the brie~ng than in any other as possible. The simple, pr~cise, factual form of oral presentajion. Five basic c~ar­ statement-whether it be a statement of acteristics of the bIliefing bear detailed a mission or an explanation of a vital consideration here. phase of a current operation-is <;he goal in the pl'esentation of briefings. Brelfity A briefing is, by' definition, a b"ief Emphasis presentation. The long, detailed briefing is Even in so condensed and concentrated the exception to the normal rule and usu­ an oral presentation as a briefing, not all aily assumes more of the characteristics material covered will be of equal weight of the orientation. The background to be or value. The background material should divulged, the detail necessary to an ade­ be clearly separated from the essential quate understanding of the task or topic data upon which directives or actions will involved, the order1, to be given, and tlite be based. Emphasis on the vitally impor­ instructions to be followed are usuaily tant phases of the presentation serves not presented in rapid succession by several only to high light these facets for the au­ persons who have specialized in one parti­ dience, but also to impress on them the cular phase of the total topic. Different importance of these elements in relation individuals may give the administrative, to other material contained in the briefing. tactical, logistical, or operational phases I of a subject, while still others will detail Summary tht. missions or projects.to be accom­ Complete understanding of a presenta­ plished. Brevity is essential if the group of tion can never be taken for granted. Am­ listeners is to grasp the entire topic as a ple opportunity should be provided for unified whole. the asking and answering of pertinent questions on the mate~ial covered. If time COllciselless . permits, all questi

Anything, the briefer does to reduce the briefings, as are such other instructional amount of time spent on background ma­ aids as tape recorders. terial is of considerable value. Time thus saved can be devoted to excellent .advan­ Conclusion Regardless of the topic or the situation, tage in expanding on material to be used the basic purpose of the briefing is to get directly'by the personnel concerned in tak­ said what must be said as briefly, clearly, ing required actions. Written summaries, and concisely as possible to provide the outlines, guides, or other supplementary listeners with the maximum amount of material reduce the time which must be time in which to implement the orders and devoted to the presentation of facts, directives presented. It is the action that figures, historical analyses, and organiza­ results from the briefing that is important. tional structure, The bl'iefing should contribute to the ease Rehearsals under as near actual condi­ and effectiveness with which that action is tions as possible serve not only to polish carried out. The briefing that does any­ the final presentation, but to weed out the thing less has-at the very least-wasted unnecessary as well. Informal monitor­ precious moments in a situation where ing by associates is an invaluable aid in time is often of far more importance than impl'oving the presentation of subsequent words.

THE MISSION OF THE MILITARY REVIEW The MILITARY REVIEW has the mission of disseminating modern military thought and current Army doctrine concerning command and staff procedures of the division and higher echelons and to provide a forum for articles which stimulate military thinking. Authors, civilian and military alike, are encouraged to submit materials which will assist in the fulfillment of this mission. Competition for Military Writers Remuneration for all published articles submitted by military writers (active-duty personnel of the uniformed services of the United States Armed Forces) in the maga­ zine is on a competitive basis. Monthly Award-All arficles written by military authors published in each issue are reviewed by a board of officers representing the Command and General Staff College. The board selects the first and second best articles published each month. The authors of the selected articles receive $100 and $50, respectively. ' , Annual Award-When 12 monthly awards have been made, the 12 first place articles are reviewed by the Faculty Board and the Annual Award article selected. The author of the Annual Award article receives $350. The selection of both monthly and annual awards is based upon the soundness, readability, completeness, reader appeal, accuracy, substance, originality of thought, authoritativeness, and the over-all merit and quality of the article. Civilian Writers Reimbursement for published articles submitted to the MILITARY REVIEW by civilian authors (to include retired military personnel, and reserve personnel not on active duty) is on an individual basis. ECONOMY Of fORCE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY :Major Sam Long, USAR

The views expressed in 'this article Basic Principles are the author's and m'e not neces­ A most obvious way of reducing the p'er­ sarily those of the Department of the centage of military personnel engaged in 'Army or the Command and General command and administrative activities is Staff College,-The Editor. to increase the number of units subordi­ nate to each headquarters. The reason for this is that a headquarters can service "E CONOMY of force is the use of mm­ and eommand twice as many subordinate imum power in a given area or 'areas in units with less than twice as many head­ order that major forces may be available quarters personnel. Speaking of organiza­ el~ewhere," Since, for every man in our tion generally, without specific reference Army who is taking direct offensive ac­ to military organization, Alvin Brown in tion against the enemy, we require from his book O"ganization, a Formulation of 7 to 14 men to do multitudinous duties Principle states: which are referred to as support activities, this phase of military activity seems a ... If organization' prescribes two stage8 lucrative pJace to start practicing economy (of subdivision of responsibility) where of force. Included in these support activi­ one is practicable, it imposes greater re­ ties is the business of bringing the means quirements of effort, of membership, and of existence and of waging war from base of cost than are necessaTY. Economy has establishments to the troops in the fighting been accepted as a major consideration in line-an activity customarily called ad­ Q)·ganization. While it cannot be expTessed ministration and supply. I propose in this mathematically, it is clem' that the fewer article to examine the basic organization the stages of delegation, the less the re­ of the United States type field army, for quil'ements of membership and of cost. consistency with certain principles of or­ ganization which have been developed and The solution to our problem is then to expounded by authoriti'es in military have each headquarters manage 30 01'40 science. I shall, therefore, suggest certain subordinate units instead of the present changes which might be made in the or­ :3 or 4. Or is it the answer? Before w~ ganization of our type field army, for the seriously consider any such radical depar­ purpose of reducing the requirement of ture from our present practice, let us first personnel which are necessary in order to begin by consulting the views of some out­ Vl'ovide administrative and logistic sup­ standing persons who have had extensive port to a given force of combat personnel. experience in this and similar matters"

A reorganization of our type field army could minimize the personnel essential for administrative and logistical support activities and, at ihe same time, increase our combat mobility and,: tactical flexibility 36 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 Karl von Clausewitz in his book, 011 tation 'stated above, as "span of control." War, wrote as follows: A century after Clausewitz, Sir Ian Hamilton in his book, The Soul and Body I'll st1'ategy we should never ask what of an Army, wrote: m1!st be the 8tl'ength (if a division or corps, but how many corps or divisions an army The average human brain finds its ef­ must have, There is nothing more unman­ fective sc(}pe in handling from three to six ageable than an army divided into three other b'rains. Pal'ts, except it be one divided into only * * * .. two, in which case the supreme command As to whether the groups are three, four, must be almost neutralized. five, or six it is useful to bear in mind a " .. " by-law: the smaller the responsibility of Inasmnch as we understand the terlll the group member, the larger may be the members ()f a whole only those which re­ number of the group--and vice versa, sult from the fil'st subdivision, we say: That is to say, one noncommissioned of­ 1. If a whole has'too few members, it -is fiCe?' in charge of three private 80ldiel's /tlIwieldy. would be too idle; one lieutenant general :!. If the parts of a whole are too lal'ge, in charge of six divi8ional generals would the power of the commander in chief is be too busy. The nearer we approach the thereby weakened, supreme head of the whole (}rganization, the more we ought to work toward groups ;j, With eve,'y additional step through which an order has to pass, it is weak­ of three; the closel' we get to the f(}ot of ened in two ways.. first, by the loss of the organization (the Infantry of the Line) force, which it suffers in its passage the more we work toward groups of six, through an additional step; second, by the longer time it needs for transmissi011, General A, P. Wavell writing for the Encyclopedia Britannica echoes the opin­ The tendency of all this is to show that ion of Sir Ian Hamilton, saying: the llumbe,' of co-ordinate members should be as great, and the serie8 of graduations Generally speaking, the number of units as sma it, as possible, and the only limita­ grouped in a formation should not be less tion to this conclusion is that in an army than thl'ee nor more than six, In a forma­ no more than b'om eight to ten member8, tion composed of two units only, the influ­ and in smallel' units 'no more than from ence of the commander orthe formation is fow' to six subdivisions, can be conven­ small; while it has been found by expe­ iently controlled. rie';ce that six units is the maximum which can conveniently be commanded and ad­ The reader probably recognizes the limi- ministered by one headquarters ..

Major Sam Long, USAR, is a graduate Span of Control of Kansas State College. He entere~ the service in 1941, and was Group A rttllerY In his book, The Armor of Organization, Aviation Officer with XXIV Corps on, Alvin Brown quotes the above authorities Leyte and Okinawa during World War on span of control; and with reference t(} II. He was separated from the service in 1946 and has been verY active in National our own Army, states further: Gua;d and Reserve affairs since that time. Major Long is also a graduate of the Field , . . .Military men are fond of saying ArtillerY Officers' Associate Course, 1949, that delegations should be limited to fOUl' and the 1958 Associate Course at the Com­ 'mand and General Staff College. or five. Any incentive to take them ser­ ECONOMY OF FORCE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY 37 iOllsly, howeve1', is abated by the fact that cal span of control in administrative mat­ they never put their convictions into prac­ ters, but as evidence that the theory is in tice, .on second thought, that statement is good standing in our present military illcorrect, It probably should be said they establishment. follow a rule of S or so-nothing between, They divided their tQctical organizations Present Organization into th1'ee parts and theil' 'admini8trative' If we accept the theory of organizing organizations into thirty, administrative and supply functions in al­ This i8, of course, exaggel'ation, and ternate echelons of the chain of tacttcal p/'obably 80me apology is due, The facts command, then our present organization are that triangular tactical OI'ganization of the type field army has an' obviously does not mean there aTe only thTee delega­ weak link. In all branches of the Army tions in a tactical unit, and that their except infantry, companies are formed 'administrative' Q?'ganizations' do not al­ into administrative and tactical units cal­ 1I'ays have thil'ty, , , , led "separate battalions." In these units; one headquarttlrs fur­ Mr, Brown has emphasized a principle nishes supply and personnel administra­ of military organization not mentioned by tion support for three to five subordinate the previously quoted authorities-that elements. Since we have determined that is, that the practical span of control in one headquarters can efficiently furnish administrative matters is vastly greater administrative support to some 30 subor­ than the practical span of control in dinate elements, the organization of sep­ tactical matters. arate battalions is inefficient in the use of Prior to 1938, our type field army was these facilities. Thus, it WQuid seem that organized so that administrative and sup­ the separate battalion is not a desirable ply matters were processed in alternate unit on which to build a type field army, echelons of the chain of tactical com­ unless it can be shown to have definite mand, tactical advantages over the regimental type of organization. Thus, in a tactical organization based on groupings of three elements, adminis­ Also, the infantry division headquarters trative matters would be processed on the furnishes supply and administrative sup­ port to only three infantry regiments and basis of at least nine elements per head~ their supporting arms. Of course, since quarters, these supporting arms are organized into I have been unable to find who was the separate battalions, the total number of author of this system. It is possible that regiments and separate battalions serviced the system is the result of trial and error, by division administration and supply is and has no single author. 11 (this does not include the newly created The logic behind this system is not too ordnance battalion). This is a large enough clear; but probably includes the fact that ll-umber to discourage us from attempting in administrative matters the desire to to move the supply and ~dministration ac­ accompliEh the mission often comes from tivities to the next higher echelon of tac­ helow, as well as from above, whereas the tical command. However, if we could ,lesire to accomplish the tactical mIssIon organize some of these supporting arms­ 'S more commonly imposed from the top for instance, the artillery-into ,regiments, ,lown. we would reduce the number of elements I quote Mr. Brown, not to prove the drawing administrative and supply sup­ validity of the theory of a greater practi­ port from division. Thus, by reorganizing 38 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 the division artillery as a regiment, we Battalion (nonadministrative) would haye seven regiments and separate Regiment (administrative) battalions drawing administrative support Brigade (nonadministrative) from diVision-and this number is small Division (administrative) enough to warrant consolidation in the next higher echelon of tactical command. Corps (nonadministrative) Army (administrative) Artillery Regiment Army Group (nonadministrative) Perhaps I should digress here to con­ Organization II sider the implications of this proposed Company (administrative) reconstruction of the artillery regiment. I have been intimately connected with the Battalion (nonadministrative) Field Artillery since 1937; and witnessed Regiment (administrative) its conversion from the regimental sys­ Division (nonadministrative) tem to the separate battalion system. Corps (administrative) Dul'ing World War II, I saw division ar­ Army (nonadministrative) tillery headquarters assume more and Army Group (administrative) more of the responsibilities of a regimental headquarters, for two l·easons. First, there Theater Army Headquarters, a tactical just were not enough capable officers to and administrative headquarters, would operate four different supply and adminis­ enter this chain of command at the ap­ trative systems efficiently (the antiaircraft propriate level to furnish the required size artillery automatic weapons battalion was of Army force in the theater. then not organic to the infantry division). It is readily apparent that Organization Second, in the competition for supply and I is identical with Organization II, ex­ administrative services at division (this cept for nomenclature. By developing my compEltition should not exist, but in prac­ theme along the lines of Organization II, tice does exist), the staff officers of the I could avoid confusing the reader as to separate battalions did not have sufficient the size of organization to which I shall rank to compete with the staff officers of refer as a "division." However; I prefer the infantry regiments. to develop my theme along the lines of Organization I, to assist the reader in fol­ Having studied field artillery tactics, lowing my thought as to the proper func­ and having "talked shop" with field artil­ tion of the headquarters of division, corps, lery officers from all theaters of World and army-that is, these headquarters War II, I can envision very few circum­ should function very much as in our pres­ stances in which the separate battalion of ent type field army; being modified as nec­ direct support artillery has advantages essary to accommodate a larger force unobtainable with a battalion of an artil­ created by interposing the brigade echelon lery regiment. I have seen many circum­ of command. I believe that, with minor stances in which the regimental organiza­ modifications, the machinery of command tion would have been advantageous. and administration which we have devel­ Getting back to the main theme, I would oped at division level during the last de­ suggest that our organization of the type cade, is well suited to control and sup­ field, army should conform to one of the port a force of some 80,000 men, organized following courses: as in Organization 1. Again, I would like Organization I to digress to consider a related problem. Company (administrative) Since we abandoned the "square division," ECONOMY OF FORCE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY 39 we have tried a number of divisional or­ If we would have maximum interchange­ ganizations-the infantry division, the ability of elements of different types of motorized infantry division, the airborne diviSions, we should either reorganiZe the division, the mountain d~vision, and the armored division along regimental lines, srmored division. Each of these organiza­ or else eliminate the regiment entirely tions was somewhat experimental and, to from all divisional organization. We have s degree, reflected the views of its chief used both of these types of organization proponents. During World War II, the in­ for some 12 years, including 3 years of fantry division and the motorized infantry warfare in diverse parts of the globe and division were combined into a new infantrY' another 3 years of "police action." division designed to be readily motorized At this time we should be able to de. ss the need arose. Since World War II, cide whether the Infantry has a sound the process of standardization of the ele­ and economical organization, or whether ments of the four remaining types of di­ the Armored Force has improved on the vision has continued. At present, the Infantry's organization. It is doubtful mountain division is a slight modification whether the difference in tactics--a dif­ of the infantry division, the airborne divi­ ference in degree rather than kind-would sion is organized very similar to the infan­ dictate one type of organization in the try division, and even the armored division Infantry and an entirely different type has some elements organized like corre­ in the Armored Force. As the reader may sponding elements of the infantry divi­ SUSP!!ct by now, I favor the regimental sion (the reconnaissance company, Table organization. of Organization and Equipment 17·57, and the tank company, Table of Organization More Basic Principles and Equipment 17-37). It is reasonable to In making suggestions for changes in expect elements of the several types of organization, I shall give thought to two division to be further standardized, in considerations proposed by General C. D. order to increase flexibility at the Depart­ Roberts in his article, The Infantry Dipi­ ment of the Army level. However, we have sion, which are: a real problem in standardizing elements of the armored and infantry divisions, in Any OI'ganization which requi1'es that its that there is a great difference in the units be habitually broken up in order to basic structure of these two divisions. function under the ordinary conditions of The armored division is organized en­ combat is faulty. tirely from separate battalions. These are organized under an armored division head­ The basic infant1·y fighting and adminis­ ;juarters (a tactical and administrative trative unit is the company. It should be headquarters) and controlled tactically homogeneous, mobile, and armed with one through an intermediate nonadminstrative p"incipal weapon. headquarters, the combat command. On the other hand, the infantry compa­ I would extend General Roberts' second 'lies are organized into regiments (tactical consideration; and say that it is desir­ nnd administrative headquarters) which able for a unit to be armed with few types "ontrol the companies tactically through of weapons, to minimize the logistic prob­ the intermediate nonadministrative bat­ lem and to minimize the amount of tactical talion headquarters. The regiments are and technical knowledge required of an ef· vrganized directly under the tactical and ficient commander. administrative division headquaorters. Now if we are to fight with a force of 40 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1964 > combineli arms, and if this force is to have The 'company headquarters would have one commandel' ; then General Roberts' two tanks and one armored vehicle. The two considerations are incompatible, and company, including command and service we'must either ignore one of them or ar­ personnel, would have approximately 100 rive at It compromise. The Armored Force to 110 officers and men, depending on the has chosen to ignore the first considera­ size of the tank crew. tion. In fact, some armored officers seem Nine tank companies would form a regi­ to take special delight in proving that, by ment of three battalions. Six companies General Roberts' standards, their organi­ would be equipped with medium tanks and zation is faulty. . three with heavy tanks. On the other hand, the Infantry tends The tank regiment would have an or­ to ignore the second consideration, and ganic reconnaissance company (Table of makes the infantry unit a miniature divi­ Organization and Equipment 17-57). Also, sion. Having saddled himself with an im­ the regimental headquarters company anll posing array of weapons, the infantry com­ each battalion headquarters company mander looks at his superhuman task of would have an organic reconnaissance control and decides that he needs more platoon identical to a platoon of the recon­ rank. I believe that a proper organization naissance company, and a command pla­ should' reflect both of General Roberts' toon equipped with two tanks and an ar­ considerations; compromised through a proper weighing of the factors involved. mored vehicle. Thus, an armored regiment would have Armored Brigade 15 light tanks, 72 medium tanks, 35 heavy In view of the foregoing theoretical tanks, and 47 armored personnel carriers. considerations, I would suggest organizing Estimated personnel strength would be armored units as follows: the tank platoon 1,900 to 2,000 officers and men. It should should have three tanks (versus five tanks be remembered that, by our present stan­ in our present platoon) and one armored dards of armored organization, this pro­ vehicle (M-75 or T-59). This vehicle would posed tank regiment is two-thirds tank carry 10 men, including the driver; and and one-third armored infantry. a mortar (81-mm or 4.2 inch). The armored brigade (corresponding in The personnel of this armored vehicle size to our present armored division) would provide the minimum foot troops re­ would normally consist of three armored quired to support tanks operating against regiments, a standard infantry regiment infantry elements, and also mortar fire completely motorized, an artillery regi­ to reach areas defiladed from the tapk ment, an engineer battalion (separate), a guns. These men could also be a trained medical battalion (separate), and a com­ reserve of tank crewmen. I believe that mand element. the task of training these men in the few Contrary to the theories expressed by infantry tactics needed to support the op­ Clausewjtz and Hamilton, the organiza­ eration of tanks is well within the capabili­ tion which I have proposed for Armor is ties of the tank company commander. based on groups of three, for two reasons: These platoons should be organized first, as organized in groups of three, the three to a company. A fourth platoon of armored unit can be used to reinforce the s~pporting weapons is not needed; as the standard infantry unit, or can itself be tank itself is a weapon of large volume reinforced by standard infantry elements; of fire, .and each. platoon has_ its own to make an Infan~ry-Arlllor team of any mortar to complement the fire of the tanks. desired ratio-with a minimum disruption ECONOMY OF FORCE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY 41 of the basic organization of E:\ither unit. mental headquarte;s, the tank 'regiment Second, the nature of Armor 'makes the could furnish a tactical co-ordinating ele­ command element also a maneuver ele­ ment to any infantry regiment to which, ment. By virtue of commanding a smaller more than one tank company is attached. number of subordinate elements, the com­ The reconnaissance company of the tank mand element is more available to per­ regiment would perform those tactical mis­ form its tactical duties. Also, if the com­ sions "now performed by the infantry divi­ nlUnd element is not burdened to the limit sion reconnaissance company. Probably all of its span of control, it can better manage nine tank companies of ':pis regiment augmentation tactical elements which may would be equipped with medium tanks. be attached as the situation requires. The only change which I would suggest Elements of,a Proposed Infantry Division in the present infantry regiment is to 10 Infantry Regiments make the tank company a normal attach­ 6 Tank Regiments ment rather than an organic unit. This 1 Armored Cavalry Regiment is in agreement with my extension of Gen­ 4 Artillery Regiments (direct support) eral Roberts' second consideration quoted (or more) Artillery Regiment (med­ earlier, and contrary to his first consid­ ium and heavy) eration. Thus, the tank company would be Drg'anized, trained, and administered by 1 (or more) Artillery Regiment (AA) the tank regiment of the infantry brigade; 1 Engineer Regiment (C) but would normally operate with a given 4 Engineer Battalions (C) (separate} infantry regiment. The reason for this lies 1 Medical Regiment in the emphasis which Armor must place 4 Medical Battalions (separate) (op­ on organizational maintenance. Mainte­ tional) nance of equipment is vitally important in 1 Quartermaster Regiment the Infantry; in Armor it is the very es­ sence of survival. It is believed that this Ordnance Regiment maintenance will be performed better in a Signal Regiment tUllk company administered by the tank Headquarters Regiment, including': regiment. Division Headquarters Company The infantry brigade (of size corre­ 4 Brig'ade Headquarters Companies sponding' to our present infantry divi­ Artillery Brigade Headquarters Bat­ sion) would normally consist of three in­ tery fantry rcg'iment'!i, a tank regiment, an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion Logistic Brigade Headquarters Com­ (,eparate), a medical battalion (sepa­ pany rate), and a command element. Military Police Battalion The tank regiment of the infantry bri­ Replacement Battalion gade would differ from that of the armored brigade in that it would have only two More About Artillery battalion headquarters. Since the prime As mentioned previously, the artillery mission of this regiment is to support the organic to our present division would be Infantry, one tank company would nor­ organized into a regiment, having three mally be attached to each of the three battalions of 10S-mm howitzers, one bat­ infantry regiments, leaving six to operate talion of 155-mm howitzers, and one an­ with the tank regiment. Having two bat­ tiaircraft artillery automatic weapons bat­ talion headquarters; as well as the regi­ talion. I would borrow an idea from the 42 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 cavalry l'egiment (Table of Organization (our present concept) of three armored and Equipment 17-51) and organize the divisions and one' infantry division. By logistic elements of the artillery regiment varying the composition of the brigades, in such a way that a detachment could be and by detachment and attachment be­ used to augment either the battalion head­ tween regiments, we could attain a high quarters battery or the service elements degree of tactical flexibility. It should also of the infantry or tank regiment to which be possible to attach a brigade of one divi­ the artillery battalion might be attached. sion to another division as the tactical This would provide the minimum logistic situation requires; with the restriction support required when the artillery bat­ that the division to which the\rigade is talion must operate at a distance from the attached should be required t use that artillery regiment. The, only information brigade as a unit. which I have concerning the operation of this system in the Armored Cavalry is Summary favorable. In the foregoing pages I have outlined a We come now to the proposed organiza­ system of organization of our type field tion of the division. A division, comparable army which should enable us to economize in size to our present corps of three in­ on logistic and administrative personnel. fantry divisions and one armored division, To prove or disprove whether such econ­ would contain the units as shown in the omy would be realized would require a proposed .division on page 41. detailed study beyond the scope of this Thus, the division would have some 37 article. Limited space also prevents me elements to administer, and 7 elements to from developing other benefits of the pro­ control operationally. The quartermaster posed organization (such as the increased regiment, ordnance regiment, signal regi­ mobility of a 16,OOO-man force, and in­ ment, and military police battalion would terchangeability of elements of the tank­ all be organized to facilitate their at­ heavy and the infantry-heavy units); or taching elements to the tactical brigades; problems which would arise in such a re­ in order to form a moderately self-suffi­ organization (such as transportation re­ cient brigade when the tactical situation quirements, or the appropriate rank of requires it to operate outside the support the commander of the proposed brigade). range of the division. I do believe that the potential bene­ By providing ten tank regiments and six fits to be gained from the proposed re­ infantry regiments in the proposed divi­ organization indicate the desirability of sion, we have the equivalent of a corps making a thorough study of the matter.

AUTHORS Authors SUbmitting materials to the MILITARY REVIEW are requested to for­ ward manuscripts through the Security Review Branch, Office of Public Informatioll. Office, Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C. COMMAND POST EXERCISE :Yv OF AFIELD ARMY

Lieutenant Colonel Car~ A, Weaver, Infantry G3 Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army

The views expressed in this article fact that all of the headquarters were al'e the author's and are not neees­charged with the normal operational mis­ sarily those of the Department of the sions of such headquarters in the field, Anny 01' the Command and Gel/eraZ and all were required to maintain a con­ Staff College.-The Editor. stant state of combat readiness in the un­ easy Korean Armistice situatioll. The CPX was superimposed on the normal mis­ The Ann]! Commander desil'es au Army­sions-no headquarters or staff section wide CPX be held on 01' abollt , was completely divested of its operational duties. F ROM this short statement a task of The second factor was an ad~inistrative great magnitude was born. As a result, one which involved the inherent difficulty during- the period 1 December to 4 Decem­ incident to an army where orders and re­ ber 1953, the Eighth United States Army ports must be· bilingual-English and in Korea conducted what is, as far ail is Korean-and four methods of staff pro­ known, the largest Command Post Exer­ cedure must be considered-United States ci$e (CPX) ever attempted by an Ameri­ (Army and Marine), United Nations, and can army in the field. The magnitude of Republic of Korea (ROK). this exercise can be seen when it is con­ In this article, rather than detailing the sidered that the army headquarters, 6 play of the problem, it is intended to dis­ corps headquarters, 24 division headquar­ cuss the conduct of such a CPX and the tl'rs, 4 technical service group headquar­ management lessons learned which should ters, and a military post headquarters­ assist those officers who may, in the fu­ spread across a front of approximately ture, be charged with preparation and ex­ 150 miles-all joined in a single exercise ecution of similar large-scale exercises. designed to te~t the operational plans of the various echelons of command and to The Plan afford training in staff functioning. The general mission of the Eighth Two additional factors added to the Army's 1953 CPX, as announced in an enormity of the task assumed in planning army training memorandum, was to test and carrying out the army commander's the current operational plans of the corps directive. Of greatest importance was the and divisions, to check the mobility of the I Only 'by a step-by-step rehearsal of the Command Post Exercise can the weaknesses and omissions be discovered and cOl'rected before fhe problem is ultimately presented to the actual players on D-day 44 MILITARY REVIEW JPNE 19])4 various headquarters, to test the establish­ pared' for each playing headquarters ment and maintenance of communications, which, as it unfolds, will present to the and to provide field training in staff players a complete picture of, the person­ functioning and procedure. nel, tactical, and logistical situation within To implement this mission, a concept each nonplaying subordinate and adja­ was adopted which envisaged a resump­ cent headquarters. It is, obviously im­ tion of hostilities during the Korean practicable for a small planning group Armistice and an attack by Communist to prepare detailed chronologies for 36' forces of the then present United Nations headquarters. To do so would require an positions. A planning group, consisting of intimate knowledge of the terrain in ap­ a chief umpire and a problem director proximately 50 regimental defense sec­ (both general officers), a deputy director, tors, and the counterattack plans of some and representatives of each of the four 22 divisions and 5 c,?rps. Therefore, using general staff sections, was established to the available intelligence estimates of the prepare the problem and develop the play. enemy and the terrain, a general chro­ This planning group designed a 4-day nology was prepared. exercise covering a period of 12 days of To set the stage for the opening of the problem time. The exercise was divided enemy offensive, a synopsis was written into three main playing phases; a period of a logical series of events which would of counterattacks, a period of withdrawal, lead to a resumption of hostilities. A de­ and a period of counteroffensive. Inter­ cision was made to reduce the time of play spersed then were nonplaying periods dur­ which would normally be devoted to the ing which the scenario developed the sit­ initiation of an attack by the enemy forces, uation further to set the stage for the and to open the exercise with that attack next phase. During each phase the play already underway with certain critical was so directed as to cause decisions re­ terrain overrun by the enemy. This, it was quiring the utmost in staff co-ordination believed, would shorten the nonessential with the emphasis equally on the tactical maneuvering of the enemy and friendly and the logistical aspects. units and lead directly to the initiation of Following approval of the concept by the division-level counterattacks. the Commanding General, Eighth Army, Accordingly, an initial phase line was the planning group completed and repro­ established. This line delineated the en­ duced the general situation for distribution emy advance in each division sector as the to the players and the scenario for the playing part of the exercise began. The guidance of umpires. bulk of the enemy forces was grouped The Preparation against the most critical terrain within each corps sector. That this was an un­ The conduct of any CPX requires that realistic and improbable enemy maneuver a detailed chronology of events be pre- was recognized, however, it was adopted to ensure an opportunity for each playing Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Weaver se1'ved with the G3 Section, Headquarters unit to put its counterattack plan into ef­ XV Corps, during World War II, and was fect. Following the initial phase, second graduated from the Command and Gen­ and third phase lines were used to depict eral Staff College in 1,q47. After 3 years with the Intelligence Division, Headquar­ the situations which followed. ters' EUCOM, he was Battalion Com­ Throughout the chronology, events were mander of the 3d Infantry Regiment in included which would require staff action Washington, D. C. He is presently as­ signed to Ihe Operations Division, G3, and co-ordination by all staffs, situations Eighth Army in Korea. were developed which would lead to esti­ COMMAND POST EXERCISE OF A FIELD ARMY 45

mates and recommendations by the staffs to two difficulties: first, the distances in­ to the commanders and to decisions by volved hampered the team in visiting and commanders, and interspersed were sam­ working with the player unit; and second, ple events which umpires at lower levels the shortage of Korean linguists in United could use as guides for events generating States and United Nations units made um­ additional staff actions. piring of ROK units very difficult. This When this chronolog'y was completed latter difficulty was only partially solved and reproduced, the chief umpires and the by the use of interpreter-translators who G4 umpires of each team were brought to were assigned to the Korean Military Ad­ the army headquarters for orientation and visory Group (KMAG) team with each briefing. The briefing included a review ROK headquarters. of the army scenario, a simplified version of a division-level scenario designed to The Conduct of the Exercise illustrate how the scenario is used a~ a One of the requirements placed on the basis for formulating messages, and dis- player headquarters was to accomplish at cussions of intelligence and logistical pl'ob- least one displacement of the headquarters lems. during the course of the exercise. Ac- The corps umpire teams were requested cordingly, approximately hilf of the com­ to prepare their scenarios immediately mandel's elected to begin the exercise while the division teams made personal re- in a field location. They accomplished the • connaissances of their assigned areas. Be- required displacement, during the play, by cause of the shortness of the time be- moving back to the semipermanent head­ tween the orientation and the target date quarters previously occupied. The remain­ for the exercise, no further meetings of ing hel}dquarters began the problem in the umpire teams were scheduled. How- the normal location and, as the tactical ever, all scenarios and chronologies were play dictated, displaced to another loca­ edited and revised by the director group, tion. The army forward headquarters to ensure co-ordination and to eliminate, physically displaced, during the exercise, insofar as possible, incorrect umpire pro- to a field location some 11 miles away, cedure. while the movement of the army main Initially, it had been planned that all of- command post was planned and simulated. fieer umpires would be gathered for the The displacement of headquarters caused orientation and that all umpire teams a severe strain on many of the units be­ would be brought in to war game th" ex- cause' of the added requirement for main­ ereise. The officer personnel required for taining all normal communications facili­ the CPX totaled 196. In addition, the um- .' ties in operation i~ case of actual enemy pire personnel numbered over 400. The action. This strain was foreseen, how­ physical limitations of housing this num- ever, and it did not interfere greatly with bel' of personnel at the army headquarters the conduct of the problem. and the limited time available precluded To implement the play of the CPX, um­ this plan from being carried out. pires at all levels of command £ed into the In the initial training memorandum, the various headquarters those personnel, in­ Army instructions directed the selection of telligence, tactical, and logistical mes­ the umpire team personnel to the United sages which would normally flow during States and United Nations units, and as- combat from subordinate, adjacent, and signed those teams to playing units with- higher headquarters not playing in the out regard to geographical location of par- CPX. The division umpires represented ent unit or assigned player unit. This led the regiments, artillery units, and the di­ 46 MILITARY REVIEW vision technical service units. The army established early; since each minor change umpires represented not only the technical ,in the concept of the problem requires a services' directly subordinate to the Army, myriad of additional changes and has an but also all higher and adjacent headquar­ impact on every staff activity played in ters such as United States Army Forces the problem. To have a successful exer­ Far East, Korean Communications Zone, cise, limit the objectives of the exercise. Republic of Korea Army, and the Fifth It is of far greater value to test thoroughly Air Force. one aspect or two related aspects in one Routine reports of casualties, successful problem and schedule a second problem and unsuccessful tactical operations, pris­ later, than to attempt to test many prob­ oner of war information, observation of lems and have the exercise so complicated enemy activities, supply expenditures, that much of the detail~d staff functioning combat losses, and the like, were delivered must be run through quickly or neglected by the propel' umpires to the playing entirely. Keep it simple and test it staffs in accordance with the planned thoroughly. scenario. Throughout the play, all umpires The initial reaction of the players,espe­ observed the staff operations critically to cially during the first 3 or 4 hours, when determine the efficiency of staff opera­ the staff is settling down into the routine tions, the adequacy of co-ordination within of combat functioning, is often the differ­ the staff' and with adjacent staffs, and the ence between a profitable and enjoyable effectiveness and tim¢liness of all orders. problem and an irritating and unprofitable Immediately followi'ng the completion of problem. Start the initial events and mes­ the last phase, the chief umpires of the sages on a slow cadence and staTt the corps teams consolidated division team I))'oblem from present positions and sitl/a­ comments with their own on the following tions. main topics and forwarded them to the In this CPX the players initially found exercise director: themselves forced back from strong posi­ 1. Operational Plans. tions which they had selected and pre­ 2. Headquarters ;,\lobility. pared carefully. The frustration caused by having lost what many considered to be 3. Communications. their strongest positions, and the rush of 4. Orders and Staff Functioning. messages detailing the positions of sub­ 5. Concept and Conduct of the CPX. ordinate units, placed many staffs in the A formal critique foJ' the army staff and wrong frame of mind early in the problem. corps representatives was held at army Starting from present positions also will headquarters 4 days after the completion allow each headquarters to make an earlier of the CPX. This was followed by cri­ and more sound evaluation of the situa­ tiques at each corps and division head­ tion, initiate timely mov~ment of re­ quarters. serves, estimate more accu"ratelY their supply requirements, and come to sounder­ CPX Management Lessons Learned and more profitable decisions. There were many lessons learned dur­ The decision to compress the action of ing the preparation and conduct of this 12 problem-days into 3 playing-days, while mammoth CPX which should be considered allowing more situations to be presented by all future director groups. Many of and played, actually had several adveroe these are almost axiomatic but are often effects on the problem. The time allowed overlooked. between phases was insufficient to allow It is necessary that a fi1'm cOllcepi be all messages initiated during one phase to COMMAND POST EXERCISE OF A FIELD ARMY 47 clear the communication channels prior to reducing the amount of staff fUnctioning the start of the next phase. As a result, and eo-ordination required and concur­

many messages requiring solutions which rently reducing I the training value re­ would have affected decisions rendered ceived. during the following phases were received It was the opinion of umpires at all

UNITED STATES EIGHTH ARMY CPX-1953

PROBLEM ACTUAL ELAPSED Pre-CPX Situation TIME TIME TIME Synopsis of Political and Military Situation D-15 days Enemy Buildup D-l day Enemy Attack, 2000 hours D-day Synopsis of Initial Attack Beginning of Phase I D+1 day 1300 hI'S, 1 Dec Play of Div C/Atks Play of Corps C/Atks End of Phase I D+2 days 1600 hI'S, 3 Dec 27 hrs Beginning of Phase II D+5 days 1900 hI'S, 3 Dec 3 hrs CG's Directive for Withdrawal D+5 days 2100 hrs, 3 Dec Corps Issue Orders Divs Issue Orders End of Phase II D+(j days 1600 hI'S, 3 Dec 21 hI'S Beginning of Phase lll-Nonplayil1g Paiod 1600 hI'S, 3 Dec Army Withdrawal Complete D+8 days Enemy Attack Continues CG's Directive for C/Offensive D+ll days 1600 hrs, 3 Dec Army Staff Prepares Order Corps Reeeives C/Offensive Order D+ll days ,1600 hI'S, 3 Dec Corps Issue Orders Divs Issue Orders Bluinninu of Phase lII-Play Paiod D+12 days 0500 hrs, 4 Dec 13 hI'S Army C/Offensive Jumps Off D+ 12 days 0600 hrs, 4 Dec End of Phase III D + 12 days 1600 hrs, 4 Dec 11 hrs Anny Critique 1300 hrs, 8 Dec I too late, and in some cases were received levels that the greatest value can be ob­ aiter "canned solutions" had been pre­ tained only when the problem is written St nted in umpire data distribrlted between to keep the play continHolls. A corollary phases.' This was especially trjle in logisti­ of this lesson is found in the statement CHI problems where technical service in­ that where several play periods are re­ stallations had to be moved b~ umpire ac­ quired, they must be so written that de­ tion during nonplaying peri~ds thereby cisions are made late in the phases. Many I 48 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 of the intelligence aspects of an action of logistically or they will have little to do. the magnitude presented in this CPX were An example from the Eighth Army CPX not played completely or effectively. In will point this up; ammunition expendi­ many respects this was caused by a failure tures in two corps initially exceeded tlie to plan the enemy action in detail. To ac­ support capability. They were overlooked complish the objectives desired, a logical entirely in most of the other units. As a and reasonable enemy tactical plan should result of not preparing ammunition ex­ be planned fully. The numerous intelli­ penditures (either by type or by ton­ gence activities within a field army must nage), both Ordnance and Transportation be listed and a flow of intelligence must technical service personnel' were forced be planned which will accurately depict to assume stockage levels and transport the logical enemy activity and test each requirements in order to engender play. intelligence orll:anization. Failure to have done so would have re­ sulted in both sections having little ac­ Casualties tivity during most of the exercise. It is Stemming from the planned enemy ac­ sometimes necessary, however, to prepare tion will be the impact of that action on a situation which is logical and yet un­ the friendly forces. The friendly casual­ likely to occur in order to ensure that all ties mllst be assessed cal'efully, not only elements of each staff will participate in ]Jersotlilel casltalties but matel'iel losses. the CPX. For each significant enemy action there must be a friendly reaction which must Practice Test be controlled to force the play along the Finally, after the problem has been desired lines. A method of control often written and the umpire teams have studied overlooked at all umpire levels is the use their situations, the plan must be "war of casualty assessment. It is not sufficient gamed." It is only through a step-by-step to announce the over-all percentage of playing-through of the CPX with the di­ casualties for an action as it is published rector group as the enemy, the umpire in Field Manual 101-10. The over-all di­ teams as the playing headquarters, and vision percentage must be applied to the the problem director as chief umpire and units in actual contact so that the in­ arbiter, that the weaknesses and omis­ fantry battalion doing the most fighting sions can be discovered and corrected be­ receives the greatest number and the more fore the problem is finally presented to rearward units receive few or none of the the actual players. It is during this war total division losses. game that lateral co-ordination between Through this procedure. not only will umpires will be assured and the proba­ G 1 replacement procedure be motivated. bility of play by reserve units pointed up. but commanders will be able to arrive at Many of the points emphasized in this more logical decisions. article will be checked during the war game and sufficient time must be available Logistical Impact before the D-day to correct the deficiencie~ Throughout the preparation of the exer­ discovered. cise the director group and the umpires Innst plan the logistical impac& of each Ability Not Availability event. Unless the logistical play is plan­ Any training exercise is only as effective ned 'carefully and concurrently with the as the instructor. A corollary to this is tactical play, either the technical services that the CPX is only as effective as its will find themselves faced with a tactical authors. The planning group and the um­ situation which they are unable to support pires are the keys to the success of every COMMAND POST EXERCISE OF A FIELD ARMY 49

CPX. Only through ca1'elul selection and conclusion of the Eighth Army Command training 01 umpi1'es can success be guar­ Post Exercise will reveal many points of anteed. Personnel must be selected on the a criticaLnature. , This is inherent in any basis of professional background, knowl­ critique. Plans were sometimes inade­ edge of the staff functioning they are to quate, implemented late, or inadequately observe, and their knowledge of current co-ordinated. Movement of headquarters plans and tactical concepts; not on the was poorly planned in some cases. Certain ability of their parent units' to (iispense means of communication were overloaded with their services during the exercise, while others stood idle. A few staffs were In the conduct of the Eighth Army CPX, inexperienced, others were out of practice. several changes in key personnel occurred These are expected criticisms. It is far because of the added requirement of con­ better to discover them during a paper tinuing current operations in the face of war than on a field of battle where they an armed enemy which might at any time are costly in lives and material. resume the offensive. While none had more There were far more examples of excel­ than a temporary effect on the exercise, lent solutions, orders, plans, and staff one change revealed a possible area for functioning, than of p~or and costly ones. improvement in control. The problem di­ As the Army Commander stated at tt.e con­ rector assumed the role of chief umpire on clusion of the exercise: the day the problem started, His previous Tile (,lIe"gy alld spirit displayed by all close association with the preparation of illl'o/ved was of the highest order. The the problem was reflected in the subse­ m'eat effurt expended is more than re­ quent play. /laid by th" tmining daived and the im­ It was recommended that in the fU,ture provements in the opemtional readiness the planning group, as a whole, act as the ,,,hick will reS/lit from a carefHI review chief army umpires during the actual play. of the /es801l8 learned. In this way manpower requirements would be I'educed and efficiency would be im­ The Command Post Exercise for 24 di­ proved by rapidity of reaction to unfore­ visions, 6 corps and a field army has been seen problems arising during the play and successfully completed. The lessons learned ability to recognize the important periods from a management standpoint have been recorded here. But before the dust has of staff action. settled on the files, there will be a new di­ Conclusions rective' prepared which will read: A review of the army and corps cri­ The A1'1ny Commander desi,·cs an Army­ tiques which were given shortly after the lI'ide CPX . ..

Because we val,ue human life so highly, it is incumbent upon us to follow the course which, if war comes, will lead to the most rapid success, the lowest cost in human life and suffering. In my own serviee I have viewed the tragic panorama of suffering brought by war. Those who have seen it at close range, all agree that measures to minimize repetitions are worthy of our finest efforts.

General Matthew B. Ridgway Molehill To Mountain

Major Reginald Hargreaves, British Al'my (Ret.)

The views expressed in this article guel're which persisted long after war had are the authol"S and are not necessar­ become an activity susceptible to consider­ ily those of the Department of the able organization. For the medieval lans­ Army 01' the Command and General pessade, or lance-corporal as we call him Staff College.-The Editor. today, was simply a cavalryman who, by negligence or mischance, had lost his horse and was serving with the infantry-with W HAT is the total number of items­ a slightly superior, if unremunerated in the way of war-like stores-for which standing-until such time as ingenuity or a present-day Ordnance Department is re­ the fortune of war could be made to replace .sponsible? A quarter of a million? Half the beast. a million? Or some aggregate even more Investigation would seem to point to the fantastic? Roman AttiliatOJ' Balistarum as the first Whatever it may be, it is safe to affirm official of an embryonic Ordnance Depart­ that it will inevitably increase, as man's ment. He was entrusted with the care of unquenchable ingenuity continues to de­ the bolt-hurling engine, the balista, and its vise and fabricate new means of destruc­ less effective substitute, the mangon. Such tion-with all that that entails in the way spares and replacements as were re­ of additions to the already vastly swollen quired-and the twisted gut of the cord "Voc;tbulary of Stores"-a volume to make was in constant need of renewal-were a mail-order catalogue look like an atten­ also in his charge. As time passed, the uated pamphlet. scope of his responsibilities widened to in­ We have come a long way from the sim­ clude the maintenance of the onagers, o~ plicity of equipment which 'characterized slings, the catapultas, the Qj'ies, or batter­ the setting forth of the primeval group ing ram, the tcstudo arietaria, the strongly­ to acquire a neighboring clan's hunting roofed shed on rollers that held the ram, ground by conquest-in which primordial and all the other siege engines required manifestation of the itch for lebensraum for defense and attack. may be discerned the origin of war. Armed In time, the Attiliator Balistarum re­ wi,th his own home-made javelin or f1int­ cruited corps of experts to assist him in headed ax, the primitive tribal warrior his work; although, as time went on, these was in no need of an Ordnance Service to Fabri came to resemble more closely an keep him active in the field. What he lost engineer-artificer unit, under their own by default or misadventure, he regained commander, the Pmefectus Fabrum-the at the expense of his opponent; fighting ordnance duties were still being performed with bare hands, teeth and toenails until by Legionaries specifically trained for the he could make good his loss with the work. . weapon wrenched from his defeated ad­ According to the usually reliable au­ versary's hand. It was an habitude du thority of Francis Grose, "It does not MOLEHILL TO MOUNTAIN 51 appear that the English had any officer allocated a daily rate of 13/4d to his lieu­ presiding over their projectile machinery, tenant; 10ls'to his master of the.carriages; previous to the invention of gunpowder 5/s to his trench master; 2/s apiece to and cannon." On the other hand, Thomas his three clerks, and 1Is each to his Rymer (1641-1713) in his Foedera malres chaplain and barber-surgeon. Sundry mention of a "clerke of the ordnance" as boyeyers and f1etchers-bow-makers and fUllctioning as early as the reign of repairers, and the fabricators of arrow­ Henry V (1413-1422). In France, the post heads-who, with the help of ten halber­ of Grand Master of the Cross-bows­ diers, also acted as escort, received a daily charged, among other things, with the 6d; although the three smiths and equal care of all ordnance stores-was an office number of carpenters had to be content of great dignity and considerable antiq­ with a modest 3d. Of the three "guyders uity; mention being made of it in the of the ordonnance"-at 4d a day-it may reign of St. Louis, who died in 1270 A. D. be said that their principal duty lay in But as the time arrived when, "This malrching ahead of the main army to the villanous saltpetre should be digged out new site selected fOJ; the night's camp, of the bowels of the harmless earth" there to mark out the ground to be re­ to fire those "vile guns," whose appearance served for the "ordonnance park." Subse­ 011 the battlefield Shakespeare's reaction­ quently they would return to the line of ary staff officer so bitterly deplored, the march to guide their own particular section Ordnance Department immediately as­ to its destination. And there must have sumed a new importance. In 1483, the first been great battles between these selfsame year of the reign of Richard III, "Rauf "guyders of the ordonnance" and the "har­ Bigod was appointed to the Mastership of bingers" sent forward by the Proviand­ the Ordnance during life, with a hundred Master, equally determined to lay claim marks fee for himself, and the wages of to the most favorable pitch! sixpence per diem for a clerke; to be paid Now, as has often been grimly recog­ out of the issues of the manors of Kyrton nized, no new department ever remains at and Lyndesay in Lincolnshire, with the the size at which it was originally planned. knight livery of the household." Thus, little astonishment need be ex­ On the strength of his elevation to this perienced ill. discovering that the enter­ new and important office, good Master prising new Master of the Ordnance, find­ Rauf Bigod lost little time in acquiring a ing himself in a remarkably good racket, "household"-Uestablishment" would be the promptly set about making the most of it.

A modern, present·day Ordnance Department is prepared to furnish many and varied items of materiel. The success of a fightinq man de­ pends on this materiel being previously obtained on an adequate scale

l1lodern military term-of his own; the In a quarter lesR than no time. a Master­ cLarge of which, presumably, was also Gunner, twelve gunners. twelve "hacque­ burne out of the manorial dues. With his . butters on horseback, for the Lyvtenant," own salary established at £1. 6.8. per a "drumme and phyfe," and one hundred d;em-taking into consideration the con­ and twenty "symyres," or general utility tt'mporary spending value of money, the ,men, were added to what had now become e'luivalent of at least £10. today-Bigod a considerable "establishment," with a 52 MILITARY REVIEW JU:lIlE 1954 consequent increase in Bigod's own emolu­ fence of ordinnance, cart traces, with all ments "as recompence for his added bur­ kind of cart wares, as ropes, cresseds and thens"! cressettes, lights, lanthorns, candell and A little later, we come across a writ linkes, with all other necessaries, which directing John Louth, "clerke of the 01'­ must be foreseen, that there be no lack be­ dnance," and "John Benet of Maidstone, fore their going on." mason," to repair to the quarries of that No wonder it took no less than "sixteen fair Kentish town and there recruit "a great wains to carry the King's stores"­ sufficient llUmber of tnasons and labourers or that the Master of the Ordnance en­ for the making of seven thousand stone joyed another raise in pay! shott for guns of different sorts." War With the "Vocabulary of Stores" be­ was in the offing, a prudent Master of the coming quite a comprehensive document, Ordnance was beginning to accumulate it became necessary to keep a check on out­ stores; and the molehill that was one day to assume the proportions of a giant moun­ goings and the general casualness of the tain had come modestly into existence. soldiery where any form of government That it speedily exhibited astonishing property was in question. It followed that powers of growth is made abundantly clear a system of indents was devised. There­ in the regulations governing the Mastel' after, it was established that no stores of the Ordnance's responsibilities embodied should be drawn "unless the clerke of th' ill "The Order of a Campe or Army ordonnance do take a bill of the captain's Royall, With the Duties of every Officer hand, or of his lyvtenant;" which docket belonging to the Same," promulgated in was subsequently filed with the Treasurer. 1518. By this decree, it was established "Paper warfare" had set in, with all the that "the master of the Ordnance must first manifold repercussions that this peculiarly of all receyve the ordonnance, shotte, corn deadly form of strife entails. powder and serpentine powder, match and However, the Ordnance personnel were all other municions, as fireworks, bowes. lIot thereby relihed from more real dan­ arrowes, strings, pikes, halberds, harque­ gers. A number of S9urces makes it clear busses, qualivers, launces, light-horsemen's that, once action ha:d-'been joined, the Mas­ staves, javelins and bore-spears. And fur­ ter of the Ordnance and his henchmen were' ther," the rescript runs, "the said Master expected to bear their part in the fray of the Ordnance must l'eceyve all kinds of alongside the rest of the troops. Indeed, uecessaries, that is to say, ladders, ladels it was specifically required of the Mastel' and sponges, for artillerie; mattocks, that he shoufd "repaire to the field, there to spades, shoveJls, pick-axes, crows of iron, see th' ordonnance planted to the most cart wheels fori ordinnances, carriages for advantage ... and be circumspect that the ordinnance 'axel-trees, hand-axes, axel­ Mr-gonners do their duties belonging trees for o;dinnances, windoscs for the de- thereto," Majoi' Reginald Hm'gj'euves, British In effect, the affinity of the Ordnance A~'my, Retired, served in both W01'ld Wm' Service with the artillery had grown, as I and World Wal' II. A devoted student of their association with the engineers had hist01'Y and a wl'itel' of numerous military tended to fall away. Of course, mere un­ topics, he has frequently contributed to many' milital'y publications throughout the enlightened trash like the infantry were world including the MILITARY REVIEW f01' regarded as of little account except as a which' he Wl'ote "Vital Spark" in October source for furnishing escorts for their 1953. Among -his many books is a study of betters; and the early Fusilier regiments If! famous sieges entitled "The Enemy at the Gate." were enrolled with this particular duty as MOLEHILL TO MOUNTAIN 53 a first call upon their activities. The Ord­ course of the Seven Years' War, and later nance's almost paternal patronage of the reappeared in increasing numbers through­ artillery, however, is clearly discernible out the American War of Independence. in the story told of the famous landsknecht But the "'Vocabulary of Stores" com­ leader, Georg von Frundsberg. Temporar­ piled by Charles, Duke of Richmond, the ily in.command of a considerable army, on Master General of the Ordnance in 1,782; olle occasion, the testy veteran snatched showed relativelY few additions to the lists the linstock from the hand of a laggard worked out by his predecessor, Charles bombardier and'applied it'to the piece Blount, Earl of Devon, a century and himself. Immediately, the Master-Gunner three-quarters earlier. The war of ma­ (an official of the Ordnance) "came up and teriel had not yet arrived and, in fact, cashiered the artillerymen for having seemed barely on its way even with Well­ yielded, and bade Von Frundsberg look ington's campaigns on the Iberian Penin­ after his own men and not meddle with sula. This was just as well, since the ap­ other people's cannon"! Obviously, to try pointment of the Master General of the and "old soldier," the Ordnance was about Ordnance tended more and more to become as risky a business as monkeying with a a piece of shameless political nepotism- buzzsaw. particularly in England. The Duke of Marlborough's campaigns, William·Pitt, as Premier and First Lord the Seven Years' War between England {!f the Treasury, in 1805 appointed his and her allies and the French, the sorry indolent elder brother, the 2d Earl of conflict between the American Colonists Chatham, to the post. This individual was and the Home Government-sadly wanting, so notorious for his lack of punctuality for once, in the English talent fol' com­ that he was invariably referred to as "the promise-added little to the volume of late Earl of Chatham." His appointment, war-like stores for which the Ordnance following on tenure of the office by the Department had already assumed responsi­ egregious Marquis of Cornwallis, spoke bility. Cannon remained the relatively eloquently enough of the prostitution into primitive engines of destruction they had which the Mastel' General of the Ord­ been in the days of Queen Elizabeth; the nance's great dignity had declined. It was musket, the pistol, and the sword contin­ a reprehensible condition of things whose ued as the principal hand-weapons; ammu­ calamitous consequences were first, and !lition had undergone little change and ex­ most grievously, experienced by the army hibited relatjvely small variety. Camp in the field. stores had not been expanded appreciably, A more energetic, knowledgeable, and pither. competent Commander in Chief than Fred­ It is true that guns had acquired their erick, Duke of York, has never guided the uwn carriages and teams-the first-named British Army's destinies. However, despite originally devised by Charles VIII of _.befuddled political interference, he some­ France and e~oyed by him in his inva-',how managed to furnish Wellington the sion of Italy in"l1494. Although the teams ~valry and infantry with which the Iron and teamsters';;01' these equipages were Duke successfully fought the Peninsular supplied by th~ civil authority, the gun­ campaign. Nevertheless, where the pro­ <'arriages, the~elves, undoubt;tdly con­ vision of artillery and an entire myriad of ,tituted an extra charge on the activities war-like stores was concerned, he was of the Ordnance Department-as did the helpless. All that, was the province of the tents and thei-r appendant items:· which Board ofOrdnance, under the Master Gen­ had been generlj.lly issued first duri~g -the era! of the Ordnance, and, no matter to 54 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE.l954 what d~pths of incompetence that august Tents, in a land where billets were in­ body might sink, the Commander in Chief adequate in number and invariably crowd­ was powerless to interfere, ed and dangerously unsanitary, were not It is true that with the stress and in general issue until a good half of the strain of active warfare to excuse what campaign had been fought, would otherwise have been interpreted as As the beneficiary of a corrupted sys­ an unwarrantable piece of intermeddling, tem of political patronage, the Master Duke Fl'ederick did succeed in improvising General of Ordnance had not been made an elementary service of supply. For this, to e realize that profiteering out of those the Ordnance's tlll'dy contribution was a soldiers' canteens-for which he enjoyed few wagons of entirely unsuitable pattern, an exclusive concession-was a less im­ such as had been used in the campaigns pOl·tant part of his job than ensuring of the Duke of Marlborough over a cen­ that the army in the field was punctually tury before. and adequately serviced. But of artillery, Wellington never had Peninsular traditions, unhappily, were anything like a sufficiency. His battering­ all too prevalent at the outset of the trains at the sieges of Almeida, Ciudad Crimean campaign of 1854-56-the first Rodrigo, and Badajaz were so inadequate major conflict to break the 40 years of that ultimately the objectives had to be peace which followed Waterloo. taken by employing the costly processes The British troops were armed, initial­ of breaching and escalade. Among the an­ ly, with the old Brown Bess, in all fun­ tiquated and unserviceable cannon scraped damentals the same weapon as had been together in an attempt to form a grand employed in the days of Marlborough. battery were brass 24-pounders nearly 200 And, this at a time when the Board of years old. Other pieces, borrowed from the Ordnance had passed the Mini!! rifle as Portuguese, bore the cyphers of Philip III thoroughly suitable for active service con­ and Philip IV of Spain--contemporaries ditions, and had actually begun, in an ex­ of England's James I and Charles 1. "No tremely desultory way, to manufacture a two cannon had the same bore," Sir Charles few. Greatcoats were in short supply and Oman has recorded, "Nor were the shot. warm and serviceable underclothing vir­ supplied for them uniform; and it was tually nonexistent until the busy fingers of necessary to cull and select a special heap private charity started to work to remedy fol:, each particular gun. The whole form­ the deficiency. The relief occasioned by ed, indeed, a sort of artillery museum the arrival of a consignment of footwear rather than an effective battering-train." did not survive the discovery that all Furthermore, there was a woeful Jack the shoes had been cut for the left foot. of trained engineers-which the Board of Those for the right foot had been packed Ordnance was also required to furnish­ in anbther transport and were still some not more than 30 being allocated to an al­ hundreds of miles on the wrong side of the lied army whose strength eventually num­ Bosphorus. bered about 70,000. I Seemingly, it had yet to dawn on the In many other particulars; the same authorities responaible for the prepara­ dilatoriness and resourcelessness were la­ tions for war that unless materiel has mentably apparent. Ordnance-manufactur­ previously been organized on an adequate ed supply wagons were so few and far scale, the fighting-man's swift demoraliza­ between that Wellington had no option but tion will be added to his virtual impotence. to fall back on the cumbersome local bul­ The initiative, both moral and physical, lock carts, supplemented by pack animals. will pass irrevocably to the enemy. MOLEHILL TO MOUNTAIN 55 Perhaps the American War of Secession ing the vast quantity of bridging material; can be regarded as the first conflict where­ the support given to the ingenious Lieu­ in full recognition was given to the over­ tenant Myers in perfecting his novel sig­ riding importance of materiel. Aside from naling system; the amazing work per­ all other considerations, it was the Fed­ formed by Herman Haupt to myet the erals' command of infinitely greater in­ needs in his efforts to adapt and expand dustrial resources than those at the dis­ the tenuous railway network to military posal of the Confederates, which ensured needs: all were proof that the Ordnance them victory over antagonists in no way Service had clearly envisaged and was less vigorous, battleworthy, or tenacious fully prepared to meet the expanding de­ than themselves. So far as the Ordnance mands made upon it by the exactions of the Department itself was concerned, it had to new warfare of materiel. learn its job the hard way, since, at the Since those days, Bellona has increas­ outset of the conflict, its organization was ingly become the handmaiden of Vulcan; little more than a promising embryo. Be­ and with every increase in the expanding cause antewar interest in the Army was burden of impedimenta with which war, negligible, many of the sound -recommen­ in seeking for swift decision, has success­ dations of the Delafield Report had per­ fully managed to embarrass its activity force gone unimplemented. Nonetheless, and cripple its mobility, the Ordnance has with command of the sea to cut off im­ manfully accepted yet another addition to ported supplies for the South, and with its manifold responsibilities. manufacturing resources equal to the "We supply anything," was the proud drive that sought so successfully to ex­ boast of one world-famous store, "from pand them, the North's swift assimilation a tintack to an elephant." Hannibal em­ of the implications of "factory warfare" ployed elephants, although it is question­ set an example that later conflicts strove able jf anything resembling a tintack ever diligently to reproduce on an ever-increas­ came his way. But it is certain that, given illg scale. The speedily-accelerated activi­ the proper indent, carefully made out in tiL'S of the Springfield Arsenal-soon triplicate, a modern Ordnance Department turning out 50,000 weapons a month­ would be quite prepared to furnish either and its improvised counterparts; the re­ commodity without so much as the flicker sourcC' displayed in devising and deploy­ of an eyelash.

Back of every significant achievement in Ordnance there is the story of a long and tedious process of trial and error-of building, testing, and modify­ ing-in an effort to determine whether a new item of equipment or a new weapon will successfully meet the established need. And during this long and tedious prOfess we are always governed by the dominant consideration as to whether the item we come up with can be produced in sufficient quantity­ and economically. Major General Elbe~·t L. Ford -~ HERMAN GORING ANSWERS ,THE $64 QUESTION Brigadier General Willia,m W. Quinn Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece

This article is )'eprinted jJ'om and all of us proceeded to the prisoner of AMERICAN MERCURY, December war compound where Goring was incar­ 1.'153. Copyright 1953 by American cerated. Mel'cllry Magazine, Inc. We moved into a rather new and modern The views expressed in this article school building which served as the head­ a)'e the autho)"s and m'e not necessar­ quarters for the enclosure. We went up­ ily those of the Depm·tment of the stairs to what had been the principal's Army 0): the Command and General office, which was very well-lighted and Staff College.-Thc Edito)·. furnished with relatively new, modernistic furniture. We all took seats in a semi­ circle in front of an enormous black desk REICH Marshal Herman Goring is which was bare except for a small, revolv­ dead-and probably forgotten by many. I ing globe of the world. have not forgotten him, however, nor have I had told the Reich Marshal of the im­ I forgotten that day in May 1945 when he pending visit of General Spaatz. He astounded some very important people with seemed delighted and, I believe, a little his keen intellect and his unusual analysis flattered that General Spaatz was inter­ of the Nazi defeat. ested in talking with him. He told me he Goring had surrendered to our forces would enjoy the visit as he was sure they earlier in the month and was being ques­ had a lot in common. tioned by some officers in the United States It was interesting to watch Goring when Seventh Army. General Carl Spaatz, who he was ushered in and seated behind the th\:n commanded the American air forces big desk. One could assume that the maker in Europe, on learning of Goring's status, of the desk must have had Goring in mind requested us to fly him to London for in­ when he built it, for they went together terrogation. like a picture and its frame. Goring Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, bowed slightly in greeting and, upon the the Seventh Army Commander, replied interpreter's instructions, sat down at the that he was not through with Goring at the desk. moment, but that if General Spaatz want­ He wore his favorite blue-gray uniform ed to talk to him at Seventh Army Head­ with heavy gold braid trimmings but with­ quarters, he would make Goring avail­ out ribbons or medals. able. Later, General Spaatz, accompanied Before the conversation began, Goring by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, certain of made a short salutatory statement to Gen­ his staff and a few civilian technicians, eral Spaatz saying that he was extremely flew to Augsburg, Germany, about the glad to be able to see and to talk with middle of May 1945. On arrival, his party General Spaatz personally as he held him was joined b'y General Patch and myself in great esteem as an airman. However. HERMAN GtlRING ANSWERS THE $64 QUESTION 57 he added that he wished the circumstances have defeated Germany by.strategic bom­ were just a little different and that he bardment alone and don't you consider, were not the vanquished. General Spaatz from an airman's point of view, that the smiled at this and the conversations began. Normandy invasion was unnecessary?" General Spaatz started with questions I remember the knowil'lg smile that about the Battle of Britain, the technique flashed across Goring's face when he an­ and tactics of the air fight over the British swered, quite dramatically, "Nein!" (No!) Isles, that is, Luftwaffe offensive tactics I also remember General Patch's chuckle and the allied defensive mechanisms. By when he turned to General Spaatz and Goring's dissertation on this comprehen­ said,' "Tooey, yon asked for it and you sive subject, it soon became apparent to sure got it." the entire party that his technical knowl­ General Spaatz countered with another edge regarding aerodynamics, meteo'l:ology, question: "If you do not believe that we and jet propulsion was amazing. Not only could have defeated you by strategic air was he a strategist, but he had a trcmen­ and that we had to invade the Continent, dous amount of hasic knowledge of aircraft will you please explain to me your reason­ and the techniques involved in their em­ ing?" ployment; so much so that General Spaatz Goring slowly rose' from the chair as on several occasions turned to his advisors the principal might have done when posed and looked at them quizzically. with a tough question fi'om one of his Without exception they nodded back af­ students. He glanced Qut of the window firmatively, indicating that they agreed and turncd slowly back to General Spaatz. with the particular observation or the As he g'ave the globe a slow turn with his statement involved. fingel', he answered, "I'll try." Goring also gave quite a discourse on I'll try to show you precisely those rea­ the B-25 and its role in the allied air coun­ ROllS, he continued. First you must under­ teroffensive. He admitted that he was stand that ill the histol'Y of wal'fare there ('ompletely fooled and surprised by its ex­ has nel'CI' yet been an offensive weapOl1 tensive use. He went on to say that it was that has 1Iot been countered by a defensil'c not the existence of the B-25 that came as oue. Swords developed the shield; the'sub­ a surprise, but the fact that he had grossly marine de'l/c/oped the destroyer; the underestimated the industrial potential of bombel' the interceptor'; and so forth. Of the United States to produce it in such com'se, offensive weapons destroy whel! the

Was the Normandy invasion necessary, 01' could we have defeated tile (Jermans by strategic bombardment alone? A Nazi ail' commande~ gives his views concerning ti,e ability of ail- power to win a major war numbers and to introduce it in combat with defensive ones are absent, but my premise ,uch speed and devastating effect. is that defensive weapons or techniques have kept only a short step behind offensive The 64-Dollar Question weapons. Nafumlly, such evolution is This conversation continued for some based on a standpoint of sheer military time, until finally General Spaatz said, necessity. "Now, Reich Marshal, I am going to ask For ea'ample, when fhe B-25, and then ~'ou what we call in America the '64-dollar later Lancasters and B-17s, were g!V11lg 'Iuestion.' I want to ask you: Could we us a going-over, we began to go under­ 58 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954

U1·o1md. I might interject at this point. the running out of time, we were now that if we had sta1'ted at the outset to go confronted with 10s8 of space. unde1'U1'oltnd, yom' B-25s would not have You 8ee, we began to lose ground when hurt 1tS seriously nor would ha1'e yO/li' we were unable to eject you from Nor­ l!eavy bombers. Howe'llIJ)', we made gl'eat mandy. The main reason was General 1)1'ogl'eSS in our passive defense p1'ogl'am, Vandenberg's Ninth Air Force, I might pal'ticltlal'ly with our ind1lstl'ial fools. add. This support was mainly responsible other critical and strategic products and for the fact, and I believe Field Marshal supplies, as well as the jet, And I tell you 'lion Rundstedt agrees with me, that we this. Hm'1' Gel1el"al, if we had had one more could 1Wt shift our reser'lles to the beaches year, at the 1'atc at which we WC,'C l"apidly in time to throw you back into the f?a, building OUi' jets IIndel' sheltel' and 1111­ However, that was a part of the invasi''OI!, molested by your sh'ategic ai?'Cl'aft, Wi' Y our8 was a concentrated a'i1' effort, in would have d1'iven you fl'01/t the ail', Ami that it was completely localized and thae­ since your pi'ople have captured ,,"d i1l­ by you employed en masse the great pow('/' spected 01li' jets, I am 8n1'e yon call Iwoe that you had. BlIt that is beside the point. little doubt. My point is that when we lost ground and Consequently, if therc had beeu 110 ill­ continued to lose gi'ound. there was en­ vasl0n, if the allied infantr!J lllld IIIlI tf/ i/ed u los8 of slibsidia~y plants, small­ stormcd the beachcs of Normalldy WitCII " parts factories, civilian [ab01" and small did, we would not ltm'e /in'lI rir'/,'alni componcnt const1'llction, Eithn' they be­ from the west, There would Ii" l'l' b('i'll ,,,' came a loss or had to be displaced flo,ther ({ecisioll 'in the west, cust, When this displacement took place. Now the )'('ason that the il/rUNiulI let! thel'C was a simultaneous internlption ill to (HO' defcaf was thc fact thai it c(1Il8cd }lI'odnetioll ill sO/l1e .pal,ticulal' item, .t1 thl' clock tu Tim twice as jw,t {mill f: great 11Iunbe,' of thesc factol'ies were (ris­ standpoint of time "vailable tv liS. I JI 1)('/'sod thronghout France and theil' 10.," otilCl' wonls, 'when the inl'asio1/ ('{fIJI!', oui· "clardi'd 0111' jet jH'odllc!ioll, }Josition became doubly H'orse, for besides We lost so much ground that eventually Wi' had to take men out of the plants, ]lilt BI'igadier GCllcml William W, Quinn m'aduated from the United States Milital'y rifles in theil' hands and dispatch them to Academy in 1,9.],1; the Comma11d and Gel1­ yUIO' /l'ont to h'y to hold back the tide-fo emi Staff Col/ege in 191,1; and the Na­ sal'c this s]lace and gain InOl'e tilllC, Awl tiortal Wal' Col/ege ill 1.91,8, Dnring World as we lost the men in the ]llan/s, OUl' ]lI'O­ - War fl. he saved as Assistant Chief of Staff, Gf!, HeadqllartC1's, ;,th Anny Corps, duction decl'cased. so that 0111' dispatch and later with Seventh Al'my Headqual'­ of a jet f01' combat was pl'ogrcssirely be­ te/'s in Ew'ope, irom the invasion of South­ coming Icss /l'eqnent, e/'Il Fmnee to,the end of the war, At the Finally we came to the ]loint whe1'c the outbreak of the I{orean conflict, Geneml prodllction 1'etnrns diminished to zero, W,' Quinn was Assistant Chief of Staff. G2. ill charge of intelligence of th~ X C01'PS fol' were OVO'l'un, We lost the war. So ill the Inchon Landing, and also commanded answer to your American 'BI,-dollal' ques­ the 17th Infant1'y Regiment, 7th D,ivision, tion,' He}')' General, had yo/! not invaded He is p1'esently assigned as Chief. United States A1'my Section, Joint United States when you did, we would ?lot be having this Military Aid G1'Ollp to Gl'eece, conversation today, r-"" Our Vanishing Military Profession

Commander D. J. Carrison, United States Navy

This article is reprinted /1'om not too distant future we shall have "all AMERICAN MERCURY; November chiefs and no Indians" in the officer rank 1953. structure. The views c.-.:pressed in this article If this investigating committee is re­ arc the author's and are not neccs­ btricted to recommendations that the Rarify those of the Department of the Armed Forces alone can take, its efforts Anny or the COI1,mand and General are doomed to failure. For the fault is a Staff College.-TJilJ Editol·. uual one-the military and the American f public are equally responsible. In recent years the military has invited disaster by IN SPITE of the wealth of experi­ permitting such things as sugar-coated enceu senior officers now in the Armed disciplipe, ~treme specialization, and in­ Forces, it is no secret that high Penta­ terservice ivalry to undermine the spirit gon officials deplore our younger officers' and moral of the Armed Forces.· Junior lack of enthusiasm for a military career. officers feel hat they have nQt been ade­ The number of resignations SUbmitted now quately represented when policy-making iR alarming, and those who are close to officers do not defend them from irrespon­ the problem feel that once we let down sible criticism and unwise legislation. the restrictive bars that were placed on Moreover, inequality of 0ppol·tunity and separations when the Korean emergency reduction of officer qualifications have started, resignations will pOUI' into Wash­ frustrated and disgusted many oj our ington. young officers. Some of our top brass Many senior officers feel that unless' have lost prestige within the services be­ something is done to make a military ca­ cause there was little evidence that they reer more attractive, high attrition in the were interested in 01' capable of protect­ junior grades will SO deplete our officer ing career officers from congressional, in­ corps that the professional militarist will terservice, 01' other similar pressure soon become another "Vanishing Ameri­ groups. can." As a star.ting point, the investigators Recog'nizing the seriousness of this sit­ can safely assume that formerly, young uation, the Secretary of Defense, Charles officers were attracted to military .-ice E. Wilson, has ordered a special committee by prestige, op~rtunity, glamor, m;" of to investigate our young officers' attitude course, a reaso ble standard of Jiving. toward a military career and to recom­ The key to the vestigation is to deter­ mend measures that will once more make mine how to re ore these attractions to military life more attractive to thelp. Mr. their former I' tive worth. "ilson must find some solution, 01' in the First consider the prestige-and the

Ii strong corps of professional military men with ,high morale is essen­ tial to the security of our nation. We must, therefore, take the steps lIeeded to make military careers attractive under present conditions 60 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 lack of it-in a military career. Here exemptions or deferments for young men our committee will find that the remedial who aspire to a college education. A ca­ measures are applicable to both the mili­ reer labeled "unworthy of superior tal­ tary and the public. The public is rep­ ent" by a large and influential segment resented by the press, commentators, and of our country's leaders gives impression­ the legislature. Probably the greatest able young men the idea that a commis­ contributing cause to the loss of pres­ sion in the Armed Forces is not a privilege tige has been criticism of the military. but an admission of inability to face ci­ Criticism in public life is expected, but vilian competition in industry. whereas a public official can fight back In spite of the detrimental effects of (as did Vice President Richard M. Nixon both public criticism and the mistakes com­ last fall), the military is muzzled by mitted by the Armed Forces, there still re­ higher authority or by its own rules. main yestiges of the former prestige ac­ Quite often we find good constructive crit­ corded' the professional military man. icism by responsible columnists and com­ West Point and the Naval Academy still mentators. More often we find irresponsi­ symbolize centers of learning where ble charges leveled at our military leaders strength of character is equally as im­ and at the military in general. These portant as scholastic ability. There are cases are obvious attempts to increase cir­ culation or Hooper ratings, and they in­ many officers in the service who are proud sidiously damage morale in the services. of their military background; President A public that delights in seeing its mili­ Eisenhower pointed this out to the as-· tary leaders ridiculed and treated unfairly sembly of Midshipmen last May when he is shortsighted and does not deserve a said that "service brats" usually brag competent body of professional officers to about their military fathers. To have defend it in time of need. one's children take pride in one's pro­ fession is a blessing indeed. Our inves­ I n regard to prestige, the military tigating' committee should recognize this should put its own house in order. First, as an innate strength of the service, and it should emphasize to its officer person­ should foster and protect it. When pride nel that except for those specifically ex­ disappears from an organization, so will eluded by the Geneva Convention, the male morale and efficiency. officer is basically a professional fighting man, and that the end purpose of his du­ Opportunities ties, regardless of assignment, is to make The committee should recommend that war or to prepare for war. The military the Armed Forces critically examine and should ruthlessly eliminate unification compare the opportunities offered to jun­ pangs, squabbles between Reserves and ior officers within each military service. Regulars, and discrimination between serv­ Career planning should be carefully in­ ice minority groups. It should stop the vestigated; the committee will find that gradual lessening of autocratic differences many career planning practices exist only between officer and enlisted grades. (The on paper and that officers are often sub­ Russians tried this in the war against ject to spur-of-the-moment assignments. Finland, but they shifted back to a more The comparison of opportunities within stringent regime after several resounding each service will indicate that there should defeats.) Our military leaders should fight be a day of reckoning for the Air Force the unwise developments of present law, and its highly irrational rank structure. which encourage employers and educators Accelerated promotion of officers in the to conduct rigorous campaigns to obtain Air Force has caused growing resentment . OUR VANISHING MILITARY PROFESSION 61 among the other services. The-"boy colo­ military awards have lost much of their nels" who are several years ahead of their . worth and meaning. contemporaries in the Army and Navy Standard of Living are not necessarily. better officers-they Last, but by no means least, in this' were jUst fortunate enough to be in the age of the devalued dollar, our committee right place at the right time. This fast should look into the standard of living promotion results in greater income, so among the officer corps. It should com­ the effects reach down to the wives and pare the present-day officers' rung on the children in the other services. Families of ladder of social ,and economic success competent offi¥rs in the Army and Navy with that enjoyed by an officer 50 years who are years senior, but junior in rank ago. The real purchasing power of the to many officers in the Air Force, are dollar has declined steadily and the Armed frustrated by the inequalities that exist. Forces have invariably lagged civilian in­ Preferential treatment is not conducive to ·dustry in asking for compensatory pay healthy morale and it will never encourage fncreases. Th~ result has been a compara­ the sel'vices toward a really solid unifi­ tive loss of pay and a marked reduction cation. in the standard of living conditions in the service. The old incentives included Glamour many fringe benefits which actually were Few will deny that there is a certain remunerative. Fofmerly a service wife amount pf glamour in the military career. could stretch a dollar by shopping at the For centuries, civilized art, literature, and local commissary and post exchange. Bow. music have glamorized great warriors and ever, in August 1949, congressional pres­ have preserved for us the details of their sure in the form of a threat of correc­ gTea1 victories. All over the world, monu­ tive legislation forced the three services ments and other memorials are concrete to close a large number of commissaries testimonials to past military achievements_ in order to avoid competition with local Our committee will find that glamour has stores. The "special order" privilege was given ground somewhat to scientific PI'og­ discontinued in the post exchange. The ress, for war now lacks the personal touch. Department of Defense Appropriation Act ~Tass death by an atom bomb does not of 1952 instituted a 5 percent surcharge ('ompare favorably with th\l "gallant" on all commissary sales to defray certain hand-to-hand fighting of yesteryear. More overhead costs. Little by little medical and more, survival depends on chance and care for dependents has been whittled not skill. There still remains, however, away; this has been easily accomplished ,orne appeal in the helmeted jet pilot, the by simply reducing the funds allocated to high-booted paratrooper, the black-faced dependent care. Dispensaries are now so Commando, the submarin-er, the Frog Man, overloaded and understaffed that many llr even the ordinary soldier and. sailor. service personnel prefer to go to a local This appeal can be exploited properly and civilian clinic in order to avoid long de­ intelligently, particularly jf one facet is lays. The Navy has never explained to its not exploited to the detriment of the other. personnel why it is the only service which / Above all, indiscriminate use of medals does not provide routine dental care for \ and awards should not be resorted to in dependents. an effort to glamorize our men for an Congress is the source of all benefits unsuspecting public. Fortunately, this and pay scales for the Armed Forces. In practice is not widespread, but it con­ many cases, officers have been attracted tributes to the general feeling that most to a military career by promises which, 62 MILITARY REVIEW

.'\ were made in good faith but which were resignations from the service. It is of undermined by later legislation. For ex­ utmost importance to our own well-being ample, retirement benefits were curtailed that we, as a nation, take the necessary by the Career Compensation Act of 1949, steps to make a military career attractive and later by the Van Zant Amendment to under present conditions. A strong corps the Department of Defense Appropriation of professional military men with high Act of 1953. Shipment of household goods morale is an essential to national security. has been limited by recent congressional We should not forget the example of action. The reservists' lobby pushed France in 1940; her politics-ridden, de­ through a provision for survivor benefits fensive-minded officers were the weakest for Reserve officers that is ludicrous in link in her armor. comparison to the benefits applicable to It has been proved conclusively that the career officer. The widow of a Re­ the campaign to "Bring the Boys Home" serve officer killed in line of duty re­ at the end of World War'II was quietly ceives almost three times as much pension fostered and encouraged by Communists. as the widow of a career officer! Such This propaganda decimated the greatest inconsistencies and reductions in benefits by legislative action amount to a breach of fighting force the world has ever seen as­ contract, and produce a feeling of inse­ sembled. Can it be that the current criti­ curity among career service personneL cism of the military and the insidious looting of military pay and benefits is Conclusions likewise inspired by Communist propa­ I~ viewing the attractiveness of a mili­ ganda7 Are we as a nation unwittingly tary career today objectively, we find sapping our strength by undermining the that in recent years there have been many morale and ambition of the Armed Forces? developments which have slowly reduced If we default in our clear responsibility the prestige, opportunity, glamour, and to remedy the situation, it is quite possi­ standard of living of the career officer. ble that our professional military officer The consequent effect on OUt' officer corps will soon disappear into one of the many cannot be determined accurately until the walks of civilian life. If this happens, end of the current 'emergency and a cor­ where will we get our top brass 15 or 20 responding relaxation of restrictions on years from now?

One who enters the military service as a career gives up a number of things. He cannot quit on his own terms. He cannot strike. He cannot bargain individually or collectively with his employer. He cannot choose his own resi­ dence. He cannot actively engage in politics. There are important abridgements upon his leisure time.

SCC1'etal'lj of the .\Tavy Robel·t B. Andel'son UNITED STATES Divisions RenumbJred Interchangeable Attachments The colors and nl.tmerical designations During World War II and the recent of four National Guard divisions, the 28th conflict in Korea, numerous bulldozers were and 43<,1 Divisions in Europe, and the 31st sidelined for long periods because damaged and 37th Divisions 'in the United States, dozer blades, cable power control units, . will soon be returned to their state of ori­ hydraulic controls, and winches could not gin. The present divisions will be renum­ be repaired or replaced. Often a seemingly uered but no announcement was made con­ ample supply of attachments in stock failed (,Pl'ning the new mimbers to be assigned. to be of any help because they were de. Personnel of the divisions will not be af­ fected by the chang'e. The renumbering i, expected to affect regiments, tank bat­ talions, artillery battalions. and other di­ visional units.-Ne~s release.

Canned Bread i As the result of' work started in 1944, the Army's "five-ih-one" ration will con­ tain canned white bread equal in quality and flavor to the gl'ocery-shelf product ac­ cording to a rece* announce~ent. It is expected that the new ration will not be· available for troop issue until next fall but when issued, each ration will contain two Interchangeable att~chments for bulldozers. tans with nine ounces of bread each. Sur­ signed to fit only a certain tractor. To com~ veys revealed that lack of white bread was bat this, tests are being conducted at the one of the major complaints of troops is­ Engineer Proving Grounds to determine sued> packaged combat rations during the effectiveness of attachments which are World War II. The new bread may be interchangeable amctng the three most com· used later in other types of combat ra­ mon commercial bulldozers used by the tions.-News release. Armed Forces.-News release. 64 MILITARY REVIEW NCO-Specialist Plan Added Take-Off Power A plan has been proposed whereby Through a new external rocket arrange­ leadership will be emphasized by establish­ ment and a water injection system in their ing only enlisted leaders as noncommis­ six jet engines, the B-47 Stmtojets have sioned officers and administrative and been provided with an increase in available technical ability will be recognized by take-off power, The B-47E has a maximum the establishment of "specialist" as a gross weight of 200,000 pounds, 15,000 more than earlier models. The plane has positions for 33 external rocket units, which provide 33,000 added pounds of thrust to that of its six jet engines. The additional power enables the newer models , , to operate from shorter fields 01' to lift maximum loads from existing runways.­ News release.

Gas-Turbine Engine A gas-turbine engine for standard-model passenger cars which has eliminated many of the difficulties in previous models is be­ ing road-tested. While gas-turbine engines offer such advantages as cheaper fuel, less New specialist grade insignia is approved. vibration, and fewer moving parts, over separate category of personnel. The sepa­ piston engines, they also use more fuel and ration will be made in the top four pay generate terrific heat, especially from the grades, and no one will be reduced in pay exhaust. The new engine incorporates a by the plan. There will be no change in heat exchange that transfers heat from the titles or insignia of noncommissioned of­ exhaust gases to the incoming air. It not ficers. Special~ts will be addressed and only cools the exhaust but saves fuel, since referred to as such and this will be their the intake air is preheated before it prefix title. They will wear distinctive reaches the combustion chamber. As a re­ insignia and their grade titles will be: E-7 sult the new engine delivers as many horse­ MastGl' Specialist, E-6 Specialist First power-miles per gallon of gasoline as a Class, E-5 Specialist Second Class, and standard automobile engine, and the ex­ E-4 Specialist Third Class. Implemen­ haust gases are several hundred degrees tation of the plan will probably be ef­ cooler. Previous models were too bulky to fected worldwide on the same day, pos­ be practical, but the latest engine weighs sibly late in 1954. All components of the only 600 pounds, several hundred pounds Army will be affected and revisions of lighter than many standard automobile tables of organization and equipment and engines.-News release. tables of distribution in which noncom­ missioned officer positions will be indi­ Stratotanker cated will be furnished to commanders A new 190,OOO-pound 4-jet airplane with at least 1 month prior to the date of a cruising speed of 550 miles an hour and conversion. The status of individuals will designed for use by the military as a not be changed by the plan, and privileges high-speed, long-range tanker-transport will l'emain much the same. The plan has is now nearing completion. It will be not qeen adopted yet.-News release. called the Stratotanker.-News release. I I MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD, 65 I;'" ! Jet Trainer Off-Post Salute Work has been started on the produc­ As a result of studies aimed at boost­ tion of the T-37A, the first true jet side­ ing service esprit, it has been recommend­ by-side trainer produced for the Training ed that Army officers and enlisted men be Command according to a recent announce- required to exchange salutes while in uniform off-duty and off-post. The off-post salute was abandoned as a result of a rec­ ommendation of the Doolittle Board. Ad­ vocates of the new plan say that through­ out military history the salute has been recognized as a greeting of respect among men of arms and hope that by restoring it to 'build pride in the uniform.-News re­ lease.

Arctic: Guardian A plane particularly suited to opera­ Jet trainer produced for Training Command. tion in subzero Arctic climate because menL The plane was succesMul in win­ of its highly-effective anti-icing system ning an Ail' Force design competition and elaborate electronic equipment, the early last year.-News release. Seol'pion F-89 all-weather interceptor, has b~en assigned the task of maintaining a Additional Training 24-hour guard on the northern approaches Still in the planning- stage is a pro­ to the United States. The plane has a g'l"a1l1 designed to stress leadership quali­ demonstrated range of approximately fkations in the officer corps of the Army. Under the program all Regular Army ap­ 2,000 miles and because of this long' range pointees in the combat arms would be can intercept, overtake, and fight ap­ required to take either the Ranger or the proaching bombers over a flexible defense Airborne Course during- their first year of training.-News release. Army Green Uniform Pending completion of administrative and logistical planning, Army personnel may be wearing a .new duty uniform as a result of long and exhaustive studies which ended in an Army-wide troop preference Survey. This survey gave a strong indica­ tIOn of dissatisfaction with the present olive drab uniform and showed that the Army green was acceptable foi' general F-89 Scorpion guards norther'; approachM. duty purposes. It was tested by troops of the 3d Infantry Regiment, in Washington. line hundreds of miles in depth. The pres­ When the uniform, similar for officers and ent planes assigned to Alaska carry six enlisted men, is adopted, it will mark a 20-mm cannon but the latest model Scor­ dear-cut separation of combat garb from pio)!, the F-89D, carries 104 2.75-inch j;'eneral duty wear uniform items.-News folding fin air-to-air rockets in wing tip lelease. pods.-News release. , \ 66 I MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 Synrhetic Rubber Icebreaker AI new synthetic rubber, which is claimed The Glacie1', the Navy's new 8,600-ton to ~e superior in many respects to other icebreaker, is scheduled for launching rub~er products, has been developed by late this year and will then be commis­ the Army Quartermaster Corps in co­ sioned in early 1955 for duty in the Arc­ operation'with civilian industry. The new tic. The vessel is designed to break ice rub1i>er product remains serviceable in more than 20 feet thick. Her bow will be temperatures ranging from minus 15 de~ heavily armored to ram through obstruc­ greas Fahrenheit to plrts 400 degrees tions-an improvement on the slower Fah~enheit. It is noninflammable, abra­ method of driving the ship on top of the sioneacid-and-heat resistant, and can be ice field and crushing it by sheer weight. It will carry helicopters to spot the best prO~lessed and vulcanized on conventional rub er equipment. It possesses unusual way through the ice.-News release. resi tance to corrosive chemicals and Combat Control Teams stro g acids such as fuming nitric and A completely volunteer force, whose job sulf ric acids. The product is affected it will be to accurately mark drop zones onl slightly by hydrocarbon fuels and for parachute delivery of men and sup­ IUb~icants, oxygen, ozone, and sunlight. plies, has become an integral part of The new rubber may be used by the mili­ Tactical Air Command's troop carrier op­ tar to make fuel hoses, diaphragms, gas­ erations. These units are to be known as ketsl, seals, tank linings, and containers and Combat Control Teams. Each team will for protective clothing boots, and coa~ings 1 consist of 1 officer and 13 airmen all of glovb used in handling corrosive materials. whom will be qualified jumpers and com­ It day also be used for coating or treating munications men. Tactical Air Command paph, fabric, wood, or metal in the con­ has an authorization for 12 of these ventional manner, either from a water specialized units and at present there are emulsion or solvent system.-News release. six teams organized. With the addition of qualified personnel and new equipment, Ato'mic Battery it is planned that ultimately there will be The climax of 40 years of scientific ef­ one control team assigned to each medium forts aimed at converting the radiation troop carrier group worldwide. According of the atom's nucleus directly into elec­ to the report these teams will drop by tricity has been achieved in the develop­ parachute in advance of the first wave of ment of an atomic battery using a waste troop carriers, mark the drop zone with product of atomic reactors. It employs recognition panels, smoke, and special the waste product, strontium 90, which communications equipment for guiding the emits high-speed electrons that bombard aircraft.-News release. pea-size transistors. The transistors, in turn, emit 200,000 slow-moving electrons Transfer Submarines for each high-speed electron striking the Under the Mutual Defense Assistance material from the waste product. The Program, four United States Navy fleet thimble-size battery with a life expectancy submarines will go into naval shipyards of 20 years produces current strong for modernization prior to their transfer enough to produce an audible tone in a on a loan basis to Turkey and Italy. The telephone receiver. Great possibilities are Barb and Dace will be transferred to foreseen by the engineers for this revo­ Italy while the Guita1'ro and Hammerhead lutionary batteiy.-News release. will go to Turkey.-News releasr MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 67

Painless Dentistry Survival Suits An ultrasonic tooth drill, deSigned by A lighter, "form-fitted" survival suit scientists at the Naval Medical Research for Navy pilots forced to "ditch" in icy Institute, is a step nearer to banishing waters h~s been designed. Known as MK3 the fear and pain of having cavities and MKf;, these suits are made from a filled by a dentist. A handpiece that can combination of materials, including rub­ be used easily and comfortably by a den­ ber. nylon. 'and a special sealing cement. tist, the device uses ultrasonic sound These suits are "form fitted" at the neck, waves to do the work of drillin'g through wrist. leg. and shoe size. Once the shoe the tooth to clean the cavity. The heat, size has been determined, rubber boots are noise, vibration, and pressure of the pres­ cemented to the suit. The necessary buoy- . ent drilling burl' have created not only ancy to float a survivor is obtained from pain for the patient but also a fear of the body temperature and the amount of dental work in many people. The scientists air trapped in the suit when it is made hope that the new equipment wiil help to airtight.-News release. cut down the fear. The ultrasonic drill is still in the experimental stage anp while New Tourniquet it drills a clean hole on extracted teeth, A new type of tourniquet that automati­ glass, and other hard surfaces, it has not cally and instantly stops the flow of blood been tested on a human patient yet.­ and maintains a regulated and uniform News release. pressure has made its appearance follow­ Psywar Loudspeaker ing 2 % years of research. The tourniquet operates by means of a carbon dioxide gas A new loudspeaker unit featuring great cartridge which. when injected. inflates a adaptability and built specifically for psycholog'ical warfare use is now under­ cuff to the correct pressure necessary to 'going tests. Its amplifier is built in a new arrest the bleeding. The injured person compact and easily movable case and can can apply the tourniquet himself simply by be mounted in allY vehicle now used by wrapping the cuff around the leg or arm, the Army, or in liaison aircraft. or in between the wound and the heart. The gas tanks. The unit is usable intact or in pressure is released by a twist of the car­ parts and consists of two 250-watt am­ tridge container, This inflates the cuff and plifiers. which can be removed by loosen­ exerts a uniform squeeze to instantly ,stop ing one screw. Thus. if one amplifier the flow of blood. No probing for pressure breaks down. it is not necessary to send points is necessary and injury to cell tis­ the entire unit to the rear for re.pair. It sues is greatly minimized or eliminated. can be used on high voltage current. or It weighs only 15 ounces.-News release. by using direct current units. the device Can operate using the vehicle's generator. 'Miniature' Fire Truck The amplifier case also has a built-in The Navy is adding a "miniature" fire tape recorder unit capable of holding truck. capable of negotiating rough ter­ many tape cartridges. A simple adjust­ rain to fight forest and brush fires, to its ment allows these tapes to keep repeating standard fire-fighting equipment in the the message. This method no longer United States and overseas. The vehicle. makes' it necessary to use highly-skilled named Ranger. is about half the size' of linguists at the front lines as the messages a standard Navy fire truck and can pump ean be recorded in the rear areas and 500 gallons of water a minute.-News used when desired.-News release. release, ·68 MILITARY REVIEW FRANCE Supe~sonic Delta Wing Mineral Source The· first high powered delta wing jet Vast deposits of minerals, including to have flown in France is the 1402 Ge1·­ copper, iron, manganese, lead, zinc, tin, taut. The plane is capable of attaining sulphur, and coal, have been found in the supersoni<: speeds. In addition to the delta Sahara Desert. It is estimated that the wing, it is further characterized by having coal deposits exceed 2 billion tons. Al­ an air feed without deviation. The pilot's ready the manganese mines in the border region between Morocco and Algeria pro­ duce 150,000 tons annually, enough to meet approximately half the needs of France. During 1954, Sahara mines are ex­ pected to prodUce 55,000 tons of zinc, 60,000 tons of lead, and 160,000 tons of sulphur. The Sahara Desert extends 2,750 miles from east to west and 2,187 miles from north to south.-News release. Supersonic Flight . Gerfaut is capable of supersonic speeds. The second French aircraft to break the sound barrier in horizontal flight, the seat is over this air feed, which improves Mystel'e IV E, is powered by an Avon R. visibility and the performance of the A.-7R. turbojet engine with a static thrust power unit. For landing, the plane uses of 7,500 pounds, and 9,500 pounds with a parachute brake lined with a second emergency parachute. It is powered by an Atm' 101.C jet engine.-News release.

Transfer Command A highly strategic sector which includes the Strait of Sicily and the Italian island of Pantelleria has been placed under the FreIl'Ch Area Command in the Mediterra­ nean in a recent agreement between the Supreme Commander Allied Forces in the Mediterranean and top officials of the Italian Ministry of Defense. The Italians have opposed relinquishing control of the Mystere IV B breaks sound barrier in test. 90-mile-wide stretch of water between Sic­ ily and North Africa. During World War afterburner. Its armament consists of two II, air and naval units of the Axis powers 30-mm cannon and air-to-air missiles. This based in Sicily inflicted serious losses is an all-weather version of the Mystb'e on allied naval and merchant ships pass­ with a service ceiling of approximately ing .through the Strait. This new move 55,000 feet. The plane has a nose similar should lead to full co-ordination ?f the to that of the F-86D. Its maximum speed Italian, French, Greek, and Turkish forces at sea level is approximately 730 miles in this area under the Supreme Com­ an hour according to available informa­ mander.-News release. tion.-News release. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 69 GREAT BRITAIN Huge Freighter Mirror Lands P'ane Claimed to be the largest of its type Because experiments carried out by the in the world, a new British air freighter, Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply the Blackburn Beverley, has been ordered proved that the high-speed approach of by the Royal Air Force for military trans­ present-day planes to aircraft carriers portation. The plane is powered by four left too short a time margin for the hu­ man reactions between the officer giving the landing signals' and the pilot Of the approaching plane, a new landing aid us­ ing a large. curved mirror has been de­ veloped. A gyro-operated mounting keeps this mirror at an angle constant to the line between the ship and the horizon. On either side of the mirror are two lines of rolored lights. From the after part of the carrier, a spot of light is projected into the mirror and providing the pilot keeps this spot in line with the colored lights, he knows that his angle of approach in the vertical plane is cor Huge 'tail boom opening of the Beverley. recto The curvature of the mirror makes enp:ines and can operate from 1,000-yard the spot visible at all necessary angles in the horizontal plane, so that the pilot runways. It is claimed that it can' "float can pick up the lights as he sweeps down" and land in almost helicopter-like around to approach the carrier's stern. manner. The Bevcl'/ey can lift 25 tons and The vertical angle at which the device is ~an b~ converted into a transport capable of carrying 132 passengers. It can also be used as a dual-purpose plane with mer­ chandise on the main deck and 40 passen­ gers on the upper deck.-News release.

Defense Budget A record peacetime "war prevention" defense budg'et of more than 4% billion dollars was recently announced in Great Mirror aids in landing plane on carrier. Britain. Under the budget it was said that tfle. strength of the armed forces set can be varied according to the type would be cut from 855,000 to 844,300. The of aircraft landing so that the undercar­ Army would suffer a cut of 13,000 men. riage will be at precisely the right height Emphasis is being placed on atomic weap­ above the carrier's stern just before touch­ ons, build up, of the strategic bomber ing down. To allow the pilot to keep his force of the Royal Air Force, and the use eyes on the aid, a special translucent panel of guided missiles in air defense. This con­ is arranged on the plane's windshield so cept is similar to the "new look" in de­ that lights of various colors indicate fense policies adopted recently in the whether the pilot is flying at the proper United States.-News release. speed or not.-News release. 70 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE---­ 1954 AUSTRALIA BRAZIL Defense Base Construction Tire Plant Basic construction of a naval base at An ultramodern tire plant with a floor Manus Island in the north has been com­ space of nearly 300,000 square feet is pleted while good progress is being made producing tires made entirely from Bra­ on an Air Force base on the same island zilian raw materials. Brazil's production according to a recent announcement. For of natural rubber, hard pushed by the the Navy, the island is an advanced base "enormous expansion of the rubber indus­ and tropical training area while the Air try, is being sharply boosted. The produc­ Force uses it as a training area and a tion of nylon cord for tiremaking is also staging base for northern flights linking being intensified according to the report. Australia with American bases in the Pa­ -News release. cific. It completes the chain of air bases stretching from Pearce and Cocos in the Steel Industry west to Townsville in the north.-News Preliminary work has started on a steel release. mill designed for an initial capacity of 50,000 tons a year of finished steel pro­ Upper Air Research ducts. The plant is to be built in' Vitoria, Plans to carry out rocket experiments capital of the state of Espirito Santo, by at heights of up to 200,000 feet-approx­ German and Brazilian interests. Industrial imately 38 miles above the earth's sur­ operations are scheduled to begin in Jan­ face-by Australian scientists have' been uary 1955 according to the announcement. announced.-News release. It has been reported that the plant will be expanded in subsequent stages up to INDOCHINA a capacity of 400,000 tons annually. Bra­ Total Mobilization zil's largest steel mill, Volta Redonda, is Total mobilization of all male citizens well on its way to a planned capacity of between the ages of 21 and 25 has been 01'­ 1 million tons of ingot steel a year. An­ • dered by Vietnam's war cabinet in order to other project for a 300,000-ton a year plant fight the Communist-dominated Vietminh at Piassaguera, near Santos, is scheduled rebels. It marks the first time that Viet­ to be ready by 1956. It is planned to nam has called its young men in large push the production at this plant to 1 numbers inte the armed forces, as pre­ million tons a year eventually according viously they were' drafted individually to the report.-News release. and there were many evasions. The brunt of the attack had been borne by the Machinery Imports French forces composed of French, North During the period 1946-52, the last year Africans, and foreign legionnaires. At the for which complete figures are available, same time, 32,000 fighting men who for­ machinery imports have quadrupled. In merly paid allegiance to religious sects 1952, the country's bill for machinery were incorporated into the 300,OOO-man totaled approximately 500 million dollars national army. More than 100,000 Vietna­ or slightly under 300 percent higher than mese volunteers now on active duty were the figure for 1946. frozen into service. The majority of the Of Brazil's imports, machinery, the exemptions from military service were largest single class by value, represented abolished and all citizens subject to mili­ 21 percent of the total in 1946 and 29 tary service were forbidden to leave the percent in 1952 according to the report. country.-News release. -News release. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 71

JAPAN NORWAY Develop Jet Engine Launch Minesweepers Work is progressing on the development The Norwegian ,Navy is to receive five of a jet engine, the JO-1, a version of the minesweepers being built this year under German BMW-008 which was originally the Vnited States Mutual Defense Assist­ shipped to Japan in 1944. This German en­ ance Program at Norwegian shipyards. gine was usep. primarily for instructional Th~y will be ready for service soon. When purposes although two of them were ulti­ this work is completed, construction will be mately used in the construction of the started on three motor-torpedo boats prototYpe of the first Japanese jet bomber which will be an improved version of the of the KIKA type, a modified version of Rapp. It is claimed that the Rapp is faster and more maneuverable than any other boat of this class and when first tested in 1952, it made 50 knots without any ap­ preciable vibration.-News release.

Research Program More than 1,000 research workers are employed in public and private laborato­ ries on projects costing approximately 16 million dollars annually. This is about twice as many workers employed on such Work ~m modern version of early jet engine. projects as before the war, and the ex­ the German Me-262. The new engine, the penditure 4!.I:!!l1t;esents approximately 2.5 JO-J, is longer than the original German pro mille of Norway's gross national in­ version and consists of an 8-stage axial come. The United States spends three compressor and a single-stage gas turbine. times as much of its income on scientific The engine has a maximum static thrust and industrial research. at sea level of 2,205 pounds and a rota­ Since the war, 11 new research insti­ tional speed of 12,000 revolutions per tutes have been established and are sched­ minute. It weighs 990 pounds and is 9 uled to occupy the industrial research feet 4 inches long with a diameter of 2 center now under construction at Blind­ feet 2.75 inches. The compression ratio of ern, Oslo.-News release. the compressor of 2.3;1 is considered very low in comparison with similar engines.­ SWEDEN FI,/gwehl' mul-Technilc. Air Force Conversion Sweden is rapidly moving ahead in her ARGENTINA program to equip the country's small, but Import Planes effective, Air Force with the latest super­ Among the several civilian models of sonic aircraft. The SAAB-32 Lansen, all­ the Skoda aircraft imported from Praha, weather attack fighter now in quantity C:Ukraine.-News release. ANew Mobility Dig('sted by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Colonel P. A. Tobin in the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" (Great Britain) November 1953.

BEFORE making any attempt to forecast the limitatiom and disadvantages which possible future military uses of the hel­ attend the modern helicopter will have icopter, it is well to establish firmly in been largely eliminated by the time that our minds the fact that this type of ma­ their large-scale employment in the mili­ chine is still in an early stage .of develop­ tary field is accepted practice. It is against ment. Although primitive helicopters were this background of guaranteed progress flying before 1939 and' were used on iso­ that we must consider the possible uses of lated occasions during World War II, it helicopters in the three services. is in fact only since 1945 that their po­ For fear that it should be thought that tential value as a practical means of any of the suggestions discussed· in this transport in both the civil and military article are unduly advanced, it is worth fields has beel) recognized. It would not remembering that a 40-seater machine is be an unreasonable basis of comparison to already under construction in the United state that the helicopter of today is in States, and that the British firm with the approximately the same stage of develop­ greatest experience of helicopter produc­ ment as the fixed-wing aircraft of 1920-24 tion has in existence design studies for a vintage. When one then remembers that machine capable of lifting 450 troops, or a in 30 short years the biplane bomber or 45-ton tank, or 40 tons of supplies over dis­ airliner of that era with its 100 miles an tances up to 230 miles. huur cruising speed has developed into the Vulcan and the Comet of today, one begins Characteristics t" visualize what scope for development The outstandtng characteristic of the Ii~s iIi front of us in the helicopter field. helicopter is, of course, its ability to land Furthermore, if one considers that de­ on and takeoff from confined spaces. True sIgners today are looking at least 10 years vertical ascent or descent will seldom be ahead, it is safe to predict that, many of possible except under the most favorable 74 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 conditions, particularly in the case of the mounted jet units as a means of propulsion. larger machines. This characteristic does, Indeed, the helicopter of .20 years hence however, enable the helicopter to operate, may obtain its vertical lift in some manner entirely independently of prepared air­ quite different from that which we under­ fields. Even for the largest machines, all stand today. that is required is a roughly cleared and The final outstanding characteristic of leveled area of perhaps one acre in extent, the helicopter is that, in its present form, while the lighter machines can operate it is not easy to learn to fiy. This, again, from platforms smaller than a tennis will be eased with development and, al­ court. though accurate judgment will always be The second characteristic is the ability required, the low operating speed ensures of the helicopter to hover in flight. This that men of average physical attributes enables the aircraft to dispense with even and relatively advanced years can become the restricted ground areas already de­ successful helicopter pilots. scrijoled, delivering or taking up its. load by In sum, therefore, the machines which winch cable. This has particular appli­ we are considering in this article may cation to operations between small ships at range widely in size but they will have in sea or in very difficult terrain on land. A common the fundamental characteristics of further adVantage is that, under difficult near-vertical takeoff and landing, the conditions, a pilot can hover to discover ability to fly at very low speeds down to a his position or can use his maneuverability standstill, limited top speeds and ceiling, to evade air attack. Similarly, the slow­ but excellent cargo-carrying facilities. In­ flying characteristics enable him to fly itially, cost and maintenance will be high safely under low clouds or to use the pro­ but will decrease with development, while tection afforded by the hills and valleys piloting will be within the powers of the below him. average serviceman. As at present envisaged, there would ap­ pear to be certain physical limitations on Naval Requirements the performance of helicopters. Speeds are As in previous wars, the primary role of unlikely to exceed 200 knots and ceilings the Royal Navy will be the protection of may not be much over 15,000 feet. Heat the ocean routes for use by our own com­ and altitude both have adverse effects on mercial and military shipping while deny­ th~ machine's ability to hover or takeoff ing these routes to the enemy. Although vertically. However, in the uscs to which the surface and air threats to our use of the helicopter is likely to be put, neither these routes cannot be entirely discounted, ceiling nor extreme speed are·.\j>f great im­ the main threats are likely to come from portance. A relatively low cruising speed the submarine and the mine. is indeed to some extent an ~dvantage, in that it permits the fuselage to be designed Antisubmarine Warfare to the most efficient shape for the carriage It is in the decisive struggle against the of men, vehicles, and supplies, without submarine that the helicopter is likely to much concession to streamlining. play its most important part in the war at The current helicopter is both expensive sea. The remarkable progress achieved in to build and costly to maintain compared submarine design, particularly in respect with its fixed-wing counterpart., This is to underwater speed and endurance, has largely due to the complications of trans­ made it both difficult and costly to produce mission and rotor design which will be surface escort vessels with the necessary greatly reduced by the introduction of tip- margin of speed. to ensure a successful F~REIGN MILITARY DIGESTS hunt and kill. Whereas the c4nventional their ability to operate from normal ships. aircraft has ample speed superiority, it It may well be necessary, initially, to op­ lacks both the vision and slow-flying char­ erate in pairs, one carrying search equip­ acteristics needed accurately to detect and ment and the other offensive weapons. attack so elusive a target. Furthermore, in A supplementary use of helicopters in general, conventional aircraft can only op­ the protection of our shipping is for the erate from aircraft carriers or .from shore control of convoys. Their use in this role bases too distant in both time ,md space to

portion of the available manpower and units, workshops, and hospitals are spread , transport at the expense of the fighting over the entire rear areas. To control units. There is no escaping the fact that, them, there springs up a rash of head­ with the complexity of modern military quarters; while to protect them we re­ equipment and the natural wish to provide quire antiaircraft units in great numbers. the individual soldier with everything that The final result is, as we have already he needs for his efficiency, health, and mentioned, an excessive proportion of our morale, the modern civilized state must men and vehicles unprofitably employed inevitably provide administrative support away from the battle area. ' on a relatively lavish scale. This commit­ It has long been apparent that an ef­ ment is a serious handicap when one is ficient system of air supply would enable fighting opponents who are prepared to ac­ considerable reductions to be made in the cept a much lesser degree of administra­ conventional administrative system, but tive backing for their troops, and who can the attendant disadvantages of supply by thus not only ~eploy a greater proportion conventional aircraft have been so serious of their available resources in men and as to make air supply on a large scale material in direct contact with the en­ possible only in exceptional circumstances. emy, but can also largely diminish the The first obvious disadvantage is the vul­ congested and vulnerable lines of com­ nerability of transport aircraft to both munication which so restrict the opera­ fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, tions of modern armies. which rules out air supply except under It seems, therefore, that, rather than conditions of almost complete air supe­ lower the standard of administrative sup­ riority. The second is the serious limiting port for our fighting formations, we should effect of weather. The third is the bottle­ aim at making use of our technical skill neck imposed by the need to use airfields and industrial capacity to develop a for both loading and delivery. (Para­ streamlined administrative machine which chute delivery is not considered a prac­ is as economical as possible in manpower. ticable proposition for prolonged large­ This is not the place to elaborate upon scale maintenance.) But the most vital the present administrative system of the disadvantage of air supply by conventional British Army, but it is well known that aircraft is that of economy. The use of a large proportion of the manpower and conventional aircraft cannot produce a re­ transport resources of an overseas force duction in the scale of normal road trans­ is necessarily deployed in the rear areas port required by an army. since the latter out of contact with the enemy. The sole must be prepared to use a conventional purpose of these resources is to keep the supply line under conditions of air infe­ 'fighting formations supplied with every­ riority or bad weather. Further, road thing they need to fight the battle. They transport in large numbers will be re­ must store and load and move vehicles, quired for the delivery of items to air­ supplies, food, gasoline, and ammunition fields and for collection at the far end. It along the lines of communication from will be obvious that the British Army, at base to divisions. The result is a contin­ any rate, will be unable to afford the uous flow of transport along congested luxury of two alternative means of main­ roads and railways. Because of the vulner­ tenance--{}ne by road and one by air. In apility of these communications, reserves fact, the effect of such a system would be must be held at every formation level, to increase rather than diminish the ad­ with men to handle and guard the sup­ ministrative overheads..Only if the sys­ plies. Maintenance areas, supply-holding tem of supply by air supersedes almost FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 81 entirely the ground system, while offer­ the use of helicopters overcomes all the ing other marked advantages, particularly disadvantages inherent in supply by cbn­ in the saving of manpower, can it be ac­ ventional aircraft. There are, however, cepted as a practical and economical sub­ other factors to be considered before heli­ stitute. This, it is considered, is what the copter maintenance can be accepted as a helicopter can provide. practical proposition. If we consider in turn the disadvantages inherent in the conventional system of sup­ Economy ply by air, we will see that they are al­ The first of these is the factor of econ­ most entirely eliminated by the use of heli­ omy. It is unlikely that, even ... nder con­ copters. ditions of mass production, the initial cost It has already been shown that the low­ of a helicopter will ever be less than 10 flying helicopter is largely immune to air times that of 1;he equivalent road vehicle. attack and, in supply operations, it will Equally, maintenance commitments will seldom be exposed to the risk of antiair­ inevitably continue to be much greater. It craft fire. thus follows that the helicopter will be While helicopters wiII undoubtedly be economically possible only if the rate -of sensitive to certain conditions of weather, utilization is so greatly superior to that particularly high winds, they wiII be able possible with its road equivalent, as to to operate under conditions of bad visi­ offset the very high capital and mainte­ bility which would ground all conventional nance charges, or if its other inherent ad­ aircraft. In fact, by day, the ideal condi­ vantages will produce such radical savings tions for helicopter operation are likely to in manpower as to justify the very severe include low clouds, which will guarantee financial commitments. immunity from air attack. It is, however, First, let us consider the rate of turn­ likely that the bulk of maintenance traffic, around. Taking as an example a haul of 80 as is the case with road transport, wiII miles between source and delivery point, move by night. the helicopter is likely to take 1 hour The flexibility of operation inherent in over the single journey as compared with the helicopter wiII enable men and material a possible figure of 4 hours for the truck. to be flown direct from source to user, thus Using the generally accepted figure of 2 avoiding, completely, the bottlenecks im­ hours for loading and unloading at each posed by airfields. end, the turnaround time becomes 6 hours Maintenance by helicopter can thus fair­ for the helicopter and 12 hours for the ly be said to be more dependable, less vul­ truck, so we can only expect twice as much nerable, and far more flexible than supply work out of the helicopter as from the by conventional aircraft. With these at­ equivalent truck. It is worth noting, how­ tributes, it can be safely used as a substi­ ever, that if the time for loading and un­ tute for conventional road transport and loading is reduced to half an hour at each thus meets the fundamental condition end, the turnaround times become 3 hours which we laid down as being necessary for and 9 hours respectively, and the helicop­ the wholesale acceptance of air supply. ter becomes three times as efficient as the I·'urthermore, not only can the helicopter truck. From this simple example, three replace road transport on the main com­ facts stand out. First, time of loading munication routes, but, due to its inherent and unloading must be reduced to a mini­ tiexibiIity, its use will obviate the need for mum if helicopter operation is ever to mad transport for delivery at each end of be economi~ally feasible. Consideration \ he supply chain. It is, thus, apparent that should be given to the use of pod contain­ q 82 MILITARY REVIEW erst Second, the larger the payload the istrative support for the field fprmations more economical the helicopter system of will be concentrated in a relatively com­ maintenance becomes. Third, however pact and easily defensible base area, linked quickly loading and unloading is effected, to the operational formations by a reliable the helicopter cannot hope to compete with and flexible, yet largely invulnerable, the truck on economical grounds alone. system of helicopter links. This latter H;l;lving established this fundamental point is particularly important when one facti,' it remains to assess whether the considers the potential threat from sabo­ other fundamental advantages inherent in tage to the communications of an army the helicopter are such as to offset the operating in Western Europe against Com­ adverse economical factor. In particular, munist opposition. we must examine whether any funda­ mental saving in manpower can be ef­ .Flexibility fected. There are three further advantages in­ Already, we have established that, herent in the helicopter system. The first thanks to the greatly superior utiliza­ is that its flexibility makes the load-carry­ tion possible with helicopters, the number ing helicopter particularly adaptable to of vehicles directly engaged on the main other administrative tasks, such as the con?munications haul may be as little as forward movement of reinforcements or one-third of the number of trucks required. the rearward evacuation of casualties, If the payload of the helicopter can be in­ prisoners of war, unserviceable vehicles, creased to, say, six tons as compared with and salvage of all kinds. The second is the tlj§ee tons of the standard truck, the that, being in no way dependent upon numb& of vehicles would come down to roads, it relieves the engineers of the very one-sixth. Here, immediately, is a funda­ heavy commitment normally involved in mental and highly important saving in the maintenance of roads and bridges in manpower, not only of the actual opera­ the real' areas. Furthermore, there is no tional crews, but of maintenance and ad­ corresponding increase in airfield upkeep. ministrative staffs to support them. Sec­ Finally, by its flexibility and relative im­ ond, we have already shown that the use munity to interference, maintenance by of helicopters, which can deliver direct helicopter is particularly well suited to the from source to user, overcomes the need supply of localities cut off by the ground for road transport at each end of this battle from their normal sources of supply, system. This provides another direct and or to the maintenance of a fast-moving valuable saving in manpower. However, force which is in danger of outrunning its the greatest saving is indirect. Due to the administrative support. speed and flexibility with which items can It is suggested that, despite the ap­ be moved by helicopter along lines of com­ parently adverse economy factor, the fun­ munication which are relatively immune damental advantages to be gained from a to interference, it will no longer be neces­ helicopter system of maintenance are so sary to hold large reserves of commodities great as to make its adoption by the Brit­ at every level from base to corps. The ish Army of vital importance. These ad­ abolition of these reserves, with their at­ vantages can be summarized as follows: tendant administrative and defensive li­ flexibility, saving in administrative man­ abilities, will result in immense savings power, increased speed of turnaround, re~ both of manpower and material. Further­ duction in reserve holdings, immunity of more, the entire system of maintenance lines of communication to interference, will be simplified, in that the basic admin­ and reduction in engineer effort. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 83.

So far, under this heading, we have only 1. Reconnaissance.-The helicopter pro­ considered the influence of helicopters on vides commanders at all levels with the the system of maintenance in the field. means for carryiNg out widespread recon­ This is the paramount issue, for if the use naissance far more efficiently and rapidly of helicopters in this role is accepted, their than can be done from the ground alone. large-scale production is guaranteed and There may possibly be scope for the one­ their use can be extended to other fields of man pack helicopter in this role. which we can only discuss a' few very 2. Pat1·olling.-It cali be carried out in briefly. depth and over a wide front, the helicop­ Of these, the most important is that of ter being used to carry the party to a casualty evacuation, in which capacity the base from which they can operate on helicopter can offer revolutionary ad­ foot. vantages. By its use, the severely wound­ 3. Ail' Observation Post.-The helicop­ ed soldier can be transported in an hour ter has many advantages over the light or less from the very foremost positions aircraft in this role. It can also be used to an operating table 50 miles or more be­ to establish ground observation post par­ hind the battle area. Not only does the ties in previously inaccessible places. speed and relative smoothness of the o 4. Intercommunication. _ Helicopters journey immeasurably increase his chances have uses'in cable-laying, for the estab­ of recovery but, as has been vividly dem­ lishment of radio relay stations on high onstrated in Korea and Malaya, the knowl­ ground, and for the carriage of messages. edge that such means of evacuation exist They have obvious uses for the transport is of immense value in sustaining the of commanders and liaison officers. morale of the combat soldier. The large­ 5. Enginee)' Tasks.-There are numer­ scale use of helicopters in this role will ous possible applications, including the have the added advantage of enabling carriage of engineer supplies to the work­ wholesale reductions to be made in the ing site. The heavy-lift helicopter may scale of medical units required in division have a useful part to play in bridging and corps areas. All serious treatment operations, while it may well prove possi­ and surgery could be carried out in well­ ble to develop methods of clearing mine equipped hospitals in rear areas. In this fields from the air. way, the helicopter will have made yet 6. Tm/fic Control.-Aircraft can be of anothel' valuable contribution to the re­ the greatest value in controlling large­ duction of the Army's administrative taii. scale road movement, and for this role To a limited extent, the same principle the helicopter is particularly well suited. cf helicopter evacuation from the battle urea could be applied to the recovery of Summary vehicles and equipment, enabling repairs To meet the demands of the Army in the to be carried out centrally at well-equipped tactical, administrative, and miscellaneous workshops, far from the battIe area where fields there appears to be a demand for men of low medical category can be em­ three main types: ployed, thus making another contribution 1. The Light Helicopter (3-4 seater).­ IowaI'd the most effective employment of This machine would meet most of the re­ "ur manpower resources. quirements in the miscellaneous category. Miscellaneous 2. The Medium Helicopter.-This ma­ Space will only allow a very brief men­ chine should be designed to combine the don of a number of possible roles under administrative cargo-carrying and the j his heading. tactical troop-carrying requirements. In 84 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE ~954

the tactical role, the ideal machine would dictated by the state of the tide. An initial ,be/able to c,arry a platoon of infantry com· assault by helicopter-borne forces offers pl~te with weapons, ammunition; and far greater chances of achieving surprise. equipment. ,This would require a payload First, because these forces can be launch­ of about five tons, which corresponds ed, either from aircraft carriers far dis­ closely with the six-ton payload consid­ tant from the assault area or, in the short­ ered eminently suitable for the cargo­ range assault, from land bases. Flying carrying type. The fuselage and doors of very low, it may well prove possible to this machine should permit the carriage of evade radar detection and achieve com­ vehicles and artillery equipments up to plete tactical surprise. A further advan­ the limiting lifting weight. tage is that the initial assault, at least, 3. The Heavy-lift l{elicopter.-This ma­ can be launched independently of the state chine would be required in small numbers of the tide. 'for the tactical movement of tanks, for Further advantages obtain during the armored vehicle recovery, and bridging build-up phase. Men and supplies can be tasks. It will require a payload of about put ashore rapidly anywhere along the 50 tons. beachhead with the minimum of compli­ cation. Congestion on the beaches is Peacetime Role avoided; double-handling of supplies is Before concluding this section, mention unnecessary; the transporting vehicles should be made of one peacetime commit­ need only be in the danger area for the ment of the Army which is not directly minimum of time, while the supplies and connected with its main operational tasks, personnel ships can be widely dispersed namely, internal security duties through­ against the threat of atomic attack. out the world. In this role the helicopter Once the force is established ashore, should prove of the greatest value for the roles for the helicopter are the same as rapid movement of reinforcing units to in normal land warfare. The requirements areas of unrest, particularly in undevel­ of an amphibious operation can be fully oped countries. met by the three types considered neces­ sary to meet Army requirements. Joint Operations Requirements In this section we will consider the pos­ Airborne Operations sible employment of helicopters in am­ The potentialities of airborne forces are phibious operations, in airborne opera­ well known. It remains to assess to what tions, and in raiding operations. extent the use of helicopters can improve During the assembly of an amphibious the efficiency or increase the scope of air­ force and its approach to the assault borne operations. area, the employment of helicopters will The principal disadvantages of airborne fall into the same categories as those al­ operations as we know them today are; the ready discussed under naval requirements. need for highly trained specialist troops; It is in the assault phase that the heli­ susceptibility to weather conditions; in­ copter can exert tl;te greatest influence. efficient means of delivery; limited powers Under conventional methods, the assembly of lift; and inflexibility. of the landing craft and run-in to the One of the greatest advantages of using beaches is a lengthy process in which sur­ the helicopter for airborne operations is prise is normally forfeited early. Land­ that any soldier can walk into it and out ing craft are,vulnerable during the run-in of it with no specialist training what­ and the timing of the entire operation is ever. Thus, a commander with a large hel­ FOREIGN ~ILITARY DIGESTS 85 icopter lift at his disposal can use it to to do so by operating from excessively land any of his normal formations behind long runways which are most unlikeJy to the enemy. He is no longer restricted to be available in the battle area. Thus, in the use of certain highly specialized and the end, the limiting factor will be the irreplaceable formations in this role: The capacity of the parachute. The helicopter, advantages of this are clearly immense, on the other hand. will be able to deliver particularly since it will allow him to the 1;Ieaviest loads up to the limit of its make use of all his available combat for­ lifting. capacity. mations, instead of having to keep his air­ By using helicopters in this type of borne forces out of battle while they con­ operation, the assembly and dispatch of tinue their specialist tmining until the the large numbers involved will be a much decisive moment comes to launch them. simpler process than that required with As, has already been mentioned. while conventional aircmft. particularly since helicopters are undoubtedly susceptible to the helicopters will be able to join and weather conditions, they are capable of remain with the unit being lifted up to taking off and reaching their objectives in the moment of delivery. Finally, helicop­ conditions of visibility which would either ters are far less demanding than the para­ ground a conventional air transport force chutist in the choice of landing zones at at its bases or render the dropping zones the far end. thus affording far greater invisible. flexibility in the choice' of areas suitable The parachute is without doubt a thor­ for airborne operations. oughly inefficient means of delivering It will be seen that by using helicop­ either men or supplies into battle. The ters the possibilities of airborne operations man requires prolonged specialist training are greatly increased. The type of machine and must be young and fit; he is vulner­ principally needed will again be the able to the enemy while descending and medium capacity cargo or troop carrier. to obstructions on landing; the "stick" One of the most effective means of tak­ from an nircraft is widely dispersed on ing the offensive in the early stages of a landing. Supplies are even more widely future global war, before our full war dispersed on landing and there is a definite potential has been developed. will be by limit to what can be economically dropped. means of raids, both for the purpose of Moreover, parachutes are expensive. take obtaining information and for inflicting up much of the aircraft payload, and re­ damage on the enemy's war machine. quire considerable effort to pack and main-. In the past. the majority of such raids tain. have been launched from the sea, although All these disadvantages are removed by a number of successful parachute opera­ the use of helicopters. which can provide tions have also been carried out. The dis­ the compact delivery of subunits anxiously advantage of the amphibious raid is that ~ought after by airborne formations with­ it can only reach coastal targets. while if put any of the dangers or disadvantages the raid is carried out by parachute some of the glider. In particular. the helicop­ alternative means of extracting the party ter requires no aircraft tug and can re­ must be provided if they are not to be t urn to make further journeys with either written off. The helicopter offers a means men or, supplies. whereby raiding parties can be inserted While there is no reason to suppose that deep into enemy territory and withdrawn the large conventional aircraft will not al­ by the same means. The advantages of ways be able to carry as heav~' a load as this method of raiding are consi'derable. the largest helicopter. it will only be able First, the party can be delivered complete 86 l\1ILIT1RY REVIEW JUNE 1954 • with its supplies, if necessary, right on top use of the most valuable of all commodi· of the objective. Second, the choice of ob·, ties-manpower-thus enormously in-: jective is in no way restricted by the creasing the fighting power of our Army. need for suitable landing or dropping These advantages extend equally to the zones. Objectives can be selected almost fields of amphibious and airborne opera­ anywhere within the range of the helicop· tions, including raids. ter. Third, the helicopter can fly low It is, thus, clear that while the Army, enough by night to evade radar detection, and, to a lesser extent, the Navy, has a ail' attack, and, if suitably routed, anti· vital stake in the future of the helicopter;' aircraft fire. Fourth, the helicopter's slow­ the RAF has virtually none. It is, there­ flying qualities will make possible really fore, unrealistic and unsound to expect the accurate navigation by night, although ex­ RAF to devote any large proportion of its tensive electronic aids are likely to be re· available financial and industrial resources quired. to the development and production of these If full use is to be made of the poten­ machines. If we are to see full use made tialities of the helicopter in this role, of the immense latent possibilities of the ranges must be many ti~es greater than helicopter, the other two services must those available today. There is, therefore, be prepared to sponsor and finance its de­ likely to be a requirement for modified velopment. 'Furthermore, this transfer of long-range versions of the medium heli­ responsibility should be made at once. For­ copter for offensive raids and of the light tunately, the difficulties in implementing machine Jor reconnaissance tasks. such a change of policy are very much less than might at first sight be imagined. Summary First, in the Ministry of Supply is central­ The conclusions reached in this article ized responsibility for the development and can be summarized as follows: production-not only of all aircraft for To the Navy, the helicopter offers one both Royal Navy and RAF but also of all vital contribution in the role of convoy Army equipment. The necessary machin­ protection against submarine attack. It ery is thus in existence and can be switch­ also provides a number of useful advan­ ed over to helicopter development for the tages which would justify small·scale Navy and Army. Second, the five firms in pl'oductio~ lighter types of machine. this country which are actively engaged To the RAF, me helicopter can offer, in helicopter development are not heavily in the p.ear future, only very slight ad· committed to production for the RAF and vantages, except perhaps in the role of could conveniently be transposed on to aircrew rescue. It is doubtful whether any helicopter production for the other two of the possible uses would justify the di­ services. version of money and manufacturing ca­ Having established that it is the Navy pacity from the more pressing needs of and the Army who have the greatest need the service. for the helicopter and who must, therefore, To the Army, the helicopter offers the be prepared to sponsor it, it would be opportunity of fundamental improvements quite unrealistic to expect the RAF to ac­ in both the tactical and administrative cept responsibility for helicopter opera­ field!;. To take full advantage of these op­ tion on behalf of the other two services. portun~ties will necessitate heavy expendi­ The Navy and Army will have to accept ture, large-scale manufacturing effort, and full responsibility, not only for the opera­ a complete change in policy. If adopted, tional aspect, but also for the associated however, they will ensure the most efficient maintenance and training commitments. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87

In the case of the Navy there should be specification. The antisubmarine helicopter little difficulty. A complete aviation or­ will almost certainly have to be a special­ ganization already exists, arid it will ized design, in size somewhere between the merely be a matter of the helicopter sup­ light category and the Army's medium ca­ planting the fixed-wing aircraft in certain pacity machine. The heavy-li~t helicopter categories. . will be almost entirely the prerogative of In the case of the Army, however, funda­ the Army, although the RAF may require mental changes will be necessary, for there a small number for aircraft recovery. is no existing organization th'at can take Further than this one cannot go without over the new technique complete. It may detailed technical investigation, but it indeed prove necessary to develop a new ,would appear that four basic types of ma­ branch of the service to handle this great chine should meet the needs of all" three new commitment. More probably it will services. fall to the lot of the Royal Army Service In conclusion, it can be said that to the Corps to assume responsibility for the op­ RAF the helicopter will be of only minor eration of these machines. Mechanics of significance. The Royal Navy has already the Royal Electrical and Mechanical En­ appreciated its importance and will un­ gineers will have to undertake repairs and doubtedly make increasing use of its at­ servicing. Training schools for pilots and tributes in the war at sea. It is, however; ground crew will have to be established." the Army that has the most to gain from Indeed, the introduction of helicopters into this new instrument and which has done the Army will involve a large-scale reor­ the least to further its development. There ganization. is little likelihood of rapid and effective In considering the types of machine that progress being made with the production will be needed, it is essential to achieve the of helicopters in this country unless tbe greatest possible measure of standardiza­ Army is prepared to sponsor it. This re­ tion between the three services, particu­ quires a bold decision to transfer funds larly in view of the limited design and pro­ and manufacturing capacity from road duction capacity likely to be available to vehicles to helicopters, for it will never be the helicopter section of the aircraft in­ within our means to afford both road and dustry. airlift together. The prizes to be gained The Army's requirements are clear cut­ are immense-possibly decisive. For it is light, medium, and heavy-lift machines­ within the power of the present leaders of and can conveniently be used as a basis for the Army, by showing vision and courage, considering the needs of the other services. to provide our forces in the field with tac­ There is a general requirement ;for light tical flexibility and administrative effi­ helicopters which should be satisfactorily ciency such as could not be matched by the met by variations on a common basic land forces of any other nation. "

("orrection-The article, The Tank as an Antitank Weapon. which appeared on page ~8 of ·our March 1954 issue, was taken from the "Military Digest," India rather than Pakistan. ..c-:­ 88 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE·J954 The German Command on the Western Front in 1944 . Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW front an article by J Lieutenant Colonel Neefs in uL'Armee-La Nation ' (Belgium) 1 August 1953.

A CLEAR understanding of the function­ The Situation ing and organization of the command is On the northern plains, the two adver­ one of the essential factors in the suc­ saries were seeking to deal one another cess of a campaign. Its organization must decisive blows by means of large-scale be such that the responsible commander maneuvers. Armor was playing a decisive of a theater of operation can co-ordi­ role in the battle. Aviation was glvmg nate closely the action of all the forces powerful support to the ground forces. at his disposal in order to fulfill his mis­ The north-south obstacles created by the sion. water courses, never seriously hindered Moreover, the various echelons of the the Soviet Army. command-once their mission has been as­ On this front, the Soviet Army was signed and their supplies allotted-must driving ahead in White Russia and threat­ be able to act without unjustified interven­ ening East Prussia. Farther to the south, tion by higher echelons. the Dniester had been reached. Hitler had The study of the preparation for, and sent the best of his troops to this front the conduct of, operations by the Germans but they had suffered serious losses. The on the western front in 1944, is highly German High Command began to enter­ instructive along this line. tain doubts relative to the loyalty of cer­ On their side, the allies had command tain of its central European satellites mastery in all echelons, and perfect co­ which it had dragged into the battle ordination between the ground, air, and against the Soviet Union. naval forces. These factors, together with On the south, the Italian partner was the spirit of the troops and the power of out of the running. The stubborn defense the materiel, were decisive in the outcome of the Peninsula by Kesselring's forces of the operations destined for creating a had not been able to prevent the allied second front. forces from reaching Rome. On the German side, it is undeniable On the Italian front, created by the thllj~ certain defective dispositions made landing on the coasts of Sicily and then wiilh a view to the battle ,in the west, ex­ on the Peninsula, the operations were ercised an influence that was by no characterized by a series of local actions means negligible in the development of·· carefully launched and were more reminis­ the operations. cent of trench warfare than of war of One of the points of merit of the Al­ movement. A characteristic example of this lied Supreme Command moreover, was campaign was the battle for Monte Cas­ that of exploiting these weaknesses to the sino. The amphibious operations of Anzio maximum-not many weaknesses escaped and Salerno also played an important role the attention of their intelligence service. in the conquest of the Peninsula. Before examining the characteristics of Also on this front, the ground forces the German organization in the west for were strongly supported by aviation. Naval the purpose of discovering its defects, let forces did not even contribute to ·the us recall, briefly, the general situation landings, however, they supported the under which the campaign of 1944-45 was units in action along the coasts with their waged. fires. ( FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 89

It is Qbvious that the High Command of was leading Germany to her ruin. In the the Wehrmacht could have drawn, from High Command of the Wehrmacht, a cer­ this double field of experiences, important tain enervation was beginning to manifest lessons for the organization and conduct itself. Several marshals and generals of the defense in the west. criticized the Fahrer's plans. It may be added, that the allied com­ They felt that their chief had a false manders of the forces destined for the idea of the situation in general and of . second front, were not persoI)s who were the military situation in particular. They unknown to their adversaries. Generals attempted to open his eyes to these things, Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery, and but when they were refused support by Patton, had fought the Axis forces in Hitler's immediate entourage, notably Africa or in Italy, and the German Com­ Keit! and Jodi, they succeeded only in mand had had an opportunity to study drawing his anger and in arousing his their methods in the conduct of amphib­ distrust. ious and ground operations. However, the Rommel was one of those who attempted High Command of the Wehrmacht was in vain, several different times, to bring not able to profit from this knowledge. Hitler and his staff to a more realistic view of things. Morale Hence, when Dr. Stroelin and Colonel Let us complete this brief resume of von Hofacker made contact with Rommel, the general situation of May 1944 with" they did not have much trouble in getting a few words concerning the state of mind him to share certain views of the chiefs that prevailed at that time in the Ger­ of the anti-HitIerian conspiracy. man camp, In short, although the people and the The defeat at Stalingrad and the re­ Army were still, for the greater pa,·t, sumption of the initiative by the Soviets loyal to the Fiihrer, rrtainelements of on the eastern front, the liquidation of the ruling classes ap'd of the High Com­ the Aj1'i!ca KOl"ps, the surrender of the mand were beginning to manifest opposi­ Italian partner, and the success of the tion to him. We are now at the eve of the allied landings on the Peninsula, the attempt on his life of 20 July 1944. heavy losses in men and materiel suffered The general situation, as just reviewed on all the fronts, and the results of the in its principal aspects, explains certain allied bombing attacks in the interior of features of the dispositions made by the Germany had left their effects on the German High Command in the west before German people and on the High Com­ 6 June 1944, and, in consequence, certain mand. phases of the operations which occurred The people were beginning to find the in Normandy. sacrifices heavy that were imposed on them for the purpos"e of winning final victory­ Western Theater and final victory still continued to be be­ The defense of the Western Theater of yond their grasp. I Operations was confided to a commander The activity of the anti-Hitlerian con­ in chief (Von Rundstedt) who had under spirators, such as Goerdeler and Stroelin, his command a commander of Army Group and the Generals, Beck and Fromm, was B (Rommel), and a commander of Army rl'doubled, yet reached only certain cir­ Group G (Blaskowitz). cles of the German popUlation-retired Peculiar restrictions limited the powers generals, nobles, and high functionaries, of the commander in chief-in fact, his who had become aware that the Fiihrer authority extended only to the ground 90 MILITARY REVIEw JUNE 1954 .. forces. But the major portion of the gen­ Runstedt's demand.proved to be of no avail. eral reserve of the theater was under the The refusal of the oItw was due, on the control of the Oberkommando del' Wehr­ one hand, to the spirit of jealo)1s inde­ macht (OKW) and could not be used with­ pendence that animated the Navy and the out its authorization. The shifting of large Air Force and, on the other, to the dis­ units from one defense sector to another trust that Hitler felt at this moment to­ was also contingent upon this authoriza­ ward his marshals. This refusal denoted, tion. The naval forcf,!:i of the theater­ at the same time, an absolute lack of Naval Group West-were directly de­ comprehension of the particular needs of pendent on the Commander in Chief of the western theater and a total contempt the Navy; the air forces-the 3d Air· for the lessons of the other campaigns­ Fleet-depended directly on Goring, Su­ particularly Italy. preme Commander of Aviation. The experiences of Salerno and of Anzio Marshal Rommel, Commander of Army had shown sufficiently that the success Group B, had been charged with the in­ of the allied landings was due to the spection of the defense works of the At­ control of the air, to the aid of the power­ lantic Wall, but he had no executive power ful fire of the naval units, and the rapid in this domain-no more, for that matter, and continuous arrival on the beaches of than did his commander, Marshal. von reinforcements and materiel. Rundstedt. Von Rundstedt could only forward re­ Because of the very nature of the op­ ports to the OKW and suggest to it the eration which the allies had to stage for improvements he judged useful. The ex­ gaining a foothold on the Continent, it ecution of the work was carried out under was imperative that the commander, the direction oli. the Todt organization­ charged with opposing their attempt, be a powerful machine which received its or­ able to co-ordinate in time and space the ders directly from the FUhrer and which action of his three forces. The allies had to was subordinate to the Minister of Arma­ traverse a sector of the sea, therefore, it. ments and Munitions. was of the most vital consequence that Limiting ourselves to the examination he attack their armada during the course of the command factor, to the exclusion of the crossing both for the purpose of of other elements for the time being, we inflicting on it 'as heavy losses as possible can see that the chief responsible for the and for disorganizing the convoys, dispers­ western front had but singularly l'e­ ing the vessels, and throwing them off stricted powers for the fulfillment of his their course. This action would engender mission. confusion and hesitation among the as­ sault forces at the extremely vulnerable Unity of Command moment of their landing. The ground Von Rundstedt and Rommel were forces of the defense could not participate clearly aware of the grave dangers exist­ in this battle until the last moment, and ing as a result of the fact that the naval then only by means of artillery fire. The and air forces of the theater were not principal action, therefore, had to be con­ directly under their command. ducted by the naval and the air forces, Von Rundstedt, supported by his subor­ and these two forces were dependent upon dinate commander, had asked the High commanders who were at Berchtesgaden Command to place all the forces assigned or in East Prussia. As far as the aviation for the defense of the west under his or­ was concerned, at least, the events on the ders, and to remove the restrictions im­ eastern front were holding all of the at­ posed on the general reserve. However, Von tention of its commanders. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91

Finally, at the moment when the as­ of unity of action when, in the same sailant reached the beaches, the action of theater, the ground forces are commanded the Air Force was to consist of attacking by a commander who is at the scene, sees the enemy with planes without lessening the situation and reacts accordingly, while the attack on the aerial "umbrella" which the naval and air forces are placed in ac­ protected him, harassing the enemy fleet tion by commanders who are far away for the purpose of disturbing its fire and and little inclined to accede to the demands for reducing the flow of reinforcements of a &ubordinate whom they persist in scheduled to be arriving on' the beach. judging as timorous? The situation was

SITUATION ON THE EVE OF 6 JUNE 1944 .POITIERS ~ LARGE INFANTRY UNITS

[§] LARGE ARMORED UNITS

This was to be done while the ground also abnormal in respect to the general forces in the landing sectors pounded the reserve, part of which could not be en­ beaches and the counterattack units pre­ gaged without the consent of the OKW. pared to go into action. As soon as the landing was learned of, Under combined operations, this re­ Von Rundstedt asked to have this general sistance could not be really effective un­ reserve placed at his disposal, but was less co-ordination of effort was achieved not given authorization until the after­ by unity of command. It was again this noon of 6 June, because of the evasiye ac­ unity of command that, in the following tions of the High Command, which once phase of the battle, was to ensure to the again had a false picture of the si~uation. armored counterattack forces the effective Even if the defects of the command sys­ u;;e of the aviation, both for immediate tem of the western theater had not existed, support by means of ground attack and the allied landing would doubtless have for the protection of the field of battle. succeeded anyWay. As a matter of fact, Bllt is it possible to respect the principle the air and naval forces available for fhe 92 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 western front were extremely weak (a troops to the Italian and eastern theaters, few submarines and speed boats and about. the western theater comprised, besides SS 300 planes). The general reserve of the formations, a large number of units com­ theater comprised only six armored divi­ posed of men who were fairly old or were sions, however, with a better organized convalescents from the hospitals. The defense, the opening of the second front units had been deprived of the majority would have been a more costly operation. of their transportation to the point where they were deprived of almost all mobility. The Defense Von Rundstedt, as well as Rommel, did Let us see how the OKW on the one not see any possibility of preventing the hand and Rommel and Von Rundstedt on landing, but, contrary to the views of his the other conceived the defense. The subordinate, he envisioned the decisive directives given by Hitler were as follows: battle being conducted in the depth of the conduct the defense battle along the coast; territory. break up the landing attempts before and during the execution of the landings; On the Continent and wipe out landings locally by counter­ Ia spite of this divergence of views, the attacks. two commanders were in accord on the These directives do not assume their fact that the FUhrer's directives should full meaning except when reviewed in the be complemented by plans providing for light of the fate reserved by the staff of countermeasures to be adopted in different the FUhrer for the plans which were hypothetical cases of the penetration of pl'esented to it by the commanders re­ allied forces onto the Continent. They sponsible for the western theater. Romniel, prepared these plans and attempted to sub­ who after the capitulation of the Afrika mit them to Hitler's staff, but were turned Kol'ps had been charged with studying down on the pretext that they should the problems relative to the Italian adhere to the directives given them and theater, had not failed to draw from the that, besides, if these were faithfully ap­ events the conclusion that the landing plied, the enemy would be annihilated on would succeed, and the allies would suc­ the beaches and there would be no strate­ ceed in gaining a foothold on the Conti­ gic operations in the interior of the coun­ nent. It was necessary, therefore, to plan on the defenders having the task of re­ try. The two marshals then called atten­ ducing beachheads of greater or lesser tion to the weakness of the air force magnitude. assigned to the theater and to that of the general reserve, for which they asked a re­ This conviction of Rommel's was the inforcement of six to eight armored and stronger since he had been in a position to note both the imperfections of the coastal five to seven motorized infantry divisions. defensive works and the deficiencies of They obtained nothing more than vague the troops assigned to the western theater. promises. In pursuance of the inspection mission The High Command once more gave no which had been assigned to him, the Com­ heed to the views of the responsible com­ mander of Army Group B, moreover, had manders who had studied ,all the pos­ pointed out the defects of the Atlantic sibilities of the defense on the spot and Wall, although without perceptible results. had compared them with what they knew The principal one, in his eyes, was its lack of the enemy. of depth. The commander in chief in the west The OKW having assigned its best thus saw himself condemned to adhere to FOREIGN MILITAII.Y DIGESTS 93 the directives received, and with means Reasons which he judged to be insufficient, in To deduce from this that the OKW still quality as well as in quantity. believed in the efficacy of Ii~ar defense, The most delicate of the problems that would be far too superficial a conclusion remained to be solved was that of the and, aU things considered, very im­ employment of the general reserve and, probable. It seems that other considera­ consequently, that of its location. tions were back of the directives given by The Commander of Army Group B dis­ Hitler to the Commander in Chief of the agreed with his commander on the employ­ Western Theater of Operations. ment of this reserve. The latter nursed Let us recall that the satellites of the belief that things being as they were, central Europe seemed to be awaiting only it would be necessary, one day, to mount an opportunity to change camp; that the a strategic maneuver in the depths of German people were beginning to doubt France. For that reason, Von Rundstedt final victory; and that in the eyes of the wished to dispose his reserves in two Fuhrer, his generals were timorous. Cost groups-one to the south, the other to the what it might, the allies could not be given cast of Paris. Rommel, on the contrarY. the opportunity to win the moral victory was of the opinion that. in view of the that even a partially successful landing weakness of this general reserve and the attempt would constitute in the west. fact that there existed scarcely any Hitler judged it indispensable to an­ sector reserves, it was better that it be nihilate the expeditionary forces before near the coast in order to permit its en­ and during the landing. Reasoning from the assumption that the enemy would suc­ gagement against the landing forces as ceed in penetrating in force onto the Con­ rapidly as possible. tinent and that after already having He was of the opinion, as a matte,· of fought him furiously on the coast, one fact, that, in view of the air superiority would not wage the decisive battle against of the en'~my, the armored divisions sta­ him until he was in the depths of the tioned in .the Paris area would arrive country, it might be too late, then, to tardily on the field of battle. Von Rund­ counteract the political consequences of stedt did not accept this r the original allied success. In addition to and imposed a compromi this, there was the fact that Hitler be­ was closer to his concepti lieved the Atlantic Wall to be invulnerable of Rommel's. and believed that the allied attempt would The physiognomy of the defense could be go to pieces at the foot of it. Seen from characterized as follows: these points of view, the directives of the Some 60 divisions of varied quality and Fuhrer can be explained, yet they lack with but slight mobility, spread out over logic, in the sense that, desiring rapid and 2,500 miles of coastline, awaited, under massed action against the landing beaches, the protection of a thin and broken he should have placed the general reserves wall, the shock of a powerful adversary of the western theater under the com­ who was strong in view of his previous mand of Von Rundstedt. successes. Truly, this was an example of However, the thing which is more dif­ a l~near defense organization! The few ficult to explain is the fact that Hitler's meager bodies of troops who existed in staff did not profit by the suggestions of the depths, and the general reserves sta­ the two marshals and attempt to guide tioned in the Paris area, did not suffice their leader to a more realistic concept of for removing this characteristic from it. the western defense. 94 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954

It appears that there were several I, Von Moltkewas reproached for conduct­ reasons for that-to begin with, the ser­ ing the battle from too far off and without vility of Keit! and Jodi with regard to taking sufficient account of the opinions Hitler and, second, their animosity toward of the army commanders who were living Rommel, whom they regarded as a de­ the situation. featist. Rommel, as a matter of fact, B. H. Liddell Hart in his work, The sever:H months previously, had counseled OtTlel' Side of the Hill, where he presents a withdrawal on the eastern and southern the results of his questioning of the im­ fronts with a view to shortening them and prisoned German generals, mentions the constituting a powerful strategic reserve. difference in conceptions that separated His proposals had been badly received. Hitler from many of his generals. The following is what Hitler's counselors This difference became increasingly ag­ seemed to fear: If the commander in chief gravated as the generals became aware of the western theater were authorized of the necessity, particularly in the east­ to take measures for an eventual decisive ern theater, of adopting an elastic plan battle in the depths of the country, would of defense, while Hitler, who mistook his he allocate enough forces to the battle on blindness for tenacity, clung desperately the coast, which was regarded as essential? to the idea of maintaining possession of Still another reason resided in the lack the terrain. He hoped, in this way, to of suppleness of mind and of breadth of safeguard the morale of the German view of Hitler and his staff. This pre­ people and of the German satellites. vented them, on the one hand, from deduc­ 'Political and psychological arguments ing the necessary lessons from a recent were given precedence over military ne­ past and, on the other, from disengaging cessities. To be sure, the supreme direct­ themselves from the preoccupations of the ing agency of a war has the right to en­ moment and foreseeing and preparing sure, at the same time, its political and sanely the operations of the future. In military conduct, but the difficulty con­ addition to this, never having made a sists in giving, in accordance with the serious visit to the Atlantic Wall, Hitler's needs of the moment, precedence either counselors also believed in its invinci­ to the military or to the political exi­ bility. gencies of the situation. But this choice Command System presupposes a breadth of vision and a cool­ headedness that were lacking at the time In a very interesting study on the Pal'U­ in the General Headquarters of the mount Command, the Air Vice Marshal German dictator. E. S. Kingston lVIcCloughry, after having The narrowness of the directives of the insisted on the necessity of a supreme Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, command surrounding itself with the coun­ the defective organization of the cOf!lmand sels of the chiefs responsible for the ex­ of the western theater, and the obstacles ecution of the plans, says: placed in the way of the exercise of this The lnterarms Committee of the German command by the OKW, weighed heavily on Chiefs of Staff (OKW), is a striking ex­ the development of operations starting ample of an organization in which coun­ with 6 June 1944. sels have no connection with responsibility The Normandy campaign is sufficiently f01' execution. The OKW is generally con­ well known for us to limit ourselves, here, sidered as one of the most important fac­ to recalling briefly a few characteristic tors that led Germany to final defeat. consequences of the initial errors of the Remember, that already in World War German Command. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 95 If the immense allied landing fleet was by the allied aviation, were obliged to able to assemble with impunity in the throw their units into the battle as they English ports and reach the French coasts managed to arrive. without serious opposition, it was pri­ The air forces which the commander in marily because the commander responsible chief required for supporting the mass for the western theater did not have the action of his tanks, were given him only necessary naval or air forces to keep in small numbers. However, it was too watch over his maritime "no,man's land" late: on the one hand, the allied forces and to harass the assailant. were already too numerous, and on the The landing of t\}e assault forces was other, a pincers movement was beginning accomplished under the cover of powerful to manifest itself around the German at­ naval artillery fire superimposed on mas­ tack mass; it could disengage itself only sed action by allied bombers. This deluge at the cost of heavy losses. of fire falling on the entire coastal strip It should also be borne in mind, that in the vicinity of the beaches, had dis­ the Commander in Chief of the Western astrous effects on the defense. THe At­ Theater could not move his large forma­ lantic Wall, because of its lack of depth, tions from one defense sector to the other was almost entirely neutralized or an­ without the consent of the OKW. As a nihilated and, moreover, the local reserves result of this, contrary to a sane economy who were too close to the coast, found of forces, numerous divisions remained themselves caught in this same fire and idle in the Pas de Calais or Brittany disorganized or decimated before they areas, when they would have been more were able to effect the counterattacks they useful in Normandy. were charged with making. There remained one last hope of hurl­ Conclusion ing the allies back into the sea-the ar­ The battle of the coasts desired by mored divisions. However, these were put Hitler was lost. The decisive battle :n the into action in the most disconnected man­ interior of the country advocated by Von ner, both with regard to time and to space. Rundstedt has been rendered impossible Von Rundstedt obtained free control over because of the irreparable losses which the armored divisions of the general re­ had been sustained, particularly by the serves on the afternoon of the 6th. He armored divisions. also assembled two armored divisions on The allies were heading for the heart the field of battle. He stationed one in the of France. There was nothing left for the north of France, and the other,' south of Germans to do but to fall back, making an the Loire. The tanks of a division that effort to keep their losses as low as pos­ were at the scene of action were employed sible. on 6 June in the Caen sector. On 10 June, This brief picture of a few of the as­ two other divisions were engaged in the pects of the battle of Normandy must not center of the landing zone. It was on 12 leave the impression that the conduct of June, that the tanks coming from the the defense was chaotic in all respects. south were engaged in the Cotentin area. The sole object of this article has been It was not until 6 August, that Von to show the fatal influence of defective Kluge, the successor of Von Rundstedt, preparations on the development of opera­ regrouped what was left of his tanks to tions-defective because it was inspired try to plug the Avranches gap. by considerations of a personal, psycho­ The greater part of these divisions, logical, or political order taking prece­ strung out on routes which were pounded dence over military imperatives. 96 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE I~54

I " Soviet Army Tactics Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in UMilitaer Orientering" (Norway) 25 June 19536"

. SOVIET tactics are based, in the main, interrogations, but whenever possible, on co-operation between the different they employ "agents" of both sexes in branches of the service-infantry, artil­ - civilian clothing. lery, armor, and aviation. In addition to The Soviet soldier is very clever at hid­ mortars, the infantry regiment possesses ing his intentions by means of camouflage at least one battery of six 7.62-cm infantry and concealment. Practical improvisatiQn howitzers. It is possible that even the bat­ is highly developed, even in the highest talion is equipped in this manner. In ad­ echelons. The reason for this is that the dition, the regiment has one battery of troops, even in civilian life, are ac­ six 7.62-cm machine cannon which are customed to simple conditiQns, and to mak­ used, especially, for antitank combat. ing many of the things they need in their The artillery prepares combat opera­ daily existence. They are very adept and tions of a major magnitude with massed swift in the construction of foot, ponton, fire. It may be taken for granted that and vehicular bridges. they will have a battalion of 122-mm The Soviet soldier is husky. He is easily howitzers or a battalion of 120- to 160-mm contented and lives, to a large extent, mortars for covering an area about 2'12 off the occupied area so that his supply acres. In decisive attacks, the artillery needs are limited, essentially, to ammuni­ concentration may be even greater. tion and technical equipment. He is less As a rule, aviation participates direct­ sensitive to climatic changes than the ly in the battle in support of the infantry soldier of the Western nations. The mili­ on the ground. From 165 to 220 yards is tary worth of the troops varies. Tank, the normal security interval between the artillery, and aviation units are looked targets and their most advanced lines. upon as elite formations. The combat The air liaison officers direct the aviation worth of the infantry is dependent, to a from tanks. Fighter aviation is employed large extent, upon the officers who com­ in patrol operations, the detachments of mand it. planes relieving one another in the per­ formance of their missions, providing Attack sufficient planes are available. Where the Thorough and, as a rule, well-covered Soviets do not have sufficient air support, armed reconnaissance usually precedes the they do not engage tanks. In the opinion attack, although it may have to be con­ of the Soviets, local air superiority is an ducted without regard for losses. These indispensable condition for tank. opera­ preliminary operations have as their ob­ tions, in all cases. ject, the determination of the enemy's The Soviets conduct very complete re­ weak points and of learning the location connaissance, orientating themselves very of his supporting points, weapons, and ob­ thoroughly before each operation. For ac­ servation posts. This information then complishing this, they do not confine serves as a basis for planning the attack themselves solely to ordinary intelligence and artillery preparations. means such as patrols, observation (by The march to the jump-off position is sight and by sound), radar, and prisoner usually conducted over well-covered ter­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 97

rain even though this may mean loss of down on the enemy's positions whose loca­ time. tions are known with certainty. Salvo fire In the jump-off position for the attack, is employed-especially against the en­ the Soviet soldier digs himself -in-pri­ emy's communications lines and against marily to avoid being exposed to his own the area where his reserves are stationed. artillery fire. These positions will be The artillery preparations last for a pe­ situated about 440 yards from the enemy's riod of 2 or more hours. These intensive main line. The security inte;rval for his preparatory bombardments often disrupt own artillery is around 220 yards. If the the enemy's telephone communications. enemy has entrenched himself at a river Whenever the enemy artillery is able to with a water velocity of up to about a fire at all, its fire must, of necessity, be yard a second, he can expect that during laid down automatically in preplanned the night, the Soviets will construct an rapid fire concentrations. underwater bridge of up to 440 yards The Attack long and capable of carrying loads of up to 60 tons. In terrain that is suitable for tanks, the infantry attacks as soon as the tanks The Soviet artillery units assemble in have come up with it. The attack is their concentration areas, as a ~ule, dur­ launched toward the enemy front the in­ ing the >light preceding the attack. It is stant the artillery fire is moved forward. not always possible to determine whether the artillery units have increased or not, The infantry follows close behind the for the artillery units are composed of tanks which fire as they advance. The guns of the same caliber as those of the' tanks operate in groups of up to 60 against infantry. On the other hand, the artillery a single objective and, as a rule, are usually fires only in salvos against the combined with about 50' percent assauit principal centers of resistance imme­ guns. The advance is supported by nu­ diately beforE' and during the attack. merous light and heavy machine guns and mortars. Their heavy use of smoke shells The Main Effort merits notice. Antitank guns are also en­ As a rule, one may expect the Soviet gaged in direct fire in support of the forces to exert their greatest pressure tanks. where the terrain lends itself best to their In terrain which is not well suited for attack and where their adversary's lines tank operations, these are used in smaller are the weakest. As far as possible, they groups, if possible. When a tank is will conduct their attack over covered ter­ obliged to stop, the Soviets protect it rain in the beginning, and their principal with their 7.62-cm antitank cannon and thrust is made against those points which, their assault guns of up to 17.2-cm in if they are taken, make the enemy's line direct fire, as accompanying artillery. Be­ more vulnerable. Such points are most cause of this, the adversary is not able to frequently determined after the attack detect the forward shift of the artillery has been launched, although a plan has preparation. heen established beforehand. The infantry moves ahead on a broad front in a line, or in a wedge formation, Artillery Preparation in order to be able to make use of as Soviet artillery preparations are very many weapons as possible simultaneously. intensive. In accordance with a newly es­ The attack is conducted at a walk and an tablished plan, they extend to a depth of weapons are used, even if their fire is from 2 to almost 4 miles.' Fire is' laid not directed. The Soviets aim at isolating 98 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1904 individual supporting points and, there­ from prisoners for they either say noth-. fore, take these points under the heaviest ing or gjve false information. fire possible. Through the breaks produced Outposts must be well concealed in or­ in the enemy's line, the formations move der that the Soviets may not gain any with no concern for fire from the flanks., idea of the outline of one's front line. Frequently, individual tanks, assault rt frequently pays to reinforce the outpost guns, or antitank guns are detached and line with artillery fire. It is often ad­ joined directly with the smaller infantry vantageous to locate this line several units. miles ahead of the actual front line. The If the Soviets have succeeded in pene­ front line should not be too densely oc­ trating their enem'y's defense lines, strong cupied. Gaps in the line can be tolerated infantry detachments go through the holes providing one is prepared to plug them and into the enemy's rear areas. Here with ,fire or counterattacks. they remain to attack the enemy from the rear simultaneously with the main attack. In terrain suitable for tank operations, counterattacks, like all active, unsche­ Soviet ViIlnerability matic undertakings, will be of consider­ The Soviet infantry is very vulnerable able influence in view of the unflexible to concentrated artillery fire and often tactics of the Soviets. One must en­ suffers heavy losses during artillery sure that the Soviet tanks or assault preparations. When the leader falls, the guns are not able to roll over one's posi­ formations halt. The lower command tions or to fire into them. If the Soviets grades, with but few exceptions, possess do succeed in rolling down a position with little initiative ,and have but a modest tac­ their tanks, the infantry of the defensive tical schooling. With a little experience, forces will have to deal with Soviet in­ therefore, one may use the Soviet's tac­ fantry and tanks in its rear areas. In dif­ tical habits to one's own advantage. It ficult terrain, however, one need not be is especially easy to make an impression overly cautious concerning tanks. on Soviet infantry forces by counterat­ I t is madness to believe that the Soviets tacking, even with small units. cannot make use of their heavy tanks and ,They are aware of the fact that they assault guns because existing bridges can­ often expose their flanks and, therefore, not bear their weight. If one's own forces make the effort to cover them by choice destroy a btidge to prevent the Soviet of terrain or the use of heavy weapons­ advance, the Soviets rebuild it so strongly accompanying tanks or assault guns. The that it will bear the weight of their Sov:iets expect counterattacks and nor­ heaviest weapons. mally plan where they will occur and with what means they will be conducted. The Soviets in Defense An attack, which they have begun dur­ Defense against tanks determines the ing the day, may be expected to continue Soviet's defense tactics more than any at night, if not terminated before. other single consideration. The troops dig themselves in well, make use of camouflage. , Defense Against Soviet Forces and constrUl!t dummy installations and In defense against Soviet forces, one traps. This is their forte. With fire and must be very painstaking in the employ­ smoke from dummy positions, they at­ ment of camouflage and observation. Re­ tempt to conceal their actual positions. connaissance must be conducted continu­ All Soviet soldiers are very familiar"with ously. One cannot expect much information earth and timber work. They are also FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99 able to lie still for a very long time, even Night Combat under very difficult conditions. The Soviets are pl/st masters in combat A threat to their flanks or threat I>f in woods, in buildings, and at night. The encirclement is not enough to cause the Russian is a forest dweller and a plains­ Soviet troops to fall back or surrender. man. When obliged to, he will go into the As long as there are any officers, thi:l mountains-but it is against his will. troops will hold. The Soviets defend on a Night operations can always be ex­ front of about 2,200 yards anll a depth of pected, whether in the form of infiltra­ 1.650 yards f. r each battalion. Every tions, encirclements, or direct attacks. It troop, company, and battalion forms an is worthy of note, that the Soviets possess all-around defensive position which also a highly developed ability to move noise­ defends the surrounding area. Generally lessly. One can always depend on night speaking, their defense is conducted in a attacks against bridgeheads, or night more established manner than the West­ crossings of dangerous river passages. ern nations. This is especially true in the It is not easy to guess the intentions case of smaller units. of the Soviet soldier or to note his prepa­ Their fire in front of the line will have rations. They can best be learned by close a depth of approximately 440 yards. In attention to his radio traffic with the help addition, there are concentrations of in­ of monitors familiar with his language. terdiction fire from the heavy infantry One must never grow lax in reconnais­ weapons and the artillery. The outpost sance activity. line is situated from 'h to 2 miles ahead The Soviets often send new formations of the front line. The depth of the de­ through their front lines to attack, and fense line is usually from 3 to 4 miles, their adversary is often unaware of the but it can also be as much as 7.5 miles. fact that he is facing reinforcements. The front is protected by tank and in­ Armored reconnaissance may assist in fantry obstacles. Mines, which are often determining their activities and cause the laid by the infantry, are used frequently. Soviets to reveal their intentions or In st~tic warfare, or when the' Soviets means prematurely. Where the Soviets draw back, one can expect to find mine are planning to make their main effort fields and booby traps wherever it is pos­ may be learned most rapidly by means of ,ible to place them. salvo fire or tank formations.

The Soviet Union includes most of the Eurasian "heartland," the domina­ tion .of which some schools of geopoliticians consider to be an essential prereq­ uisite to world domination. It has a large population, enormous nat!lral re­ sources, and a rapidly growing industry, Its land armies are numerically the largest in the world; its air "forces are powerful; and its navy is second only to our Navy. It controls its people with an iron hand, and its foreign policies are in no way guided by the same moral restraints that guide our policies. Its large extensive borders, of course, constitute a point of weakness. To overcome this weakness, it has buffer states with which to conduct limited objectives. Admiml Arthur W. Radfm'd 100 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 Artillery Fuzes Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major R. J. Lewendon· in UThe Jonrnal of the Royal Artillery" (Great Britain) January 1964.

IT IS a well-known axiom that the shell, to initiate the explosive train in a round not the gun, is the gunner's weapon. The will be discussed at some length in this speed, accuracy, and volume of the fire article. that can be brought to bear on a target A shell when it bursts produces noise, -be it an infantry position or an aircraft blast, and splinters. Of these, the first -depend upon many factors. The more two are most ineffective in damaging a important are the skill of the gunner, the target, unless the shell is burst under design and efficiency of his gun, the ac­ water or in a confined space when the ef­ curacy of his fire control instruments, fects of blast are most pronounced. The the efficiency of his wireless sets, his tac­ greatest damage is caused by splinters tical dispositions, and the quantity and and their optimum size depends upon the quality of the ammunition available. The target to be engaged. Obviously, the gunner may have superb equipment and splinter size and velocity required for may be perfectly trained so that he can antipersonnel targets differ from those guarantee the most effective fire on all required for antiaircraft targets. It is im­ targets. If, however, the quality of his portant from the economic point of view ammunition is such that he cannot damage that the size and quantity of splinters· is his target, then all his efforts are 'in vain, such that a target is not "killed twice and he may as well put his guns into over." The maximum amount of damage heavy grease and go home. must be done with the minimum expendi­ The average officer, since he is han­ ture of ammunition in order to conserve dling his guns, vehicles, and fire control gun life and to reduce the ammunition instruments every day in training and organization in the Army's administratiye maintenance, has a good working knowl­ tail. edge of them. However, his knowledge of Two further points need to be remem­ the round fired out of the gun is probably bered when considering shell fragmenta­ not so extensive. This is only natural, as, tion. First, a shell which bursts on impact after all, ammunition is either issued im­ with the ground wastes at least 50 percent mediately before it is fired, or, if it is of its lethal splinters and the remaining held in the unit, it is treated with the 50 percent are only effective if the ground respect it deserves and is not stripped is perfectly flat. Second, in the antiair­ down for cleaning, as is the custom for, craft role, to produce an aircraft casualty, say, a breech mechanism. either a large amount of damage must be Assuming that the gunner has the means inflicted on a major structural component. and the skill to place the shell near the or a relatively small amount of damage target he is engaging, then, in order to must be inflicted on the small vulnerable do damage, the shell must have two requi­ components, such as the crew, the engines, sites. First, it must have a fuze that will or the controls. In either case, it is ex­ initiate the explosive train in the round tremely difficult to achieve effective at the right moment, and second, the shell damage on an aircraft. must be so designed that its fragments, There are several requirements of a or· splinters, will do the maximum amount fuze that are universal and some that are of damage most economically. Fuzes used peculiar to a particular user. Among the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 101 universal requirements are the following: The main requirements peculiar to the The fuze must be "bore safe," that is user are: to say. it must not arm while it is in the The field gunner wants to be able to bore of the gun. Neither must it arm if burst his shell either on, or shortly after, it is subjected to any amount of rough impact with the ground or at any point handling, dropping, or vibration. The along its trajectory. In addition, a fuze governing principle is that a premature is required that can be set to function must be avoided at all costs .. A dud, al­ either immediately on contact with the though undesirable, is preferable to a ground, for use against troops in the open, premature. This requirement is rigidly or after a short delay on first impact, to adhered to in the British service, but is enable the shell to penetrate cover, such not always so in foreign services. as slit trenches, or buildings, before burst­ The final safety device in the fuze must ing. be inaccessible and must be operated only The antiaircraft gunner wants a fuze by the dynamic forces which come into that will ensure that his shell will burst play when the round is fired. A manually if it hits an aircraft 01' if it passes within operated safety device may be provided. a certain distance from it. That distance Th~ fuze should be cheap, easy to make, depends upon the lethal zone of the shell. and easy to inspect. This is an important An additional requirement is for the fuze requirement in view of the immense quan­ to have a positive self-destruction device tity of ammunition components that are which comes into action if the shell misses required, especially in war. The term the target completely. "mass production" can only be properly The coast artillery gunner requires a applied to ammunition production in war­ base fuze for his armor-piercing shell time. which has a delay incorporated so that A requirement, allied to that above, is the projectile 'can penetrate, say, the for standardization. IdeaUy, the gunner ship'S armor plate, and then explode in­ should only have two or three fuzes for side the hull. The need for a base !'uze all types of shell. To achieve this re­ is, of course, that a nose fuze would be quires considerable effort on the part of damaged when the projectile hits the ar­ the designer to ensure that the ballistic mor, ~nd that the resulting burst with a shape and weight of such a fuze are suit­ nose-fuzed shell would do little damage able for the ballistics of each shell. to the plate. The fuze must be robust enough to with­ The antitank gunner requires both nose stand the shock of discharge in the gun and base fuzes to initiate his various anti­ and rough handling. This requirement is tank projectiles. ~ven more important now that automatic loading gears are being fitted to some Fundamental Considerations guns with high rates of fire. Ammunition The dynamic forces referred to arise handled by such gears is subjected to in­ when the projectile is fired from the gun. eredibly high acceleration and retarda­ First, the projectile accelerates very tions. rapidly up the bore of the gun. This high The fuze must function efficiently over axial acceleration gives rise to a large the entire temperature range, from arctic force which acts on the fuze components 10 tropic conditions. The fuze must also in a similar manner to that which acts function efficiently after storage for any on persons standing in a rapidly acceler­ length of time under the most adverse ating bus or train. The components tend elimatic conditions. to "setback" unless they are firmly fixed 102 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 to one another. Second, the projectile firing the projectile, the setback forces starts to spin as it passes up the bore of and centrifugal pressure can be made to"· the gun. This gives rise to a rotational actuate an unlocking device, and the ro­ acceleration and the resultant force tends tational acceleration can be made to move ~o make the fuze components spin in the the displaced part of the train across to same direction as the shell is spinning­ fill the gap. When this occurs, the fuze unless they are restricted. Third, because is said to be armed.. of the spin of the fuze, centrifugal pres­ Another safety device is to have lock­ sure is acting on the components which ing devices to prevent the striker moving tends to make them fly outward, if they down on to the detonator or vice versa. can. Last, because of "side slap," lateral The unlocking is achieved by the setback accelerations act on the fuze components. forces or centrifugal force. The phenomenon of side slap arises when In the design of a fuze, usually more a shell passes through a worn gun. It than one such safety device is incorporat­ vibrates from one side of the barrel to ed as well as manually operated devices, the other. The greater the wear of the such as safety pins, or nose caps. gun-for a given muzzle velocity-the In present design, it is the policy to greater is the magnitUde of the side slap ensure that there is an intrinsic delay in force. There comes a time when a fuze the operation of the arming device so can sustain no greater side slap loading. that the fuze is not armed until it is well This enforces the provisional condemning clear of the barrel of the gun. limit for the particular gun. Thus, the 1:he explosive train of a fuze starts gun barrel provision program is often with a detonator, consisting of sensitive . dictated by the type of fuze employed. high explosive which is initiated by the For instance, a percussion fuze may be blow of a striker or by the heating of a used in a much more worn barrel than a wire by an electric current. The flash time mechanical or proximity fuze. produced when the detonator is initiated The safety requirements for a fuze are sets off the next stage in the train, usu­ formidable and difficult to achieve. If the ally chemical explosive stemmed channels. explosive train in the fuze is prematurely This, in turn, initiates the magazines of the initiated, that is, initiated while the fuze which is usually a fairly:large quan­ round is in storage, while it is passing up tity of chemical explosive. Thus, the ex­ the bore of the gun, or while it is im­ plosive power is amplified in this train mediately in front of the gun, it must be from the relatively small power of the prevented from passing to the shell filling. detonator to that of the magazine which. The results of such a premature sbell produces a detonation wave of sufficient burst are most unpleasant and must be power to function the shell filling. prevented at all costs. The storage life of the fuze is assured The methods by which the explosive by careful attention to the rustproofing train is prevented from initiating the shell of the components and also by the provi­ filling prematurely depend for their sion of a moistureproof barrier around functioning upon the dynamic forces re­ the fuze. This prevents moisture from ferred to earlier. causing corrosion on the exterior of the The most common safety device is to fuze and tends to prevent it getting in­ have· a gap in the explosive train, with side the fuze to dampen the filling and to suitable means to prevent flash jumping corrode the internal components. It is across. The part of the train to bridge now realized that although a fuze may be the gap is kept locked to one side. On waterproofed, it is not proofed against FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103 damp air which can seep into the fuze and for a large number of prematures. From cause serious corrosion. The packaging of the design aspect, it is a detrimental the fuze, as well as the conditions of the force and steps have to be taken to mini­ storage, materially affect the storage life mize its effects-delayed arming devices. of a fuze. Samples of fuzes in storage are Side slap forces' are so large that 'it is tested annually by firing them. If they necessary for the fuze to be ruggedly function correctly, then it is assumed that constructed, if it is not to break down. the bulk of the fuzes in storage are serv­ When a round emerges from a barrel, it iceable. If they fail, then the fuzes af­ meets air resistance and the impulse on fected are destroyed. meeting this resistance is great enough to force all unprotected strikers rearward, Forces Acting causing the fuze to function prematurely. In the following paragraphs, the forces To counter this, a wind shield has to be acting upon a fuze when it is fired will incorporated in the design to protect the be summarized. The forces are eithp- ben­ striker head. The shield must be 'strong eficial or detrimental to the funationing of the fuze. Those of the latter category W!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I!!II have to be counteracted if the fuze. is to function correctly. / TARGET +-----"0'"'0 The setback force which acts on fuze components is due to the very high axial acceleration imparted to the round when it passes up the bore of a gun or a mor­ tar. This force tends to push the compo­ nents that are free to move rearward to­ ward the base of the fuze. This is used to move detents rearward against the ac­ DETONATOR tion of springs and thus bring about the CHEMICAL unlocking of safety devices, allowing the ~l...--~r-- ~::~~~~~ fuze to arm. The round, when it paS$es up a rifled gun barrel, receives rotational accelera­ tion. The force resulting from this ac­ TO FUZE MAGAZINE rderation is used to move centrifugal AND SHEll fiLLING bolts and swinging shutters. Centrifugal SIMPLE NOSE DIRECT ACTION PERCUSSION FUZE bolts are used in some fuz~s to lock com­ ponents in a safe position, and when the bolt is withdrawn by the force caused by enough to withstand the air pressure, but 1he spin, the fuze can arm. Swinging must collapse when the fuze strikes the ,hdtters carry a part f the explosive target to allow the striker to be actuated. t rain of the fuze and ar locked to one The round, during its entire flight, ~ide giving a gap in the ha·n. This is meets air resistance and its velocity is llsed as a safety device. Th steadily retarded. This retardation causes mg from the spin causes- shutter, internal fuze components, which are free 'vhen it is unlocked, to swing ov r and to to move, to move slowly forward or to (·omplete the explosive train. creep. To prevent this, creep springs are The force resulting from the ide slap incorporated in the fuze design. These s considered to have 'been esponsible springs prevent the forward movement 104 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 of components caused by the retardation, train. The characteristics of this fuze but are not strong enough to prevent this are its relative simplicity and speed of. forward movement when high retarda­ functioning. This speed depends largely tions are encountered as, for example, on the amount of resistance offered by when the fuze strikes a target. the target. If the target is soft, then When the fuze strikes the target, its the fuze may not function. The other draw­ remaining velocity is destroyed. A force back to this fuze is the fact that unless comes into play which causes free compo­ the shell hits the target with a large angle nents to set forward. This movement is of descent, the striker may well be bent us;d to initiate the detonator by a blow and will jam. A very oblique strike on from a striker. the target will almost certainly cause a The decay in the spin of a round, and dud. also any yawing of the round, in flight, In order to enable a nose-fuzed shell give rise to a complex series of forces to function at low angles of strike, where acting upon the fuze. To counter the ef­ only the shoulder of the shell makes con­ fects of these forces, it is now considered tact with the ground, the graze fuze was necessary not only to lock all components developed. In general, the striker is fixed in the safe or unarmed position, but also to the fuze body and the detonator is car­ once the fuze has armed, to lock compo­ ried free in the "inertia pellet." On strik­ nents in this position. This will ensure ing the target, the inertia pellet over­ correct functioning of the fuze when it comes the action of a spring and is forced strikes the target. on to the striker. This spring has suffi­ cient strength to ensure that the pellet Types of Fuzes does not set forward. on to the striker There are three basic types of fuzes, when the shell is retarded by the air percussion fuzes, time fuzes, and proxim­ resistance on leaving the barrel. There is ity fuzes. The percussion fuze functions no pure nose graze fuze in the service. when it hits the target. The time fuze Invariably the direct action mechanism is functions at a point on the trajectory, incorporated with the graze mechanism. depending upon the time after the gun is Base fuzes are used for initiating ar­ fired. The proximity fuze locates its tar­ mor-piercing shells as used by the coast get and functions within a given distance artillery gunnel' and also for initiating from it. certain antitank projectiles. The princi­ ple of their functioning is the same as The Percussioll Fuze for the graze fuze. When the round strikes These fuzes are the simplest and most the target, the detonator held in an in­ common· in use in the service. They can ertia pellet is thrown forward on to the be divided into two groups, nose fuzes striker or the striker may be held in the and base fuzes. The former group can inertia pellet and thrown forward on to again be divided into direct action and the detonator. The resulting flash initi­ graze fuzes. All types of percussion fuzes ates the explosive train. A delay in func­ are based on identical dynamical considera­ tioning can be obtained by having a long tions. explosive train in the fuze or by the em­ The percussion fuze is most frequently ployment of a shear wire. Usually a delay used· by the field gunner and the light is required in a base fuze, except those antiaircraft gunner. On impact with the for certain antitank projectiles, Since the target, the striker is driven down to the type of projectile in which it is used does detonator which functions the explosive not require an immediate explosion upon FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 105 contact. The usual types of safety devices relative to the upper ring, the total length are incorporated in the mechanism. of the powder ring which has to be burned, before the explosive train is initiated, can Time F~~e8 be varied, and this governs the time to Time fuzes can be divided into two the burst. groupls; powder burning and mechanical. The accuracy of the fuze depends­ The task of any time fuze is to burst the apart from the correct setting of the rings shell at a required point on the trajectory. --on the constant rate of burning of the Powder-burning fuzes have' been in use gunpowder filling the powder rings. The in the service for some time and are still rate of burning depends on several factors,

,\~~___-----TARGEJ

INITIATING fLASH CHANNEL

DETONATOR

I"!!:fl'i+--+----SPRING

CONNECTING INERTIA PELLET fLASH CHANNEL "lIf--\,--TlME SPRING

GUNPOWDER---t;~"~~lC:!!!iBJ-___ DETONATOR CHANNEL <. GUNPOWDER MAGAZINE ...... _U~:::;;?_<--fLASH CHANNEL

TO THE SHELL fiLLING fOR A SMOKE ROUND, fOR AN HIGH EXPLOSIVE ROUND. A GAINE IS INTERPOSED BETWEEN THE SIMPLE NOSE GRAZE PERCUSSION fUZE MAGAZINE AND THE SHELL fiLLING,

~AYOUT Of A SIMPLE POWDER BURNING FUZE in use. When the gun is fired, the initial the more important of which are the den­ setback force on components of the fuze sity or the tightness of the filling in the cause the detonator to set back on to the rings, the particle size of the gunpowder, time needle and set off the detonator. The and the variation between batches of Hash from this passes through flash chan­ powder. The filling of the powder rings­ nels and ignites the upper powder ring. if an accurate fuze is to be produced­ The upper powder ring burns until it needs very careful control and is, in fact, ! omes to the flash channel connecting the an art rather than a science. upper and the lower powder rings, when' The prevention of the ingress of mois­ t he lower powder ring is ignited and ture into the fuze is a most important burns. The stemming of the fuze is initi­ point whel). considering its functioning. If ,lted and, in turn, the fuze magazine and the gunpowder in the rings becomes even lhe shell filling are initiated. slightly damp, then the fuze will either By making the lower ring and the con­ fail to function or will function errat­ 'lecting channel turn in the fuze body ically. The moisture is kept out of the fuze 106 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE ~95.i'." by the application of luting and cement. rotated relative to the r~st of the fuze. However, one big drawback is that once This ring has a slot in it and when the the fuze is set, or in other words when the arm comes under the slot, the arm flies up rings are moved relative to one another, into the slot, releasing trip levers which, the moistureproof seal is broken. If, for in turn, release the striker and so initiate any reason, the shell cannot be fired in the: the explosive train. Hence, the striker can immediate future, then the gunpowder in' be set to actuate at any time after the the rings will become damp, unless the'­ round is fired, by moving the flanged ring fuze is re-moistureproofed. .. to the appropriate setting. Another source of malfunctioning in' In practice, the mechanism is more in­ this type of fuze is the fact that the volved than that described above as vari­ flash from the burning upper powder ring ous safety devices are incorporated. Usu­ does not reach and ignite the lower powder ally in both the antiaircraft and field role ring through the connecting channel. a' direct action percussion mechanism is In practice, powder-burning time fuzes incorporated for the same reasons as those usually incorporate some form of direct which led to its incorporation in the action percussion mechanism as well as powder-burning fuze. the time device. This is required to meet the user's need. The field gunner requires Proximity Fuzes his time fuze to burst on the ground for The proximity fuze was a British con­ initial ranging and the antiaircraft gun­ ception, developed in America during the ner requires his shell to function if he last war since British effort was required should happen to hit the aircraft. elsewhere. Early American production has The usual safety devices are incorpo­ been seen in service to date, although rated in the direct action mechanism and British production is now in the embryonic the time device is made safe by setting the stage. lower ring in the safe position, that is to The basis of the proximity fuze is a say, the flash channel between the two conventional firing condenser discharging rings is closed and also between the bottom into an electrical detonator, thereby ini­ ring and the magazine. tiating the explosive train. The circuit The powder-burning time fuze is rela­ from the firing condenser to the electrical tively cheap and quickly produced when detonator is interrupted by an electronic compared with the expensive and com­ switch which closes only when operated plicated mechanical time fuzes. by the proximity device. The latter type of fuze was brought into The firing condenser received its charge use immediately prior to the last war in from a power supply carried in the fuze. an endeavor to introduce an accurate time The power supply is activated when the fuze. projectile is fired. The electrical detonator The normal British type of mechanical depends upon the heating effect of the time fuze consists essentially of a small discharge current to ignite the explosive. clockwork mechanism. This mechanism is To obtain an efficient heating effect from tested for correct time keeping and is a given current, it is necessary to pass it wound up before it is inserted in the through a high resistance at the point fuze. On firing this fuze, the shock of the where the effect is required. In the manu­ discharge sets the clockwork mechanism facture of the electrical detonator, the running and it turns a spring-loaded arm. current carrying wires are arranged to This arm in .. turning, bears against the provide this localized high resistallce point surface of a flanged ring which can be and the explosive is molded around it. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107

The proximity device in the fuze con­ smoke, an~ in the antiaircqlft role from sists of a special radio transmitter and friendly aircraft at lower levels, and receiver. The signal transmitted from the , from heavy rain or some types of smoke. fuze is reflected from the target back to Other refinements al'e concerned with muz­ the projectile. It is found tl).at the fre­ z]'e safety and self-destruction. quency of the reflected signal reaching the In current antiaircraft tactics, the over­ projectile is different from that originally whelming weakness is the long time of transmitted. One explanation C!f this phe­ flight of the projectile, during which pe­ nomenon can be found in any standard riod the target is a free agent. Although physics textbook under the heading "The the many variables associated with the Dopple!; Effect." This difference in fre­ gun, propellant, shell, fuze, and fire con­ quency and also the amplitude of the rec trol systems, result in the volume enclos­ fleeted signal are functions of the type ing possible burst positions being very of target, relative velocity of target to considerable, it is insignificant when com­ projectile, and the aspect of the projectile pared with the volume which encloses the to the target. The electronic circuitry is possible -positions of the target at the designed to interpret these relations so as time of burst. to close the firing switch at a prede­ As an example, if -we consider a 600­ termined distance from the target. knot target, a 30-second time of flight and In service fuzes, various refinements are normal predictor, gun, propellant, and vari­ to be found. These are required to miti­ ables, then if the target holds a straight gate, for instance, spurious operation of and level course but its velocity, which the proximity device. This should not oc­ previously had been constant, varies by cur during the flight of the projectile. This only 1 percent during the flight of the shell, may occur in the field role, from interven­ it is most unlikely that any lethal frag­ ing' creRts and possibly heavy rain or ments will hit the target.

The amassing of Soviet power alerted free nations to a new danger of ag­ gression. It compelled them in self-defense to spend unprecedented money and energy for armaments. It forced them to develop weapons of war now capable of inflicting instant and terrible punishment upon any aggressor. It instilled in the free nations-and let none doubt this-the unshakable conviction that, as long as there persists ~ threat to freedom, they must, at any cost, remain armed, strong, and ready for the risk of war. It inspired them-and let none doubt this-to attain a unity of purpose and will beyond the power of propaganda or pressure to break, now or ever.

Pl'esident Dwight D. Eisenhower A WINDOW ON RED SQUARE. By Frank THE ULTIMATE WEAPON. By Oleg Anisi~ Rounds, Jr. 304 Pages. Houghton Mifflin mov. 163 Pages. Henry Regnery Co., Chi­ Co., Boston, Mass. $3.00. ' cago, III. $3.50. By LT COL ROGER E. LAWLESS, SigC By LT COL JOHN E. OLSON, In! The author served as a translator at According to Mr. Anisimov, the ultimate the United States Embassy in Moscow, the weapon is not the atom bomb, as most windows of which front on Red Square, people would assume, but propaganda. In from January 1951 to July 1952. His pub­ the past, nations have been torn asunder lishers feel that Mr. Rounds' book is "the by the struggle of political, social, and latest, fullest, most understandable (post­ economic ideologies for the control of the war) ,picture of Russia and the Rus­ minds and actions of the populace. Some­ sians..." I do not believe this is so. times-as in the case of England-this In fact, the volume is a tedious diary, struggle has been resolved peacefully and principally recounting innumerable eve­ gradually through legislation and other - nings at the Bolshoi (mostly ballet) and democratic actions. At other times-as in, excursions into Moscow's hinterlands. All the case of France and Russia-the con­ tljis 'is written rather ingenuously and flict has erupted into swift, violent, and breathlessly, interspersed with guide-book bloody revolution. Today, the struggle facts and figures. The few redeeming transcends national boundaries as the two pages are those quoted from Tolstoy's Rcs­ great forces-democracy and communism urrcctions, which has had a considerable -seek to spread their doctrines through­ reputation of its own for some time. out the world. The greatest question fac­ Lacking the mirth of Thayer's Bea~'8 in ing the world today is, "Will the conflict the Cav;ar or the astute gossip of Lydia be resolved peacefully or lead to another Kirk's Postmarked Moscow, Mr. Rounds' world war?" A Willdow on Red Square does not ap­ While he recognizes that circumstances proach its billing as a "brilliant personal may precipitate a third world war to de­ story of a young American in Moscow." cide the issue, Mr. Anisimov refuses to Instead, it comes off a very ordinary thing. bow to war as the inevitable result. He The volume seems to conclude that Ivan maintains that the triumph of reason, not Ivanovitch does not really have two heads, might, offers the only lasting solution. -'eaqh with a single eye. On the contrary, The author feels that the majority of thl} Russian man-in-the-street is painted the peoples of postwar Europe regard the as a _regular fellow, rather lonesome, who future with nothing but foreboding. is, alas!, the tool of his fumbling, heart­ Whether the reader agrees with all of less, lackluster, totalitarian masters: the ideas presented by Mr. Anisimov or something the West has suspected all not, he will find this work interesting and along. stimulating. BOOKS OF 'INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER 109 THE TRUTH ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA. By RUSSIAN ASSIGNMENT. By Vice Ad. P. D. Ostovic. 300 Pages. Roy Publishers, miral Leslie C. Stevens. 568 Pages. Atlantic, New York. $3.50. 'Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, Mass. $5.75.

THE PISTOL ~HOOTER'S BOOK. By By LT COL R. P. DE CAMARA, SigG Lieutenant Colonel Charles Askins. 347 The author was the United States Naval 'Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa. Attache in Moscow from 1947 to 1949. He $6.00. describes his experiences and travels in THE RAID. By Laurence Greene:246 Pages. the Soviet Union but, unfortunately for Henry Holt & Co., New York. $3.00. the military reader. is overly discreet on political and military subjects. By LT COL GREY DRESSE!l-. Armor . For those who feel that a deeper in­ The Raid is the story of Harpers Ferry sight into t.he character' of the Russian from its earliest days, through John "Osa­ masses is dictated by current events, RUf!­ watomie" Brown's raid-with which he sian Assignment will hold a special appeal. deals in detail-and the ebb and flow of It should be read by those who desire an "Yankee" and "Rebel" occupations. impartial and scholarly appraisal of Rus­ Through the pages of this unusual rec­ sians as individuals, and the effects on ord of violence and death, which is the those individuals of a regimentation which history of the unhappy village, pass such is difficult for the American mind to con­ impressive personalities as Georg'e Wash­ ceive. ington, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jeffer­ son, Robert E. Lee, J. E. B. Stewart, John THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES. Wilkes Booth, and others whose lives United States Army in World War II. The were at one time much involved there. War in the Pacific. By Robert Ross Smith. The Raid is a new kind of history which 623 Pages. Superintendent of Documents. utilizes contemporary material to the full­ U. S. Government Printing Office, Wash­ est. The author, Mr. Laurence Greene, ington, D. C. $5.50. does not sacrifice accuracy for the sake of HIMMLER. The Evil Genius of the Third humor which he so expertly employs. Take, Reich. By Willi Frischauer. 258 Pages. The for example, Mr. Greene's description of Beacon Press, Boston, Mass. $3.75. the founder of Harpers Ferry, "An un­ By LT COL JEROME F. SMITH, Armor likelier town founder for 1747 than Rob­ ert Harper cannot be imagined. He was Many volumes have been written about an arch-Tory, a native of Oxford, an archi­ Nazi Germany, but none provide so clear tect, and a fellow who liked bathtubs." an indictment of the German people as Mr. Greene deftly uses the light treat­ this complete biography of Heinrich·Him­ Illent to make portions of the book which mler, leader of the SS and chief of the are necessary to its understanding more Gestapo. readable, but which otherwise would have Written in the easy-reading style of Mr. been dull and tedious. Frischauer, this biography of the "Mon­ ster of the Third Reich" is recommended FNCONDITIONAL HATRED. By Captain for the student of history and those in­ Russell Grenfell. 273 Pages. Devin-Adair, terested in the intrigues and the struggle New York. $3.75. for power within Nazi Germany. It is COERCION OR THE WORKER IN THE completely indexed and includes a bibli­ ~OVIET UNION. By David Rousset. 63 ography which should be of value in any Pages. The Beacon Press, Boston, Mass. research int.!> this period of German his­ $1.50. tory which ~nded with World War II. :;"1 110 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE IU5(;

GEOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CEN. Reservoir. Each story is packed with vivid TURY. Edited by Griffit~ Taylor. 661 Pages. details of unusual experiences, heroic The Philosophical Library, New York. $8.75. 7deeds, and humorous events in the lives of By LT GOL MITCHEL GOLDENTHAL, CE the front:line soldiers. No mere atlas, this volume is a de­ Veteran missionary that he is, Father tailed, comprehensive study by 22 world­ Mulvey admirably portrays the glorious famous authorities on the growth, fields, sacrifices of the, American men, as well techniques, aims, and trends of geography, as the outstanding characteristics and and their applicatory roles in the devel­ bravery of the Korean people. His style opment and status of our modern civiliza­ is fluent, lively, and highly dramatic. tion. THE CHINA TANGLE. By Herbert Feis. The book, in its entirety, is skillfully 445 Pages. Princeton University Press, and professionally written. It points out, Princeton, New Jersey. $6.00. in an interesting and magnetizing manner, By COL EARL MATTICE, Inf the link between the four environmental sciences of botony, astronomy, physics, In this book, Mr. Feis makes a most and geology, and the four human sciences scholarly effort to present comprehensibly of history, sociology, economics, and an­ the intricate, and often confusing, history thropology. It also demonstrates the clar­ of our relations with China from Pearl ity and truth of Woodrow Wilson's famous Harbor to the Marshall Mission. His ar­ comment that "history is geography in rangement of the material, based on of­ motion." ficial documents and other original sources, and his personal conclusions combine to THESE ARE YOUR SONS. By Timothy J. develop an eminently readable exposition Mulvey. 278 Pages. McGraw-Hili Book Co., of what we tried to do in and for China Inc., New York. $3.75. during' this critical period. By CHAPLAIN (MAJ) JOSEPH M. MOLLNER Anyone who desires to enlighten himself Father Timothy J. Mulvey, professional on this crucial episode in our history script writer for radio and Hollywood, would do well to read this book. secured sIiecial permission to visit Korea FROM LENIN TO MALENKOV. The His­ for the express purpose of writing this tory of World Communism. By Hugh Seton­ book. His mission was accomplished in that Watson. 377 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, he pens the type of story that should ~ew York. $6.00. capture the avid imagination of relatives of the boys in Korea. But like the casual By COL GEORGE C. REINHARDT, CE visitor who usually recounts things seen This fourth book by Professor Seton­ through the eyes of others, he tends to be Watson (University of London) on the So­ dramatic, emotional, and unable to view viet Union and communism is aptly de­ things in the calm manner of the front­ scribed by its subtitle. Less analytical than line chaplain who lives the daily life with Possony's Century of Conflict, broader his boys. in scope than Kintner's The Front is The military reader will find interest­ Evel'ywhm'e, Seton-Watson's history does ing reading in the vivid description and no violence to either. Supplemented by an highly dramatic account of the valiant extensive bibliography and a thorough in­ stand at Chipyongi; the trials and death dex, F,·om Lenin to Malenkov offers a of the brave American priest in Chunchon; comprehensive record for general reading and the successful withdrawal of the or a useful approach to more detailed United States Marines from the Chosin study.; BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER 111

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CUS­ THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN ~AT­ TOM. By Burleigh Cushing Rodick. 244 IONALlSM,1848-1861. By Avery O. Craven. Pages. The Philosophical Library, New 433 Pages. Louisiana State University York. $4.75. Press, Baton Rouge; La. $6.50. By LT COL DANIEL C. POLLOCK, USMC By LT COL ROBERT C. CAMERON, In! The author glances backward through This book is Volume VI of a 10-volume European history to point out that there work entitled, A History o! the South. is scarcely a single important feature of With a single exception, each of these our American political system that does books is written QY a different author. The not bear the imprint of earlier European set traces the development of the Southern tradition. He then traces expertly the States from 1607 to 1946. American constitutional growth from the The author has presented his material founding fathers to the election of Jef­ in great detail. The reader is introduced ferson. In conclusion, he briefly spans the to the Tafts, the McCarthys, and the Rus­ period from Jefferson to Lincoln to show se lis of another era. that while the Atlantic seaboard remained The Growth o! Southel·n Nationalism is the cultural fringe of Europe during this not read with the ease of a novel. How­ period, it was the West that developed a ever, as a documental, historical work, it set of customs that were somewhat more will prove of great value and'interest to indigenous to the American soil. anyone wishing to explore the glQry of the' Even thQugh most of the material pre­ old South. sented consists of familiar facts, the book THE MAN IN THE TROJAN HORSE. By is interesting and instructive because it Kurt Singer. 251 Pages. The Beacon Press, studies influen~es bearing on the thoughts Boston, Mass. $3.50. and beliefs of the time, rather than the results of action stemming from decisions By LT COL I!ONALD L. DURFEE, In! made. The author's analysis of the Amer­ This is a well-documented and apparent­ ican Revolution and the earlier revolu­ ly factual account of some of the modern tion in England is useful to the military espionage agents who, for one reason or reader in studying the rash of political another, have betrayed their countries. revolutions that have followed World The author tells of the activities of such War II. people as Lavrenti Beria, Richard Sorge, Admiral Canaris, Otto Katz, Alger Hiss, FROM DOWN UNDER TO NIPPON. By and others. General WaIter Kreuger. 393 Pages. Com­ Mr. Singer analyzes and objectively bat Forces Press, Washington, D. C. $6.50. criticizes the activities of Senator Joseph By MAJ JOHN J. EARLEY, In! McCarthy and the other Congressional This book is General Kreuger's testimo­ investigating committees. He questions the nial to his troops. It is not his biography, loyalty and motives of the ex-Communists but the story of how a brave and efficient who turn informer, and asks "Can we American army, at the thin end of the trust them?" supply line, performed the miracles it was This book could be read by every loyal ot·dered to, and did it without fanfare. citizen with considerable benefit. It deals From Down Under to Nippon will be with an old subject--treason-but puts it useful