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MILITARY REVIEW VOLUME XXXIV JUNp·1954 NUMBER 3 CONTENTS DEFENSE BY FIRE ____ ______________________________________ 3 Lieutenant Colonel Marshall H. Armor, Jr., Artillery PETAIN'S ApPROACH TO FAME _ ________ _________ ____ ______________ 14 Leslie Anders PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE IS A MUST! __ ______ ___ ______ _________ 19 Captain Paul B. Nelson, Jr., Infantry AIRBORNE FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION _______________________ 21 Lieutenant Colonel George T. Metcalf, Artillery THE CONDUCT OF BRIEFINGS ________________________________ ..:___ 31 Lieutenant Carl M. Guelzo, Transportation Corps " ECONOMY OF FORCE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY _____________ _ 35 Major Sam Long, USAR COMMAND POST EXERCISE OF A FIELD ARMY ___ ______________ 43 Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Weaver, Infantry MOLEHILL TO MOUNTAIN __ ___ _ __ ___ __ _ _____ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ ____ _ 50 Major Reginald Hargreav.es, British Army (Ret.) HERMAN GORING ANSWERS THE $64 QUESTION _ _ ___ __ _ _ _ 56 Brigadier General William W. Quinn OUR VANISHING MILITARY PROFESSION ____________ __ ___ _________ 59 Commander D. J. Carrison, United States Navy MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ___________________ ~ 63 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS _____________________ _ _ ________ 73 A New Mobility -------____.__________________ ~___ _________ 73 The German Command on the Western Front in 1944 ________ 88 Soviet Army Tactics --------___________________ ___________ 96 Artillery F.UZBS ___________________________ _ ~ ________ ~_ 100 BooKs OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER ____________________ 108 MILITARY REV··IEW STAFF EDITOR IN CHIEF LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD L. DURFEE NORTH AMERICAN EDITION Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL GREY DRESSER Assistant Editor: MAJOR JOHN J. EARLEY SPANISH·AMERICAN EDITION Editor: MAJOR RUI(ERT AMY Assistant Editors: CAPTAIN ANTONIO V. MUNERA, CAPTAIN TOMAS H. GUFFAIX BRAZILIAN EDITION Editor: MAJOR SERGIO A. PIRES, BTazilian Anny Assistant Editor: MAJOR HELlO FREIRE, Brazilian Anny Production Officer MAJOR JAMES A. TRENT The printing of this publication has been approved by the Direcior of the Bureau of the Budget 2 July 1953. MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. in the English, Spanish, and Portuguese langua~es. Entered as second..class matter August 31. 1934, at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under the Act of March 3, 1879 .. Subscription rates: $3.50 (United States currency) a year in the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere: $4.50 a year in aU other countries. Individual revrints. except for copyrighted material. are authorized. provided credit is given 'the "MILITARY REVIEW." Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Kansa •. .. DEFENSE BY FIRE Lieutenant Colonel Marshall H. Armor, Jr., Artillery Instructor, Command and General Staff College "THE assaulting infantry must be in so that they can be thrown in at once the enemy's positions simultaneously with as the attack progresses. the last rounds -of their artillery . in spite of loss from stray 'shorts' and in­ Despite the striking resemblance to jury from their own shell splinters..•." current Soviet doctrine,'" the foregoing In a document published near the end quotations are, in fact, from a German of the war, the Generalissimo spelled document captured in World War I, "The out in some detail his instructions to the Attack in Position Warfare," published Armies on the conduct of offensive action. 1 January 1918 by Von Hindenbu~'s Su­ He emphasized speed: preme Headquarters. Even though Von Hindenburg (or Lu­ The break-through battle consists of dendorff, his alter ego) forbade massing "devouring" the series of hostile positions, troops to the density of the Soviet steam­ for the most part in the face of heavy roller, the similarity of German to Soviet opposition by the enemy. It must be car­methods in the attack is emphasized by I'ied thl'ough mpidly. .The enemy other sources: must not be permitted to recover from his surprise. His countermeasures must The German attack is characterized by: be rendered useless by the rapid pl'ogress surprise, violence, rapidity of execution, maneuver (and) depth of penetration of fhe attack. ... sought . .., Marshal Foch wrote in 1918, He prescribed narrow frontages: as Commander in Chief of the allied armies. IJ'he~'e it is merely a question of seiz­ illg an enemy's front line system . Attack En Masse a division may cover as much as 8,800 He continued: YUI'ds and more. If, however, it is in­ l'iolcllce is obtained by the intensity tellded .to penetrate the enemy's position of the bombal'dmellt, all calibers and all in depth, narrower division fronts must sorts of shells being employed·, simul­ be allotted. ... taneously over a depth of from 1, to 5 He prescribed depth in the formation: ·See Soviet Military Doctrine, by Raymond L. Garthofl', The Rand CorporatIOn. 1953. especially In attacks on a large scale, fresh for­Chapter 4. "The Principle of the Offense. and De­ fense:' Chapter 6. "Forms of Offensive Maneuver," ma tions will be held close up in readiness and Chapter 19. "Employment of Ground, Forces'" Conduct of a successful defense against the Soviet amled forces in a future war may require something. more than flexibility of method and materiel, efficient fire control, and rapid, reliable communications 44 4 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1954 kilometers, and by the attack en masse viets-defeated in World War I-may of the infantry which, during the artil­ have learned their offensive tactics from lery preparation, is aS8embled about 200 the Germans who beat them, just as they to 300 meters from the first lines. that learned their politics from a German. are to be taken. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this During its forward movement the infan­ article to outline the development of try is first protected by the rolling bar­ French defensive tactics and technique ill rage of the artillery and then by the ac­ World War I, and to demonstrate their companying artillery and minenwerfer application in the Battle of Champagne­ fires. Besides, it makes great use of its Marne where, east of Reims, the last own fire, and especially of its Ught ma­ great German offensive was ground to a chine guns. ... sudden stop_ . The depth of penetration is obtained Comparison of the French defense with by the rapid and resolute march of the what we do today may provide some indi­ troops on the objectives which have been cation as to the adequacy of present determined upon in advance and situated United States methods and means, if we at great distance. Its effect is promptly should be attacked by the Soviet Union. to dillol'ganize a defense which is not en­ We have the advantage of knowing what til'elll constituted by taking away from it, to expect. The French did not, and in con­ in its objectives, the essential points of sequence they were surprised tactically its organization . ... at the beginning of World War I by the Besides, the violence of the bombard­ destructive power of German artillery. ment is such that from the beginning all They were perhaps only a little less sur­ conw!uliication between the Command and prised by the comparative skill with which the troops is impossible; so that any de­ the German machine guns were employed. cision taken at this moment to maneuver In consequence of their failure to ap­ the troops of OCC:lIpation cannot be realized. preciate fully the effects which artillery and machine guns were to have on opera­ History May Repeat tions, the French held initially to the It was against such attacks as Marshal pattern of defense which had served them Foch describes that the French held the well for more than a century-a line of greater length of the western front itt riflemen stood shoulder to shoulder and, World War 1. (In July 1918, for example, when possible, t!lok cover in a trench. the French held 353 miles of the 530-mile The line of men at close interval had bllttle line.) In any foreseeable future war, the advantage of producing a dense bar­ attacks in similar pattern may be encount­ rier of small-arms fire across the front, ered again-with Soviet troops behind the however, overriding disadvantages soon approaching bayonets. The similarity of became evident. The first was the ability methods suggests, indeed, that the So- of the German artillery to smash the trench and-in concert with the weapons Lieutenant Colonel Marshall H. Armor, of attacking infantry-to pin down the Jr., is a graduate of the Advanced Course defenders under such vast volumes of fire of The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla­ that their machine guns and rifles were homa, in 191,9. He served in Korea with the '52d Field Artillery Battalion, 21,th useless. The second signal disadvantage Infantry Division, and subsequently in was the ability of an attacker who was the Training Division, GS Seotion of GHQ, successful in seizing any portion of the FEe. He was graduated from the Com­ trench to secure the rest of it with rela­ mand and General Staff College in 1959, where he is now an instruotor. tive ease br flanking action. DEFENSE BY FIRE 5 Multiple trench lines, one behind an­ A main parallel, the most forward other, were a partial solution to both trench. problems. By exploiting his machine guns, A support parallel, about 200 yards be­ the defender was able to increase the in­ hind the main parallel. terval between riflemen in each of several A redoubt parallel, forward of the ar­ trenches, while still maintaining an ade­ tillery. quate density of fires to the front. Fur­ A number of intermediate pamllels ther developments led to creating, with~n might be located between the support and the trench system, strong points capable the redoubt parallels.

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