Newsletter No.5 February 23, 2021

Prospects & Perspectives

The people of Yangon were unafraid of government threats and on February 7, a crowd of almost 100,000 walked onto the street, which was subsequently followed by crowds in other cities. Picture Source: VOA, “Demonstrators denounce the military coup in ,” Wikipedia, . Implications of the Myanmar Coup for

Regional Security

By Shangmao Chen

O n February 1, 2021, hours before the latest elected legislators in Myanmar were to be inaugurated, Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, issued an arrest order for the senior officials and chief members of the National League for , including incumbent president Win Myint and State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi, based on claims of electoral fraud. The Defense Services announced its official takeover of the government and a one-year state of emergency for the country. Min Aung

Newsletter No.5 February 23, 2021

Hlaing will receive actual control over the state, while Vice President Myint Swe, who has a military background, will serve as the interim president.

In order to prevent the coordination of protests over the internet, the Myanmar government severed the national telecommunication system and shut down airports. However, the people of Yangon were unafraid of government threats and on February 7, a crowd of almost 100,000 walked onto the street, which was subsequently followed by crowds in other cities. The Myanmar police fired rubber bullets at the demonstrators and the military made it known that it does not rule out the possibility of suppression. The state of Myanmar is indeed worrisome.

The main reason for the recent coup d’état stems from the Defense Services’ claim that there were over 10 million cases of fraud during the election campaign and that the government failed to respond, despite requests to the election commission for investigation. The coup on February 1 was simply the climax. However, according to ANREL and other election watch groups around the world, preliminary reports on the Myanmar election suggest that obvious violations of electoral regulations were absent. Such findings suggest that the reason for the coup is insufficient. Nonetheless, the military coup will no doubt have considerable consequences for domestic politics and regional developments.

Implications and Responses of Neighboring Countries In the aftermath of the coup, as the incumbent chair of ASEAN, Burma re-emphasized the importance of political stability in ASEAN countries for the establishment of a regional community grounded on peace, stability and prosperity. Nonetheless, the reaction from the ASEAN members was divided. , and Singapore all expressed serious concern and called for all parties in Myanmar to show restraint and resolve differences through peaceful communication. Meanwhile, Vietnam and Laos did not make an effort to respond, while Cambodia, and the all expressed reserve towards intervening in the domestic politics of Myanmar. The silence is considered by observers as granting consent to the coup. In Thailand, while the official response is interpreted as support for the coup, reactions from the general populace was different. Crowds in Thailand walked onto the street in support of democracy in Myanmar. Correspondingly, influenced by student

Newsletter No.5 February 23, 2021 demonstrations in Thailand earlier, crowds in Myanmar walked onto the street and held up three-fingered gestures in protest against the military government. On the internet, activists established action groups and changed their profile pictures on social media networks. As such, Myanmar became the latest member of the “ Alliance” that included , , Thailand and . Alliance members share the goal of safeguarding democracy and human rights and challenging authoritarian rule.

Implications and Responses of Major Powers in the Region The Mekong River region where Myanmar is located is a contended area amidst US- competition. In July 2009, the US proposed the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and upgraded the initiative to the Mekong-US Partnership in 2020. In response to US activity, China initiated the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) in 2016, which made apparent US-China competition in the region. Even though the Milk Tea Alliance seems to coalesce around anti-China sentiments, it is foreseeable that China’s influence will be strengthened if the five countries in the Mekong region fall under authoritarian rule.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2020, democratic development in the five countries of the Mekong region is in retreat. Except for the description of Thailand as a flawed democracy, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos are all described as authoritarian regimes. The Mekong Five are important partners in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly Myanmar, which serves as a critical channel that connects China to the Indian Ocean. It is to the benefit of China if Myanmar becomes increasingly authoritarian. Aside from avoiding the use of the term “coup d’état” to describe Myanmar’s development, China also relied on its status as a permanent member of the United Nations to pass a Security Council a statement calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and others, while turning a blind eye to the military coup. Such gesture may further encourage Myanmar and other states to reaffirm China’s leadership status in the region. In return, one can expect the military government in Myanmar to align with Laos, Cambodia and Thailand in actively supporting China’s interests.

Myanmar’s coup is the first foreign policy challenge of the newly inaugurated Joe Biden administration. As the international community watches,

Newsletter No.5 February 23, 2021 observers expect Biden to return to the Obama administration’s policy of supporting democracy and human rights. Hence it was unsurprising that Biden immediately issued a statement condemning the coup and terminated all assistance to Myanmar, and later sanctioned 10 Myanmar military officials and three companies tied to Myanmar’s military while requesting China to express its position. It is clear that the US, at least in the short run, will adopt a policy of strong sanctions, as in the past, and seek to isolate Myanmar. However, since opening up its economy, Myanmar has done well in attracting foreign investment from corporations and businesses from Singapore, China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and the ASEAN countries. In addition, with the completion of RCEP on November 15, 2020 – an initiative that includes Myanmar – the effect of US sanctions is expected to be less than effective. Once strong sanctions fail, if the US cannot build on the influence of global civil society and stand with the Milk Tea Alliance in repelling authoritarianism, its policy of isolation will only push Myanmar further towards China.

(Dr. Chen is Professor, Department of Public Affairs, Fo Guang University)

Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or the position of the Prospect Foundation.

The Prospect Foundation is an independent research institution dedicated to the study of cross-Strait relations and international issues. The Foundation maintains active exchanges and communications with many think tanks of the world.

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