A New Way of Working Together: A Civil-Military Interaction Model for Future Australian Disaster Response Operations
Emily M. Chapman
A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
UNSW AUSTRALIA
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
UNSW Canberra
January 2020 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Australia's UNSW Global SYDNEY University
Surname/Family Name Chapman Given Name/s Emily Margaret Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar PhD Faculty UNSW Canberra School Humanities and Social Science A New Way of Working Together: A Civil-Military Interaction Model for Future Thesis Title Australian Disaster Response Operations
Abstract 350 words maximum:
To support populations affected by natural disaster, Secretary General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Elhadj As Sy, stated in 2016 that actors need to move beyond institutional loyalty and commit to working together. This strategic thinking lays the foundation for this study, which examines interaction between civilian and military actors during disaster response with the aim to determine if there is a new or better way for actors to come together in times of need. Innovation in this field is critical heading into the future because relationships between civilian and military actors have historically formed through necessity rather than an institutionalised approach.
Using an inductive methodology, this study draws on Australia's responses to natural disasters in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji to examine how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) interacts with a broad range of civilian actors during disaster preparedness and response, two phases within a disaster management cycle. Following these case studies, a consolidated list of factors that influence civil-military interaction are drawn from a cross-case pattern search, coordination theory and broader literature review. This knowledge is used to build a model that addresses the core purpose of this study, which is to propose a civit-military interaction process model that supports the conduct of an Australian response to international natural disasters.
The model developed specifies how and when Australian civilian and military actors should interact within a whole-of- government approach and with external civilian actors, including affected nation authorities and humanitarian organisations. It does so by proposing agile and adaptive practices, behaviours, and structures built through strategic commitment to disaster management, mutual understanding, learning and adaptation, training and education, tailored capability, and adherence to aligned governance structures. The endpoint of the model is unity to meet the needs of an affected nation through civilian and military efforts being part of a purposeful whole.
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Date Table of Contents
Acknowledgements vii Author’s Note ix Abbreviations x List of Figures xii List of Tables xiii
Chapter 1. Working Together during Disaster Management 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Disaster Management 3 1.2.1 Mitigation 5 1.2.2 Preparedness and Planning 6 1.2.3 Response 6 1.2.4 Recovery 7 1.3 Working Together 8 1.3.1 Whole of Government 9 1.3.2 External Actors 13 1.4 Types of Civil-Military Interaction 19 1.4.1 Coherence 19 1.4.2 Cooperation 20 1.4.3 Coordination 20 1.4.4 Coexistence 21 1.4.5 Curtail 21 1.4.6 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 22 1.5 Levels of Civil-Military Interaction 23 1.5.1 Strategic 24 1.5.2 Operational 24 1.5.3 Tactical 24 1.6 Civil-Military Interaction Disaster Management 25 1.6.1 International Structures 25 1.6.2 Regional Structures 34 1.6.3 Australian Structures 38 1.7 Research Purpose 39
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1.7.1 Research Objective 40 1.7.2 Research Questions 41 1.8 Summary 42
Chapter 2. Research Strategy 2.1 Introduction 43 2.2 Worldview 44 2.3 Military involvement in Disaster Management 48 2.4 Methodological Approach 54 2.5 Building Theory Using Case Studies 56 2.6 Data Collection 64 2.7 Data Analysis 71 2.8 Model Development 74 2.9 Research Limitations 77 2.10 Summary
Chapter 3. Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) – Philippines – Operation Philippines Assist 3.1 National Context 81 3.2 Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 84 3.3 Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 85 3.3.1 National Response 86 3.3.2 National Disaster Response Plan 88 3.3.3 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 89 3.3.4 Multinational Coordination Centres 89 3.4 Australian Whole-of-Government Response 91 3.4.1 ADF Response – Operation Philippines Assist 94 3.4.2 Preparation 95 3.4.3 Capability 97 3.4.3.1 Immediate Response Teams 97 3.4.3.2 Composition 100 3.4.3.3 CIMIC and Liaison Officer Network 101 3.4.3.4 Gender Participation 103 3.4.3.5 Co-location and Teaming of Civilian and Military Actors 103 3.4.4 Leadership 104 ii
3.4.4.1 Command and Control 106 3.4.4.2 Delegation and Decision Making 107 3.4.4.3 Relationship Building 108 3.4.4.4 Key Leadership Engagement 109 3.4.5 Coordination Structures 109 3.4.5.1 Operating Procedures 111 3.4.5.2 Requests for Military Assistance 111 3.4.5.3 Accreditation 112 3.4.6 Monitoring and Evaluation 113 3.4.7 Organisational Learning 116 3.4.7.1 Lessons Identified 117 3.5 Summary 119
Chapter 4. Tropical Cyclone Pam – Vanuatu – Operation Pacific Assist 2015 120 4.1 National Context 122 4.2 Tropical Cyclone Pam 124 4.3 National Response 125 4.4 International Response 127 4.5 Australian Whole-of-Government Response 130 4.5.1 ADF Response – Operation Pacific Assist 2015 131 4.5.2 Preparation 132 4.5.3 Capability 134 4.5.3.1 Immediate Response Teams 134 4.5.3.2 Composition 135 4.5.3.3 CIMIC 136 4.5.3.4 Co-location of Civilian and Military Actors 137 4.5.3.5 Civil-Military Teaming 137 4.5.4 Leadership 139 4.5.4.1 Command and Control 140 4.5.4.2 Relationships 141 4.5.4.3 Key Leadership Engagement 143 4.5.5 Coordination Structures 143 4.5.5.1 Standard Operating Procedures 151 4.5.6 Organisational Learning 152 iii
4.5.6.1 Lessons Identified 153 4.6 Summary 155
Chapter 5. Tropical Cyclone Winston – Fiji – Operation Fiji Assist 156 5.1 National Context 158 5.2 Tropical Cyclone Winston 159 5.3 National Response 159 5.4 Australian Whole-of-Government Response 163 5.4.1 ADF Response – Operation Fiji Assist 164 5.4.2 Preparation 167 5.4.3 Capability 170 5.4.3.1 Immediate Response Teams 171 5.4.3.2 Advance Party 172 5.4.3.3 Co-location of Civilian and Military Actors 172 5.4.3.4 Gender Perspective and Participation 173 5.4.3.5 CIMIC 175 5.4.4 Leadership 176 5.4.4.1 Command and Control 176 5.4.4.2 Relationship Building 177 5.4.4.3 Key Leadership Engagement 178 5.4.5 Coordination Structures 178 5.4.5.1 Requests for Military Assistance 182 5.4.5.2 Information Management 183 5.4.5.3 Transition 183 5.4.6 Organisational Learning 184 5.4.6.1 Lessons Identified 186 5.5 Summary 188
Chapter 6. Framing Civil-Military Interaction in Disaster Management 189 6.1 Natural Disaster Environments 189 6.2 Coordination Theory 193 6.3 Framing Effective Civil-Military Interaction 196 6.4 Factors that influence Civil-Military Interaction 200 6.5 Organisational Culture 201 iv
6.5.1 Relationships 202 6.5.2 Command and Control 203 6.5.3 Decision Making 205 6.5.4 Strategic Mission 205 6.6 Preparation 207 6.6.1 Training and Exercises 208 6.6.2 National, Regional and Cultural Context 209 6.6.3 Knowledge and Experience 211 6.7 Capability 212 6.7.1 Dedicated Functions 212 6.7.2 Co-location of Civilian and Military Actors 215 6.7.3 Gender Participation and Perspective 216 6.7.4 Immediate Response Teams 217 6.7.5 Civil-Military Teaming 218 6.8 Governance 218 6.8.1 Coordination Mechanisms 219 6.8.2 Operating Procedures 220 6.8.3 Information Management 221 6.8.4 Accreditation 222 6.9 Outcomes of Effective Civil-Military Interaction 222 6.10 Broader Literature 223 6.11 Logic Model 227 6.12 Summary 229
Chapter 7. Preparing for Natural Disaster Response 231 7.1 Model Background 232 7.2 Preparedness 235 7.3 Step 1: Commit to Disaster Management 236 7.3.1 Step 1.1: Localisation 241 7.4 Step 2: Build and Manage Knowledge 243 7.4.1 Step 2.1: Regional Partnerships 243 7.4.2 Step 2.2: Education, Training and Exercising 246 7.4.3 Step 2.3: Capacity and Timelines of Military Assets 250 7.4.4 Step 2.4: Knowledge Management 253 v
7.5 Step 3: Align and Practice Governance Structures 256 7.5.1 Step 3.1: Cross-referencing Governance Documentation, Structures and Practices 257 7.5.2 Step 3.2: Practice and Rehearse Structures 260 7.6 Step 4: Mutual Understanding 261 7.6.1 Step 4.1: Shared Experience and Mental Models 262 7.6.2 Step 4.2: Relationships 262 7.6.3 Step 4.3: Understand Comparative Advantage 263 7.7 Summary
Chapter 8. Responding to Natural Disasters 265 8.1 Step 5: Primacy of Affected Nation 267 8.1.1 Step 5.1: Partnerships 269 8.1.2 Step 5.2: Adaptable missions 272 8.2 Step 6: Agile Leadership 274 8.2.1 Step 6.1: Clear authority, roles and responsibilities 277 8.2.2 Step 6.2: Shared Responsibility 278 8.3 Step 7: Tailored Response 281 8.3.1 Step 7.1: Immediate Response Teams 281 8.3.2 Step 7.2: Information and Knowledge Management 282 8.3.3 Step 7.3: Co-location 285 8.3.4 Step 7.4: Dedicated Civil-Military Engagement Functions 286 8.3.5 Step 7.5: Civil-Military Teaming 288 8.3.6 Step 7.6: Gender Perspective and Participation 289 8.4 Step 8: Adherence to Governance Structures 292 8.4.1 Step 8.1: Coordination Mechanisms and Procedures 293 8.4.2 Step 8.2: Support to accredited teams 294 8.5 Unity 295 8.6 Summary 297
Chapter 9. Situating the Model 299 9.1 Counterinsurgency 300 9.1.1. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 302 9.1.2 Female Engagement Teams 304 vi
9.2 Pandemics 308 9.2.1 Preparation 310 9.2.2 Culture 311 9.2.3 Tailored Response 313 9.2.4 Governance Structures 314 9.2.5 Coordination Mechanisms 315 9.2.6 Information Management 318 9.2.7 Unified Purpose 320 9.3 Operations in Dense Urban Environments – Mosul 320 9.3.1 Preparation 322 9.3.2 Dedicated Civil-Military Interaction Functions 323 9.3.3 Coordination Mechanisms 325 9.3.4 Information Management 325 9.4 Summary 326 9.5 Civil-Military Interaction Models 326 9.6 Summary
Chapter 10. Conclusion & Recommendations 335 10.1 Civil-Military Interaction 337 10.1.1 Culture 339 10.1.2 Preparation 340 10.1.3 Capability 341 10.1.4 Governance 343 10.2 Framing Effective Civil-Military Interaction 344 10.3 Building a Model for the Future 345 10.4 Situating the Model 347 10.5 Recommendations 347 10.6 Future Research 354 10.7 Conclusion 354
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Acknowledgements
To those who welcomed me across Fiji, Vanuatu, the Philippines and the ADF, this thesis would not exist without your kindness and support. Thank you, I am truly grateful and humbled that you shared your lives, and at times, your homes with me.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of people for their unwavering encouragement – Ian & Claudia Chapman, Shannon Chapman & Scott Mitchell, Dr Deane Peter-Baker, Bernadette McDermott, CDRE Brett Sonter, Tegan Davey, Gabby Follett, Stacey Harvey, Sam Coltimo, Jordan, Simone, Bryon and Harper Norrish, Stevie Bliss, Maj Brennan Simi (USMC), Jim Hutton, Martin Shaw, Jan-Maree & David Ball, Iain Cruickshank and Heath Jamieson.
Finally, to Dan Fussell and Oliver Schulz for pushing me outside my comfort zone and being there to listen afterwards.
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Author's Note
In November 2013, I received notice from the ADF that I would be going to the Philippines - in eight hours, I went from my home in Brisbane, Australia to the Philippines, a nation devastated by Typhoon Yolanda. I spent approximately a month as an Air Force Operations Officer as part of the Air Component Coordination Element. In the Philippines, I met the most resilient and inspiring women and men, who to this day, remain my friends.
In February 2016, I was requested to deploy in response to TC Winston. I embarked on HMAS Canberra and spent the deployment as an Air Force Air Liaison Officer. The complexity of the first operational deployment of HMAS Canberra included bringing together a headquarters, ship’s company, and elements from all over Australia. To this day, it remains one of the most challenging experiences of my service.
In exploring civil-military interaction during natural disaster response, this project brings to life the above experiences. It also brings to life the voices of the women and men who experienced Yolanda and Winston. I will never forget how you shared your stories during my fieldwork phases, so that the international community can learn.
It is for communities affected by natural disasters that I write this. In the hope, that civilian and military communities will more effectively come together in the future to assist those affected by natural disasters and conflict.
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Abbreviations
AAR – After Action Review ACCE – Air Coordination Component Element ACMC – Australian Civil-Military Centre ADF – Australian Defence Force AHA – ASEAN Coordination Centre for Humanitarian Assistance AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines AWB – Adaptive Warfare Branch AUSMAT – Australian Medical Assistance Teams ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations C2 – Command and Control CA – Civil Affairs CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation CMO – Civil Military Operations CMOC – Civil-Military Operations Centre COIN – Counterinsurgency CRT – Crisis Response Team DACC – Defence Assistance to the Civil Community DART – Disaster Assistance Response Team DDR – Disaster Risk Reduction DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DJFHQ – Deployable Joint Force Headquarters DPR – Disaster Preparedness and Response Activities DRT – Disaster Response Teams DRS – Disaster Response System EMA – Emergency Management Australia FET – Female Engagement Teams FRANZ – France, Australian, New Zealand Agreement HADR – Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief HCT – Humanitarian Country Team HOM – Head of Mission HQJOC – Headquarters Joint Operations Command HuMOCC – Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Centre IASC – Inter-Agency Standing Committee IFRC – International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IO – International Organisations JTF – Joint Task Force KLE – Key Leadership Engagement LCA – Lesson Collection Activity LHD – Landing Helicopter Dock LNO – Liaison Officer Network MOE – Measures of Effectiveness MOP – Measures of Performance MNCC – Multinational Military Coordination Centre/Multinational Coordination Centre MNF SOP – Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures MSF – Medicines Sans Frontiers NDMO – National Disaster Management Office NDRRMC – Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
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NEOC – National Emergency Operations Centre NGO – Non-government organisation OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OSOCC – On-site Operations Coordination Centre PHT – Pacific Humanitarian Team PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Teams RAAF – Royal Australian Air Force RAN – Royal Australian Navy RCG – Regional Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific RFMF – Republic of Fiji Military Forces RSF – Recovery Support Force RFA – Request for Assistance SOP – Standard Operating Procedures SRT – Support and Response Teams TOR – Terms of Reference UN – United Nations UN CMCoord – United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination UNDAC – United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team UNMEER – United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response USAR – Urban Search and Rescue VHT – Vanuatu Humanitarian Team VMF – Vanuatu Mobile Force WPS – Women, Peace and Security WHO – World Health Organization WOG – Whole of Government
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Natural disaster subgroup classification 4 Figure 2: Disaster Risk Management Cycle 5 Figure 3: Activities within the Disaster Management Cycle 8 Figure 4: International Coordination during Disasters 19 Figure 5: Levels of Civil-Military Interaction 23 Figure 6: Cluster System Approach 30 Figure 7: Linkages between Coordination Structures 34 Figure 8: RCG Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards 37 Figure 9: Foundations of Social Research 44 Figure 10: Case Study Plan 60 Figure 11: Comparison of Variance and Process Models 75 Figure 12: Typhoon Haiyan Map of Affected Areas 79 Figure 13: Foreign Military Deployed Assets in the Philippines 90 Figure 14: Operation Philippines Assist Command and Control Structure 94 Figure 15: Location of Australian Elements 95 Figure 16: Proposed RFA Process Flow on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), Philippines, Typhoon Yolanda, 2013 112 Figure 17: JTF 630 Achievements 114 Figure 18: JTF 630 Maritime Component (HMAS Tobruk) 115 Figure 19: JTF 630 Land Component (Recovery Support Force) 115 Figure 20: The Path and Impact of Cyclone Pam 120 Figure 21: Foreign Military Deployed Assets 130 Figure 22: Timeline of key SRT Events 131 Figure 23: Civil Military Operations Centre 147 Figure 24: Shefa Assessment Team Logistics Plan and Tafea Assessment Team Logistics Plan 138 Figure 25: Tropical Cyclone Winston Path 156 Figure 26: Foreign Military Assets 160 Figure 27: Australia’s response to help Fiji recover from Tropical Cyclone Winston 163 Figure 28: Cyclone Winston NDMO Coordination Command and Control 180 Figure 29: Performance assessment framework civil-military cooperation 198 Figure 30: Consolidated Outcomes of Effective Civil-Military Interaction 223 Figure 31: Civil-Military Interaction Logic Model 229 Figure 32: Process Model 232 Figure 33: Flowchart Diagrams 233 Figure 34: Preparedness Process Model 236 Figure 35: USAPACOM Disaster Relief Operational Framework 240 Figure 36: Civil-Military Interaction Process Model 267 Figure 37: Structure of a US Provincial Reconstruction Team 303 Figure 38: UN-CMCoord model of coordination 328 Figure 39: Key Concepts of UN-CMCoord 328 Figure 40: Process model for civil-military cooperation at the local level 331 Figure 41: Consolidated Outcomes of Effective Civil-Military Interaction 344 Figure 42: Civil-Military Interaction Logic Model 345 Figure 43: Civil-Military Interaction Process Model 346
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List of Tables
Table 1: Spectrum of Civil-Military Interaction 21-22 Table 2: Civil-Military Interaction Frameworks, Guidelines and Practices 27-28 Table 3: ASEAN Member Nations 35-36 Table 4: South Pacific FRANZ Partner Countries and Territories 36 Table 5: Comparison of Positivism and Constructivism Worldviews 46 Table 6: Constructivist Worldview 44 Table 7: Theoretical Concepts surrounding military involvement in disaster response 49 Table 8: Research Sub-Questions 54 Table 9: Research Project Outline 55-56 Table 10: Case Study Selection 61 Table 11: Criteria for Case Study Quality 62 Table 12: Sources of Evidence 64-65 Table 13: Comparison of research models 75 Table 14: Summary of AFP and Foreign Military Assets Deployed in Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan 90 Table 15: Australian Commitment to Typhoon Haiyan Response 92-93 Table 16: Definitions of Coordination Theory 194 Table 17: Coordination mechanisms in organisations 195 Table 18: Factors that Influence Civil-Military Interaction 192 Table 19: Strategic and Operational Planning 198 Table 20: Factors Influencing Civil-Military Cooperation 215 Table 21: Systematic Civil-Military Coordination Literature Review 216 Table 22: Factors Influencing Civil-Military Cooperation – ACMC 218 Table 23: Purpose and Outcomes of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 294 Table 24: Factors that influence civil-military interaction during disaster response 329
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! Chapter One Working Together during Disaster Management
1.1 Introduction The needs of populations impacted by natural disasters are increasing at a greater pace than the resources allocated to respond.1 During the period 2005 to 2014, the average number of annual disasters reached 380, caused 76,416 deaths and affected 199.2 million people. In 2015, 376 natural disasters caused 22,765 deaths, affected a further 110.3 million and caused US$70.3 billion in economic damages.2 Data from 2016 reflects 301 disasters affected 102 countries, caused 7,628 deaths, affected a further 411 million persons and caused economic damages of US$97 billion.3 While deaths are reducing due to disaster risk reduction measures,4 natural disasters are predicted to impact countries with greater occurrence and severity, which will test the capacity of communities, nations, and humanitarian actors to respond.5
To support populations affected by natural disaster, Secretary General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Elhadj As Sy, stated in 2016 that actors need to move “beyond our institutional priorities, step out from our silos and to commit to working together in a spirit of true collaboration" through finding “a new way of working together.” 6 This strategic thinking lays the foundation for this research project which will examine how civilian and military actors interact during disaster response to determine if there is a new or better way of coming together to assist nations prepare and respond to natural disasters.
Innovation in this field is critical heading into the future because relationships between civilian and military actors have historically formed through necessity rather than an
1 E. As Sy, ‘Resilience: saving lives today, investing in tomorrow,’ in World Disasters Report: Resilience: saving lives today, investing in tomorrow, D. Sanderson & A. Sharma (eds), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2016, p. 8. 2 D. Guha-Sapir, P. Hoyois, & R. Below, Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2015: The Numbers and Trends. CRED, 2016, p. 1. 3 A. Vanderveken, ‘2016 preliminary data: Human impact of natural disasters,’ in CRED Crunch. December 2016, viewed on 25 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/cred-crunch- newsletter-issue-no-45-december-2016-preliminary-data-human-impact-natural 4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam, Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 44. 5 R. Barber, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Tailoring the International Response to the National Need Following Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam. CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, 2015, p. 3. 6 E. As Sy, op. cit, p. 9. 1
! institutionalised approach based on lessons learned from previous operations.7 Militaries are also increasingly becoming involved in natural disaster response, with domestic militaries often being first responders and foreign militaries regularly deploying at the request of an affected nation to provide assistance. However, some humanitarian actors have reacted by limiting dialogue with militaries, shaped by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rationale that militaries undertake humanitarian assistance to achieve political outcomes.8
This makes civil-military interaction during disaster response to be typically characterised by a lack of unified planning and information sharing, where individuals drive cooperation efforts.9 It is widely acknowledged that civilian and military organisational culture, structure, and operating procedures will never converge and these factors are often used to explain the nature and outcomes of civil-military relationships.10 This means finding a way of working together that is dedicated and systematic requires more knowledge to be built of civil-military interaction.
To contribute in this area, this thesis draws on Australia’s whole-of-government responses to natural disasters in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji to build knowledge of civil-military interaction during disaster response. To bound the research, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the ‘military’ actor and it interfaces with civilian actors in two ways: firstly with civilian agencies and actors within a whole-of-government response; and secondly, with all other civilian actors including populations, officials, and agencies of an affected nation, humanitarian organisations, private sector, media, and spontaneous volunteers. This thesis is framed using an ADF lens because I am a current serving Royal Australian Air Force Operations Officer (Reservist) who deployed to the Philippines and Fiji. The project was undertaken as an “insider researcher” which informs the positionality and organisational lens of the project.
7 S. Rietjens, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?’ PhD diss., University of Twente, 2006, p.8. 8 S. Haysom, ‘Civil-Military coordination: the state of the debate,’ in Humanitarian Exchange. Special feature Civil-military coordination, January 2013, p. 3. 9 C. Gourlay, ‘Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions.’ Disarmament forum, vol. 3, 2000, p. 34. 10 See A. Kyazze, ‘Challenge and Innovation: Civil-Military Relations in a Changing World’ in NGO- Military Contact Group Conference. 26 February 2015, viewed on 26 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NMCG%202015%20Conference%20Summary%2 0note%20FINAL.pdf 2
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Focusing the project on an Australian context ensures consistent use of terminology, doctrine, standard operating procedures and benefits from knowledge gained from direct experience. This focus is a necessary part of the project because there are differences between nations in terms of military size, posture, structure, competence, professionalism, and provision of humanitarian assistance which has implications for the nature of interaction with civilian actors.11 Different legislation, policy and practices guide ADF involvement in domestic natural disaster response, known as Defence Assistance to the Civil Community or DACC. For this reason, the project focuses on overseas natural disaster response.
Australia’s commitment to overseas disaster management will now be outlined to introduce the policy, actors and activities that comprise part of, or influence, an Australian overseas disaster response. Following on from this, the chapter presents terms and concepts that are used to describe civil-military interaction, the levels where this interaction occurs, and current guidelines, frameworks and practices that guide or inform civil-military interaction.
1.2 Disaster Management The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) defines a disaster as “a situation or event that overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request at the national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering.”12 Disasters can arise from accidents, nature or human activity and can be sudden-onset or develop from longer-term processes. They fall into two categories - natural and technological. Natural disasters are defined as events triggered by a natural hazard and affect a human population, and they are classified into sub-groups of geophysical, hydrological, meteorological, climatological, biological and extra-terrestrial (Figure 1).
11 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 34. 12 D. Guha-Sapir, P. Hoyois, & R. Below, op. cit., p. 7. 3
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Figure 1: Natural disaster subgroup classification 13
The Asia and Pacific region is the most disaster-prone area in the world.14 From 2005- 2014, the region experienced over 40 per cent of the total of global disaster events with a reported 1,625 events. At least 480,000 people have lost their lives, with around 1.3 billion people affected. Economic damage has totalled US $523 billion worth, which accounts for 45 per cent of global damage.15
Australia plays an active role in assisting nations in the Indo-Pacific region prepare and respond to natural disasters, led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). This is achieved through DFAT enabling disaster governance, preparedness, hazard identification, and technological innovation in the region,16 including through a dedicated disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response program.17 Australia’s response to short-notice disaster response situations in the region, including improving coordination through building regional preparedness and conducting international engagement, is also ratified in the 2016 Defence White Paper.18
The scale of a disaster informs the response because it is considered the magnitude of a hazard event and an affected nation's exposure and preparation to manage such an event.
13 ibid 14 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Disasters without Borders: Regional Resilience for Sustainable Development. Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2015. United Nations publication, 2016, p. 4. 15 ibid 16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Disaster risk reduction and resilience.’ Viewed on 26 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building- resilience/drr/Pages/disaster-risk-reduction-and-resilience.aspx 17 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘2019-20 Australian aid budget at a glance.’ Viewed on 26 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/corporate/portfolio-budget-statements/Pages/2019-20- australian-aid-budget-at-a-glance.aspx 18 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p.22. 4
! This includes physical, social, cultural, economic and environmental vulnerability and exposure domains.19 Based on this, how a nation prepares and responds to natural disasters is encapsulated in a ‘disaster management cycle’ that typically spans four phases: mitigation, preparedness and planning, response, and recovery. This research adopts the model used by the Humanitarian Advisory Group (Figure 2) because it provides an effective visual representation of a typical model.
Figure 2: Disaster Risk Management Cycle 20
1.2.1 Mitigation The mitigation phase of disaster risk management includes structural and building efforts, such as dams and levees, to lesson or minimise loss of life, property and economic interests from disasters. This phase includes also includes non-structural measures, such as insurance, writing and monitoring building codes, and conducting mitigation planning.21 Environmental, social policies and public awareness to are further examples of disaster mitigation.22
19 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,’ ‘Terminology.’ 02 February 2017, viewed on 26 December 2019, https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology 20 P. Henty, K. Sutton & B. Eggleston, Humanitarian Partnership Agreement: The impact of disaster risk reduction programming. Humanitarian Advisory Group, 2017, p. 6. 21 Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘What is Mitigation.’ 19 September 2018, viewed on 29 December 2019 https://www.fema.gov/what-mitigation 22 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, op. cit. 5
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1.2.2 Preparedness and Planning Disaster preparedness refers to “the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current disasters.”23 Disaster preparedness is continuous, achieved and maintained through planning, training, equipping, rehearsing, evaluating and taking corrective action. Planning refers to knowing the disaster response plan, which means disaster respondents benefit from being involved in its design, and conducting collective training and rehearsals in order to be fully conversant if there is a need to implement it.24
Preparedness and planning activities are also known as Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) or are coupled together with response efforts under the umbrella term ‘disaster preparedness and response activities’ (DPR activities). DDR refers to efforts to reduce disaster risks by analysing and reducing the causal factors of disasters while ‘DPR activities’ is a term given to “any facilities, services, processes, distributions, resources, training, education or information that are conducted or provided for the purpose of preparing for and/or responding to disaster.”25 These efforts include food production, location and composition of infrastructure, financial systems and disaster education. Communities are able to respond and recover more efficiently after having undertaken such activities.26
1.2.3 Response Disaster response refers to actions “taken directly before, during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.”27 Providing disaster relief, infrastructure support (e.g. road and building repair, airspace management and water supply), and delivering humanitarian aid fall within this phase. Some disaster management cycles
23 ibid 24 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Emergency Response Plan.’ Viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/emergency 25 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, op. cit. 26 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘Quick Impact Workshop – Outcomes Post Tropical Cyclone Pam.’ No date, p. 2, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.acmc.gov.au/resources/publications/quick- impact-workshop-outcomes-post-tropical-cyclone-pam-roundtable-civil 27 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, op. cit. 6
! include ‘transition’ within the response phase, 28 which is a consideration when exploring civil-military interaction because it is the period where a military completes its mission and exits an affected area. A transition process is informed by the completion of operational tasks, typically based on an assessment and confirmation of mission outcomes, and assurance that civilian structures are in place to support the affected nation.29
1.2.4 Recovery Recovery is the disaster management period that focuses on restoring or improving an affected population’s livelihood and heath across physical, social, cultural, economic and environmental domains.30 The aim of these activities is to assist a nation return to pre- disaster livelihood, home and infrastructure conditions31 through the re-establishment of social, economic, physical and environmental wellbeing.32
The purpose of a disaster management cycle is to build resilience. This is the “ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basis structures and functions.” 33 Australian actors, both civilian and military, undertake a range of activities throughout the disaster management phases to support other nations. A generic taxonomy of these activities have been mapped by Athol Yates and Dr Anthony Bergin of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) who drew on the work of Chris Piper (Figure 3). The case studies within this study will provide the specific details of the activities undertaken by civilian and military actors.
28 See P. Safran, ‘The Disaster Management Cycle.’ May 2005, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-Disaster-Management-Cycle-Source-Safran-2005- p22_fig1_235298482 29 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 43. 30 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, op. cit. 31 G. Heaslip & E. Barber, ‘Using the military in disaster relief: systemising challenges and opportunities.’ Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, vol. 4, no. 1, 2014, p. 68. 32 B. Prosser & C. Peters, Directions in disaster resilience policy, Emergency Management Policy Branch, Attorney General’s Department, p. 10, viewed on 31 December 2019, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUJlEmMgmt/2010/52.pdf 33 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, op. cit. 7
! 1.3 Working Together Australian disaster management in support of other nations brings together a broad range of civilian and military actors across different phases of the cycle. As briefly introduced above, from the perspective of the ADF two civil-military interfaces exist. The first is internal with other government public service agencies as part of a whole-of-government approach. The second is an external interface as part of a broader international response which sees ADF personnel interact with civilian actors of an affected nation, including government agencies and local communities, humanitarian organisations, other contributing nations, the private sector and the media.
Figure 3: Activities within the Disaster Management Cycle34
34 A. Yates & A. Bergin, More than good deeds: Disaster risk management and Australian, Japanese and US Defence force. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011, p. 5. 8
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1.3.1 Whole of Government A ‘whole of government’ (WoG) approach is one where national agencies work across portfolio boundaries in an integrated manner towards a shared goal.35 The objective is to coordinate government policy and response, especially for issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries and are difficult to place bureaucratic process around.36 A WoG approach, including management and implementation, draws together available organisational capability and is situation dependent.37 Such a framework supports efforts towards mutual goals, aligns desired outcomes with the operational mission, and enables integrated capabilities to deliver coherent assistance.38 Effective characteristics include shared leadership structures, recognising expertise, and undertaking activities that achieve responsiveness, cooperation, accountability, and communication.39
Key agencies within an Australian whole-of-government construct during disaster response include DFAT, the ADF, Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT) and Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART).
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) As noted above, DFAT is the agency responsible for leading an Australian Government response to an international humanitarian crisis.40 DFAT also administers Australia’s commitment to partner governments though building their capacity to respond to disasters. This is actioned under DFAT's Humanitarian Strategy, which has been designed to “save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of conflict, disasters and other humanitarian crises, as well as to prevent and
35 Australian Public Service Commission, Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, p.1, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.apsc.gov.au/sites/default/files/connectinggovernment.pdf 36 ibid, p. 223. 37 Australian Public Service Commission, op. cit., p. 11. 38 Canadian Centre for Management Development, ‘Using horizontal tools to work across boundaries: lessons learned and signposts for success.’ CCMD Roundtable on the Management of Horizontal Initiatives cited in Australian Public Service Commission, ‘Issues and themes in recent literature on whole of government approaches.’ Australian Government, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.apsc.gov.au/issues-and-themes-recent-literature-whole-government-approaches-0 39 Australian Public Service Commission, op. cit. 40 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Humanitarian preparedness and response.’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building- resilience/humanitarian-preparedness-and-response/Pages/humanitarian-prepraredness-and-response.aspx 9
! strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.”41 Three DFAT disaster management concepts are applicable to this project:
Australian Humanitarian Partnership (AHP) The AHP is a strategic partnership covering the period 2017 to 2021 between DFAT and six Australian Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and their consortium partners - CARE Australia, Caritas Australia, Oxfam Australia, Plan International Australia, Save the Children Australia and World Vision Australia. The overarching AHP strategic initiative, Disaster READY, focuses on localisation to support regional partners, NGOs, the private sector and communities coordinate more effectively disaster preparedness and response.42 The AHP replaced the DFAT-NGO Humanitarian Partnership in place from 2011 to 2016, which is the period that the case studies within this project cover.
Australia Assists Australia Assists is an Australian Government funded program that deploys civilian specialists to work with national governments agencies, UN agencies, NGOs, the private sector, multilateral agencies, and communities to support them prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters and conflict. The program was first delivered via the Australian Civilian Corps and is now managed by RedR Australia.43 A recent example is the deployment of two Australian specialists to provide on-the-ground assistance to the Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) during the onset of Cyclone Donna in May 2017 in order to enhance its ability to prepare and respond to the ensuing disaster. Other examples include disaster recovery in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan, Vanuatu after Tropical Cyclone Pam, and Fiji after Tropical Cyclone Winston.
41 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Strategy. Australian Government, 2016, p. 2. 42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Fact Sheet: Australian Humanitarian Partnership.’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building- resilience/humanitarian-policy-and-partnerships/Documents/ahp-factsheet.pdf 43 RedR, ‘Australia Assists.’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.redr.org.au/partners-in- the-field/australia-assists/ 10
! Crisis Response Team (CRT) DFAT maintains an immediate response team capability in the form of a CRT. In the aftermath of a crisis, DFAT CRT personnel deploy overseas to support Australian diplomatic posts or partners in the field. A CRT includes staff with expertise in humanitarian responses, enabling a team to provide essential humanitarian support and liaison in affected nations. CRT have been deployed to Nepal, Vanuatu, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Myanmar, Fiji and Tonga.44
Australian Defence Force (ADF) The ADF is responsible for the defence of Australia’s people and interests. It comprises the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Australian Army, and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The ADF deploys overseas in response to natural disasters under the leadership of DFAT, within a whole-of-government construct, after an affected nation’s request for assistance. The ADF has a broad range of capabilities available for disaster relief, with the deployment of military assets taking into account the specific requests of an affected nation, available and positioned military assets, and the disaster environment. While no ADF response will be the same due to operational and humanitarian context,45 typical force structures include a Support and Response Team, Joint Task Force and Air Coordination Component Element.
Support and Response Team (SRT) The ADF maintains an immediate response team on short-notice, referred to as a Support and Response Team (SRT). SRTs rapidly deploy and provide liaison and planning support to the Head of Mission. They also establish relationships with an affected nation to build situational awareness and integrate ADF efforts into the broader response.
Joint Task Force During a disaster response, the ADF typically deploys a Joint Task Force (JTF) which is an organisational command and control structure that integrates units
44 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Humanitarian preparedness and response.’ Op. cit. 45 M. Smith, ‘Analyzing the Effectiveness of Australian Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) after 15 Years of ‘Small Wars,’’ in Small Wars Journal. 16 February 2015, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/analyzing-the-effectiveness-of-australian-civil-military-cooperation- cimic-after-15-years-o 11
! and capabilities to provide a unified ADF response.46 The staffing, structure, and capability of a JTF influences civil-military interaction, both within a whole-of-government approach and with other civilian actors.
Air Coordination Component Element (ACCE) An ACCE is an Air Force component element that has personnel and platforms assigned to achieve a specified mission. An ACCE often operates parallel to a JTF, providing air subject matter expertise and support to JTF forces. During Operation Philippines Assist, the ADF deployed a JTF and ACCE and both structures interfaced with civilian actors.
Australian Medical Assistance Team (AUSMAT) AUSMATs are a specialised and flexible civilian disaster response medical capability consisting of multi-disciplinary health teams postured to deploy and provide emergency medical care in the aftermath of a disaster. These teams are tailored to the health needs of an affected country and can include doctors, nurses, paramedics, fire-fighters (logisticians) and allied health staff, such as environmental health staff, radiographers, and pharmacists. AUSMAT maintain a large cache of medical and self-sustaining equipment in the Northern Territory, which is pre-packed for multiple disaster scenarios.47
An AUSMAT is prepared and deployed through the collaborative efforts of DFAT, the Department of Health, the Attorney-General's Department Emergency Management Australia, and State and Territory Governments at the request of the Australian Government.48 AUSMATs have regularly deployed since being established under the National Critical Care and Trauma Response Centre (NCCTRC) in 2005, including to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, to Vanuatu in the aftermath of Cyclone Pam in 2015, and to Fiji after Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016.
46 S. Woodward, ‘Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters.’ RAND, 2011, p.1. viewed on 27 December, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2011/RAND_RB9625.pdf! 47 National Critical Care and Trauma Response Centre, ‘AUSMAT.’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.nationaltraumacentre.nt.gov.au/what-we-do/disaster-management/ausmat 48 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT).’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building- resilience/humanitarian-policy-and-partnerships/Pages/australian-medical-assistance-teams-ausmat.aspx 12
! Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) A DART is an urban search and rescue capability, drawn from the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services and Fire and Rescue NSW, postured to deploy overseas in the aftermath of disasters. DART capabilities include locating and removing people from rubble, water rescue during flooding, urgent repairs to critical structures, managing hazardous materials and spills, and water purification and desalination.49 At the strategic level, these teams contribute to the International Urban Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), which brings together 80 countries and organisations under the direction of the United Nations. Of relevance to this study is that a NSW DART deployed to Vanuatu in 2015.
1.3.2 External Actors During Australian disaster management efforts, the interface that the ADF has with external actors is broad and covers an affected nation and its authorities, agencies and communities, humanitarian organisations, other nations (militaries and aid agencies), the private sector, and media and social media.
Affected Nation An affected nation is the “state upon whose territory persons or property is affected by a disaster.”50 The national government of an affected nation is responsible for providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance, with external assistance only provided with their consent.51 There are several key actors within an affected nation that the ADF interacts with during disaster response. A summary of these actors are as follows:
Disaster/Crisis Management Authorities Nations often have a government agency responsible for coordinating national disaster activities. Within the Indo-Pacific region these agencies are typically called National Disaster Management Offices (NDMO) The main function of an NDMO or equivalent is
49 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Disaster assistance response teams (DART).’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building- resilience/humanitarian-policy-and-partnerships/Pages/disaster-assistance-response-teams-dart.aspx 50 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines For The Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations,’ The Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations, 2014, p. 17. 51 M. Eburn, ‘International Law and Disaster Response,’ in Monash University Law Review. Law Review 30, 2010, viewed on 27 December 2019, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MonashULawRw/2010/30.html 13
! to manage disaster events including the deployment of government emergency services and civil defence forces. These authorities also undertake risk reduction through the adoption of preparedness measures, such as national and local disaster plans, early warning systems and evacuation plans.52
Domestic Militaries Domestic militaries play an important role in a disaster response because they are often first responders. Some also have authority or responsibility to oversee and coordinate foreign military assets during a response.53 Domestic militaries may also have defined roles in disaster preparedness and response, including building community capacity to reduce risk and manage the impact of disasters. Some nations, such as in the Philippines, have ratified military roles in disaster-related legal, policy, and doctrinal documents.54
Local Communities An affected nation's local population includes individuals and communities impacted by a disaster. Individuals, households, communities and social networks are viewed as social actors with coping capacity, including social networks.55 Local communities have a critical role in disaster preparedness and response, their traditional knowledge mitigates the scale of a disaster and, as the case studies will show, they can be the primary civilian actor that the ADF interacts with during a disaster response.
Disasters often cause the displacement of people, who become known as internally displaced persons (IDPs). An IDP is any person forced to leave their home suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human
52 I. Davis, ‘Introduction,’ in Disaster Risk Management in Asia and the Pacific, I. Davis (ed), Routledge, London and New York, 2015, p. 7. 53 V. Bollettino, ‘Evaluating Military Engagement in Disaster Response.’ 29 August 2016, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/evaluating-military-engagement-disaster-response 54 J. Flint, et al, Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model, Regional Consultative Group Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific, 2017, p. 138, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/ROAP/Civil%20Military%20Coordination/images/RCG_05042017_F inal_electronic.pdf 55 D. Holhorst, ‘Responding to Disasters: Diversity of Bureaucrats, Technocrats and Local People.’ International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, March 2003, vol. 21, no.1, p. 47, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/hihorst.pdf 14
! rights, or natural or man-made disasters within their own country.56 Foreign military assets can be used to transport IDPs before and after a disaster.
Humanitarian Organisations This category of civilian actors consists of organisations that work to assess and meet humanitarian needs. They perform a wide range of activities guided by the four humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The breadth of civilian humanitarian organisations fall into three broad categories as follows:
International Organisations (IOs): IOs are organisations mandated through intergovernmental agreements between States. UN agencies and the World Food Program are amongst these organisations. International legal instruments govern IOs, which in-turn provides their specific mandates and operating procedures for interacting with militaries.57 In the specific context of disaster management, there are UN agencies with responsibility for disaster risk reduction (UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction) and coordination (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs): The United Nations Charter (Article 71) defines NGOs as organisations motivated by humanitarian and religious values but operating independently of government, UN and commercial sectors.58 NGOs that are officially recognised by the lead international organisation and authorised to work in the affected area are ‘mandated.’ Those working in a private capacity, without official recognition or authorisation, are considered ‘non-mandated.’ The role and size of an NGO often informs the nature of their cooperation with militaries.59 As these organisations write their own charter and mission, they are legally distinguished from other humanitarian organisations. NGOs can be further divided into local and international NGOs.
56 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Questions and Answers about IDPs.’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Issues.aspx 57 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 34. 58 Charter of the United Nations, ‘Chapter X – The Economic and Social Council: Article 71’ viewed 31 December 2019, https://legal.un.org/repertory/art71.shtml 59 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 34. 15
! Local Non-Government Organisations These NGOs work at a local level, with their strengths being that they have knowledge of the local context (local power structures, land-owning patterns, and politicians, bureaucracies and regulations) and aim to be accountable to local populations.60 In some cases, local NGOs are supported through international NGO funding and capacity- building initiatives.61
International Non-Government Organisations These organisations are characterised by an international scope and reach. Their primary purpose is operational in support of community-based organisations and/or advocacy- based to influence policy making or change. The resourcing of international NGOs is predominantly through funding, volunteer assistance and expertise donated by private individuals.62
International Humanitarian Organisations: This category includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements, and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). A mandate to assist and protect victims govern these organisations.
Other Nations Depending on the region, other foreign nations may respond at the request of an affected nation. These responses may take the form of a whole-of-government approach and consist of government aid agency personnel and military assets. As touched on above, military forces from other nations will vary in size, capability, posture and potentially in competence and professionalism.63 Some responses are guided by agreements and bilateral relationships, which will be discussed below because they inform how civilian and military actors come together during disaster management.
60 International Institute for Environment and Development, ‘Local organizations: introduction.’ 01 April 2010, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.iied.org/local-organizations-introduction 61 Commonwealth Network, ‘International NGOs.’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors/civil_society/international_ngos/ 62 ibid 63 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 34 and H. Slim, ‘The stretcher and the drum: civil-military relations in peace support operations.’ International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 126. 16
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Private Sector The private sector is increasing playing a key role throughout the disaster management cycle, often due to a sense of corporate responsibility. 64 A private sector committed to disaster risk reduction is able to influence public purchase and use of materials, systems, and technology that can contribute to resilient communities.65 In addition, the sector can contribute to community safety and resilience through establishing standards and quality assurance for structures, especially for those living in vulnerable communities.66 Private- sector companies are increasingly becoming 'major players' in relief efforts because are able to rapidly provide goods and services, including logistics and support.67 Companies can opt to make financial contributions to funds or through philanthropic partners, however some also respond by sending personnel to affected areas.
A key example of private sector involvement in disaster management is Duetsche Post DHL Group (DHL) who, in cooperation with UN OCHA, have established Disaster Response Teams (DRT). At the request of the UN, DHL form DRT on a volunteer basis from a pool of over 400 specifically trained employees. DRT can be operational at a disaster-site airport within 72 hours, where they assume logistical responsibilities such as unloading freight palettes, warehousing relief supplies, conducting inventory, and ensuring organisations receive their relief supplies in an orderly and timely manner.68 In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, which affected the Philippines in November 2013, DRT Asia Pacific deployed to Mactan Airport, Cebu. This airport became the main hub for arriving relief supplies and the DRT coordinated logistics for incoming relief supplies and assisted in ensuring the transport of goods over a period of three weeks.69
Similarly, Procter & Gamble (P&G) have a global response approach that includes Disaster Relief Teams. With the support of NGOs and other partners, these teams distribute P&G Purifier of Water packets. In addition to cash donations, P&G provides
64 A. Chandra, S. Moen, and C. Sellers, ‘What Role Does the Private Sector Have in Supporting Disaster Recovery, and What Challenges Does It Face in Doing So?’ RAND, 2016, p. 1, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE187/RAND_PE187.pdf 65 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘Top IBM and AECOM executives join UNISDR Private Sector Advisory Group as commitment by sector to disaster risk reduction grows.’ 09 June 2011. 66 A. Chandra, S. Moen, and C. Sellers, op. cit., p. 5. 67 ibid 68 Deutsche Post DHL Group, ‘Disaster Management.’ No date, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.dpdhl.com/en/responsibility/society-and-engagement/disaster-management.html 69 ibid 17
! products, and also has mobile relief units to provide products and services directly to affected populations.
Media and Social Media Domestic and foreign media is a key actor during disaster management due to its wide- reaching and influential verbal and print messaging ability that includes delivering timely, accurate and relevant flow of information.70 During disaster relief operations, the media can be used to deliver early warning and evacuation messages, with radio being specifically beneficial for reaching remote areas.71 The use of social media has also emerged as a consideration during disaster management because it has become a means for people to rapidly share information and resources. Use of media and social media be done passively through information dissemination or through active use of social media networking to issue warnings, receive requests for assistance, establish situational awareness, and upload images to conduct needs assessments.72
The multitude of actors and the connections they form during disaster response has been mapped by Gisli Olafsson, who noted that during the large-scale response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 over 600 organisations became involved within the first week alone.73 This reflects the complexity and uncertainty of disaster response, with an Australian disaster response becoming part of this situation, with civilian and ADF actors integrating into relevant parts of a broader international response.
70 Australian Broadcasting Corporation International Development, Media Capacity Building and Disaster Risk Reduction: Building Resilience and Protecting Socio-Economic Development Gains in Southeast Asia.’ No date, p. 3, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/cm/lb/9223690/data/media-capacity-building-and-disaster-risk-reduction-report- data.pdf 71 ibid 72 B. Lindsay, ‘Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options, and Policy Considerations,’ Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. 6 September 2011, p. 5, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41987.pdf 73 G. Olafsson, ‘Effective Coordination of Disaster Response – The International Perspective.’ Conference Paper, Proceedings of the 7th International ISCRAM Conference, May 2010, p.4. 18
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Figure 4: International Coordination during Disasters 74
1.4 Types of Civil-Military Interaction Following on from the introduction to civilian and military actors involved in disaster response, the terms and concepts that surround the interaction that occurs between these actors will now be discussed. The aim of this section is to provide the rationale behind civil-military interaction and reflect how different types of civil-military relationships form based on situation, purpose or goals. Relationships largely centre around five core concepts – coherence, cooperation, coordination, coexistence/communication and curtail. These terms are considered applicable to civil-military interaction that occurs within a whole-of-government approach and externally.
1.4.1 Coherence Civil-military coherence refers to unity of effort within and between actors based on a common sense of purpose. This includes having a unified leadership or organisational structure, consistent policies and actions, a fully integrated approach, and defined priorities. Interaction consists of joint assessments, planning, implementation, and
74 ibid!! 19
! monitoring and evaluation.75 An example of a coherent operation was the Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) .
1.4.2 Cooperation Cooperation is the relationship between civilians and a military force, not regarded as a combatant force, which includes joint planning, division of roles and information sharing.76 This type relationship forms between actors with complementary and/or overlapping mandates and objectives who decide to conduct joint or collaborative action.77 The difference between coordination and cooperation is that the former results in independent, but coordinated action, while the latter results in joint action.78 All actors retain their organisational independence, with the focus of a cooperative relationship being to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of combined efforts.79
The ADF, like many militaries, have a dedicated civil-military interaction capability, known as Civil-Military Cooperation or the acronym CIMIC. Doctrinally, CIMIC is “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and the civil dimension, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”80 CIMIC, as a concept and capability, focuses on establishing relationships and conducting activities in support of an ADF mission.
1.4.3 Coordination When civilian and military actors coordinate they undertake actions and activities to share and respond to information in order to avoid conflict, duplication and overlap. The broad purpose of these efforts are to develop common situational awareness between actors who have different mandates or require clear organisational independence.81 This
75 C. de Coning and K. Friis, ‘Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach,’ in Journal of International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, 2011, p. 255. 76 G. Heaslip & E. Barber, op. cit., p. 68-69. 77 C. de Coning and K. Friss, op. cit., p. 256. 78 ibid 79 ibid !! 80 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.11 Civil-Military Operations, 01 April 2009, p. 1-2, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP3.11-Civil- MilitaryOperations.pdf 81 C. de Coning and K. Friss, op. cit., p. 256. 20
! type of interaction is supported by dedicated coordination mechanisms to enable actors to retain independent or separate action.
1.4.4 Coexistence Civil-military coexistence occurs where actors interact to minimise competition and coordination, and want to focus on de-conflicting civil and military efforts.82 Doctrinally, militaries use the concept civil-military operations (CMO) to reflect coexistence. CMO are “operations conducted in support of military operations, or in times of emergency, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of a military force or civil operation and reducing the negative aspects of military operations on civilians.”83 Militaries largely employ CMO at the strategic and operational levels of operations to coordinate the integration of military and non-military actors, most typically in support of stability and counterinsurgency operations.
1.4.5 Curtail Scholar Lisa Schirch includes 'curtail presence' in the spectrum of civil-military relationships. This situation occurs where it is not possible for civilian and military actors to operate together or where some actors elect to leave the area or not use military assets.84 While military assets are important, the military may not be primary option for many agencies when delivering aid. This situation was reflected in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan where twenty-one percent of humanitarian actors noted their organisation did not rely on military assets.85 Alternatively, agencies use military assets for short period of time, again turning to Typhoon Haiyan, 18 percent of organisations relayed on military support for between six and 14 days, with 23 percent noting they accessed assets for 5 days or less.86
Coherence Unified civilian and military organisational structure, with a clear command and control structure and joint planning and execution outputs
82 ibid 83 The Cove, ‘ADDP 3.11 Civil-Military Operations.’ 29 May 2018, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/addp-311-civil-military-operations 84 L. Schirch, ‘Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security.’ May 2011, p. 6, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://allianceforpeacebuilding.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Civil-Society- Military-Roadmap-on-Human-Security.pdf 85 V. Bollettino, ‘Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan.’ Disaster Medicine and Public Health, vol. 10, no. 1, February 2016, p. 9. 86 ibid 21
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Cooperation Civilian and military missions partially or fully align, there may be some collaboration on joint projects, particularly in disaster relief. Coordination Civilian and military missions partially align, there may be some basic coordination to promote core values in human security. Coexistence/Communication Civilian actors operate in the same space but their missions do not align, only basic communication on logistical details takes place. Curtail Impossible for civilian and military actors to operate safely or together; civilian actors may pull out of the mission, leave the area or not use military assets.
Table 1: Spectrum of Civil-Military Interaction87 1.4.6 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Also relevant to the debate on framing civil-military interaction, is United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CM-Coord). UN CM-Coord facilitates the dialogue and interaction between humanitarian and military actors that is undertaken with the purpose of protecting and promoting humanitarian principles, avoiding competition and duplication, minimising inconsistencies between actors’ practices and processes, and where appropriate, working towards common goals.88 Strategies to achieve these outcomes can range from coexistence to cooperation, with planning, information sharing and task division being the three specified civil-military coordination elements within the framework. Within this approach, coordination is considered a ‘shared responsibility’ which is facilitated by liaison and collective training.89
In introducing the broad range of terms and concepts that frame civil-military interaction, it becomes clear that language and meaning are important respective actors, which can be linked to organisational culture, structure, agendas and priorities between civilian and military actors.90 Some civil-military interaction approaches also bring these terms together, for example the '3C' approach of coherent, coordinated and complementary civil-military interaction, as a high-level (strategic) whole-of-government and whole-of- system approach.91 To reflect the diverse range of actors and dimensions of civil-military
87 Adapted from L. Schirch, op. cit., p. 6. 88 Civil-Military Coordination Section, UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian, v 2.0, p. 7, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5d147c4b4.pdf 89 Ibid. 90 S. Haysom, op. cit., p. 3. 91 See Geneva Centre for Security Sector Advisory Team, ‘3C: Coherence, Coordination, Complementarity report.’ 2009, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource- Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/3C-Coherence-Coordination-Complementarity-report 22
! relationships, the term ‘civil-military interaction’ is used within this project. It is purposefully broad to ensure the study capture the breadth and depth of dialogue, engagement, and relationships that occur between actors.
1.5 Levels of Civil-Military Interaction During disaster management, Australian government agencies and the ADF conduct civil-military interaction at varying organisational levels - tactical, operational and strategic. Other actors, including humanitarian organisations and affected nations, use different language to describe operating levels, such as local, regional, national or international levels. Theoretically, scholars Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis propose that civil-military interaction exists across four levels: agency coherence, whole-of- government/organisation coherence, international coherence and international/local coherence.92
This builds knowledge from an Australian perspective, with the ADF as the military actor, and it will use the ADF’s doctrinal tactical-operational-strategic level typology (Figure 5). This supports an examination of interaction at respective organisational levels, which have different roles and responsibilities for disaster management and civil- military interaction planning, resourcing and decision-making. As reflected in the Figure 4, these levels are all linked, with tactical actions directly contributing to, or relying on actions at, the operational and strategic levels.
Figure 5: Levels of Civil-Military Interaction 93
92 C. de Coning & K. Friis, op. cit., p. 257. 93 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, ed. 3, 31 May 2012, p. 2-4, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP-D- FoundationsofAustralianMilitaryDoctrine.pdf 23
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1.5.1 Strategic At the strategic level of operations, a nation determines national strategic objectives and guidance, and then deploys national resources to achieve these objectives.94 From the perspective of the military, this level of command links the military instrument of national power to a whole-of-government approach to national security.95 National oversight, command, control and coordination of a whole-of-government response to an overseas natural disaster occurs through an Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF).
1.5.2 Operational The operational level is doctrinally defined as the level of command where military forces contribute to achieving strategic objectives by synchronising, aligning and resourcing tactical elements, actions and efforts. Actions at the operational level are joint, often coalition or combined, and interagency.96 For the ADF, the operational level is Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC).
1.5.3 Tactical At the tactical level, task forces plan and conduct activities and actions to achieve military objectives as part of a broader campaign.97 During disaster response, tactical actions include disaster relief efforts, infrastructure support and enabling the delivery of humanitarian aid.98 The achievement of tactical actions supports the accomplishment of operational level objectives, which in turn set the conditions for strategic objectives to be met.99 Tactical level ADF force structures during a disaster relief operation include a JTF and ACCE.
94 D. Sukman, ‘The Institutional Level of War.’ The Strategy Bridge, 05 May 2016, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/5/5/the-institutional-level-of-war 95 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power, 2017, p. 15, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/lwd_1_the_fundamentals_of_land_power_full_july_2017.pdf ?acsf_files_redirect 96 ibid 97 ibid and D. Sukman, op. cit. 98 Australian Army, op. ct., p. 16. 99 ibid 24
! 1.6 Civil-Military Interaction during Disaster Management This part of the chapter introduces and provides a brief overview of the extensive range of international, regional and Australian policy, guidelines, frameworks, and practices that guide or inform civil-military interaction during disaster management. These have been mapped at Table 2 below, based on use at tactical, operational and strategic levels, to provide insight into the scale, scope and variance in mechanisms which currently exist to bring civilian and military actors together. Some documents are used at the tactical and operational levels and this is reflected in the table.
1.6.1 International Structures Historical efforts to reduce the impact of natural disasters and provide assistance to disaster-affected populations include the designation of the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). During this period the international community focused on a cooperative approach to natural disaster reduction.100 The Inter- Agency Standing Committee (ISAC), as the primary mechanisms for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, was established in June 1992 through United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 based on an identified need to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance. ISAC brings together UN and non-UN humanitarian partners at a strategic level
Following the IDNDR, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) was established in 2000. The second World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) was held in Hyogo, Japan in 2005 which finalised the review of the Yokohama Strategy and its Plan of Action, and saw the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005- 2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (HFA) by 168 nations. Following the HFA, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Reduction 2015-2030 was established in order to align DDR policy with the evolving complexity of disaster risk, including how disasters are impacting economic development gains, and affecting populations socioeconomically and institutionally.101
100 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘History.’ No date, viewed on 10 January 2020, https://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/history 101 See A. Aitsi-Selmi, et al, ‘The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: Renewing the Global Commitment to People’s Resilience, Health and Well-being.’ International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, vol. 6, iss, 2, June 2015, pp. 164-176. 25
! Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 The Sendai Framework was adopted at the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2015 by 187 UN member states. It aims to reduce the disaster risk and loss in lives, livelihoods and health that occurs across economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental areas at an individual, business, community and national level.102
The Framework focuses efforts, at local, national, regional and global levels, on four disaster risk areas: understanding; strengthening governance and management; investing to build resilience; and enhancing preparedness to effectively respond and undertake recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.103 It is a voluntary agreement that provides a clear mandate for an integrated DDR process that includes 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' actions, integrates local scientific and technical knowledge, and synergises health, climate change and sustainable development.
102 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 2015, p. 12, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf 103 ibid p. 14. 26
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Tactical Operational Strategic On-site Operations Int. UN early '90s Humanitarian Civil-Military Reg RCG 2016 International Decade for Int. 1990s Coordination Centre Cooperation Standards Natural Disaster Reduction (OSOCC) 1990-2000 Civil-Military Operations Int. Mil - Australian Interagency Aus Govt. 2015 Inter-Agency Standing Int. UN 1992 Centre (CMOC) Preparedness Framework Committee (IASC) Civil-Military Cooperation Int. Mil - Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines Reg UN OCHA 2014 FRANZ Agreement Reg. Govt. 1992 (CIMIC) For the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response (APC-MADRO) Multinational Military Int. Mil - Australian Government Guiding Aus Govt. 2014 International Strategy for Int. UNDR 2000 Coordination (MNCC) Principles for Civil-Military-Police Disaster Reduction R Centre in International Disaster and Conflict Management Humanitarian-Military Int. UN 2014 Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Int. Mil - Inter-Agency Standing Int. UN 2004 Operational Coordination Committee (IASC) OCHA Centre (HuMOCC) Reference Paper on Civil- Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies Standard Operating Reg ASEA 2018 ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Reg ASEAN - ASEAN Agreement on Reg. ASEA 2005 Procedure for Regional N Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management and N Standby Arrangements and disaster management (AHA Centre) Emergency Response Coordination of Joint (ADMEER) Disaster Relief and Emergency Operations (SASOP) Recommended Practices for Reg RCG 2018 IASC Humanitarian System-Wide Int. UN 2018 Global Facility for Disaster Int World - Effective Humanitarian Scale-Up Activation (previously L3 Reduction and Recovery Bank Civil-Military Coordination activation) (GFDRR) of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man- Made Disasters Guidelines on the Use of Int. UN 2003 - Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Int. UN OCHA 2017 Sendai Framework for Civ 2015 Military and Civil Defense rev 2006 Protect People from Disasters and Disaster Reduction 2015- Assets to Support United Environmental Change 2030 Nations Humanitarian
27
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Activities in Complex Emergencies. (MCDA Guidelines) Disaster Response in Asia Reg UN 2013 Guidelines for the domestic Int. IFRC 2011 and the Pacific – A Guide to ROAP facilitation and regulation of International Tools and international disaster relief and Services initial recovery assistance IFRC Humanitarian Civil-Military Int. OCHA 2014 Coordination A Guide for the Military Cluster Approach Int. Civ. 2005 (UN or Nation led)
Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) Int. Mil. 2014 US Pacific Command
Civil-Military Guidelines & References for Complex Emergencies Int. UN 2008 IASC SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response Int. SPHERE 1997 UN-CMCoord & UN Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook Int. UN 2018
Oslo Guidelines Int. UN OCHA 2007 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.11 Civil-Military Operations, Aus. ADF 2009 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6: Civil-Military Cooperation Aus. ADF 2017
Table 2: Civil-Military Interaction Frameworks, Guidelines and Practices
Int. - International Reg. – Regional Aus. – Australia
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The Sendai Framework recognises that all stakeholders, governments, civil society, and the private sector, need to work together to effectively design and implement disaster risk reduction policies and plans.104
Australia endorsed the Sendai Framework in 2015, and through DFAT, supports nations in the Indo-Pacific to also meet their commitments to the Framework. DFAT specifically engages in the Indo-Pacific region to promote and build understanding of disaster risk, including climatic risk, strengthen disaster risk governance, invest in DDR, enhance disaster preparedness, and appropriately re-build after disasters.105 Of relevance to this project is that the Framework contains no specified role for militaries in disaster risk reduction, despite their regular involvement in disaster preparedness and response.
Cluster Coordination The current international humanitarian coordination system originates from UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 'Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations.' Further coordination reforms were undertaken in 2005 as part of the UN Humanitarian Reform Agenda and this saw the introduction of the cluster approach (Figure 5). Clusters are groups of likeminded civilian and military actors that are part of national coordination structures or are activated during a response to bring together main sectors of humanitarian action to coordinate efforts within that area. The main purpose of the system is to provide clear points of contact and achieve predictable, accountable, adequate and appropriate humanitarian assistance for an affected nation – in-turn, they create partnerships between international humanitarian actors, national and local authorities, and civil society.106
The cluster approach is adapted to country requirements, which means there is broad diversity in how clusters are used by nations, including application at national and sub-
104 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, ‘Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015- 2030.’ Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 30, iss. 3, 2015, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/items/AJEM-30-03-03 105 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Humanitarian preparedness and response.’ Op. cit. 106 Humanitarian Response, ‘What is the Cluster Approach?’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, no date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach 29
! national levels.107 One of the challenges with the approach is that application of the approach differs from this theoretical construct, which will be discussed further in the case studies, with challenges surrounding leadership, decision-making and collaboration between actors. The cluster system also shares similar roles and responsibilities with a military coordination mechanism known as a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC), which has the potential to lead to overlapping coordination, as will be discussed below.
Figure 6: Cluster System Approach 108
On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) The OSOCC concept, as a platform and coordination methodology, arose from a need to assist affected nations in coordinate search and rescue (SAR) efforts in the aftermath of an earthquake. The concept is now broadly applied during disaster response to assist national and local authorities coordinate international actors, resources and effort. An OSOCC can be established following a disaster by the first arriving international urban SAR team or a United National Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team. The three primary objectives of an OSOCC are to link international responders and the Government of the affected nation; provide a system for coordinating and facilitating
107 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Disaster Response in Asia and the Pacific.’ 2013, viewed on 31 December 2019, http://interactive.unocha.org/publication/asiadisasterresponse/InternationalHumanitarianArchitecture.htm l 108 Humanitarian Response, op. cit. 30
! international relief efforts; and provide a framework for cooperation, coordination and information management among international humanitarian agencies in the absence of an alternative coordination system.109
Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) A HuMOCC is a comparatively new national-level humanitarian-military coordination platform, developed from experience and lessons learned from past emergencies.110 The first and only HuMOCC raised to date was part of the Nepal Earthquake response in 2015. The concept evolved from the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC) established after the Haiti earthquake response in 2010, and the subsequent Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) platform adopted in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.
A HuMOCC complements an OSOCC by providing a physical space for humanitarian and military actors to share information, allocate tasks, and conduct collaborative planning. By undertaking these processes, actors work towards establishing and maintaining common situational awareness, and prioritising and optimising the use of foreign military assets.111 This is also sufficient flexibility within the HuMOCC concept to be established without an OSOCC. This is evident in that it can be integrated into an affected nation's national and sub-national coordination structures, and is sufficiently flexible and robust to mirror an affected nation's capacity, pending their consent.112
109 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC).’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.unocha.org/our- work/coordination/site-operations-coordination-centre-osocc 110 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in the Nepal Earthquake Response.’ Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Newsletter, iss. 5, May-June 2015, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CMCoord%20Newsletter%20- %20May%202015%20%28Issue%205%29.pdf 111 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘UN-CMCoord Response for Nepal Earthquake: Humanitarian Military Operation and Coordination Center (HuMOCC).’ Meeting Minutes, 03 May 2015, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/hum occ_meeting_-_3_may_2015_0.pdf 112 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Workshop, ‘Integrated Civil-Military Regional Response Planning for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief,’ Workshop Report, October 2014, p. 15, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/%5BWorkshop_Report%5DIn tegrated_Civil-Military_Regional_Response_Planning_For_Large- Scale_International_Disaster_Relief.pdf 31
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Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief - "Oslo Guidelines" The Oslo Guidelines “establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in international disaster relief operations.”113 The framework includes principles, concepts and procedures to request, coordinate and interface with military and civil defence assets, and it is considered to be leading policy in support of civil-military engagement.
On reflection, these guidelines are considered to be more appropriate for the policy and operational level because they do not provide actors with specific practices on how and when to interact. This means they cannot be used as a sole reference during disaster response because actors require greater clarity on implementing key aspects of the civil- military relationship, including using military assets as a last resort and information sharing mechanisms.114
Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) Military actors also have coordination mechanisms and procedures, one of these being MNF SOPs. These are military procedures published by the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), headquartered at United States Indo-Pacific Command (previously US Pacific Command). Elements of the ADF have adopted MNF SOP, notably Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ), who can be responsible for deploying a JTF during a disaster response.
The purpose of MNF SOPs are to “increase the speed of response, interoperability, mission effectiveness, and unity of effort in multinational force (MNF) operations within the Asia-Pacific region during crisis action situations.”115 The procedures focus on planning and conduct of military operations other than war to achieve consensus between nations so they can collectively conduct and small-scale contingencies.
113 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, November 2007, p. 9 114 S. Haysom, op. cit., p. 3. 115 U.S. Pacific Command, Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures. Version 2.9a, December 2014, p. 1. 32
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In the context of this research, MNF SOPs include two civil-military coordination mechanisms that can be adopted during disaster response – Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) and Multinational Military Coordination Centre (MNCC). They also include processes and forms for a ‘Request for Assistance’ procedure to allow actors to request use of military assets. Whilst sound in principle, MNF SOP do not create any binding agreement between nations participating in disaster relief operations, which makes their use optional and, as the case studies will reflect, inconsistent and overlapping civilian structures.
Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) A CMOC is an operations centre established by military forces to provide a direct interface with the local population, humanitarian organisations, NGOs, IOs, the UN and other nations. Specific roles include collaborative planning and information sharing, the conduct or coordination meetings, and the processing of Requests for Assistance (RFA) for military assets.116 Key considerations in the establishment of a CMOC include:
•! Whether IOs and NGOs will come to a military coordination centre and if there is a need to initially seek these organisations out; •! Any perception that the military is an obstacle to IO and NGO operations; •! Awareness of military aspects and capability
A CMOC can be established at all levels of command, however they are not used as a military command and control node. The size and composition of a CMOC is dependent on operational need, with likely military representation in areas of civil affairs, legal, operations, logistic, engineering and medical representatives.117 There is clear overlap between the cluster approach and a CMOC, which can lead to less effective and timely use of military assets because of the need to go through multiple process with different stakeholders.
116 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.11 op. cit., 4-7 and Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6: Civil-Military Cooperation, 2017, p. 60, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/lwd_3-8-6_civil- military_cooperation_interim.pdf?acsf_files_redirect 117 D. Petraeus, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 60. 33
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Multinational Military Coordination Centre (MNCC) When established, an MNCC is responsible for facilitating the coordination and cooperation of foreign military forces using a military-military interface. The linkages with other coordination mechanisms are outlined below at Figure 6. The key roles of an MNCC include de-conflicting operations in the same geographical area, coordinating needs assessments, avoiding duplication of assets and capabilities, and aligning military support to an affected nation's priorities. Working with an affected nation, an MNCC will also develop transition criteria and a transition plan for foreign military support.118
The Director of the MNCC is from an affected nation, with personnel organised into cells including an information-sharing cell, request for assistance (RFA) cell, operations cell, planning cell, civil-military coordination cell, and public affairs/media cell. One example was the establishment of an MNCC at Mactan Airbase, Cebu Province in the Philippines during the international response to Typhoon Haiyan.
Figure 7: Linkages between Coordination Structures119
1.6.2 Regional Structures Civil-military relations also have regional and historical context which influences coordination arrangements and responses.120 In the South East Asian region, some countries have ratified the military as primary disaster relief responders in their constitution or national disaster management legislation. In these nations, militaries play
118 U.S. Pacific Command, op. cit. p. B2 B6 B-13 119 Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Platforms in Emergencies,’ United Nations for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Presentation. No date. 120 See J. Flint, et al, op. cit. 34
! a greater role in other areas including political and economic affairs and may augment civilian authorities during a disaster response.
Especially within the Asia-Pacific region, nations are beginning to “ignore the outdated and increasingly irrelevant United Nations (UN) stipulation that military assets should be used only as a last resort in responding to natural disasters.”121 Instead, they are recognising the need for greater and improved civil-military interaction, as reflected in the establishment of The Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil- Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific being initiated. The purpose of the RCG is to facilitate operational planning between civilian and military stakeholders during a major disaster response in the Asia-Pacific.122
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN is a regional association of nations progressing economic, political and security cooperation among its members (Table 3). ASEAN Member States signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) on 26 July 2005 to put in place “to jointly respond to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international cooperation.”123 AADMER is a legally-binding framework since its enforcement in 24 December 2009 that governs regional multi-hazard and policy on cooperation, coordination, technical assistance and resource mobilisation in all aspects of disaster management for ASEAN nations. The second AADMER ‘Work Programme’ was launched on 29 April 2016, covering the period 2016 to 2020, to implement initiatives that enhance disaster risk reduction.124
ASEAN MEMBERS Brunei Malaysia Thailand Cambodia Myanmar Vietnam
121 D. Canyon, B. Ryan & F. Burkle, ‘Military Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Non-Conflict Crises.’ Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, November 2017, p.1. 122 See Regional Consultative Group Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific, Third Session Summary Report. 123 V. Salazar, ‘Toward a Disaster Resilient Region: Examining US-ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management under the Obama Administration.’ FSI Insights, Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies, Foreign Service Institute, vol. III, no. 3, October 2016, viewed on 01 January 2010, http://www.fsi.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2016-Vol-3-No-3-October-US-ASEAN-Disaster- Management-Cooperation-Salazar.pdf 124 See ASEAN ‘AADMER Work Programme 2016 – 2020.’ April 2016, viewed 01 January 2020, https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/AADMER-Work-Programme-2016-2020-v1.6.pdf 35
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Indonesia Philippines Laos Singapore Table 3: ASEAN Member Nations125
At the operational and tactical levels, respectively, ASEAN has established the Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) and issued Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Operations (SASOP). The SOPs provide the framework to initiate arrangements for a disaster relief and emergency response, including a Request for Assistance process, and outline procedures for joint disaster relief and emergency response operations, procedures for using military and civilian assets and capabilities, and the methodology to exercise an ASEAN disaster emergency response.126 The SOPs include flowcharts and templates to enable a coordinated response, however they do not mention other coordinating mechanisms, including MNCC or the cluster system, which indicates SASOP are not aligned with other procedures and coordination mechanisms.
FRANZ Agreement To coordinate and optimise disaster response efforts in the South Pacific region, France, Australia and New Zealand ratified the FRANZ agreement in 1992. The FRANZ agreement is civilian-led framework, supported by defence forces, that recognises and coordinates within the political, economic and social context of disaster management in Pacific Islands. During a disaster response, FRANZ Partners work closely with all actors, including the Pacific Humanitarian Team, to enable coordination and maintain respect to the sovereignty of the affected nation.
Partner Countries and Territories in the South Pacific Cook Islands Kiribati Niue Tokelau Tuvalu Samoa Fiji Nauru Papua New Guinea Tonga Vanuatu Solomon Islands
Table 4: South Pacific FRANZ Partner Countries and Territories127
125 E. Albert & L. Maizland, ‘What is ASEAN?’ in Council on Foreign Relations. 20 December 2019, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean 126 ASEAN, ‘Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).’ September 2015, p. 2. 127 No author, ‘The FRANZ Arrangement.’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/NZDRP-docs/Franz-Arrangement-Brochure.pdf 36
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Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards The RCG agreed to the development of common Humanitarian Civil-Military Standards (the Standards) as its annual meeting in February 2016. The Standards were endorsed in October 2016 and are now codified in Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets in Natural and Man-Made Disasters. The Standards and Practices address a number of limitations identified within the Oslo and CMCoord Guidelines, specifically the need to operationalise the civil-military relationship and information sharing.128 They also incorporate lessons learned from previous civil-military interaction experience that have proved or been identified as effective, including capability development; guidance, policy and doctrine; exit strategy planning and handover; and understanding outcomes. 129 However, they were not in place at the time of the case studies within this project so they are used as a reference guide and to validate effective civil-military practices.
Figure 8: RCG Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards130
128 S. Haysom, op. cit., p. 3. 129 No author, Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters, 18 September 2018, p.2, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/48574/Recommended+Practices+for+Effective+Hu manitarian+Civil-Military+Coordination+of+Foreign+Military+Assets+in+Natural+and+Man- Made+Disasters/b6c934f0-1dec-42ea-9396-5313e3e2f2d3 130 Ibid, p. 6. 37
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1.6.3 Australian Structures The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) has developed two documents that provide disaster preparedness and relief guidance: Australian Interagency Preparedness Framework131 and Australian Government Guiding Principles for Civil-Military-Police Interaction in International Disaster and Conflict Management.132 Individually and collectively, the purpose of these documents is to inform an Australian response to an international disaster at the operational and strategic levels.
Within the preparedness framework, the specific model consists of planning, resourcing, training, exercising and learning as follows:133
Planning: Strategic and operational planning to prepare for and coordinate responses. Resourcing: Resources to establish, maintain and mobilise human and material resources to support responses. Training: Formal and informal training programs to build interagency preparedness. Exercising: Exercises that test and rehearse interagency capability. Learning: Lessons learned processes that will inform interagency preparedness and capability.
This model is supported by five Guiding Principles, which recognise that collaborative civil-military interaction is key to operational effectiveness. These principles are as follows: 1.! Clearly defined strategic objectives and operational roles and responsibilities. 2.! Proactive engagement. 3.! Knowledge and understanding sharing. 4.! Leveraging organisational diversity. 5.! Commitment to continuous improvement.
131 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘An overview of the Australian Interagency Preparedness Framework (AIPF).’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.acmc.gov.au/what-we- do/building-capability/australian-interagency-preparedness-framework/overview 132 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘Australian Government Guiding Principles for Civil-Military- Police Interaction in International Disaster and Conflict.’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.acmc.gov.au/resources/publications/australian-government-guiding-principles-civil- military-police-interaction 133 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘An overview of the Australian Interagency Preparedness Framework (AIPF),’ op. cit.! 38
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There are many commonalities between the Australian guidance and principles, and the regional Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards. This consistency reflects the field is learning from its experiences and documenting them in order to bring structure to civil-military interaction. However, the accessibility and applicability of these documents, especially for ADF personnel prior to a disaster response, is unknown.
For the ADF, civil-military interaction is doctrinally guided by Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.11 Civil-Military Operations, ADDP 3.20 The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations (not publicly available due to classification) and Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6: Civil-Military Cooperation.
1.7 Research Purpose The aim of introducing the breadth of civilian and military actors, relationships and coordination mechanisms in disaster management was to outline what currently informs how actors work together. After mapping and examining the breadth of international, regional and Australian policy, guidelines, frameworks, processes and practices, it becomes clear that there is no consistent way for civilian and military actors to interact during disaster management. There are variances in interaction mechanisms because of international, regional and national policy, guidelines, frameworks, practices and processes. This is assessed to result in a lack of clarity on the type of interaction, from coherence through to curtail, that actors should have based on their respective purpose, goals and organisational position.
Furthermore, disaster response frameworks that inform civil-military interaction exist at varying levels, are dispersed, not fully operationalised and under-utilised. Many of the frameworks appear to have been developed in silos, which is reflected in international approaches sitting parallel to regional approaches where integration is especially critical in the South East Asia region.134 A similar assessment has been made by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).135
134 J. Flint et al, op. cit., p.10 135 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘International disaster response laws, rules and principles (IDRL).’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.ifrc.org/what- we-do/disaster-law/about-disaster-law/international-disaster-response-laws-rules-and-principles/ 39
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Actors have also demonstrated a knowledge gap of key coordination mechanisms. A study of civil-military coordination during the response to Typhoon Haiyan reflected less than half of humanitarian aid respondents were familiar with the Oslo Guidelines, with only 12% using to the Guidelines to inform their interaction with military actors.136 These guidelines are considered to be the “leading policy instrument for civil-military engagement.”137 Relationships are further complicated because preparedness, response and recovery tasks are often undertaken by different people, groups and organisations.138 As such, it is concluded that there is currently no clear way for civilian and military actors to work together within a disaster management cycle, with interaction assessed to stem from necessity rather than dedicated planning, analysis or long-term goals.139 The negative consequences of this inconsistent interaction is becoming apparent at national levels.140 With coordination between actors being “ the most discussed issue in international disaster response” because "failures in this area remain a constant complaint both among international actors and between international actors and their domestic counterparts in affected states.”141
1.7.1 Research Objective The objective of this research is grounded in the above assessment, which identifies that a new way to conduct civil-military interaction during disaster management is needed. As noted, this is because current frameworks, practices and procedures lack clarity, exist at varying levels, are dispersed, not fully operationalised and under-utilised, and actors lack knowledge of them.
To address this gap in research and practice, this thesis aims to develop a model of civil- military interaction that can be consistently employed during disaster response within an Australian whole-of-government approach. By addressing the deficiencies identified above, the model will reduce time spent inventing solutions for effective civil-military
136 V. Bollettino, op. cit.,, p. 7 137 ibid, p. 8. . 138 B. Ramalingam, B. Gray & Giorgia Cerruti, Missed Opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses, ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund, 01 October 2013, p. 6. 139 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 34. 140 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, op. cit., p. 86. 141 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study, 2007, p. 150, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/125639/113600-idrl-deskstudy-en.pdf 40
! relationships, enable the adoption of practices that enhance outcomes for an affected nation, and present a way for actors to build agile and adaptive interaction practices, behaviours, and structures.
1.7.2 Research Questions As detailed above in the research objective, the aim of this research is to develop a civil- military process model to support overseas Australian disaster management in the areas of disaster preparedness and response activities. When implemented, the intent of such a model is to assist Australian actors during an international disaster response to build effective civil-military partnerships in order to enhance outcomes for an affected nation.
With this in mind, the overarching research question is:
What civil-military interaction model supports the conduct of an Australian response to international natural disasters?
When addressing this question, the following sub-questions, will be answered:
1) How, and to what end, is civil-military interaction employed during disaster relief operations? 2) How does civil-military interaction contribute to tactical task accomplishment, operational progress and strategic objectives during disaster relief operations? 3) What outcomes does civil-military interaction generate for the military, the affected nation and civilian actors during disaster relief operations? 4) What barriers to effective civil-military interaction exist, for both civilian and military actors?
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1.8 Summary Effective civil-military interaction is critical heading into the future, especially at a time when a new model of humanitarian action is needed because the current one is crippled by legitimacy and capacity challenges.142 A diverse range of actors working together is considered to be the solution to effectiveness in disaster response operations.143 The challenge lies in respecting organisational identity and cultural differences but identifying how they can effectively work together at all levels, which will form the remaining chapters of this thesis.
142 C. Bennett, Time to let go: Remaking humanitarian action for the modern era, Humanitarian Policy Group, April 2016, p. 7. 143 ibid p, 8. ! 42
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Chapter Two Research Strategy 2.1 Introduction Following the introduction to the research topic, this chapter will outline the research strategy for this project, which is derived from scholar Kathleen Eisenhardt's1 roadmap of inductively building theory from case studies. This roadmap sequences the thesis by presenting case studies to build a rich picture of the civil-military interaction that occurred during Australia’s whole-of-government response to natural disasters in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji. This knowledge is then used as a foundation to identify effective factors of civil-military relationships. These factors are then used to build a model that identifies a new way to conduct civil-military interaction during disaster management, which is at the core of the project.
To explain the research strategy in-depth, this chapter presents the epistemological and ontological approach to the research, before introducing the theoretical debate on military involvement in disaster management activities. It then outlines the inductive research roadmap in detail to explain the sequencing of information within the thesis. The positionality of the author as an ‘insider researcher’ and the organisational lens of the project as the ADF is highlighted and explained where relevant.
The research strategy has been mapped using Crotty’s conceptualisation of social research, as adapted by scholars John Creswell and Viki L. Plano Clark2 and reflected in Figure 8 below. This framework presents a logical flow through key implications for this research, including the worldview paradigm underpinning the project, the methodological approach, and the methods of data collection and analysis. Also included in this chapter is the case study protocol, which specifies how data collection, management and analysis was standardised across the case studies. The purpose is to contribute to the reliability of the research, which is defined as the “extent to which a
1 See K. Eisenhardt, ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research.’ Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review, vol.14, no.4, 1989, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/258557?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 2 J. Creswell & V. Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 2nd Edition, SAGE, California, 2011, p. 38. 43
! measurement process produces similar results on repeated observations of the same condition or event.”3
Figure 9: Foundations of social research4
An inductive approach was selected to bring methodological rigour to the research, which is particularly critical for this project because I deployed on two of the three operations selected as case studies as a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Operations Officer. These deployments were Operation Philippines Assist in 2013 and Operation Fiji Assist in 2016. I also supported learning after these operations as an Operations Analyst at Headquarters 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters. In this position, I was involved in data collection and analysis of post-operational After Action Reviews and Lesson Collection Activities for both operations.
This positions me as an ‘insider researcher’ which enables a deep level of understanding and interpretation but increases potential for bias in all aspects of the project.5 The research investigates ADF operations where personnel experience exists and it collects data from close colleagues. To address this position, the role and organisational lens of the researcher is specified throughout the project, including theoretical lens of the project, data collection and analysis, and presentation of within-case and cross-case analysis.
3 S. Baskarada, Qualitative Case Study Guidelines, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, DSTO- GD-0773, Victoria, November 2013, p. Glossary. 4 J. Creswell & V. Plano Clark, op. cit., p. 38. 5 See J. Fleming, ‘Recognizing and resolving the challenges of being an insider researcher in work- integrated learning.’ International Journal of Work-Integrated Learning, Special Issue, vol. 19, 2018, pp 311-320.! 44
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2.2 Worldview Researchers are guided by their philosophical assumptions, which informs how knowledge is created or built.6 Collectively, these assumptions form an individual’s ‘worldview’ which scholar Egon Guba defines as meaning “a basic set of beliefs that guide action.”7 It is important for researchers to outline their philosophical stance because it has implications for knowledge generation8 and affects the selection of data collection and analysis.9
An examination was undertaken of two major worldviews - 'positivist' and 'constructivist' - to determine the most suitable stance to approach this project. Positivism is a philosophical and epistemological approach which holds that knowledge is acquired through actual experience. This worldview sees the goal of knowledge to be to “simply describe the phenomena that can experienced; the purpose of science is, therefore, to observe and measure”10 with knowledge existing independently of the researcher. A positivist worldview is inconsistent with this project because distance and impartiality cannot be achieved because of the researcher's direct involvement in Operation Philippines Assist and Operation Fiji Assist.
On the other hand, constructivism is an approach which “holds knowledge is the outcome of experience, mediated by one’s own prior knowledge and the experience of others.”11 From a constructivist standpoint meaning is subjective, negotiated socially, and informed by an individual’s prior knowledge, experience and norms.12 Knowledge is constructed by a researcher by capturing this meaning, which makes truth contextual and derived from experience. Understanding is built by interacting with people with requisite experience who provide their subjective views. This is a process which scholar William
6 J. Creswell & V. Plano Clark, op. cit, p. 39. 7 E. Guba, ‘The alternative paradigm dialog,’ in The paradigm dialog, E. Guba (ed), Sage Publications, Inc., 1990, p. 17. 8 See P. Eriksson & A. Kovalainen, Qualitative Methods in Business Research, SAGE, California, 2008. 9 N. King & J. Brooks, Template Analysis for Business and Management Students, SAGE, California, 2017, p. 14. 10 E. Mazourenko, ‘Supporting Military Decision-Making: an investigation into the integration of Program Theory into campaign planning and assessment processes.’ Commander’s Paper, Australian Defence College, 2012, p. 11. Not publicly available. 11 ibid 12 J. Creswell, Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches, SAGE, California, p. 8, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm- binaries/22780_Chapter_1.pdf 45
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Shadish refers to as “constructing knowledge about reality, not constructing reality itself”13 based on the perspective that humans construct meaning through engaging with people and the world they are reflecting on.14 Table 5 contains a comparison between the positivist and constructivist ontology, epistemology and axiology.
Worldview Element Positivism Constructivism Ontology (nature of reality) Reality is tangible and Reality is constructed, objective; 'truth' exists and can subjective and relative. be captured and measured. Constructions are not more or less 'true,' only more or less informed. Epistemology (nature of The knower and the known are The knower and the known are knowledge; relationship independent of each other; the interactively linked; findings are between researcher and that influence of the researcher on 'created' as research proceeds. being researched) the researched can be controlled; only replicable findings are 'true.' Axiology (role of values) Inquiry is objective and thus Inquiry is value-bound; values value free; value and biases can are inherent in the context of the be eliminated through the use study; the researcher's values of rigorous procedures. affect the study; researchers actively talk about their biases and interpretations Methodology (process of Deductive; researchers tests a Inductive; researchers start with research) priori theory participants' views and build "up" to patterns, theories, and generalizations
Table 5: Comparison of Positivism and Constructivism Worldviews15
A constructivist viewpoint recognises that a researchers’ background and experience will shape their interpretation of data, and they resultantly adopt a position within a project that acknowledges how “their interpretation flows from their personal, cultural, and historical experiences.”16 In contrast to positivism, where researchers start with a theory, constructivists generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning.17 A constructivist worldview places practitioners, those who had a direct experience, at the centre of the research because it is assumes they will have the greatest knowledge. Table 6 below outlines the full position of this paradigm.
13 W. Shadish, ‘Philosophy of science and quantitative-qualitative debates: Thirteen common errors.’ Education and Program Planning, vol. 18, iss. 1, p. 67. 14 J. Creswell, op. cit., p. 8 15 J. Creswell & V. Plano Clark, op. cit., p. 42. 16 J. Creswell, op. cit. p. 8. 17 ibid 46
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Item Constructivism Inquiry aim understanding; reconstruction Nature of knowledge individual reconstructions coalescing around consensus Knowledge accumulation more informed and sophisticated reconstructions; vicarious experience Quality criteria trustworthiness and authenticity Values included - formative Ethics intrinsic: process tilt toward revelation; special problems Voice "passionate participant" as facilitator of multi-voice reconstruction Training resocialization; qualitative and quantitative; history; values of altruism and empowerment Accommodation incommensurable Hegemony seeking recognition and input
Table 6: Constructivist Worldview18
In practice, the goal of constructivist research is to share “as much as possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied.”19 This means people and communities who have direct experience in planning, conducting and responding to natural disaster will be the focus of this project because they have the greatest knowledge. To ensure this, inductive logic and qualitative methods will be employed to gain understanding of a particular phenomenon – civil-military interaction - within its social context.20 Following on, data collection techniques were selected to enable them to construct meaning of a situation, typically using broad, general and open-ended questions to have discuss and interact with study participants. A constructivist position best suits this research because it contributes to mitigating bias arising from the researcher having direct experience in two case studies. Adopting an inductive process the builds knowledge enables the capture of multiple meanings, followed by analysis into broad patterns where understanding can be drawn from to generate theory.21
More specifically, a constructivist position underpins the following characteristics of this research:
18 See Y. Lincoln & E. Guba, ‘Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emergency Confluences,’ in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (eds), SAGE Publications, 2005. 19 J. Creswell, op. cit., p. 8. 20 E. Mazourenko, op. cit., p.11. 21 J. Creswell & V. Plano Clark, op. cit, p. 40. 47
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1.! Inductive research strategy consistent with a focus on capturing others knowledge and experience. 2.! Selection of case studies that provides the researcher with a 'voice' to enable fuller reconstruction and access to data. 3.! Use of multiple methods and techniques to collect and analyse data to achieve the inquiry aim of understanding and reconstruction.
2.3 Military involvement in Disaster Management The theoretical lens of this project centres on the discourse surrounding the role of militaries in disaster management, largely centred on their role during disaster response. Militaries, both domestic and foreign to an affected nation, are increasingly becoming involved in natural disaster response. This is for a number of reasons, including an increase in the scale and occurrence of natural disasters, a trend towards the "militarisation of humanitarian response" from conflict and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan which has had flow-on effects to other situations, and an increased interest in disaster response by militaries because of positive public perception, staff morale, training opportunities, and diversification of role and expertise.22 Additional reasons include being legislated as primary responders and providing niche capabilities and expertise, such as airlift, helicopters, engineering, logistical support, engineering resources for infrastructure projects, personnel for debris clearing, and dependent on the situation, security for their own or other personnel.
Scholars Etkin et al. identify two views on the role of military assets in disaster response - one supportive of greater military presence and the other critical. The latter sees military functions to engage with civilian actors, such as CIMIC, as 'militarised humanitarianism' which contrasts with militaries who consider the capability to support effective coordination and to be part of their contribution to humanitarian issues.23 Scholar Marjan
22 M. Thapa, ‘Out of Barracks: Civil-Military Relations in Disaster Management. A Case Study of Nepalese Army’s Humanitarian Response during 2015 Earthquake in Nepal.’ Ideas for Peace, University for Peace, no. 1, June 2016, p. 1. 23 J. Marret, ‘Complex Emergencies: Disasters, Civil-Military Relations, and Transatlantic Cooperation,’ in Humanitarian Assistance: Improving US-European Cooperation, J. Streets & D. Hamilton (eds), GPPi/Center for Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins University, 2009, p. 339, viewed on 05 January 2020, https://www.gppi.net/media/Steets_Hamilton_-_Humanitarian_Assistance_EU-US- Cooperation.pdf 48
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Malesic24 mapped out the theoretical arguments underpinning military involvement in disaster response (Table 7 below) to demonstrate the major perspectives with linkages to key concepts. Perspective Key Concepts Utilitarian "! Benefits to the deploying country "! Realise national strategic interests "! Increase in positive public image "! Make diplomatic, trade and security gains "! Promote policy objectives by collaborating in disaster management "! Increase positive public image of the military and its legitimacy in society "! Military assistance is predominately motivated by political reasons "! Humanitarian motivations are of secondary importance Security-strategic "! International military assistance promotes better relations with allies and strengthens position of the country in the region "! Military disaster management as a soft power "! Contribution to human security "! Achieves military gains o! Militaries diversify role o! Provides training opportunities and increase morale of staff Militarisation "! Critical of militarised response to disasters "! Military should be last resort; instead often first choice "! Critical of formation of disaster management military units, plans, training and assets that might dominate process "! By deploying military, civil society relief organisations may become militarised "! Presence of military at disaster sites jeopardises core principles that guide the work of international humanitarian agencies and NGOs Functional- "! Pragmatic approach of military presence contributing to overcoming humanitarian consequences of the disaster "! A large-scale disaster will overwhelm civilian capabilities "! Population and authorities need assistance "! Infrastructure requires repair "! Military has capability (personnel, equipment, logistics), assets and the expertise to help people in need Rejection- "! Military should only play a passive role in disaster management isolation "! Disaster response a distraction from other military missions and reduces capacity for combat missions "! Rational use of military capabilities "! Restrictions on foreign military assistance Table 7: Theoretical Concepts surrounding military involvement in disaster response25
These different approaches reflect that it is important to consider the discourse on the role of militaries, especially because nations may have motive or purpose and objectives broader than meeting humanitarian needs when deploying their military forces during a
24 See M. Malešič, ‘The impact of military engagement in disaster management on civil-military relations.’ Current Sociology, vol. 63, iss. 7, 02 April 2015, p. 986, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0011392115577839 25 Ibid, p. 986. 49
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disaster response. Understanding these considerations is crucial for understanding civil- military interaction because they can inform timelines of deployment, types of military assets deployed, how military assets are employed (frequency and nature) and humanitarian organisation use of military assets.
It also informs how civilian actors, particularly humanitarian agencies, engage with militaries. In advocating for the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, civilian actors have diverging views on military involvement in humanitarian assistance because of the motivation behind their involvement.26 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) affirms a strong commitment to the humanitarian principles, strongly arguing against any link between humanitarian and military actions.27
Drawing on experience of civil-military interaction within Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, research conducted by Save the Children UK identified four main ways that humanitarian agencies can engage with military actors to achieve the type of civil-military relationship desired:
1.! Principled non-engagement: agencies do not engage, directly or indirectly, because any association with militaries may impair their actual or perceived independence. 2.! Arms-length interaction: engage through another entity (e.g. UN) to maintain distance, though possibly enhancing perceived independence of the organisation. 3.! Proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement: agencies proactively shape the nature and substance of interactions, building on existing liaison relationships to contribute to discussion on military activities and voice concerns on how civil- military entities should operate. 4.! Active, direct engagement and cooperation: agencies will engage directly and co- ordinate with these entities in terms of identifying humanitarian and reconstruction projects. 28
26 G. McHugh & L. Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Team and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan. Save the Children, London, 2004, p. 1. 27 Medecins Sans Frontieres, ‘MSF rejects links of humanitarian and military actions.’ 08 October 2001, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.msf.org/msf-rejects-link-humanitarian-and-military-actions 28 G McHugh and L. Gostelow, op. cit., p.42-43. 50
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As introduced in Chapter One, the major policy and practice that informs the use of military and civil defence assets in natural disasters are the ‘Oslo Guidelines.’ These guidelines include the concept of ‘last resort’ where “foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need.”29 The principle of last resort is key for organisations, such as the Red Cross. However, the concept is difficult to apply in practice (operationalise) because it implies that affected nation and humanitarian decision-makers need to explore every available option before making an informed request, which is near impossible in natural disaster response due the speed needed to get assistance to affected populations. This often makes pragmatism the solution, with good judgement considered sufficient to assess whether use of military assets are suitable for the situation. 30
Critics of military involvement in disaster response argue it is “inefficient, inappropriate, inadequate and expensive, contrary to humanitarian principles and driven by political imperatives rather than humanitarian need.”31 Further concerns are that militaries are politically motivated, which means political and security objectives may override humanitarian needs. Two specific examples used to underpin this perspective are the methods used by militaries to undertake assessments and consultations with local communities, with concerns that these methods are influenced by objectives, which limits the ability of militaries to provide assistance in an accountable and impartial manner. The second is that military commitments are short-term, usually no more than six weeks, which leads to a focus on achieving immediate effects that may undermine longer-term development goals of humanitarian agencies.32
Reflection by Charles-Antoine Hofmann and Laura Hudson from the British Red Cross in the context of natural disasters, identifies that "many humanitarian actors understand that the military can play a legitimate and at times vital role in supporting humanitarian
29 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, November 2017, p. 8 30 C. Hofmann & L. Hudson, ‘Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or inevitable trend?’ in Humanitarian Exchange. October 2009, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://odihpn.org/magazine/military-responses-to-natural-disasters-last-resort-or-inevitable-trend/ 31 ibid 32 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, ‘Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods.’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011, p. 1087, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.icrc.org/es/doc/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale-virk.pdf 51
! relief efforts." 33 In the era of growing military involvement in natural disaster response efforts, the authors argued that humanitarian organisations have an opportunity, and perhaps even a responsibility, to engage more with the military, with this engagement having the potential to maximise benefits for an affected nation. They pose that the "question for humanitarian organisations is no longer whether to engage with the military, but rather how and when to do so." 34
Further to this debate is Australia’s strategic position on the use of its military forces, which at the moment is focused on international engagement to “help reduce the risk of military confrontation, build interoperability with key partners and improve the coordination of response to shared international challenges including ... disaster relief.”35 More specifically, Australia is engaging with Pacific Island Countries in its immediate region and South East Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), contributing to disaster relief in the Indo-Pacific Region, coordinating disaster relief with New Zealand, France, the United States and Japan, enabling Tonga to enhance their capacity to conduct disaster relief missions; and engaging Sri Lanka on disaster relief.36 This shows that Australia’s regional position, both in terms of geography and economy, and existing bilateral arrangements influences the deployment of its military forces, with the current strategic position being that the ADF is modernised and postured to respond to these type of operations.37 The willingness of the government of the day further drives the participation and legitimisation of the ADF in disaster response.
Linking this position back to the theoretical debate, it is clear that Australia has adopted a 'security-strategic' position on using military assets in disaster management in order to strengthen relations within its immediate region. Viewing military involvement based on this lens makes a connection between civil-military interaction and longer-term development. It provides insight into whether decisions made during disaster response, such as the location, configuration and tasks of military forces, can influence broader
33 C. Hofmann & L. Hudson, op. cit. 34 ibid 35 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p.22. 36 See ibid 37 S. Bullard, In Their Time of Need: Australia’s overseas emergency relief operations, 1918-2006,The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Volume VI, Cambridge University Press and Australian War Memorial, 2017, p. 34. 52
! outcomes such as contributing to human security and national relationships. This means disaster response is not just activities and small-scale reconstruction work, instead it engagement with an affected nation to determine their needs as part of recovery efforts.38
The pragmatic use of military assets is also a consideration because civilian capabilities can be overwhelmed, especially in extreme weather situations, and require military capability to assist. As such, this study also recognises the ‘functional-humanitarian’ perspective of using military forces because it centres on meeting the needs of an affected nation. This approach links to the pragmatic use of military assets and recognises that militaries can deploy on a rapid-timeline with capability and expertise to provide immediate assistance. This position is reflected in Australia's Interagency Preparedness Framework and takes into account the following points when responding:
•! the nature of the crisis •! the political, economic and environmental context and implications of Australian involvement •! the context, culture and needs of the Affected Nation •! the roles and capabilities of responding agencies •! multi-level response requirements (individual, community, society, national, regional, international) •! combining dispersed individual, agency, sector, field-based and Canberra-based operations.39
From this discourse, a merged ‘functional-humanitarian’ and 'security-strategic' theoretical lens will be adopted for this study because it recognises that militaries play a critical role in disaster management. However, this role is directly informed by the needs of an affected nation, and recognises and respects civilian agency autonomy on the nature of dialogue and interaction with militaries based on their guidelines and requirements.
38 G. McHugh & L. Gostelow, op. cit., p. 34. 39 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘An overview of the Australian Interagency Preparedness Framework (AIPF).’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.acmc.gov.au/what-we-do/building- capability/australian-interagency-preparedness-framework/overview 53
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2.4 Methodological Approach The research strategy adopted to address the research question is Eisenhardt's roadmap for building theory from case studies, which brings together elements of grounded theory, qualitative methods and case study research. Theory building in the field of civil-military interaction is critical because “mainstream scholarship ... has so far failed to adequately to address civil-military relations in disaster management.”40
Scholar Susan Lynham41 notes that the choice of definition of theory is a fundamental issue in theory building because of the purpose of theory. As such, this research has adopted the American Heritage Dictionary definition of theory as a “set of statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or phenomena, especially one that has been repeatedly tested or is widely accepted and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena.”42 This definition supports theory building of civil-military interaction because its purpose “is to make sense of the observable world by ordering the relationships among elements that constitute the theorist's focus of attention in the real world.”43 Therefore, theory building in this project is the process by which coherent descriptions and explanations of civil-military interaction will be generated, verified, and refined.44 In answering the overarching research question, this project has four sub- questions which will be used to build theory within the case study write-up (Table 8). Sub-Question Approach How, and to what end, is civil-military interaction Description of civil-military interaction, employed. and the intended and unintended outcomes that occurred. How civil-military interaction contributes to: Explain relationship between civil- - tactical task accomplishment military interaction and tactical, - operational progress operational and strategic outcomes. - strategic objectives Outcomes civil-military interaction generates for: Description of outcomes. - the ADF - the Affected State - civilian actors Barriers to effective civil-military interaction for: Description of barriers. - civilian actors - the ADF Table 8: Research Sub-Questions
40 M. Malešič, op. cit., p. 980. 41 S. Lynham, ‘Theory building in the human resource development profession.’ Human Resource Development Quarterly, vol. 11, iss. 2, p. 161. 42 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, ‘Theory.’ No date, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=theory 43 R. Dubin, ‘Theory building in applied areas’ in Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, M. Dunnette (ed), Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago, 2011, p. 26. 44 S. Lynham, op. cit., p. 161. ! 54
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Using this foundation, a Research Project Outline is proposed at Table 7 that is mapped to Eisenhardt's roadmap to support building theory, firstly through identifying the factors that influence civil-military interaction and the outcomes it achieves and secondly through using this knowledge to build a civil-military interaction process model that is applicable for future Australian response.
Chapter Activity Purpose Introduction -! Focus effort One -! Disaster Management -! Provides grounding of -! Civil-Military Interaction construct measures -! Define Research Question -! Retain theoretical flexibility Research Strategy & Structure -! Constrains extraneous variation Two -! Theoretical discourse of militaries in and sharpens external validity disaster relief operations -! Reliability -! Theory Building using Case Study -! Extend understanding Research -! Focus effort on pragmatic cases -! Case Study Protocol that extend theory by filling in -! Data collection and analysis conceptual categories -! Replication logic -! Strengthens grounding of theory by triangulation of evidence -! Synergistic view of evidence Case Study: Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Operation Philippines Assist 2013 -! Data collection Three •! Literature Review -! Exploratory Case Studies •! Semi-structured interviews -! Within-case analysis to gain •! Fieldwork in Ormoc and Tacloban familiarity with data Case Study: Tropical Cyclone Pam -! Preliminary theory building Operation Pacific Assist (Vanuatu) 2015 -! Expressed by participants of a -! Data collection situation Four •! Literature Review -! Overlap data collection and •! Semi-structured interviews analysis to enable adjustment to •! Fieldwork in Port Vila data collection Case Study: Tropical Cyclone Winston -! Flexible and opportunistic data Operation Fiji Assist 2016 collection methods to explore -! Data collection emergent themes and unique Five •! Literature Review case features •! Semi-structured interviews •! Fieldwork in Suva and Koro Island Frame Civil-Military Interaction -! View evidence through -! Cross-case pattern search multiple lenses -! Identify effective points of interaction -! Sharpens construct definition, ! Identify outcomes of civil-military validity and measurability - interaction (positive/negative) ! Confirms, extends and - ! Search evidence for "why" behind sharpens model Six - relationships ! Builds internal validity - ! Comparison with conflicting and - similar literature -! Concept Mapping
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Process Model – Preparedness -! Address gaps in the literature -! Propose why, how, and when civilian on how and when actors and military actors should interact should interact during disaster Seven prior to a disaster response preparedness
Process Model – Response -! Address gaps in the literature ! Propose why, how, and when civilian on how and when civilian and Eight - and military actors should interact military actors should interact during a response during disaster response Situate the Model -! Test model -! Compare and contrast with other -! Builds internal validity, raises operational environments and civil-military theoretical levels and interaction models sharpens construct definitions Nine o! Counterinsurgency -! Sharpens generalisability o! West Africa Ebola Outbreak Response o! Battle of Mosul
Conclusion Ten -! Relevance and feasibility of the model for use in future disaster relief operations.
Table 9: Research Project Outline
2.5 Building Theory using Case Studies Epistemology and methodology are closely aligned, with methodology being the practical application of epistemology. Specifically, methodology refers to the principles that guide the research process and research design. Case study research is defined as “scholarly inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”45 A case study enables an in-depth examination of civil-military interaction, including documentating it in a balanced and multidimensional way that captures setting, stakeholders, events, problems and conflicts, with the latter being key considerations because the purpose of case studies is to reflect real-world situations. 46
45 L. Dooley, ‘Case Study Research and Theory Building.’ Advances in Developing Human Resources, vol. 4, no. 3, August, 2002, p. 335-336, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1523422302043007 46 ibid, p. 337. 56
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Case studies involve the collection of direct evidence and use an iterative data collection and analysis process to use emerging results to inform the collection of subsequent data.47 Each case study presents difference opportunities for data collection, however common sources of evidence are documents, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artefacts.48 This process results enables the development of a rich description and ongoing reflection of data, with theory being continually modified as the research progresses.
Scholar Robert Yin49 identifies two case study research designs: single-case and multiple-case designs. Single-cases are useful to examine critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal cases, where they can be used to test a significant or innovative theory. Multiple-case study design enables observation and analysis of disaster response in different settings. Since disaster responses have different context, operational environments and military responses, there will be varying levels and types of civil- military interaction. This makes a multiple-case study design suitable for this study because it enables a broader collection of evidence and the use of replication logic to build a more robust civil-military partnership model.
Each case study, whether a single-case study or part of a multiple-case study, can be holistic or embedded - a holistic case study involves a single unit of global analysis while an embedded case study includes analysis of subunits.50 To achieve a thorough examination of civil-military interaction in each case study, including different aspects and the relation to each other, a holistic case study approach has been used within this study. This type of case study builds an understanding of the process of civil-military interaction within the context of the respective operational environments, with the process being the unit of analysis.
47 See GAO, Case Study Evaluation, United States General Accounting Officer, Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, November 1990, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/76069.pdf 48 R. Tobin, ‘Descriptive Case Study,’ in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, A. Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (eds), SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2012, p. 2. 49 See R. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4 edition, SAGE, Los Angeles, 2009. 50 ibid 57
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Types of Case Study Case studies can be broadly catagorised into exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. Exploratory case studies are suited to investigating phenomena prior to defining research questions or hypotheses51 in new research fields due to a lack of preliminary research or data.52 Research in areas with restricted data access, such as the military, are examples of environments suited to these forms of case studies because researchers have a large degree of flexibility in research design and data collection. However, their relevance beyond formation of hypotheses has been questioned because there is limited structure and specificity.53
Descriptive case studies provide a complete description of the characteristics of the phenomena under study to enable researchers to make analytical comparisons, causal statements or describe unexplored areas.54 As a process to build descriptive theory, it specifies the boundaries of a case and contributes to the rigor of the study by examining and interpreting data as part of building theory.55 These case studies provide a means of using a narrative approach to explain natural phenomena in a rational and feasible way that can lead to general understanding through applying the same approach to similar situations across varying contexts.56 Descriptive case studies use knowledge and reconstruction of a sequence of antecedent events to determine outcomes, which are considered contingent on a chain of decisions or occurrences.57 The findings from descriptive case studies are also generalisable to theoretical propositions
Explanatory case studies can be used to both explore and describe phenomena, and investigate causal relationships. This makes them suitable for theory testing because they investigate relationships between proposed theory components.58 These types of case studies consist of a description of the facts of the case, an examination of alternate explanations, and a conclusion formed through explanations consistent with the
51 S. Baskarada, op. cit., p. 2. 52 C. Streb, ‘Exploratory Case Study,’ in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, A. Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (eds), SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2012, p. 2. 53 ibid 54 R. Tobin, op. cit., p. 2. 55 ibid 56 S. Gould, 'The Range and Power of Narrative Style in Science' in Causal Explanation for Social Scientists, A. Vayda & B. Walters (eds),AltaMira Press, 2011, p. 76. 57 Ibid 58 S. Baskarada, op. cit., p. 3. 58
! described facts.59 Since the purpose of this study is to build and test theory, explanatory case studies have been identified as the most suitable as they extend the examination of civil-military interaction beyond description. Scholar Henry Harder notes that explanatory case studies should include a flowchart or logic model to ensure that the research maintains integrity and both are included in this study to achieve this.60
Building Theory Replication logic is the foundation of building theory from case studies61 and each case within this study is considered a standalone distinct experiment that contributes to replication, contrast and extension of emerging theory.”62 This means that theory develops over the course of project as emerging concepts are extended to subsequent case studies and as more data is collected and analysed. Three case studies are included in the project to enable the researcher to observe similar phenomena in different settings in order to confirm or disconfirm the theory of civil-military interaction progressively taking shape.
This project is well suited to being grounded in case studies because it enables a focus on the specific phenomenon of civil-military interaction and aims to understand the relationship in its entirety through examination of related variables and their interacting relationships at multiple levels.63 However, it is recognised that theory building using case study research is an 'arduous process' because the approach “does not lend itself well to generalization or prediction.”64 To overcome this challenge, the project research strategy includes ongoing comparison of data and theory, and continuous alignment of theory and practice.65
The main criticism of case study research is achieving external validity, which considers whether findings can be generalised to other cases. Threats to external validity include connection of a causal relationship with outcomes and connection of the causal
59 H. Harder, ‘Explanatory Case Study,’ in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, A. Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (eds), SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2012, p. 2. 60 ibid 61 K. Eisenhardt, op. cit., p. 532. 62 R. Yin, op. cit. 63 L. Dooley, op. cit., p. 336. 64 ibid 65 S. Lynham, op. cit., p. 161. 59
! relationship with settings.66 External validity within this project is maximised through treating case studies like experiments to enable generalisation to theoretical propositions and not a population.67 Further ensuring external validity is the use of replication logic in a multiple-case study research framework.68
Case Study Plan A Case Study Plan (Figure 7) was developed to increase the reliability of the study through demonstrating that the case studies, including data collection protocol, can be repeated and lead to the same results. As Case Study Plan shows the research will progressively examine the three case studies, firstly internally, and then cross-case to build a model that supports the conduct of an Australian response to international disaster relief.
Design Phase Collect & Analyse Phase Conclude
Single Case ! Data Collection & Analysis Cross Case Analysis ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Research Conduct Case Write up Situate the Model ! Strategy Study 1 Case Study 1 ! Cross Case ! Pattern Search ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Case Study Conduct Case Write up Model Draw final ! Selection Study 2 Case Study 2 ! Development conclusions ! Logic Model ! ! Exploration! ! ! ! ! ! Case Study Conduct Case Write up ! Protocol Study 3 Case Study 3 ! ! ! ! ! ! Data Collection & Analysis Protocol
Figure 10: Case Study Plan
66 See W. Shadish, T. Cook & D. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 2002. 67 S. Baskarada, op. cit., p. 7. 68 Yin, op. cit. 60
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Case Study Selection As noted in Chapter One, the ADF has deployed overseas to over 20 natural disasters since 2004. These operations form the population from which the case studies used in this research were selected. Case study 'population' is an important aspect of this study because it bounds the set of operations available to be considered for inclusion in the project. Based on this population, it was assessed that the most suitable method of case study selection was theoretical sampling, where cases are chosen for theoretical rather than statistical reasons.
The goal of theoretical sampling is to gain a deep understanding of the selected cases, in comparison to statistical sampling which aims to achieve representative capture of all possible variations.69 This form of sampling supports the development of theory either through replicating previous cases, extending emergent theory, filling theoretical gaps or provide examples of contrast.70 Defence Scientist Sasa Baskarada notes that case study selection is also informed by convenience, purpose and probability (Table 10).
Basis for Selection When to use and what questions it can answer Convenience Case selected because it was expedient for data collection purposes Bracketing* What is happening at extremes? What explains such differences? Best Cases* What accounts for an effective program? Worst Cases* Why isn't the program working? Cluster* How do different types of programs compare with each other? Representative* Instances chosen to represent important variations. Typical* Instance chosen to represent a typical case. Special Interest* Instances chosen based on an unusual/special attribute. Probability What is happening in the program as a whole, and why? * indicates purpose Table 10: Case Study Selection71
From the case population, Operation Philippines Assist (2013), Operation Pacific Assist (2015) and Operation Fiji Assist (2016) were identified as the most practical cases by
69 S. Baskarada, op. cit., p. 7. 70 K. Eisenhardt, op. cit., p. 537.! 71 S. Baskarada, op. cit., p. 4. 61
! which to address the research question because the cases are convenient. Operation experience in the Philippines and Fiji, in addition to being in the ADF, enabled the expedient capture of background information, identification of ADF personnel to interview, and understanding of fieldwork locations. The addition of the third case study of Operation Pacific Assist 2015, where the ADF deployed to Vanuatu in the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Pam, ensures both a representative sample and sufficient variation on dimensions of theoretical interest.72
Using a convenient basis for selection of case studies overcomes some of the unique challenges of conducting research within a military environment, including requesting document access, declassification of operational documents, and understanding military processes and terminology. Documentation access is specifically useful because “the ADF is not very good at sharing its experiences”73 with few military personnel writing unclassified accounts of their experiences that can be used to inform research projects. Noting the researcher’s direct involvement in the case studies, the quality of this study in terms of construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability needs to be robust. To achieve this, a number of strategies will be incorporated into the case studies to mitigate bias and ensure quality (Table 11).
Criteria Case Study Characteristic Phase of Research Construct •! Use multiple sources of evidence •! Data collection validity •! Establish chain of evidence •! Data Collection •! Have key informants review •! Composition draft case study report Internal validity •! Conduct pattern matching Data analysis •! Conduct explanation building •! Address rival explanations •! Use logic models External validity •! Use replication logic in multiple- Research design case studies Reliability •! Use case study protocol Data collection •! Develop case study database
Table 11: Criteria for Case Study Quality74
72 J. Seawright & J. Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.’ Political Research Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 2., 2008, p. 296. 73 J. Brown, ‘Living in the Anzacs’ long, dark shadow.’ The Australian, 15 February 2014, viewed on 04 January 2020, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/living-in-the-anzacs-long-dark- shadow/story-e6frgd0x-1226827697069 74 Developed from R. Yin, op. cit. p. 41. 62
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To ensure the most suitable methodological approach was selected for this project, grounded theory and ethnography were examined for their applicability. A grounded theory approach uses inductive and deductive processes to generate theory through constant comparative methods, comparing research sites, undertaking theoretical sampling and testing emerging concepts with additional fieldwork. The overarching intent of grounded theory is to use extensive fieldwork to explore what is occurring in the real world.75 This approach is specifically useful to generate theory when there is not much knowledge on the topic or to identify new insights into existing knowledge.76
While grounded theory may be suitable in the conceptual development phase of theory building, more so than case study research,77 the method is unsuitable for this research project for two reasons. The first is that fieldwork would need to be conducted during a disaster relief operations and it is not practical for the researcher to wait for a disaster relief operation. Secondly, in grounded theory it is necessary for a researcher to have no prior knowledge of the subject to mitigate being influenced by incorrect assumptions.78 This is not possible due to the researcher having deployed on two disaster relief operations and having knowledge of civil-military interaction at the tactical level.
Ethnography is the long-term and intensive observation and involvement in a group or process at the centre of a research project.79 The purpose of ethnography is to capture perspectives and interaction between individuals to interpret the situation as they see and interpret it.80On the surface, ethnography appears to be a suitable research strategy as the researcher is a Reservist within the ADF and has been involved in disaster relief operations. However, as like grounded theory, using ethnography as the core research strategy would require the deployment of the researcher during a disaster relief operation
75 See B. Glaser & A. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967 and A. Strauss & J. Corbin, Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques, Sage Publications, 1990. 76 Z. Vincze, ‘Grounded Theory,’ in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, A. Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (eds), SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2012, p. 2. 77 L. Dooley, op. cit., p. 336. 78 H. Steenhuis & E. de Bruijn, ‘Building theories from case study research: the progressive case study.’ Conference Paper, April 2006. 79 ScienceDirect ‘Ethnography.’ No date, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/ethnography 80 See M. Saunders, P. Lewis, & A. Thornhill, Research Methods for Business Students, Harlow: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2000. 63
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which is not practical. Instead, ethnography was used within the project to identify ADF members to interview as part of the case studies, and to identify authors of operational documentation to request re-classification and release for inclusion in the research.
2.6 Data Collection This phase of the research includes using collecting multiple sources of evidence, the creation of a case study database, and the maintenance of a chain of evidence. The specific sources of data collected within each case study is documentation, key informant interviews, and fieldwork. Collecting data from different sources is one strategy used to ensure construct validity of the research,81 with multiple sources of data enabling the researcher to collect the most relevant data and triangulate evidence which leads to enhanced validity and reduced bias.82
The potential for ‘informant bias’ is acknowledged within the data collection phase based on being an insider researcher. This is where interview data may be influenced by the position of the researcher and the relationships held outside the research. This was mitigated through a disclaimer at the commencement of every interview that while I was present during a case study, participants need to respond as if I were not there and we were discussing it for the first time.83
Source Strengths Weaknesses Documentation -!Stable – can be reviewed repeatedly -!Retrieving – can be difficult to find -!Unobtrusive – not created as a result of the -!Biased selectivity, if collection is case study incomplete -!Exact – contains exact names, references, -!Reporting bias – reflects unknown bias of and details of an event author -!Broad coverage – long span of time, many -!Access – may be deliverability withheld events, and many settings -!Classification – may be unrealisable to the public, classified military documents Archival Records -!Same as those for documentation + -!Same as those for documentation + -!Precise and usually quantitative -!Accessibility due to privacy reasons Interviews -!Targeted – focuses directly on case study -!Bias due to poorly articulated questions topics -!Response bias -!Insightful – provides perceived causal -!Inaccuracies due to poor recall inferences and explanations -!Reflexivity – interviewee gives what the interviewer wants to hear
81 R. Yin, op. cit. 82 GAO, op. cit. 83!See J. Fleming, ‘Recognizing and resolving the challenges of being an insider researcher in work- integrated learning.’ International Journal of Work-Integrated Learning, Special Issue, vol. 19, 2018, pp 311-320. ! 64
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Direct Observations -!Reality – covers events in real time -!Time consuming -!Contextual – covers context of the case -!Selectivity – broad coverage difficult without a team of observers -!Reflexivity – the even may proceed differently because it is being observed -!Cost – hours needed by human observers Participant -!Same of those for direct observations + -!Same of those for direct observations + Observations -!Insightful into interpersonal behaviour and -!Bias due to participant-observer motives manipulation of events Physical Artefacts -!Insightful into cultural features -!Selectability -!Insightful into technical operations -!Availability Table 12: Sources of evidence 84
Documentation Documentation is used to conduct literature reviews at four points during the project, commencing with Chapter One which provided a review of key concepts of disaster management and civil-military interaction. The goal of the review was to outline, summarise and critically reflect on the literature in order to clearly define the research problem and why it needs addressing. The need for this research was established, based on it being unclear of how and when civilian and military actors should interact to optimise assistance to other nations to enable them to prepare and respond to natural disasters.
A systematic literature review was undertaken as part of each case study to identify relevant literature, with a focus being on building context and a rich description of civil- military interaction that occurred through providing a chronology of operational events and organisational learning. This focused the review on an examination of cause-and- effect within the case studies to make linkages between factors that influence civil- military interaction and the outcomes they achieve. Conducting a literature review within the case studies provided context for data collected through semi-structured interviews and fieldwork. The combination of literature with other sources of data will contribute to identifying new insights and subsequent model development.85
Broader literature on civil-military interaction is examined in Chapter Six to determine whether the factors that influenced civil-military interaction which emerged from the case studies were present in existing literature. Through this process, effective points of
84 R. Yin, op. cit., p. 102. 85 p.18. 65
! interaction were identified through comparison with similar and conflicting literature to build evidence of the “why” behind effective civil-military relationships. In Chapter Nine, documentation is used to situate the model and consider the applicability of the model to other situations. Eisenhardt notes that comparing and contrasting a study's emergent theory with extant literature, as occurs in Chapter Six and Chapter Nine, is a key feature of theory building. Comparison with extant literature strengthens the internal validity and also the generalisation of the research86 while confidence in findings are reduced if conflicting literature is not considered. Conflicting literature presents a researcher with the opportunity to enter into a different mode of thinking; and the generalisation of the research is sharpened.87
Throughout this project, the sources of documentation include policy documents, books, declassified ADF post operational reporting, scholarly articles, academic publications, online blogs and articles, after action reviews, 'lessons learned' and operational reports. Key to reviewing these documents is appreciating that they may not always accurately reflect reality as they may be out-of-date or be published from limited perspective.88 Existing knowledge is categorised into the following three four types:
•! Primary literature – research conducted personally by an individual scientist or as collaboration by a group of scientists, published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal. •! Secondary literature – publications that rely on primary sources for information, often with the purpose to summarise and synthesize knowledge in a specific area. Secondary literature is used to gain an overview and/or become familiar with relevant research areas. •! Tertiary literature – published works that are based on primary or secondary sources which are aimed at an interested lay audience and/or researchers working in different areas from the subject matter of the publication. •! Grey literature – refers to sources of scientific information that have not been published and distributed in the usual manner89 consisting of documents “produced
86 K. Eisenhardt, op. cit., p. 544. 87 ibid 88 ibid 89 P. Schembri, ‘The Different Types of Scientific Literature,’ The University of Malta, 13 December 2007, p. 2, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/file/0006/42981/The_different_types_of_scientific_literature.pdf 66
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on all levels of government, academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial publishers.”90 Grey literature includes theses and dissertations, conference papers and proceedings, reports with limited distribution, and Government documents. These documents are considered “expert opinion” and they have been included in this project after critical appraisal, including consideration of trustworthiness, and relevance and value to context of the project. 91 The term ‘grey’ refers to the limited distribution and difficulty in accessing that publication rather than scientific merit or content.92
A paucity of academic literature on civil-military interaction literature has been identified, as such there will be a heavy reliance on grey literature in this project, including ADF post-operational reporting and lessons identified publications. Scholar Roshni Pramanik undertook a systematic literature review dealing with civil-military coordination, with only 15% of identified literature being published in scientific peer- reviewed journals and considered scientific literature. The remainder was grey literature such as conferences, internal reports, guidelines, policy reports, non-peer reviewed or open source journal pieces, meeting updates and workshop outcome documents, and documents from civilian agencies such as the UN and NGOs. 93
As an insider researcher, access was granted to key ADF documentation, such as post operational reports which are not publicly available. References to ADF documentation was made with consideration of release classification and that I continue to work for the ADF as a member of the organisation. Post operational reports are quoted only where essential to ensure ethical handling of inside knowledge and access, and maintain the integrity of military documents.
90 The New York Academy of Medicine, ‘What is Grey Literature?’ Grey Literature Report, no. date, viewed on 04 January 2020, http://www.greylit.org/about 91 See J. Tyndall, ‘AACODS Checklist.’ Flinders University, November 2010, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://dspace.flinders.edu.au/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2328/3326/AACODS_Checklist.pdf;jsessionid=85 3919F6658496DDC8B8F32B9BEB8AA2?sequence=4 92 P. Schembri, op. cit. 93 R. Pramanik, ‘Challenges in coordination: differences in perception of civil and military organizations by comparing international scientific literature and field experiences.’ Journal of Risk Research, 03 July 2015, p. 10. 67
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Interviews Semi-structured interviewing was identified as the most suitable method to collect data from ADF and DFAT personnel because it is a flexible but formal qualitative interviewing technique useful for small-scale research, such as this project. A list of participants was identified through existing knowledge of ADF operations in the Philippines and Fiji. A review of ADF operational literature, such as Post Operation Reports, identified ADF members for participation from operations in Vanuatu.
The researcher developed and used a list of open-ended questions and topics to guide interview but maintain flexibility to delve into other areas that are appropriate to the research topic as they arise. Semi-structured interviews are well suited to this research project because the researcher only had one chance to interview personnel94 and this type of interview provides participants the opportunity to express their experience in their own terms.
In addition, semi-structured interviews were a “powerful tool to capture the voices and the ways people making meaning of their experience”95 which also provided reliable and comparable qualitative data. Semi-structured interview questions were able to be prepared ahead of interviews, providing the researcher sufficient time to gain subject matter knowledge, which is critical to effective data collection. Due to their flexible nature, semi-structured interviews were used to capture disaster relief operational experience outside the case studies and interviewees were able to make comparisons between the case studies and their other experience. This data contributed to strengthening the external validity of the study, providing evidence that the findings could be generalised beyond the disaster relief operations that formed the case studies. This is based on the demonstration of external validity through multiple and varied data sources yielding the same results.96
94 H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 4th Edition, Altamira, New York, 2006, p. 212, viewed on 04 January 2020, ww.cycledoctoralfactec.com/uploads/7/9/0/7/7907144/%5Bh._russell_bernard%5D_research_methods_i n_anthropol_bokos-z1__1_.pdf 95 S. Rabionet, ‘How I Learned to Design and Conduct Semi-structured Interviews: An ongoing and Continuous Journey.’ The Qualitative Report, vol. 16, no.2, 2011, p. 203. 96 L. Dooley, op. cit., p. 340. 68
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It is acknowledged that interviewees may be biased, unable to articulate their experiences, or have poor recall which makes it necessary to corroborate data collected through interviews with information from other sources.97 Accordingly, interviews were conducted with a range of actors from military, government, civilian agencies and local communities.
Interview Sample Size Interviews were requested with ADF members who had tactical, operational and strategic insight or experience into civil-military interaction which occurred during the case studies, including operational planning. A total of 15 ADF members were interviewed, including two Joint Task Force Commanders, with some ADF members having experience across multiple case studies. Interviews were conducted in location with Units and personnel in Townsville, Brisbane, Canberra and Sydney.
Due to lack of approval being granted to interview members of Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT), one ex-member from AUSMAT was interviewed. Three DFAT personnel interviewed were identified with the support of the Australian Civil- Military Centre (ACMC). Interviews were conduct within each case study until data saturation was reached and no new information or themes emerged.
Fieldwork Fieldwork is the collection of information in the natural setting of the phenomena under investigation, including observing and recording information from everyday interactions with communities. This method is a key component of this research project because it achieved the collection of data to reflect on the longer-term (12 months +) outcomes of civil-military interaction, specifically visually seeing engineering and infrastructure work completed by the ADF. The longevity of works, including community engagement to conduct the works, and the role they played in assisting communities re-build were key to capturing the perspective of government authorities, local communities and NGOs in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji.
97 S. Baskarada, op. cit., p. 9. 69
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Limited research exists on the perceptions of affected nations on the contributions and actions of foreign militaries during relief operations, especially in high-risk environments.98 Allan Sheppard's PhD research on local populations preparing for, and responding to, natural disasters is considered to be the first to focus on "the previously unexplored perspective of local populations at municipal and village level."99 Affected nations, including communities, government authorities and local NGOs, are arguably the most important stakeholder group to enable effective disaster relief operations.
Fieldwork consisted of opportunistic interaction and observation of ADF completed engineering works and disaster relief tasks with local community members, government authorities and non-government organisations in the areas the ADF deployed to in the Philippines and Fiji. It also included attendance at key meetings and informal interaction with senior military leaders, which has been ethically captured and referenced. Due to existing literature on the Australian response to Cyclone Pam that struck Vanuatu which captured local voices, fieldwork was focused on Port Vila. The main purpose of including fieldwork in this study was to give a voice to beneficiaries by collecting their perspective of how they interacted and worked with military personnel, in-turn providing a means to identify the outcomes of civil-military interaction, including long term outcomes.
For the fieldwork phase, a phenomenological approach was adopted to explore the lived experiences of community members. Data collection techniques were tailored to this approach and included open-ended interview questions, direct interactions and personal narratives. This approach was validated during fieldwork on Koro Island, Fiji, when a research participant noted these techniques suited the nature of the research because participants were able to behave naturally and explain their lived experience in their own words,100 which is considerate of the sensitive nature of re-living experiences from a natural disaster. The broadness of a phenomenological approach during fieldwork enabled access to more data from the participants.101
98 J. Brett, Recent Experience with Comprehensive Civil and Military Approaches in International Operations, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), DIIS Report, 2009, p. 17, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import_efter1114/diis_report_2009_09_recent_experience_ comprehensive_civil_military_approaches_web.pdf 99 A. Sheppard, ‘A capability model to understand in-field responses to natural disaster relief in the develop world,’ PhD diss., Griffith University, February 2013, p. iii. 100 Interview with author, Nausouri Village, August 2019 and Cozby and Bates 201 101 See C. Moustakas, Phenomenological research methods, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, California, 1994. 70
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2.7 Data Analysis Two analysis techniques are undertaken within this research project: within-case and cross-case pattern search. Within-case analysis was conducted in order to examine each case in-depth as a standalone entity. This process consisted of a detailed examination and write-up of each case study to provide a pure description of the civil-military interface and whether interface points were effective or not. Description is central to generating the insight required for model development because it mapped the points of the civil- military interface to enable exploration and examination in subsequent case studies. This form of analysis enabled the researcher to understand attributes and patterns within cases prior to locating general patterns and themes that existed across all cases, which were then used to suggest preliminary theory that was developed and validated in subsequent cases.
A feature of building theory from case studies is the overlap of data analysis with data collection within cases. Thematic analysis was undertaken during data collection within cases in order to inform subsequent data collection opportunities and make adjustments to data collection instruments (e.g. the addition of questions to interviews). It was considered legitimate to alter data collection instruments because the researcher was intent on forming an understanding of each case individually, to the extent that is practically feasible.102
Cross-Case Pattern Search Based on the purpose of the project to build theory in a rigorous manner, a constant comparative method (CCM) was adopted to conduct cross-case analysis. This grounds the development of theory in the data103 by using an inductive approach104 to “discover the latent pattern in the multiple participant’s words.”105 The specific process used to conduct CCM is based on scholars James Thomas and Angela Harden106 method for conducting thematic synthesis of qualitative research:
102 K. Eisenhardt, op. cit., p. 539. 103 B. Glaser & A. Strauss,op. cit. 104 See H. Boeiji, ‘A purposeful approach to the constant comparative method in the analysis of qualitative interviews.’ Quality and Quantity, vol. 36 , 2002, p. 391-409. 105 B. Glaser, ‘Constructivist Grounded Theory?’ Forum: Qualitative Social Research, vol. 3, no. 3, 2002, p. 2. 106 J. Thomas & A. Harden, ‘Methods for the thematic synthesis of qualitative research in systematic reviews.’ BMC Medical Research Methodology, 8, no. 45, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://bmcmedresmethodol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2288-8-45 71
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1.! Free coding of the original findings: Allocation of a ‘code’ to resources, activities, functions, behaviours, and attitudes (factors) that influence civil-military interaction and the outcomes that occur within a case study. 2.! Grouping of similar free codes (factors) into descriptive themes: Identify patterns of free codes across the three case studies; look for similarities and differences to start grouping them; map factors into a logic model of civil-military relationships and a concept map that specifies linkages between factors and outcomes. 3.! Generating analytical themes that emerge from and step beyond the descriptive themes: ‘going beyond’ by using the descriptive themes that emerged to develop a process model that demonstrates how to achieve the descriptive themes; answering the question of ‘what works.’
Thematic synthesis draws out key civil-military interaction concepts from the analysis process because it identifies concepts within the case studies and translates them into the others, with ‘translates’ being defined as the process of “taking concepts from one study and recognising the same concepts in another study, though they may not be expressed using identical words.”107 These concepts were then used to form categories, establish the boundaries of the categories, assign the segments to categories, summarise the content of each category and find negative evidence, with the overall “goal being to discern conceptual similarities, to refine the discriminative power of categories, and to discover patterns.”108
The purpose of this approach was to compare and contrast civil-military interaction within the case studies, develop codes and broader descriptive themes that are close to the studies, then examine cause and effect to generate interpretive constructs and explanations for how to ensure effective civil-military interaction. The approach answers the questions of ‘what works?’ by preserving an explicit and transparent link between the case studies and thematic conclusions.
107 ibid 108 R. Tesch, Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 96. 72
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One of the issues with synthesis of qualitative studies is deciding what to extract, referred to as ‘key concepts’ or ‘summaries of findings,’ especially where the case studies focus on description.109 This was overcome by identifying dimensions of the civil-military interface within Operation Philippines Assist, and then searching for these dimensions in Operation Pacific Assist 2015 and Operation Fiji Assist. This technique enabled the researcher to go beyond initial impressions of the data in a structured manner. This process improved the accuracy and reliability of building theory because it ensured a close fit with the data and contributed to internal validity through data source triangulation. It also enabled the capture of novel findings that may exist in the data.110
As this project is from the perspective of an insider researcher with direct experience in two of the case studies, the impact of personal relationships and organisational loyalty in data analysis and interpretation is acknowledged. This position strengthened the analysis because the context of participant’s responses were understood, including the complexities of working in a dynamic and uncertain environment with a focus on saving lives and providing immediate life-saving measures. To mitigate against the project unintentionally being driven towards positive results or a known outcome due to patterns expected in the data, the core of the research - a process model that presents a new way to conduct civil-military interaction during disaster management – was reviewed by Commodore Brett Sonter, who was the Joint Task Force Commander in Fiji, and a civilian humanitarian actor. This process ensured data analysis and conclusions were interrogated and challenged by independent subject matter experts. Credibility is further strengthened through acknowledging the data collection and analysis position as an insider researcher and reflecting how this may influence the research process.111
Logic Model Typically used within evaluation, a logic model visually depicts the relationships between resources, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact of a program with the purpose of reflecting intended effects. Chapter One demonstrated that civil-military relationships during disaster response are complex, and often uncertain, despite the myriad of policies, guidelines and framework that exist. A logic model was determined
109 J. Thomas & A. Harden, op. cit., p. 4. 110 K. Eisenhardt, op. cit., p. 541. 111 See J. Fleming, op. cit. 73
! to be an effective means to build a schematic representation of civil-military interaction, following data analysis, that can be used as a tool to understand causal connections.112
The use of a logic model within this study provides clarity of how civil-military interaction works in practice, in-turn illustrating outcomes that occur in a disaster response environment due to effective civilian and military dialogue and coordination. This is achieved by making key components of relationships explicit, which supports cross-case pattern search for consistent points of interaction. By specifying the logic underpinning civil-military activities, outcomes and causal links, a connection is made between civil-military interaction, how it works, and those involved, including motivations, behaviour and learning.113 It also provides a logical depiction of relationships based on sequential progression, which is used during model development.114
2.8 Model Development Drawing on the cross-case pattern search and logic model, a model is developed that addresses the research question at the core of this project – a civil-military interaction model that supports the conduct of an Australian response to international natural disasters. Scholar Michael Pidd defines a model as “an external and explicit representation of part of reality as seen by the people who wish to use that model to understand, to change, to manage and to control that part of reality.” 115
Different types of models can be used to explain phenomena, including variance, process and conceptual models. Scholar Lawrence Mohr116 presents an overview of variance and process models. The objective of a variance model is to identify causal relationships between independent variables (potential predictors) and dependent variables (outcomes) in order to generalise knowledge through predicting patterns of phenomena across situations.117 In contrast, a process model focuses on determining sequential conditions
112 See Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence, Developing and Using Program Logic: A Guide. New South Wales Ministry of Health, Population and Public Health Division, 2017, p. 9. Viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.health.nsw.gov.au/research/Publications/developing-program-logic.pdf 113 ibid 114 ibid 115 M. Pidd, Tools for Thinking: Modelling in Management Sciences, Wiley, Chichester, 1996, p. 15. 116 See L. Mohr, Explaining Organizational Behavior, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1982. 117 M. Newman and D. Robey, ‘A Social Process Model of Use-Analyst Relationship.’ MIS Quarterly, vol. 16, no.2, June 1992, p. 249-266. 74
! necessary to explain how and why outcomes occur, which links back to building understanding what works in civil-military interaction. Discrete outcomes are generated from the patterns that emerge from the data, which are then used to explain effective interaction.
The usefulness of a conceptual model was also considered for this project based on Sheppard's118 research on in-field responses to natural disaster relief in the developing world. His research developed a conceptual model that outlines a way to improve how local populations prepare for, and respond to, natural disasters. These different models are mapped below in Table 13 and Figure 11. Variance Model Process Model Conceptual Model Time Static Longitudinal Study-specific
Definition The cause is necessary Causation consists of Proposed causal and sufficient for the necessary conditions in linkages among a set outcome sequence; chance and of concepts believed to random events play a role be related to a particular problem; presentation of multi- level causality. Assumptions Outcome will invariably Outcomes may not occur Visual representation occur when necessary and (even when conditions are of the elements of a sufficient conditions are present) theory present Elements Variables Discrete outcomes Variables Logical If X, then Y; if more X, If not X, then not Y; cannot Organising and Form then more Y be extended to “more X” or integrating information “more Y” Table 13: Comparison of research models 119
Figure 11: Comparison of Variance and Process Models 120
118 A. Sheppard, op. cit. 119 Adapted from S. Rietjens, op. cit., p.11 and M. Newman and D. Robey, op. cit. 120 A. Burton-Jones, E. McLean & E. Monod, ‘Theoretical perspectives in IS research: from variance and process to conceptual latitude and conceptual fit.’ European Journal of Information Systems, vol. 24, November 2015, p. 666. 75
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As reflected in Chapter One, civil-military relationships during disaster management are complex, operate at different levels and are informed by a wide range of coordination structures. This makes a process model best suited for this study because it presents dimensions (or 'precursors') necessary for effective civil-military interaction but also recognises that whilst they may be insufficient to 'cause' an effective outcome, presence is necessary for the outcome to occur.121
Lawrence Mohr122 likens this approach to a ‘recipe’ where necessary conditions can form a satisfactory causal explanation when they are sequentially linked together in such a manner to detail how the outcome occurs whenever it does occur. Adopting process theory is consistent with the disaster relief operation literature and processes because it recognises that more than one cause is necessary to generate an effective civil-military cooperation outcome. A characteristic of this approach is also that it acknowledges that chance and random events can contribute to an effective outcome.
The external validity of the model is strengthened using replication logic, where factors of effective civil-military interaction were confirmed across cases. Scholars Tony Hak and Jan Dul123 highlight the challenges with replication logic, noting it is not often possible within research and there is “no actual published example of an actual case of replication.” Instead, replication was claimed where two or more of the cases supported the same theory.124
To strengthen the generalisability of this project, which builds a process model wholly from civil-military interaction during natural disaster response, an examination is undertaken of civil-military interaction in different situations. Specifically, Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Africa Ebola Outbreak and the Mosul Offensive (also known as the Battle for Mosul). The purpose of situating the model in this manner is to ‘test’ it by determining how applicable it is to other situations.
121 See L. Markus & D. Robey, ‘Information Technology and Organizational Change: Causal Structure in Theory and Research.’ Management Science, vol. 34, iss. 5, May 1988. 122 L. Mohr, op. cit., 1982. 123 T. Hak and J. Dul, ‘Theory-Building With Cases,’ in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, A. Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (eds), SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2012, p. 3. 124 R. Yin, op. cit., p. 38.! 76
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2.9 Research Limitations This study adopts a broad definition of ‘civil-military interaction’ which results in a need to cover two interfaces – civilian and ADF interaction within an Australian response, and civilian and ADF interaction external to an Australian response. Actors that fall within the former category are Australian government agencies and organisations, such as DFAT, DART and AUSMAT. External civilian actors include affected nation authorities, agencies and communities, International NGOs such as the UN, NGOs, the private sector and spontaneous volunteers. These civilian actors all interface with the ADF at different levels, at different times, using different communication and coordination means. This complexity and scope made mapping and explaining the relationships difficult, especially where there were differences in the maturity and predictability of relationships. Despite this limitation, it was determined that the foundations of effective civil-military relationships are the same and this has formed the process model in the research.
The selection of case studies dating back to 2013, 2015 and 2016 is another recognised limitation of the research. During data collection, interviewees in Vanuatu and Fiji noted that much had matured since these responses, including more effective use of the cluster system during responses to subsequent natural disasters. Conducting interviews in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji was an effective means to address this limitation because it provided a means to gain an understanding of changes made to coordination structures, national plans and operating procedures. While they are dated, the extreme nature of the cases meant the knowledge they generated can be aligned to a future characterised by complexity, uncertainty and unanticipated situations. This makes them particularly valuable to demonstrate what future civil-military interaction needs may be.
2.10 Summary This chapter presented the research strategy underpinning this project using Crotty’s conceptualisation of social research that maps the worldview, theoretical lens, methodological approach and methods of data collection that underpin this project. At the core of this research is using Eisenhardt's approach to building theory using three case studies centred on Australia’s response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Tropical Cyclone Pam and Tropical Cyclone Winston. The project is strengthened through case study protocol, and within and cross-case analysis. This chapter also discussed the 77
! theoretical lens of the project, which is a merged 'security-strategic- and 'functional- humanitarian' approach to military involvement in disaster response, which is considerate of the increasing role and frequency of militaries in disaster response operations, especially within the Indo-Pacific region.
78
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Chapter Three Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) – Philippines – Operation Philippines Assist
On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as ‘Yolanda’) made landfall in the Eastern Visayas region of the Republic of the Philippines (the ‘Philippines’). Yolanda is considered to be one of the strongest typhoons ever recorded, with wind speed reaching up to 315 km/hour at its peak and a storm surge of 5-6 metres.1 Causing widespread damage, the final situation report from the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) stated over 16 million people were affected by Yolanda, with more than 4 million people displaced.2 The number of people who died reached 6,300, with over 1,000 missing and 28,000 injured. A total of 44 provinces, 591 municipalities, and 57 cities were impacted.3
Figure 12: Typhoon Haiyan Map of Affected Areas 4
1 N. Mori, et al, ‘Local amplification of storm surge by Super Typhoon Haiyan in Leyte Gulf.’ Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 41, iss, 14, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2014GL060689 2 ASEAN, Weathering the Perfect Storm - Lessons Learnt on the ASEAN’s Response to the Aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, ASEAN Secretariat, October 2014, p.3, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.rcrc- resilience-southeastasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Weathering-the-Perfect-Storm-lowres.pdf 3 J. Trajano, Building Resilience from Within: Enhancing Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Post-Haiyan Philippines,’ Centre for Non Traditional Security Studies Report No. 6, December 2016, p. 7. 4 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘Typhon Haiyan – Map of affected persons by province.’ Viewed on 29 December 2019, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/Typhoon%20Haiyan%20Map.pdf 79
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As an exploratory case study, this chapter provides a chronological description of the Australian whole-of-government response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) to provide a rich description of the civil-military interaction that occurred. Its purpose is to outline when, where and how the ADF interacted with civilian actors to identify the nature of interaction that occurred, including establishment of relationships and frameworks, practices and procedures used. Within-case analysis identified four broad themes that influenced civil-military interaction during Operation Philippines Assist – preparation, leadership, capability and coordination structures.5 This chapter groups these factors and presents them aligned, as closely as possible, to an operational chronology.
The data in this chapter was gathered from semi-structured interviews with four ADF commanders and two DFAT personnel who were involved in the planning and conduct of Operation Philippines Assist, operational documentation and after action/lessons learned reviews, and a period of fieldwork in Tacloban and Ormoc in August 2018. The fieldwork included visiting 10 schools which the ADF assisted and conducting semi- structured interviews with 22 indigenous teachers who had interacted with the ADF. 6 In Tacloban, semi-structured interviews were also conducted with indigenous medical staff - a nurse and doctor - who worked at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Centre and interacted with the AUSMAT. To enable participants to speak freely, especially military personnel, handwritten notes were taken for all interviews. A translator was used when required during the fieldwork phase.
As an insider researcher with experience in this case study as an ADF member, pre- existing knowledge is that parts of the ADF response (the Joint Task Force) had dedicated and systematic engagement with civilian actors, both within and external to the whole- of-government response. Other elements of the ADF (the Air Component Coordination Element) response relied heavily on personnel with previous operational experience and knowledge rather than having a preparation period or a procedural means of conducting interaction. This research position supported access to three ADF members to interview,
5 Governance is defined in this project as the coordination structures, mechanisms and practices that bring together civilian and military stakeholders to achieve consensus-based decision making and actions. 6 In order of attendance these schools were Ipil Central School, San Antonio Elementary School, Macabug Elementary School, Lorenzo Y. Palou Elementary School, Linao Central School, New Ormoc City National High School, Cogan Central School, San Pablo Elementary School, Concepcion Elementary School and Liloan Central School. 80
! with snowball sampling used as an alternate strategy to recruit additional ADF members and DFAT personnel to broader the depth of participation. Fieldwork was conducted at schools identified from the Joint Task Force (JTF) Post Operation Report, with the researcher having no previous interaction with the participants.
Overall, the civil-military interaction that occurred in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan is consistently considered to have been "well-coordinated and effective"7 and "one of the better examples of large-scale disaster response operations."8 The data captured during a survey of humanitarian actors supported "anecdotal accounts that the coordination between civilian and military actors during the disaster relief efforts in Typhoon Haiyan worked well."9 Humanitarian actors perceived that military assets "enabled more efficient delivery of aid to populations in need," "civil-military coordination functioned well" and "civil-military engagement had a positive outcomes for local communities"10 However, it has also been noted that there was much to learn from the response, and civil-military interaction processes have changed based on this experience.11 This chapter details this learning to build a new way of conducting civil-military interaction during disaster management.
3.1 National Context There are historical and cultural considerations for civil-military coordination in the Philippines, with the roles and responsibilities of actors influenced by the Nation's political and colonial legacy.12 The national context of the Philippines is provided to reflect the situation that civilian and military actors were working within.
7 V. Bollettino, ‘Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan.’ Disaster Medicine and Public Health, vol. 10, no. 1, February 2016, p. 9. 8 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, Advances in Civil-Military Coordination in Catastrophes: How the Philippines Turned Lessons Learned from Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Into Best Practices for Disaster Preparedness and Response, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 2015, p.14, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.rcrc-resilience-southeastasia.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/01/2014-CFE-Advances-in-Civil-Military-Coordination-in-Catastrophes-How-the- Philippines-Turned-Lessons-Learned-from-Super-Typhoon-Ha.pdf 9 V. Bollettino, op. cit., p.9 10 ibid 11 J. Trajano, op. cit, p.3 12 ibid, p. 8. 81
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The Philippines is a middle-income country with strong national capacities and a well- developed disaster management system.13 The legal framework for disaster management is the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010/Republic Act 10121, May 2010 (PDRRM Act (2010)). The PDRRM Act (2010) governs the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and establishes the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), which is responsible for national policy and coordination for disasters.14 Member agencies of the NDRRMC include government, non-government, civil sector and private sector organisations authorised under the Act.
The Philippines government has a National Disaster Response Plan focused on hydro- meteorological hazards (typhoons, tropical storms, flooding). Developed by the Office of Civil Defense in consultation with NDRRMC agencies, it outlines national-level coordination processes and mechanisms along three phases - pre-disaster, during disaster and post disaster. Local authorities are delegated responsibility to develop local response plans meaning that the disaster management system is decentralised, with local authorities accountable for aspects of disaster management.15
Importantly for civil-military interaction, the Plan details the roles and responsibilities of responding agencies, including foreign militaries.16 Chapter 3 Section 3.2.3 outlines that international assistance is to be coordinated by the NDRRMC using the cluster system.17 As outlined in Chapter One, a key tool to enable civil-military coordination is the activation of clusters, which brings together likeminded organisations in main sectors of humanitarian action - health; logistics; nutrition; protection; shelter, sanitation and hygiene; camp coordination and camp management; early recovery; education;
13 D. Carden & A. Jonathan Clements, ‘The Typhoon Haiyan Response: Coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan.’ Humanitarian Exchange, no. 63, January 2015, p. 3, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/humanitarian-exchange-63-special-feature-the-typhoon-haiyan- response 14 G. Martinez, Civil-Military-Police Coordination in Disaster Management: Perspectives from South East Asian Countries. Australian Civil-Military Centre and Humanitarian Advisory Group, 2018, p. 62, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-08/Civil-Military- Police_Coordination_in_Disarster%20Man_xx.pdf 15 ibid, p. 63. 16 ibid 17 ibid, p. 64. 82
! emergency telecommunications; and food security - to provide assistance to populations based on their needs in these sectors.
While the Philippines communicates its humanitarian needs through the Department of Foreign Affairs, the NDRRMC acts as the coordination point between donors and recipients of foreign and local donations.18 During an international response, the Council will initiate a 'one-stop-shop' to facilitate the arrival of international assistance. Headed by the Bureau of Customs and the Department of Finance, the facility includes all relevant NDRRMC agencies with the purpose of expediting the documentation and processing of international assistance.19 Military-to-military assistance is managed bilaterally by the Department of National Defense, in collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs, and coordinated through a Multinational Coordination Centre (MNCC).20
The modern Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was established under the National Defence Act by the United States colonial authorities in 1935 and its primary role was internal security, with the U.S. responsible for external security. In the 1990s, police functions and personnel were transitioned from the AFP to the newly established Philippine National Police (PNP) within the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Under the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganisation Act of 1998, the legislated role of the police became maintaining peace and order, and law enforcement., However the AFP retained the role of primary responder in event of a disaster and is fully integrated into the Philippines disaster management system.21 During natural disaster response in the Philippines, this means a historical basis for civil-military relations has evolved whereby military involvement in disaster response is recognised as essential, however civilian policy and authority directs military deployment, activities, tasking, reporting procedures and operational timelines.22
18 Philippine Government, National Disaster Response Plan for Hydro-Meteorological Disaster, 2014, Chapter 2-10. 19 G. Martinez, op. cit., p.64. 20 ibid 21 ibid, p. 59. 22 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 12 83
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3.2 Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Typhoon Haiyan started as a tropical storm on 3 November 2013, with the system upgraded and given the international name Haiyan on 4 November. Haiyan made landfall in Palau and parts of Micronesia on 6 November before entering the Philippines on 7 November and being assigned the local name of Yolanda. As it reached the east coast of the Philippines and made landfall in Eastern Samar at 0440 local time on 8 November 2013, Haiyan produced sustained winds of 315 kilometres per hour, the highest ever recorded at the time. After impacting the Philippines, it tracked towards Vietnam and made landfall in north-east Vietnam with winds of 120 kilometres per hour. From 11 November, Haiyan weakened as it crossed into southern China and dissipated over Guanxi.23
The intensity and impact of Typhoon Haiyan were of "unusually high magnitude"24 and it affected the whole of the Philippines. The primary effects, those resulting directly from the event itself, were caused by the physical factors of storm surge, high wind speeds and heavy rain. The storm surge reached five to six metres in height on parts of the Leyte and Samar coasts, including Tacloban City. The death toll was over 6,300 and many of these casualties occurred in Tacloban due to the storm surge.25
The typhoon hit the Philippines at a time when its domestic resources were at a low after responding to a rebellion in Zamboanga and an earthquake in Bohol.26 The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance reflected that these crises compounded, resulting in Typhoon Haiyan incapacitating all first responders and exposing the limitations of "existing contingency plans."27 The scale and impact of the destruction, coupled with the challenges and demands of the resulting emergency situation, tested the entire region's procedures and mechanisms.28 In the aftermath, then Secretary to the Philippines Cabinet Rene Almendras was quoted in the media stating
23 ArcGIS, ‘Typhoon Haiyan.’ No date, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=bba35e41b8da423498ae3bf461e161c8 24 ibid 25 ibid 26 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit., p. 8 and J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 3. 27 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit, p. 8. 28 ASEAN, op. cit., p. 4. 84
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"Please understand, there has never been anything at the magnitude of what we are trying to do now—not in size, not in volume, not in even the breadth of it."29
3.3 Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the international community came to the aid of the Philippines and this part of the chapter outlines the civil-military interaction that occurred and the national level. Colonel Ben Basio, at the time Defense and Armed Forces of the Philippines Defense Attaché to Thailand, stated that the response was "one of the most complex international relief operations in the Asia-Pacific region with 57 contributing countries." 30 The Government of the Philippines and the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) conducted early coordination to make preparations in response to Haiyan prior to it making landfall, with a United National Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) deploying to Manila to position for travel into affected areas.31
To support the response, the Government of the Philippines accepted the UN offer of international assistance on 9 November 2013, a day after the typhoon hit.32 This was followed on 11 November 2013 with President Aquino declaring a national state of calamity across all Haiyan-affected provinces and, on the recommendation of the NDRRMC, calling for international assistance.33 Coordination was hampered early on by the Philippines not submitting the necessary documentation to formally request foreign assistance to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management, the AHA Centre.34 This reflects the importance of adhering to existing and systematic mechanisms to effective govern coordination.
The response from the international humanitarian community was swift, with the severity of the disaster activating an IASC Humanitarian System-Wide Level 3 (L3) Response on
29 N. Gutierrez, ‘Palace aware of slow relief: ‘We’re moving.’’ Rappler, 14 November 2013, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.rappler.com/nation/43658-palace-slow-relief-moving-yolanda 30 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit, p. 14. 31 T. Hanley, et al, IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response, Inter- Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, October 2014, p. 4, viewed on 20 January 2020, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/evaluation_report_iahe_haiyan_december_2016.p df 32 UN-CMCoord, ‘After Action Review on the Humanitarian-Military/Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, Philippines.’ 25 March 2014, p. 3, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7ptUi-k6twmd1poY1AzcEsyZlk/edit 33 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 13. 34 ibid 85
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12 November. This was the first time a natural disaster had been declared an L3 emergency, with the designation reflective of the highest level of a humanitarian crisis.35 The L3 response triggered an IASC 'Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Activation.' The activation prompted the deployment of over 450 international staff deploying to the Philippines within three weeks and OCHA establishing its "largest sustained civil- military coordination operation to date."36
3.3.1 National Response Early media reports claimed that the government of the Philippines was overwhelmed by the scale and the disaster and the United States Pacific Command had stepped in to coordinate the relief operation.37 However, it appears that the "Philippine government's operational logic clashed with that of the international system ... inhibiting effective coordination." 38 This issue was identified by Philip Dy and Tori Stephens based on four domains: locus of control, accountability and pressure to deliver, timelines for relief and recovery, and coordination processes.39 The Philippine Government and international response coordination processes were not initially aligned, with the international community implementing an L3 response, which paralleled government structures and brought a surge of staff and resources without clear guidance on respective authorities and responsibilities.40
Both the Philippine government and the humanitarian community were under scrutiny and pressure to effectively respond to the disaster. This led them to prioritise their own objectives and intra-institution coordination over broader Philippine coordination efforts of the international response.41 The resources which followed the L3 activation also took
35 D. Carden & A. Jonathan Clements, op. cit., p. 3. 36 ibid 37 I. McPhedran, ‘Relief ship HMAS Tobruk leaves Townsville bound for the Philippines.’ News.com.au, 18 November 2013, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.news.com.au/relief-ship-hmas-tobruk- leaves-townsville-bound-for-the-philippines/news-story/64b92b1d1d878d649530bbce66af5c63 38 P. Dy & T. Stephens, The Typhoon Haiyan Response: Strengthening Coordination among Philippine Government, Civil Society and International Actors, Program on Crisis Leadership Discussion Paper Series, March 2016, p. iv., viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/research- initiatives/crisisleadership/files/Dy_and_Stephens.pdf 39 ibid, p. iv-v. 40 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘IAHE Haiyan – HPC and Empowered Leadership.’ No date, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/evaluations/iahe- recommendations-database/iahe-haiyan-hpc-and-empowered-leadership 41 P. Dy & T. Stephens, op. cit., p. 41. 86
! some time to integrate into the relief response. This caused misalignment between the Philippine and international community timelines for transition to recovery, because the government was focused on transition to a recovery phase as early as possible, ahead of the international response's schedule.42
The Philippine government expected international organisations to coordinate through its structures during the Haiyan response. However, the international community enacted its own structures and worked within them rather than deal with government structures that were considered to have "uneven capacities."43 It was identified that in establishing new processes, the international response did not align with existing government systems and was not considerate of the system of devolution in the Philippines which delegates responsibilities to local authorities.44
Furthermore, provincial governments were largely bypassed during the response, although they are mandated to coordinate humanitarian assistance and act as intermediaries between national and municipal governments under Section 12 of the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act.45 As a result, it is assessed that the international response was not fully effective in coordinating with national and local governments and organisations who were not part of the cluster system, such as the private sector, because it didn't understand or engage with local governance structures. 46 This identified the need for a L3 activation to be tailored to an affected government's disaster management framework and capacity, including providing opportunity for local ownership from the commencement of the response by involving local government staff in cluster meetings to leverage collective knowledge and experience.47
Despite these points, it was evaluated overall that there was "relatively good alignment" between the Philippines National Cluster System and the International Cluster System. Where misalignment arose it was because "roles and responsibilities in co-leadership
42 ibid, p. v. 43 ibid 44 G. Walter, et al, Evaluation of DFID’s Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), UK Department of International Development, May 2015, p. 7, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/50122 5/Eval-Humanitarian-Response-Typhoon-Haiyan.pdf 45 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 8. 46 G. Walter, et al, op cit, p. 7. 47 P. Dy & T. Stephens, op. cit., p. vi and G. Walter, et al, op cit., p. 7.! 87
! were not clearly defined, nor were they adjusted to the scale of the disaster and response."48
3.3.2 Natural Disaster Response Plan To govern the response to Haiyan, a ‘Haiyan Action Plan’ was produced on 12 November based on available government data and key informant interviews. Municipal and Regional Plans produced using initial damage and needs assessments requested from local government units on 25 November.49 The HCT also released a Humanitarian Action Plan within four days of the typhoon making landfall.50 However, these efforts were deemed to be inadequate, resulting in the absence of a comprehensive disaster response plan to facilitate a coordinated response by national and local level officials and agencies.51
A comprehensive and practiced national disaster response plan would have addressed some of the key issues that arose in the aftermath of Haiyan. First, there was a need to put have coordination measures in place if first responders become victims of a disaster. It became evident in Tacloban, one of the heaviest hit areas, that local authorities who were designated first responders became victims of the disaster themselves. National authorities stepped in to coordinate the relief efforts, however there was no clear chain of command, which hampered the coordination of government agencies and local and foreign humanitarian groups.52
Secondly, some organisations bypassed national coordination efforts and arrived quickly into affected communities but took different approaches to coordinate with municipal governments. In addition, civil society organisations hadn't maintained formal partnerships with local governments, believing they were out of touch with civil society needs and not visible enough in the early response. Without a planned approach and
48 T. Hanley, et al, op. cit, p. 40. 49 Reliefweb, ‘Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Action Plan November 2013.’ 12 November 2013, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-typhoon-haiyan-action-plan- november-2013 50 T. Hanley, et al, op. cit., p 4. 51 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 3. 52 ibid, p.14. 88
! established relationships, local governments found it challenging to know which organisations were working within their jurisdiction. 53
3.3.3 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) During the response an important governing body was the NDRRMC, who was responsible for the "development of coordination mechanisms and the identification of activities to achieve coherence in the implementation of disaster risk reduction and management ... policies."54 The Council was tasked to lead civil-military coordination because of its responsibilities for the welfare and protection of people affected by disasters or emergencies.55 Despite the Council's role, there was an absence of a system which coordinated all stakeholders during the Haiyan response.56 As a result, one of the recommendations that emerged from the response was the need to establish a national- level civil-military coordination mechanism.57
3.3.4 Multinational Coordination Centres (MNCC) The AFP was able to achieve effective military-military cooperation at the national level through the establishment of an MNCC in Manila at the AFP staff college to manage relief efforts and coordinate participating nations. The MNCC put in place a "collaborative planning and execution mechanism that prioritised the enormous needs with available capabilities from the militaries."58 The MNCC became an effective mechanism for contributing countries to discuss movement and distribution of aid on naval and air assets. Importantly, the centre acted to de-conflict airspace, air corridors and landing times to manage the arrival of foreign aid and assets.59
A Command Coordination Centre (CCC) was initially established by the AFP and US as a bilateral HADR mechanism to support military-military cooperation at a regional level.60 As the number of foreign militaries increased, the AFP converted the CCC into
53 ibid! 54 ibid, p.12 55 UN-CMCoord, op. cit., p. 2. 56 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 14. 57 UN-CMCoord, op. cit., p. 2. 58 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 16. 59 Brigadier Peter Gates, ‘Australia’s experience in humanitarian aid and disaster relief: Avenue for Confidence Building.’ No date, viewed on 01 January 2020, http://news.ntu.edu.sg/SAFNTU/Documents/Panel%205%20-%20Brigadier%20Peter%20Gates.pdf 60 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 15. 89
! a MNCC, positioned at Mactan airport, Cebu to coordinate the 57 contributing countries and 29 foreign militaries (Table 14 and Figure 13) that were providing assistance. Prior to the MNCCs being established, there were no coordinating mechanisms for international responders, including foreign militaries. This caused the AFP to struggle "to manage, synchronize, coordinate, and de-conflict the operations and efforts of foreign forces,"61 which was exacerbated by some nations taking guidance on activities from their respective embassies in Manila or from national aid agencies, such as USAID.62
Assets Deployed AFP Foreign Militaries Total Sea Vessels 46 29 75 Aircraft 46 145 191 Personnel 25,526 15,400 40,926
Table 14: Summary of AFP and Foreign Military Assets Deployed in Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan63
Figure 13: Foreign Military Deployed Assets in the Philippines, December 201364
61 I. Chiu et al, Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, January 2014, p. 24. 62 ibid 63 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit, p. 14 citing United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Multinational Planning Augmentation Team. 64 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Philippines: Foreign Military Deployed Assets (as of 30 December 2013).’ 30 December 2013, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-foreign-military-deployed-assets-30-december-2013 90
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The MNCC at Cebu was designated as a 'one-stop shop' to receive and process travel and clearance documents from international responders. Nightly briefings with foreign military commanders during the first few days of operation were ad hoc, however these briefings became regular daily coordination meetings once processes were put in place. The use of an MNCC as a coordination mechanism resulted in the activities of foreign militaries being systematic, organised and timely, which accelerated the delivery of relief items and evacuation of survivors from the affected areas.65 The coordination and employment of military assets were clearly optimised through a dedicated coordination mechanism.66 Overall, the military-military interaction that occurred through the MNCCs was an effective precursor to civil-military interaction during the response because it consolidated military asset capability, capacity and availability before making this information available to civilian actors to request assistance.
During an interview with UN OCHA conducted in the Philippines, it was stated that bilateral military-military assistance can bypass OCHA, which is what occurred during the response to Typhoon Haiyan. This situation means that OCHA has reduced knowledge of foreign militaries arriving to provide assistance and as a result, they cannot integrate these militaries into coordination structures.67 The interviewee stated that there is a need for information to flow more effectively from military-military coordination forums into civil-military forums, such as the cluster system.
3.4 Australian Whole-of-Government Response On 9 November 2013, in the immediate aftermath of Haiyan, the Australian Government committed emergency relief supplies. To further assist, an ADF operation named ‘Operation Philippines Assist,’ was initiated on 11 November to commence planning for the deployment of personnel and assets to the area. The first military airlift was conducted on 13 November, when a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130J Hercules and C- 17A Globemaster III transported a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Crisis Response Team (CRT), an ADF Support and Response Team (SRT) and an Australian Medical Assistance Team (AusMAT) into the Philippines. In line with their
65 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 16. 66 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit, p. 14 67 UN OCHA Philippines, interview with author, August 2018. 91
! purpose, these teams rapidly deployed, gained situational awareness for DFAT and the ADF, and provided planning and liaison expertise to support follow-on Australian personnel and assets.
The Government of the Philippines formalised their request for assistance from the Australian Government on 14 November, whereby a second C-130J was deployed and a RAAF Air Coordination Component Element (ACCE) established on 15 November 2013. A Joint Task Force (JTF) from Navy and Army, consisting of HMAS Tobruk and an Engineer Recovery Support Force (RSF), arrived to assist with relief efforts on 23 November. The Australian response and humanitarian assistance package progressively increased to reach a total value of AUD $102 million. This package is mapped in Table 15 below.
Assistance Figure (AUD) Disaster Response & Humanitarian Assistance 2 x rotations of AusMAT $3.4 million Tacloban City UN Action Plan $19.25 million 1.! UN Children's Fund 1.! $7 million 2.! UNOCHA 2.! $1 million 3.! UN Population Fund 3.! $1.25 million 4.! World Food Programme 4.! $5 million 5.! World Health Organization 5.! $5 million Red Cross $7 million 1.! Australian Red Cross 1.! $3 million 2.! International Committee of the Red Cross 2.! $4 million •! Australian Federal Police Disaster Victim $600,000 Management Specialists and equipment •! DFAT Humanitarian and Consular Experts Australian NGOs $5 million Philippine Non-Government Partners $3.75 million Community and Family Services International $500,000 Handicap International $250,000 Catholic Relief Services $1.5 million Gawad Kalinga $1 million Philippine Red Cross $500,000 Emergency Relief Stores $1 million Prepositioned Stores $390,5000 1.! Philippines Red Cross 1.! $342,500 2.! United Nations Population Fund 2.! $48,000 Medical consumables and pharmaceuticals to the $65,000 Philippines Health Department ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Affairs $50,000 (AHA Centre) Defence Force and Police Assets
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HMAS Tobruk $30 milllion •! Amphibious watercraft •! Helicopter Air Component Coordination Element •! 2 x C-130J based at Mactan Airport, Cebu •! C17 Flights Engineer Element (Recovery Support Force) Australian Federal Police •! Disaster Victim management specialists and equipment and training of Philippine counterparts Recovery and Rehabilitation Government of Philippines $31 million •! Delivered through existing programs Basic Education Support Transformation Program $20 million •! Department of Education National Community Driven Development Program $3 million •! Department of Education Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program $4 million Climate Change Commission and UNDP $3 million Replenishment of pre-positioned stocks with WFP and $1 million UNFPA Table 15: Australian Commitment to Typhoon Haiyan Response68
From the perspective of the ADF, which is the organisational lens of the project, the civil- military interface during Operation Philippines Assist was characterised by two relationships. Firstly ADF interaction with other government agencies within the Australian response, and secondly ADF interaction with the broad range of domestic and international civilian responders external to the Australian response. Doctrinally, civil- military interaction is deliberate or opportunistic, with actions focusing on engagement with the purpose of disseminating information and enhancing civil-military cooperation, military freedom of action and the legitimacy of the mission.69
Analysis of the interviews conducted with the JTF Commander, ACCE Commander, and Commander RSF identified that the civil-military relationships which formed at the tactical level, both within the Australian response and externally, were deliberate and anticipated. This means that dedicated ADF effort and capability went into interaction to ensure ongoing and consistent dialogue, coordination and cooperation,70 and this will be
68 Australian Embassy, The Philippines, ‘Australia’s Response to Typhoon Yolanda.’ No date, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://philippines.embassy.gov.au/mnla/TyphoonYolandaTyphoonYolanda.html 69 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6: Civil-Military Cooperation, 2017, p. 58, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/lwd_3-8-6_civil- military_cooperation_interim.pdf?acsf_files_redirect 70 JTF Commander, ACCE Commander, Commander RSF, interviews with author, 2018 -2019. 93
! outlined aligned to key characteristics of the response including configuration, leadership and mission within the broader themes of preparation, culture, governance, and capability.
3.4.1 ADF Response – Operation Philippines Assist As outlined above in Table 15, Australia supported the Philippines with a mixture of civilian and military capabilities. The ADF deployed three force elements: an SRT, ACCE and JTF630, as per Figure 14 below. The SRT and ACCE were located at Cebu- Mactan Airport, the HQJTF and RSF located at Ormoc, and HMAS Tobruk initially operating in Ormoc Bay, before delivering HADR stores around the Visayan Sea to Bantayan.
Figure 14: Operation Philippines Assist Command and Control Structure 71
In terms of a whole-of-government response, DFAT personnel were co-located with the ACCE in Cebu for the early stages of the response, prior to returning to Manila. DFAT personnel were co-located with the JTF for the duration of the response. AusMAT were transported into the Philippines via Cebu before being establishing a hospital in Tacloban. The location of Australian Elements are visualised below in Figure 15.
71 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, op. cit., Annex A. 94
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Figure 15: Location of Australian Elements72
3.4.2 Preparation Preparation to conduct Operation Philippines Assist and civil-military interaction varied across the ADF, most notably between the ACCE and RSF. One member of the ACCE published an account of his experiences, stating for disaster relief operations at the time "there [was] no RSO&I, no handover/takeover, no SOPs, SIs or BLIs73 and no one to tell you what to do: it becomes a matter of making it up as you go along, and coming up with novel solutions to problems."74 This was reinforced by the ACCE Commander in an interview for this project, who stated that this situation led to ad hoc interaction in the initial stages of the response.
The need for coordination was recognised by civilian and military actors, however there were no mechanisms or procedures in place to achieve it, including within RAAF standard operating procedures.75 This caused RAAF personnel to operate outside of established procedures to meet mission requirements.76 The absence of military disaster response coordination procedures and a lack of mutual understanding between civilian
72 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Philippines: civil-military coordination in humanitarian response.’ Philippines Humanitarian Bulletin, iss. 6, June 2016, viewed on 05 January 2020, https://ochaimphil.github.io/Humanitarian-Bulletin/HumBulletinJune2016.html 73 The following acronyms were used - RSO&I - Reception, Staging, Onforwarding and Integration; SOPs - Standard operating procedures, SIs - Standing Instructions, BLI - Base level instructions. 74 RAAF Operations Officer Newsletter, July 2014, p. 6. Internal Defence Document. 75 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018. 76 ibid 95
! and military actors led to the first few days being spent learning respective capability and processes, including the civilian cluster system and military planning processes. The time spent sharing this knowledge was observed by the ACCE Commander to decrease the efficiency in the delivery of aid until mutual understanding and a robust system was developed.77
In comparison, the RSF had a period of time to prepare while embarked on HMAS Tobruk and they received a package of briefings on the Philippines.78 The briefings consisted of public affairs and media awareness, health and medical training, a Philippine cultural and lingual brief, mental health training and intelligence updates. Some personnel also received self-defence training in preparation for crowd control and crowd containment.79 In addition, RSF Troop Sergeants and the 2IC studied humanitarian assistance/disaster relief doctrine, resources and publications to gain a greater understanding of the potential environment the RSF would be working in.80
Analysis of the interviews conducted with ADF personnel who deployed to the Philippines and operational documentation reflects there are benefits of conducting preparation for disaster response. However, there were variances identified in the type of preparation that best suits disaster response operations, including specialist training like CIMIC training. It was fortuitous that the RSF sailed and had time to access and apply knowledge, however other elements were on air transport, which clearly reduced their timelines to access knowledge. This 'just in time' approach to knowledge management reflects the need for a more systematic training package in support of disaster relief operations.
In addition to knowledge of the Philippines and other actors, there was a need to have an understanding of their own capabilities, roles and responsibilities. Whilst embarked on HMAS Tobruk, the RSF 2IC spent time understanding the capability and limitations of the elements which were supporting the RSF. These elements included medics’ ability to
77 ibid 78 Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February, 2019 and Commander Recovery Support Force, ‘War Diary – Operation Philippines Assist 2013.’ 20 December 2013, p. 7. Provided to author – not publicly available. 79 Commander Recovery Support Force, op. cit., p. 7. 80 ibid 96
! provide primary health care treatment; environmental health in support of local communities, such as mosquito fogging and dealing with environmental threats; and available communication capability to ensure that voice and strategic communication plans were linked in with the joint force.81 Troop Commanders also confirmed their key capabilities by assessing what capability bricks could best achieve the required engineering effect for anticipated tasks.82 Knowledge of own capability was identified as critical on arrival into Ormoc because it ensured roles and responsibilities were known and adhered to, and contributed to managing the expectations of other stakeholders.83
More broadly than the Australian response, actors who responded to Haiyan had significant levels of professional experience, but modest levels of exposure to civil- military training or participation in joint exercises.84 This may go some way to explaining why just under half were familiar with the ‘Oslo Guidelines’. This was considered 'notably low' by scholar Vincenzo Bollettino because the Oslo Guidelines are considered a leading policy instrument that informs civil-military engagement.85 These findings suggest that better communication is required to ensure the guidelines are known and are being effectively incorporated into training.86
3.4.3 Capability The configuration of the ADF capability that deployed, as per Figure 14, in terms of immediate response teams, composition and location, was identified during within-case analysis to influence civil-military interaction because they support building relationships and commence early information sharing. These factors will be discussed below to reflect how capability decisions can contribute to deliberate, dedicated and systematic civil-military interaction to enhance disaster response.
81 Commander Recovery Support Force, op. cit., p. 7. 82 ibid 83 Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February, 2019. 84 V. Bollettino, ‘Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan.’ Disaster Medicine and Public Health, vol. 10, no. 1, February 2016, p. 8. 85 ibid 86 ibid 97
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3.4.3.1 Immediate Response Teams A CRT and SRT, from DFAT and the ADF respectively, arrived on 13 November 2013. This rapid deployment of small, expert civilian and military teams built relationships, coordinated the arrival of follow-on elements and achieved early engagement with national authorities in the Philippines to identify their needs.
The SRT comprised members from the RAAF and Army who acted as liaison officers in Cebu and Tacloban to ensure the ADF and AUSMAT deployments met national requirements, such as customs and quarantine clearance. The team also commenced relationship building and organised facilities at these hubs, with these efforts supporting the smooth arrival of the ACCE and JTF and enabling both elements to become operational quicker.
The ADF JTF reconnaissance team deployed shortly after the SRT to Manila, with the team including the JTF Commander and proceeding the arrival of the main JTF. Together with DFAT, the team commenced liaising with the Government of the Philippines to identify a population centre that needed assistance but which had not attracted the intense attention of international first responders that Tacloban had.87 Engagement between national authorities, DFAT and the team determined that Ormoc to be the city the JTF would support because it required assistance for immediate survival and recovery due to extensive damage caused by high winds. A total of 97 schools were damaged to the extent that it was assessed that the school term could not commence on 02 December 2013 as scheduled without immediate assistance.88
The JTF Commander stated during his interview for this project that “no specific process or structure guided this decision-making and there were external pressures at play, including broader DFAT development goals.” 89 Instead, he noted that the decision for the JTF's location was made based on ad hoc discussions informed by the damage in Ormoc, where other responders were working, and the presence of suitable sea and air access points.90 The cooperative approach that Filipino, DFAT and ADF personnel used
87 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, January 2014, p. 2. Provided to author – not publicly available. 88 Operation Philippines Assist, op. cit., p. 3 and Commander JTF, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 89 Commander JTF, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 90 Operation Philippines Assist, op. cit., p. 3. 98
! to have ADF forces assigned to provide assistance to Ormoc optimised the use of JTF assets and capability.
The timing of the reconnaissance team's arrival was an important factor in ensuring ADF forces were deployed to a location that required assistance. However, it was deemed too late to inform the composition of incoming JTF forces. The team was deployed seven days after the typhoon hit and this delay, coupled with the urgency to deploy ADF assets, meant that the team was unable to inform the force composition and equipment loads embarked on HMAS Tobruk.91 Whilst the force composition and loads largely met the needs of the Philippines, the opportunity to tailor a response was observed to minimise deploying with unnecessary equipment.92 This highlighted, that when deployed early enough, a reconnaissance team can pass information on the disaster situation and needs of an affected nation back to Australia to inform ADF force composition and equipment loads.
The immediate deployment of an ADF Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability was also raised. The CIMIC Detachment arrived in the Philippines after the JTF reconnaissance team, which meant they were not integrated into operational planning and execution.93 As a result, relationships had to be 'handed over' to CIMIC personnel which confused civilian agencies and local community leaders.94 This identified the benefits of the early deployment of CIMIC personnel, either with a JTF reconnaissance team or SRT so that military points of contact remained the same for the duration of the response.95
The composition of immediate response teams was identified as an area of improvement by an AUSMAT member who deployed to the Philippines. In an interview for this project, the member stated that AUSMAT should be part of a DFAT CRT to ensure expertise is available to inform the location of AUSMAT. This was raised because during the Haiyan response, he observed that DFAT personnel provided advice on where the AUSMAT hospital would deploy to. While these personnel had sufficient knowledge of the capability to make an educated decision on where the hospital should be located,
91 ibid, p. 8. 92 Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 93 Operation Philippines Assist, op. cit., Enclosure 2. 94 ibid 95 ibid, p. 13. 99
! having a dedicated AUSMAT member to provide advice and support decision-making would ensure that the Australian health response also fits within the broader health response.96
3.4.3.2 Composition As briefly touched upon above, the composition of the ADF influenced civil-military interaction, both within an Australian whole-of-government response and with external civilian actors.
Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) After the declaration of ADF operations in the Philippines, an ACCE was established at Brigadier General Benito T Ebuen Air Base, which is co-located at Mactan International Airport, in Cebu. The ACCE consisted of approximately 90 personnel and was based across three main locations - Manila, Mactan Airport (Cebu) and Ormoc Airfield. The airlift capability at the centre of the ACCE was two C-130J Hercules, with personnel providing logistics, maintenance, air operations, air movement, air traffic control, communications, and aviation security, as well as providing a combat camera capability and staffing a Role 1 Medical Facility.97
During its time of operating from 13 November until 20 December, the ACCE conducted over 250 flights. The Element transported 5800 passengers throughout the Philippines, including more than 3500 internally displaced persons, and transported more than five million pounds of cargo.98 The ACCE had two positions dedicated to engaging with civilian actors, which proved critical because a logistics coordination hub (civil-military interface) and MNCC (military-military interface) were located at Mactan Airport.99
At the tactical level, an example of how the composition of ADF forces enabled effective civil-military interaction was its relationship with AUSMAT. AUSMAT were transported into and around the Philippines on RAAF air transport, which meant they
96 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 97 No author, ‘RAAF Returns from Philippines Assist Mission.’ Australian Aviation, 23 December 2013, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://australianaviation.com.au/2013/12/raaf-returns-from-philippines- assist-mission/ 98 ibid 99 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018. 100
! had a number of interactions with the ADF. Their first interaction with the ADF was in Australia with the RAAF to palletise and load their hospital and equipment on a C-17 aircraft. Early engagement with a RAAF loadmaster ensured that weights and measurements were considered when the field hospital was palletised for transport, which enabled seamless transport into theatre.100 On arrival in theatre, AUSMAT were enabled by the ACCE and the SRT who coordinated and scheduled their movement into Tacloban. As AUSMAT were transferring from a C-17 to a smaller C-130 for intra- theatre movement, the co-location of an ACCE and AUSMAT member at the cargo hold ensured the AUSMAT's logistics were effectively moved to the second aircraft.101
Joint Task Force (JTF) The configuration of the JTF consisted of Maritime and Land Component - respectively HMAS Tobruk and an Engineer Recovery Support Force (RSF) from 2 Combat Engineer Regiment (2 CER), 3 Brigade, Townsville. As mentioned above, the composition and equipment loads of these components largely met the needs of the Philippines, however the need to tailor a response based on information from the JTF reconnaissance team was raised earlier in the chapter. This is because a tailored response maximises loading in Australia and minimises the deployment of unnecessary equipment.102
The Commanding Officer of the RSF stated in an interview for this project that 2 CER was primarily responsible for the engineer force structure, with changes being made to the recommend force structure based on what could physically fit on HMAS Tobruk.103 This reflects that engineering knowledge and experience from 2 CER informed the force structure. However, having to change the configuration of the RSF based on HMAS Tobruk highlights the need for disaster response load lists to mitigate the need to make rapid changes to doctrinal force structures.104
3.4.3.3 CIMIC and Liaison Officer Network The JTF deployed with a dedicated CIMIC capability, including a Headquarters CIMIC Detachment and a RSF CIMIC Advisor. There was a period of confirming roles and
100 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 101 ibid 102 Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 103 ibid 104 ibid 101
! functions, after which the CIMIC Detachment become responsible for immediate and ongoing liaison support with local government officials, local key leaders and supply managers for the delivery of engineer stores. The CIMIC Advisor became responsible for tactical level CIMIC duties, including involvement in the Australian civil-military team.105 The dedicated CIMIC capability, with specified roles and responsibilities, enabled the RSF to synchronise reconnaissance and engineering effects at the tactical level.106 The use of appropriately trained CIMIC officers to engage with civilian stakeholders was observed to reduce time spent building knowledge of stakeholders and coordination mechanisms, which in-turn, increased the predictability and effectiveness of civil-military coordination.107
Whilst the ACCE did not have a CIMIC capability, it did have dedicated personnel to liaise and coordinate with civilian actors, either as their primary role or as part of broader duties, and this function was identified to be a key factor of effective civil-military interaction. The benefits of having a dedicated role for civil-military coordination was evident at both the ACCE and JTF with the tempo of the response requiring attendance at constant meetings. Having a dedicated person at these meetings ensured information flow was consistent and timely, and people were freed up to complete the relief tasks required. A dedicated civil-military interaction structure avoided multiple points of contact into the ADF, ensuring that agencies and organisations were aware of who to go to for information and decision-making.
In addition to having a CIMIC capability, Commander JTF established a liaison network with a broad range of military, government and NGO personnel, with key relationships being with Defence Attaché Manila and related staff, DFAT, Australian Federal Police, the US Marine Corps’s III Marine Expeditionary Force, Japanese Self Defence Force,
105 Operation Philippines Assist, op. cit., Enclosure 2. 106 Operation Philippines Assist, op. cit., Enclosure 2 and Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 107 No author, Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters, 18 September 2018, p.18, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/48574/Recommended+Practices+for+Effective+Hu manitarian+Civil-Military+Coordination+of+Foreign+Military+Assets+in+Natural+and+Man- Made+Disasters/b6c934f0-1dec-42ea-9396-5313e3e2f2d3 102
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Ormoc Local Council and the ACCE.108 The existence of a LNO and CIMIC capability was found to enhance information flow and relationship-building, leading to de- confliction of military and civilian relief efforts.
3.4.3.4 Gender Participation There are increasing calls for women and vulnerable groups to have a greater voice in disaster response, including increased participation and integration of their perspective and needs. Interaction and discussions conducted with teachers in Ormoc who received engineering assistance from the JTF highlighted the benefits of female participation in military forces for civil-military interaction. Teachers at three schools remembered the "two girls who worked like the boys" and completed tasks such as debris removal, environmental hazard reduction, and restoration of classrooms. These women, who the teachers considered did a "man's job," were identified in analysis to contribute to operational effectiveness by demonstrating how women can mobilise in the aftermath of natural disasters to undertake 'non-traditional roles' such as rebuilding infrastructure and clearing roads and rubble. 109
The selection of a female linguist, who formed part of the civil-military team who visited schools to identify needs, was a deliberate decision by the Officer Commanding the RSF110 based on an appreciation that many schools have female teachers and it was important to form relationships as part of the needs assessment process. By focusing on relationship building, the RSF was able to build trust and a space for females to discuss their needs.
3.4.3.5 Co-location and Teaming of Civilian and Military Actors The co-location of Australian civilian and military actors achieved effective civil- military engagement with affected communities. To align Philippine and DFAT objectives with JTF operations, an Australian interagency civil-military team was formed. The team supported RSF activities in Ormoc by engaging with the local
108 Operation Philippines Assist, Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division, ‘Whole of Australian Government After Action Review Observations.’ No date, serial 12. Provided to author – not publicly available. 109 E. Chapman, ‘Women in the ADF: the operational imperative of participation.’ The Strategist, 29 November 2018, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/women-in-the-adf-the- operational-imperative-of-participation/ 110 Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 103
! community and conducting needs assessments.111 Comprising a DFAT Liaison Officer and an ADF engineer, linguist and CIMIC advisor,112 this team visited schools and engaged with Head Teachers to identify specific engineering requirements, including debris removal, environmental hazard reduction, and restoration of classrooms. 113 After repair needs were identified, the ADF engineer took each school's requirements directly back to the RSF to implement, reducing double-handling of information.
This civil-military teaming at the tactical level achieved a means to process and prioritise response activities for the RSF to complete. While not a doctrinal concept and therefore ad hoc, the team was instrumental in ensuring local humanitarian and engineering needs were met. Teaming enabled consultative community engagement, identification and prioritisation of needs, while also ensuring community expectations were met and a smooth transition after the completion of agreed tasks. The DFAT component of the team was also able to facilitate military attendance at cluster meetings, which resulted in direct communication of JTF capability and remit into the meetings.114
A DFAT Liaison Officer (LO) was positioned with the ACCE in Cebu early in the response, however returned to Manila before the end of the mission. The benefits of a permanent DFAT LO co-located with the ACCE was identified because, as like demonstrated in Ormoc, this position provides critical input into the prioritisation of ADF tasks and use of assets.115
3.4.4 Leadership During the fieldwork phase in Ormoc, 22 teachers at 10 schools were engaged with to capture their perspective of interacting with Australian personnel in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda). The consistent observation that emerged from the teachers was that the Australian interagency civil-military team, as outlined above, engaged with Head Teachers prior to conducting engineering works. The engineers that arrived to complete the work identified by the civil-military team were described by teachers at
111 Operation Philippines Assist, Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division, op cit., serial 12. 112 ibid 113 New Ormoc City National High School, interview with author, August 2018. 114 Operation Philippines Assist, Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division, op. cit., serial 12. 115 ibid, serial 1. 104
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Macabug Elementary School to be “approachable, helpful and generous.”116 Within case- analysis reflects that this initial engagement was critical to forming effective relationships and ensuring the specific needs of each school was met.
Civil-military teaming coupled with this engagement approach reflects a number of effective leadership traits within the Australian response, including the flexibility of ACCE and JTF missions, operational command and control, delegation and decision- making, and relationship building. Within-case analysis of the interviews with ADF personnel and post operation reporting identifies that tactical flexibility stemmed from the agile missions given to the JTF and ACCE from Headquarters Joint Operations Command. These missions enabled personnel to adapt their methods of interacting with civilian actors depending on mission requirements.
The mission of the JTF was "to provide military support to Australian WoG recovery operations in vicinity of Ormoc IOT to enable GOP led relief and recovery operations."117 It recognised the need for all military support to be conducted within the context of broader Australian operations, which it critical for effective civil-military interaction.118 This achieved alignment of DFAT and JTF operations in Ormoc, ensured the JTF provided support that respected national sovereignty, and clearly defined a division of labour for the ADF to prevent duplication of effort.
In contrast, the ACCE had a broad mission to conduct air mobility, air operations and combat support tasking in support to a wider range of civilian actors including: a.! Australian Head of Mission (HOM) Philippines and Australian Government Agencies (AGAs); b.! international relief efforts; and c.! Australian JTF 630.119
116 Interview with author, Macabug Elementary School, August 2018. 117 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force – Post Operation Report, op. cit., p. 4. 118 M. Smith, ‘Analyzing the Effectiveness of Australian Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) after 15 Years of ‘Small Wars,’’ in Small Wars Journal. 16 February 2015, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/analyzing-the-effectiveness-of-australian-civil-military- cooperation-cimic-after-15-years-o 119 Air Component Coordination Element, Post Operation Report, p. 2. Provided to author – not publicly available. 105
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This mission resulted in the ACCE having specified but varying interfaces with civilian actors, both within the Australian response and externally. As such, they were able to coordinate airlift either through the cluster system or externally through direct engagement, depending on the needs of the civilian actor. Having the flexibility in its mission to prioritise needs in this way meant that ACCE personnel were able to use their military expertise to schedule and load aircraft. This optimised the use of air assets and ensured a broad range of stakeholder needs were met.
3.4.4.1 Command and Control An aspect of leadership is command and control, with the ADF adopting a structure that resulted in the ACCE and JTF having separate and parallel leadership. From the perspective of the ACCE Commander interviewed for this project, this separation positively influenced civil-military interaction because the structure was agile to meet the needs of all civilian actors, including the requirements of the logistics cluster as the "primary customer."120 Since the cluster was co-located with the ACCE, requests for assistance were rapidly processed. An alternate command and control structure, where the ACCE is part of a JTF, would have caused a physical dislocation of higher headquarters and caused a delay in decision-making because reduced situational awareness and limited communication.
This command and control structure also reflects lessons learnt from the historical employment of air power - centralised control and decentralised execution by commanders with professional mastery of air power.121 This gave Commander ACCE the agility required, within an overall command structure under Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), to be responsive to the dynamic requirements of disaster relief operations and maximise aircraft schedules and loads.122 In-turn, enabling the ACCE to achieve its broad mission in support of AUSMAT and DFAT personnel, international relief efforts (delivering humanitarian aid and transporting internally displaced persons), and supporting JTF airlift needs.
120 ACCE Commander, interviews with author, 2018. 121 Australian Air Publication AAP 1001.1, Command and Control in the Royal Australian Air Force, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 2-2. 122 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018. 106
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3.4.4.2 Delegation and Decision Making One of the key leadership characteristics of the ADF response to Haiyan was the delegation and decision-making model adopted by both the JTF and ACCE. Both force element commanders delegated responsibility for decision-making on mission tasks to tactical (field-level) positions which had direct access to information, were attending cluster meetings, and had built relationships with civilian counterparts. The delegation of decision-making down to the field level achieved faster decision-making processes and execution of decisions, leading to humanitarian needs being met in a responsive and timely manner, including loading and scheduling of military assets and completion of engineer tasks.
This model resulted in decision-making being held at a level that optimised civil-military interaction because it empowered ADF personnel to make decision and commit to realistic and achievable actions in support of civilian actors. More specifically, by enabling decisions at the tactical level, ACCE personnel could get commitment from other stakeholders and build consensus within the logistics cluster to achieve “cross- cutting decisions.”123 This resulted in decisions being made based on the culmination of previous decisions made, including those made during earlier military-military planning meetings.
Broadly within the Australian response, there was evidence of collaborative decision making between the Philippines, DFAT and the ADF, as reflected in the deployment of JTF 630 to Ormoc in order to focus JTF efforts on the recovery of education facilities.124 This decision-making was delegated to the JTF Commander, which was identified from post operational reporting to be commensurate with the need for a timely and informed decision based on the environmental situation where 97 schools were damaged to the extent that made the recommencement of school term on 2nd December 2013 highly unlikely.125
123 McKinsey & Company, ‘Decision making in the age of urgency.’ April 2019, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/decision-making-in-the- age-of-urgency?cid=other-soc-lkn-mip-mck-oth-1905--&sid=2285170152&linkId=66845391 124 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, op. cit., p.3. 125 ibid 107
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3.4.4.3 Relationship Building During the response to Haiyan, the ADF was observed by a member of the AUSMAT team to have a “strong humanitarian ethos”126 and this organisational trait lay the foundation for effective relationships. Also contributing to effective civil-military coordination were pre-existing relationships, both professional or personal, gained from previous deployments and/or training events.127 Where pre-established relationships existed there was a sense of mutual understanding in terms of knowing who decision- makers were and military asset capability.128 In an interview for this project, the JTF Commander noted that he participated in Exercise Balikatan129 in 2013 which built knowledge and understanding of the Philippines and laid the foundation for effective relationships with other actors, including 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. His involvement in Exercise Talisman Sabre later that year laid the foundations for an effective relationship with 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which was also involved in the U.S. military response to Haiyan.130
Another facet of civil-military interaction was mentoring between nations that occurred, which enabled the Philippines to strengthen their response capacity. Two examples of mentoring were identified, firstly the US supported the MNCC through mentoring key AFP personnel. The US military deployed a member at O6 (Colonel) Level as a mentor to the AFP Director of the MNCC, and re-rolled mentors who were deployed to assist in counter terrorism/insurgency operations to support the Haiyan response.
In the JTF Post Operation Report, the JTF Commander observed that the capacity of the AFP to host and coordinate a multinational operation, including the coordination of foreign militaries, greatly improved through mentoring provided by the US and Australia.131 Secondly, the JTF undertook indigenous capacity building, which is a
126 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 127 UN-CMCoord p. 6 and Major General Stuart Smith, DSC, AM, ‘Lessons Learned by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters.’ 2015 RUSI QLD Blamey Oration, p. 4. 128 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 129 Exercise Balikatan is the name given to annual military exercises between the Philippines and the United States. 130 Commander JTF, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 131 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, op. cit., p.14. 108
! doctrinal outcome of CIMIC, whereby RSF tradesmen taught their Philippine solider counterparts how to use mechanical trade tools during the construction of the new mess facility.132
3.4.4.4 Key Leadership Engagement One of the facets of leadership during the Haiyan response was the Key Leadership Engagement (KLE) undertaken the ACCE and JTF Commanders. KLE were personal interactions between military and civilian leaders, including local communities, national authorities, and humanitarian community. Often used as a civil-military engagement strategy to enhance support for military forces and interests, the doctrinal use of KLE sees leaders focus on "inform and influence actions."133
In contrast to the doctrinal definition of KLE, ADF personnel at all levels engaged respectively and openly with other key stakeholders, using engagement as a relationship building practice rather than an influence practice as doctrine directs. This was reflected in relationships that emerged from dedicated KLE and coordination meetings, which resulted in the ACCE and JTF maintaining a high level situational awareness and understanding which enabled them to understand civilian actor needs and priorities. By using KLE to build relationships, ADF personnel demonstrated that engagement should be deliberate, consistent and respectful, and used as an information sharing tool, not just an information collection and influence tool as is the doctrinal focus.
3.4.5 Coordination Structures Participation in coordination efforts, either ad hoc or procedural, as part of governance to support effective civil-military interaction facilitates communication, information sharing, task division, decision-making and builds situational awareness.134 On arrival into Cebu, ACCE personnel identified that there was no structured system in place to support the delivery of aid, with "local NGOs ... not aware of the logistics cluster system."135 The absence of an effective coordination mechanism at a key logistics hub meant that military aircraft weren't flying at capacity - at times they were observed to be
132 Commander Recovery Support Force p. 20. 133 Australian Army, op. cit., p. 58 134 No author, Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters, op cit., p. 12. 135 Operation Philippines Assist, Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division, op. cit., serial 3. 109
! flying at half cargo capacity. 136 This made it clear that while the cluster system had been adopted at the national and regional levels, local governments and NGOs had not been informed of the system or incorporated it into their disaster response practices.137
A logistics cluster was stood up in Cebu. Conducted daily, a key role of the cluster was to facilitate the air transport of relief cargo on behalf of the humanitarian community. Initial cluster processes were observed to move aid as if aircraft were conducting scheduled services, which wasn't efficient aircraft flew on timings rather than when they were full of cargo. The logistics cluster system was also not in RAAF doctrine or SOPs at the time, which further delayed the establishment of a process while relationships were established.
In response, ACCE personnel (a Loadmaster and Pilot) developed and implemented a load planning process using an 'effects-based approach' whereby NGOs would tell militaries details of their cargo and where it needed to go. This information would be discussed amongst the military load teams, who would then link up with NGOs of the cargo they would transport, then aircraft would be scheduled and loaded. In essence, NGOs submitted 'bids' for air mobility effects and military load planners constructed a flying program.138
As mentioned above, the JTF and RSF included a CIMIC capability, which meant that they were aware that a cluster system would be activated. However, the RSF got their tasking through direct liaison with DFAT and the local government (Department of Education), with the RSF visiting local schools to gain an understanding of the work required before prioritising needs and conducting the work.139 This approach was a by- product of the ADF being the only responder in Ormoc and local governments developing ad-hoc coordination arrangements to suit their needs prior to meshing these systems with the cluster system when other responders entered their area. Direct liaison between the RSF, DFAT and the local government, even though outside a dedicated
136 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018 137 P. Dy & T. Stephens, op. cit., p. iv and J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 8. 138 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018. 139 Commander RSF, interview with author, 01 February, 2019. 110
! coordination mechanism, was identified as effective because it was a collaborative approach that ensured community needs were prioritised and met in a timely manner.
3.4.5.1 Operating Procedures Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) inform decision-making and processes, and as a result they are considered a critical factor in civil-military interaction because they provide a framework to conduct liaison and provide assistance. During the response to Haiyan, the ACCE was operating on air movement waivers issued by Headquarters Air Command because there was no dedicated disaster relief chapter in air movement SOPs. These waivers enabled movement of people and goods commensurate with operational requirements, including moving people as fast as possible out of damaged area by allowing travel with (for example) uncovered footwear and with livestock.
The JTF had adequate SOPs for the operation, with SOPs being largely effective at the HQJTF and RSF level. However, there was an observed lack of project management procedures to enable the JTF to easily translate GOP regional and local government needs assessment into JTF priorities.140
3.4.5.2 Requests for Military Assistance The process for civilian stakeholders to request military assets, known as a 'Request for Assistance' (RFA), was observed by ADF personnel to be focused on requesting space on an aircraft at a certain time rather than an 'effect.' This approach differs from military planning, which uses an 'effects based' approach based on weight, dimensions of cargo and delivery location - stakeholders provide this information and airlift loadmasters schedule and load aircraft to optimise use of the asset. The disconnect between civilian and military understanding of RFA reflects that there was no uniform and consistent procedure to request the use of military assets during the Haiyan response.
A process emerged after the response, at Figure 16 below, where the request flows from civilian stakeholders to military liaison officers, who coordinate directly with stakeholders for execution after the request has been passed through the Logistics Cluster
140 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, op. cit., p. 13. 111
! and MNCC. This flow mirrors the process which developed organically during the Haiyan response, which the ACCE as outlined above.
Figure 16: Proposed RFA Process Flow on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), Philippines, Typhoon Yolanda, 2013141
3.4.5.3 Accreditation The Philippines experienced a significant influx of individuals and teams wanting to assist in the aftermath of Haiyan. In addition to this influx were people already in the country and wanting to assist or provide goods for affected communities. At the time, there were no means of tracking, coordinating or having oversight of these responders because they were not operating within established coordination structures. Many of their efforts were intermittent, sporadic and largely reactive and conducted without a unified approach.142
In the example of medical teams, an overwhelming number of medical teams arrived that did not have accreditation or the experience and knowledge required to effectively operate in the Philippines. One such team originated from Australia, MedRescue, and it was transported into and around the Philippines on ADF assets. The need for greater
141 T. Encarnacao, ‘A Case Study on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord).’ Civil- Military Coordination Section, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, presentation, no date, p. 11. 142 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit, p. 14 112
! governance of these teams were identified because they pose a reputational risk and by being transported on military assets, they take up precious space needed for higher priority transport or cargo.143
3.4.6 Monitoring & Evaluation Reliable data collection and analysis tracks whether military activities are meeting the needs of civilian actors, including integrating into the cluster system and reaching affected communities. 144 Towards the end of the Haiyan response, DFAT requested aircraft cargo metrics from the ACCE to collate the quantity, nature and locations of assistance delivered by Australia. However, this request was difficult to fulfil because the Component had enacted 'Mercy Mission' practices and personnel were only tracking the weight of cargo, not the type and breakdown, in order to speed-up the delivery of assistance. To collect data to the level of fidelity required by DFAT, the Air Component required early guidance and additional personnel.
DFAT similarly requested statistics from AUSMAT, which caused challenges because they had not been maintaining the statistics that were requested. Instead they were collecting data based on WHO requirements, which is part of field hospital accreditation. As in the case of the ACCE, it would have been beneficial for DFAT to articulate their need for monitoring and evaluation data from the outset of operations. This would provide supporting agencies with an understanding of what data is required and when to provide it.
More broadly, a Foreign Military and Civil Defence Asset register was in place that listed the type of asset (e.g. fixed wing strategic, fixed wing theater, rotary wing, ship, medical, engineering, advanced party), a description of the asset (without details of capacity such as cargo capacity), deployment dates, its location and equipment.145 Greater depth was required to effectively track foreign military assets, including their cargo weights and limitations. This level of fidelity builds a robust common operating picture that can be used in a multitude of places, including the MNCC and logistics cluster. What is not clear
143 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 144 No author, Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters, op. cit., p. 20. 145 T. Encarnacao, op. cit., , p. 5. 113
! from the Haiyan response is which organisation is responsible for the development and maintenance of a Foreign Military and Civil Defence Asset register - the MNCC or UN OCHA.
In comparison, JTF 630 maintained robust achievement statistics reflecting key outputs aligned to education, health infrastructure, local government infrastructure and life sustaining HADR support. As reflected in Figures 17 - 19, JTF 630 mapped activities by geographical location, enabling the Commander to provide a quantitative 'assessment of support'
Figure 17: JTF 630 Achievements146
146 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, op. cit. Annex C. 114
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Figure 18: JTF 630 Maritime Component (HMAS Tobruk) 147
Figure 19: JTF 630 Land Component (Recovery Support Force)148
147 ibid 148 ibid 115
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3.4.7 Organisational Learning Following Australia's response to Typhoon Haiyan, individual and organisational learning activities were conducted which captured civil-military interaction experience and best practice. At the individual-level, the ACCE Air Load Coordination Officer captured coordination procedures and updated the Air Mobility Group Manual of Air Movements to include them. There is now a dedicated chapter titled 'Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief Chapter', which enables the RAAF to understand and integrate into the cluster system.149
Secondly, the ACCE Operations Officer (OPSO) captured all operational documentation, including situation reports, templates and procedures on local servers prior to transferring it back to the ADF's central storage structure, called 'Objective'. Deployed personnel were advised of the location of all operational documentation in a follow-up email from the OPSO. In addition, the OPSO also shared his operational experience in the RAAF Operations Officer Newsletter of July 2014.150
Despite ACCE personnel transferring their operational experience into organisational memory, it was self-initiated because the capture of operational information and products was not outlined in Standing Instructions or Base-Level Instructions - the two key document types that guide RAAF operations at the tactical level. Based on his own knowledge of information management requirements, the OPSO was guided by the higher level requirements, in this case, the Archives Act,151 rather than directed or procedural organisational learning requirements. The outcome of non-procedural knowledge management was noted by Commander ACCE, who observed he was unable to find the ACCE Post Operation Report to prepare for his interview for this project.152
Learning was conducted in a more structured manner at the organisational-level, with the ADF facilitating a tactical-level WoG After Action Review (AAR). The Adaptive Warfare Branch (AWB), Headquarters 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera, conducted the AAR within the framework
149 Personal communication with author, 2018. Manual of Air Movements not publicly available. 150 RAAF Operations Officer Newsletter, op. cit. 151 Personal communication with author, 2018. 152 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018. 116
! of the Army's 'Lessons Learned' process. The activity was attended by deployed personnel from DFAT, ACCE and the JTF, and captured tactical observations with the intent to improve future HADR operations.153 AWB published and distributed the outcomes of the AAR to attendees and have made the document accessible on the Defence intranet for consideration during future operations.154 Overall, ADF organisational learning after Operation Philippines Assist effectively contributed to the ADF's explicit knowledge base on disaster relief operations.
At the national-level, a number of 'lessons learned' reviews were undertaken, however it was observed that senior DFAT personnel were not in attendance. Instead, lower managerial levels were in attendance despite reciprocal organisations having senior members there. The key observation made regarding effective knowledge management is that decision-makers need to be in attendance at workshops so that action can be taken to address the issues that arose. 155 This is particularly critical for civil-military interaction issues because they are the responsibility of multiple agencies and often cannot be addressed by a single agency.
3.4.7.1 Lessons Identified Much of the learning from the Typhoon Haiyan response has taken the form of 'Lessons Learned." These are actions, activities and structures put in place based on experience from the Typhoon Haiyan response, reflecting their importance for effective civil- military interaction. A key lesson learned was the need for effective coordination of foreign military assets, with experience from Typhoon Haiyan reinvigorating the MNCC concept because it demonstrated that foreign military assets are best coordinated through this mechanism.156 Unlike the response to Haiyan where there was a delay in establishing MNCCs and resultantly, coordination, an MNCC was fully operational 48 hours before Typhoon Hagupit (year) made landfall in the Philippines.157
153 See Operation Philippines Assist, Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division, ‘Whole of Australian Government After Action Review Observations.’ No date, serial 12. Provided to author – not publicly available. 154 Internal Defence Network. Adaptive Warfare Branch Sharepoint 155 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 156 G. Jumamil-Mercado, et al, op. cit., p. 14. 157 ibid 117
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The response also generated the introduction of a Civil-Military Coordinating Centre (CMCC) as operational level mechanisms to coordinate foreign militaries and international responders.158 The purpose of a CMCC is to directly link the AFP with the international NGOs and UN humanitarian organisations who use military assets. The AFP has also firmly adopted the UN Civil Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) concept because it is closely aligned with UN practices in terms of coordination between the military and NGOs.159 These coordination mechanisms are critical to ensure norms regarding the use of military assets are adhered to during disaster response. These include that the military follows policy direction from the civilian authority on deployment, activities, tasking, reporting procedures and timelines, and that disaster response, although a secondary military task, is nevertheless vital in meeting the military's strategic goals in the affected area.160
The challenges experienced in the initial stages of the response, where stakeholders spent much of the time learning about each other and civil-military cooperation mechanisms, including the cluster system, led to the recommendation from ACCE personnel that in future key governmental and NGO representatives be invited to participate in Air Force Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercises, such as Exercise Cope North, to increase corporate knowledge on both sides. These exercises present an opportunity to engage with key stakeholders from the UN and NGO Community, including the World Food Programme, which is responsible for managing the Logistics Cluster. 161
The conduct of a desktop exercise between civilian and military stakeholders to map out major interactions and ensure understanding of airlift capability (building pallets, dangerous good movement) every two years between Australian agencies was identified by a person with AUSMAT experience as a means to ensure regular and ongoing relationship building between stakeholders.162 Regular and ongoing exercises develop personal relationships, which are observed to make a significant difference in the field
158 J. Trajano, op. cit., p. 4. 159 ibid, p 25. 160 Ibid, p. 12. 161 Air Component Coordination Element, p. 6. 162 AusMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 118
! because there is immediate trust, as well as consistent knowledge of military rank structure and capability.163
The importance of transferring 'lessons learned' and research outcomes, especially to affected communities and groups affected, was identified during the fieldwork phase. A doctor interviewed in Tacloban for this project reflected that a significant number of researchers had visited Tacloban and interviewed her but she had never been provided a copy of the research outcomes or published papers.164 While a large body of literature on 'lessons learned' and evaluation exists on the international response to Typhoon Haiyan, it appears that affected communities have not received this knowledge, which limits their ability to access and apply it for future disaster responses. This was identified to be a critical deficiency in disaster response knowledge management because there was no passage of information back to local first responders, who require the information as they will be at the forefront of future responses in their community.
3.5 Summary This Chapter outlined Australia's response to Typhoon Haiyan, which was "considered a success on the basis of its impact and immediate support to an area devastated by the disaster." 165 In providing a description of the civil-military interface that occurred, the chapter identified that civil-military interaction centred around broad themes of preparation, capability, leadership, coordination structures and organisational learning.
Civil-military interaction was heavily influenced by coordination structures, including action plans, standard operating procedures, request for military assistance processes, the cluster system, and military-military coordination structures. While civil-military interaction was largely deliberate and anticipated by the ADF, more broadly the ADF did not consistency prepare for the operation or integrate into national coordination structures. This inconsistency supports the need for a new way to conduct civil-military interaction during disaster management to ensure effective preparation, leadership, capability and governance.
163 ibid 164 Interview with author, Tacloban, August 2018. 165 Department of Defence, ‘Operation Philippines Assist.’ Annual Report 2013-14, viewed 02 January 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/features/feature-operation-philippines-assist.asp 119
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Chapter Four Tropical Cyclone Pam – Vanuatu – Operation Pacific Assist 2015
On the evening of 13 March 2015, Vanuatu was hit by Cyclone Pam, a category 5 cyclone that was the most powerful cyclone recorded in the Southern Pacific region at the time. Winds reached 250 km/hr with gusts peaking at 320 km/hr, flattening homes, schools and villages and causing 11 deaths.1 An estimated 188,000 people, over 70 percent of Vanuatu's population, had their homes, livelihoods and essential services damaged or destroyed, with an estimated 65,000 people displaced from their homes.2 The greatest impact of Cyclone Pam was felt in Shefa (Efate Island and Shepherd Island), Tafea (Erromango and Tanna islands) and Malampa provinces, as reflected in Figure 20 below. On reflection of the aftermath, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) noted that “no single entity anywhere in the Pacific has the resources to respond to the sort of destruction caused by TC Pam alone.”3
Figure 20: The Path and Impact of Cyclone Pam4
1 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Flash Appeal Emergency Response Plan for Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam March – June 2015, p. 3, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Vanuatu- TCPam_flash_appeal_final%2024MAR2015.pdf 2 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam, Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 1. 3 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, End of Mission Report United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination Team (UNDAC) Tropical Cyclone Pam 16 March to 04 April 2015. 20 April 2015, p. 4, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20%20April%202015%20Vanuatu%20UNDAC% 20%20Mission%20Report.pdf 4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, op. cit., p. 18. ! 120
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Like the proceeding case study, this chapter provides a description of the civil-military interaction that occurred during the Australian whole-of-government response to Cyclone Pam. It details when, where and how the ADF interacted with civilian actors to identify the nature of interaction that occurred. Within-case analysis reflects that the broad themes which influenced civil-military interaction in the Philippines also influenced interaction in Vanuatu. As a result, civil-military interaction in this chapter is presented aligned to the themes of preparation, capability, leadership, coordination structures and organisational learning.
Structuring the chapter in-line with themes that emerged from the previous case study supports this project’s aim to build theory through observing similar phenomena in different settings while also providing opportunity to examine alternate explanations. The insider research position is reflected in an ADF organisational lens throughout the chapter, which supported access to post operational documentation and ADF personnel to interview. A key characteristic of this case study was identified by a Ni-Vanuatu NGO worker interviewed in Port Vila, who noted that there were “big lessons learnt” by the Vanuatu Government from Pam and much has progressed in disaster management since.5 This means that while the chapter provides valuable insight into civil-military interaction, especially interaction that occurs during extreme disaster response cases, it is dated.
Following selection of this case study, a literature review identified that Australia’s response to Cyclone Pam had been evaluated by the DFAT Office of Development Effectiveness. Titled Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam,6 the project addressed the following questions: •! What was achieved with Australian assistance •! Effectiveness of Australian aid, including whether the response was aligned with the needs and priorities of the Vanuatu Government and affected communities •! Coordination of aid within the Australian assistance •! Connectedness of Australian aid to previous investments and to established
5 Interview with author, Port Vila, 3 May 2019. 6 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, op. cit. ! 121
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government structures and systems for responding to disasters
The nature of the evaluation questions and data collection from focus group discussions with beneficiaries in affected islands of Efate, Tanna and Erromango meant that the evaluation largely mirrors an exploratory case study, which is the purpose of this chapter. A significant body of research on the international response to Cyclone Pam has also been undertaken by Humanitarian Policy Advisor Rebecca Barber. In an effort not to duplicate this literature and encumber Vanuatu authorities and local communities to collect data on a similar topic, this chapter draws heavily on the DFAT evaluation and Barber’s research and combines it with seven semi-structured interviews with ADF and DFAT personnel, ADF operational documentation, and a period of fieldwork in Port Vila, Vanuatu which captured data from the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and local NGOs. An ADF member that held a leadership position during the operation did not accept the offer to participate in this research.
4.1 National Context Environmental and development considerations inform disaster response in Vanuatu which influence civil-military interaction in a number of ways, including capability required to access affected communities, pre-existing relationships that have enabled knowledge and cultural exchange, and the nature of national response structures. The national context of Vanuatu is provided to outline the environment that civilian and military actors were working within during the response to Cyclone Pam.
The susceptibility of the Pacific region to natural disasters is increasing in frequency, severity and impact, with six Pacific Island countries listed in the top 15 countries most at risks to disasters globally.7 Vanuatu is particularly at risk - it is listed as the most- disaster prone country in the world and, on average, natural disasters affect more than a third of the nation's population each year.8 The nation is an archipelagic region of 83 islands, with 65 inhabited, covering over 1000 kilometres and located in the South
7 Prof Dr. Hans-Joachim, et al, World Risk Report 2018, Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and Ruhr University Bochum – Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, p.6, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WorldRiskReport-2018.pdf 8 ibid 122
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Pacific. The population of Vanuatu is approximately 281,000 and Port Vila, on the island of Efate, is the capital of the nation.
Vanuatu has a strong legal and regulatory disaster management framework underpinned by the National Disaster Act 2000, the National Disaster Plan 2004 and the National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management 2006-2016. It also has hazard-specific plans, including a National Cyclone Support Plan, national-level humanitarian clusters, and the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT), which is a network of non-government actors that conduct disaster preparedness and response.9
As of 2013, prior to Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu’s National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) “provided a level of leadership that was supported by relatively high capacity and support from other organisations within the DRS [disaster response system] both in Vanuatu and from outside.”10 The credibility, legitimacy and strength of the DRS stemmed from NDMO leadership and the VHT, with its multi-sector membership functioning effectively due to pre-existing relationships and internal governance based on the cluster approach. A shared vision was identified to exist across the DRS in response to climate change and disasters.11 Overall, national coordination structures were considered to be “genuine and fit-for-purpose until Cyclone Pam struck.”12
Australia has a strong relationship with Vanuatu, based on being its largest bilateral development partner and closest security partner.13 The Australian Federal Police provides assistance to the Vanuatu Police Force, under the Vanuatu Policing and Justice Support Program. Australia also has a Defence Cooperation Program, which was established in 1983. Further development assistance to the nation includes supporting the
9 R. Barber, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Tailoring the International Response to the National Need Following Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam, CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, June 2015, p.6, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Reflections%20on%20Cyclone%20Pam_WHS%2 0Report.pdf 10 A. Gero, et al., Disaster response and climate change in the Pacific: Understanding the Pacific’s adaptive capacity to emergencies in the context of climate change, National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, 2013, p. 5, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files_publications/Gero_2013_Disaster_response_ climate_change_Pacific.pdf 11 A. Gero, et al., op. cit., p.5. 12 R. Barber, op. cit., p. 20. 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Vanuatu country brief.’ No date, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/geo/vanuatu/Pages/vanuatu-country-brief.aspx 123
! maintenance and operation of its Pacific Patrol Boat (the RVS Tukoro), donated in 1987.14 Vanuatu is due to receive a replacement for this vessel, a Guardian-class Patrol Boat, under the Pacific Maritime Security Program. The vessel will continue to be accompanied with sustainment, training, infrastructure, and advisory support,15 to support Vanuatu to use it in a wide variety of roles, including natural disaster response.16
4.2 Tropical Cyclone Pam Tropical Cyclone Pam, a category 5 cyclone, struck Vanuatu on March 13 and 14, 2015 and is recorded as the worst cyclone to make landfall in Vanuatu.17 The eye of the storm was recorded as 27.4km, passing to the east of Efate Island where the capital Port Vila is located with rainfall at rates of 50mm per hour. The Eastern and Southern islands were harshest hit, resulting in approximately 80 percent of housing being damaged or destroyed, and nearly half the population lacked access to clean drinking water.18 The provinces of Shefa and Tafea were the hardest hit, with severe winds destroying up to 90 per cent of shelters on Erromango Island and 50 percent of shelters on Tanna Island.19 Most education and health facilities were also badly damaged in these areas.20
In the aftermath of Pam, it was estimated that over half the population required emergency food assistance, up to 65 percent of the population in Shefa and Tafea provinces required drinking water, and over 30 percent required emergency shelter.21Water sources in many rural and urban communities were damaged or
14 ibid. 15 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Stepping-up in Vanuatu.’ No date, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/geo/vanuatu/Pages/stepping-up-in-vanuatu.aspx and Department of Defence, ‘Pacific Maritime Security Program.’ No date, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/features/maritime.asp 16 Interview with author, 14 August 2019. 17 J. Rafferty, ‘Cyclone Pam.’ Encyclopedia Britannica, 02 April 2015, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cyclone-Pam 18 M. Mis, ‘Almost half Vanuatu people lack clean water, month after cyclone: UNICEF.’ Reuters, viewed on 05 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vanuatu-water-unicef/almost-half- vanuatu-people-lack-clean-water-month-after-cyclone-unicef-idUSKBN0ND1VJ20150422 19 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, End of Mission Report United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination Team (UNDAC) Tropical Cyclone Pam 16 March to 04 April 2015 op. cit., p. 3. 20 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p.19. 21 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Flash Appeal Emergency Response Plan for Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam March – June 2015, op. cit., p. 2-3. 124
! contaminated. Food stocks were also destroyed, with estimates being that 95 percent of crops were destroyed in affected areas. 22
Following Cyclone Pam, the two most important economic sectors in Vanuatu - agriculture and tourism - were devastated. Farming, fishing and forestry enterprises were significantly impacted while tourism infrastructure was destroyed. The overall economic impact of the cyclone caused GDP to contract by more than 2 percent before growth rebounded to 4 percent in 2016 and 4.5 percent in 2017, driven by recovery in tourism and agricultural production. Australia has been the largest international contributor to the cyclone response, providing $50 million to support humanitarian needs, and early and long-term recovery needs.23
4.3 National Response As detailed above, existing Vanuatu disaster response systems and structures were considered effective in responding to previous, smaller-scale disasters. However, the scale of destruction after Cyclone Pam resulted in the Government issuing its first generalised appeal for international assistance. President, Baldwin Lonsdale, verbally issued an “appeal on behalf of the government and people of Vanuatu to the global community, to give a lending hand” on 14 March 2015.24
The NDMO activated its National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) and was within days hosting daily briefings, as was the VHT and pre-existing clusters. The NDMO had also commenced conducting needs assessments.25 This was the first time the NEOC had been established as a national-level central communications agency.26 Due to the widespread damage in Port Vila, the nation’s capital, the government’s ability to respond
22 ibid 23 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Overview of Australia’s aid program to Vanuatu.’ No date, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://dfat.gov.au/geo/vanuatu/development-assistance/Pages/development- assistance-in-vanuatu.aspx 24 No author, ‘Tropical Cyclone Pam: Vanuatu’s president appeals for international help after deadly storm which left thousands displaced.’ ABC News, 15 March 2015, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-15/vanuatu-appeals-for-lending-hand-in-wake-of-cyclone- pam/6320328 25 R. Barber, op. cit., p. 6. 26 Pacific Community, Tropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop Report, June 2015, p. 16, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://www.spc.int/sites/default/files/wordpresscontent/wp- content/uploads/2016/12/TC-Pam-Lessons-Learned-Report.pdf 125
! was hampered.27 Reports also reflect that the Vanuatu government “delayed the initial aid distribution by a week to 10 days to avoid creating a culture of donor dependency” with “large-scale humanitarian organisations … initially held back from delivering aid.”28
The Vanuatu Government Disaster Review Plan in place to govern the response was stated by scholar Siobhan McDonnell to invoke the concept of a “homogenous, unified community with shared characteristics, implying the existence of a group of individuals that possesses a similar set of values and goals.”29 However, as emerged during the response to Pam, communities do not exist as a coherent group as policy often reflects. Instead, differences arose that influenced resource management outcomes, local politics, strategic interactions, and layered alliances.30 The heterogenous nature of communities and disaster response actors is important to note in the context of civil-military interaction because it informs who Australian whole-of-government actors, both civilian and military, engage with to capture and respond to community needs. It also informs the need for coordination structures that consider and include the breadth of community and civil society actors in recognition of differences in rationality and priorities.
Whilst the national response to Cyclone Pam was challenging, the low death toll of the event – eleven deaths with four being people in or attempting to move their boats – are credited to disaster preparedness and response activities undertaken by Vanuatu. The factors identified to influence the low death toll were effective warnings, self-reliance and traditional knowledge and preparation, training and evacuation, shelter and housing.31 Of note is that traditional knowledge, such as seeing a particular bird in flight in advance of a cyclone, and preparedness activities, including storing emergency food
27 G. Storer, Tropical Cyclone Winston Response, Fiji: After Action Review – Report, CARE Australia, September 2016, p. 21, viewed on 02 January 2020, http://www.careevaluations.org/wp- content/uploads/Tropical-Cyclone-Winston-Response-Fiji.pdf 28 S. McDonnell, ‘100 days since Cyclone Pam, people across Vanuatu pause to reflect on loss and resilience.’ The Conversation, 18 June 2015, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://theconversation.com/100-days-since-cyclone-pam-people-across-vanuatu-pause-to-reflect-on- loss-and-resilience-40481 29 S. McDonnell, ‘Other Dark Sides of Resilience: Politics and Power in Community-Based Efforts to Strengthen Resilience.’ Anthropological Forum, 2019, p. 8. 30 ibid 31 J. Handmer & H. Iveson, ‘Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu: learning from the low death toll.’ Australian Disaster Reslience Knowledge Hub, April 2017, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/ajem-apr-2017-cyclone-pam-in-vanuatu-learning-from-the-low- death-toll/ 126
! rations and water, cutting down banana plant leaves and tying down roofs, in response was observed to be declining. This may have an impact on disaster management into the future, especially coupled with the observation that disaster recovery is being “largely replaced with a reliance on government, NGOs, and international aid.”32
4.4 International Response After the Vanuatu Government called for international assistance, it was reported by the National Disaster Committee in the media that over 100 NGOs and faith-based organisations responded.33 The generalised nature of the appeal resulted in international NGOs flooding the country – many uninvited, with no established relationships or knowledge of national actors and institutions.34 Actors with a presence in Vanuatu quickly flew in surge capacity, including staff from global emergency response teams. This meant the time available to be briefed on national coordination structures was limited.35 Scholar Chelsea Wentworth argued that the situation was reminiscent of colonial times, stating the “Relationships between aid agencies and the ni-Vanuatu today reflect the structure of historical interventions enacted during colonial rule.”36
The flood of actors resulted in a range of humanitarian tools and services, including the UN’s Disaster Assessment and Coordination team (UNDAC) being deployed as part of ‘a standard package’ to support coordination of the response. This was despite an UNDAC team never being used in or by Vanuatu previously.37 National planning processes did not anticipate the surge of responders even though this is a predictable trait of large-scale international responses to natural disasters. As a result, the national response effort was unable to effectively integrate responders and was quickly overwhelmed due to the significant pressure placed on structures and procedures.38
32 ibid 33 R. Barber, ‘Legal Preparedness for the Facilitation of International Humanitarian Assistance in the Aftermath of Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam.’ Asian Journal of International Law, vol. 8, iss.1, January 2018, p.156. 34 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 6. 35 ibid 36 C. Wentworth, ‘Unhealthy Aid: Food Security Programming and Disaster Responses to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu.’ Anthropological Forum, 2019, p. 5 37 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 15. 38 ibid, p. 6. 127
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An NGO worker with experience in the response interviewed in Port Vila for this project described the response in one word - “miscoordination.”39 Subsequent interviews conducted with different NGOs in Port Vila reinforced this experience, stating that there were no standardised tools to conduct needs assessments and people attending cluster coordination meetings were not trained. As a result, there was a lack of understanding of what relief items needed to be distributed and to which locations, which was exacerbated by the NDMO not being sufficiently staffed and provinces not having capacity or authority to make decisions despite efforts to localise the response. From their experience, the NGOs interviewed identified the need for standardised coordination tools and practices to achieve quality and consistency of information flow between actors and ensure the timely delivery of aid.40
A CARE Australia After Action Review Report from the Tropical Cyclone Winston Response in Fiji compared the national responses between Vanuatu and Fiji, stating in the case of Vanuatu that “the government was not fully functional, and OCHA and other UN agencies and international NGOs played an active role in staging and executing the response.”41 This description was somewhat mirrored in other literature, with it reflected that despite the Government maintaining a strong stance that it was going to lead and control the humanitarian response,42 national structures “were overtaken by a large-scale international response within a week.”43 More specifically, there was overlapping coordination structures, and national and local actors faced difficulty working with unfamiliar international systems.44 The collective behaviours, attitudes, communication styles, and actions of external responders negatively impacted the response because they did not fully respect the national situation.45
Cultural sensitivities were also not respected by civilian staff new to Vanuatu, with a failure to understand the Melanesian culture causing friction in the early stages of the response. Humanitarian Policy Advisor Rebecca Barber identified two parts to this issues
39 Interview with author, Port Vila, 3 May 2019. 40 Interviews with author, Port Vila, April - May 2019. 41 G. Storer, op. cit., p. 21. 42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 20 43 R. Barber, 2018, op. cit., p.144. 44 ibid 45 See R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 19. 128
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– staff failing to show deference to figures of authority and men in senior positions; and pushing aside national and experienced international staff. The first issue was evidenced by international staff “taking dominant standpoints and speaking over the top of senior government authorities.”46 In contrast, “staff with experience in Vanuatu, or elsewhere in the Pacific, or who were otherwise culturally sensitive, for the most part had good relations with the authorities and were able to work together to achieve results.”47
The second issue, related to first, was that national staff and international staff with experience in Ni-Vanuatu culture, government, systems and processes, were often pushed to the side. This issue occurred within NGOs, UN agencies, coordination forums, and the EOC. Cluster meetings were characterised as “fast-paced, dominated by international staff, and exclusively in English.”48 The EOC, despite being a government entity, was dominated by foreigners, with it described a “hardly a Ni-Vanuatu representative there. The culture was completely foreign – early morning starts, loud, a militarised culture … high pressure, completely different from the way anyone operates here. It would have been an extremely difficult thing for a Ni-Van to walk into that room.”49
Within this context, civil defence assets and foreign militaries from seven nations responded, as outlined in Figure 21. The Solomon Islands deployed Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) AUKI to deliver aid and conduct an evacuation of women and children from Mataso Island and four surrounding islands and Tonga deployed PPB NIEFU. While Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) engineers focused on re-building five schools on Efate Island, with their main effort being the Presbyterian College.50 The support provided by civil defence, including the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) and Vanuatu Police Patrol Boat, and foreign military was deemed “critical to the success of the response.”51
46 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., citing interview with Tim Nelson, Save the Children, Port Vila, April 2015 and NGO, interview with author, Port Vila, April 2019. 47 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 19. 48 ibid 49 ibid, citing interview with Tom Bamforth, IFRC, Port Vila, April 2015. 50 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, 21 May 2015, p. A-5. Provided to author – not publicly available. 51 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, op. cit., p. 5. 129
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Figure 21: Foreign Military Deployed Assets52
4.5 Australian Whole of Government Response Under DFAT’s leadership, Australia’s whole-of-government response was considered timely, with the ADF, AUSMAT and USAR quickly deploying and meeting Australia’s strategic commitment to respond within 48 hours of a country’s request for assistance.53 The response was the first time a ‘DFAT Single Crisis Response Protocol’ was used, with the resulting coordination evaluated to be strong and effective.54 The structure connected to the protocol supported a robust response, where staff understood each other’s roles because Crisis Action Plans were integrated and a whole-of-post crisis response exercise was held in November 2014 at the start of cyclone season that exercised these roles.55
52 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Vanuatu: Foreign Military Deployed Assets (as of 29 March 2015).’ 29 March 2015, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/vanuatu-foreign-military-deployed-assets-29-march-2015 53 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 2 54 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 38. 55 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 2. 130
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4.5.1 ADF Response – Operation Pacific Assist 2015 The ADF responded within 36 hours of the cyclone passing, making it the first foreign military to provide assistance - the first RAAF aircraft “in the skies over Port Vila on 15 March was met with cheers and tears of joy from residents.”56 Named Operation Pacific Assist, the ADF response commenced with the deployment of a Support and Response Team (SRT) and other ADF assets, such as airlift, on 15 March 2015. A Joint Task Force (JTF) was subsequently established on 21 March. The focus of Australian efforts were support to Tafea Province through the provision of engineer works, and aid delivery to Shefa, Tafea, Malampa, Penama and Torba Provinces by HMAS Tobruk, the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE), and helicopters.57 This is mapped below in Figure 22, which reflects the timeline of key ADF events until the cessation of SRT operations.
Figure 22: Timeline of key ADF events 58
The SRT Commander documented his experience in a post operational report, which states that the timeline of arrival of ADF assets was not supported by a formal leadership function. 59 A JTF Commander was appointed on 18 March and arrived in Vanuatu on 19 March, five days after the first ADF assets. This situation highlighted the need for a JTF Commander to deploy either as part of an initial deployment, or shortly afterwards,
56 Port Vila Post, ‘Vanuatu: Cyclone Pam: Lessons Learnt,’ 11 June 2015, p. 2. 57 Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, 11 May 2015, p. 2-3. Provided to author – not publicly available. 58 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 1. 59 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 1. 131
! to commence relationship building, gain situational awareness and integrate ADF personnel into coordination forums. The SRT Commander’s operational experience also identified the need for an SRT to have responsibilities to task, request and inform the allocation of ADF assets because they are often the first ADF capability to arrive in the aftermath of a natural disaster.60
Overall, the rapid timeline of the response was found to be justified and DFAT took action to influence the speed of the Australian response as needs became clearer, however the overall response could have been “slowed down to better align with national systems and better address needs.” 61 This was especially necessary for the ADF deployment, which needed to be rate more commensurate with national leadership and humanitarian requirements.62
4.5.2 Preparation A dedicated period of ADF preparation for the conduct of Operation Pacific Assist was not identified, which is in contrast to the Army preparation undertaken for Operation Philippines Assist while embarked on HMAS Tobruk. However, the need for disaster response preparation was detailed in post operation reporting, which states that it would be beneficial for ADF personnel to have knowledge of details of operating in an archipelagic region including information specific to an affected nation, such as airfields and accessible ports. This knowledge would have assisted with initial planning and inform the deployment of the most suitable assets, for example use of helicopters for delivery of aid to remote island communities.63
The benefits of civil-military knowledge sharing prior to a disaster response was identified by a DFAT member interviewed for this project who stated that he did not conduct any exercises or training with the ADF prior to deploying in response to Cyclone Pam or Cyclone Winston. While he was able to “make it work, preparation with the ADF would have shared knowledge on language, including staff branch numbering, roles and responsibilities.” 64 This experience was reflected in operational literature, which
60 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 2. 61 ibid, p. 37. 62 ibid, p. 36. 63 ibid, p. 4. 64 DFAT, interview with author, 27 September 2019. 132
! identify the need for preparation opportunities that bring civilian and military actors together, specifically civilian actors receiving training and education on ADF capability, such as the SRT and JTF. This knowledge sharing would support coordination by optimising use of military assets because civilian actors would have an understanding of capacity and planning processes.65
The Honiara-based Defence Attaché (DA) and Vanuatu-based Maritime Surveillance and Technical Advisers were observed to contribute valuable knowledge and assistance to support ADF engagement with national and agency-level decision-makers and conduct assessment of key infrastructure.66 These connections were considered critical, highlighting the need for Australia to have a whole of government approach to maintaining relationships with regional partners that builds national and regional knowledge to apply when providing assistance. 67 The benefit of these relationships identified an area of preparation, with it being stated by the DA in an interview for this project that DFAT and ADF teams should deploy with people who are trained as ‘advisors’ or mentors. Preparing personnel to advise and mentor is an investment that would have been realised early during the Vanuatu response because it would have enabled the Australian response to be fully prepared and educated for operations in a Pacific Nation.68
The need for military personnel to be prepared, considerate of other actors and relationship-focused when conducting disaster response operations was specifically noted by the SRT Commander in his post-operational report annex titled 'COMD SRT-1 Reflections on HADR Ops:'
"While other military operations require dominance, controlled-aggression, and ruthless determination to overmatch the enemy, HADR [Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief] requires slightly more interagency-orientated traits that could be characterised as decisiveness, responsiveness and humility. In other words, the
65 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, ‘Tropical Cyclone Pam: Civil-military cooperation in humanitarian disaster response in the Pacific.’ Outcomes Document, 21 May 2015, p. 2. 66 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 4. 67 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 2 and Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. 68 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One , op. cit., p. 6 and Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. ! 133
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ADF is not running the WoG [Whole of Government] response: it supports other agencies best by being clear about the limits of what it will and won't take, being mindful of the disproportionately large logistic capability it can wield to deliver HADR, and being humble in how it uses that capability."69
4.5.3 Capability As like in the Philippines, the configuration of the ADF capability that deployed to Vanuatu in terms of immediate response teams, composition and location, was found to influence civil-military interaction. These characteristics of an ADF response supported information sharing, achieved access to affected populations in remote communities and achieved civil-military teaming to conduct needs assessments, as will be discussed below.
4.5.3.1 Immediate Response Teams
The rapid arrival of the DFAT CRT and ADF SRT in Port Vila contributed to effective civil-military interaction. The SRT arrived in Port Vila to provide support to the Australian Head of Mission (HOM) and from arrival was collaborative and outcome- focused, which resulted in the team effectively embedding in the High Commission and their efforts effectively supporting a whole-of-government response.70 As the teams consisted of senior and experienced civilian and military personnel, they were able to provide planning expertise, both in-country and back to Australia, to inform operational decisions of follow-on ADF capability.71
Both the SRT and DA also performed an essential liaison role between the High Commission and the JTF after it was established. This relationship supported civil- military interaction to the extent that the departure of the SRT as a liaison function made coordination with the JTF challenging.72 The very high quality of deployed staff was key factor in engagement, especially those who were returning to Vanuatu as they had local knowledge and were able to engage immediately on arrival.73 The effectiveness of the
69 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., Annex B. 70 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 4. 71 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 6. 72 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 4. 73 ibid. 134
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SRT resulted in the High Commission noting that they “would seek a similar coordination mechanism in the event of another large disaster.”74
The challenge faced by the SRT, as touched upon in the timeline of the ADF response, was that other ADF assets, including airlift, arrived concurrently to deliver humanitarian and disaster relief supplies.75 This meant that ADF capability grew quickly in Vanuatu to include multiple medical teams, engineer reconnaissance teams, military logistics teams, and air operations teams without a formalised command and control function.
4.5.3.2 Composition
The composition of the ADF response to Cyclone Pam included aircraft, helicopters and HMAS Tobruk (as mapped in Figure 21 above). Together with DFAT’s commercial humanitarian partner, HK Logistics, ADF assets proved to be a vital part of humanitarian efforts. The arrival of Army Blackhawk helicopters on 21 March was considered to be a ‘turning-point’ in the response because until then there were no assets to reach affected populations on remote islands. Fixed-wing aircraft were unsuitable in the initial stages of the response because the conditions of the runways on these islands were unknown or unusable. The use of helicopters quickly addressed the logistical and geographical challenges of reaching affected populations after Cyclone Pam, identifying the need for early and urgent access to heavy-lift helicopters in aftermath of a natural disaster in an archipelagic region.76
While the benefits of the rapid deployment of helicopters was identified, post operational reporting also reflects the need for military capability to be better tailored to a response environment. Firstly, a water purification and desalination system was deployed which required handling equipment that meant it could not be used efficiently in an archipelagic region with remote and dispersed population. Secondly, HMAS Tobruk found it difficult to find a suitable anchorage to unload engineer plant equipment due to the sea and weather conditions, which resulted in heavy plant equipment remaining onboard throughout the operation.77 While HMAS Tobruk was decommissioned from service in
74 Ibid. 75 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 1. 76 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 4. 77 Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF 665 Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit., p. 5. 135
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July 2015, this example highlights the need for regional knowledge and information flow from immediate response teams to inform the configuration of an Australian response. Commander of the SRT reinforced this point in his post operation report, stating that “at the moment Australia has the requisite parts and intent for interagency operations .. but the ADF does not understand well how to make them fit together.”78
4.5.3.3 CIMIC The ADF deployed with a dedicated CIMIC function consisting of four people, including an Officer in Charge (OIC) CIMIC Detachment and a dual-hatted CIMIC/Liaison Officer position. The function enabled effective civil-military interaction, especially at the tactical level where CIMIC Liaison Officers were deployed with engineers on Tanna Island. These roles supported the alignment of ADF activities with broader UN and NGO efforts based on the mantra of being “unified in purpose”79 and a focus on comparative advantage, where the ADF conducted activities that other agencies could not due to logistical challenges of reaching remote affected communities.80 CIMIC personnel also teamed with DFAT to engage with villages to identify their needs and possible projects, while not making commitments.
It was noted by an ADF member interviewed during the response that it was “profoundly noticeable that these guys had CIMIC training and exposure.”81 The interviewee noted that this was because they were prepared, able to seamlessly integrate with civilian actors, and did not need time to adjust to their roles and responsibilities – they “knew what was needed.”82 This interviewee went on to note that civil-military interaction roles require a certain personality and skillset that develops when identified in young leaders.83
The need for the right people in CIMIC positions was emphasised by another ADF member interviewed with experience Vanuatu and Fiji, who noted that CIMIC is good capability but treated as a “hobby rather than a profession.” To address this, he stated
78 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., Annex B 79 OIC CIMIC, interview with author, 09 May 2018. 80 ibid. 81 Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. ! 82 Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018 and OIC CIMIC, interview with author, 09 May 2018. 83 Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. 136
! that dedicated positions such as Loadmasters and Operations Officers, would benefit from receiving CIMIC training to enable them to do their primary tasks with requisite knowledge of civilian actors and coordination mechanisms.84
4.5.3.4 Co-location of Civilian and Military Actors
Effective civil-military coordination was achieved through the SRT being co-located with the Australian mission, providing direct planning support and information flow on ADF operations to the Head of Mission. The benefits of co-location of the SRT and DFAT led to the recommendation that a JTF HQ should collocate with an affected nation’s lead agency for disaster response, in this case, the NDMO. Physically “being next door will optimise functionality, increase closer working relationships and connectedness, demonstrate commitment to the mission, and reduce the requirement for a flood of LO.”85 This perspective was reinforced by the High Commission, who noted the strong links with the ADF SRT, in part due to co-location, contributed to the success of the response.86
Co-location could not be achieved between international humanitarian organisations, foreign military forces and the NDMO due to various reasons, including the size of facilitates. However, civilian and military actors engaged in regular and consistent meetings that achieved comparable outcomes to co-location, including information sharing, task allocation, and planning activities that led to common situational awareness and informed decision-making.87
4.5.3.5 Civil-Military Teaming Over a five day period in early April, civilian and military actors teamed to plan and conduct the second round of detailed multi-sector needs assessment of Shefa and Tafea Provinces. The assessment brought together the FRANZ Joint Task Force, Pacific Military Partners, the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team, UNDAC Team and UN-CMCoord officer to plan and conduct the assessment, which saw the deployment of 22 teams to 47
84 Amphibious Air Liaison Officer, interview with author, December 2018. 85 Ibid, p. 5. 86 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 1. 87 R. Reario, ‘The HuMOCC: Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets.’ Liaison, vol. VII, Fall 2015, p. 10. 137
! assessment sites on 24 islands covering four provinces over a two-day period (1st to 2nd April).88 Each team consisted of between four and eight people, who were deployed into pre-designated and planned locations using naval and air military assets, including Australian assets HMAS Tobruk, Blackhawk helicopters, King Air aircraft, and C130 aircraft; New Zealand assets Sea Sprite helicopter and King Air aircraft; a French Puma helicopter; and Solomon Islands and Tonga contributed their Pacific Class Patrol Boats. A civilian helicopter, leased by the Australian Government, also supported the activity by providing airlift.89
Figure 24: Shefa Assessment Team Logistics Plan (left) and Tafea Assessment Team Logistics Plan (right)90
Led by Australia, due to the strong rapport that existed between JTF leadership and CIMIC teams with the UN and NDMO , the activity consisted of deliberate combined planning and a two-phase execution period involving assets from six different nations.91 The assessment was only achievable through teaming, both in the planning and conduct
88 R. Reario, op. cit., p. 10. and Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF 665 Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit., p. 5 and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, op. cit., p. 6. 89 ibid 90 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015, op. cit., p. 6. 91 R. Reario, op. cit., p. 10. and Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF 665 Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit., p. 5. 138
! phase, because it was dependent on civilian assessment expertise and military planning and capability.92
In conducting a joint planning process, civilian and military actors worked together based on comparative advantage, whereby experienced civilian personnel used military assets, to build a comprehensive picture of humanitarian needs in affected areas that either validated or identified gaps in the existing provision of assistance. The assessment also provided greater insight into overall loss and damage to property and livelihoods that was fed into subsequent phases of disaster management, recovery and reconstruction planning.93 Importantly, noting the need for expediency during disaster response, without military support the conduct of the assessments would have taken much longer.
4.5.4 Leadership Leadership, and its components of command and control, relationship building and Key Leadership Engagement, within the Australian whole-of-government response in Vanuatu was identified to be a factor that influenced civil-military interaction.
DFAT’s leadership of the Australian response helped ensure the response was coherent, however there was no whole-of-government action plan (mission) in place to articulate DFAT’s overarching approach and priorities, specify roles and responsibilities, and provide desired outcomes to implementing partners.94 It was noted that “Coherence would have been improved if DFAT had articulated an action plan for the response to provide a common sense of purpose for the overall assistance package.” This could be achieved through DFAT producing and distributing a short written statement that outlines “the overall purpose, strategic priorities, suite of partners and approach of Australia’s assistance.”95
Within-case analysis identified that the absence of a DFAT action plan contributed to a lack of clarity on leadership and responsibilities between Head of Mission (civilian) and
92 ibid 93 R. Reario, op. cit., p. 10. 94 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 2 and interviews with author (DFAT and Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché) 03 December 2018 and 26 September 2019. 95 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 5. 139
! the JTF Commander (military).96 This was exacerbated by the mission given to the JTF, which did not articulate military efforts being in support of HOM and a whole-of- government approach, as was the case during Operation Philippines Assist. Instead, the JTF was given the mission to “lead the ADF contribution to the Australian Whole of Government (WoG) response to TC Pam IOT assist the recovery operations led by GoVUT [Government of Vanuatu]”97 with intent being to “deliver required HADR [Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief] effects IAW [in accordance with] the National Disaster Management Organisation (NDMO) priorities.”98 This caused confusion about the hierarchy and leadership between the Head of Mission and JTF Commander.99 It also identified the need to explore whether there are more effective models of JTF leadership that would strengthen coordination of an Australian response.100
4.5.4.1 Command and Control A post operation ADF report states that there was uncertainty, which caused a delay, around the establishment of the JTF and assigning a JTF Commander. Initially, Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) commenced planning, with 3rd Brigade then taking on the lead in anticipation of standing up as the JTF. However, Commander Australian Amphibious Task Group (COMAUSATG) was assigned as Commander JTF, which resulted in headquarter staff deploying from the Amphibious Task Group, which was a component at the time of the operation not connected to either DJFHQ or 3rd Brigade. The delay in assigning the Commander, which also determined the component which formed the JTF, hampered planning and caused confusion at the tactical and operational level because there is no clarity on military capability that would be deploying.101
The ADF response to Cyclone Pam highlighted the suitability of COMAUSATG, with headquarter staff from ATG forming a JTF for disaster response in an archipelagic
96 DFAT, interviews with author, 26 September 2018. 97 Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF 665 Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit., p. 2 98 ibid 99 DFAT, interviews with author, 26 September 2018. 100 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 3. 101 Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF 665 Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit., p. 6. 140
! environment, such as Vanuatu. This was because the knowledge and expertise for planning, providing command and control for, and conducting amphibious operations, such as disaster response to remote islands, resides within ATG because of its role as the ADF’s joint amphibious capability.
4.5.4.2 Relationships As noted in Chapter One, the civil-military interface during disaster response requires relationships to be built between civilian and military actors within an Australian response, and for military actors to build relationships with external civilian actors. The positive outcomes of effective civil-military relationships have already been touched upon under Immediate Response Teams, co-location of civil and military actors, and civil-military teaming.
However, the response to Cyclone Pam also identified there is opportunity to strengthen civil-military relationships within an Australian response by SRT Commanders being familiar with DFAT and Crisis Response Team (CRT) functions. This knowledge would enable them to be better positioned to interact and build relationships with DFAT, AUSMAT, USAR, UN and NGO actors based on understanding respective roles and responsibilities within an Australian whole-of-government structure.102
More broadly, effective collaboration in Vanuatu was found to be dependent on connections based on “the strength of relationships, the degree of inclusivity in dialogue on disasters and how organisations communicate.”103 This meant that the speed and effectiveness of the response Cyclone Pam were “reliant on being connected to the right people,” in-turn reflecting the importance of trust and relationships between individuals to enable coordination.104 In terms of the ADF, it was identified through the DFAT evaluation that “ADF assistance contributed to the development of positive relationships due to respectful and friendly engagement with local communities. Consultation with community leaders was routinely used to identify the assistance that was most
102 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 5 and Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. 103 A. Gero, et al, op. cit., p. 104. 104 Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. 141
! needed.”105 The Australian response also benefited from strong pre-existing relationships with the Vanuatu Government and partners. The importance of building and maintaining these relationships came to the fore in the early days of the response, with Australian personnel able to engage with other actors, gain accurate information and engage in meaningful discussions.106
The relationship-focused approach adopted by the ADF was reinforced in an interview with an NGO during fieldwork who had direct experience working with the ADF. The NGO member noted that ADF personnel attended cluster meetings, listened, captured information and returned to subsequent meetings to inform planning having analysed information from all the clusters. While the ADF was not extremely vocal or collaborative in the cluster meetings, the NGO member stated that it was clear that the ADF was capturing information, piecing it together, identifying gaps in assistance and producing a plan to address these gaps.107 In their opinion, this approach resulted in a “good assessment of what needed to be done”108 and supported civilian actors prioritise and request military assets. The relationships formed by the ADF in Vanuatu also positively changed NGO perspective and understanding of military roles in natural disaster response, with personnel “out in the field doing activities, not spending time bossing people around at government level.”109
Overall, the response to Cyclone Pam is considered to be “an excellent example of civil- military coordination that enabled the ADF and other militaries to provide efficient logistical support to the relief operation.”110 This assessment was mirrored by the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator, Osnat Lubrani, in sending a letter to then Chief of Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Binskin, noting “The support your Force has shown set a global standard of Humanitarian Civil-Military Cooperation and I believe that future emergencies will try and emulate the great cooperation that has taken place in Vanuatu between Government, Humanitarian organisations and Military Forces.”111
105 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 35. 106 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 3. 107 NGO, interview with author, Port Vila, 29 April 2019. 108 ibid 109 ibid 110 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 38. 111 United Nations Letter No: 058 File Ref: ORG 130/1 UNRC dated 17 April 2015. 142
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4.5.4.3 Key Leadership Engagement Both the SRT and JTF conducted Key Leadership Engagement (KLE) with High Commission staff, DFAT, NDMO, Other Government Agency and FRANZ military partners. This KLE, as like in the Typhoon Haiyan response, was deliberate and considered “critical to the successful coordination”112 of ADF activities within broader Vanuatu Government efforts. The engagement initiated by the JTF with civilian actors, including the UN and NGOs, ensured ADF support and efforts were appropriately allocated and expectations for ADF commitments were managed.113
4.5.5 Coordination Structures More than 70 new organisations arrived in Vanuatu after the Government’s general appeal, which was calculated to be one for every 3,700 people in Vanuatu. This created a significant coordination challenge for the Government, with the strong relationships between the Vanuatu Government, the UN and FRANZ laying the foundations to synchronise actors in the face of this significant influx.114 During an interview with a DFAT staff member who arrived in the early stages of the response, it was noted there was no systematic coordination structure in place and Australian assisted in establishing one, which became the CMOC.115
However, it was identified from literature that was not the only mechanism established, with civilian and military actors using varying mechanisms to assist coordinate the response – the VHT implemented clusters; UNDAC established a Reception and Departure Centre (RDC) and On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC). Liaison Officers were also used, with these positions enabling the effective use of military assets to support the delivery of relief items, support the conduct of needs assessments, capture aerial photography of affected areas to allow prioritisation, and provide engineering support to affected communities.
112 Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit. 113 ibid 114 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 3. 115 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019. 143
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At the beginning of the response, coordination was occurring between local actors with existing relationships. With the rapid influx of external actors, coordination became more difficult, with meetings being longer than necessary to accommodate the number of actors, many of which had limited understanding of national processes and requirements. Furthermore, as will be detailed below, some civilian actors did not coordinate their activities through any of the established means and went straight into the field, which reduced NDMO oversight of response efforts.
FRANZ Agreement The FRANZ Agreement, as introduced in Chapter One proved to be a key coordination mechanism during the response. FRANZ was mobilised prior to the cyclone, with daily meetings chaired by DFAT to support systematic coordination of military assets. These meetings grew to become the de facto core of donor coordination and information- sharing, with Chinese and Japanese officials, UN and other agencies attending.116 Notably, the tempo and scope of the meetings evolved to meet the changing needs of Vanuatu, the NDMO and FRANZ nations.117
The DFAT evaluation of the effectiveness of Australia's response to Cyclone Pam found that, overall, the “FRANZ alliance … resulted in effective civil-military coordination which enabled the ADF and other militaries to provide efficient and significant logistical support to the relief operation.” 118 Indicators of this success were the respectful and friendly engagement of the ADF with local communities, consultation with community leaders to identify assistance that was most needed, close coordination of the ADF with the Vanuatu Mobile Force, and the scale and functional capacity of ADF assets.119
While the humanitarian response identified a number of areas of improvement, a component of the international response that was deemed effective was the activation of the FRANZ Arrangement. The Arrangement was established prior to the impact of Cyclone Pam, bringing together France, Australia and New Zealand to assist Vanuatu coordinate response efforts by functioning as an effective civil-military coordination and
116 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 3. 117 ibid. 118 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 36. 119 ibid, p. 35-36. 144
! information sharing mechanism, as will be discussed below.120 In partnership with the NDMO, DFAT acted as the FRANZ chair, supporting the effective coordination of civilian and military resources that included ADF personnel and equipment.
Vanuatu Humanitarian Team The Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) was considered to be a key coordination mechanism for humanitarian actors. Established in 2011, the Team is a network of agencies that work together with to support effective humanitarian coordination, disaster preparedness and humanitarian response.121 Convened by Oxfam, the team includes members from the Vanuatu Red Cross, French Read Cross, Vanuatu Association of NGOs, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Oxfam, CARE International, Save the Children Australia, Peace Corps, World Vision, Act for Peace, and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In the aftermath of Cyclone Pam, coordination structures were established based on the cluster system, which were led by Government ministries and co-led by VHT agencies.122 While a valuable asset during the response, the VHT’s coordination efforts in support of the NDMO and Ministries were not clear or formalised enough, which raises the need for clear roles and responsibilities, and reporting lines to strengthen the VHT.123
Cluster System While the cluster system was established to assist coordination and was considered a useful mechanism,124 considerable challenges were faced because people were not trained in the use of it. This meant that local actors did not know how things would get distributed or even what needed to be distributed.125 This identified the need for Vanuatu to convene a high-level decision-making group, including government and non- government members, to determine how the cluster system should be developed and how it should function in future responses.126
120 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 38. 121 ibid, p. 20. 122 R. Barber, op. cit., p. 14. 123 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, op. cit., p. 5 and R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 14. 124 NDMO, interview with author, Port Vila, May 2019. 125 NGO, interview with author, Port Vila, 29 April 2019. 126 Pacific Community, op. cit., p. 3. 145
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The Tropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop specifically identified a number of areas that require action to further improve the cluster system:127 •! The Cluster System and inter-cluster coordination should be purposeful and efficient as possible without adding any additional workload through lengthy meetings. •! Clear Terms of Reference and SOPs need to be developed for the clusters’ roles and operations. •! Cluster meeting schedules should be well coordinated to avoid timing conflicts. •! Clusters and inter-cluster coordination should be a strategic and decision-making forum, rather than a reporting forum. •! Data collection, collation and sharing between clusters needs to be improved. •! The Shelter and Evacuation Working Groups should develop stronger relationships to progress common issues.
A training period that includes simulation was identified as an effective means to prepare personnel to understand and use the cluster system because desktop exercises do not fully solidify system practices and processes.128
ADF Civil Military Operations Centre The structure of the JTF Headquarters did not include a planning function, with planning responsibility remaining with the SRT. To address this and establish direct linkages between the NDMO and the Australian response, the SRT established a Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) with a DFAT Director and LO, and staffed with SRT personnel. The CMOC provided a means to coordinate requests for Australian support (Figure 23) to ensure all ADF activities had NDMO and HOM endorsement before being passed to JTF 665 for execution on a 48 to 72 hour event horizon.129 In this example, the CMOC acted as a ‘de facto’ planning function for the JTF to enable it to focus on coordination of current operations. The process used by the CMOC saw requests from the logistics cluster go to the Australian Head of Mission (HOM) for approval in line with Government of Vanuatu priorities (political considerations) and then to the JTF to task an asset to action the request. The CMOC facilitated civil-military cooperation
127 ibid. 128 NGO, interview with author, Port Vila, 29 May 2019. 129 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 4. 146
! between DFAT and the JTF by ensuring requests for ADF support from civilian actors outside the Australian response were managed, endorsed, and issued to the JTF as actionable tasks.130
While this approach aligned civilian and military actors within Australia’s response and was considered by a DFAT member interviewed for this project to have “worked really well,”131 it was identified by an ADF member interviewed to cause the ADF to operate largely independently of other coordination mechanisms.132 The different decision- making processes adopted by foreign militaries, such as the ADF CMOC, also meant that each nation had its own decision-making authority. This approach hindered civil-military interaction because it was not conducive to meeting urgent requests from clusters and was observed to cause delays in accomplishing tasks.133
Figure 23: Civil Military Operations Centre134
130 Ibid, p. A-3. 131 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019. 132 Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. 133 R. Reario, op. cit., p. 10. 134 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 4. 147
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UNDAC Reception and Departure Centre (RDC) & On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) As noted above, the response to Cyclone Pam was the first time a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) was deployed in Vanuatu. Discussions for the deployment of the UNDAC commenced on 11 March between the Government of Vanuatu and the OCHA Regional Office for the Pacific, with a formal request for assistance made to the Regional Office on 13 March by the Director General of the National Disaster Council, Mr Jotham Napat. The Team arrived in Vanuatu with no agreed Terms of Reference (TORs) with the Government, instead it “arrived ready to support as required over the full spectrum of its capabilities” 135 which was not fully known because, as mentioned above, an UNDAC had not previously been deployed to Vanuatu.
During the response, UNDAC established two coordination mechanisms – a Reception and Departure Centre (RDC) and an On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) inside the NDMO. The RDC was established at the airport to record incoming humanitarian teams, and provide them with information and related Government instructions, including maps. The OSOCC supported the NDMO’s Emergency Operations Centre, providing a coordination hub for response operations as well as acting as information centre for data products and mapping products.136
The UNDAC assessed in their End of Mission Report that the team supported existing structures and integrated with Government and local partners, more than is often the case. In previous disasters, standard Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) methodology was used to ‘gap fill’ Government-led plans. In contrast, “the coordination effort in Vanuatu was fully integrated into the Government-led mechanisms.”137 The example cited was that the OSOCC team was integrated into the NDMO, supporting the clusters and VHT, rather than be established as an external coordination mechanism which can cause duplication of coordination forums.138
135 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015, op.cit., p. 4. 136 ibid ! 137 ibid, p. 5. 138 ibid 148
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One of the issues identified from the arrival of UNDAC was that there no clear understanding of the team’s roles and responsibilities alongside the NDMO and the VHT, with UNDAC not referenced in NDMO or VHT documents.139 While roles and responsibilities were quickly agreed between the NDMO, UNDAC and VHT, they were not more broadly disseminated. 140 Barber noted this contributed to the overlapping coordination structures, illustrated by a daily meeting schedule that lasted four hours each morning. The duration and approach of coordination meetings was considered excessive because it siloed the passage of information and reduced available time for activities and actions. The meeting structure also confused people because the hierarchy and responsibilities of decision-making were not clear.141
Liaison Officer Network As like the response to Typhoon Haiyan, the Australian response to Cyclone Pam also adopted a Liaison Officer Network as a coordination mechanism. Liaison Officers from the JTF were positioned within Other Government Agencies and NGOs, with reciprocal DFAT LOs working closely with the JTF to support monitoring of tasking for relevant organisations. As the ADF’s presence in Port Vila grew rapidly, the NDMO at times struggled to articulate the assistance it required from ADF assets, with LOs supporting effective communication to overcome this barrier.142 In the early stages of the response, the role of Australian liaison officers was unclear at times, especially in relation to other military roles such as a ‘watchkeeper.’ This identified the need for all liaison officers to have clear roles and responsibilities, including de-confliction with other deployed positions.143
Two specific examples were identified which amplify the importance of well-placed and effective liaison officers to enable civil-military interaction. Firstly, was the embedding of a DFAT Australian Civilian Corps officer in the NDMO which established an operational link between the Vanuatu Government and the Australian response for
139 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘Post Tropical Cyclone Pam Roundtable with Civil Society.’ Quick Impact Workshop Outcomes, Australian Government, p.3, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://acmc.gov.au/resources/publications/quick-impact-workshop-outcomes-post-tropical-cyclone- pam-roundtable-civil 140 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 16. 141 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 16 and Southwest Pacific Defence Attaché, interview with author, 03 December 2018. 142 Operation Pacific Assist, Post Operation Report – Support and Response Team – One, op. cit., p. 3. 143 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 2. 149
! humanitarian and consular purposes. This link was critical for accurate information sharing, ensuring a consistent Australian approach, and supporting the NDMO manage external actors.144 The second example was the placement of an ADF Liaison Officer into the Civil-Military Operations Command at the NDMO. This LO ensured that the use of ADF assets were prioritised according to tasks identified by the NDMO. ADF presence in the NDMO also supported the conduct of the civil-military needs assessment, as will be detailed below.
Liaison officers were also deployed between the national headquarters of France, Australia and New Zealand to support the synchronisation of nation’s efforts, which was further enabled by regular meetings between Commanders and staff officers, and attendance at command briefings. These collaborative efforts also included a combined joint planning teams and the use of assets from across the alliance to achieve specific tasks.145 The alignment of military efforts using these means ensured that assets were effectively and efficiently aligned with broader response efforts.
While most actors worked within these mechanisms and communicated with key actors including the Government, the clusters or the VHT to identify local needs, some did not. A number of organisations chose “to work independently in sectors and geographic locations with no respect for government priorities.”146 These NGOs arrived in Vanuatu and went directly into affected areas, bypassing coordination mechanisms and reducing oversight of what aid been delivered (e.g. tarps) and to whom. This practice increases the risk of duplication and wastage of resources, both time and money.147
NDMO spokesman Benjamin Shing voiced Government concerns with these practices in the media, stating that aid agencies “have their own operational systems, they have their own networks and they refuse to conform to government directives,”148 as a result
144 Port Vila Post, op. cit., p. 3. 145 Operation Pacific Assist 2015, JTF 665 Post Operations Report – Operation Pacific Assist 2015, op. cit., p. 5. 146 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 24 and R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 16. 147 R. Barber, 2015, op. cit., p. 16. 148 ABC, ‘Tropical Cyclone Pam: Vanuatu’s government criticizes aid groups over poor coordination of disaster relief.’ 19 March 2015, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03- 19/vanuatu-criticises-lack-of-aid-coordination-after-cyclone-pam/6333676 150
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“We had to spend the first three days trying to get some form of coordination in place. That was much previous time that could have been spent doing the assessments instead.”149 This disorganisation was denied by Oxfam, with Transparency Vanuatu blaming the government for delaying the delivery of aid stating that “after six days the problem with the aid is that it has not been distributed”150 because “officials were still identifying where aid and medical supplies ought to be delivered.”151 However this appears to be part of the broader issue that lots of time was spent on ‘coordination’ at meetings rather than enabling the Government to conduct the response.
4.5.5.1 Standard Operating Procedures During the response to Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu did not have a framework or operating procedures in place to conduct civil-military coordination, which meant the NDMO was not aware of how to request and integrate military assets into its response.152 More broadly, the NDMO’s role in regards to logistics transportation and coordination was not clearly defined153 nor were there clear Terms of Reference and SOPs for cluster roles and operations.154 Combined with the rapid flow of ADF assets into Vanuatu, coordination was challenging from the outset because Ni-Vanuatu and local actors were unsure where militaries fit within the broader response and in specific clusters. This situation was underpinned by many people being new to the NDMO and receiving training during the response on coordination processes.155 A Request for Assistance (RFA) form was subsequently introduced to support the NDMO request the use of military assets and this became an effective process as people become familiar with it.156
The lack of procedures to govern civil-military interaction during the Cyclone Pam response highlighted that the Government of Vanuatu needs “a clear mandate on how and when it wants to engage military assets in disaster response. Military assets have strict guidelines on the use of their assets; systems need to be reviewed to ensure that these can be made available earlier.”157 The follow-on benefits in addressing this issue
149 ibid 150 ibid. 151 ibid. 152 NDMO, interview with author, May 2019. 153 Pacific Community, op. cit., p. 35. 154 ibid p. 3. 155 NDMO, interview with author, Port Vila, May 2019. 156 ibid 157 Pacific Community, op. cit., p. 36. 151
! include strengthened coordination and information sharing mechanisms between civilian and military actors, the communication of guidelines on the use of military assets to NGOs and Provincial agencies, and military deployments conforming to diplomatic channels and protocols
4.5.6 Organisational Learning Extensive learning was undertaken after the Cyclone Pam response, consisting of evaluation, lessons learned workshops, After Action Reviews and Post Operation Reports. This learning supports civil-military interaction by examining leadership and coordination of resources and expertise to identify best practice and areas of improvement.
As mentioned and referenced throughout this chapter, an in-depth evaluation was undertaken of Australia’s response to Cyclone Pam by the DFAT Office of Development Effectiveness. The purpose of the evaluation was to review Australia’s response to identify how “DFAT can better support Pacific countries to prepare for, respond to and recover from rapid-onset emergencies.”158 The project’s terms of reference did not include Australia’s subsequent response to Cyclone Winston, however linkages were made between relevant aspects where improvement was observed.159 Specifically, the evaluation “found substantial evidence that DFAT has incorporated specific learnings from the Cyclone Pam response into subsequent responses to rapid-onset emergencies in the Pacific.”160
DFAT also commissioned a workshop with Defence personnel in May 2015 to draw on experience from the response to Pam to identify how DFAT-Defence interoperability might be improved. The workshop was hosted by the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) on 21 May 2015 and covered how DFAT worked with Defence, processes that worked well, and gaps in skills and understanding that DFAT might need to lead a whole- of-government response.161
158 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 18. 159 ibid p. 19. 160 ibid p. 71. 161 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 1. 152
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ACMC also conducted a ‘Quick Impact Workshop’ in June 2015 that brought together government, NGOs, and civil society organisations who responded to Cyclone Pam to discuss disaster and humanitarian best practice in the Pacific region.162
In Vanuatu, the NDMO with support from the Pacific Community and European Union, held a two-day ‘Tropical Cyclone Pam – Lesson Learned Workshop’ from 24 to 25 June 2015.163 Invitees included government representatives, humanitarian organisations, private sector, disaster affected people and academic institutions. The focus of the workshop was on participatory sessions to “explore new partnerships and strengthen existing ones for enhancing the current coordination mechanisms for disaster response.”164 The Tropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop Report was published in June 2015, in-turn supporting the Building Safety and Resilience in the Pacific project.165 Coordination was a key focus of the report, with Logistics and Coordination – Civil Military Deployment emerging as a cross-cutting issue that requires attention.
4.5.6.1 Lessons Identified A number of recommendations emerged from the DFAT evaluation to ensure civilian and military actors within an Australian response work closer with an affected nation to support nationally-led responses and localisation. These were “unifying implementing partners around a common understanding of localisation” and identifying, in advance of a crisis, the local, national and regional partners, private sector and civil society actors that will be involved in a response and the decision-making and coordination mechanisms that will be used to synchronise their efforts.166
An evaluation completed on behalf of Save the Children Australia, CARE Australia, Oxfam Australia and World Vision Australia by Rebecca Barber provides an international NGO perspective. This perspective is based on the experiences of NGO
162 Australian Civil-Military Centre, op. cit., p. 1. 163 Daily Post, ‘NDMO reviews disaster response from Tropical Cyclone Pam.’ 24 June 2015, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://dailypost.vu/news/ndmo-reviews-disaster-response-lessons-from-tropical- cyclone-pam/article_a7511f2a-5a92-527c-adef-8271b4082740.html and Pacific Community, op. cit. 164 Daily Post, op. cit. 165 Pacific Community, op. cit., p. vi. 166 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam op. cit., p. 5 and NGO interview with author, Port Vila, April 2019. 153
! staff involved in the response to Cyclone Pam and supplemented by discussions with government, community and UN representatives.167 The evaluation identified four ‘areas of action,’ with the relevant areas for civil-military interaction being:
–! Recognise and support national actors - •! National non-government responders play a significant role in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and there is opportunity for international humanitarian actors to ‘step up’ engagement with these actors to build local capacity. •! National coordination structures need to be equipped to scale up and partner with international support structures for large-scale responses due to extreme occasions such as Cyclone Pam, which are assessed to be the ‘new normal.’
–! Tailored response: •! The international community needs to recognise its core role as providing surge capacity, technical advice and expertise to national actors to enable them to lead and coordinate disaster response. •! This is supported by a move away from ‘one-size-fits-all’ systems and procedures, such as standard response plans and checklists, to an approach that is “genuinely tailored to national contexts.”168
–! Action to address climate change: •! International actors need to support communities, civil society and national governments to reduce vulnerability, manage risk and effective respond to disasters.
To address these areas, proposed efforts included promoting understanding amongst national actors of the international tools and services available to assist with disaster response, such as OCHA’s Disaster Response in Asia and the Pacific: A Guide to International Tools and Services and IFRC International Disaster Response Law Guidelines. These tools and services may then be incorporated into national planning
167 R, Barber, op. cit., p. 7.! 168 ibid, p. 4. 154
! processes and policies, which will result in linkages between national and international structures and coordination mechanisms.169
A complete review of international and regional humanitarian rules, templates, checklists, guidelines and terms of reference was also recommended with the aim to remove the ‘default assumption’ that international systems will be used during a response, with UN agencies in the lead.170 Lastly, is the need for actors to “get much better at understanding contexts, respecting cultural mores and utilising in-country experience and local knowledge” 171 through briefing and training of deployable staff and/or more effective integration with in-country teams.
4.6 Summary The Australian response to Cyclone Pam identifies that the deliberate and concerted efforts by civilian and military personnel supported effective liaison and engagement. These efforts included chairing the activation of the FRANZ agreement, relationship building, key leadership engagement, and civil-military teaming to achieve a multi-sector needs assessment. The outcomes of these efforts included synchronised and parallel civilian and military effort, which supported coherence of the Australian response. They also resulted in close working relationships between the ADF, DFAT Crisis Response Team and Head of Mission, NDMO and UN. As noted, this resulted in the nature of civil- military coordination during the Cyclone Pam response being considered best practice.
However, the multitude of coordination mechanisms that were established, by both civilian and military actors, were ad hoc and not always integrated into national structures. This resulted in overlapping structures and a burden being placed on individuals to attend multiple meetings. Australia also suffered from unclear leadership arrangements. In summary, it is assessed that the Cyclone Pam case study reflects the need for a more systematic way to conduct civil-military interaction during disaster management.
169 ibid, p. 5. 170 ibid 171 ibid 155
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Chapter Five Tropical Cyclone Winston – Fiji – Operation Fiji Assist Over the period 20-21 Feb 16 Tropical Cyclone Winston passed over the Fijian island group. With maximum average wind speeds reaching 233 km/hour and wind gusts peaking at around 306 km/hr, it was one of the most powerful cyclones recorded in the Southern Hemisphere and the first Category 5 cyclone to directly impact Fiji.1 The Eastern Division of Fiji was first impacted, with Koro, Ovalau and Taveuni Islands being severely damaged. It reached peak strength and subsequently made landfall on Viti Levu and Vanua Levu (Figure 25). In addition to the extreme wind speeds, many islands experienced storm surges, with some being inundated almost 200 metres inland.
Cyclone Winston caused widespread damage and destruction, impacting over 540,400 people, which was approximately 62 percent of the total population of Fiji. The number of fatalities reached 44, with 40,000 people requiring immediate assistance.2 Over 30,000 houses, 500 schools, and 88 health clinics and medical facilities were damaged or destroyed. Approximately 80 percent of the nation lost electricity, including the entire island of Vanua Levu.
Figure 25: Tropical Cyclone Winston Path3
1 S. Esler, Fiji Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: Tropical Cyclone Winston, February 20, 2016, Government of Fiji, May 2016, p. 10, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Post%20Disaster%20Needs%20Assessments%20C YCLONE%20WINSTON%20Fiji%202016%20%28Online%20Version%29.pdf 2 ibid 3 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Fiji: Severe Tropical Cyclone Winston.’ Situation Report, no. 5, 25 February 2016, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20TC%20Winston%20Situation%20Repo rt%20%235.pdf 156
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This chapter provides a chronological description of the Australian whole-of-government response to Cyclone Winston to detail the nature of civil-military interaction that occurred. The chapter commences by providing the national context of the response, including the status of the Fijian disaster response system prior to Cyclone Winston. Within-case analysis reflects that the broad themes which influenced civil-military interaction in the Philippines and Vanuatu also emerged in Fiji. As a result, civil-military interaction in this chapter is presented aligned to the themes of preparation, capability, leadership, coordination structures and organisational learning.
The data in this chapter was gathered from interviews with eight ADF members, including the JTF Commander and DFAT personnel who were involved in the planning and conduct of the response. The chapter is also informed by operational documentation and after action/lessons learned reviews, and a three-week period of fieldwork in Fiji in August 2019. The fieldwork included visiting Koro Island and capturing data using a mixture of group discussion, observation and interaction in Nabasovi, Tavua, Navaga, Kade, and Nausoui Villages. In Suva, data collection included attendance at the South West Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces Meeting, and interviews with the ADF Defence Attaché and three personnel from the Fijian National Disaster Management Office (NDMO). A period of time was also spent in the Pacific Collection at The University of the South Pacific, Laucala Campus, Suva to capture local perspectives of the response, including a review of reporting in The Fiji Times. To enable participants to speak freely, handwritten notes were taken for all data collection. A translator was used on Koro Island where required. Interview and observation notes were collated with operational documentation and analysed using thematic analysis to identify trends and patterns.
As an insider researcher with experience in this case study as an ADF member, pre- existing knowledge is that the JTF experienced challenges with passage of information and decision-making regarding Requests for Assistance (RFA) to use ADF rotary wing assets. This was due to the levels of decision-making applied and decision-makers being embarked on HMAS Canberra when RFA were emerging from interaction and meetings in Fiji. This experience reflected variances in how the ADF conducted civil-military interaction in the Philippines and Fiji, which lends to the perspective that the ADF would benefit from a dedicated and systematic way to conduct civil-military interaction. This 157
! would reduce time inventing solutions for effective civil-military relationships, processes and procedures, including the passage of information and decision-making. This experience supported access to two ADF members to interview, with snowball sampling used as the alternate strategy to recruit additional ADF members and DFAT personnel to broader then depth of participation. Fieldwork was conducted on Koro Island with villagers based on convenience sampling, where interaction was conducted based on opportunity and availability of village community members.
5.1 National Context Fiji is one of the largest and most developed nations amongst the Pacific Island Countries, and is considered the geographical and economic centre of the Pacific. Fiji is an archipelagic nation of 332 islands (around 110 are inhabited), spread over a land area of approximately 18,300km2 and a geographic area of almost 50,000km2. The current population of Fiji is over 900,000, with the majority of people residing in Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. It is one of the wealthiest nations in the Pacific, with a gross domestic product (GDP) reaching US$ 6 billion and a gross national income of US$ 5,860 per capita as at 2018.
Fiji is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, and has historically experienced an average of one cyclone per year due to being located in the tropical cyclone belt. The nation is surrounded by the Pacific Ring of Fire, which aligns to the boundaries of the tectonic plates and is associated with extreme seismic activity, volcanic activity, large earthquakes, and tsunamis. The impact of climate change is being felt in Fiji, with the nation experiencing extreme events associated with the characteristics of climate change, including rising sea-levels, temperature extremes, and droughts.4
Climate and development research led by scholar Anna Gero prior to Cyclone Winston reflected that Fiji had a "relatively strong, well defined DRS [disaster response system] with clear lines of authority ... Leadership was .... strong and effective and included all levels of society."5 In terms of policies in place to coordinate resources during disaster
4 K. Belson, ‘Paradise Threatened: Fiji’s War Against Climate Change.’ The New York Times, 24 October 2018, viewed on 05 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/travel/fiji-global- warming.html 5 A. Gero, et al., Disaster response and climate change in the Pacific: Understanding the Pacific’s adaptive capacity to emergencies in the context of climate change, National Climate Change Adaptation 158
! response, Fiji had generic policies in place that "needed to be more clearly defined for specific disasters."6 The key determinants of Fiji's disaster response capacity were identified to be information and knowledge application, communications and relationships, financial capacity, and leadership, management and governance.7
5.2 Tropical Cyclone Winston Cyclone Winston initially tracked across the Lau group of islands in the Eastern Division before passing to the south of Taveuni, intensifying into a Category 5 cyclone, and passing directly over Koro Island. The storm made landfall at Rakiraki on the northern coast of Viti Levu before continuing west and south west past Ba, the Yasawa group of islands and Nadi. In Koro and Vanua Balavu in the Eastern Division, up to 90% of structures were destroyed. Significant damage was recorded on the southern side of Taveuni and Vanua Levu. Catastrophic damage was also recorded on the island of Ovalau and the Rakiraki district of Viti Levu. Communications were temporary lost with at least six islands, with some remaining entirely isolated more than two days after the cyclone had passed.8
5.3 National Response In response to Cyclone Winston, the Government of Fiji declared a State of Natural Disaster on 20 February 2016 for 30 days, followed by a state of emergency. The overall coordination of the response was the responsibility of the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management based on the National Disaster Management Plan (1995) and the National Disaster Management Act (1998). The National Emergency Operation Centre (2010) standard operating procedures were enacted, with the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) activating the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) the day after Cyclone Winston made landfall. This enabled the District Emergency Operations Centres to mobilise and deploy teams to undertake initial damage assessments (IDAs).9 IDAs were preliminary assessments to
Research Facility, 2013, p. 39, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files_publications/Gero_2013_Disaster_response_ climate_change_Pacific.pdf 6 ibid, p. 41. 7 ibid, p. 43. 8 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Fiji.’ No date, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://www.unocha.org/office-pacific-islands/fiji 9 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, op. cit., p. 24. 159
! enable the government to distribute immediate food relief, and inform agriculture and housing response plans. ! During this period, the government effectively led response efforts and coordination of foreign military assets from Australia, New Zealand, France, Tonga and India (Figure 26) using the national cluster system. 10 This system includes the disaster management clusters of Education, Food Security, Health and Nutrition, Logistics, Public Works and Utilities, Shelter, Safety and Protection, and WASH.11 Each cluster was led by a Government Ministry and corresponding co-lead, which in most clusters was an international agency. The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) also provided support to the Fijian government, which enabled coordination of international assistance through ensuring an effective and appropriate response.12 Overall, the government was “quick to set into motion the humanitarian response framework necessary for initiating and coordinating humanitarian assistance.”13
Figure 26: Foreign Military Assets 14
10 ibid, p. 32. 11 National Disaster Management Office, ‘Fiji National Cluster System for Disaster Management.’ No date, viewed on 02 January 2020, http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/NDMO%20OLD/Fiji_National_Cluster_System_for_Disaster_Manage ment.pdf 12 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, op. cit., p. 24. 13 ibid 14 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Fiji: Foreign Military Assets as at 13 March 2016.’ 13 March 2016, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/fiji/fiji- foreign-military-assets-fma-13-march-2016
160
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While Fiji had mature processes in place to support disaster response, the severity of the damage and destruction caused by Cyclone Winston resulted in many existing processes being adapted rather than being strictly followed.15 To achieve a timely and agile response, the Fijian government was observed to prioritise practices that achieved flexibility, ingenuity and collaboration rather than adhere to formal protocols and structures.16 This included Fijian and foreign militaries playing a significant role in the response to the extent that the situation is considered a "non-bifurcated, cooperative and integrated"17 civil-military response. It combined military and civilian assistance in a collaborative manner that leveraged the flexibility of the FRANZ agreement without reverting to a "predefined standard operating procedures and set ways of structuring a disaster response."18 Instead, the effectiveness of the response stemmed from "well- established, long-term relationships and the building of trust over time"19 that was in place between nations prior to Cyclone Winston affecting the nation.
Due to this approach by the government, the deployment of emergency relief following Cyclone Winston was rapid, underpinned by strong institutional structures and systems. This capacity was evidenced through three effective coordination means - the NDMO coordinating field/tactical-level relief efforts and assessments, military coordination through the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF), and donor coordination through the national cluster system. Furthermore, the practices adopted resulted in government and national actors conducting strong engagement with foreign actors, this saw almost 60 percent of total funding raised under the Flash Appeal going to government funded projects and eight percent to national NGOs. The use of existing projects and systems to manage the response and deliver assistance both “strengthened local capacity and ensured a localised response.”20
15 K. Winterford & A. Gero, Humanitarian response for development in Fiji: lessons from Tropical Cyclone Winston. IIED, London, p. 15, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10853IIED.pdf 16 ibid 17 D. Canyon, ‘A Collaborative Future for Civil-Military Relations in HADR’ in Disaster Response Regional Architectures Assessing Future Possibilities, J. Ear, A. Cook & D. Canyon (eds), Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, September 2017, p. 64. 18ibid 19 ibid 20 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, op. cit., p. 31.! 161
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In response to the magnitude of the response, with over 1000 evacuation centres being established and housing 55, 000 internally displaced persons, the need for frequent civil- military dialogue and information flow was identified by the RFMF. Colonel Vosaicake met with civilian and military actors, including Division Teams, the Tongan Navy, New Zealand Defence Force and Embassy staff, on February 29 with the intent to improve response efforts such as teamwork and coordination. More frequent dialogue was “mandated and information was directed to flow through the military headquarters before it was disseminated to regional commissioners and the NDMO.”21 Military coordination through the RFMF, and resulting military-military information flow prior to dissemination to civilian actors, ensured that civilian and military decision makers received accurate information to inform response activities.22
The government response to Cyclone Winston "demonstrated that a Pacific Island Nation had the capacity, knowledge and skills to manage a large disaster and the attendant flood of international aid with a professional and mature level of confidence and expertise."23 The response was enabled through the pre-positioning of relief supplies, which resulted in the rapid delivery of supplies to affected regions using military assets. The government also re-financed its budget to fund initial relief and rehabilitation costs, which saw it conduct relief operations while the humanitarian and donor community were establishing themselves. 24 Funding was channelled bilaterally to the Fiji Government or UNOCHA’s flash appeal, which enabled the government to strategically prioritise needs, reduce duplication of response efforts and effectively lead the response. 25
Existing government processes, capacity and coordination mechanisms resulted in Cyclone Winston response efforts being timely and effectively led by the Government of Fiji.26 Some of the response strategies implemented were unique to the country and region. Firstly, this was due to the response leveraging and building upon existing
21 D. Canyon, ‘Fiji’s Cyclone Winston,’ p. 47. 22 ibid 23 ibid, p. 48. 24 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, op. cit., p. 33. 25 ibid, p. 27. 26 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, Social Protection and Humanitarian Assistance Nexus from Disaster Response: Lessons Learnt from Fiji’s Tropical Cyclone Winston, Social Protection and Labor Discussion Paper 1701, World Bank Group, February 2017, p. 32. and D. Canyon, ‘Fiji’s Cyclone Winston,’ in Disaster Response Regional Architectures Assessing Future Possibilities, J. Ear, A. Cook & D. Canyon (eds), Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, September 2017. 162
! national systems, and secondly to the provision of immediate assistance to affected communities through effective civil-military coordination.27 The severity of the Cyclone Winston aftermath resulted in Fijian government enacting emergency powers that provided a legal framework for military assets to support the response. This meant that the Fijian military, working closely with foreign militaries, played a key role in the response, despite no mention of this role in the National Disaster Plan and Act.28
5.4 Australian Whole-of-Government Response The Australian government announced their commitment to support the response to Cyclone Winston on 22 February 2016. Working closely with the Fiji Government to understand their needs, Australia provided AUD$15 million in immediate assistance that commenced the provision of relief supplies to over 200,000 women, men and children. This included shelter, water, food, hygiene items, emergency health care and access to education.29 Australia’s response is displayed at Figure 27 below.
Figure 27: Australia’s response to help Fiji recover from Tropical Cyclone Winston 30
27 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, op. cit., p. 4-5, 25. 28 National Disaster Management Office, ‘TC Winston Lessons: Briefing for Australian Long Reach.’ Presentation, Suva, 14 September 2017, slide 5. Provided to author. ! 29 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tropical Cyclone Winston Education Response Evaluation, Australian Government, October 2017, p.14, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/tropical-cyclone-winston-education-response-evaluation.pdf 30 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Tropical Cyclone Winston: Immediate Assistance.’ No date, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building- resilience/humanitarian-preparedness-and-response/tc-winston/Pages/immediate-support-to-fiji.aspx 163
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The Australian response to Cyclone Winston was directly informed by organisational learning from Cyclone Pam, the proceeding case study. The DFAT Evaluation of the effectiveness of Australia’s response to Cyclone Pam, published in January 2017, identified that DFAT “succeeded in using lessons learned to improve future humanitarian responses. Australia’s response to Cyclone Winston in Fiji took proactive steps to build on what was learnt from the Cyclone Pam response.”31 One of the underpinning actions that reflect this learning is DFAT ensuring AUSMAT and funded NGOs worked with local partners during the Winston response to prioritise capacity building and support localisation.32
5.4.1 ADF Response – Operation Fiji Assist On the same day as the Australian Government announcement, the ADF deployed a Support and Response Team (SRT), Joint Task Force (JTF), RAAF airlift and four Army MRH-90 helicopters to Suva, Fiji. The ADF subsequently deployed follow-on forces consisting of Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) HMAS Canberra with a JTF command and control element based on the Amphibious Task Group, three Navy MRH-90 helicopters, a pre-landing force from 2 Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR), an engineer element from 2 Combat Engineer Regiment (2 CER) and two DFAT Liaison Officers and humanitarian aid. Embarkation was conducted at Brisbane, with HMAS Canberra sailing in the early hours of 26 February 2016 and arriving in Fiji on 01 March 2016.
On arrival in Fiji, command of the JTF transitioned from LTCOL Hill in Suva to CAPT Brett Sonter aboard HMAS Canberra, with LTCOL Hill assuming the role of Deputy Commander. For the duration of the deployment, which reached approximately 60 days, the JTF conducted helicopter transport, engineer reconnaissance and reconstruction, debris clearance, aid distribution, liaison and key leader engagement, and damage assessments in support of response efforts. It was anticipated that the JTF would transition and cease activity on a 30-day timeline, however it was agreed between the Australian and Fijian Governments that JTF would stay based on the 30-day extension of the emergency conditions. This resulted in a staggered return to Australia, with HMAS Canberra departing the area on 25 March 2016 and command of the JTF reverting back
31 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam, Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 4. 32 ibid 164
! to LTCOL Hill. The JTF continued operations until 18 April 2016, with the last personnel returning to Australia on 21 April 2016.33
At the height of operations, ADF support included: •! approximately 1000 personnel •! aerial assessments by P3 Orion surveillance aircraft •! seven MRH-90 helicopters •! C-17 and C-130 aircraft flights •! HMAS Canberra -! Engineering assets -! Water purification equipment -! Humanitarian supplies
Koro Island The island of Koro, in the Lomaiviti Group of Fiji, bore the brunt of Cyclone Winston, bringing with it cyclonic wind and storm surges. One hundred per cent of the buildings on the island were damaged and 1000 homes were completely destroyed, which was 77 per cent of the housing on the island. Early and targeted liaison between Fijian government officials and the ADF identified that the capability embarked on HMAS Canberra would be best situated in vicinity of the Lomaiviti Islands to assist Koro and Taveuni Islands.
Upon arrival in the waters surrounding Koro Island, ADF personnel, vehicles and engineering equipment was moved ashore to remove debris, restored critical infrastructure, supplied fresh drinking water and delivered supplies. Six primary schools and one high school were repaired and re-opened on 14 March. In total, the ADF completed 52 engineering tasks on Koro Island, including providing power to four villages, water facilities to 700 people, repairs to plumbing and drainage, and assessing and repairing two medical centres. Working with the RFMF, the ADF also built temporary shelters. The total humanitarian supplies delivered to Koro Island included 1156 tarps, 910 hygiene packs, 650 shelter kits, 27, 227 food packs, 1350 sleeping mats,
33 Operation Fiji Assist, JTF Post Operation Report (Amphibious Phase) – Operation Fiji Assist 2016, 26 April 2016, no page. Provided to author – not publicly available. 165
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432 bed nets, 216 kitchen kits, 64,000 water purification tabs, 40 Oxfam buckets, 312 and tents.34
The main phase of ADF activities was conducted over the period 1 - 24 March throughout multiple locations, with main effort being Koro Island from 1 - 19 March. During this time, the ADF supported relief efforts in other areas, including Taveuni Island, by conducting engagement, engineering and general reconnaissance, and delivering humanitarians assistance. A period of fieldwork was conducted Koro Island from 5 – 12 August 2019 to capture material from villages that the ADF assisted in the aftermath of Winston. Five villages were visited on an opportunistic basis – Nabasovi Village, Tavua Village, Navaga Village, Kade Village and Nausouri Village – to gain insight into how the ADF interacted with affected populations to get an understanding of their needs. This included walking the paths which ADF engineers cleared to enable villagers to gain access to their farms and hearing firsthand experiences of when the cyclone hit.
Analysis of the material collected during the fieldwork phase identifies that the major characteristics of the ADF response were the rapidness of the response, and the flexibility, discipline and respect that ADF personnel showed towards community members. In every village visited, community members stated that DFAT and ADF personnel interacted with village leaders to identify community needs, which ranged from debris clearing, engineering tasks and establishing water sources. In Nabasovi Village, a community member stated that “when they had nothing at all, Australia was there.” Similarly, in Nausoui Village, Australians were the “only ones who arrived to help” with “some girls … who helped with women needs.” In an interview conducted on Koro Island with a local community member, it was stated that Australians “don’t differentiate the people” when they provided assistance.35 In three villages that were visited, there was a strong desire was for the ADF to stay longer and continue providing assistance.
34 See No author, ‘Koro Island, Fiji.’ Viewed on 02 January 2020, http://www.korois.org and No author, ‘FIJI ASSIST transitions to new phase.’ 30 March 2016, viewed on 02 January 2020, http://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/fiji-assist-transitions-to-new-phase 35 Interview with author, Nausouri Village, August 2019 166
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The deployment of HMAS Canberra enabled the ADF to conduct simultaneous activities across four different locations over a geographic spread of approximately 200 kilometres in support of the Fijian government and affected communities. The ADF formally concluded its mission on 19 April 2016, which coincided with the cessation of the Fiji Government's State of Natural Disaster.36 The Australian Government continued to assist Fiji with the longer term recovery and reconstruction efforts, committing funding of AUD $20 million to rebuild critical infrastructure and increase resilience to natural disasters.37
5.4.2 Preparation Three activities were identified in the course of the case study that specifically prepared the ADF to respond to Cyclone Winston. The first was Exercise Sea Series (subsequently known as Integrated Sea and Land Series [2018] and Joint Warfighting Series [2019]) which is part of the ADF's annual exercise continuum that prepares personnel to conduct integrated land and amphibious operations including conducting a Non-Combatant Evacuation scenario. The exercise provided personnel with a practical understanding of amphibious capability and operations, which was considered critical in the planning and embarking/disembarking of loads and vehicles during the response.38 This was reinforced by (then) Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral Griggs:
"From our perspective, the skills and competencies needed for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from the LHD, as an example, are a subset of the same skills and competencies that are required from a war-fighting perspective to conduct amphibious operations. There is a big part of that that is exactly the same. That is why we look at this as part of our core competency."39
However, while Sea Series enabled the ADF to access remote communities in a timely manner because it practiced embarking/disembarking processes, it did not directly develop or practice a disaster response, with a member who deployed from 2 RAR noting
36 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Tropical Cyclone Winston: Immediate Assistance,’ op cit. 37 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tropical Cyclone Winston Education Response Evaluation, Australian Government, 20 October 2017, p. 3, viewed on 02 January 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/tropical-cyclone-winston-education-response-evaluation.pdf 38 Adaptive Warfare Branch, ‘Operational Insights: OP FIJI ASSIST 2016,’ June 2016, Headquarters 1st Division, Australian Army, p. 20. Provided to author – not publicly available. 39 Vice Admiral Griggs, Hansard Inquiry into the DAR 2015-16 - 17 Feb 17, p. 11. 167
! that there was “no formalised process for short notice HADR and the situation was largely unknown because we didn’t know what role would entail.”40 Instead, the value of the exercise was that it exposed people to working in a joint environment, and it supported the development of an agile learning culture within 2 RAR that resulted in an “open mind … willing to do anything … adapt to role”41 that manifested in effective community engagement during the response.42
From the ADF’s perspective, DFAT attendance on Sea Series built relationships and knowledge of DFAT’s role during disaster response. The relationships and understanding developed collective exercises is deemed valuable for operational crisis response.43 However, some DFAT personnel did not have an opportunity to conduct training with the ADF prior to deploying on HMAS Canberra. One DFAT staff interviewed noted that he did not participate in Sea Series prior to deploying, which led to him taking some time to gain confidence and integrate into JTF operations.44 However, once he achieved this, he was able to inform military planning and operations, including ensuring the ADF maintained humanitarian principles and ensured localisation by supporting local officials deliver aid.45
A DFAT member interviewed for this project stated that involvement in ADF training and exercises enables effective civil-military interaction within an Australian whole-of- government response because it educates DFAT personnel on “ADF language, all the numbers and acronyms and understanding the roles of civilian and military organisations and how it all fits together.”46 After having the opportunity to participate in Sea Series after the Cyclone Winston response, the interviewee noted that "These experiences personally strengthened my understanding of whole-of-government crisis response capabilities, my ability to lead in crisis, and my networks across government."47
40 2 RAR Warrant Officer, interview with author, 04 May 2018. 41 ibid 42 Interviews with author, Koro Island, August 2019. 43 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘Integrated Sea and Land exercise Series, one of the largest military exercises in 2018.’ Australian Government, 19 February 2019, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://www.acmc.gov.au/news/one-of-largest-military-exercises-2018 44 DFAT, interview with author, 27 September 2019. 45 ibid 46 ibid 47 Australian Civil-Military Centre, op. cit. 168
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The positive impact of DFAT involvement in ADF exercises on civil-military interaction during disaster response resulted in ADF personnel advocating for the involvement of humanitarian actors, such as UN OCHA and NGOs, in ADF exercises. Exercising with these actors would build an understanding of each other’s processes and practices, in- turn contributing to effective relationships that form the basis of partnerships throughout the Pacific region. 48 The inclusion of NGOs in ADF exercises was specifically noted as valuable because it enables them to gain an understanding of Defence requirements for movement of aid and stores. However, the resourcing of civilian involvement in ADF exercises was raised by a DFAT member interviewed, who noted decreased human resources in some areas means that expectation of civilian involvement in exercises needs to be understood.49
The other two activities that directly contributed to effective civil-military interaction were Exercise Longreach and shared training experiences of the DFAT Crisis Response Team (CRT) Leader and Commander JTF (ashore). Exercise Longreach is detailed below while in regards to the latter, both personnel undertook the same CRT Induction Training and DFAT field exercise at Majura Training Range in December 2015. This collective training built shared experience and provided the foundations of an effective operational relationship.50
Exercise Longreach 2015 Exercise Longreach was an ADF-facilitated combined planning activity with the RFMF to practice the NDMO in the development of contingency and operational plans to support a Fijian whole-of-government approach to large-scale natural disaster. Funded by the ADF as part of a defence cooperation initiative on disaster management, it was held in Suva from 28 October to 5 November 2015 and attended by the RFMF, ADF, Fiji Police Force, Salvation Army, and NGOs.51 Longreach was the first ADF-RFMF bilateral exercise since 2006 and it laid the foundations for effective relationships during
48 Adaptive Warfare Branch, op. cit., p. 29. 49 DFAT, interview with author, 27 September 2019. 50 Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, JTF (Suva) Post Operation Report – OP FIJI ASSIST 2016, 20 May 2016, p. 8. Provided to author – not publicly available. 51 Australian High Commission 'Australia Helps in Disaster Preparedness.' The Fiji Sun, 31 October 2015 viewed on 02 January 2020, https://fijisun.com.fj/2015/10/31/australia-helps-in-disaster- preparedness/ 169
! the response to Cyclone Winston.52 The success of the activity was not just "in the familiarity with particular ADF officers but rather with the familiarity of the ADF uniform and presence. Ex LONGREACH provided the physical RFMF-ADF contact required to build trust."53 It also supported the clarification of roles and responsibilities between national and district levels.54
In terms of tailored and dedicated training for the response, members from 2 RAR who formed the pre-landing force (PLF)/reconnaissance party onto Koro and Taveuni Islands, received a cultural awareness brief whilst they were sailing. While it was a basic brief covering an introduction to Fijian language and local culture, it was considered to be sufficiently focused and relevant.55 There was no training on NGOs or humanitarian principles, however this level of knowledge was not deemed relevant for the PLF because liaison with these actors was conducted at higher-levels within the JTF.56 While this reasoning is sound, especially for soldiers who may have little interaction with humanitarian actors, the importance of understanding humanitarian principles was emphasised by a DFAT member involved in the response because it ensures they are adhered to.57
5.4.3 Capability As noted above, the ADF response to Cyclone Winston was immediate, where existing regional relationships based on personal connections and trust resulted in the ADF offering direct and immediate assistance.58 The Executive Order for HMAS Canberra to sail was made on 24 February 2016, with the ship leaving Brisbane on 26 February and arriving in the vicinity of Fiji on 1 March 2016.59 This capability decision resulted in the co-location of DFAT and ADF elements during the first operational deployment of an LHD, which was considered to be a “correctly tailored task force to achieve the
52 ibid 53 Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, op. cit., p. 12. 54 JTF Liaison Officer, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 55 2 RAR Warrant Officer, interview with author, 04 May 2018. 56 ibid 57 DFAT, interview with author, 27 September 2019. 58 South West Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces Meeting 2019, attendance by author, Suva, Fiji, August 2019. 59 Chief of Navy, ‘Operation Fiji Assist.’ Operations Public Hearings, Parliament of Australia, 17 February 2017, 2.13, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade /DARReport2015-16/Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024062%2F25087 170
! mission”60 even with an observed “absence of strategic preparedness notice for short notice requirements, such as HADR” 61 at the time of deployment. In deploying HMAS Canberra, the ADF was able to provide complex logistical support to remote and inaccessible islands, including the delivery of emergency assistance to Koro Island. Other actors did not have had the capacity or resources to reach these affected populations, as evident by them arriving after the ADF on Koro Island.62
Another critical capability deployed by the ADF was a P3 Orion aerial surveillance aircraft. During discussions with a local community member during fieldwork in Nausouri Village, the RAAF aircraft flying over on the Monday morning following the cyclone caused “crying” because “Fiji didn’t know what happened on Koro”63 and that it “was devastated by Winston.”64 Data captured during fieldwork on Koro Island reflects that aerial surveillance, using either aircraft or drones, was identified as a critical capability during disaster response in Fiji because there is “no network, no nothing” to get information through to the NEOC to ensure that community needs were understood. 65
5.4.3.1 Immediate Response Teams As like in the preceding case studies, an SRT was deployed in consultation with the Head of Mission. However, in contrast it only consisted of two personnel which severely reduced its effectiveness because subject matter experts, such as logisticians with finance and contracting skills, were not on the team. 66 This decision was subsequently reversed and a full SRT contingent of eight members deployed four days later.67 This identifies the need for immediate response teams to deploy in accordance with procedures, which as reflected in previous case studies, supports civil-military interaction through relationship building and information sharing. The deployment of a full SRT also ensures that the team has sufficient personnel and expertise to the conduct planning, coordination
60 Helicopter Operations Officer, interview with author, 02 May 2018. 61 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons Brief to CDF & SCG,’ op. cit. 62 Interview with author, Nausouri Village, August 2019. 63 ibid 64 Interview with author, Nausouri Village, August 2019. 65 ibid ! 66 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons, Brief to CDF and SCG 28 June 2016.’ Provided to author – not publicly available. 67 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons, Brief to CDF & SCG 17 May 2016.’ Provided to author – not publicly available. 171
! and operational functions required during early stages of a disaster response to support other actors.68
5.4.3.2 Advance Party The Headquarters Joint Task Force (JTF) Advance Party arrived in Suva two days into the operation, which was the same day as the DFAT CRT and a day after the NDMO commenced operations. The rapid arrival of the Advance Party resulted in the JTF embedding liaison officers within key organisations from the outset of relief efforts and the commencement of interaction with Fijian national actors to support the arrival and tasking for follow-on ADF forces. The timeline also enabled the JTF to obtain work areas to support an air liaison role, as will be discussed below, and rotary and fixed wing air movement. Most importantly, it enabled Commander JTF to build relationships at diplomatic, political and operational levels to support the ADF response and arrival of HMAS Canberra.
5.4.3.3 Co-location of Civilian and Military Actors One of the key characteristics of civil-military interaction was the physical dislocation of Commander JTF, who was given direction to remain onboard HMAS Canberra, and ADF elements and Fijian national, RFMF, and humanitarian actors ashore. This reduced the Commander’s ability to build face-to-face relationships from arrival into Fijian waters. It also separated key JTF functions, specifically the CMOC and liaison officers in Suva and the JTF HQ onboard.
Although recognised as unavoidable due to the direction given, the dislocation of JTF functions slowed down information flow, specifically regarding the processing of RFAs in a timely fashion.69 While the directive was observed to initially hamper relationship- building, viewing it through a lens of localisation identifies it respected the primacy, authority and legitimacy of the Government, NDMO and RFMF to coordinate the response. In hindsight, the directive achieved a positive strategic outcome and was necessary to best support the RFMF, which had taken a very proactive role in coordinating the military-military interface. To strengthen relationships and trust,
68 ibid 69 Operation Fiji Assist, op. cit., Annex B Serial 5. 172
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Commander JTF initiated a program of hosting a broad range of actors onboard HMAS Canberra, which addressed issues with being directed to remain onboard HMAS Canberra.
Two examples of effective co-location were identified from the Australian whole-of- government response that highlights the benefits of this practice. Firstly, was the co- location of the Head of Mission and JTF staff ashore at the Australian High Commission. Proximity built confidence and trust amongst whole-of-government response stakeholders because operational and situation changes could be communicated directly. Secondly, were the two DFAT Liaison Officers (LOs) embarked on HMAS Canberra. The LOs deployed without Terms of Reference, and the experience of one of the DFAT LOs interviewed for this project reflects they just received broad guidance to “do good things.”70 Within-case analysis reflects they were able to effectively inform ADF activities. As noted above, this included ensuring the ADF adhered to humanitarian principles and being placed in the lead for community engagement. This saw the DFAT LO speaking with District Officers to determine community needs and taking this information back to HMAS Canberra to feed into JTF planning.71
5.4.3.4 Gender Perspective and Participation Operation Fiji Assist was the first ADF operation to integrate UNSCR 1325 - Women Peace and Security and a gender perspective in the military operational order, and the first ADF operation to deploy Gender Advisors as part of ADF capability.72 From the perspective of HQJOC, the ADF's operational-level headquarters, the relationships established between the ADF Gender Advisors, DFAT and humanitarian actors during and post Operation Fiji Assist "resulted in improved civil-military cooperation, coordination, and understanding."73 The outcomes achieved through gender participation and perspective, especially in enabling civil-military interaction at all levels during and post operations, confirmed that future disaster responses should have a dedicated Gender Advisor and Gender Focal Points.
70 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019. 71 DFAT, interview with author, 27 September 2019. 72 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons, Brief to CDF and SCG,’ op. cit. 73 Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on 28 March 2017. 173
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This was because the JTF included a fully integrated WPS component, with three JTF staff officers dual-rolled to provide this function - one as a Gender Advisor and two as Gender Focal Points. The Gender Advisor was aboard HMAS Canberra with a primary role as the JTF Legal Officer and the other two were ashore, including one based in Suva, with primary roles as logisticians. The Gender Advisors effectively engaged with the Government of Fiji, RFMF, NGOs and local populations. This was achieved through closely coordinated activities with DFAT and the Head of Mission, including conducting a number of events for International Women's Day with DFAT gender and humanitarian advisors, and attendance at UNOCR Protection Cluster meetings.74 Through integrating gender perspective and participation in its response, Australia achieved a broad range of outcomes at all levels.
At the field level, dedicated Gender Advisors enabled a gender perspective to be integrated into response planning and ensured needs of the whole Fijian population were considered. This was confirmed during fieldwork on Koro Island in the villages of Tavua and Nausori. Group discussion and interaction conducted with five women reflected that their needs were met while the ADF were providing assistance in Tavua Village, while an interview conducted with a community member in Nausori Village identified that “girls in the Navy and Army … helped with women needs.”75
Strategically, the ADF's commitment to WPS laid the foundations for further engagement and relationship building with the RFMF.76 This is evidenced through the following subsequent international engagements:
•! Lessons Workshop 03 June 2016: RFMF Chief of Staff invited HQJOC and IP Division Director of the Pacific Region back to Fiji to deliver a Lessons Learnt presentation at a workshop to share lessons on the national and international response to Cyclone Winston.77
74 Ibid 75 Group Discussion with author, Tavua Village and interview with author, Nausouri Village, August 2019. 76 Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, op. cit., p. 9. 77 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons, Brief to CDF and SCG,’ op. cit. 174
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•! HMAS Canberra Port Call into Fiji 18 August 2016: A WPS workshop was conducted with representatives from the ADF, RFMF, NGOs and DFAT. •! Gender and Protection in Humanitarian Action training 21-23 November 2016: The ADF was invited by UN Women to attend annual Gender and Protection in Humanitarian Action training within the Pacific in preparation for high risk weather season.
5.4.3.5 CIMIC While CIMIC advice was available to the Commander JTF, there was no dedicated function onboard HMAS Canberra to conduct civil-military interaction - either in the headquarters element or deployed with elements on Koro Island. This was in contrast to the preceding case studies, where both responses included a CIMIC capability. At the headquarter-level, an absence of a dedicated CIMIC capability was observed to cause poor information flow during the JTF RFA processes and suboptimal decision-making.78 It was noted that having a dedicated CIMIC function would have supported more timely and complete flow of information to support the RFA process, increased situational awareness of activities occurring on the ground, and supported the compilation and collection of Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) against transition metrics.79 This led to the recommendation that an Amphibious Task Group JTF have CIMIC allocated during disaster response operations. 80
At the tactical level, a CIMIC function with the reconnaissance team from 2 Royal Australian Regiment, an infantry battalion, would have supported their engagement with local communities on Koro Island. More specifically, CIMIC would have enabled them to systematically capture community needs, feed this information up the chain of command, and manage community expectations of requests. This would address the broken link observed “between the requests being staffed and the requests followed through on” to prevent “empty requests.”81
78 Operation Fiji Assist, op. cit., Annex B Serial 4. 79 Operation Fiji Assist, op. cit., Annex B Serials 4 and 8. 80 Operation Fiji Assist, op. cit., Annex B Serial 4. 81 2 RAR Lance Corporal, interview with author, May 2018. 175
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5.4.4 Leadership Overall, the leadership of the Australian whole-of-government response, including the ADF component, was commended and within-case analysis reflects it contributed to effective civil-military interaction. This was because leaders adapted to the significant changes that occurred during the response, such as the extension of the operation, and effectively communicated these changes and the impact on organisational planning with actors at all levels, including Head of Mission, DFAT and UN OCHA staff.82 However, as like the preceding case studies, a strategic action plan or framework was not located in the course of the data collection that outlined Australia’s objectives or provided guidance to the ADF to support the alignment of civilian and military activities and efforts. This issue was partially addressed by the JTF having a robust mission that specified the need for the response to be in accordance with DFAT direction and priorities, and Government of Fiji priorities in support of the Fijian humanitarian relief effort.83
Importantly, the ADF mission is assessed to have been aligned with DFAT’s long-term development program – ‘build back better’ – to provide consistent, considerate and localised efforts that achieved lasting effect. One of the examples underpinning this finding was the rebuilding of a school complex, including the handover of engineering documentation and specifications packs to provide DFAT personnel and Fijian officials with an understanding of the works undertaken. This school rebuild provided a foundation for longer-term recovery and resilience, with children able to return to school whilst alleviated parents from care duties so they could focus on rebuilding homes and communities.
5.4.4.1 Command and Control As like in response to Cyclone Pam, there was a level of uncertainty surrounding the establishment of the JTF and subsequent change of command between Suva-based personnel and the headquarter element onboard HMAS Canberra. From the experience of a DFAT member interviewed for this project, a period of 24-48 hours occurred where there was unclear division of roles and responsibilities between ADF personnel ashore
82 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019 and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, op. cit., p. 10. 83 SACC Warrant Officer, interview with author, 18 October 2018. 176
! and afloat.84 This again highlights the need for the ADF to have a more robust standing disaster response concept of operations, including firmer baseline C2 arrangements that supports critical civil-military interaction factors, including relationship building, key leadership engagement and integration of ADF personnel into national coordination structures.
This need was reinforced in a key learning point from the response being the need for the development of a "coherent, broad and adaptive operational concept for HADR" that covers "initial C2 arrangements until a tailored solution is developed."85 This includes the incorporation of DFAT, Emergency Management Australia, and Other Government Agencies to enable more consistent planning and execution of disaster response operations.86 This characteristics of this command and control approach are simply: •! Be careful not to overcomplicate it •! Do not be constrained by prescribed models - remain flexible to circumstances •! Planning must focus on unity of effect and effort - not unity of command87
5.4.4.2 Relationship Building Australia’s whole-of-government response to Cyclone Winston acted as “a catalyst for improving relations”88 with Fiji, with the six week operation significantly advancing the Australia-Fiji relationship because of the trust and respect that underpinned Australia’s response efforts. This was particularly evidenced in the relationships fostered by the embarked JTF Commander because he understood the importance of the political situation to the operation.89 The example and leadership set by respective JTF Commanders ensured the ADF response was based on "mutual cultural awareness and understanding" and a "Robust and enduring working relationship based on Fijian primacy and partnership approach."90
84 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019. 85 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons, Brief to CDF and SCG,’ op. cit. 86 ibid 87 ibid 88 John Blaxland, ‘LHDs: Game changing in Indo-Pacific.’ The Australian Naval Institute, 25 August 2019, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://navalinstitute.com.au/lhds-game-changing-in-indo-pacific/ 89 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019. 90 Operation Fiji Assist 2016 , ‘Lessons. Brief to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2016.’ Provided to author – not publicly available. 177
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5.4.4.3 Key Leadership Engagement Dedicated engagement with other actors was undertaken by the JTF, with Key Leadership Engagement (KLE) being one of the critical functions adopted by the ADF to achieve effective civil-military interaction. The ADF command and Liaison Officer team spent the early stages of the response determining how the response was being coordinated and by whom. This included building face-to-face relationships through social calls to national authorities and key leaders to build trust, and establish points of contact and information flow. This effort ensured the ADF understood the status of the response to best integrate its capabilities, including the placement of LOs and the arrival of HMAS Canberra.
5.4.5 Coordination Structures As touched on above, the overall coordination of Cyclone Winston was found to be largely effective even though many formalised national protocols and structures were not followed. Instead, practices that prioritised flexibility, ingenuity and collaboration were adopted.91 Despite this adaptation, and as like the preceding case studies, one of the issues identified by the Fijian NDMO during an interview for this project was that "parallel coordination systems were employed, causing confusion" below the national level.92 NDMO experience, captured in a ‘Lessons Learned’ presentation, reinforces this and states that the cluster system was effectively used at the national level, with Government Ministries showing strong leadership of the clusters, however there was no equivalent or clear structure at the sub-national level to coordinate non-government actors. 93
Consultant Aisha Mansur and Economists Jesse Doyle and Oleksiy Ivaschenko identified that at the national level “response efforts were well coordinated and seldom showed any duplication. The government and humanitarian actors were seen to be complementing existing efforts and structures rather than reinventing the wheel.” 94 The authors go on to state that the response was the first activation of the Fijian National Cluster System and they assessed it to be “quite effective in its ability to coordinate response at the national level and work with all humanitarian actors.”95
91 K. Winterford & A. Gero, op. cit. p. 15. 92 National Disaster Management Office, op cit., slide 4. 93 ibid., slide 2. 94 A. Mansur, J. Doyle, & O. Ivaschenko, op. cit., p. 32. 95 ibid 178
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Post operational reporting and literature reflects that when aid entering the country began to cause congestion at Nausori Airport in Suva, a dedicated civil-military coordination function was created under the NDMO.96 This function was responsible for improving information sharing, allocating tasks and responsibilities to responders, operational planning, and coordination of military assets. This function was selected in favour of adopting OCHA’s Request for Assistance protocol, which was acknowledged but not used. This system would have required requests to be vetted by a UN-CMCoord Officer, which was considered unacceptable to the Fijians.
The National Emergency Operations (NEOC) is procedurally responsible to conduct an operational and planning function. However, the magnitude of the response required planning expertise and resulted in the establishment of a ‘Future Operations Cell’ at the Minister’s request, which included RFMF personnel to support response planning. Formal protocols would see UNOCHA work through the NEOC.97 This process was mapped by an ADF member interviewed for this project and included below at Figure 28. In establishing these coordination functions, Fiji both adopted practices that fit their needs and demonstrated they had the response under control using national resources and practices.98
96 D. Canyon, ‘Fiji’s Cyclone Winston,’ op. cit., p. 47. 97 JTF Liaison Officer, interview with author and email communication, May 2018. 98 D. Canyon, ‘Fiji’s Cyclone Winston,’ op. cit., p. 47. 179
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MINISTER Republic!of!Fiji! Military!Forces!HQ
Permanent! Secretary Future!Operations! Cell
UN!clusters
UNOCHA
Director!NDMO
National!Emergency! Operations!Centre!
Figure 28: Cyclone Winston NDMO Coordination Command and Control
ADF post operational reporting also reflects the ADF established a CMOC, which was considered by an international stakeholder to operate separate to local systems and reflect that
"Australia ... had no idea how that works at the local level ... it became clear that the Australia ... military hadn't been briefed but no one realised. They flew in and operated within their own terms of reference. No one thought to ask. You need to find out what are the local systems before you go. Other NGOs did this too. Came in without understanding the local systems."99
An interview conducted with two members of NDMO whilst in Suva during the fieldwork phase identified the opposite from their perspective and that "foreign militaries understand their role and understand the HADR system and integrated well." 100 This perspective reflects experience and opinion that contributes evidence that the ADF
99 K. Winterford & A. Gero, p. 15. 100 NDMO, interview with author, Suva, Fiji, 21 August 2019. 180
! understood how to integrate its personnel and capabilities, into Fijian coordination structures.
Liaison Officer Network As like both previous case studies, Liaison Officers (LO) proved to be a very effective mechanism that enabled civil-military interaction through strengthening coordination and information sharing.101 The ADF placed liaison officers in positions that maintained consistent interaction and dialogue with local authorities and the RFMF.102 The network also facilitated decision making between the NDMO, RFMF and the ADF where early engagement "informed follow-on-forces and force structure based on Fijian requirements."103
The two ADF LO embedded within the NDMO specifically contributed to effective civil- military outcomes. Their interpersonal skills enabled full integration into the NDMO, which ensured they were able to understand local needs and provide support that complemented existing systems.104 Initially, they were located in the Future Operations Branch, which was the responsibility of the RFMF. Through building rapport and enabling the RFMF, the LOs were able to gain the trust of the NDMO and start supporting civilian personnel in the Current Operations Branch, which covered transport, infrastructure, and health.105 While embedded, the LOs updated existing reporting templates, rather than replace them or overlay ADF reporting approaches, which reflected their respect of the NDMO culture and broader Fijian response.106
The key to the success of the LO network was identified to be the configuration, selection and performance of personnel. While a number of LO positions were detailed above, the network also included a RAAF Air Liaison Officer (ALO) which proved to be a critical part of the Advance Party before folding into the LO network. Limited coordination was occurring at Nausori International Airport in the aftermath of Winston, with the ALO
101 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Whole-of-Government Humanitarian Logistics Workshop DRAFT Summary.’ Canberra, 21 October, 2016, p. 3. 102 ibid 103 Operation Fiji Assist 2016 - Lessons Brief to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, op. cit. 104 JTF Liaison Officer, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 105 ibid 106 Air Liaison Organisation, interview with author, 10 May 2018. 181
! establishing relationships and coordination mechanisms with Air Traffic Control, customs and immigration to support civilian and military aircraft movement and unloading. More broadly, an ALO supports the prioritisation of air transport between an affected nation, ADF forces, DFAT, INGOs and NGOs to coordinate and optimise the use of military air assets.107
In terms of selection, personnel were chosen to fill LO positions based on their attitude and interpersonal skills. On one occasion, an LO was reallocated to another position because another person was identified to be more suitable for the LO role. The need for ensuring people with requisite experience were embedded in liaison positions was also recognised by the Fijian Government, with both the Minister of Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and Natural Disaster Management and head of NDMO being instrumental in ensuring people with experience were placed in the NDMO. This saw ex- RFMF personnel with experience in crisis management and coordination being embedded in the NDMO.108
While the network was considered robust, there were also gaps identified, specifically: •! A private sector /contracted logistics LO embarked on HMAS Canberra, working alongside the DFAT CRT LO, to coordinate contracted logistics requirements •! A DFAT Humanitarian Liaison Officer at HQJOC.109
5.4.5.1 Requests for Military Assistance Similar to the response to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu, the ADF adopted a ‘Request for Assistance’ (RFA) process to assist the NDMO request the use of military assets for relief efforts. Initially, the JTF received RFAs from the NDMO in various forms, both officially and ad hoc, even though the process is contained within the Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOPs). This meant that in the early stages of the response, the RFA forms were lacking information and situational awareness to support ADF decision-making and allocation of resources.110
107 Adaptive Warfare Branch, op. cit., p. 25. 108 NDMO, interview with author, August 2019. 109 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Whole-of-Government Humanitarian Logistics Workshop DRAFT Summary,’ op. cit, p.3. 110 JTF Liaison Officer, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 182
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The placement of ADF aviation and construction engineering LOs within the NDMO addressed these challenges and ensured the JTF remained responsive to NDMO requests. This was achieved by LOs reviewing the RFA, seeking out additional information as required, prioritising the request in line with Government of Fiji needs and providing the completed RFA, with recommended military capability to achieve the request, to Commander JTF for approval. The use of RFA forms, supported by LO to ensure timely and accurate information flow, enabled the JTF to make informed decisions, allocate resources to prioritised tasks, and remain flexible and responsive to NDMO requests. At times, urgent short notice tasks were requested. Once again, liaison and communication between the ADF LOs at the NDMO, helicopter operations, and Commander JTF achieved common understanding, situational awareness and timely decision-making.
Ad hoc practices ensured RFA were processed in a timely fashion, however overall the JTF RFA approval process, stemming from Amphibious Task Group practices, was observed to lengthen decision-making timelines by passing through multiple JTF positions before reaching the Commander. This multi-layered approach was not responsive to the immediacy of the situation and identified the need for flexible practices to support more timely acceptance and completion of tasks that require helicopter support.111
5.4.5.2 Information Management An aspect highlighted in post operational reporting was the creation and sharing of an on-line geospatial information product developed by the JTF that was used an effective information sharing tool to support effective coordination. The tool assisted by enhancing situational awareness between the NDMO, OCHA, and other organisations contributing to disaster relief efforts. Named the 'Disaster Response Tracking Tool,' it enabled the tracking of all relief effort (what went where and when), in addition to having additional information layers that monitored other data aspects, such as health issues (e.g. disease outbreaks), flooding, and crime reporting. These products were transferred to Fiji for ongoing management, which enabled the NDMO's capacity to track future disasters and meant that the ADF had an enduring impact on recovery efforts.112
111 Helicopter Operations Officer, interview with author, 02 May 2018 and Adaptive Warfare Branch, op. cit., p. 32. 112 Operation Fiji Assist 2016, ‘Initial Lessons Brief to CDF & SCG’ op. cit. 183
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5.4.5.3 Transition The ADF undertook a dedicated and systematic transition upon completion of its disaster response efforts in Fiji, which highlighted the importance of military actors handing over efforts to national, local and humanitarian actors after community needs change from immediate and life-saving to recovery. The JTF developed and applied a robust and transparent monitoring and reporting framework based on Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) that tracked the completion of emergency needs, such as debris clearing, engineering works, fixing water sources, and delivery of aid.113 This framework was developed despite MOP and MOE not being in Disaster Response or Amphibious Task Group operating procedures.114
The framework supported the ADF, DFAT and Government of Fiji to transition into a recovery, which as outlined in Chapter One, is the disaster management phase that includes reconstruction and rebuilding. It did so by conducting deliberate assessments to confirm MOP and MOE completion, followed by ground-truthing the assessments through key leadership engagement with Government of Fiji officials on Taveuni, Vanua Levu and Koro Islands. The assessments included the provision of maps and documents outlining completed disaster response activities and the details of tasks not completed by the JTF so that they could be formally handed over to other actors for completion. The value of this process was highlighted by NDMO Minister Seruiratu, appreciably noting "the ADF as setting the right conditions for ongoing NDMO and RFMF efforts in the rehabilitation phase. This comes after the collective deliberate assessment conducted in Taveuni."115
5.4.6 Organisational Learning Fijian and Australian actors undertook dedicated activities to learn from the Cyclone Winston response, including the ADF who deployed an Operational Analysis Fly Away Team to collect lessons while response efforts were ongoing. This four-person team, consisting of two members from the ADF and two from Defence Science and Technology
113 Operation Fiji Assist, op cit., no page. 114 SACC Warrant Officer, interview with author, 18 October 2018. !! 115 Operation Fiji Assist, ‘Initial Lessons Brief to CDF & SCG,’ op. cit., citing ADF Situation Report 016/16 - 16 March 2016. 184
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Group, deployed to Fiji from 12 to 16 April 2016 to collect strategic and operational level lessons in support of learning from the ADF's contribution to the whole-of-government response. The team included dedicated member examining gender perspective and participation. 116 No publicly available or unclassified report was found that outlines lessons identified from this activity.
A post-operational Lesson Collection Activity (LCA) was also conducted by the Adaptive Warfare Branch, Headquarters 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Australian Army. Over the period 11 April to 06 May 2016, staff from the Branch interviewed ADF members from the 3rd and 7th Combat Brigades (2 RAR and 2 CER), 6th Combat Support Brigade, 16th Aviation Brigade, 17th Combat Service Support Brigade and HQ 1st Division who were involved in the planning and conduct of Operation FIJI ASSIST. The focus of the LCA was on tactical considerations for preparation and deployment on disaster relief operations, with one output being the Operational Insights Handbook - OP FIJI ASSIST 2016 which synthesised observations and insights collected during the LCA.117
A Whole-of-Government Humanitarian Logistics Workshop was conducted in Canberra on 21 October 2016, hosted and managed by DFAT, and facilitated by ACMC. This Workshop brought together approximately sixty representatives from across government and the private sector to discuss lessons from overseas disaster response, identify good practices and challenges in logistics coordination, and determine ways to enhance cross- agency coordination.118 It identified the need for a 'Pacific component capacity mapping' exercise to understand the key capacities for humanitarian partners. 119 From this, a recommendation was made to strengthen government and partner systems for more coordinated implementation, management and reporting of disaster preparedness and response efforts. This was achieved through Australia and Fiji co-hosting a regional civil- military workshop in May 2018 120 which enhanced inter-agency cooperation within and between Pacific Island Countries on humanitarian and disaster response.
116 ADF Lessons Team Leader, email communication with author, 2018. 117 Adaptive Warfare Branch, op cit. 118 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Whole-of-Government Humanitarian Logistics Workshop DRAFT Summary,’ op. cit.. 119 ibid, p. 5. 120 ACMC, email communication with author, November 2019. 185
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The Fijian NDMO consolidated their experience in a 'TC Winston Lessons' presentation, which was delivered as a briefing for Exercise Long Reach on 14 September 2017. The presentation reflects that following Cyclone Winston many organisations conducted Lessons Learnt, with those presented being "general lessons gathered during the TC Winston National Lessons Learn exercise, and from diverse government actors." 121 The presentation also notes that lessons identified from militaries were not included in the presentation, concluding that "We look forward to the far-reaching discussion on lessons learnt during the next few days."122
While it clear that extensive organisational learning was undertaken to learn from the response to Cyclone Winston, there was limited collective or cross-functional learning conducted. An interview with a DFAT member who deployed to Fiji captures learning from this experience well – “lessons learnt are the same lessons. For Fiji everyone did one but there was no whole-of-government learning.”123 This was reinforced through a number of post operation reports being written, however no collective report covering all actors in the Australian response being available.
5.4.6.1 Lessons Identified An examination of the learning outcomes from Cyclone Winston identifies a number of lessons for future disaster response that need to be considered when developing a civil- military process model that supports the conduct of an Australian response to international natural disasters. Firstly, in terms of disaster preparedness, there is a need to strengthen civilian actor knowledge and understanding of ADF logistics capabilities, roles and responsibilities, and support requirements that will be applied in a humanitarian situation.
The need for clearer understanding of roles and responsibilities during disaster response also emerged from the Fijian NDMO, who identified the need to "Review National Disaster Management Act and Plan to clearly defined (sic) stakeholder roles &
121 National Disaster Management Office, ‘TC Winston Lessons: Briefing for Australian Long Reach,’ op. ci., slide 3. 122 ibid 123 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019. 186
! responsibilities."124 One way to build this knowledge is the conduct of a civilian-led, disaster focused exercise that includes all agencies likely to be involved in an overseas disaster response. To specifically enhance civil-military interaction, this exercise should practice, through simulation, civil-military aspects of humanitarian logistics and medical assistance coordination.125
The outcome of the HQ 1 DIV Lesson Collection was the issuing of three Operational Adaptive Notes (OAN) covering three tactical lessons - packaging and carriage of dangerous goods, HADR construction store stock holding, and nesting of Amphibious SOPs. The two relevant OANs are covered below:
Packaging and Carriage of Cargo – the packaging, labelling and carriage of goods on aircraft. The specifics of the lesson was the carriage of dangerous goods, however delving further into lessons identified literature, reflects this was not just the case for dangerous goods. A lack of understanding/knowledge of movement of goods on military aircraft results in equipment not being prepared for transport, including generators not being empty of fuel, labels not meeting required standards, and goods not being palletised or packaged correctly. This understanding mitigates friction, reduces administration, and ensures timely movement of critical aid and equipment.126 Recommendations for adaptation include the placement of Liaison Officers/Movements representative to inform personnel of the processes for packing and carrying items, and ensure items are moved in a timely manner.
Nesting of Amphibious SOPs – identified the need alignment of SOPs for HADR between military force elements, including the Amphibious Task Group, Combat Brigade and Engineer element, and more broadly within regional SOPs, such as MNF SOPs. The nesting of SOPs, especially engineer element and amphibious operations, would enable the deployment of pre-planned engineer load lists to support short-notice
124 National Disaster Management Office, ‘TC Winston Lessons: Briefing for Australian Long Reach,’ op. ci., slide 4. 125 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Whole-of-Government Humanitarian Logistics Workshop DRAFT Summary,’ op. cit, p. 2. 126 Headquarters 1st Division, ‘1 DIV OPERATIONAL ADAPTIVE NOTE 01/16 – Packaging and Carriage of Dangerous Cargo 27 April 2016.’ Provided to author – not publicly available. 187
! deployment, in-turn enabling more efficient and effective planning and conduct of disaster response operations. 127
An OAN is issued when action is required from lessons identified that are outside the remit of HQ 1 Division. The responsible command is requested to initiate action to remediate identified issues through an OAN.128 A mechanism, such as OANs to monitor learning, supports organisational accountability, action and transparency and contributes to effective knowledge management.
5.5. Summary This chapter strongly reflects the importance of relationships with nations in Australia’s region. Australia’s whole of government response to Cyclone Winston, at all levels, was based on respect and recognition of Fijian sovereignty in leading and coordinating the response. This was strongly evidence in the respectful leadership and civil-military engagement demonstrated by both ADF JTF Commanders, the effectiveness of the liaison officer network, and the collaborative manner to decide that Australian forces would assist Koro and Taveuni Islands.
However, a number of tactical issues were found to hamper civil-military interaction, including the RFA process, multi-layered decision-making within the JTF, and an absence of a dedicated CIMIC function. The capture of these issues in organisational memory reflects that these issues are known to be addressed in future responses. Across the cases, these issues also reflect there is no consistent way that the ADF is approaching civil-military interaction because different decision-making on capability and current interaction practices lacking clarity, existing at varying levels and not being applied operationally. This reinforces the need for a dedicated and systematic way to conduct civil-military interaction during disaster management.
127 Headquarters 1st Division, ‘1 DIV OPERATIONAL ADAPTIVE NOTE 03/16 – Nesting of Amphibious SOPs 27 April 2016.’ Provided to author – not publicly available. 128 Headquarters 1st Division, Adaptive Warfare Branch Lessons Learned Handbook 2018, p. 26. Provided to author 188
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Chapter Six
Framing Civil-Military Interaction in Disaster Management
The preceding case studies of Australian whole-of-government natural disaster response in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji demonstrate that civil-military interaction during natural disasters is not undertaken in dedicated and systematic way. There were varying application of coordination structures, practices and procedures, with efforts duplicated between civilian and military actors due to parallel structures being established. Civil- military interaction was also found to be influenced by a range of factors, including preparation, leadership and capability.
Drawing on this knowledge, the purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors that contribute to effective interaction to lay the foundation of a new way to conduct civil- military interaction, which is at the core of this project. To achieve this, the chapter draws on coordination theory, broader literature on natural disaster environments and civil- military interaction, and the cross-case pattern search of the case studies. This approach will identify other factors that influence civil-military relationships and draw on existing theory to strengthen the theoretical foundations of the project. It will also build an understanding of what outcomes or goals are desired and/or intended from civil-military interaction.
This presents the evidence behind why civil-military relationships form to lay the foundations for chapters 7-8 that will present the when and how actors should interact to enhance outcomes for an affected nation. By building this knowledge, the chapter lays the foundations of addressing the core research question of building a new way of conducting civil-military interaction during disaster management.
6.1 Natural Disaster Environments In the aftermath of a natural disaster, civilian and military actors are often united in their efforts to provide immediate, and at times, life-saving assistance to affected populations. The current paradigm of civil-military interaction identified in the literature "makes a sharp distinction between complex emergencies and natural disasters in peacetime ... because the way in which a crisis is characterized matters for the pattern of civil-military
189
! relations that subsequently develop."1 This distinction is reflected in the different sets of international guidelines on the use of military assets in humanitarian response – the ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief’ and the ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.’ These are known as the ‘Oslo Guidelines’ and ‘MCDA Guidelines’ respectively, with the latter arising out of experience between humanitarian actors and military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and codified in 2003.2
Scholars Ajay Madiwale and Kudrat Virk argue that security is the environmental characteristic that most informs the level of civil-military interaction, with humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality considered critical for humanitarians to safely and securely access populations in need. As such, situations of armed violence and conflict will change the level of civil-military interaction because humanitarian actors accept differing levels of armed escort, if at all, to reach affected communities.3 This position is reinforced by Scholars Gary Lloyd and Gielie van Dyk who note that “no noticeable barriers exist that prohibit cooperation and coordination between the military and humanitarian components” during natural disaster response, instead “These barriers only exist in complex emergencies where the humanitarian component fears the loss of independence and neutrality when associated with the military.”4
In contrast, Paul Spiegel MD, at the time with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, argues that in terms of needs of an affected nation:
“consequences and responses to natural disasters and complex emergencies may have more similarities than differences … similar basic health needs (eg, water,
1 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, ‘Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods.’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011, p. 1104, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.icrc.org/es/doc/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale-virk.pdf 2 ibid, p. 1088. 3 ibid p. 1098. 4 G. Lloyd & G. van Dyk, ‘The Challenges, Roles and Functions of Civil Military Coordination Officers in Peace Support Operations: A Theoretical Discussion.’ Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, vol. 35, no.2, 2007, p. 82, viewed on 28 December, https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/viewFile/38/65 190
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sanitation, food, shelter, health care, and protection) … immediate and long-term effective aid, and data to make decisions and evaluate interventions.”5
Scholar Jose-Miguel Albala-Bertrand differentiates between natural disaster response and complex emergencies because the latter are characterised by the deliberate restructuring of societal frameworks following a breakdown or failure of authority.6 In comparison, natural disaster may result in the loss of some or all functions of state, such as local government and elements of national government, however most nations will have an agency and functionality to conduct disaster management, such as an NDMO.
The challenge for practitioners is that some responses are not easily distinguishable as a natural disaster or complex emergency for them to apply respective guidelines for interacting with militaries. One example is the 2010 Pakistan floods, where flooding started in late July following monsoon rains, firstly impacting Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces and then Sindh and Punjab provinces. As water flowed down the Indus River, an area a fifth of the country’s landmass became submerged. Around 2,000 people were killed and 20 million severely affected across 84 of Pakistan’s 121 districts from homelessness, injury, malnourishment or sickness.7
Pakistani authorities, along with some UN agencies and International NGOs, responded to the floods as a natural disaster, unconnected to geopolitical pressures (Pakistan’s proximity to NATO operations in Afghanistan) and security requirements to use armed escorts in districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh.8 However, members of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, a number of other International NGOs, and other UN agencies, viewed the floods as taking place within the context of a larger complex emergency.9 The “divergence in understandings of the crises was felt across the board in civil-military relations, including over the use of military assets, the
5 P. Spiegel, ‘Differences in World Responses to Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies.’ JAMA, vol. 293. no. 15, 20 April 2005, p. 1915. 6 J. Albala-Bertrand, ‘Complex Emergencies versus Natural Disasters: An Analytical Comparison of Causes and Effects.’ Oxford Development Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, August 2010, p. 189.!! 7 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, op. cit., p. 1091. 8 Pakistan Civil-Military Coordination Working Group meeting 30 September 2010 9 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, op. cit., p. 1099. 191
! use of armed escorts, and the applicability of guidelines.”10 Three distinct approaches were taken in response to how actors characterised the floods:
1.! Actors who perceived they were responding to a natural disaster tended to adhere to the Oslo Guidelines. 2.! Actors who perceived they were responding to a complex emergency, where the Pakistan national military and NATO were viewed as parties to a conflict, tended to follow the MCDA guidelines and maintained distance from the military where possible. 3.! Actors who perceived they were responding to a natural disaster within a complex emergency, where there are no international guidelines and neither the Oslo or MCDA guidelines provide guidance on civil-military interaction with a national military, tended to have varying interfaces with the military.
While humanitarian principles and guidelines influenced many actors in responding to the floods, others took a more pragmatic approach that was independent of how they viewed the crisis. Their considerations included the scale of the disaster and humanitarian needs, the size of their programme, organisational mandate, media and public pressure on Pakistani authorities to deliver aid quickly, geopolitical pressures and a lack of knowledge of civil-military principles and guidance by all actors, including different application of the use of military assets as ‘last resort.’11
This brief reflection on the 2010 Pakistan floods demonstrates how principles and pragmatism inform civil-military interaction based on the nature of the response environment. Of note, is that only one of the pragmatic considerations was grounded in meeting the needs of the affected population, which is the purpose of the process model being developed in this project. This means the lens applied to civil-military interaction will be informed by needs rather than principles, which links to the broader ‘functional- humanitarian’ and 'security-strategic' theoretical lens adopted for the project, as outlined in Chapter Two.
10 ibid ! 11 ibid, p. 1100. 192
!
6.2 Coordination Theory
Underpinning the current paradigm of civil-military interaction is the perspective that "coordination and cooperation by nature is something positive that will yield improved results if performed correctly and to a large enough extent."12 However, there is a lack of evidence to support either an empirical or theoretical connection between coordination/cooperation and effectiveness.13 This is despite a widely held view within the peace operations policy community that there is a "causal link between coherent civil- military interaction and improved operational effectiveness."14 Scholars Robert Egnell and Roshni Pramanik identify there is a specific lack of data on how and when civilian and military actors should coordinate or cooperate to increase effectiveness.15 To begin to address these gaps and strengthen the theoretical foundation of this project, coordination theory is examined to determine how relevant theoretical constructs can inform civil-military interaction.
During civil-military interaction, one of the key considerations is the dependencies that arise between actors in conducting activities required to deliver immediate and life- saving assistance, including the way in which these interdependencies are managed, for example sharing resources when multiple tasks require the same resources. Scholars Thomas Malone and Kevin Crowston examined dependencies and coordination challenges in a variety of situations, introducing Coordination Theory (CT) as a theoretical approach to frame and analyse coordination in complex processes.16
Broadly, the term 'coordination theory' refers to how actors work together and how activities can be coordinated.17 Coordination, within the context of civil-military
12 R. Egnell, ‘Civil-military coordination for operational effectiveness: Towards a measured approach.’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 24, no. 2, p. 238. 13 ibid 14 C. de Coning, ‘Civil-Military Interaction: Rationale, Possibilities and Limitations,’ Effective Civil- Military Interaction in Peace Operations: Theory and Practice, G. Lucius & S. Rietjens (eds), Springer, Switzerland, March 2016, p. 14. 15 R. Egnell, op. cit., p. 238 and R. Pramanik, ‘Challenges in coordination: differences in perception of civil and military organizations by comparing international scientific literature and field experiences.’ Journal of Risk Research, 03 July 2015, p. 10. 16 See T. Malone & K. Crowston, ‘The Interdisciplinary Study of Coordination.’ Computing Surveys, vol. 26, no. 1, March 1994, p. 87-119. 17 See Y. Miao, et al, ‘Representation of Coordination Mechanisms in IMS Learning Design to Support Group-based Learning,’ Handbook of Research on Learning Design and Learning Objects: Issues, Applications and Technologies, L. Lockyer, et al, (eds), IDEA group, 2008. 193
! interaction, was outlined in Chapter One and is largely reflective of the definition of coordination within the theoretical field as connected actors working harmoniously and pursuing goals together so that single actors do not pursue the same goal.18 The rationale behind coordination is to manage the dependencies that arise between actors so their activities become part of a purposeful whole. This definition reflects unity between actors, including reducing duplication, which is the general purpose of civil-military coordination. The history and progression of coordination theory is outlined below (Table 16) to reflect how context influences effective coordination, with early studies being undertaken in static organisational environments before authors began examining dynamic environment, such as crisis management organisations.19
Author(s) Definition March and Simon Coordination can be achieved by standardisation. (1958) Chandler (1962) Coordination is structuring and facilitating transactions between interdependent components. Thompson (1967) Coordination consists of the protocols, tasks and decision-making mechanisms designed to achieve concerted actions between interdependent units. Lorch (1969) Coordination describes the integrative devices for interconnecting differentiated sub- units. Kaufmann (1986) Coordination happens insofar as difference actions of various actors become linked to constitute a chain of actions. Holt (1988) Coordination composes purposeful actions into larger purposeful wholes. NSF-IRIS (1989) Coordination is between commitments and human networks that are enabled by communications technologies. NSF (1989) Coordination is the joint efforts of independent communicating actors towards mutually defined goals. Konigsveld and Coordination is the actions and decisions of individual actors within an organisation, Mertens (1986) which need to be attuned in a timely manner for the organisation as a whole to realise its aim. Singh (1992) Coordination is the integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work efforts towards the accomplishment of a larger goal. Malone and Crowston Coordination is the act of handling interdependencies among activities performed to (1994) accomplish a goal. Reezigt (1995) Coordination is instituting and attuning concerning tasks with the purpose of guaranteeing that the execution of isolated tasks is on time, in the right quantity and in the right order. Comfort (2007) Coordination means aligning one's actions with those of other relevant actors and organisations to achieve a shared goal. Table 16: Definitions of Coordination Theory 20
18 T. Malone & K. Crowston, ‘What is Coordination Theory and How Can It Help Design Cooperative Work Systems.’ Proceedings of the Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, 1990, p. 4. 19 See L. Comfort, ‘Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Control.’ Public Administration Review, vo. 67, Special Issue on Administrative Failure in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, December 2007. 20 Ye Ryung Kim – Chung, ‘Social Network Model for Accessing and Sharing Expertise During Disasters.’ PhD diss., The University of Sydney, 2017, p. 18. 194
!
Coordination theory is described as "a pattern model ... meaning that it seeks to explain phenomena by showing how they fit a known pattern,"21 which fits the nature of this project because the research evidence to frame civil-military interaction is being drawn from a cross-case pattern search of the case studies presented in earlier chapters. The use of CT also fits the context of civil-military interaction because it frames group action in terms of stakeholders performing interdependent tasks which require resources – it focuses on the need to coordinate rather than on an coordination being an outcome.
During disaster response operations, civilian and military actors purse a common goal of providing life-saving measures and alleviating suffering. A CT framework considers coordination mechanisms (Table 17 below) and reflects that these mechanisms rely on “other necessary group functions, such as decision making, communications and development of shared understandings and collective sensemaking."22 This means consideration needs to be given to these mechanisms and their connection to group functions when developing the process model.
Coordination mechanism Definition Mutual adjustment Achieves coordination by the simple process of informal communication Direct supervision Achieves coordination by having one person issue orders or instructions to several others whose work interrelates Standardization of plan Achieves coordination through the establishment of schedules by which the activities in organizations are performed Standardization of work Achieves coordination by specifying the work processes of people processes carrying out interrelated tasks Standardization of output Achieves coordination by specifying the results of the work Standardization of skills and Achieves coordination of work by virtue of the related training the knowledge workers have received Standardization of norms Achieves coordination by controlling the norms infusing the tasks, usually for the entire organization, so that everyone functions according to the same set of beliefs
Table 17: Coordination mechanisms in organisations23
21 K. Crowston, J. Rubleske & J. Howison, Coordination theory: A ten-year retrospective.’ Syracuse Univeristy School of Information Studies, 2006, p.4, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://crowston.syr.edu/content/coordination-theory-ten-year-retrospective 22 K. Crowston, ‘The bug fixing process in propriety and Free/Libre Open Source Software: A coordination theory analysis,’ in Business Transformation, V. Grover & M. Markus (eds), Armonk, New York, 2005, p. 6. 23 Extracted from H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1979. 195
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Drawing on scholars Samar Faraj and Lee Sproull who conducted research of software development teams, two types of coordination are identified - expertise coordination and administrative coordination. Expertise coordination is considered to be knowledge of where expertise is located, when it's needed, and how to bring it to bear. This type of coordination is necessary for intellectual tasks that are complex, such as managing knowledge and skills dependencies.24 In contrast, administrative coordination is considered essential for managing the completion of tangible and economic resource dependencies because it provides teams with formal mechanisms, such as schedules, documents, and communication, and structures needed to complete their tasks, including managing policies and procedures.25
While coordination theory provides useful insight into coordination processes to support looking for patterns in the case studies and informing the nature of coordination that occurs, the theory has not been placed into operational context nor does it determine how coordination can be measured.26 This leaves a knowledge gap on the factors which are "necessary conditions for a civil-military partnership to succeed"27 because it remains clear how the outcome of civil-military interaction should be measured.28
6.3 Framing Effective Civil-Military Interaction A way to measure and frame the effectiveness or success of civil-military interaction was not identified in existing literature.29 This assessment is mirrored by Pramanik who identified “there is a lack of .. scientific literature and empirical studies primarily on how … civil-military coordination can contribute to improve humanitarian outcomes” and the extent to which existing frameworks and guidelines improve interaction.30 Commonly used concepts to evaluate performance, such as effectiveness and efficiency, are not useful because there is often a lack of clear objectives for civilian and military actors
24 S. Faraj & L. Sproull, ‘Coordinating Expertise in Software Development Teams.’ Management Science, vol. 46, no. 12, 2000, p. 1555. 25 ibid, p. 1555. 26 K. Crowston, J. Rubleske & J. Howison, op. cit. 27 S. Rietjens, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?’ PhD diss., University of Twente, 2006, p.xiii. 28 ibid 29 ibid 30 R. Pramanik, op. cit., p. 10. 196
! when engaging, and these concepts are directly linked to objectives.31 The opposite is the case in the key area of humanitarian logistics, where a “vast number of possible performance indicators have been offered in theory and business practice; making it challenging to adopt the most relevant.” 32
This turns the chapter to exploring literature which informs what effective civil-military interaction is based on the outcomes desired or intended from the interaction, which may vary based on an actor's mandate, objectives or principles.33 Since the focus of this project is on meeting the needs of an affected nation, this resulted in two approaches being identified with existing literature that are applicable. The first was developed by scholar Sebastiaan Reitjens (2006), who draws from Dutch civil-military cooperation (cimic) experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo, to develop a CIMIC performance assessment framework. The second is proposed by CIMIC practitioner Mark Smith who takes a broad view of measuring the effectiveness of ADF interaction through considering whether the “nature and degree of the interaction was appropriate to the operation."34
Rietjens proposes normative and descriptive measures to frame the performance of CIMIC based on partner locus, which views performance as the result of separate partners. Normative measures are criteria were developed that related to the perceived performance of the civil-military relationship by those involved in the relationship. Descriptive measures are used to provide more objective measurements, often reflecting the extent to which objectives have been achieved.35 Drawing on NATO cimic doctrine, he frames outcomes of civil-military cooperation based on 'support to the force' and 'support to the civil environment.' The first considers how civil-military coordination contributes to force protection, a safe and secure environment, and situational awareness
31 B. Rietjens, ‘ Understanding the Performance of Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team.’ 32 J. Bealt, et al., ‘Collaborative relationships between logistics service providers and humanitarian organizations during disaster relief operations.’ Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, vol. 16, no. 2, 2006, p. 123. 33 K. Menkhaus, Measuring Impact: Issues and Dilemmas. InterPeace, Occasional Paper Series, Geneva, 2003. 34 M. Smith, ‘Analyzing the Effectiveness of Australian Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) after 15 Years of ‘Small Wars,’’ in Small Wars Journal. 16 February 2015, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/analyzing-the-effectiveness-of-australian-civil-military- cooperation-cimic-after-15-years-o 35 B. Rietjens, op. cit. ! 197
! in benefit of the military. The latter considers civilian actors and the host nation, including whether their needs have been addressed, local capacity has developed, and activities are sustainable (Figure 29).
Figure 29: Performance assessment framework civil-military cooperation36
Based on the desired outcomes of civil-military interaction to meet the needs of the affected nation during a natural disaster, three applicable criteria can be drawn from this framework - situational awareness, needs of civilian actors and affected nation, and local capacity:
1.! Situational awareness: Civil-military interaction, including coordination and information sharing, enhances situational awareness. Partnering as part of a larger network tends to increase situational awareness.37 Situational awareness refers to information sharing to have a consistent understanding of needs and the environment. 2.! Host Nation Needs: The extent to which the needs of the civil environment have been met, including coping capacities of the affected nation and humanitarian organisations.
36 S. Rietjens, 2006, op. cit., p. xiii. 37 ibid, p. 66. 198
!
3.! Local Capacity: A focus on local actors and communities to build local capacity, provide people with self-supporting skills, provide communities with sustainable projects, and decrease dependency.
Practitioner Lieutenant Colonel Mark Smith takes a broader view of framing the effectiveness of Australian CIMIC. Rather than focus on variables such as mission accomplishment, interagency approaches, and organisational cultural barriers, he frames CIMIC using three themes – alignment of political objectives and mandates between nations, operational environment and freedom of movement, and learning and adaptation across organisations to overcome systematic issues.38 Using the example of Operation Sumatra Assist, the ADF’s deployment to Banda Aceh after the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, Smith highlights that the effectiveness of ADF interaction is enhanced when the ADF’s objectives are aligned with the mandates of other agencies. Such alignment is not always fully achievable, particularly in areas of conflict and instability. Differences in political objectives and mandates require the ADF to tailor its interactions to other agencies and achieve varying levels of cooperation, which is based on a mature understanding of the position of other agencies, especially those who do not interact with militaries.
The second theme from Smith’s analysis is that the operational environment also influences the ADF’s ability to effectively interact with civilian agencies. He notes that there is greater risk in operations outside Australia’s immediate region, which means that some civilian agencies elect not to deploy or deploy with a ‘risk-averse’ approach that reduces their activities, and hence their interaction with military forces. Lastly, Smith uses whole-of-government learning and adaption since 1999 to reflect a commitment to continuous improvement across the ADF, Australian Government Agencies, and NGOs to enhance interaction. This includes the creation of formal CIMIC courses (Tactical Operators Course and Staff Officers Planning Course), the ongoing development of CIMIC doctrine, and the establishment of a standing CIMIC capability within Deployable Joint Force Headquarters before being moved to 2nd Division, Australian Army, a Reserve Brigade. Having a designated staff function and capability ensures the ADF can conduct tactical CIMIC activities, integrate CIMIC effects into headquarter
38 M. Smith, op. cit. !! 199
! processes and practices, and participate in exercises involving civilian agencies – all of which develop skills and relationships for effective interaction on operations.39
Both Rietjens and Smith provide valuable insight into how to frame effective civil- military interaction, however neither are fully applicable to this project. Security may be a consideration in natural disaster environments, however the case studies reflect that ‘force protection’ and ‘safe and secure environment’ were not considerations that arose. As such, Rietjens’ framework is not fully applicable to this project. Smith’s approach frames the effectiveness of civil-military interaction in the context of ADF mission success while this project examines effectiveness more broadly through the lens of an affected nation. Notwithstanding, his analysis contributes useful insight into factors that influence civil-military interaction.
6.4 Factors that influence Civil-Military Interaction To continue building knowledge of what influences civil-military interaction, analysis from the case studies, using a cross-case pattern search, will now be presented. This approach is comparable to that undertaken by Pramanik who identified coordination differences between civilian and military actors through understanding facilitators and inhibitors.40 Within this approach, factors are defined as specific and observable characteristics, actions or conditions that demonstrate a change has happened towards intended outcomes in support of an affected nation.
The process of cross-case pattern search was outlined in Chapter Two, to briefly re-cap, a constant comparative method was used to discover patterns in the case studies based on grouping of similar free codes. The civil-military interaction that occurred within the case studies was compared and contrasted to develop descriptive codes and themes, examine cause and effect, and generate interpretive constructs and explanations for how to ensure effective civil-military interaction. This process included comparing the case studies, identifying points of interaction, and determining whether the presence or absence of these factors was found to influence civil-military interaction. It identified how factors influenced interaction and what outcomes were achieved from this
39 ibid 40 R. Pramanik, op. cit., p. 11. 200
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interaction to address why civilian and military actors should interact to enhance operational outcomes. From this four overarching themes emerged - organisational culture, disaster preparedness, response capability, and governance (Table 18).
Culture Preparation Capability Governance Relationships Training & Exercises Dedicated functions Coordination Mechanisms Command & Control National, Regional and Co-location Operating Procedures Cultural Context Decision-making Knowledge & Experience Gender Participation Information Management Strategic Mission Rapid Response Teams Accreditation Civil-Military Teams Table 18: Factors that influence civil-military interaction
6.5 Organisational Culture Drawing from scholar Andrea Baumann, organisational culture "refers to collectively held beliefs, symbols, rituals and practices, which give meaning to an organisation's purpose and goals and often provide a specific language."41 Baumann goes on to state that organisational culture is wide reaching, informing templates, routines and standard practices that an organisation adopts in pursuit of its mission, and reflected in capabilities acquired or maintained by the organisation.42 Coordination with other actors is influenced by organisational culture. This was demonstrated through an examination of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) organisational culture and decision-making processes, which concluded that "UNHCR's vertical values, assumptions, and behaviour are reflected in its relations with numerous external partners."43 All of these factors emerged from the case studies as influencing civil- military interaction and will be progressively discussed in the remainder of the chapter.
The differences that arise between military and civilian actors because of respective organisation culture is cited within existing literature as a barrier to effective
41 A. Baumann, ‘Clash of Organisational Culture? The Challenge of Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Stabilisation Operations.’ The RUSI Journal, vol. 153, no. 6, December 2008, p. 72. 42 ibid 43 M. Gottwald, Competing in the humanitarian marketplace: UNHCR’s organizational culture and decision-making processes. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Research Paper No. 190, October 2010, p. 30, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4cb55c0ec.pdf 201
! cooperation,44 both within a whole of Australian government approach45 and externally with other response stakeholders.46 However, in contrast, the case studies reflect that the ADF had a number of organisational cultural traits conducive to effective civil-military interaction. An NGO interviewed in Port Vila stated that she observed ADF members to listen during planning meetings, identify gaps in delivery of aid, and then recommend how the ADF could provide assistance in those areas. This approach was observed to effectively inform operational requirements and outcomes without being forward or aggressive.47
6.5.1 Relationships All the case studies reflect that complex linkages between civilian and military actors emerge at all levels in the aftermath of a natural disaster, influenced by the skillset, capability, motivation and quantity of individuals. Australian actors, both civilian and military, engaged in dedicated and respectful effort to build relationships, which resulted in trust between Australia and respective affected nations. How deployed individuals interacted, communicated and built trust was found to influence relationships because when respectful, these actions lay the foundations for civilian and military actors to effectively work together. Trust is especially critical because it was found to lead to information sharing and effective integration into affected nation agencies, such as the NDMO.
Conversely, failing to recognise the importance of relationships and a lack of trust impedes collaborative and cooperative relationships.48 This situation arises when there is limited information sharing, decision-makers not investing in relationship building49 and inadequate training. 50 Broader literature reflects the same, with effective civil-military
44 A. Baumann, op. cit., p. 72. and Lieutenant Colonel Mark Smith, ‘No better friend, no worse enemy: How different organisational cultures impeded and enhance Australia’s whole-of-government approach,’ Australian Civil-Military Centre Paper 01/2016, p. 1. 45 ibid 46 A. Baumann, op. cit., p. 70. 47 NGO, interview with author, Port Vila, 29 May 2019. 48 G. Kovács & K. Spens, ‘Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations.’ International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, vol. 37, no. 2, 2007. 49 I. Kwon & T. Suh, ‘Factors Affecting the Level of Trust and Commitment in Supply Chain Relationship.’ The Journal of Supply Chain Management, vol. 40, no. 4, Spring 2004, p. 4. 50 G. Kovács & K. Spens, ‘Identifying challenges in humanitarian logistics.’ International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, vol. 39, no. 6, July 2009. 202
! cooperation strongly influenced by “the personalities of the actors involved rather than on planning and standard operating procedures."51
Effective civil-military relationships are enabled through dedicated preparation of individuals, including ongoing analysis of required skills52 and cultural knowledge, which supports the development of mutual respect and trust between actors.53 Relationships built before a disaster response especially enhance civil-military interaction, as evident in the Philippines and Fiji where pre-established relationships led to actors being able to work quickly and closely together.
6.5.2 Command & Control The case studies demonstrate that agile and adaptive leadership at all levels is necessary for effective civil-military interaction because it enables leaders to deal with the ambiguity and uncertainty of disaster response. This includes an ability to deal with significant operational changes, a problem solving approach and appreciation of the collective ability of teams. This factor also covers the command and control of an Australian response, with command being leadership within an capability or existing organisational structure (e.g. the ADF) and control being providing overall direction across capabilities within the mission to ensure outcomes are met (e.g. DFAT leadership of an Australian response).54
All three Australian responses saw the ADF form a Joint Task Force (JTF), however beyond this, there was little consistency in command of the responses. Differences included the origin of headquarter staff and Commander, which came from the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters in response to Typhoon Haiyan versus the Amphibious Task Group (ATG) in response to Cyclone Pam and Cyclone Winston. When the ATG formed the JTF, there was also uncertainty surrounding the establishment, with the specific lesson the cyclone Pam response being that while the
51 S. Reitjens, op. cit., p. xi 52 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, op. cit., p. 1101. 53 R. Dubey, A. Gunasekaran & S. Samar Ali, ‘Exploring the relationship between leadership, operational practices, institutional pressures and environmental performance: A framework for green supply chain.’ International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 160, February 2015, p. 120. 54 Australian Government, ‘AUSASSISTPLAN2018: Australian Government Overseas Assistance Plan.’ 20 December 2017, p. 3, viewed on 31 December 2018, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/emergency/files/plan-overseas-assistance.pdf 203
!
“JTF was quickly established and worked well … there could be more effective models for leading the JTF that would better DFAT and Defence reporting lines.”55
Variances in command and control limits transfer of organisational knowledge, creates misunderstanding between planners and forces56 and can cause the inconsistent application of standard operating procedures, such as Requests for Assistance which the case studies reflect is a critical process for affected nations to effectively and efficiently use ADF assets. Conversely, consistency of command and control inculcates organisational, cultural and individual traits consistent with disaster response, including the attitude noted by Commander Vanuatu SRT above under relationships. ! Historian Steven Bullard identified that the ADF has not employed a consistent command arrangement during overseas emergency relief operations. The operations where the JTF was formed from the same organisation, such as Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ), lessons learned by the staff were deemed invaluable for subsequent operations. The specific case Bullard identified was DJFHQ deploying on Operation Ples Drai in response to a drought in Papua New Guinea in 1997, then Operation Shaddock after a tsunami in 1998. The knowledge and experience gained from these operations was invaluable for DJFHQ when they were allocated to lead the INTERFET deployment in East Timor in 1999.57
Other command and control models arose during other operations, including task force commanders being drawn from engineering, logistics, infantry, aviation, air force or navy units, with the decision about command and control being dependent on the type of response required. In at least one case, the response to Cyclone Namu in 1986, there was no joint command in place due to the staggered deployment of units from different services which were conducting relatively discrete tasks.58 With the benefits of consistent command arrangements identified and also the issues that arise with a lack of joint
55 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, ‘Tropical Cyclone Pam: Civil-military cooperation in humanitarian disaster response in the Pacific.’ Outcomes Document, 21 May 2015, p. 3. 56 Operation Fiji Assist, ‘Initial Lessons Brief to CDF & SCG 17 May 2016.’ Provided to author – not publicly available. 57 S. Bullard, In Their Time of Need: Australia’s overseas emergency relief operations, 1918-2006,The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Volume VI, Cambridge University Press and Australian War Memorial, 2017, p. 494-495. 58 ibid, p 495. 204
! command, there is a need for the ADF to address the command of overseas HADR operations within the ADF.59
6.5.3 Decision Making Cross-case analysis reflects that “decision making was held at different levels” 60 within ADF JTFs and this informed the nature of civil-military interaction, once again in regards to processing and actioning RFA. An ADF member interviewed stated that ADF decision-making in Fiji was tightly controlled (or multi-layered), which caused a mismatch between RFA and allocation of capability that led to suboptimal use of military assets. A specific example was the movement of roofing tin to Koro Island using a helicopter rather than using a more suitable asset, such as a naval landing craft.61
ADF participation in decision-making activities across the case studies, such as planning and cluster meetings, reflect military personnel adopted an approach to support civilian stakeholders to prioritise and allocate assets - in military language, this is referred to as supported/supporting relationship where there is a lead agency (supported) that is enabled to achieve its goals through the support of other organisations (supporting). Specific examples were ADF behaviour during cluster meetings in Cebu, Philippines and Port Vila, Vanuatu and ADF engineers engaging directly with local authorities in the Philippines and Fiji. These members were empowered by leaders who had delegated authority to them to make decisions to ensure effective planning and prioritisation processes for the use of military assets. This manifested in their behaviour, which was a facilitation role that ensured meetings achieved decision-making based on consensus.
6.5.4 Strategic Mission In all three case studies, the ADF had a specified and clear mission received from Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) – in general, this was the provision of assistance in-line with DFAT and affected nation direction and priorities. While these missions appear to have been distilled from strategic guidance because they recognised DFAT leadership and the importance of meeting the needs of an affected nation, no publicly available document was located in any case study that confirmed a strategic
59 ibid 60 Helicopter Operations Officer, interview with author, 02 May 2018. ! 61 ibid 205
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response plan. The evaluation of the Australian response to Cyclone Pam specifically identified the absence of a DFAT action plan to synthesise and align civilian and military mandates, objectives, and capabilities towards a defined strategic goal.
The increasing recognition of the benefits of aligning disaster response to regional development goals, as reflected in the Cyclone Winston case study, means that strategic planning, which codifies civilian and military roles and responsibilities against a defined mission, is critical for an effective Australian response. In conducting strategic planning, an Australian response inclusive of civilian and military actors will conduct an activity that will:
“set priorities, focus energy and resources, strengthen operations, ensure that employees and other stakeholders are working toward common goals, establish agreement around intended outcomes/results, and assess and adjust the organization’s direction in response to a changing environment. ”62
By completing strategic planning, a document is produced that integrates the needs of an affected nation with available resources, and communicates actions to meet these needs using a specified strategic goal and objectives. From a Strategic Plan, civilian and military actors can distil an operational plans, tasks, and monitoring and reporting requirements (Table 19). This assists in the prioritisation of tasks and use of military assets on arrival to support an affected nation. Strategic Plan Operational Plan A general plan for management by Coordination and A specific plan for use of the resources of the Control organization in pursuit of the Strategic Plan. Suggests strategies to be employed to reach goals Details specific activities/actions/tactics to be outlined in the Strategic Plan undertaken to implement the strategies A plan to achieve the overall mission/Strategic Plan A plan for the day-to-day operations Enables management to formulate an Operation Plan Not formulated without a Strategic Plan Once formulated, changed only by major changes in May be modified as situation changes overall circumstances May consist of one or multiple projects Specific for one project Table 19: Strategic and Operational Planning 63
62 No author, ‘Strategic Planning Basics.’ Balanced Scorecard Institute, 23 October 2017, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://balancedscorecard.org/?s=strategic+planning+basics ! 63 M. Birnbaum, et al, ‘Research and Evaluations of the Health Aspects of Disasters, Part IV: Interventional Research and the Disaster Logic Model.’ Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Special Report, p. 187. 206
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6.6 Preparation A theme which emerged from the cross-case pattern search was the impact of knowledge and experience on civil-military interaction. In terms of knowledge, civilian actors noted the importance of understanding military capabilities, including capacity, and decision- making processes which inform the allocation of resources and personnel in the field.64 Conversely, military personnel stated they need to have an understanding of civilian coordination structures that are activated during a disaster response, including the cluster system. However, they also noted that much of their understanding of coordination mechanisms came from previous experience in disaster response, not through dedicated training or courses.65
As such, more so than knowledge, experience in disaster response, gained from training and exercises or previous operations, was found to enable effective civil-military interaction. These activities gave people insight into coordination mechanisms, their roles and responsibilities, and who to approach to facilitate liaison and decision-making. They also provided an opportunity to conduct response planning, which enabled participants to work through existing procedures to identify and remediate gaps. The conduct of Exercise Longreach in Fiji in 2015 provides a key example of the benefits of gaining experience and exposure to people and processes prior to a disaster response.
The importance of stakeholders having knowledge and experience of national and regional context was specifically highlighted during the international response in the Philippines. An evaluation of the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) response to Typhoon Haiyan reflected that experience working in 'failed states' was not directly transferable to natural disaster environments because there is nation-specific context, including government structures in place to manage disaster response.66 Overall, it was drawn from the case studies that preparation of responders is
64 UN-CMCoord, ‘After Action Review on the Humanitarian-Military/Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, Philippines.’ 25 March 2014, p. 3, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7ptUi-k6twmd1poY1AzcEsyZlk/edit 65 Amphibious Air Liaison Officer, interview with author, December 2018. 66 G. Walter, et al, Evaluation of DFID’s Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), UK Department of International Development, May 2015, p. 23, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/50122 5/Eval-Humanitarian-Response-Typhoon-Haiyan.pdf 207
! key. The activities identified to most effectively prepare personnel are training and exercises, regional engagement and knowledge management because they build knowledge, experience and knowledge - a critical foundation of civil-military interaction.
6.6.1 Training and Exercises The case studies identified that ADF personnel undertake a broad continuum of individual and collective training, education and exercises. Training included initial employment training (e.g. Officer Basic Course), specialised training (e.g. CIMIC training), mission-specific, pre-deployment and in-mission activities. Informal activities, such as mentoring and on-the-job training, were also a part of this continuum. As the response to Cyclone Winston demonstrated, Exercises Longreach and Sea Series was found to contributed to the preparation of ADF members. !
Australian Army personnel stated during interviews that many of the requirements for disaster response operations are sufficiently covered in the military training continuum.67 The Officer Commanding (OC) the engineer element in the Philippines said that this is “especially true for engineers because the tasks they complete during a natural disaster response are standard practice and covered as part of their initial employment training.” 68 He went on to state that because there was no difference between engineering tasks conducted as part of disaster response or combat operations, there was no requirement to conduct dedicated training or exercising in preparation for disaster response operations.69 More specific knowledge of disaster response, such as the cluster system and NGOs, is taught in engineer Regimental Officers Basic Course (ROBC), and he deemed this training to be adequate for Army personnel to conduct effective interaction with humanitarian agencies.70
An area of exploration within the case studies was the value of specialist CIMIC training for military personnel. This issue was explored because it has flow-on effects to the selection of personnel for deployment and the maintenance of a deployable civil-military interaction capability. Two Australian Army personnel interviewed who held leadership
67 JTF Commander, interview with author, 08 May 2018 and OC RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 68 OC RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 69 ibid 70 ibid 208
! positions in the Philippines noted that dedicated training is not required to conduct civil- military interaction.71 Instead, they assessed that the necessary skills and experience were assessed to be sufficiently developed through existing military training, education and promotional continuums. They both stated that the primary benefit of CIMIC training was that it builds and/or strengthens relationships between stakeholders, which was identified during data analysis as an outcome from preparation activities and was not unique to specialist training. Overall, the case studies reflect that the ADF is preparing its personnel for liaison officer and CIMIC roles through incorporating liaison and engagement skills in broader military training, education and activities, including regional engagement.
Overall, two military personnel interviewed who participated in dedicated preparation activities prior to a national disaster response found them useful in establishing relationships and points of contact however some did not consider them to be critical to successful interaction.72 In terms of skills to enable relationship-building, an ADF personnel interviewed held the opinion, from experience, that relationship building is an inherent part of being an effective soldier or officer and that required skills are adequately covered in the current training continuum.73
6.6.2 National, Regional and Cultural Context An Australian response is enabled by having knowledge of the type and maturity of an affected nation’s coordination and logistical structures, the levels which they operate at, and roles and responsibilities at respective levels. Data from interviews conducted with all five NGO personnel in Vanuatu reflect that foreign individuals benefit from having knowledge of the cultural context of an affected nation, country-specific civil-military coordination guidelines, and an appreciation of a nation's posture and preparation for disaster response.74
71 JTF Commander, interview with author, 08 May 2018 and OC RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 72 JTF Commander, interview with author, 08 May 2018 and Air Liaison Organisation, interview with author, 10 May 2018. 73 OC RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 74 Interviews with author, Port Vila, May 2019. 209
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This knowledge supports the placement of liaison officers to optimise information sharing and the attendance of personnel at appropriate cluster coordination meetings to ensure Australian coordination efforts are integrated, not replacing national structures. Having this depth of knowledge is useful for Australian actors because it also enables them to understand how a nation has historically responded to natural disasters, including the role and mandate that domestic militaries have.
A consistent theme that emerged from all three case studies was the need for ADF personnel to receive cultural awareness training or a cultural briefing covering “cultural sensitivities, and the geographical and political landscape” 75 to understand local culture. This training would impart knowledge of: •! Religious considerations (e.g. not working on specific days due to adherence to religious activities) •! Community structures and understanding who to engage with in local communities •! Extent and nature of local relationships (e.g. Wantok) and the way in which they effect decision-making •! How to engage effectively with Host Nation Government officials, authorities and agencies •! The value of face-to-face relationships that established over time rather than an email/written communication approach •! The significance that communities place on family or tribal status, age, gender, ethnicity, and social roles and expectations
Dedicated cultural briefings ensures personnel deploy with knowledge on cultural traits and community structures, in-turn mitigating any potential risk of cultural misunderstanding. Insensitivity to such factors has the "potential to derail the provision of aid by alienating locals from the planning and execution process."76 Feasible actions to achieve this training for disaster response operations, were developing a baseline
75 Helicopter Operations Officer, interview with author, 02 May 2018. ! 76 C. Bartzokis ‘Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? Humanitarian civil-military cooperation in post- conflict reconstruction.’ The Yale Review of International Studies, March 2017, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://yris.yira.org/essays/2020 210
! cultural awareness training for regional nations that can tailored and delivered at short- notice.
6.6.3 Knowledge and Experience Individuals having knowledge of disaster response environments, including context of the affected nation, other actors, and coordination mechanisms, prior to a response emerged from all three case studies as being a factor of effective civil-military interaction. In terms of understanding the military, all three case studies reflect the need for civilian and military actors to have a basic understanding of ADF humanitarian assistance/disaster relief doctrine, resources and publications, however accessing this knowledge is a barrier because these documents may be classified and not releasable to civilian actors. Thereby limiting understanding of military governance and capability during a response.
For most ADF members, much of the knowledge gained was ad hoc and delivered on transit to a disaster area. Across all three cases, irrespective of training, civilian and military actors had limited knowledge of each other’s roles and responsibilities. This was specifically identified by scholar Vincenzo Bollettino from an examination of the response to Typhoon Haiyan, noting that humanitarian actors reflected that they “lacked as much knowledge of military actors as they felt military actors lacked knowledge of them.” 77 Knowledge enables actors to integrate into a host nation's coordination structures, instead of establishing duplicating or overlapping of structures, as occurred in all three case studies. It can also influence civil-military interaction from the outset, with military leaders shown to use organisational memory and experience to inform the composition of elements and deployment of positions.
In the lead-up to a response, valuable sources of knowledge include Australian diplomatic staff and defence attachés, who played an important role in facilitating and informing an Australian response in all three case studies. These staff monitor and gather information as natural disasters track towards and impact nations, make recommendations back to Australia on a suitable response, and support the receipt and
77 V. Bollettino, ‘Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan.’ Disaster Medicine and Public Health, vol. 10, no. 1, February 2016, p. 9. 211
! delivery of relief goods. Defence attachés use their local knowledge and contacts to conduct liaison prior to the arrival of military elements, in-turn supporting the deployment of military assets to areas in need.
The value of knowledge and experience during disaster response means organisations need to be able to effectively capture and manage knowledge through collaborative, dedicated and systematic knowledge management practices, processes and systems. The requirement for DFAT to capture individual and collective experience to inform subsequent activities is specifically detailed in the AUSASSIST Plan, with the organisation having to "Conduct an end-of-deployment evaluation and lessons learned activity to participate in those events conducted by other parties."78! The outcomes of effective knowledge management was evident in the aftermath of Typhoon Hagupit in December 2014, where lessons learned from the response to Typhoon Haiyan were applied, which in-turn strengthened coordination and command capacities.79
6.7 Capability The configuration, functionality, timeliness and location of military capability was found to influence civil-military interaction because these characteristics inform the nature and quality of information sharing, situational awareness, and enables the definition of roles and responsibilities to reduce duplication of efforts between civilian and military actors. The appropriateness of military assets that are deployed also supports effective coordination because it ensures they are used as in-line with guidelines and able to be integrated into broader national efforts, known as absorptive capacity.
6.7.1 Dedicated Functions The case studies and broader literature reflect that both humanitarian and military stakeholders should have dedicated functions to conduct civil-military engagement – humanitarians use CMCoord while militaries use Civil Affairs (CA), Civil Military Operations (CMO), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Liaison Officer Networks, and
78 Australian Government, op. cit., p. 8. 79 G. Martinez, Civil-Military-Police Coordination in Disaster Management: Perspectives from South East Asian Countries. Australian Civil-Military Centre and Humanitarian Advisory Group, 2018, p. 59, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-08/Civil-Military- Police_Coordination_in_Disarster%20Man_xx.pdf
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Key Leadership Engagement (KLE). The need for a dedicated function is well documented in literature, including Lessons Learned and After Action Reviews, because the role ensures reliable attendance at coordination meetings, in-turn building trust, supporting information sharing (information to the right person at the right time), and achieving common situational understanding and informed decision-making. In all three case studies, the ADF had dedicated functions to interact with civilian actors and these functions were mostly consistent. The establishment of a CMOC and deployment of a dedicated CIMIC function onboard HMAS Canberra were the two identified differences.
Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC): One of the challenges with effective civil- military interaction is the term ‘CIMIC’ – the ADF defines and employs CIMIC in multiple and inconsistent ways - as a role, relationship, capability or process in support of a military mission. This is reflected in the characterisation of CIMIC by Major General Michael Smith (Retired) as:
•! a relationship of mutual support; •! an understanding of common objectives in complex peace operations and humanitarian emergencies; •! a relationship based on trust, respect and "separate identities;" •! a willingness to exchange information between military and civil actors for the common good; and •! where joint planning is encouraged.80
Clarity is required for the multiple personalities of CIMIC, with the case studies reflecting it is a function or role assigned to military personnel to support a military missions, it is not a relationship, process, outcome or impact nor is it “a proposal for a genuine ‘partnership’ of equals.”81
Liaison Officer Network: Another function that was found to contribute to effective civil-military interaction was Liaison Officers (LO), which were formed into a Liaison
80 Major General Michael G. Smith AO (Retd) Chief Executive Officer AUSTCARE Presentation 'CIMIC Actors' HMAS Penguin 3 April 2006, viewed 11 May 2012, www.austcare.org.au/media/28717/030406-hmas-pengpres.ppt. 81 S. Gordon, ‘Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).’ Journal of Humanitarian Aid, 2001, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.jha.ac/a068/ 213
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Officer Network in all three case studies. ADF Liaison Officers enabled information flow between actors, both within an Australian response and with external civilian actors. Australian LO, both ADF and civilian, integrated into NDMOs were able to frame national purpose, method and goals for response efforts, which was turned into “executional direction for the ADF”82 that enabled personnel to prioritise tasks in support of an affected nation. As briefly touched upon above under Relationships and Co- Location factors, the suitability and location of individuals was found to influence the effectiveness of an LO Network. For example, during the response to Cyclone Winston, the need for an Air Force LO to be included in the Advance Party to support coordination at the airport was identified. This case study also showed that unsuitable LO has the potential to create friction, impede coordination efforts, and hinder situational awareness and prioritisation of needs.
A key recommendation stemming from the Typhoon Haiyan UN-CMCoord After Action Review was the need for organisations to deploy with 'competent' and experienced military liaison officers. Individual skills and experience was deemed critical because of the impact they have on information sharing, communication, and matching capabilities with needs.83
More specifically, experienced liaison officers were found to be able to: •! effectively explain available capabilities and limitations; •! distil information to identify and define priorities; •! keep lines of communication and coordination simple; •! align capabilities and complementary support with needs; •! provide geographical and situational information and awareness; •! avoid duplication; •! be a single point of contact for consistency; and •! reduce confusion through effective information sharing.84 !
82 Helicopter Operations Officer, interview with author, 02 May 2018. ! 83 T. Encarnacao, ‘A Case Study on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord).’ Civil- Military Coordination Section, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, presentation, no date, p. 20. 84 UN-CMCoord, op. cit., p. 3-4. 214
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Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC): To enable coordination and achieve CIMIC functions, ADF commanders and CIMIC personnel may establish a CMOC, which occurred during the response to Cyclone Pam and Cyclone Winston. As outlined in Chapter One, a CMOC facilitates integration between civilian agencies, the local population and the military by providing a dedicated meeting place to exchange information. The value of a CMOC is recognised doctrinally based on their primary role to “provide the liaison necessary to coordinate effort and to keep the NGO informed of the tactical situation.”85 However, no clarity on a CMOC structure, size and composition emerged from the case studies, reflecting a lack of clarity on decision-making behind establishing a CMOC and inconsistency in using it as a coordination mechanism. Notwithstanding, a CMOC was observed to duplicate civilian coordination efforts during the response to Cyclone Pam.
6.7.2 Co-location of Civilian and Military Actors All three case studies reflected that the co-location of stakeholders is an important element of expertise coordination, leading to effective civil-military interaction. Co- location occurred in the Philippines and Vanuatu, with a dislocation of leadership happening in Fiji and noted for remediation. However, no consistent typology was identified to frame a discussion on forms of co-location, including definitions and boundaries. There have also been few studies that explicitly discuss the theoretical underpinnings of dedicated co-location between civilian and military actors, 86 however it continues to emerge from practice as necessary to optimise information sharing, establish common situational awareness, facilitate unity of effort and pooling of resources.87
Co-location was found to be important for stakeholders within an Australian response (e.g. DFAT and the ADF) and external stakeholders (e.g. ADF attendance at cluster meetings) because it resulted in:
85 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.11 Civil-Military Operations, 01 April 2009, p. 4.20, viewed on 31 December 20019, https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP3.11-Civil- MilitaryOperations.pdf 86 A. Reichardt & M. Holweg, ‘Co-located supplier clusters: forms, functions and theoretical perspectives.’ International Journal of Operations & Production Management, vol, 28, no.1, January 2008, p. 54. 87 UN-CMCoord, op. cit., p. 4. 215
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•! Open and efficient information sharing to understand and prioritise affected nation and humanitarian needs; •! Deliberate planning; •! Face-to-face contact, which is valuable in Pacific Island Countries; •! Expedient problem solving; and •! Mutual understanding.
During the response to Cyclone Winston, the co-location of DFAT and ADF aboard HMAS Canberra contributed to whole-of-government outcomes by enhancing the delivery of stores and also ensuring adherence to principles of humanitarian aid.88 More broadly, the co-location of DFAT and ADF personnel ensures that the ADF receives guidance and direction from DFAT on response planning, load/cargo loading and delivery prioritisation.89 The outcomes of co-location can also include an up-to-date common operating picture, unity of effort and pooling of resources for affected areas, which in-turn lead to civil-military coordination.
In situations where there was a lack of co-location, such as DFAT co-location with the Air Component and onboard HMAS Tobruk in the Philippines, it was noted as a characteristic of the response that needed to be remediated. DFAT co-location with military personnel was identified to enhance the planning and conduct of response efforts, specifically the processing of Australian and approved foreign national passengers out of disaster areas, and the efficient prioritisation, manifesting, tracking and delivery of DFAT cargo and humanitarian aid using military assets, including fixed wing, rotary wing and naval platforms.
6.7.3 Gender Participation and Perspective The Australian responses in the Philippines and Fiji reflect how gender participation and perspective are critical aspects of effective civil-military interaction. To support a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, the ADF has developed a dedicated gender advisor capability, introduced operational orders that direct the inclusion of a gender perspective and deployment of gender advisors, and released a doctrinal note on gender
88 DFAT, interview with author, 27 Septemer 2019. 89 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 6. 216
! in air operations. This has enabled the ADF to effectively integrate a gender perspective into natural disaster response in recognition of the contribution women make to operational effectiveness.90
The participation of ADF women during response efforts in the Philippines and Fiji were specifically identified as contributing to interaction with women in local communities. While the response to Typhoon Haiyan was conducted prior the introduction of formal WPS requirements, the response included a female linguist and engineers that competed tasks like debris removal, environmental hazard reduction, and restoration of classrooms. These ADF members “who did a ‘man’s job’ demonstrated how women can mobilise in the aftermath of a natural disaster to assume ‘non-traditional roles’ such as rebuilding infrastructure and clearing roads and rubble.”91
The response to Cyclone Winston was the first time ADF operational orders specifically required the use of gender advisers. Women and vulnerable groups have specific needs in the aftermath of natural disasters but may be unable make their needs known. Females in engagement roles with local communities ensured female participation in discussions with local leaders and resulted in tailored assistance to Fijian communities.
6.7.4 Immediate Response Teams Immediate response teams from DFAT and the ADF were deployed in all three case studies and were found to have a positive influence on civil-military interaction, including forming relationships with affected nation authorities and feeding information back to Australia on the situation on the ground. Two case studies, the Philippines and Fiji, identified the need for Australian immediate response teams to include an AUSMAT member to ensure health planning expertise is available to inform the location and composition of AUSMAT. Civilian actors have comparable teams, including DHL Disaster Response Teams, which further enable civil-military interaction through the provision of logistics expertise. Very importantly, immediate teams are able to inform
90 See E. Chapman, ‘Women in the ADF: the operational imperative of participation.’ The Strategist, 29 November 2018, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/women-in-the-adf-the- operational-imperative-of-participation/ 91 Ibid 217
! whether additional Australian capability, including AUSMAT and ADF assets are required, and if so, the configuration of these capabilities.
6.7.5 Civil-Military Teaming Civil-military teaming occurred in all three case studies, taking a number of forms – DFAT and ADF personnel worked together in the Philippines; the ADF, humanitarian and affected nation agencies worked together in Vanuatu to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment; and the ADF and affected nation agencies working together in Fiji. Civil-military teaming brought together organisations that had “differing organizational cultures and values, … lack shared training and educational experiences, and … operate using different lexicons."92 In teaming, differences in planning, decision-making, operational styles, and leadership, were overcome to achieve unified actions.
6.8 Governance As discussed in Chapter One, the current international humanitarian coordination system originates from UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 'Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations.' Further coordination reforms were undertaken in 2005 as part of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda and this saw the introduction of the cluster system, which was activated in all three case studies. These coordination mechanisms form the part of the structures that surround civil-military interaction, their purpose is to bring together diverse stakeholders, and achieve consensus-based decision making and collective actions.93 Within this project, these structures are referred to as ‘governance’ with the term referring to the “interrelated sets of norms, organisational and institutional actors, and practices ... that are designed to reduce the impacts and losses associated with disasters.”94 Governance enables a range of outcomes, including accountability and predictability, situational awareness, oversight of resources and capabilities (availability and capacity), the
92 K. Ross et al, Development of a Competency Model for Civil-Military Teaming, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1960, September 2012, p. vi, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a567464.pdf 93 See C. Ansell & A. Gash, ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice,’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol. 18, iss.4, October 2008, https://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/05/Ansell-and-Gash-Collaborative-Governance-in-Theory-and- Practice.pdf 94 K. Tierney, ‘Disaster Governance: Social, Political, and Economic Dimensions.’ Annual Review of Environment and Resources, vol. 37, no.1, October 2012, p. 344. 218
! prioritisation and accounting of aid, and matching capabilities with needs – all of which support a systematic response.
6.8.1 Coordination Mechanisms The need for dedicated and systematic coordination mechanisms to enable civil-military interaction was identified from the case studies and broader literature, with the cluster system being the most consistent method used to assist coordination. As noted in Chapter One, the cluster system provides a means for systematic communication and information sharing between all actors during a response. In activating the system, actors have a dedicated approach to share information on the needs of affected communities, implement tools to track cargo, and have common standards, procedures and processes to manage information flow.95
While there were challenges and delays identified with establishing the cluster system in all three case studies, the system was found to contribute to civil-military interaction in the following ways:
1. Provide an element of predictable leadership at levels where it was implemented; 2. Enable accountability in terms the response and beneficiaries; and 3. Support coordination and prioritisation of tasking for military assets.96
There was inconsistency in the application of other coordination mechanisms and procedures, MNF SOPs, MNCC (military-military interaction), a CMOC, and the Oslo Guidelines. At times, this caused parallel coordination systems to be established by international civilian and military actors, which caused confusion. The NDMO in Suva, Fiji identified this as a lesson from the Tropical Winston response, further noting that "Many actors entered communities without understanding local protocols and procedures."97
95 J. Bealt, et al, op. cit., p. 121. 96 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Appeal for Building Global Humanitarian Response Capacity 2007- 2008, p. 1, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2007 _cluster_appeal_11.pdf 97 National Disaster Management Office, op. cit.,, slide 8. Provided to author. 219
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Military engagement with coordination structures, such as the cluster system, increases accountability and predictability by ensuring division of labour between civil and military organisations, leading to actors having clearly defined roles and responsibilities.98 The need for military personnel to have knowledge of these structures, including regional specific guidelines such as the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations, strongly emerged from all the case studies. Without this knowledge, there is a risk military actors will establish their own coordination structures which adds a decision-making layer, rather than integrate into national or humanitarian structures.
6.8.2 Operating Procedures A Request for Assistance (RFA) procedure, which enabled civilian actors to request the use of ADF assets, was found to be a critical procedure that supported interaction in all three case studies however there was inconsistency in the procedure between the cases. An RFA process is included in MNF SOPs, however the SOPs were not systematically applied by the ADF. There was no data collected that reflected MNF SOPS were known or practiced by civilian actors, either within an Australian response or with external actors.
As operating procedures outline organisational roles and responsibilities, processes and reporting requirements, they were found to support effective civil-military interaction by enabling: • Systematic interaction with affected nation and humanitarian stakeholders, and their respective coordination mechanisms; • Mission development and identification of suitable operational locations and projects; • Prioritisation of tasks, use of assets and projects; • Collaborative planning, implementation and evaluation of assistance and projects; and
98 UN-CMCoord, op. cit., p. 4. 220
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• Information analysis and coordination, including development of operational monitoring framework. 99
6.8.3 Information Management A key factor of effective civil-military interaction effectiveness is the degree to which actors are able to learn and adapt. The benefits of knowledge to enhance an Australian response has been outlined above, including national, regional and cultural context, individual knowledge and experience, and the transfer of this knowledge into organisational memory such as doctrine and operating procedures. Information management was also identified from the case studies as a critical means to support information sharing, maintain situational awareness and develop a common understanding of the situation.
Another facet of information management that supports civil-military interaction is a monitoring and reporting tool that tracks Australian assistance and aid. Such a tool was found to be valuable when used or necessary when absent, with the response to Cyclone Winston notably reflecting the importance of monitoring and tracking to support transition efforts. Tracking response activities ensures that all assistance is documented, leading to transparency and accountability. As such, implementing a simple and transparent tracking system: •! ensures national levels are kept informed of military air transport and activity; •! contributes to situational awareness, including informing the humanitarian community on the movement of relief items; and •! de-conflicts civilian and military efforts.
While the need for a simple monitoring and evaluation system to track the delivery of aid and conducted tasks emerged from all the case studies, there was no consistent system applied to achieve this outcome as demonstrated varying usage of infographics to collate and reflect Australian achievements. Such a system is deemed of "significant importance for future civil-military coordination logistics operations"100 because it ensures
99 See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of military involvement in civil assistance in peacekeeping operations, The Office of Internal Oversight Services, 13 December 2005. ! 100 UN-CMCoord, op. cit., p. 5. 221
! transparency and visibility of available air assets, and allows for the prioritisation of delivery of assistance.101
Actors require suitable information technology systems, including a level of compatibility between different civilian and military systems, to support information management needs. A lack of adequate systems “leads to poor information sharing, limited collaboration and the duplication of efforts,” 102 in-turn acting as a barrier to effective civil-military interaction.
6.8.4 Accreditation In all three case studies, a surge of individuals, teams and unsolicited donations flooded in the aftermath of the disaster. In the specific case of the Philippines, challenges arose regarding the coordination, quality and capacity of Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs). EMTs pose a particular challenge because of the rapid increase in the deployment of teams in the aftermath of disasters.103 This surge caused significant coordination challenges because an affected nation was faced with both coordinating efforts to respond to the immediate needs of its population, and the oversight and management of responders. Few national systems are adequately prepared for this, and it lead to ad hoc rule-making, confusion, and the proliferation of poorly prepared and underequipped responders.104 This issue impacts civil-military interaction because unregulated or uninvited teams can use military assets, which is what occurred during the Typhoon Haiyan response when Medical Rescue deployed to the Philippines on ADF assets.105
6.9 Outcomes of Effective Civil-Military Interaction In presenting the factors that were found to influence civil-military interaction, the outcomes that these factors achieved were also captured. In some cases, different factors achieved the same outcomes, for example co-location and dedicated interaction functions both resulted in information flow, leading to situational awareness and common understanding. A consolidated list of outcomes from the cross-case pattern search, under
101 ibid 102 J. Bealt, et al., op. cit., p. 131. 103 World Health Organization and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The Regulation and Management of International Emergency Medical Teams, June 2017, p. 13, viewed 28 December 2019, https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/233516/EMT%20Report%20HR.PDF 104 ibid 105 AUSMAT, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 222
! the broad themes of culture, preparation, governance and capability, is presented at this point to draw together knowledge gained from the cross-case pattern search.
• Mutual understanding, trust and unity of effort • Relationship-focused Culture • Shared responsibility
• Pre-established relationships • Regional, national and cultural understanding Preparation • Agile and adaptive thinking • Clear and rehearsed plans, roles & responsibilities • Dedicated and systematic interaction • Accountability and predictability • Common situational awareness and understanding • Oversight of available foreign military assets Governance • Aid is documented, prioritised and accounted for • Military assets are matched with needs (capability optimised) • Integration of military efforts into broader response • Aligned procedures (needs assessments & RFA) • Faster, informed and timely decision-making • Tailored response (configuration and location) • De-conflict military and civilian efforts Capability • Single point of contact • Information sharing • Identify needs of vulnerable groups
Figure 30: Consolidated Outcomes of Effective Civil-Military Interaction
6.10 Broader Literature To build external validity, and sharpen construct definitions and generalisability within the project, the factors identified from the case studies are now situated within broader literature. This process also ensures concerns arising from insider research are addressed, including that a researcher may be too familiar with the data and present tacit patterns or preconceived ideas. Three approaches that present factors that influence civil-military interaction were identified in the literature. The first draws again from Sebastiaan Rietjens who identifies factors internal within actors or external between actors. These are summarised below in Table 20. Internal influences include a lack of commitment to civil-military cooperation, with specific examples being the absence of useful and clear guidelines to undertake civil-military cooperation, and limited knowledge transfer.
A critical civil-military interface was found to be military engagement with the location population. Failure to involve communities and authorities, and integrate into their governance structures can result in a lack of cohesion and ownership, and lead to a
223
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mismatch between needs and assistance activities.106 Between actors, inconsistent situational awareness, inaccessibility of information, and inadequate transfer of tasks and responsibilities after completing activities were identified as influencing factors. Overall, Reitjens concludes that the factors which most influence the performance of civil- military relationships are internal within partners, despite the complexity of operational environments.
Clusters Policy and Time frames Structures and Coordination and Means Contingency domain Cultures communication factors
- Tasks - Time horizon - Organisation - Coordination - Resources - Proliferation of - Humanitarian - Continuity structure - Communication - Technology civilian actors principles - Transfer - Organisation - Operational Factors - Mandate culture environment - Use of force - Local cultures - Unity of effort - Trust
Table 20: Factors influencing Civil-Military Cooperation107
A similar perspective is articulated by Roshni Pramanik,108 who undertook a systematic literature review on challenges to civil-military coordination before using semi- structured interviews to explore the topic further. He identified a number of factors which had a positive or negative impact on coordination; the first referred to as facilitators and the latter inhibitors (Table 21 below). Drawing on interorganisational coordination concepts, Pramanik reflects that socialisation is considered a facilitator because it refers to a “proactive strategy that allows individuals to modify their behaviour, to adjust to new roles” and “adapt to new roles, explore strategies to counter ... situations and develop cooperative attitudes by utilizing informal channels to find solutions.” 109 Flexibility is another factor, distinct from socialization and referring to how practices, procedures and roles need to allow for innovation and recognise interdependence.
106 S. Rietjens, op. cit., p. 191. 107 ibid, p. 38. 108 R. Pramanik, ‘Challenges in coordination: differences in perception of civil and military organizations by comparing international scientific literature and field experiences.’ Journal of Risk Research, 03 July 2015. 109 ibid, p. 9. 224
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Theme Factors to overcome Challenges Sources challenges Communication Socialization Use of different terminologies Soeters and Recht (1998), Comfort (2002), Bharosa, Lee, and Jansseen (2009), Lalonde (2010), Thompson (2010), Salmon et al. (2011) Information Socialization; informal Use of non-uniform information Comfort (2002), Bharosa, Lee, management contacts for exchange of platform/ infrastructure; use of and Jansseen (2009), Lalonde information non-uniform method of collating (2010), Thompson (2010), data Salmon et al. (2011)
Organizational Flexibility; formalization No clarity on whom to contact for Soeters and Recht (1998), structure a particular information in a Rietjens et al. (2009), Ödlund hierarchy; whom to send to which (2010), Salmon et al. (2011) meeting Organizational Flexibility in approaches Different treatment to same Soeters and Recht (1998), culture and/or decisions; information; different treatment to Feaver and Kohn (2000), Pugh formalization; same meeting; different treatment (2001), Weinberger (2002), standardization to other’s goals Tierney and Bevc (2007), Engdahl (2009), Rietjens et al. (2009), Ödlund (2010) Organizational Attitudes (personal and/or Perception of another Natsios (1995), Weiss (1997), identity organizational); organization; ideologies leading Soeters and Recht (1998), background (historical/ to cooperative attitudes Feaver and Kohn (2000), Pugh political) (2001), Tierney and Bevc (2007) Rietjens et al. (2009), Engdahl (2009), Ödlund (2010)
Table 21: Systematic Civil-Military Coordination Literature review110
A different approach identified within the literature focuses on reflecting the impact that individual, team and organisational variables have on civil-military effectiveness, with 'success factors' considered to exist at corresponding individual, agency and whole-of- government levels.111 The Australian Interagency Preparedness Framework reflects this position (Table 20) based on the position that “operational effectiveness is largely a reflection of the practices and processes of the interagency operation.”112 A lack of
110 ibid, p. 8. ! 111 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘An overview of the Australian Interagency Preparedness Framework (AIPF).’ No date, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.acmc.gov.au/what-we- do/building-capability/australian-interagency-preparedness-framework/overview 112 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘Interagency Operational Effectiveness.’ No date, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.acmc.gov.au/what-we-do/building-capability/australian-interagency- preparedness-framework/success-factors 225
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commitment to establishing a partnership between national and local actors is considered the “biggest hindrance to effective performance.” 113
Success Factor Whole-of-Government Agency Individual Clear Purpose and The strategic objectives are Agency plans are aligned Individuals understand the Strategy articulated and communicated with WoG strategic operation's common Common understanding objectives purpose of and commitment to the Sub-agency (unit) plans are Individuals have clarity strategic objectives of the aligned with agency plans about their role in the response operation and operation respective roles and Agency roles and Agency plans and operations Individuals understand the contributions of responsibilities are clearly recognise the roles of other role of other agencies participating agencies is delineated agencies critical The overall leadership The agency leadership Individuals understand the structure of the operation is structure is clear agency and operation clear The relationship between the leadership structure agency leadership structure and the leadership structure of the operation is clear Situational Awareness Situational information and Agency plans and operations Individuals are briefed on Aware of local context intelligence informs planning reflect situational the context of the operation and cultures of the and coordination informational and Affected Nation and intelligence differences in capabilities Agency plans and operations Individuals understand the and styles of other are based on understanding operational style and agencies contributing to the operational style and capabilities of other the response capabilities of other agencies agencies
Coordination, Communication structures, Communication structures, Communication and processes and protocols are processes and protocols Information Sharing clear within and between agencies Structure, roles, protocols are clear and systems used; sharing of relevant information Agency communication between agencies systems, formats and templates are consistent and/or interoperable Information is shared across Agencies share information agencies, where appropriate with other agencies, where appropriate
Collaborative A culture of collaboration is Agencies foster collaboration Individuals are encouraged Partnerships fostered across agencies within the organisation and supported to Flows from practices that collaborate within and precede the response and across teams and agencies developed over a long Cross-government structures Agencies participate in cross- Individuals participate in periods - networks and and activities (networks, government structures and cross-government structures forums, and joint planning activities and activities
113 ibid! 226
! joint planning, training training and exercises) build Agencies develop bilateral Individuals build and exercises and support collaboration activities and arrangements, relationships and networks partnerships and agreements across the sector to support joint operations People Capabilities Cross-government structures Agencies include a focus Individuals develop and Technical and managerial and activities promote and capabilities for interagency practice capabilities to capabilities; knowledge support the development of operations in people support interagency and skills; individual's people capabilities for development planning and operations including whole- attitude and approach interagency operations training offerings of-government Agency provide for cross- coordination, relationship agency participation in management, training and exercise communication and opportunities negotiation skills, cultural sensitivity, awareness of self and others, flexibility and resilience.
Table 22: Factors influencing Civil-Military Cooperation – ACMC 114
Overall, many of the factors that emerged from the cross-case pattern search can be located in broader literature, though not with identical language.. As like Rietjens’ identified, the factors that influence civil-military interaction are internal with actors, with their practices and decisions mitigating against external factors, such as differences in culture and procedures. This strengthens the validity of the factors which emerged, demonstrating they are a robust summary of findings to lay the foundation to determine the necessary conditions for effective civil-military interaction. The outcomes identified were compared also to the RCG Recommended Practices for Effective Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters, with most of the outcomes mirrored in these practices. This strengthens the relationship between the factors identified and intended outcomes.
6.11 Logic Model The case studies and broader literature present a range of factors that influence civil- military interaction. To simplify civil-military interaction to lay the foundations for building a process model, the logic underpinning civil-military relationships is mapped to build a clearer picture of the relationships that form and how they form. A logic model (Figure 31) is used in this project as a visual representation to demonstrate relationships between resources (staff, time, money, research base, materials and equipment),
114 ibid 227
! activities (governance, education, training and exercises), and results (learning, action and conditions).
The model reveals the assumptions that underlie linkages in civil-military relations to support the development of an empirically sound model in following chapters, and to strengthen internal validity of the project. Mapping civil-military interaction in this way is considered critical to establish the linkages between a disaster response, strategic Australian priorities and operational civil-military activities and actions, and the outcomes and impact these have on an affected nation. In developing the logic model, the following definitions have been used, linked back to the factors that emerged:
Situation: − Needs of an affected nation after a natural disaster. − Other stakeholders in the area; stakeholder engagement.
Priorities: − Mission: A statement of an organisation’s goals. It provides a benchmark for measuring progress and limits ‘mission creep’ whereby actors can proactively take on additional roles without formalised objectives. − Values: Organisational culture, including leadership, communication, coordination, and decision-making. − Local dynamics: Local, national and regional context, including cultural, capacity, role of domestic military/police forces, and historical role of foreign militaries.
Inputs: Resources, in terms of time, staff, expertise, equipment, and assets, which an actor commits to a response.
Outputs: The activities undertaken and who is reached through those activities; tangible deliverables within an organisation’s control; what is created or delivered, number of people assisted, and activities and services carried out – ‘what we do’ (activities) and ‘who we reach’ (participation).
Outcomes: Changes or results relative to civil-military interaction, generally defined in terms of changes of knowledge, skills, attitudes, behaviour. The effect that activities and 228
! outputs will have on people. The outcomes presented above at 6.9 have been refined after being situated in broader literature.
Impact: The results that can be directly attributed to the outcomes of civil-military interaction, considerate of external influences.
External Factors: Factors that are external to the process which may facilitate or impair the ability to achieve the outcomes and impact desired. These factors include the setting of the disaster response, weather, terrain and safety.
Inputs Outputs Outcomes - Impact Situation Priorities Activities Participation Learning & Action Conditions
• Regional • Training, engagement • Individual skills Education & • Capability • ADF and knowledge Exercising • Mutual Development • DFAT • Common ADF: support • Information situational Understanding affected nation; • Information • AUSMAT sharing awareness • National control immediate Management • USAR • Governance • Agile leadership • Comparative assistance • Immediate • EMA • Co-location • Tailored response Advantage Natural Response • Civil-military structures • Organisational Disaster Teams teaming • Regional • Informed and learning response • Predictable • Gender Partners timely decision- • Behavioral Aus.: leadership and participation • UN making adaptation National command & • Dedicated • Predictable Interest, • NGOs control functions (e.g. • Accountable development CIMIC) goals • Accreditation
Assumptions: Activities and actions are in support of External Factors: The setting of the the affected nation/ affected populations. disaster response, weather, terrain and safety.
Figure 31: Civil-Military Interaction Logic Model
6.12 Summary This chapter covers the breadth of considerations surrounding civil-military interaction with the intent to present the evidence behind why civil-military relationships form and lay the foundations for subsequent chapters that will present the when and how actors should interact to enhance outcomes for an affected nation. The chapter commenced with a discussion on the characteristics of natural disaster environments to reflect on how external factors can influence civil-military interaction. An examination of coordination theory was then undertaken, which confirmed that coordination is a process rather than
229
! an outcome of civil-military interaction, and can be used to provide insight into finding patterns within the case studies.
The findings from the cross-case analysis were presented as factors that influence civil- military interaction, based on the patterns that emerged from the case studies. These factors were then situated within broader literature to strengthen external validity, and sharpen construct definitions and generalisability. Finally, the relationships that emerged were mapped into a logic model to reflect factors as inputs, outputs and outcomes. The purpose of this chapter was to build understanding of factors that contribute to effective interaction to lay the foundation of a new way to conduct civil-military interaction, which is at the core of this project.
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Chapter Seven Preparing for Natural Disaster Response
In the previous chapter, an examination of coordination theory, a cross-case pattern search and broader literature review was presented as a way to identify the factors that influence civil-military interaction. The following two chapters brings this knowledge together to present the process model that answers the central research question of this thesis - a civil-military interaction process model which supports the conduct of an Australian response to international natural disasters. As noted in Chapter 1, the disaster risk management cycle consists of four phases - mitigation, preparedness and planning, response, and recovery. The case studies that were the focus of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 identified that the ADF did not engage in disaster mitigation, which is defined as structural and non-structural efforts to hinder, mitigate and prevent disasters.1 Instead, ADF efforts focused on disaster preparedness and response, with activities handed over upon completion to enable relevant stakeholders to conduct recovery and reconstruction efforts.
This chapter commences by presenting a brief background to the model development before revisiting the concept of process models to explain key characteristics of business process management and introduce flowchart diagrams, which is how components of the model for this project will be visually represented. Effective civil-military interaction spans strategic, operational and tactical level relationships and activities of a two-phased, 9-step model, covering disaster preparedness and disaster response. The model builds on the knowledge in previous chapters to specify how and when civilian and military actors should interact to enhance a natural disaster response. Using data captured from the case studies and broader literature review, the model also reflects on the current status of each step, to demonstrate how Australia can enhance its response to natural disasters.
1 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,’ ‘Terminology.’ 02 February 2017, viewed on 26 December 2019, https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology 231
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7.1 Model Background As outlined in Chapter 2, process models are built using longitudinal events where causation consists of necessary conditions in sequence, as reflected in Figure 32 below. This means that the key characteristic of the model developed here is that it reflects sequential and necessary conditions for effective civil-military interaction. However, it is recognised that more than one cause is necessary to generate an outcome, a precursor is insufficient to cause an effective outcome but its presence is necessary for the outcome to occur, and that chance and random events can contribute to an outcome. In identifying events or activities that need to occur, the model addresses the research objective by providing an approach to civil-military interaction that can be consistently employed by Australian civilian and military actors.
Figure 32: Process Model 2
The complex nature of civil-military interaction was demonstrated in the Logic Model in Chapter Six, which reflected that many factors - situation, investment, and activities – can influence civil-military interaction in the same way. Both a flow of actions and dialogue between people were identified to inform an effective civil-military relationship.3 To simplify and demonstrate this interaction, a business process management approach was adopted that incorporates a flowchart diagram to visually represent action and relationship sequencing based on five core activities - a decision, action, output, relationship or start/end point (Figure 33 below).
2 A. Burton-Jones, E. McLean & E. Monod, ‘Theoretical perspectives in IS research: from variance and process to conceptual latitude and conceptual fit.’ European Journal of Information Systems, vol. 24, November 2015, p. 666. 3 C. Argyris, ‘Field Methods and Techniques: The Flow Chart.’ Human Organization, vol. 10, Winter 1951 p. 37. 232
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Decision Action or Process Output Relationship Start/End
Figure 33: Flowchart Diagrams 4
Business process management is typically undertaken to align customer needs with a systematic approach that manages, measures and improves processes, which is achieved through cross-functional teamwork and empowering individuals.5 The approach uses "methods, techniques, and software to design, enact, control and analyze operational processes involving humans, organizations, application, documents, and other sources of information."6 Its purpose is to standardise activities and processes to improve organisational efficiency in meeting the needs of internal and external customers, while addressing the interdependence of strategy, people, process and technology.7
Process mapping followed by process modelling are the next steps in business process management. The first allows organisations to gain an understanding of process functions and the stakeholders within them, while the latter involves modelling a business process using diagrams to demonstrate a flow of activities. When complete, a process models provides the conditions that "define how and when an activity is performed."8 The output is a flowchart that visually displays the sequence of activities within a civil-military interaction process, including who is responsible for these activities. Flowcharts provide a sequential rather than hierarchical representation of components, so they do not as clearly show the relationships between steps.9 Instead, their strength lies in presenting
4 Cornell University, ‘Flowcharting Guidelines.’ No date, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://hr.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/flowcharting_guidelines.pdf 5 H. Reijers, Design and Control of Workflow processes: Business Process Management for the Service Industry, Springer, Berlin, 2003, p. 18. 6 M. Weske, W.M. P. van der Aalst, & H.M.W. Verbeek, ‘Advances in Business Process Management.’ Data and Knowledge Engineering, vol. 50, no. 1, July 2004, p. 2. 7 G .Daines III, ‘Aligning Customer Needs: Business Process Management (BPM) and Successful Change Management in the L. Tom Perry Special Collections.’ Library Leadership & Management, vol. 29, no.1, 2014, p. 5. 8 T. Tanrikorur cited in ibid. 9 J. Martin & C. MClure Diagramming Techniques for Analysts and Programmers, Prentice Hall, 1985, p. 160. 233
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"complicated and interrelated interactions and events in a relatively simple and unified manner."10
The following definitions are used:11 •! Decision: A diamond shows points in the process where a yes/no question is asked or a decision is required. •! Action or Process: A box or rectangle is used to show a task or activity performed in the process. •! Output: The activities undertaken and who is reached through those activities; tangible deliverables within an organisation’s control; what is created or delivered, number of people assisted, and activities and services carried out. In process mapping outputs can be considered outcomes or desired results, however in this project outputs are distinct from outcomes, as defined in the logic model in Chapter Six. •! Relationship: Arrows show direction of the flow of the process. There is usually only one arrow out of an activity box. If there is more than one arrow, a decision (diamond) may be needed. Every feedback loop (relationship) is closed i.e. every path takes either back to or ahead to another step. •! Start/End: An oval is used to show the input to start the process of the output at the end of the process.
This approach was adopted to simplify the complexities of civil-military relationships into detailed and connected steps to present why effective relationships should be developed and how effective relationships can develop. A number of sub-steps or 'support activities' were identified within the steps which reflect the activities, which collectively build to achieve the conduct of the core activities.12 The purpose of these sub-steps is to explicitly capture the factors that positively influence civil-military interaction.
The use of a business process management approach, which focuses on activities within an Australian response to meet external needs, closely mirrors the evidence from the case
10 C. Argyris, op. cit., p. 37. 11 Adapted from Iowa State University Facilities Planning & Management, ‘Process Mapping.’ Accessed at www.fpm.iastate.edu/worldclass/process_mapping.asp 12 Adapted from ‘Porter's Value Chain.’ See M. Porter, Competitive Advantage, The Free Press, New York, 1985. 234
! studies, which reflects that variances in civilian and military organisational values, structures, processes, practices and skill sets are firmly entrenched. This makes any organisational solution to civil-military coordination difficult.13 Instead, to improve interaction, common ground between civilian and military actors should be found and a framework built from this.14 Such an approach is based on the factors that emerged in Chapter Six, which reflect that most conditions necessary for success are internal considerations by actors rather than external factors due to operational and environmental context.
At this stage, it is also important to revisit the theoretical position of this research on the role of militaries in disaster response, as outlined in Chapter Two. This project adopts a merged 'security-strategic' and 'functional-humanitarian' position on the role of militaries, which is supportive of early and pragmatic military involvement in disaster response. This position reflects, firstly, Australia's efforts to ensure disaster preparedness through regional relationships and security. Secondly it reflects Australia's regional context where militaries are often the first responders to assist when civilian capabilities are overwhelmed.
7.2 Preparedness As outlined in Chapter One, disaster preparedness refers “the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current disasters.”15 Chapter Six reflected that civilian and military actors would benefit from undertaking a collective period of preparation, which demonstrates that civil-military interaction needs to commence prior to a response, in the disaster management preparedness phase. As such, preparedness is the focus of the first phase of the process model and includes four steps to reflect how civil-military interaction needs to occur in disaster response planning and preparation (Figure 34) to enable an effective Australian disaster response.
13 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 34 and H. Slim, ‘The stretcher and the drum: civil-military relations in peace support operations.’ International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 40. 14 C. Holshek, ‘Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: Looking Beyond the “Latest and Greatest,”’ in History and Hope: The International Humanitarian Reader, K. Cahill (ed), Fordham University Press, 2013, p. 286. !! 15 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,’ ‘Terminology.’ 02 February 2017, viewed on 26 December 2019, https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology 235
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7.3 Step 1: Commit to Disaster Management The case studies and broader literature reflect that response stakeholders need to have a strategic foundation to underpin their involvement and mission during disaster response. This foundation is explicit guidance, plans and administrative frameworks to enable investment in meeting capability (people and equipment) and preparedness needs for response environments, including conducting training and exercises, regional engagement and knowledge management. From this, the first step in the process model is specified as requiring response actors to make an explicit commitment to disaster management and ensuring their disaster response effort has adequate capability, in terms of people, practices and equipment. This step is considered a capability decision to acknowledge the increasing occurrence, severity and impact of natural disasters, in-turn enabling investment to achieve an effective and coherent civil-military approach to respond. !
Capability - Decision 1.1#Localisation STEP 1: COMMIT TO DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Preparation - Process 2.1 Regional#Partnerships# STEP 2: 2.2#Education,#Training#&#Exercises BUILD & MANAGE KNOWLEDGE 2.3#Capacity#and#Timelines#of#Capability 2.4#Knowledge#Management# Governance - Output STEP 3: 3.1#CrossFReference#Governance# ALIGN & PRACTICE 3.2#Practice#and#Rehearse GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Culture - Output 4.1 Shared#Experience#& Mental#Models STEP 4: 4.2#Relationships MUTUAL 4.3#Understand#Comparative#Advantage UNDERSTANDING
Figure 34: Preparedness Process Model
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Strategically, Australia's commitment to disaster risk reduction, resilience and response is articulated in the Australian Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, the 2016 Defence White Paper, and the 2016 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Humanitarian Strategy. In terms of funding, disaster risk reduction and resilience is one of Australia's aid investment priorities, with $664.8 million allocated in the 2019-20 Budget.16
Within the specific context of civil-military interaction, the Foreign Policy White Paper reflects that "The Australian Defence Force is able to undertake humanitarian and disaster relief operations, including in cooperation with our police and disaster response teams."17 Similarly, the 2016 Defence White Paper affirms that Australia will respond to short-notice disaster relief situations in the Indo-Pacific region and improve the coordination of these responses through building regional preparedness and conducting international engagement.18 To enable operational and tactical-engagement, DFAT's Humanitarian Strategy acknowledges the need to support initiatives that "strengthen civil-military cooperation and engage in disaster preparedness exercises that include civil and military representatives."19
Whilst the above mentioned documents provide broad and aligned strategic commitment, there is a gap in addressing how this commitment will be realised. As introduced in Chapter Six, the Australian Government Overseas Assistance Plan (AUSASSIST Plan) is an Australian Government plan prepared and maintained by Emergency Management Australia (EMA), which outlines the provision of emergency assistance following a disaster or emergency in another country. While the plan details the coordination arrangements of Australian Government capabilities, including the ADF, it does not specify the administrative arrangements for establishing a disaster response mission, detail how the mission will be managed, or specify responsibility for determining
16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Building resilience: humanitarian assistance, disaster risk reduction and social protection.’ No date, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building-resilience/Pages/building-resilience.aspx 17 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 19. 18 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p.22. 19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Strategy. Australian Government, 2016, p. 17. 237
! operational priorities.20 These details were identified as critical during Australia's response in the Philippines because they support civil-military decision-making on the location of military capabilities and the prioritisation of needs.
Similarly, the ADF lacks a publicly available document that outlines a strategic commitment to disaster response. This is demonstrated through an examination of the Australian Army's Futures Statement titled Accelerated Warfare, which was released in August 2018 by Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Rick Burr to outline Army's strategic commitment to prepare for the future.21 The focus of the statement is preparation for conflict, which does not consider the key role that the Army plays in disaster preparedness and response within the regional and domestically. As the case studies reflected, Army capability - in terms of people and equipment - is critical to achieving a timely and flexible Australian response to natural disasters, and it will continue to play a key role in shaping and influencing disaster management through regional exercises.
More broadly, the 2016 Vice Chief of Defence Force’s Future Operating Environment 2035 recognises that natural disasters will "increase demands on the joint force and other government agencies to provide humanitarian and disaster relief assistance."22 However, there is no evidence that this document has influenced ADF disaster response preparation or capability development. Since the ADF does not specify disaster management as a core mission, it rests its activities on a supposition that its people, equipment and processes are sufficiently agile and adaptive to scale back from warfare to other operations without mission-specific training. This approach may be a legacy of the 2009 Defence White Paper which stated that the ADF's disaster response tasks do not require specialised capabilities because the "characteristics and structural features of the force ... will generate a wide range of capabilities which can be deployed for such tasks with very
20 Australian Government, ‘AUSASSISTPLAN2018: Australian Government Overseas Assistance Plan.’ 20 December 2017, viewed on 31 December 2018, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/emergency/files/plan-overseas-assistance.pdf and A. Yates & A. Bergin, More than good deeds: Disaster risk management and Australian, Japanese and US Defence force. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011, p. 60. 21 Australian Army, ‘Accelerated Warfare,’ 08 August 2018, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/from-the-chief-of-army/accelerated-warfare 22 Vice Chief of Defence Force, Future Operating Environment: 2035, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p. 9, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://cove.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/08-09_0/08/Future- Operating-Environment-2035.pdf 238
! little warning (for example, amphibious ships, sea and airlift, aero-medical evacuation assets, and logistics and medical support)."23
The case studies reflect that this is in the main an effective approach, with ADF personnel noted by communities in the Philippines and Fiji to have the requisite interpersonal skills and equipment to support community needs. However, in making a deliberate strategic commitment to disaster response and establishing it as a core mission, the ADF can invest in regional preparedness needs and capability development to meet the predicted occurrence and severity of natural disasters in the region. This includes ensuring its current and future capabilities meet the requirements to operate effectively in an archipelagic region, including using capabilities such as air drops and investing in technology advancement in areas such as telemedicine and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).24
In progressing towards formalising a commitment to disaster response, Australia can look to the United States. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) Directive25 that specifies defence policy and responsibilities for FDR. Included within this program is support to disaster preparedness activities, which consists of disaster management training.26 The Directive is a strategic commitment from the DoD that outlines its role and chain of command.27 Despite the existence of this guidance, the U.S. also suffers from the absence of a “whole of government disaster preparedness program framework … to facilitate effective and efficient implementation.”28 However, at least one of its commands – U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), previously Pacific Command (USAPACOM) – has an operational framework (Figure
23 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p.60. 24 Z. von Bertouch, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Trialling Accelerated Warfare – Part 2.’ Land Power Forum, Australian Army, 03 April 2019, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/blog/strategy/humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief-trialling- accelerated-warfare-0 25 Department of Defense Directive, ‘Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).’ Number 5100.46, Change 1, 28 July 2017, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/510046p.pdf 26 MAJ D. Licina, ‘Disaster Preparedness – Formalizing a Comparative Advantage for the Department of Defense in U.S. Global Health and Foreign Policy.’ Military Medicine, vol. 176, November 2011, p. 1207. 27 Department of Defense, op. cit., p.2. 28 D. Licina, op. cit., p. 1207. 239
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35) for disaster relief missions, with activities specified along operational phases that builds a level of predictability and comparative advantage between actors.
Figure 35: USAPACOM Disaster Relief Operational Framework29
One of the key opportunities for the ADF in making a strategic commitment to disaster response is that it will enable the development of a baseline disaster management Joint Task Force (JTF), with specified purpose and functions to conduct disaster response. This reform is required to improve clarity of command and control during short-notice response operations, and enhance the coordination of civilian and military expertise. It also provides an opportunity to explore alternative command arrangements, with an option being for a JTF to be more collective and reflective of DFAT lead, more effectively coordinate tactical civil-military efforts, and reflect Whole-of-Government crisis management. Possible options include a diarchal model with both DFAT and Defence senior staff working closely together to coordinate effort. This model was successfully demonstrated in Pakistan Assist 2.30
29 A. Yates & A. Bergin, op. cit., p. 43. 30 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, ‘Tropical Cyclone Pam: Civil-military cooperation in humanitarian disaster response in the Pacific.’ Outcomes Document, 21 May 2015, p. 6. 240
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Australia has made a strategic commitment to disaster management in foreign policy and Defence White Papers. To lay the foundations for effective civil-military interaction during a response, civilian and military actors within an Australian response need to distil this guidance and detail how they will meet this commitment. This includes putting in place operational frameworks to detail how missions will be managed, and the explicit roles and responsibilities of civilian and military stakeholders. This commitment will have flow-on effects during a response by enabling strategic planning and the development of a Strategic Disaster Plan.
7.3.1 Step 1.1: Localisation At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), aid donors and humanitarian organisations committed to the concept of 'Localisation' through 'The Grand Bargain' - an agreement to "get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action."31 Localisation is based on the premise that local actors have the best understanding of context, including cultural considerations, local relationships, language, and acceptance of assistance, which makes them an essential part of a response.
For Australia, localisation means recognising, respecting, and strengthening local and national leadership and decision-making to address the needs of affected populations.32 Pacific researchers developed a Pacific definition of localisation as being the process of "recognising, respecting and strengthening the independence of leadership and decision making by national actors in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations."33 In practice, it is investing in the capacity, delivery and leadership of national and local actors in emergency response by providing support and tools to enable community response, empowerment and resilience. The broad purpose of localisation is to ensure national and local partners become more involved in decision- making processes during a humanitarian response.34
31 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘The Grand Bargain.’ November 2019, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain 32 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tropical Cyclone Winston Education Response Evaluation, Australian Government, October 2017, p.8, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/tropical-cyclone-winston-education-response-evaluation.pdf 33 Y. Ayobi, et al, Going Local: Achieving a more appropriate and fit-for-purpose humanitarian ecosystem, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, October 2017, p. 4. 34 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Localization.’ No date, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.unocha.org/lebanon/localization 241
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In the Pacific, localisation includes a shift of relationships and power so that local, national and international actors have complementary roles instead of international actors replacing local and national actors, as was observed from the Typhoon Haiyan and Cyclone Pam responses. International actors need to respect that nations "have our own system and ways of doing things, our own way of reaching the people, our churches, our skills and knowledge"35 which is not always recognised. Without a commitment to localisation, there is potential for uneven power dynamics during a response, including at cluster meetings where international actors can control resources and decision- making.36
In making a commitment to disaster management, all international actors need to relinquish control over resources and decision-making in critical coordination forums, such as cluster meetings. More broadly, they need to commit to localised humanitarian action based on preparing for a response with the following characteristics:
•! led by national actors, with their leadership encompassing decision-making and ownership of the response at all levels. •! recognises, builds on, and strengthens local and traditional structures and practices. •! maximises national and regional capacity before international support is requested or arrives. •! national actors will make decisions in collaboration with international actors, however will retain decision-making over when, how and where international resources are utilised. •! international actors are in a supporting role aligned with national and local priorities. •! coordination is in accordance with national tools, systems and processes.37
Within the Pacific, effective localisation is grounded in building relationships built on mutual trust and respect, which includes greater recognition of traditional knowledge and
35 Y. Ayobi, et al, op. cit., p.5. 36 ibid, p. 4. 37 ibid, p. 5. 242
! approaches, and recognition of national leadership and authority.38 This means "that people can’t just fly in and make decisions, but if you have a relationship with a partner built on trust, you can make decisions together, using that shared knowledge.”39 This leads into the following step of the process model, which requires response stakeholders to build knowledge of the region to support more effective local capacity building.
7.4 Step 2: Build and Manage Knowledge The importance of stakeholders having knowledge of disaster response environments has previously been highlighted through the case studies and analysis of the broader literature. As per table 20, the Australian Civil-Military Centre categorised the types of knowledge required into 'People Capabilities' and 'Situational Awareness', to reflect the importance of individual knowledge, skills, attitude and approach, and organisational knowledge of the culture and context of an affected nation and other agencies contributing to a response. This makes building and managing individual and organisational knowledge a critical step in disaster preparedness because it provides individuals with the necessary knowledge to engage with other actors, while also supporting the transfer of the experience individuals gain into organisational memory that can be used to inform future disaster management activities.
From this, Step 2 in the process model was determined to be that stakeholders need to build knowledge through three sub-steps: regional engagement, education, training and exercises, and capability load lists. The fourth sub-step is the effective storage, dissemination and management of this knowledge to enable individuals to access and apply it when required.
7.4.1 Step 2.1: Regional Partnerships The regional, national and environmental context of disaster response operations means that no disaster response will be the same and each will have different facets of civil- military interaction. Further complicating response environments is that relationships between nations can result in affected nations accepting offers of assistance through bilateral arrangements, bypassing humanitarian coordination bodies such as OCHA.
38 ibid p. 6 39 ibid! 243
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Bilateral relationships, both formal and informal, will influence civil-military interaction, especially in the Pacific where military-military relationships often have strong foundations built on shared experience, as reflected in the response to Cyclone Winston. This is despite it being acknowledged that accepting offers of assistance through these channels can “lead to gaps and overlaps in tasks and capabilities, to a lack of coordination and even overloading of the affected country’s absorptive capacity.”40
Civilian and military actors both need to have knowledge of the characteristics of Australia’s region to understand the historical, cultural, climatic and political factors that will influence a disaster environment. This is especially critical in the South-East Asian region, which is distinctive because of the historical evolution of civil-military-police relations that sees military or police being the primary responders to a natural disaster.41 Australian civilian and military actors must work collaboratively and build knowledge of regional nations through deliberate, structured and aligned engagement, using existing DFAT and Defence programs and regional exercises. The need for quality engagement is recognised in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper which states that:
“Our ability to protect and advance our interests rests on the quality of our engagement with the world. This includes the ideas we bring to the table, our ability to persuade others to our point of view and the strength of the relationships we build with other governments and, increasingly, with influential non-government actors.”42
In the context of civil-military interaction, the purpose of this engagement is firstly to build relationships that will support a response, including building shared knowledge and enhancing trust and confidence in respective authority and decision-making.43 Secondly, the purpose is to capture and store the cultural and disaster management contexts of nations to enable timely and effective integration into their practices, processes and
40 S. Wiharta et al, The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008, p. 49. 41 G. Martinez, Civil-Military-Police Coordination in Disaster Management: Perspectives from South East Asian Countries. Australian Civil-Military Centre and Humanitarian Advisory Group, 2018, p. 5, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-08/Civil-Military- Police_Coordination_in_Disarster%20Man_xx.pdf 42 Australian Government, op. cit., p. 17. 43 Y. Ayobi, et al, op cit, p. 6. 244
! structures during a disaster response. This knowledge can then be provided at short- notice to deploying personnel as part of cultural awareness briefings and packages.
Interviews with DFAT personnel conducted for this research identify that DFAT is organisationally building this knowledge, specifically through the placement of Australia Assists personnel in NDMOs within the region.44 As noted in Chapter One, the Australia Assists program is the Australian Government's humanitarian civilian deployment program where technical specialists are embedded within foreign governments, United Nations agencies, national and international NGOs and the private sector to assist them to prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters and conflict.45 More broadly, extant Australian diplomatic regional relationships, training and exchange officer arrangements were identified to be working effectively in enabling relationships and formalising coordination mechanisms.46
Private sector actors are increasingly becoming involved in disaster response based on corporate social responsibility and economic interests. This raises a number of consideration for civilian and military actors, including how private sector actors integrate into coordination mechanisms to ensure oversight and management of the capabilities, resources and aid they provide, including delivery of in-kind donations using military assets. A key example of this is in the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda, the biggest fast food chain in the country, Jollibee, provided in-kind donations of 600 sacks of rice, ready to eat meals and other Jollibee products that required delivery to survivors and volunteers.47 Another consideration is the purchasing of goods from local suppliers, such as roofing nails in Fiji, which may cause a rise in prices and limit availability for the local population. The makes knowledge of the private sector, even a generic understanding of larger actors like DHL Disaster Response Teams, important.
The ADF maintains a level of knowledge, both on the Indo-Pacific region and working with other response stakeholders in nation-specific 'pre-deployment' and broader
44 DFAT interviews with author and DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 7. 45 RedR, ‘Australia Assists.’ No date, viewed on 27 December 2019, https://www.redr.org.au/partners-in- the-field/australia-assists/ 46 DFAT-Defence Lessons Workshop, op. cit., p. 7. 47 E. Umbao, ‘Jollibee Donates P30 Million to Typhoon Yolanda Victims.’ Philippines News, 13 November 2013, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://philnews.ph/2013/11/13/jollibee-donates-p30- million-to-typhoon-yolanda-victims/ 245
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'operational' handbooks, for example 'Pre-deployment Handbook: Solomon Islands'48 and 'Operational Handbook: Working Amongst Different Cultures.'49 Pre-deployment handbooks provide an outline on the mission, history, geography, culture, and language aspects pertinent to an area of operation. Operational handbooks provide generic details of the Cluster system but doesn't reflect nation-specific coordination details, which can be found in civilian publications, such as ACMC's 'Civil-Military-Police Coordination in Disaster Management: Perspectives from South East Asian Countries.' This publication provides considerations for practitioners on civil-military-police coordination, including roles and responsibilities of relevant actors and a summary of disaster response information.50
While it is clear that Australian civilian and military actors are undertaking a broad range of regional engagement activities and maintaining knowledge of the region, with these activities outlined above, no evidence emerged during the research conducted for this project of a consolidated or aligned Australian approach to regional engagement that enables the systematic capture of knowledge between civilian and military actors to build regional partnerships. A defined and aligned Australian approach to build regional partnerships would enable disaster preparedness and response because it would specify and capture the knowledge required to enhance assistance support regional partners when required.
7.4.2 Step 2.2: Education, Training and Exercising Within an Australian response, developing personnel to effectively respond to a natural disaster covers three broad areas - education, training and exercising. These areas cover formal education, individual and collective training conducted internally by stakeholders or integrated with other response stakeholders, and exercising or simulation.51 More specifically, education includes opportunities to learn concepts, frameworks and guidelines, and engaging in professional development to strengthen knowledge and learn when to apply concepts.52 Training includes the individual training continuum, including
48 Provided to author, not publicly available. 49 Provided to author, not publicly available. 50 G. Martinez, op. cit. p. 25. 51 H. Fischer, Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction and Its Perpetuation The Sociology of Disaster, (3rd ed) University Press of America, 2008, p. 147. 52 ibid 246
! specialist training to conduct CIMIC roles. Lastly, exercises are considered activities with specified training objectives consistent with strategic, military and operational requirements. These objectives often include interoperability, command and control, and, for militaries, are focused on responding to an adversary.
The importance of these activities was highlighted by Australian Major General Stuart Smith during a 2015 RUSI Queensland Blamey Oration, in which he stated that mission effectiveness during Operation Philippines Assist was improved through a program of international engagement as well as command post and field training exercises prior to the response. 53 These activities were observed to have established a cohort of staff officers who had existing working relationship with counterparts in DFAT, Department of Border Protection and Customs, as well as the Philippines Armed Forces, Marine Forces Pacific and Japanese Ground Self Defence Forces.54 For example, the JTF Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Rod Lang was quoted as saying
"The United States military response to the disaster was led by the commander of the 3rd U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade. I had worked with him that year on exercise Talisman Sabre. So, I was able to liaise with him directly and confirm our concept for Australian military support quickly."55
This practitioner experience is reflected in the case studies and broader literature, which indicates that integrated training, education and exercises between civilian and military actors establish connections and commence relationship building. In turn, this fosters trust and respect, bridges cultural gaps, and supports clear division of roles and responsibilities, and enables information flow. 56 Most critically, because of the variances in operational environments, these activities "nurture the necessary skills to improvise appropriately and quickly."57
53 Major General Stuart Smith, DSC, AM, ‘Lessons Learned by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters.’ 2015 RUSI QLD Blamey Oration, p. 4. 54 ibid 55 ibid 56 J. Jenny, ‘Civil-military cooperation in complex emergencies: Finding ways to make it work.’ European Security, vol. 10, 2007, p. 31. 57 C. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 40. 247
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The question remains as to how to achieve these outcomes through preparation activities, which the case studies reflect is through integrated education, training and exercising that focuses on developing civil-military relationships at all levels. However, a specific exercise was not identified in the case studies or publicly available literature that enables a JTF to form and respond to an overseas natural disaster. Large exercises, such as Exercise Sea Series, was found to incorporate humanitarian assistance scenarios, however it was of a non-combatant evacuation which contain elements relevant to disaster relief but are not specific to disaster response operations. This is an identified gap in Australia's preparation for disaster response, especially given the outcomes of the Cyclone Pam response, which identified the need for a more effective civil-military organisational response model.
To build knowledge of humanitarian actors, the ADF would benefit from a dedicated training, education, and exercising opportunity with the UN and NGOs, especially covering the coordination mechanisms such as the cluster system and HuMOCC. A lack of understanding between actors can cause miscommunication and hamper interaction because there are recognised differences in humanitarian and military planning approaches, language, and knowledge of military capability. Opportunities to enhance knowledge of military assets, planning, decision-making, and coordination processes should be realised through the delivery of a pre-prepared ‘military assets and capability’ education program, to inform civilian stakeholders about military capabilities. This should, for example, include a session on load prioritisation.
Developing the capacity of other nations, particularly those at risk of natural disasters, is an important component of localisation. Previous approaches to developing local capacity has been assessed as "broadly ineffective ... past lessons are not being reflected in capacity development practice."58 However, data collected from interviews with NDMO and ADF officials in Suva, Fiji reflects that this is situation has changed, with bilateral exercises, specifically Exercise Longreach, resulting in in effective civil- military response practice.59
58 Y. Ayobi, et al, op. cit., p. 6. 59 Interviews with author, Suva, Fiji, August 2019. 248
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In 2017, the focus of Exercise Longreach 2017 a National Tsunami Response Plan and Drill for Fiji.60 The exercise was NDMO-led and saw civilian and military participants collaboratively develop a Tsunami Response Plan, with the intent to practice the Plan during a National Tsunami Drill, update it as required, and submit for Cabinet approval.61 This approach to planning supports an effective response because it brings together all stakeholders, recognises the risk of specific hazards to manage community perceptions of likelihood,62 and puts in place an activity that rehearses and tests the plan. The Fijian NDMO aim to update its Tsunami Response Plan following the national drill and then holding the drill as an annual event63 reflects planning as a continuous process, which means it has a greater chance of being effective.64 This process of "creating the written document serves to function as an on-going education or training process for those involved in the planning ... Continuous planning results in reducing the unknown. It increases the likelihood of anticipating problems and developing solutions."65 As Exercise Longreach enabled, a plan was developed based on a realistic and anticipated disaster while also being flexible enough to consider the unanticipated.66
Outside of Exercise Longreach, exercising or rehearsing national disaster response plans, was identified as a gap in efforts that needed to be addressed. This is because existing training was not allowing participants to simulate a response environment to gain an understanding of the complexities that arise, nor did it allow participants to learn from their actions to develop best practice or improve for actual responses.67 Additional development gaps identified included the short-term and fragmented nature of training, which manifests in local actors not being given responsibility or opportunity to practice their skills during a response and means "when a disaster happens they [external humanitarian actors] turn up and take over the show."68
60 National Disaster Management Office, Suva 'National Tsunami Response Plan & Drill' Briefing for Exercise Longreach - 14 September 2017. Provided during NDMO interview during Fiji Fieldwork - 21 August 2019 61 Ibid 62 H. Fischer, op. cit., p. 157. 63 National Disaster Management Office, op. cit. 64 H. Fischer, op. cit., p. 157. 65 ibid 66 ibid 67 NDMO, interview with author, August 2019. 68 Y. Ayobi, et al, op. cit., p.6. 249
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In summary, education, training and exercising is a critical step in preparedness to enable civil-military interaction during a disaster response. Chapter Six reflects that ADF individual training is largely sufficient to effectively conduct civil-military interaction, with specialist training enhancing existing skills rather than being an essential requirement. Instead, opportunities lie in integrated training, both within an Australian government response and with external civilian stakeholders as well as relevant personnel from nations at risk of natural disaster. Effective preparation links education, training and exercising to maximise the benefits of these activities, which as noted is essential to build trust and knowledge of respective civilian and military capacity.
7.4.3 Step 2.3: Capacity and Timelines of Military Assets The SIPRI Report on The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response identified that being aware of the efficiency and timeliness of foreign military capability influences effectiveness and integration within broader coordination efforts.69 Efficiency refers to the way assets are used to achieve their assigned mission and also how they are used as part of the broader response effort. Timeliness is considered to be the main factor that affects the effectiveness use of military assets and it is the period of time it takes for assets to arrive and become operational.70 However, the case studies and broader literature reflect that there is a need to build knowledge of the capacity and timelines of military assets.
The Headquarters Joint Force New Zealand HADR Lessons Learning Synopsis details this issue, stating that the "immediate problem we face here is that the OGA [Other Government Agencies] planners are never the same people and they have no appreciation of military capability."71 Specific issues that arose during civilian and military actors during the Cyclone Pam response were decision making on the types of assets deployed and appropriateness to the environment, and priorisation of loads. Some NGOs lacked an understanding about military asset capabilities, including key military logistical terms
69 S. Wiharta et al, op. cit., p. xii. 70 ibid, p. xii and 31. 71 Headquarters Joint Force New Zealand, ‘HADR Lessons Learned Synopsis.’ J8 (Continuous Improvement), no date. Provided to author – not publicly available. 250
! such as ‘pallets,’ which made if challenging for ADF members to arrange and prioritise loads.72
This identifies an opportunity in the disaster preparedness phase for civilian actors to gain a better understanding of the capacity and timelines of military assets, with one of the key ways to build this knowledge being ‘load lists.’ Load lists were found to be a critical enabler of effective civil-military interaction at the tactical level. They are documents that detail the composition and weight of loads (e.g. vehicles, field hospitals and equipment) that can be carried on air and sea lift assets. Load lists were identified to be critical documentation because disaster response loads often consist of a breadth of personnel, equipment, assets (e.g. helicopters) and aid. Detailed lists enable responders to translate strategic requirements into load prioritisation and delivery. Competing priorities for the deployment of personnel and equipment versus humanitarian aid on military assets can become a significant friction point at the tactical level between stakeholders and load lists contribute to mitigating these pressures.
The ADF provides airlift transport for other agencies, including Urban Search and Rescue Teams, Australian Federal Police, Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT) and Non-government Organisations (NGOs). Reciprocal understanding between stakeholders of agency loads, both in terms of configuration and movement, is critical to ensure equipment, capabilities and personnel are transported in a timely and prioritised manner that reduces friction between stakeholders. When air assets are deployed to assist other agencies before loads are known, there is potential for aircraft and crews to wait for loads or to have to re-prioritise and reconfigure loads because the load was not as expected. Alternatively, aircraft may not be easily unloaded at the receiving end because of a mismatch with affected nation services and material handling equipment (e.g. forklifts) due to inadequate understanding of other agency loads. Agency load lists that have been shared, practiced and rehearsed, ensure a clear understanding of the labelling, packaging and prioritising of loads among civilian and military actors.
72 Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘Post Tropical Cyclone Pam Roundtable with Civil Society.’ Quick Impact Workshop Outcomes, Australian Government, p.4, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://acmc.gov.au/resources/publications/quick-impact-workshop-outcomes-post-tropical-cyclone- pam-roundtable-civil 251
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In it especially critical that humanitarian organisations have an understanding of requirements for transport on military assets, with it identified that they do not place importance on labelling and packaging functions, which were found to be critical elements for the efficient delivery of aid on military assets. 73 Any knowledge sharing activity between civilian and military actors would need to provide civilian actors with clarity on military planning and conduct where personnel plan and conduct to achieve an “effect” rather than provide an asset for task. 74 For example moving a load of 50kg from location A to location B versus requesting the use of a helicopter.
The need for disaster response load lists was specifically identified during Operation Fiji Assist, which was the first operational deployment of a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), HMAS Canberra. HMAS Canberra had been exercised as part of ADF Exercise Sea Series, however there were no load lists to enable operational decision-making on the configuration of vehicles and equipment on the LHD.75 This meant that Commander Amphibious Task Group (incoming JTF Commander) had to decide what to load onto the LHD on the Brisbane wharf after the assets had arrived 2 Combat Engineer Regiment from Gallipoli Barracks.
Overall, there is opportunity for a greater level of awareness and predictability of military support that may be provided to an affected nation. While this is an identified issue being remediated by FRANZ countries, who are preparing a list of capabilities in an unclassified document that could be made available to all Pacific countries, no further details were located on this action.76 UN OCHA maintained a Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities until 2010, however the “evolution of alternative data bases, combined with bilateral relations, regional mechanisms and appeals to source accurate and timely emergency assistance information … the Central Register have not reached potential users as originally intended.”77 As reflected in current need and
73 J. Bealt, et al., ‘Collaborative relationships between logistics service providers and humanitarian organizations during disaster relief operations.’ Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, vol. 16, no. 2, 2006. 74 Helicopter Operations Officer and ACCE Commander, interviews with author, 2018. 75 JTF Commander, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 76 Regional Consultative Group Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for the Asia and the Pacific, ‘Third Session: Summary Report.’ 2017, p. 14, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rcg3_summary_report_final.pdf 77 United Nations, ‘Interoffice Memorandum: OCHA Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities.’ 23 July 2010, viewed on 30 December 2019, 252
! historical practice, greater knowledge sharing between civilian and military actors is required on the capacity and timelines of military assets likely to support affected nations.
7.4.4 Step 2.4: Knowledge Management Organisational learning by both civilian and military actors within an Australian response occurred in all three case studies, however there was inconsistency in both whole-of- government learning, and broader civil-military learning where Australian government agencies, humanitarians, and academics have the opportunity to come together and learn in collaborative manner after a response. This is not unique to Australia, with David Polatty, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College in the Humanitarian Response Program, noting that:
“Militaries typically do a very thorough job analyzing their responses to natural disasters and publishing detailed lessons observed. Most humanitarian organizations do the same. What we haven’t seen often enough, though, is a cross-functional approach where academics, humanitarians, and militaries come together to make an effort to comprehensively examine civil-military engagement and attempt to measure its effectiveness with respect to positive and negative impacts on the affected state and its population.” 78
The positive impact of knowledge and experience on civil-military interaction emerged from the case studies and literature review, as detailed in Chapter Six. The need to build knowledge through regional engagement, education, training and exercises, and load lists was detailed in sub-steps 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. Following on from these steps, this sub-step focuses on ensuring the knowledge built and documents used during these activities are effectively captured in organisational memory for access and use by others working in disaster management. Knowledge management contributes to effective civil- military interaction by establishing an information sharing network and ensuring organisational knowledge is included in planning the response. It is also a key
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/Central_Register_of_Disaster_Management_ Capacities_MRM.pdf 78 V. Bollettino, ‘Evaluating Military Engagement in Disaster Response.’ Reliefweb, 29 August 2016, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/evaluating-military-engagement-disaster- response 253
! determinant of adaptive capacity because it enables individuals to apply knowledge to a situation in an agile manner.79
The practice of knowledge management was outlined in Chapter Six, with it becoming clear that capturing experience and storing it in organisational memory (systems, publications, practices and behaviours) enables stakeholders to enhance operational outcomes, improve efficiency and effectiveness of its practices, implement best practice, and capture knowledge to inform subsequent activities. A flow-on effect of a systematic lessons-learned approach is that personnel will have time built into an activity to seek out lessons material and "read it, understand it, reflect on it and incorporate it into their thinking"80 prior to the conduct of an activity. My analysis of the case studies showed the practice of accessing and applying knowledge was ad hoc. For example, at time of writing there is still no "consolidated analysis of lessons from Fiji from Joint Operations Command"81 to inform future operational actions and activities.
This means that Australia, through respective stakeholders, needs to have in place an effective means to manage knowledge gained from strategic, operational and tactical regional engagement and disaster response. Chapter Six identified inconsistencies in post-operational learning and a disconnect between military and civilian publications that needs to be addressed to ensure response stakeholders learn from collective civil-military experience.
The ‘management’ of whole of government lessons on civil-military-police coordination in natural disasters overseas, with a focus on inter-agency level of decision making and coordination, is the remit of the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) as per their website.82 However, one of the lessons identified from Australia’s Whole-of- Government mission in Afghanistan was that despite the existence of ACMC, “no single organisation is the custodian of developing, storing and disseminating whole-of-
79 A. Gero, et al., Disaster response and climate change in the Pacific: Understanding the Pacific’s adaptive capacity to emergencies in the context of climate change, National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, 2013, p. 24, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files_publications/Gero_2013_Disaster_response_ climate_change_Pacific.pdf 80 ADF member, personal communication with author, 2018. 81 ADF member, personal communication with author, 2019. 82Australian Civil-Military Centre, ‘What we do: Delivering knowledge-driven, joined-up capability.’ No date, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.acmc.gov.au/what-we-do 254
! government lessons.”83 Instead ACMC has been providing this capability on a case-by- case basis, leading to the recommendation that it should be given responsibility for maintaining a whole-of-government lessons capability.84
In terms of organisational learning, a number of reoccurring issues were identified that reflect learning outcomes from the Cyclone Pam response do not appear to have been implemented or tracked to inform future operations. The most notable issue was the establishment of a JTF, with the same uncertainty surrounding the establishment of an ADF command element being identified from responses to Cyclone Pam and Cyclone Winston. There was evidence of DFAT organisational learning, with the evaluation of Australia’s response to Cyclone Pam finding that specific lessons were incorporated into the response to Cyclone Winston. In general, within an Australian response “everyone does lessons learnt, but there is no whole-of-government”85 approach or process.
As a result, whole-of-government and cross-functional knowledge management needs to be strengthened by individual agencies and ACMC to enhance Australian responses to overseas national disasters. This includes having an accountable and transparent means of assigning learnings for remediation and making civil-military learning available to deploying commanders. This was emphasised by Commander JTF during Operation Fiji Assist who stated that "we had nothing" at the commencement of the operation.86 This can only be addressed by stakeholders having a learning culture, process and system that enables individuals to transfer their tacit knowledge into organisational memory, and for individuals to have access to relevant aspects of this memory. Having a dedicated lesson collection process in place, prior to the conduct of an exercise or operation, requires individuals to share their experiences and documents throughout an activity. This systematic practice should replace ad hoc lessons collection, or appending a system of identifying lessons as an afterthought, which was the practice during Operation Philippines Assist.
83 Australian Civil-Military Centre, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government Mission, Australian Government, November 2017, p. 49. 84 ibid!! 85 DFAT, interview with author, 26 September 2019 and Australian Civil-Military Centre, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government Mission, op. cit., p. 49 86 Commander JTF, interview with author, 05 July 2018. 255
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7.5 Step 3: Align and Practice Governance Structures Communication and relationships between civilian and military actors are enabled by governance structures, including the coordination mechanisms which were introduced in Chapter One. The value of these structures were confirmed in Chapter Six, reflecting the benefits of governance that is credible, consistent and inclusive because it leads to accountability and predictability. To recap, governance is defined within this project as the responsibilities, practices, policies and procedures between stakeholders to enable collaborative action based on strategic direction while ensuring objectives are achieved, risk is managed, and resources are used in an accountable and responsible manner.
In two case studies – the Philippines and Vanuatu – coordination structures were initiated as part of the Australian response because a process, such as the cluster system, was not in place on arrival. More broadly, all three case studies and extant literature reflect that a myriad of mechanisms exist across all levels of a response, with varying hierarchical and networked characteristics. This makes it very clear that robust and known governance arrangements are critical to effective civil-military interaction. Without them, interaction is impacted, especially when actors are not familiar with key guiding documents such as the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civilian Assets in Disaster Relief (known as the "Oslo Guidelines"). To enable broader understanding, civilian and military actors should invest in aligning and practicing their respective governance structures, specifically doctrine, operating procedures, especially for critical activities such as needs assessments and requests for assistance.
Activities associated with this step would build understanding of the differences in civilian and military policy, practice and procedures, and provides a means for civilian and military actors to apply culturally and nationally appropriate frameworks during a response. Such an activity is particularly important, noting that in "the current humanitarian ecosystem, local and national actors must comply with polices and standards that do not necessarily make the most sense in context and are sometimes seen as counter-intuitive or counterproductive."87
87 Y. Ayobi, et al, op. cit., p. 7. 256
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Rebecca Barber argues that knowledge needs to flow both ways to align governance structures – every government in the Pacific should be encouraged to produce a guide for international actors on their national laws, policies and institutions. This guide should be the starting point for a response, with external actors reviewing and aligning their systems to fit the specified national institutions, structures, procedures and practices. As necessary, this information should be included in response briefing material for UNs, NGOs, and foreign governments. This governance process must be done cognisant of situations where national governments are either unable or unwilling to lead and international leadership is required.88 The alignment and practicing of governance structures may also bring policy and practice closer together in disaster response, which was a gap identified in the case studies.
7.5.1 Step 3.1: Cross-referencing Governance Documentation, Structures and Practices One of the key findings from Chapter Six is that civilian and military actors have largely developed documentation, structures and practices to inform how they conduct civil- military interaction in isolation from each other. This is evidenced by a duplication between the ADF doctrinal concept of a CMOC and humanitarian practice to implement the cluster system. While it is stated in Army Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) that it is "rare that the military would establish a CMOC"89 (because the coordination of such agencies is usually undertaken by the affected nation or the UN), a CMOC was nonetheless established in two of the case studies - Vanuatu and Fiji. In contrast to the cluster system, one of the challenges identified with the establishment of a CMOC is that its location outside of a main military headquarters reduces attendance by senior commanders who have the ability to “decide rather than influence priorities.,”90 as was the case during operations in East Timor during INTERFET.
88 R. Barber, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Tailoring the International Response to the National Need Following Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam, CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, June 2015, p.18, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Reflections%20on%20Cyclone%20Pam_WHS%2 0Report.pdf 89 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.11 op. cit., 4-7 and Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6: Civil-Military Cooperation, 2017, p. 60-61, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/lwd_3-8-6_civil- military_cooperation_interim.pdf?acsf_files_redirect 90 S. Gordon, ‘Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).’ Journal of Humanitarian Aid, 2001, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.jha.ac/a068/ 257
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To ensure the comparative advantage of civilian and military actors within national coordination systems, DFAT, ADF, humanitarian actors and regional NDMOs should undertake a dedicated activity to cross-reference key documentation they use during a disaster response. This process should include identifying points of similarity and difference in operational frameworks, guidelines, doctrine, operating procedures, battle rhythms, needs assessments and requests for military assistance. The activity will result in greater alignment of national response frameworks and applicable civil-military interaction principles and concepts. At a minimum, such an activity will share information on civilian and military response capabilities and practices. This includes informing actors of the processes required to request use of military assets, and to understand suitability, timelines and interoperability of these assets within the context of broader response efforts. It will also share knowledge of current practices, such as Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disaster and relevant updates to Multi-National Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOPs).
As noted above, a critical component of governance to support natural disaster response are the coordination mechanisms that are activated. It was identified from the case studies that varying approaches to civil-military interaction exist, all of which "promote a separate response."91 Under the concept of an On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), which was originally developed by UN OCHA and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, civilian actors are coordinated. UN OCHA also supports the use of a Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) which provides a mechanism for civilian coordination of military actors. However, the HuMOCC concept did not emerge in any of the case studies and is appears to be replaced with military-military coordination mechanisms, such as Multinational Coordination Centres (MNCC). As noted in Chapter One, an MNCC facilitates military-military coordination under the overall direction of the military of the affected nation prior to and after a civilian-military interface. The cluster system and CMOC concept is added to this mix, and in all three case studies, a duplication of coordination mechanisms occurred.
91 D. Canyon, ‘A Collaborative Future for Civil-Military Relations in HADR’ in Disaster Response Regional Architectures Assessing Future Possibilities, J. Ear, A. Cook & D. Canyon (eds), Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, September 2017, p. 64. 258
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Of importance for an Australian response, is knowledge of the coordination mechanisms that will be established and how civilian and military actors integrate into these structures in a timely and effective manner, including attending meetings and engaging with key leaders and decision-makers. Clarity for military personnel on who is responsible to manage coordination processes, such as the clusters, is also required, with current military doctrine reflecting UN OCHA being responsible for clusters, however many nations have government-led clusters, with co-leads being from humanitarian agencies. 92
Another civil-military interface that requires cross-referencing and alignment is the battle rhythms and decision-making schedules between NDMOs and JTFs, which were identified as being different in Fiji. Differences in the timing of decision-makings was observed to hamper information flow between NDMO and JTF 635, in-turn creating friction and delaying decision making on requests for ADF assistance. This interaction is part of discussions at a policy level, where civilian agencies can work to inform military doctrine and practices. Drawing from experience from the United Kingdom, British Armed Forces doctrine publication was renamed from humanitarian relief operations to Disaster Relief Operations based on consultation with civilian agencies to reflect the need to respect humanitarian principles, including the use of language surrounding the principles.93
In terms of humanitarian practice, this step will enable nations to consider the applicability of current global policies and standards. This may necessitate adaptation of existing tools, such as the Sphere Handbook and Core Humanitarian Standards, to match local and national processes and ensure they are locally and culturally appropriate.94 In summary, cross-referencing governance structures will enable stakeholders to understand the breadth and depth of existing mechanism and enable them to understand how each can be adapted to response needs. It would also address the current lack of alignment between international, regional and national approaches to civil-military
92 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6: Civil-Military Cooperation, 2017, p. 60, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/lwd_3-8-6_civil- military_cooperation_interim.pdf?acsf_files_redirect 93 C. Hofmann & L. Hudson, ‘Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or inevitable trend?’ in Humanitarian Exchange. October 2009, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://odihpn.org/magazine/military-responses-to-natural-disasters-last-resort-or-inevitable-trend/ 94 Y. Ayobi, et al, op. cit., p. 7. 259
! coordination.95 Effort in this direction was identified from the Regional Consultative Group Third Session on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific with the inclusion of 'Coordination Architecture in Disaster Response' Panel that raised awareness of coordination platforms that can be activated during a response.96
In addition to building knowledge to enable comparative advantage and maintain distinct roles between actors during a response, aligned governance ensures the effective and optimised use of resources within endorsed policies and agreed objectives. The key outcomes of good governance practices are: •! Performance: provision of an agreed and tailored capability to an Affected nation •! Compliance: meet legal, standards and expectations of probity, accountability and transparency •! Reduced duplication: removal of mechanisms that duplicate effort or replace national structures •! Efficiency: ensure the best use of resource against objectives, mission and strategy •! Language: understanding of lexicon and terminology differences between actors.
7.5.2 Step 3.2: Practice and Rehearse Structures Once stakeholders have cross-referenced their documentation, the following sub-step is practicing and rehearsing these structures to enable stakeholders to adopt the most applicable approach during a response, based on situation and context. This step is reinforced, firstly, by theoretical concepts of organisational design which reflect that different structures and coordination mechanisms facilitate different functions.97 Secondly, by many international frameworks, guidelines and operating procedures not having been operationalised or evaluated after use in the field. 98 Finally, the ad hoc establishment of coordination mechanisms by Australian actors in the Philippines and Vanuatu due to observed gap on arrival.
95 G. Martinez, op. cit., p. 5. 96 Regional Consultative Group Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for the Asia and the Pacific, op. cit., p. 7. 97 B. Nowell, et al, ‘The Structure of Effective Governance of Disaster Response Networks: Insights From the Field.’ American Review of Public Administration, vol. 48, iss. 7, September 2017, p. 700. 98 V. Metcalfe, S. Haysom & S. Gordon, Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination: A review of the literature, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2012, p. 29. 260
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To enable disaster preparedness, actors and their relevant capabilities (e.g. teams and structures) should conduct regular and collective rehearsal and simulation to build a rich understanding of the needs of respective stakeholders. By conducting rehearsals, actors are able to fully test the timeliness and accuracy of critical practices including early warning systems which provide critical to saving lives in Vanuatu.
7.6 Step 4: Mutual Understanding Mutual understanding was determined to be the necessary output from civilian and military actors preparing to conduct disaster response. It lays the foundation for flexible leadership and an agile disaster response because actors have an understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities and comparative advantage. As such, relationships are built on trust and knowledge. This step of the model is considered a cultural output because it covers organisational approaches to relationship building, leadership and pursuit of a mission. Similarly, the sub-steps within Step 4 are considered outputs, with shared experience & mental models, relationships and understanding of comparative advantage considered the outputs of Steps 1 – 3 of the model.
Mr. Chan Yeng Kit, Singapore's Permanent Secretary (Defence) articulated it well to the Regional Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in 2017:
“Effective disaster response ultimately relies on the effective coordination and cooperation among the various humanitarian organizations in theatre. Mutual trust and interoperability form the foundation for this, but it cannot be built overnight. Militaries and civil agencies have to build stronger ties and come together more frequently for exchanges and exercises to strengthen our multilateral responses to disasters.”99
99 Regional Consultative Group Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for the Asia and the Pacific, op. cit., p. 3.! 261
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7.6.1 Step 4.1: Shared Experience & Mental Models In undertaking preparedness steps, response stakeholders build shared experience and mental models. Mental models are defined by Marsick and Watkins as the "deeply held cognitive, value-based, feeling-fraught frameworks people use to interpret situations they encounter" 100 Shared mental models enable effective interaction between civilian and military actors, especially when they are dispersed, by ensuring consistent understanding of the situation, in turn supporting them to conduct tasks consistent with priorities of an affect nation.101 In addition to assisting understanding, mental models also influence how individuals take action. Experience and education inform the development of mental models, which further reinforces the importance of collective education, training and exercises for civilian and military actors involved in disaster response.102
7.6.2 Step 4.2: Relationships The purpose of civil-military interaction in disaster preparedness is to actively build and encourage trust between actors, which leads to effective relationships and cooperation.103 The response to Cyclone Winston reflected that relationships developed prior to a response are foundational to effective civil-military interaction. In recounting the response to Cyclone Winston, Rear Admiral Naupoto spoke of the three phone calls he received in the aftermath - the first from (then) Chief of the ADF, the second from (then) Chief of the New Zealand Defence Force and the third from US Pacific Command.104 His personal connections and trust with regional militaries meant that nations had a direct line to offer assistance, noting that the load of dealing with the response was lessened because he knew he "had friends in the region willing to help."105
100 V. Marsick & K. Watkins, ‘The Learning Organization: An Integrative Vision for HRD.’ Human Resource Development Quarterly, vol. 5, iss. 4, Winter 1994, p. 356. 101 S. Connaughton, M. Shuffler, and G. Goodwin, ‘Leading Distributed Teams: The Communicative Constitution of Leadership. Military Psychology, vol. 23, 2011, p. 510. 101 M. Meuthal & M. Hoegl, op. cit., p. 328. 102 Major J. Byerly, ‘Using ‘Mental Models’ to Outthink the Enemy.’ September 2016, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2016/08/19/using-mental-models-to-outthink-the- enemy/ 103 See M. Stephenson, ‘Making humanitarian relief networks more effective: Operational coordination, trust and sense making.’ Disasters, vol. 29, no. 4, December 2005, p. 337-350. 104 The person who contacted Rear Admiral Naupoto from US Pacific Command was not specified in the speech. 105 South West Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces Meeting 2019, attendance by author, Suva, Fiji, August 2019. 262
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Trust between actors in this manner is considered to the foundation of collaborative behaviours,106 which is also connected to organisation learning with “level of mutual benefit in relationships depends on the flexibility to adapt and learn from each other.”107 Conversely, a lack of trust can cause poor coordination, which in-turn inhibits communication, information flow, situational awareness, and has the potential to lead to inefficiency.
Scholar Max Stephenson108 identifies four types of inter-organisational trust that are useful for civil-military relationships: •! Trust based on judgement of good will •! Trust based on the perceived ability of others to carry out tasks or 'get the job done' •! Trust based on whether behaviour is consistent with contractual agreements •! Trust based on expediency based on the need to accomplish tasks and goals quickly
The cultural context of establishing and maintaining effective relationships also need to be understood. In the Pacific, it is recognised that relationships, more than understanding, ensures the endorsement and adherence to coordinating mechanisms.109 As such, coordination practices are directly related to the establishment and maintenance of effective relationships.110 Relationships are especially critical in the Pacific region, where “it is recognized that in the Pacific, understanding does not always equate to endorsement or compliance. This is a complex issue related to Pacific culture, and permeates decision- making and Pacific governance structures more generally.”111
7.6.3 Step 4.3: Understand Comparative Advantage The term ‘comparative advantage’ is drawn from marketing theory and practice, where it refers to situations “when a country produces a good or service for a lower opportunity
106 D. Saab, et al, ‘Inter-organizational Coordination in the Wild: Trust Building and Collaboration Among Field-Level ICT Workers in Humanitarian Relief Organizations.’ voluntas (International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations), vol. 20, iss.1, March 2009, p. 204. 107 J. Bealt, et al., op. cit., p. 129. 108 M. Stephenson, ‘Making humanitarian relief networks more effective: Operational coordination, trust and sense making.’ Disasters, vol. 29, no. 4, December 2005, p. 337-350. 109 K. Winterford & A. Gero, ‘Humanitarian response for development: lessons from Tropical Cyclone Winston.’ International Institute for Environmental Development Briefing, June 2018, p.25, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17472IIED.pdf 110 A. Gero, et al., ‘Disasters and climate change in the Pacific: adaptive capacity of humanitarian response organizations.’ Climate and Development, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 42. 111 ibid, p. 41. 263
! cost than other countries.”112 Opportunity cost reflects a measured ‘trade-off’ where countries have determined that the benefits of buying a good or service outweighs any disadvantages.113 Transferring this concept to civil-military interaction, actors are considered to have a ‘comparative advantage’ when they provide a good or service with a lower cost or resource impost.114 In essence, it recognises that civilian and military actors have unique expertise and niche capabilities, and advocates, firstly for these advantages to be known and secondly, for this knowledge to inform decision-making during a response to ensure resources are efficiently used.
The final civil-military interaction sub-step in disaster preparedness is civilian and military actors having an understanding of comparative advantage prior to a disaster response. To maximise coordination, this should be captured in national coordination systems, as identified by the National Disaster Management Office in Suva following the response to Cyclone Winston.115 This is an important part of mutual understanding where knowledge should exist on respective actors’ cultural traits, capabilities, resources and likely actions and activities based on operating procedures and organisational mandates.
7.7 Summary A dedicated and resourced period of preparation is considered essential to lay the foundations for effective civil-military interaction during an Australian response to overseas natural disasters. This period commences with actors distilling existing strategic guidance on disaster response and making an organisational commitment to disaster management with the intent to align their actions and activities to support building regional partnerships, knowledge sharing and management, and aligned and practiced governance structures including coordination mechanisms and decision-making. In undertaking these activities and integrating civilian actors external to an Australian response, such as the UN, NGOs and NDMOs, mutual understanding is developed.
112 K. Amadeo, ‘Comparative Advantage Theory and Examples.’ The Balance, 16 December 2019, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.thebalance.com/comparative-advantage-3305915 113 ibid 114 ibid 115 National Disaster Management Office, ‘TC Winston Lessons: Briefing for Australian Long Reach.’ Presentation, Suva, 14 September 2017, slide 5. Provided to author. 264
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Chapter Eight Responding to Natural Disasters
At the core of this project is presenting a process model that reflects sequential and necessary conditions for effective civil-military interaction during an Australian response to overseas natural disasters. The nature of civil-military and military-military relationships that form in the aftermath of disasters was mapped in Chapter Six, with it demonstrated that the ADF interfaces with a range of civilian actors within a whole-of- government Australian response. These actors are largely consistent, being the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT), Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT), and Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USAR). This provides a level of predictability to inform the conditions necessary for effective civil-military interaction. Conversely, as reflected in the case studies, the relationships that the ADF forms with civilian actors external to an Australian response are much more ad hoc, and influenced by national context, the quantity and type of other actors, ADF force structure, and coordination mechanisms in place.
This phase of the model draws on the coordination theory discussed in Chapter Six. To briefly re-cap, coordination theory was used as a means to identify and explain patterns in civil-military interaction during Australian responses to overseas natural disasters. The focus of the theory was on the need to coordinate rather than on an outcome of coordination, which means civil-military interaction relies on inputs, outputs and outcomes, as mapped in the Civil-Military Interaction Logic Model. Also outlined in Chapter Six was the research of Faraj and Sproull, who use terms ‘expertise coordination’ and ‘administrative coordination’ to distinguish between the different forms of coordination necessary for effective civil-military interaction. Expertise coordination is the skills and knowledge that individuals bring to their tasks and refers to managing resources and expertise dependencies, while administrative coordination covers the governance structures required to accomplish tasks.1
1 S. Faraj & L. Sproull, ‘Coordinating Expertise in Software Development Teams.’ Management Science, vol. 46, no. 12, 2000, p. 1559. 265
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In developing a response model aligned to practitioner experience, there is a need to recognise the realities of disaster response – people, including senior decision-makers, can arrive with little or no disaster response training, knowledge or experience. This was reflected in all three case studies, with the Philippines case study specifically reflecting not only does this occur, but also that experience from other situations or operations is not directly transferrable to natural disaster response. This means, despite investing in preparation, civilian and military personnel may respond at short notice without knowledge of response processes, practices and mandates. For these people, they will need access to organisational knowledge, plans and procedures and to have requisite skills and traits to integrate into a response without the benefit of formed relationships and experience.
Furthermore, the situation on arrival will be ambiguous – in Vanuatu, as the case study reflected, national authorities were experiencing challenges with the surge of actors and the varying approaches to coordination. This situation is not unique and can worsen, with a national leadership vacuum occurring in the aftermath of natural disasters in Haiti and Mozambique in 2000, where “the coordination of foreign military assets became the responsibility of the internationals themselves. The UN peacekeeping force, MINUSTAH, and the US military served as lead entities in Haiti, while South Africa served as the lead country for air operations in Mozambique.”2
This makes a prescriptive civil-military interaction model unsuitable based on anticipated variances in ADF interaction with a heterogenous range of civilian actors. Instead, as like the preparation phase, focus in this phase of the model turned to detailing conditions that achieve flexible and adaptable behaviours, structures and actions. Feedback loops have been identified between steps in the preparation phase and the response phase, and these linkages are visually represented and will be discussed in respective steps or sub-steps.
2 S. Wiharta et al, The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008, p. 40. 266
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Capability - Decision 1.1#Localisation STEP 1: COMMIT TO DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Preparation - Process 2.1 Regional#Partnerships# STEP 2: 2.2#Education,#Training#&#Exercises BUILD & MANAGE KNOWLEDGE 2.3#Capacity#and#Timelines#of#Capability 2.4#Knowledge#Management# Governance - Output STEP 3: 3.1#CrossFReference#Governance# ALIGN & PRACTICE 3.2#Practice#and#Rehearse GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Culture - Output 4.1 Shared#Experience#& Mental#Models STEP 4: 4.2#Relationships MUTUAL 4.3#Understand#Comparative#Advantage UNDERSTANDING ! ! Extreme' !! weather' ! event'
Culture- Decision STEP 5: 5.1 Partnerships. PRIMACY OF 5.2.Adaptable.missions AFFECTED NATION
Culture - Decision 6.1 Clear.authority,.roles.and.responsibilities
Expertise STEP 6: AGILE 6.2.Shared.Responsibility. Coordination LEADERSHIP
7.1.Immediate.Response.Teams Capability - Decision 7.2.Information.and.Knowledge.Management
STEP 7: 7.3.CoFlocation. TAILORED 7.4.Dedicated.civilFmilitary.engagement.function RESPONSE 7.5.CivilFMilitary.Teaming. Governance - Process 7.6.Gender.Perspective.and.Participation
Administrative STEP 8: 8.1 Coordination.Mechanisms.&.Procedures Coordination ADHERENCE TO GOVERNANCE 8.2.Support.to.accredited.teams STRUCTURES
Culture - Endpoint
UNITY ! FigureFigure 36: 32:Civil Civil-Military-Military Interaction Interaction Process Process Model Model ! 8.1 Step 5: Primacy of Affected Nation Cooperation with an affected nation and local humanitarian organisations, at all levels of a response, is identified here as the starting point of effective civil-military interaction. Cooperation as a type of civil-military relationship, as introduced in Chapter One, consists of collaborative activities such as joint planning, clear division of roles, and information sharing because civilian and military missions are partially or fully aligned.
267
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Early, ongoing and respectful engagement with an affected nation and local humanitarian organisations enables their decision-makers, national agencies and humanitarian organisations to articulate their needs directly to Australian staff, to either make decisions or pass information back to decision-makers, and inform an Australian response. From the perspective of the ADF, to enable this civilian-military interface, they need to understand and work within an affected nation’s cultural and response context, including civil society. Ideally this knowledge should be gained as part of a dedicated preparation phase.
More broadly, all stakeholders need to work within the context of an affected nation, which respects the primacy of the nation and local organisations, irrespective of limitations and barriers that may arise because of the degree of maturity of an affected nation's coordination structures. Historically, external actors have failed to engage local communities and civil society organisations in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Local actors can be bypassed, ignored or weakened due to cultural, organisational, political and linguistic barriers to their involvement in response efforts.3
Australia’s responses in the all three case studies demonstrated the importance of affected nation and community engagement throughout disaster preparedness and response, with relationships and trust being at the core of effective interaction. Such an approach is also strongly advocated for in anthropological4 literature, which notes there is often limited engagement or a total absence of engagement with local populations. Scholar Siobhan McDonnell notes that “little credence is given … to the knowledge and capacity that might be possessed by people living in villages, for instance indigenous knowledge in relation to disaster management.”5 She illustrates this by the way disasters are responded to with ‘expert-driven solutions’ without clarification of who is an expert, and who, in contrast is the beneficiary of this expertise.6 McDonnell’s argument to have community-
3 E. Ferris, ‘Future directions in civil-military responses to natural disasters.’ Australian Civil-Military Centre, Paper 05/2012, p. 7, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/05-civ-mil-disasters-ferris.pdf 4 See S. McDonnell, ‘Other Dark Sides of Resilience: Politics and Power in Community-Based Efforts to Strengthen Resilience.’ Anthropological Forum, 2019 and C. Wentworth, ‘Unhealthy Aid: Food Security Programming and Disaster Responses to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu.’ Anthropological Forum, 2019. 5 Ibid, p.5.! 6 ibid, p. 6. 268
! based needs considered is strengthened by scholar Chelsea Wentworth who identified a disconnect between government and NGO food assistance in the aftermath of Cyclone Pam and previous healthy food initiatives. Communities received rice, noodles and tin fish - food they considered unhealthy based on public health messages. In this manner, disaster preparedness and response did not account for the health needs of communities.7
This situation is also reflective of how the values of inclusive and grassroots humanitarian action were not enacted during the Cyclone Pam response, instead external agencies brought in ‘disaster experts’ who failed to coordinate with local community members.8 When unsuitable and not considerate of broader development goals, it was found that aid programs can worsen the economic situation of beneficiaries and erode traditional knowledge for disaster response.9 This situation can negatively impact disaster response in the future because they can cause a weakening of local disaster management structures.10 A standardised approach to disaster response that does not account for cultural values and national variations was found to significantly impact the response to Cyclone Pam, highlighting the need for “culturally appropriate responses to natural disaster relief efforts will ultimately be essential … to meet the global challenges ahead.”11
The sub-steps necessary to recognise the primacy of an affect nation are partnership building and flexible missions, which covers the concept of ‘last resort.’ Ideally, a relationship with an affected nation is founded on an existing regional partnership (Step 2.2).
8.1.1 Step 5.1:Partnerships Relationships grounded in trust, mutual understanding and localisation were found to underpin effective civil-military interaction in all three case studies, making formal and informal partnerships a critical part of a response. Formal networks are those based on political, diplomatic, bilateral, and organisational relationships, and are often
7 C. Wentworth, op. cit., p. 14. 8 ibid 9 ibid p. 15. 10 J. Campbell, ‘Development, Global Change and Traditional Food Security in Pacific Island Countries.’ Regional Environmental Change, vol. 15, October 2014. 11 C. Wentworth, op. cit., p. 15. 269
! underpinned by formal governance and arrangements, or memorandums of understanding. Informal networks are considered those which are “self-made amongst its members and occur naturally among people or organizations with mutual interests.”12 These relationships develop from personal relationships and trust, which are a foundational element of disaster response in the Pacific.13 Another way these relationships are built is through deploying Australians with a cultural background or heritage in the affected nation, which has been observed to result in a culturally aware and integrated team that understands national and cultural nuances.14
In all of the case studies analysed here, the ADF was observed to build partnerships within an Australian response and externally with the affected nation, UN, NGO and local communities through dedicated consultation and relationship building. In the case of the Philippines, the ADF was part of an Australian civil-military team that engaged with key community and institutional leaders, such as school principals. This consultation enabled the ADF to gain an understanding of needs directly from affected communities and supported effective prioritisation of needs because information went directly to decision-makers.
Similar relationship-building was identified from ADF activities on Koro Island, Fiji – during interviews conducted as part of fieldwork, community members from three villages reflected that the ADF integrated well into their community, to the extent that they "ate, slept, partied" and "washed the dishes" with them. This resulted in an effective process of community consultation. One local community member from Nausouri Village stated that engaging at the grassroots levels and dealing with communities directly, as the ADF did, ensures that local voices are heard and considered.15 The process the interviewee recommended for future responses is telling, namely:
•! Open up discussion
12 A. Gero, et al., Disaster response and climate change in the Pacific: Understanding the Pacific’s adaptive capacity to emergencies in the context of climate change, National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, 2013, p. 42, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files_publications/Gero_2013_Disaster_response_ climate_change_Pacific.pdf 13 South West Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces Meeting 2019, attendance by author, 14 August 2019. 14 2 RAR Warrant Officer, interview with author, 08 May 2018. 15 Nausouri Village, interview with author, August 2019. 270
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•! Allow the community to raise concerns •! Decide what the community really needs •! Provide assistance directly to communities16
While the term ‘localisation’ was not explicitly used by interviewees during data collection, the ADF was identified to conduct its activities in line with the concept because personnel, at all levels, empowered local decision-making. In the Philippines, an example of this occurring was the interaction conducted between government authorities and the JTF Commander in Manila which resulted in the deployment of the JTF to Ormoc.17 In Vanuatu, the placement of an ADF liaison officer in the NDMO Civil- Military Operations Command ensured the use of ADF assets were fully aligned to tasks prioritised by the NDMO. Similarly, in Fiji the use of ADF liaison officers supported NDMO command and control of the response. In addition, the JTF Commander remaining onboard HMAS Canberra during the response supported the primacy of the Government, NDMO and RFMF.
While some overlap of coordination mechanisms occurred, such as the establishment of CMOCs, in general the ADF integrated into local structures, respected local and national authorities, and complemented humanitarian actors. During all responses, dedicated effort in support of local and national leadership was achieved through Key Leadership Engagement. These efforts contributed to building a shared understanding of the situation between civilian and military actors, which led to community needs being communicated and met in a timely manner.
The importance of consultation with local communities was highlighted through the contrasting activities of some humanitarian organisations who did not fully integrate into local response structures or consult prior to commencing activities. In the Philippines, the international humanitarian community enacted its own L3 structure and worked through this rather than deal with the government structures because they were considered to have “uneven capacities.”18 In Vanuatu, there was a sense of the
16 ibid !! 17 Operation Philippines Assist, Joint Task Force 630 – Post Operation Report, January 2014, p.3. Provided to author – not publicly available. 18 P. Dy & T. Stephens, The Typhoon Haiyan Response: Strengthening Coordination among Philippine Government, Civil Society and International Actors, Program on Crisis Leadership Discussion Paper 271
! humanitarian community "taking away some of the roles/authority of the government."19 Lastly, on Koro Island, Fiji, a local community member interviewed noted that "NGOs did not sit down and discuss what needs to be done"20 on their arrival into communities and as a result, duplicated activities that had already been done by the ADF and other NGOs. While not reflective of overall humanitarian efforts, these examples highlight the need for collaboration with an affected nation at all levels.
Key to building effective partnerships is the selection of competent personnel and defining the roles and responsibilities of respective functions. The former is supported by deploying personnel who have relationships and experience with an affected nation, either through preparedness activities, participation in a Defence Cooperation Program or previous operational experience in the nation. For example, the positive impact of Exercise Longreach for participants deploying during the response to Cyclone Winston was identified during analysis of interview data collected from ADF and Fijian NDMO personne because the exercise established trust and confidence. With regard to roles and responsibilities, this is especially important for liaison officers because their specific roles are unclear at times, which was apparent during the early stages of the Cyclone Pam response where there was no role differentiation between liaison officers and ADF watch keepers.
8.1.2 Step 5.2: Adaptable missions A consistent theme which emerged from the fieldwork conducted in the Philippines, Vanuatu and Fiji was the flexibility of Australian responses at the tactical/field level. This characteristic was identified as key for effective civil-military interaction because it enabled rapid decision making, coordination and adaptation based on the situation on the ground. One of the examples directly underpinning the need for flexibility in military missions to support civil-military engagement came from the Philippines case study, where the RAAF ACCE operated with an agile mission that enabled them to provide support to a range of stakeholders.
Series, March 2016, p. v., viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/research- initiatives/crisisleadership/files/Dy_and_Stephens.pdf 19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia’s Response to Cyclone Pam, Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 25. 20 Nausouri Village, interview with author, August 2019. 272
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At the operational and strategic levels, an Australian response will benefit from a specified strategic mission, framework or action plan tailored to the response, as introduced in Chapter Six and as Step 1 of the model. This will support operational and tactical flexibility because it provides a common sense of purpose and specifies priorities as part of an overall assistance package. This includes alignment of disaster response with broader development goals where appropriate. As such, coherence of civil-military interaction will be improved through the Australian lead agency, DFAT in most cases, articulating an ‘action plan’ that outlines “the overall purpose, strategic priorities, suite of partners and approach of Australia’s assistance.”21
To optimise the flexible use of military assets, affected nation and humanitarian actors should be clearer on how military assets should be used in disaster response. The employment of foreign military assets during disaster response is often framed as ‘last resort,’ as per the Oslo Guidelines:
“military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.”22
The purpose of ‘last resort’ aims to uphold and respect humanitarian principles, ensure actors assist an affected nation in a manner that respects their sovereignty, and maintains a distinction between humanitarian, military, and other governmental actors involved in the response.23 In practice, it means the use of a specific military capability or asset only when civilian assets cannot meet an affected nations’ requirements and needs. However the Guidelines are difficult to apply, with the immediacy of disaster response reducing
21 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 5 22 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, November 2017, p. 4. ! 23 No author, Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters, 18 September 2018, p.2, viewed on 01 January 2020, https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/48574/Recommended+Practices+for+Effective+Hu manitarian+Civil-Military+Coordination+of+Foreign+Military+Assets+in+Natural+and+Man- Made+Disasters/b6c934f0-1dec-42ea-9396-5313e3e2f2d3 273
! time available for humanitarian actors to determine the necessity and appropriateness for using military assets.24
In addition, as identified during the Cyclone Pam and Winston responses, some nations do not have clear or formalised structures on the use of military assets. The Vanuatu Government was noted to be seeking a clearer mandate to ensure military assets are made available as early as possible. The Fijian Government is working to define and include the roles of all Fijian disciplined forces (Republic of Fiji Military Forces, Fiji Police Force, National Fire Authority and Fiji Correction Services) in the National Disaster Management Act.25
Finally in terms of adaptable missions, there is benefit in civilian and military actors using immediate response teams to recognise that an affected nation may not need assistance or assistance beyond an immediate response team. This reflects Australia should be responsive to the needs on the ground, identified through direct engagement with an affected nation. A key example of this occurring was Mercy Corps withdrawing from the response to Cyclone Pam after assessing the situation, providing a statement - “While the storm’s damage was severe, we determined that the immediate response by the government and international partners is comprehensive – the needs of survivors are already being met, so our immediate role in the relief effort is not required.”26
8.2 Step 6: Agile Leadership As reflected throughout this project, natural disaster environments are characterised by uncertainty, despite having a level of predictability based on national capacity to respond and international surge in response. This means civilian and military leaders need to make quick decisions, often with poor or inaccurate information flow and an unclear end
24 C. Hofmann & L. Hudson, ‘Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or inevitable trend?’ in Humanitarian Exchange. October 2009, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://odihpn.org/magazine/military-responses-to-natural-disasters-last-resort-or-inevitable-trend/ 25 National Disaster Management Office, ‘TC Winston Lessons: Briefing for Australian Long Reach.’ Presentation, Suva, 14 September 2017, slide 5. Provided to author. 26 R. Barber, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Tailoring the International Response to the National Need Following Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam, CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, June 2015, p.15, viewed on 02 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Reflections%20on%20Cyclone%20Pam_WHS%2 0Report.pdf 274
! state.27 Furthermore, the nature and quality of leadership, and resulting degree of staff empowerment, was identified in Chapter Six to be critical factor that influences civil- military interaction. As a result, civilian and military leadership needs to be agile during natural disaster response, matching the needs of the affected nation and situation.
Leadership within this project covers the behaviours leaders adopt to lead in their organisation, make decisions, and influence groups and individuals to attain organisational goals.28 Situational leadership theory (SLT) recognises that effective leaders requires a coherent understanding of the situation, task-orientation, and flexibility and adaptability based on the situation and people they are leading. 29 This links to the view of leadership as a process (versus traits or style of a person or organisation) where leaders focus on matters within their remit, and are considerate of both group dynamics and structures when making decisions (relation-orientated behaviours).30
To demonstrate the need for agile leadership, it is important to reflect on the nature of the teams that form during disaster response, with cooperative teamwork found to be connected to effective leadership.31 The Philippines case study reflected that RAAF personnel initiated a process to enable the delivery of aid in the absence of a cluster system on arrival in Cebu. Similarly, in Vanuatu, a DFAT person noted a coordination structure was established in the absence of one. These two examples closely mirror the concept of a ‘self-organised team,’ whereby civilian and military response stakeholders formed into a self-regulated and semi-autonomous team to maximise relief efforts.
In coming together, the teams collectively developed common understanding, with behaviour and actions based on a recognised need for self-organisation, outcome-focused cooperation, with collective knowledge being most useful.32 These types of teams – also
27 Headquarters Joint Force New Zealand, ‘HADR Lessons Learned Synopsis.’ J8 (Continuous Improvement), no date. Provided to author – not publicly available. 28 See G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, Eighth Edition, Pearson, 2013. 29 See J. McCleskey, ‘Situational, Transformational, and Transactional Leadership and Leadership Development.’ Journal of Business Studies Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, 2014, pp. 177 – 130. 30 ibid 31 D. Parker, M. Holesgrove & R. Pathak, ‘Improving productivity with self-organised teams and agile leadership.’ International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, vol. 64, no.1, 2015, p.120. 32 See C. Zarraga & J. Bonache, ‘The impact of team atmosphere on knowledge outcomes in self- managed teams.’ Organization Studies, vol. 26, no. 5, p. 661-681. 275
! called self-directed or self-managed – have been noted to be more effective and improve productivity because they:
• Use effective decision-making strategies; • Implement and evaluate their own solutions and decisions; • Tolerate task-related deviance; • Contain the smallest number of members to achieve its goals; • Are highly cohesive and cooperative; and • Have effective conflict management strategies.33
The effective management of ‘self-organised’ teams, as reflected in Chapter Six, requires ‘agile leadership’ to enable facilitation of activities rather than strict control which was found to be ineffective in disaster response.34 Scholars David Parker, Melanie Holesgrove and Raghhuvar Pathak identify that these teams operate under six agile leadership concepts: guiding vision, teamwork and collaboration, simple rules, open information, a ‘light touch’, and agile oversight.35 When a cluster system was established in the Philippines and Vanuatu, for example, respective cluster agency leads became responsible for coordination, however team members were largely able to determine, plan and manage cluster activities which reflects that the position retained agile leadership characteristics.
Since agile leadership positively influences all levels of civil-military interaction, actors need to make an organisational (internal) and inter-organisational (collaborative) decision to adopt this approach. It is considered a critical step in the process model because it is characterised by essential traits required during a disaster response:
•! an ability to deal with change; •! a view of organisations as fluid, adaptive systems of intelligent people; •! a recognition of the limits of external control in establishing order; and of the role of intelligent control that employs self-organisation;
33 Parker, M. Holesgrove & R. Pathak, op. cit., p.115. 34 ibid, p. 118. 35 ibid, p. 119.! 276
!
•! an overall problem solving approach that is humanistic by regarding people as skilled and valuable stakeholders in the management of a team; •! appreciation of the collective ability of autonomous teams as basic problem solving mechanisms; •! reduced up-front planning based on an assumption of environmental unpredictability, instead emphasising adaptability to changing conditions; •! considered reactions based on emergent outcomes from the self-organised team; and •! managing outcomes to remove obstacles that prevent the team achieving their goals.36
More broadly, agile leadership respects and appreciates the maturity of an affected nation’s coordination structures, and the cultural context. This type of leadership is closely aligned to the concept of “socialization” which was introduced in Chapter Six as "a proactive strategy that allows individuals to modify their behaviour, to adjust to new roles as opposed to the restrictive task or role previously assigned."37 Socialization facilitates civil-military interaction because it enables individuals to adapt to new environments and roles, and to develop a cooperative attitude that utilises available channels – both formal and informal - to find solutions. In following these leadership practices and approaches, civilian and military leaders are able to adapt their decision- making to the dynamic and uncertain environments of disaster response, and provide authentic leadership that empowers and enables subordinates. To sub-steps support the implementation of agile leadership – providing staff with clarity on authority, roles and responsibilities and ensuring ‘shared responsibility.’
8.2.1 Step 6.1: Clear authority, roles and responsibilities A barrier to effective civil-military interaction was identified to be an absence of "role definition, clearly mandated tasks, deployment time frames, understanding organisational cultures, operating procedures”38 because these issues hamper timely
36 ibid, p. 118. 37 R. Pramanik, ‘Challenges in coordination: differences in perception of civil and military organizations by comparing international scientific literature and field experiences.’ Journal of Risk Research, 03 July 2015, p. 9. 38 G. Lloyd & G. van Dyk, ‘The Challenges, Roles and Functions of Civil Military Coordination Officers in Peace Support Operations: A Theoretical Discussion.’ Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, vol. 35, no.2, 2007, p. 83, viewed on 28 December, https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/viewFile/38/65 277
! decision making and action. Conversely, scholars Aida Idris and Saiful Nizam Che Soh identified that the systematic division of tasks was a factor of humanitarian aid and disaster relief mission success.39 As a result, civilian and military actors greatly benefit from having clearly assigned authority, roles and responsibilities during a response. Ideally, these should have been negotiated, agreed and codified in the disaster preparation phase – Step 3: Alignment and Practice of Governance Structures.
Three prominent examples drawn from the case studies of a lack of clear roles and responsibilities were the activation of an L3 response in the Philippines, which created a surge of humanitarian staff and resources without clear guidance on their mandate, authority and responsibilities, and the arrival of the UNDAC in Vanuatu with no terms of reference. It was also identified that the assignment of Liaison Officers was an informal position with inconsistent training and preparation requirements. This is despite the role being used across all three case studies by civilian and military actors, and liaison activities and checklists being detailed in Multi-National Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP).
8.2.2 Step 6.2: Shared Responsibility A foundational leadership concept of an effective Australian response, based on the nature and behaviour of individuals and teams being led, is 'shared responsibility' or delegation. Decision-making is considered an organisational value, akin to communication, coordination, problem solving and leadership.40 The specific trait of decision-making that influenced civil- military interaction was found to be the degree to which lower and middle ranks of the ADF41 were delegated responsibility to make decisions to meet the needs of other actors. Delegating decision-making authority to lower ranks, where they are co-located with civilian counterpart decision-makers and authorised to make decisions within clearly defined terms of reference, was identified to be an effective means of mitigating poor or inaccurate information flow. Specific
39 A. Idris & S. Nizam Che Soh, ‘Determinants of HADR Mission Success: Exploring the Experience of the Malaysian Army.’ Disaster Prevention and Management, vol. 23, no. 4, 2014, p. 460. 40 M. Gottwald, Competing in the humanitarian marketplace: UNHCR’s organizational culture and decision-making processes. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Research Paper No. 190, October 2010, p. 7, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4cb55c0ec.pdf 41 In this context, lower and middle ranks of the ADF are defined as any position below that of Commander Joint Task Force / Commander Air Component Coordination Element 278
! examples were attendance at Cluster System and NDMO meetings to support the loading and scheduling of military assets,
This delegation transfers onus for decision-making to the group (e.g. Cluster System meeting, NDMO meeting or MNCC meeting) which aligns to the concept of shared responsibility, where the group collectively has high levels of problem solving skills, experience and expertise to communicate, coordinate and reach a decision. This approach requires a leader to ensure adherence to group structure, processes and practices to maintain participants’ confidence and momentum, which in-turn implies a cooperative effort between the leader and the group to reach a shared decision. 42
A key characteristic of the effective civil-military interaction that occurred in Cebu during the response to Typhoon Haiyan was the delegation of military decision-making down to the tactical level. This resulted in ADF personnel on the ground, those attending cluster meetings and liaising with other stakeholders, making decisions about the loading and scheduling of ADF airlift assets, thereby optimising the use of military assets.43 Delegation of decision-making, referred to as ‘shared leadership’ in the literature, is the “distribution of leadership influence across multiple team members … to serve as an initiating mechanism for expertise coordination.”44 Through delegation, respective JTF and ACCE Commanders transferred responsibility for decision-making and administration of functions to subject matter experts, subordinates or others. While their actions and activities are not controlled by the JTF or ACCE Commander, but they did remain fully accountable.
Shared leadership occurs when team members are trusted and become engaged in team leadership.45 This approach is considered a critical step to enable civil-military interaction because it leads to collaborative team behaviours. These include members identifying information and action required to enhance performance, making consensus based decisions, giving advice based on experience and skills, and having open
42 M. Gottwald, op. cit., p. 8. 43 ACCE Commander, interview with author, 2018. 44 M. Meuthal & M. Hoegl, ‘Expertise Coordination over Distance: Shared Leadership in Dispersed New Product Development Teams.’ Leadership Lessons from Compelling Contexts (Monographs in Leadership and Management), vol. 8, 2016, p. 327. 45 C. Pearce & C. Manz, ‘The New Silver Bullets of Leadership: The Importance of Self- and Shared Leadership Knowledge Work.’ Organizational Dynamics, vol. 34, no.2, 2005, p. 133-134. 279
! discussions to support information flow. By distributing responsibilities among all team members, shared leadership means all team members accept responsibility and display leadership, not leaving the formal team leader being solely responsible for displaying leadership.46
This approach is especially necessary for situations where co-location is not possible, as in Operation Fiji Assist, because leaders are unable to fully oversee the needs and outcomes of dispersed teams. 47 As such, actors need to appreciate how to effectively lead dispersed teams, especially where traditional forms of leader-centred leadership and face-to-face leadership are unavailable. Where this occurs, leaders would benefit from adopting a shared leadership or delegation approach to ensure team performance. This will empower and enable teams members to identify action needs, initiate team action to foster team performance and ensure knowledge and information sharing.48 Experience from stability operations also reflects that many practitioners emphasize the need for decision making authority to reside down the chain of command, at the tactical/field level, to provide staff with greater flexibility to respond to changes in the environment and local needs.49
The literature on disaster response in developing countries reflects similar experience and the need to empower decision making at a lowest level. Due to a lack of plans for stakeholder coordination at the local level, these stakeholders must wait to consult with a central decision-making body. This increases both decision-making times and the risk of inaccurate information flow, and may result in actions or responses that are implemented as generic, central mandates.50 As a result, local governments note the costs
46 See F. Morgeson, D. DeRue & E. Karam, ‘Leadership in teams: A functional approach to understanding leadership structures and processes.’ Journal of Management, vol. 36, no. 1, January 2010, p.5-39. 47 M. Meuthal & M. Hoegl, op. cit., p. 328 and S. Connaughton, M. iv, and G. Goodwin, ‘Leading Distributed Teams: The Communicative Constitution of Leadership. Military Psychology, vol. 23, 2011, p. 505. 48 M. Meuthal & M. Hoegl, op. cit., p. 328 49 A. Baumann, ‘Clash of Organisational Cultures? A Comparative Analysis of American and British Approaches to the Coordination of Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Stability Operations, 2001- 2010.’ PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2011, p. 339., viewed on 03 January 2020, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d78f/c14ebfec3131e985557f833757eb5083e10f.pdf 50 B. Kusumasari, Q. Alam & K. Siddiqui, ‘Resource capability for local government in managing disasters.’ Disaster Prevention and Management, vol. 19, no. 4, 2010, p. 443. 280
! and inefficiency of central decision making because it does not provide sufficient power and responsibility to respond.51
8.3 Step 7: Tailored Response The structure and composition of capabilities deployed by Australia into a natural disaster response environment was found to influence civil-military interaction, with the term 'design for purpose' emerging from the response to Cyclone Pam. This step ensures the appropriateness of people and assets arriving into a disaster response environment, which is a reflection of how well they meet the needs of the response and how suitably matched they are to the local and political context of the affected nation.52 It means Australia needs to structure its responses to optimise civil-military efforts, including tailoring military capability to ensure deployed assets are effectively balanced against the needs of an affected nation and the context of the response.
This step brings together six sub-steps to reflect that actors need to have the necessary structure and composition of capabilities to achieve effective civil-military interaction. The steps focus on enabling communication and information sharing between actors, which are both considered essential for cooperation and coordination because they build mutual understanding. 53
8.3.1 Step 7.1: Immediate Response Teams As outlined in the case studies, immediate response teams are civilian and military teams that deploy overseas at short notice to support Australian diplomatic posts and/or partners in the field. These teams are specifically DFAT’s Crisis Response Team, the ADF's Support and Response Team, and JTF reconnaissance teams. They are a critical part of an effective Australian response because they commence building relationships with key individuals, confirm the need for further Australian assistance and set up the infrastructure needed for follow-on elements. When deployed in a timely manner, these teams can inform the configuration of follow-on elements, including medical assistance
51 ibid 52 S. Wiharta et al, The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008, p. xii. 53 H. Weigand, F. van der Poll & A. do Moor, ‘Coordination through Communication.’ Conference Paper, Proceedings of the 8th International Working Conference on the Language-Action Perspective on Communication Modelling, 2003, p. 116. 281
! teams and military assets, in terms of staff, preparation, equipment, and logistics.54 Of note, is the importance for a member from AUSMAT to be included in a CRT to inform the early phases of Australia’s health response, which was a feature of all three case studies.55
8.3.2 Step 7.2: Information and Knowledge Management Information, both access to and understanding of, is essential for collaboration between civilian and military stakeholders and the coordination of response efforts. Information and knowledge management takes three forms during a response - firstly, the ability for deploying personnel to access and apply knowledge to inform civil-military interaction; secondly the flow, collection, and analysis of information between actors to support response efforts; and thirdly knowledge management in support of organisational learning.
The ADF differentiates between information management and knowledge management. The former aims to provide "the right information at the right time, to the right person, to support the decision making process while avoiding information overload."56 The ADF considers knowledge management to be process and practice "to analyse, corroborate and refine information in support of the decision making process."57 This is akin to the definition of information management used by humanitarian actors, which is "the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information to support decision- making and coordination in an emergency." 58 While definitions differ between civilian and military actors, both clearly recognise the importance of timely and accurate information to prepare personnel, improve situational understanding, and inform decision making.
54 A. Robertson, et al, ‘Disaster response from Australia: What is the role of Forward Teams?’ Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, vol. 9, 2011. 55 AUSMAT, Team Leader Bravo, Operation Philippines Assist, interview with author, 06 February 2019 and see A. Robertson, op. cit. 56 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, ed. 3, 31 May 2012, p. 6-8, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP-D- FoundationsofAustralianMilitaryDoctrine.pdf 57 ibid 58 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Disaster Response in Asia and the Pacific.’ 2013, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://interactive.unocha.org/publication/asiadisasterresponse/ToolsAndServicesForDisasterResponse.ht ml#Asia-Pacific%20Humanitarian%20Partnership 282
!
Access and Apply Knowledge: The need for deploying personnel to access individual and organisational knowledge to inform was covered in Step 2: Build and Manage Knowledge. In the response phase, information management is considered to be civilian and military actors having effective means to provide deploying personnel with useful information, such as national context, likely coordination structures, and national and regional points of contact. As identified in the case studies and detailed in Step 2, the ADF currently uses pre-deployment booklets and operational handbooks to achieve this aim.
Information Flow, Collection and Analysis: Information flow is achieved through human networks, such as Liaison Officers, and information and communication technologies (ICT). Both networks were found to be critical during response operations, with information sharing playing a critical role in informed and timely decision-making. Information is considered "as crucial as trust to effective coordination and collaboration of relief efforts,"59 with information management being critical to the success or failure of any relief operation.60 This means actors need to have the capability (staff, processes and tools) to conduct effective information management, which covers information flow, collection and analysis.
A key part of information sharing is understanding what needs to be communicated, to whom and how - inaccurate, poor or "dumping information" is not considered effective sharing.61 Actors need mechanisms to collect and store information, but more importantly they must have the ability to produce useful knowledge from the information and provide this knowledge to those who need it - " information exchange between the civil and military actors should involve more information processes than just the sharing of information."62 Information management becomes an internal consideration for
59 D. Saab, et al, ‘Inter-organizational Coordination in the Wild: Trust Building and Collaboration Among Field-Level ICT Workers in Humanitarian Relief Organizations.’ voluntas (International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations), vol. 20, iss.1, March 2009, p. 199. 60 S. Wiharta et al, op. cit., p. xiii. 61 A. Fitz-gerald & F. Walthall, ‘An integrated approach to complex emergencies: The Kosovo experience.’ Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/integrated-approach-complex-emergencies-kosovo-experience 62 S. Rietjens, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?’ PhD diss., University of Twente, 2006, p. 28. 283
! stakeholders, in terms of capability, and an external consideration in order to understand the information requirements of other stakeholders.
Monitoring and Reporting: An Australian response would benefit from a baseline operational monitoring and reporting framework as a means to measure progress and activities to assess impact and inform subsequent actions. This framework needs to cover all levels of a response and adaptive to specific operational context based on the strategic mission. It would provide Australian actors with a readily available and consistent tool to track and report activities, ensure accountability and enable the military’s transition out of a disaster area.
For the ADF, having a strategic Action Plan (as detailed at Step 5.2) with a baseline framework, supports the development of Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) that are used as indicators of military progress to ensure actions are contributing to broader response efforts and a specified operational endpoint. These MOP and MOE would be reported against by tactical-level forces, such as a JTF or ACCE, to inform mission progress and provide civilian actors, including DFAT and NDMOs, with an reasoned assessment to support handing over recovery efforts to local authorities. The MOP and MOE used during Operation Fiji Assist are assessed to be a solid framework that can be used or tailored for future operations to meet this need.
As part of the process, civilian actors should specify any data requirements at the commencement of operations, to ensure the military captures the required information (e.g. fixed wing and rotary wing flights, and quantity and type of disaster relief delivered on military assets). With specified operational-level objectives and progress tracking, Australian actors can also manage the expectations of communities receiving assistance, with this need emerging during the response to Cyclone Winston.
Similarly, civilian stakeholders would benefit from understanding the assistance provided to communities by Australian actors. Interviews conducted with community members on Koro Island, Fiji reflected problematic duplication between military and NGO efforts. After the ADF left, NGOs were observed to repeat the same tasks (fixing toilets and pipes) for villages. One interviewee from Nausouri Village, Koro Island specifically noted that NGOs were not aware of what had been completed previously, 284
! reflecting to him that "there was no tracking of what had been done"63 which led to significant duplication of effort. This occurred despite the ADF developing and sharing an effective tracking system with the NDMO, including formally handing over the tool, as shown in the case study. Developing and implementing systems for data collection, assessments, analysis, reporting, aid tracking and monitoring is identified as a key enabler of effective civil-military interaction.
Organisational learning: Knowledge management during a response supports organisational learning because it puts in place measures to capture and store information that can be used for future disaster preparedness and response activities, and to update organisational memory such as policy, doctrine and operating procedures. Useful operational information includes situation reports, coordination processes, and localisation practices that ensure an Australian response supports both the capacities of affected communities, and broader national and local development and response efforts.
8.3.3 Step 7.3: Co-location As reflected in Chapter Six, co-location of civilian and military actors supports effective interaction and should be achieved where possible. This is because geographical distance can negatively impact leadership and the expertise coordination required for effective civil-military interaction is unlikely to evolve organically in dispersed teams.64 Leaders need to adopt other means, such as frequent, informal and regular communication to build shared understanding and reduce task conflict. This communication is linked to technological solutions, such as emails and telephone communications, and is required to ensure accurate and timely information sharing to inform decision-making.65
As reflected during the response to Cyclone Winston, connectivity issues significantly hampered the flow of information from shore-based personnel to HMAS Canberra, which resulted in leaders on-board being impacted by poor information flow.66 Decision- making, including timeliness and level of detail available, can become impacted when co-location is not achieved and there is a reliance on ineffectual technological means.
63 Nausori Village, interview with author, August 2019. 64 M. Muethal & M. Hoegl, op. cit., p. 327. 65 S. Connaughton, M. Shuffler, and G. Goodwin, op. cit., p. 505. 66 Helicopter Operations Officer, interview with author, 02 May 2018. 285
!
This makes it clear that civil-military effectiveness increases when team members’ expertise is actively coordinated through direct interaction, such as co-location.
8.3.4 Step 7.4: Dedicated Civil-Military Engagement Functions Chapter Six reflects that response stakeholders need to have dedicated and deliberate civil-military interaction functions at all levels of a response. For civilian stakeholders this can take the form of CMCoord while militaries use a number of positions as civil- military interaction functions. At the operational level the function is largely achieved through liaison officers because there is no coordination branch (J9) within Headquarters Joint Operations Command. At the tactical level, liaison officers, civil-military coordination (CIMIC), and a civil-military operations centre (CMOC) were used with the decision to deploy or initiate these functions being made by the JTF Commander. Each function was identified to have a different purpose, falling into the three main categories outlined below:
•! Advice to a military commander (CIMIC)67 "! Advises the military on the structure, mandate and operating strategies of the Affected nation and humanitarian actors; "! Provides specialist advice on CIMIC during planning processes; "! Communicates Affected nation and humanitarian needs within the broader framework of operational goals; "! Advises on humanitarian policy and guidelines on the use of military assets and resources; and "! Advises on the process and channels for authorisation of the use of military assets and resources by the Affected nation and humanitarian actors. •! Advice to humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms (CIMIC)68 !! Advises humanitarian organisations and coordination mechanisms on the structure, mandate, hierarchy, and command and control nature of the military; and !! Advises on the utilisation and maxismisation of military assets, capacity and resources in support of humanitarian stakeholders.
67 G. Lloyd & G. van Dyk, op. cit., p. 87-88. 68 ibid, p. 88. 286
!
•! Coordination (CIMIC, CMOC) and Liaison (Liaison Officers)69 !! Identifies, establishes and maintains relationships with relevant stakeholders to enable information flow; !! Defines and details their roles, responsibilities and decision-making boundaries to avoid duplication of effort; !! Establishes or participates in coordination mechanisms in a collaborative, participative and consultative manner to enhance flexibility; !! Coordinates organisational capabilities to be complementary with other efforts; !! Attends local meetings, cluster meetings and other meetings and reports back to enable information flow; !! Contributes to the development of integrated plans and assessment of mission and objectives; and !! Conduct field/need assessments and/or participate in needs assessment teams. The civil-military outcomes these functions achieve were demonstrated in the case studies. For example, while CIMIC advice was available to the JTF Commander onboard HMAS Canberra, there was an absence of a dedicated CIMIC function was a clear capability gap in the Cyclone Winston response. The roles are considered a key part of an Australian response because they significantly enhance information sharing, facilitate unity of effort, and contribute to building trust and respect between stakeholders.70 However, as noted under governance, the decision to stand-up certain civil-military functions, such as a CMOC, should be considered as part of operational requirements and should take into consideration affected nation coordination structures and approaches.
The case studies and broader literature reflects that the terms CMCoord and CIMIC are used interchangeably to describe a process, a function or an output and clarity around these terms would support effective interaction. Within this project, these concepts are functions that enable effective civil-military interaction and they should be recognised as
69 ibid 70 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.11, Civil-Military Operations, 01 April 2009, p. 2-1, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP3.11-Civil- MilitaryOperations.pdf 287
! such, including how they contribute to respective actors’ missions. In some cases, civil and military missions will differ and actors will need to have capacity to manage these differences.
8.3.5 Step 7.5: Civil-Military Teaming As the case studies reflected, civil-military teams during natural disaster response can take a number of forms - DFAT/ADF (Philippines) and affected nation/ADF (Fiji). Civil- military teaming brings together organisations with different cultures, processes and lexicon, sometimes without shared training and education. In teaming, these differences which manifest in planning, decision-making, operational styles, and leadership, can be overcome to support unified actions.
The specific example underpinning the benefits of civil-military teaming is the conduct of joint needs assessments, which emerged from all three case studies as an effective practice that enhanced civil-military interaction. Joint needs assessment teams bring together civilian actors with expertise to assess the impact of the disaster and identify the corresponding needs of affected communities, with military personnel who can enable access to remote areas using military assets and inform decisions on the composition and location on follow-on military forces. More broadly than the case studies, the benefits of joint civilian and military assessments were identified by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams who responded to the Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2007 floods in Mozambique. 71 The practice of civilian and military actors conducting joint needs assessments is a considered an initial step to improve civil- military coordination during disaster response.72
To support civil-military teaming, mitigate unsuitability, and ensure personnel are prepared to working with counterparts from different backgrounds and agencies, adherence to a 'competency model for civil-military teaming' would be beneficial. Such a model was developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences in 2012. 73 While it focuses on developing Army leaders, the
71 S. Wiharta et al, op. cit., p. 41. 72 ibid. 73 See K. Ross et al, Development of a Competency Model for Civil-Military Teaming, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1960, September 2012, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a567464.pdf 288
! competencies listed were reflected in the case studies and literature, as effective traits for both civilian and military personnel to enable effective interaction. The twelve individual competencies, under three 'meta-competencies' identified were:74
1.! Adapts Across Organizations and Cultures •! Understands the cultural context of situations •! Assesses new cultural environments and adjusts appropriately (cultural agility) •! Understands multiple perspectives 2.! Builds Partnering Relationships •! Understands capabilities of partners and systems •! Establishes effective partnerships and teams •! Develops positive relationships •! Builds common ground and shared purpose •! Manages conflict •! Manages the flow of communication 3.! Collaborates to Solve Problems •! Uses integrative methods for planning and problem-solving •! Synchronizes tactical actions, operational objectives, and strategic goals •! Applies available resources and expertise
Despite the positive impact of civil-military teaming, historically civilian and military actors have tended to conduct their own needs assessments, which makes it difficult to achieve common situational understanding and avoid duplication or gaps in efforts.75 There has also been little attempt to establish civil-military teaming as best practice to conduct needs assessments, despite the teaming enabling rapid and comprehensive information flow and completion of needs assessments.
8.3.6 Step 7.6: Gender Perspective and Participation Natural disasters have different impacts on women, men, girls, boys and vulnerable populations, such as people with disabilities. Women and children are at higher risk of
74 ibid, p. vi. ! 75 S. Wiharta et al, op. cit., p. 41. 289
! death during disasters,76 and there is an increase in sexual and gender-based violence in the aftermath of disasters.77 These community groups are disproportionately affected because of: •! food and water shortages cause women, girls and vulnerable groups to travel further in less secure conditions •! the disruption of essential services, notably reproductive and maternal services, can risk women's health •! any breakdown of rule of law exposes women to increased violence, including gender-based violence •! the destruction of protective infrastructure like homes, police stations and shelters leaves women vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.78
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction acknowledges that women's participation is critical for "managing disaster risk and designing, resourcing and implementing gender sensitive disaster risk reduction policies, plans and programmes."79 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’s (CEDAW) also commits to a gender-based approach to climate change and disaster prevention and response.80
Two specific angles of WPS are applicable to civil-military interaction during disaster response operation: perspective and participation. The former ensures that the gender and vulnerable population considerations are incorporated into planning, including aid delivery for women and children, such as sanitary products, nappies and school books. While a military gender advisor can support this, a robust military intelligence function
76 See E. Neumayer & T. Plumber, ‘The gendered nature of natural disasters: the impact of catastrophic events on the gender gap in life expectancy, 1981-2002.’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 97, iss. 3, September 2007. 77 See V. Le Masson, et al., Disasters and violence against women and girls: Can disasters shake social norms and power relations? Overseas Development Institute, London, November 2016, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11113.pdf 78 Ibid 79 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 2015, p. 23, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf 80 See Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 37 on Gender related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in the context of climate change.’ 07 February 2018, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/CEDAW_C_GC_37_864 2_E.pdf 290
! also ensures a full operational picture. Integrating a gender perspective into operations entails developing a ‘gendered understanding’ of the disaster or conflict area.81 This starts in the preplanning phase and involves assessing the differing needs of vulnerable groups, and incorporating that information into operational design and actions.
Australia has committed to a WPS agenda, which has seen the development of an operational gender advisor capability, introduced operational orders directing the inclusion of a gender perspective and deployment of gender advisors, and the dissemination of a doctrinal note on gender in air operations.82 The RAAF also recognises the need for women in roles that have a civilian interface, with Commander of the Air Mobility Group directing an increase in female loadmasters to "improve interactions with people and communities in those countries most impacted by disaster."83 All of these actions are considered to be a vital part of effective civil-military interaction during a natural disaster response.
The real strength of the WPS agenda during disaster response is participation. Female participation in ADF forces was found to influence civil-military interaction in two of the case studies - Philippines and Fiji. In the first case, female soldiers acted as role models by clearing debris and demonstrating to affected women and girls, within a male- dominated society, that they could participate in the recovery process. A deliberate decision was made by the Officer Commanding (OC) to deploy a female linguist as part of the Engineer Support Force. This was based on his knowledge of natural disaster responses, particularly an awareness that it was likely the ADF would engage with the education sector, which is largely female. 84
81 S. Hutchinson, ‘Leading the Operationalisation of WPS.’ Security Challenges, vol. 14, no. 2, 2018, p. 127, viewed online 28 December 2019, https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/resources/Documents/Leading%20the%20Operationalisation%20of %20WPS.pdf 82 See E. Chapman, ‘Women in the ADF: the operational imperative of participation.’ The Strategist, 29 November 2018, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/women-in-the-adf-the- operational-imperative-of-participation/ 83 Department of Defence, ‘Occupation – specific efforts to increase women’s representation, Air Force Loadmasters.’ No date, viewed 28 December 2019, https://www.defence.gov.au/jcg/Women_Peace_Security/docs/Occupations- specific_efforts_to_increae_womens_representation_Air%20Force_Loadmasters.pdf 84 OC RSF, interview with author, 01 February 2019. 291
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In Fiji, the deployment of a female gender advisor enabled tailored aid to be provided to communities, which directly contributed to operational success, As then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull noted, "personnel delivered more effective, targeted help because they were able to connect with local women and target their needs."85 These examples demonstrate that women naturally feel safer and more comfortable talking with other women about their needs. 86 This makes gender perspective and participation a key step within a tailored Australian response, which must be achieved through a robust intelligence function and female participation in civil-military interaction roles, including linguists and loadmasters.
To further strengthen Australia's commitment to gender participation and perspective, any future National Action Plan (NAP) should focus on increasing female leadership in disaster management and response. Such a commitment has the potential to contribute to disaster preparedness, build resilience, and reduce the impact of humanitarian crises.87 In addition to the case studies reflecting the need for gender participation and perspective the response phase, lessons from the Fijian NDMO reflect the need for response plans and polices to include a "community, diversity, disability, gender focus."88 This means there is also a preparation phase in this space, including engagement prior to a response to gain knowledge of existing plans for vulnerable populations and/or the deployment of a dedicated advisor in an immediate response team or advance party to capture this information for integration into Australia's response.
8.4 Step 8: Adherence to Governance Structures The need for governance to support effective civil-military interaction was covered in- depth in Chapter One and Chapter Six. Opportunities to align and practice governance structures was detailed in Chapter Seven at Step 3 as a means for civilian and military actors to share knowledge of guidelines, practices and procedures. It was also noted in the introduction to this chapter that there may be situations where civilian and military
85 J. Bajkowski, ‘More military female role models needed: Turnbull.’ 08 March 2017, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.themandarin.com.au/76545-76545/ 86 Department of Defence, ‘Addressing Gender for Disaster Response Success.’ 16 August 2016, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://news.defence.gov.au/media/stories/addressing-gender-disaster-response- success 87 See ActionAid, On the Frontline: Catalysing Women’s Leadership in Humanitarian Action, 28 August 2018, viewed on 03 January 2020, https://actionaid.org.au/resources/on-the-frontline-catalysing- womens-leadership-in-humanitarian-action/ 88 National Disaster Management Office, op. cit., slide 4. 292
! personnel are involved in a disaster response without any preparation and on a short- notice timeline that does not allow them to fully prepare.
As a result, adherence to governance structures is considered to be an important process to enable effective civil-military interaction. In all three case studies, coordination mechanisms were initiated in an ad hoc manner below the national level, resulting in a lack of clear structure for actors to coordinate, share information, and request the use of military assets. Adherence to known and practiced governance structures, including international and national law, policy, recommended practices and operating procedures will bring predictability to civil-military relationships. More specifically, templates (such as SITREPs etc) and a 'battle rhythm' provides a structure for sharing information, which is considered to be the first step of creating trust and critical to overcoming language barriers, including native language differences, between civilian and military actors.89
Explicitly stating the need to adhere to governance structures is considered the last line of defence to counter "information redundancy, duplication of effort, poor planning and implementation, and basic lack of knowledge and information"90 that can arise during a disaster response. The step recognises that civilian actors have different perspectives on, and approaches to, engaging with military actors and it provides a means to enable interaction based on these considerations.
8.4.1 Step 8.1: Coordination Mechanisms and Procedures Dedicated and systematic mechanisms bring structure and predictability to civil-military interaction, which was identified from the case studies and broader literature as necessary for coordination, optimising the use of military assets through oversight of availability and capability, and matching capabilities to needs. However, there was inconsistency in the application of common mechanisms and procedures, such as a HuMOCC, MNFSOPs and the Oslo Guidelines.
Another persistent issue identified was that parallel coordination systems were established by different international actors, which caused confusion. As part of
89 D. Saab, et al, op. cit., p.198. 90 ibid 293
! recognising the primacy of an affected nation and enabling localisation, external actors need to adhere to local systems, roles and responsibilities and avoid establishing their own systems. If there is insufficient knowledge of a nation's mechanisms prior to a response, this means making time at the commencement of activities to frame an understanding of existing community capacities, and placing effort into strengthening this capacity rather than replacing or undermining it.
The implementation of consistent and practiced governance structures is considered the best means to “enhance predictability and develop a common understanding of … civil- military coordination mechanisms and their respective functions during a response.”91 The need for greater predictability in civil-military interaction was one of the first recommendations that emerged from the Regional Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific, the regional forum established in 2014 to bring together humanitarian, civilian and military actors to support the planning and response to disasters in the region.92
8.4.2 Step 8.2: Support to accredited teams The regulation and management of responders during a natural disaster, such as international emergency medical teams (EMT), is critical for effective coordination. As was identified during the Philippines case study, challenges arise regarding the coordination, quality and capacity of EMTs, a problem which is exacerbated by a rapid increase in the deployment of EMTs in the aftermath of disasters.93 These challenges arise because an affected nation is faced with coordinating efforts to respond to the immediate needs of its population, and the oversight and management of responders' activities. Few national systems are adequately prepared for this, leading to ad hoc rule- making, confusion and the proliferation of poorly prepared and underequipped
91 Regional Consultative Group Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for the Asia and the Pacific, ‘Third Session: Summary Report.’ 2017, p. 8, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rcg3_summary_report_final.pdf!!! 92 J. Flint, et al., Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model, Regional Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific, 2017, p. ii, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/04/RCG_05042017_Final_electronic.pdf 93 World Health Organization and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The Regulation and Management of International Emergency Medical Teams, June 2017, p. 13, viewed 28 December 2019, https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/233516/EMT%20Report%20HR.PDF 294
! responders.94 This issue impacts civil-military interaction because unregulated or uninvited teams can use military assets to deploy to a response, which is what occurred during the Typhoon Haiyan response when Medical Rescue deployed to the Philippines on ADF assets.95
In the case of EMTs, the World Health Organization (WHO) has created a global classification system and minimum standards framework for the response of EMTs in the event of a natural disaster.96 Another effective accreditation initiative is the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), under which Australia's Urban Search and Rescue Teams are accredited. Based on the need to support an affected nation through ensuring quality and effectiveness of deployed capability, responders should provide evidence of accreditation prior to being allowed to use military assets.
The regulation of responders will also contribute to mitigating against "parachuting," which refers to the arrival of external actors without a connection to relief efforts or the affected population.97 Parachuted responders, while usually well-meaning are not part of a professional humanitarian response, and they can create a number of issues during a response. This includes using scarce resources that might be better going to affected communities or violating cultural and social norms.98
8.5 Unity The desired endpoint of civil-military interaction during disaster response, as identified from the case studies, broader literature, and theoretical concepts, is unity based on the needs of an affected nation. As discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Six, coordination in the context of civil-military interaction refers to processes, practices and behaviours to manage the dependencies that arise between actors so that their activities are part of a purposeful whole. The term ‘unity of effort’ has been used to describe a comparable
94 ibid 95 AUSMAT, Team Leader Bravo, Operation Philippines Assist, interview with author, 06 February 2019. 96 World Health Organization and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, op. cit., p. 14. 97 M. Wessells, ‘Do No Harm: Toward Contextually Appropriate Psychosocial Support in International Emergencies.’ American Psychologist, vol. 64, no. 8, 2009, p. 843. 98 ibid, p. 843-844. 295
! concept by both academic and military authors,99 however different language is used in this project to recognise that humanitarian agencies operate on a needs based approach that is not necessarily aligned to military effort. While a common goal of assisting an affected nation was identified between actors in the case studies, more broadly there may not be alignment between humanitarian and military mandates and objectives which the term ‘unity of effort’ infers.
The concept of unity during a response is characterised by: • A common understanding of the situation • Understanding and respecting actor missions, goals and values • Understanding efforts and realising opportunities for alignment • Common measures of progress and the ability to change course if necessary100
As reflected in the process model, this endpoint is achieved through sequential conditions, actions and activities that bring civilian and military actors together in manner that respects and appreciates comparative advantage, focuses on coordination and dialogue, and maintains actor independence by distinguishing between military and humanitarian action. This process enables actors to work toward their own mandate and objectives but considerate of and within broader response efforts, and ideally development efforts. It preserves humanitarian space and promotes relationships between civilian and military actors. Importantly, unity empowers stakeholders to achieve coordination without an overriding bureaucratic structure that has ambitions or a mandate for subordination under a single command.101
Furthermore, a focus on unity builds traits that are consistent with high-performing civil- military relationships:102
99 See Lieutenant Colonel G. Jensen, DOD Disaster response: “unity of effort versus unity of command,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 17 May 2007 and C. Bartzokis ‘Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? Humanitarian civil-military cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction.’ The Yale Review of International Studies, March 2017, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://yris.yira.org/essays/2020 100 Joint Staff J7, Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide: Improving Unity of Effort, Future Joint Force Development, 31 August 2013, p. 6, viewed on 09 January 2020, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pams_hands/uef_solution_guide.pdf
101 B. Nowell, et al, ‘The Structure of Effective Governance of Disaster Response Networks: Insights From the Field.’ American Review of Public Administration, vol. 48, iss. 7, September 2017, p. 702. 102 ibid ! 296
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1.! Rapid adaptation: a response network has the flexibility to rapidly adapt to changing conditions and variations in network composition and structure. 2.! Distributed Information Management: management of distributed information, ensuring that information flows rapidly and accurately from those who have it to those who need it for higher-level decision-making and action. 3.! Bilateral Coordination: actors bilaterally coordinate to identify and avoid destructive interference that can undermine goal accomplishment. 4.! Emergent Collective Action: collective action when an opportunity for collaborative advantage among two or more stakeholders arises.
Lastly, unity provides a means to bring civilian and military actors together to conduct collective and cross-functional learning. Whole-of-government learning occurred in all three case studies in varying forms, reflecting inconsistency in civil-military learning. There was also no evidence of key regional humanitarian actors, such as UN OCHA and IFRC, being involved in Australian lessons workshops. This type of learning is valuable for future responses, feeding knowledge gained from multiple facets of civil-military interaction back into disaster preparedness activities and future responses. Of most importance, is including affected nations in learning processes and returning knowledge gained directly to local authorities, communities and first responders. This was achieved after the Cyclone Winston response, through the conduct of a WPS Lessons Workshop in June 2016 that shared lessons on the national and international response.
8.6 Summary After natural disasters, especially those which cause significant and widespread damage and place pressure on national leadership, militaries "are often the only institutions that possess the transport and logistics capabilities to deliver relief supplies when communications and transport infrastructure are disrupted."103 This means it is almost inevitable that civilian and military actors will come together during a response despite barriers that may exist. In recognition of this and to enable effective interaction, this chapter presented the Response phase of the process model at the core of this project.
103 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Asian disaster relief: lessons of Haiyan.’ Strategic Comments, vol. 20, comment 2, February 2014, p. iii. 297
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This phase of the model focuses on an Australian response having agile and timely behaviours and structures that recognise the primacy of the affected nation through partnerships and flexible missions to meet their needs. This flows onto agile leadership that empowers other actors and subordinate units by providing clear, authority, roles and responsibilities, respecting agency and adopting a shared responsibility approach. These cultural decisions, which stem from the organisational cultural characteristics outlined in Chapter Six, are followed by a decision on the configuration of Australian capability to be deployed - including people, assets, equipment and their type, quantity, location and composition. In progressing towards the desired endpoint of unity, the model addresses the need for actors to adhere to governance structures to enhance predictability. This step provides common ground for civil-military interaction to occur based, while recognising that civilian and military actors have different approaches to interaction and respecting their agency. !
298
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Chapter Nine Situating the Model The purpose of this study is to develop a process model of civil-military interaction to inform future Australian whole-of-government responses to natural disasters. The positionality of being an insider researcher and an ADF organisational lens has been made explicit in previous chapters. The research strategy outlined in chapter 2 recognises the potential for researcher bias, with steps taken throughout the project to minimise informant bias and familiarity with data to draw out tacit or preconceived patterns.1 However, the major step to address these concerns is the adoption of an inductive research strategy based on Eisenhardt's2 roadmap of building theory from case studies. This roadmap sequences theory building and theory testing by comparing and contrasting emergent theory, which are proposed in chapters 7 and 8, with extant literature.
To conduct theory testing, this chapter will firstly provide an examination of civil- military interaction in other operations, and secondly identify and compare relevant existing models of civil-military interaction. The intent is to determine generalisability of the process model across a breadth of situations and to raise the theoretical level of the project. This approach achieves the ‘transferability’ of the findings to different contexts, which is one of the ways that insider research can build ‘trustworthiness’ in research design.3
The chapter achieves this aim drawing on three operational contexts - counterinsurgency, pandemics and urban environments - to compare and contrast civil-military interaction in different environments to reflect whether the factors and outcomes of interaction change based on the context. This includes an examination of the 'decision points' which brought civilian and military actors together. Much of the literature in this section of the
1 See J. Fleming, ‘Recognizing and resolving the challenges of being an insider researcher in work- integrated learning.’ International Journal of Work-Integrated Learning, Special Issue, vol. 19, 2018, pp 311-320. 2 See K. Eisenhardt, ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research.’ Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review, vol.14, no.4, 1989, viewed on 04 January 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/258557?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 3 J. Fleming, op. cit., p. 314.!! 299
! chapter is drawn from grey literature, with civil-military interaction in many contexts continuing to suffer from a paucity of academic research.4
The chapter then presents two applicable models identified from the literature - the current humanitarian paradigm for civil-military interaction, known as United Nations - Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), and a model developed by Sebastiann Reitjens as part of a PhD thesis. The purpose of this comparison is to situate, and further test, the model presented in chapters 7 and 8 through presenting alternative explanations of civil-military interaction models.
9.1 Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency (COIN) re-entered military discourse in the early 2000s in response to Western operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to insurgent behaviour from a range of actors. There was little change in broader counter-insurgency strategy from Vietnam to Afghanistan, with US President Lyndon B. Johnson's statement on victory in Vietnam depending "upon the hearts and minds of the people who actually live out there"5 being echoed in President Obama's 2007 strategy for Afghanistan not succeeding with "bullets or bombs alone."6 However, due to the dynamic nature of insurgencies, measures adopted to counter them have "no constant set of operational techniques."7 Colonel Peter Connolly reflected that "counterinsurgency requires a careful balance between the ability to win the support of the people, and the application of close combat to destroy the enemy with precision whenever and wherever the opportunity arises."8
4 A. Levine & D. Polatty, ‘August 2018 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop Summary Report’ Workshop Reports, 3, 2018, p. 5. 5 B. Moncure, ‘”Winning Hearts and Minds” – The Long History of a Failed Strategy.’ War History Online, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/winning-hearts- and-minds.html 6 The New York Times, ‘President Obama’s Remarks on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.’ 27 March 2009, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama- text.html 7 D. Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux.’ Survival, vo. 48, no. 4, December 2006, p. 112. 8 Colonel Peter Connolly, Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, August 2011, p. 1, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/sp321_counterinsurgency_in_uruzgan_2009- peter_connolly.pdf 300
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Australian doctrine refers to a four-stage approach to COIN - shape, clear, hold and build. 9 The ' shaping' phase occurs at the strategic level to present a united narrative and maximising effect; the 'clear' stage involves clearing the area of operations of insurgents; the ‘hold' stage consists of maintenance of security; and 'build' means the "establishment of basic services, but more importantly, the establishment/re-establishment of local law and order."10 In the 'build' phase - also known as post-conflict reconstruction - militaries undertook activities and Quick Impact Projects, including humanitarian assistance, re- building infrastructure and informing governance and the rule of law, in an effort to 'win hearts and minds' of local populations.
In conducting these activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, militaries assumed governance, administrative and development roles usually held by civilian actors, and resultantly, it is assessed that they mixed a range of purposes – economic development, social outreach and intelligence gathering – into the civil-military interaction framework. The military was also interfacing with local political and tribal leaders, providing security for civilians in active conflict areas, and participating in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This approach forced an increase and re-orientation in civil-military interaction which sees the military as no longer exclusively an instrument of force.11 It also brought with it a 'unity of command' approach that saw civilian and military actors brought together, formally and informally, under a military command. Two examples of civil-military interaction - Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Female Engagement Teams - will be explored to reflect how civilian and military actors were integrated during counterinsurgency operations.
9 Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine, LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, December 2009, Section 3-4, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/lwd_3-0- 1_counterinsurgency_full_0.pdf?acsf_files_redirect 10 Captain M. Proud 'The COIN Environment: the Integration and Execution of Lethal and Non-Lethal Effects t the Tactical Level - Platoon Team Lessons from MRTF-2 in Afghanistan.' Australian Army Journal, vol VIII, no. 1, Autumn 2011, p. 26. ! 11 J. Williamson, ‘Using humanitarian aid to ‘win hearts and minds’: a costly failure?’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011, p. 1037, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc-884-williamson.pdf and Colonel M. Hochwart, The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – A Model for Future Nation Building Operations, A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 08-09, 12 May 2009. 301
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9.1.1 Provincial Reconstruction Teams In general, PRTs were joint teams of international civilian and military personnel which operated at the provincial level, firstly in Afghanistan before the concept was applied in Iraq, undertaking security, reconstruction, support to central governance and relief activities.12 US PRTs were defined by USAID as “Joint Civil Military units, which strengthen the reach of the central government through improved security and the facilitation of reconstruction and development efforts.”13 There is an extensive body of literature on civil-military relations in counter-insurgency, a very small snapshot is provided in this chapter on specific characteristics of PRTs, namely their mission and purpose, civil-military teaming, co-location, command structure and governance, to examine different forms of civil-military interaction. Much of the military doctrine on stability operations and COIN states, if not mandates, interagency coordination and collaboration,14 however!bringing together civilian and military actors under a unified command as occurred in PRTs resulted in "disastrous results for both the local population and for humanitarian civil-military relations.”15
In Afghanistan, PRTs were one of three operational strategies employed by the international community to respond to insurgency in the nation – the other strategies were Operation Enduring Freedom (US-led Coalition) and the NATO-led, UN-mandated, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). PRTs were initiated by the US in 2003, and with the support of other Coalition nations, evolved into a network of 13 teams by the end of June 2004. There were considerable differences in PRT mandates based on command and control – the ISAF-led teams fell under the UN-mandated force while the Coalition PRTs operated at the invitation of the Afghan government, without a UN mandate. 16
12 G. McHugh & L. Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Team and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan. Save the Children, London, 2004, p. 1. 13 R. Rana, ‘Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility?’ IRRC, vol. 86, no. 855, September 2004, p. 574. 14 G. Long, ‘Effectiveness of U.S. Military Female Engagement Teams.’ Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2012, p. 106, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a567705.pdf 15 C. Bartzokis, ‘Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? Humanitarian civil-military cooperation in post- conflict reconstruction.’ The Yale Review of International Studies, March 2017, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://yris.yira.org/essays/2020 ! 16 G. McHugh & L. Gostelow, op. cit., p. 1. 302
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A lack of clarity surrounded the roles and missions of PRTs, with militaries using the concept to undertake activities, including ‘hearts and minds’ operations and ‘quick impact projects’ that were more closely aligned to humanitarian assistance and the remit of humanitarian actors.17 The unified command structure and co-location of civilian and military components in the PRTs (Figure 37) coupled with the nature of their activities, blurred the lines between humanitarian and military actors. This increased the risk of humanitarian actors being perceived as working with or for military forces, and therefore being considered as a target in the ongoing conflict.18 In addition, higher headquarter elements failed to implement NGO recommendations for military action to focus on providing security and repairing large-scale infrastructure, which would enable NGOs to maximise aid delivery and conduct humanitarian projects19 and in turn achieve comparative advantage.
Figure 37: Structure of a U.S. PRT20
COIN and military strategy to capture ‘hearts and minds’ orientated civil-military interaction towards the military concept of CIMIC, where activities and engagement focused on the military mission under military command. Save the Children (2004) concluded that negative consequences arose because of the purpose and outcomes behind
17 ibid 18 Ibid, p. 5. 19 C. Bartzokis, op. cit. 20 G. McHugh & L. Gostelow, op. cit., citing US State Department presentation, p. 18. 303
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PRTs, as outlined in Table 23 below. More specifically, they were found to “complicate the humanitarian –military interface” due to: •! Non-adherence to ‘working guidelines’ concerning relief operations; •! Variation in roles and missions of different PRTs, depending on the lead country; •! Lack of pre-deployment consultation by some PRTs with local communities and humanitarian agencies operating in the same areas; and •! Turnover of personnel within the PRTs, which makes institutional learning more difficult.21 Overall, the assessment of PRT performance is overwhelmingly negative due to "Inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation." 22
Role Purpose Operational Outcomes !! Achieve situational awareness !! Influence: achieve !! Consent of the targeted and situational understanding (including consent from target individuals segments of the local population ‘ground truth,’ information sources, route and groups so they were receptive !! Influence within key Iraqi reconnaissance, understanding of tribal to military forces and where leadership and political power structures and cultural required, shape them to elicit !! Improved freedom of awareness) cooperation. manoeuvre !! Establish communication linkages !! Engage: build !! Enhanced situational with key Iraqi government, security, relationships, including through awareness tribal, and religious leaders incentive of projects and !! Enhanced force protection !! Liaise with civilian and other associated commercial, political military actors operating in or transiting and community benefits. the area of operations !! Leverage: harness the resources of another organisation in support of the mission. Table 21: Purpose and Outcomes of PRTs 23
9.1.2 Female Engagement Teams Female Engagement Teams (FET) gained prominence as part of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The purpose of FET were to achieve military engagement with female populations in order to gain an understanding of cultural and contextual frameworks, local governance structures, and population needs.24 In contrast to teams with similar intent, such was Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and PRTs, FETs
21 ibid, p. 3. 22 M. McNerney, ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?’ Parameters, vol. 35, Winter 2005-06, p. 33. 23 Lieutenant Colonel M. Armstrong, ‘Not Hearts and Minds: Civil-Military Cooperation in OBG(W)-3.’ Australian Army Journal, vol. VIII, no.1, Autumn 2011, p. 68-70. 24 G. Long, op. cit., p. v. 304
! comprised purely military personnel and was not considered a Civil Affairs function, despite the intent of the teams.25 On reflection, they are viewed as "ad hoc organizations recruited at random, poorly trained, and inadequately resourced.”26!!
FETs were first established by the United States Marine Corps in 2009 in Afghanistan with the aim to capture the perspective of local women. It was assessed that if women are not systematically engaged during counterinsurgency efforts, U.S. military forces would miss 50% of the population.27 The Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) confirmed the importance of dedicated female engagement, stating in the May 2010 NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Engagement with Afghan Females Directive that these activities “support the battle space owners’ priorities, including, but not limited to…understanding of the operating environment, civil-military operations, medical capabilities visits, and educational programs…in order to build confidence and support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and ISAF.”28 Examining the use of FETs as a dedicate civil-military function provides insight whether gender perspective and gender participation contributes to effective civil- military interaction. More broadly, it contributes to understanding whether the WPS agenda can be used as a foundation for enhanced humanitarian civil-military interaction.29
The Afghan value on hospitality ensured that guests will be taken care of, as the FETs were which resulted in the opinion forming that they were effective. However team outcomes were limited to an exchange of aid, medical advice or projects and any information obtained from Afghan women.30 MSgt Watson, cited in Gail Long, reflects that “FETs represent an intrusion of the civilian sphere by the military in the tradition of civil-military fusion endemic to counterinsurgency operations.” 31 While the intent of
25 ibid, p. 2. 26 ibid, p. 6. 27 M. Vedder, ‘Building Confidence with the Population: Proposal for Military Female to Engage Afghan Females.’ Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, 23 February 2012, no page, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-FemaleEngagement.pdf 28 Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, ‘Engagement with Afghan Females Directive.’ NATO/ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, 31 May 2010, viewed on 06 January 2020, http://cryptome.org/dodi/100531_EngagementwAFFemales_ISAF-3.pdf 29 G. Long, op. cit., p. 3 and A. Levine & D. Pollatty, op. cit., p. 7. 30 G. Long, op. cit., p. 29. 31 G. Long, op. cit., p. 92 citing MSgt J. Watson. 305
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FETs to enable civil-military interaction was sound, conducting effective interaction was hampered by a lack of defined mission, which meant that the teams were not integrated into a coherent operational or strategic concept.32 This lead to duplication of effort, a waste of resources and contributed to the "blurring" of missions between civil affairs, humanitarian and military actors. Despite this assessment of FET, the broad intent behind FETs – gender perspective and participation – was identified in proceeding chapters to be connected to effective civil-military interaction.
Scholar Andrea Baumann captures the essence of civil-military interaction during counter-insurgency operations: policy slogans ...have failed to convey an adequate sense of how difficult it is in practice to design effective institutional frameworks for the concerted action of military, diplomatic, and developmental organizations. The vision outlined in official statements and documents of a seamless, unified civilian-military approach stands in contrast to the experience of many practitioners.33
This is mirrored in a growing body of literature that reflects the use of short-term aid and relief programmes by military forces as an operational strategy is ineffectual and may even have undermined broader military goals to defeat insurgents.34 From this operational experience, scholar Raj Rana 35 noted that humanitarian actors have formed a perspective on civil-military cooperation and civil affairs that occurs in post-conflict environments as follows: •! Serves as a focal point within the military for monitoring and influencing the general and humanitarian situation; •! Military personnel filling these functions adopt a role of ‘humanitarian diplomat and conscience of their commander’ but as a combat support function and not as operational decision makers;
32 G. Long, op. cit., p. 6. 33 A. Baumann, ‘Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Revisiting the Role of Interagency Coordination in Complex Operations.’ Prism, vol. 3, no.3, p.34, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_3-3/prism33-46_baumann.pdf 34 J. Williamson, op. cit., p. 1035 and A. Baumann, op. cit., p. 33. 35 R. Rana, op. cit., p. 574. 306
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•! Functions are part of a broader range of non-combat tools that a commander employs to dominate an area of operations – the media, the civilian population (winning support for forces/denying support to the enemy), intelligence, and in support of broader political objectives (nation-building, integrated approach); and •! Current civil-military cooperation and civil affairs projects are “almost identical in implementation to those of humanitarian organizations.” As like humanitarian counterparts, the roles of CIMIC/CA include needs assessments, definition of projects, securing financing, finding implementation partners or contractors, and evaluating the impact of projects.
Based on a brief examination of PRTs and FETs to situate this project within broader civil-military interaction experience, linkages can be drawn between the process model for disaster response and counterinsurgency. Firstly, is the need for military actors to step back from humanitarian roles and recognise comparative advantage. As both types of teams reflect, there was no clearly specified roles and responsibilities for military actors within the context of a broader operational and strategic purpose, which caused them to infringe on humanitarian roles to achieve tactical ‘hearts and minds’ outcomes. 36 There was an absence of a specified strategic endpoint during operations in Afghanistan, with Colonel Peter Connolly writing "It would be useful to have a strategy from Canberra to synchronise and prioritise whole-of-government efforts in delivering nation building efforts, but no strategy is apparent at this stage."37
The same could be said for military operations in Iraq, after the military campaign to defeat the Saddam regime, the guidance regional combatant commands received to prepare for 'Phase IV' operations (humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations) was one sentence that "be prepared to support interagency efforts and coalition nations in responding to stabilization and support requirements as a result of decisive combat operations in Iraq."38
36 G. Long, op. cit., p. 45. 37 Colonel Peter Connolly, op. cit., p. 66 38 D. Johnson, et al, The U.S. Army and the Battle For Baghdad: Lessons Learned – And Still to Be Learned, RAND Corporation, 2019, p. 31, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3076/RAND_RR3076.pdf 307
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Secondly, was the need for knowledge of national and cultural context to inform activities because "Without a detailed knowledge of the local population - including all of its tribal allegiances and cultural complexities - and a sensitivity to dealing with them, a counterinsurgency force is more likely to turn the local population to the cause of the insurgent."39 This is linked to localisation because it is draws from the premise that "People need to be engaged and local leaders need to be allowed to be leaders."40
Lastly, and arguably most importantly, is that civil-military interaction during counterinsurgency operations tended towards 'unity of command' and not unity. Military efforts to 'win the hearts and minds' of the local population resulted in them ineffectively using civil-military teams and conducting activities that integrated humanitarianism into a military chain of command.41 Post-conflict reconstruction projects have historically been the remit of civilian institutions (e.g. United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State), international organisations (e.g. the UN) and NGOs. In moving into the humanitarian sphere, militaries shifted the nature of civil- military relationships which has led to animosity and collective hostility between military and humanitarian actors.42
9.2 Pandemics In 2014, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone experienced an Ebola outbreak which overwhelmed domestic health systems and required an international response which became a "defining moment for the health of the global community"43 and moved all the “goalposts of a standard humanitarian emergency.”44 This is because the outbreak blurred the lines between a public health emergency and a crisis requiring coordination akin to a humanitarian disaster, 45 which resulted in an unforeseen need for civil-military interaction to assist affected populations. The timeline of the response reflects that an 18-
39 Colonel Peter Connolly, op. cit., p. 70 40 M. Proud op, cit., p. 32. 41 C. Bartzokis, op. cit. 42 ibid. 43 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, July 2015, p. 5, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/ebola-panel-report/en/ 44 L. Hughes, N. McWilliam & A. Frankland, ‘The Ebola emergency: perspectives on information management and mapping resources.’ Humanitarian Exchange, no. 64, June 2015, p. 22, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/he_64.pdf 45 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, ‘Civil-military cooperation in Ebola and beyond.’ The Lancet, 09 January 2016, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140- 6736(15)01128-9/fulltext 308
! month old child - ‘Patient Zero’ - is thought to have died in Guinea in December 2013, with the first public health alert being issued on 24 January 2014. The domestic health systems of Liberia and Sierra Leone were ill-equipped and quickly became overwhelmed at the size and scale of the outbreak, and an emergency response was launched by Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) in March 2014. The WHO publicly announced the outbreak on its website on 23 March 2014 after 49 cases and 29 deaths had been officially documented.
A number of smaller non-state actors and INGOs, such as MSF, were able to react in a timely manner, however the majority of organisations were unprepared for a crisis of this nature and some responded by withdrawing their staff and closing down operations. The collective international humanitarian community was considered slow and inadequate in their response, with the capacity of the system to respond to a health-related crisis brought into doubt. 46 On 2 September 2014 in the UN General Assembly, in response to the deepening crisis, Dr Joanne Liu, the international President of MSF, called for States to deploy civilian and military assets to curb the outbreak after it was declared a threat to international peace and security.47
The United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) was subsequently established on 19 September 2014 to coordinate a UN response. Dr Liu called for international assistance again on 16 September, noting the response to “Ebola continues to fall dangerously behind.”48 At the time, Dr Liu acknowledged the commitment made by the US to deploy military and medical assistance to West Africa but noted that “If this is true … we have no real details yet on what this deployment entails, and how fast it will be.” 49
In response to the UN request for assistance, member states deployed technical expertise, medical capability, humanitarian assistance, and military and civil defence assets. More
46 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, Saving Lives: The Civil-Military Response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, The University of Sydney, October 2015, p. 2 47 J. Lie, ‘MSF International President United Nations Special Briefing on Ebola.’ Medecins Sans Frontieres, 02 September 2014, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.msf.org/msf-international- president-united-nations-special-briefing-ebola 48 J. Lie, ‘MSF President’s remarks to the UN Special Briefing on Ebola.’ Medecins Sans Frontieres, 16 September 2014, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.msf.org/msf-presidents-remarks-un-special- briefing-ebola 49 ibid 309
! than 5000 thousand domestic and foreign military personnel from the USA, UK, China, Canada, France and Germany deployed to the region to establish an orderly response to the outbreak. The Australian Government contributed approximately AU$45 million, which covered Aspen Medical management of an Ebola treatment centre in Sierra Leone, and a regional Ebola response preparedness package focused on the Indo-Pacific. While the ADF had a minimal role in Australia’s contribution to the Ebola response in West Africa, it is anticipated that they will be involved in a health crisis response within the Pacific region.50 Reflection on the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa demonstrates linkages between the civil-military interaction process model developed for this project and health emergencies in areas of preparation, culture, governance and capability.
9.2.1 Preparation Findings from The University of Sydney research project titled Saving Lives: The civil- military response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa identified that considerable confusion surrounded how humanitarian actors and militaries operated together during the outbreak, despite there being a long history of civil-military interaction in other contexts, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Broad areas where knowledge needed to exist included whether the international health community need militaries to respond to these types of activities, and whether they will have a role to play in the provision of health care such as quarantine, isolation and clinical care.51 There was also a need for actors to have an awareness of the political, economic and social history of affected populations because it informs the response of foreign militaries in nations where there may be a history of hostile actions against domestic armed forces or local populations.52
The importance of building relationships during a preparation phase was also identified, with the WHO's ability to partner with other key response actors, including the UN, the private sector and other non-State actors, being ineffective and causing a delay in the response. It was found that "These relationships cannot be established during crises, but need to be developed when building preparedness."53 The outbreak strongly highlighted the need for greater awareness of the interface between humanitarian and military actors,
50 J. Swann, ‘Early Considerations on Civil-Military Responses to Emerging Diseases: Ebola as a case study.’ Liaison, vol. VII, Fall 2015, p. 20. 51 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 22. 52 ibid 53 World Health Organization, op. cit., p. 24. 310
! including understanding respective roles, functions and capabilities applicable to a health emergency. Similar to preparing for natural disasters, actors needs to have clear and explicit responsibilities and reporting lines that have been trained, practiced and reinforced through simulation exercises to the highest organisational level.54 This training is critical prior to performing duties in the field to mitigate errors and adverse outcomes for affected populations.55
Dr Liu’s sentiment on lacking understanding of military assistance came to fruition, with the both US and UK military missions coming under criticism because it was anticipated governments would deploy personnel capable of providing 'hands on' clinical and skilled in biohazard containment.56 However, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, these expectations differed from what foreign militaries actually delivered, which reflected a knowledge gap between civilian and military actors that can be remediated in a preparation phase.
9.2.2 Culture An independent committee led by Dame Barbara Stockings appointed to review the WHO response concluded in the Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel that the WHO did not have the capacity or organisational culture to effectively manage the outbreak.57 This was because the organisation was assessed to have a ‘technical, normative culture’ that does not have any experience with managing large-scale, long- term and multi-country emergency responses.58 The Report went on to recommend the creation of a single, unified WHO Centre for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response with the head of the centre being "a strong leader and a strategic thinker, with political, diplomatic, crisis coordination, organizational and managerial skills; and able to make sound decisions quickly, and to discern when to move from a situation of normal readiness and alert to rapid response in the field."59
54 ibid, p. 15-18. 55 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 22. 56 ibid, p. 14 citing MSF report and interview data. 57 L. Schnirring, ‘WHO independent panel calls out Ebola response flaws.’ Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy News, 07 July 2015, viewed on 29 December 2019, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2015/07/who-independent-panel-calls-out-ebola-response- flaws 58 World Health Organization, op. cit., p. 13. 59 ibid, p. 16. 311
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More broadly then the WHO, points of cultural dominance emerged when "at different times in Guinea and Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Health was side-lined and played only a nominal role."60 In Sierra Leone, the coordination meetings in the NERC and Commander Unit Briefings (CUB) were observed by respondents of the Saving Lives project as "particularly militarized and masculine spaces."61 Due to this, there were few opportunities for questions, discussion or to challenge the guidance given by military leaders. This meant there was no space for people to "admit failure in specific areas, or those with expertise outside the military to speak up about issues they did not agree with."62
The nature of some civil-military relationships were largely indirect, with autonomy respected and everyone understanding their purpose. The minimal friction observed was due in part to humanitarian actors respecting that the military was an integral part of the response, with differences put aside to work towards a common goal.63 A number of individuals interviewed by practitioners Colleen Forestier et al, reflected that "an essential part of what made the interagency relationships effective was the vagueness with which they were defined allowing a high degree of flexibility to partners."64 These pockets of effective relationships occurred despite many actors never having previously encountering each other under such situations and closeness. The co-location of militaries, International NGOs and NGOs in the same headquarters at local government level alongside DFID and the Ministry of Health may have assisted. As like disaster response, personality was also found to influence civil-military interaction, which again reinforces the importance of ensuring "the right people partake in the right roles at the right time, particularly when it comes to interagency relationships."65
While there were pockets of effective interaction, the changing nature of the response necessitated an evolution in civil-military interaction that did not occur. The early response suited the leadership, decision-making directedness, and hierarchical structure
60 ibid, p. 19. 61 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 16. 62 ibid 63 C. Forestier, A. Cox & S. Horne, ‘Coordination and relationships between organisations during the civil-military international response against Ebola in Sierra Leone: an observational discussion.’ J R Army Med Corps, vol. 162, March 2016, p. 161. 64 ibid, p. 160. 65 ibid, p. 162. 312
! that occurred which aligned to military practices. However, as more organisations arrived, the rates of Ebola slowed, and the response became more systematic, this approach was not suitable. In some cases, it was seen as a 'dictatorship' that negatively impacted relationships, which are instrumental in effective civil-military interaction.66 This highlights the need for military leadership to transition to civilian agencies as soon as possible.
9.2.3 Tailored Response Differences in foreign military approaches occurred during the response to the outbreak, which reinforces how the nature and configuration of a military response can inform civil-military interaction.67 In Liberia, the US military remained separate from the Armed Forces of Liberia, instead working in direct support of USAID. Perhaps as a result of this, it was noted that "no single entity appeared to be in charge and interagency coordination was limited, illustrating the need to improve America's 'whole of government' response."68
In contrast, the British military working in Sierra Leone integrated and embedded personnel within the RSLAF, akin to a liaison officer network, in the initial months of their response. The UK military was observed to engage closely with other actors, including DFID and UK-based actors, to enable coordination however it was noted that they were very much in charge of the national response during the early stages "in all but name."69 The Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel reflected that the UK military had command and control prior to handing over to civilian leadership.70 However, most sources reflect that military personnel worked under civilian leadership in coordination centres, providing effective support to command and control through manning key positions, providing advisors and Chiefs of Staffs.
Organisational approaches to engagement with local community leaders emerged as an essential consideration during the Ebola outbreak. Women were found to be particularly important for this effort, however, they were not mobilized effectively during the
66 C. Forestier, A. Cox & S. Horne, op. cit. 67 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2016. 68 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015. 69 ibid 70 World Health Organization, op. cit., p. 19. 313
! response. As like in natural disaster responses, the engagement of women and women's organizations contributes to changing behaviours and educating communities. A medical anthropologist who worked in the response is quoted in the Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel saying "Ebola is a fire; women are the water. And it is water that puts out the fire."71
9.2.4 Governance Structures The critical factor that shaped the Ebola response was that it was designated as a 'public health emergency.' This triggered a response under the governance of International Health Regulations (IHR) with the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and the subsequent establishment of UNMEER, drawing together health ministries, the WHO, the World Bank, health-focused INGOs and academic health specialists.72 However, the outbreak was considered by many commentators to be a humanitarian crisis requiring a humanitarian response because it occurred in “post-conflict countries with corrupt and ineffective governments, where inadequate basic health care, food insecurity and poverty."73 A 'humanitarian disaster' invokes a different response, which from a humanitarian actor perspective is led by OCHA and activates relatively well-known coordination practices based on the cluster framework. This approach brings together a broader and experienced set of actors, including the World Food Programme (WFP), INGOs, and domestic and foreign militaries.
In terms of establishment of governance structures, the IHR declaration of a PHEIC "caused significant and unjustifiable delays in raising the distress signal for the world to take action."74 Furthermore, in failing to activate a humanitarian disaster, the WHO struggled to coordinate an integrated response to achieve outbreak control and humanitarian activities.75 UNMEER was assessed as being largely symbolic because it "arrived too late, left too soon and did not locate its official headquarters in an affected
71 World Health Organization, op. cit., p. 20 and See J. Swann, op cit., p. 24. ! 72 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2016. 73 K. Bergtora Sandvik, ‘Ebola: A Humanitarian Crisis or a Crisis of Humanitarian Governance?’ Humanitarian Practice Network, 14 October 2014, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://odihpn.org/blog/ebola-a-humanitarian-crisis-or-a-crisis-of-humanitarian-governance/ 74 L. Schnirring, op. cit. 75 ibid 314
! country but instead in Accra, Ghana."76 In the 6-8 weeks it took UNMEER to deploy sufficient personnel, other actors had established their own coordination mechanisms and assumed responsibilities. Furthermore, UNMEER did not implement common or standard humanitarian management processes because it viewed the outbreak as a public health emergency rather than a humanitarian disaster.77 The designation of UNMEER as a public health mission with a 30-60-90 day health target strategy informed the establishment of a '4 Pillars' coordination framework that was a siloed approach inconsistent with the OCHA-led cluster system.78
In initiating UNMEER, the UN established an entirely new and unpractised system in the middle of a response and this caused considerable coordination challenges during the response. 79 Furthermore, in failing to adopt a cluster system, UNMEER did not respond to the broader social and economic consequences arising from the outbreak, including the impact of the crisis on food security, emergency shelter, non-food items and protection. Furthermore, in diverging from standard humanitarian response practices UNMEER created confusion amongst some partner agencies.80 While UNMEER was created to assist with coordinating various UN agencies, the entity failed to provide both leadership and coordination and affected nations were left to take full carriage of their own national response.81 Overall, in terms of governance, the outbreak placed a spotlight on the differences which exist between international systems for responding to health emergencies and humanitarian response, with agreement that they need to better integrated into the future.82
9.2.5 Coordination Mechanisms A briefly touched on above, a number of coordination mechanisms existed at national, regional and local levels during the Ebola response, both prior to and during the existence of UNMEER. A sub-regional Ebola operation coordination centre (SEOCC) was established as an outcome of a Ministerial Meeting held in Accra, Ghana in July 2014
76 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 9. 77 ibid 78 ibid 79 L. Schnirring, op. cit. 80 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 10. 81 ibid 82 World Health Organization, ‘WHO Response to the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel Report.’ 07 July 2015, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ebola-panel- report/en/ 315
! and it was officially opened on 24 July 2014.83 The SEOCC was a platform for governments and agencies to coordinate the international and cross-border aspects of the Ebola response through providing support to national, sub-regional and field level activities.84 A Logistics Cluster was established at the request of the WHO, with personnel deploying to affected countries on 17 August 2014. The Cluster released a West Africa Ebola Outbreak: Concept of Operations on 1 September 2014 to detail its objectives and planned activities of coordination, information management, and logistics services.85 This was followed by the formal activation of the Logistics Cluster in Liberia on 12 September and it was co-led between the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Nations also established and implemented their own structures.
Liberia Liberia, through the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), established a national task force and expert committee to oversee its response. In July 2014, this structure was augmented by a 'purpose-built' incident management system (IMS), which was developed with assistance from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). CDC deployed a team of epidemiologists, data management specialists, emergency management specialists, and health communicators to assist MOHSW implement public health emergency incident management principles along lines of command, operations, logistics, planning, finance/administration, and scientific/public health functions. The response structure was refined in August 2014 to enhance command and control, planning, linkages with country-level response and external partners, and meeting outcomes.
This framework was considered effective, with MOHSW leading and directing the national response effort including the coordination of foreign military assets, INGOs, and
83 World Health Organization, op. cit., p. 25 and World Health Organization, ‘Sub-Regional Ebola Operations and Coordination Centre (SEOCC).’ No date, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.afro.who.int/news/sub-regional-ebola-operations-and-coordination-centre-seocc 84 World Health Organization, op. cit., no. date and O.O, et al, ‘Incident Management Systems are Essential for Effective Coordination of Large Disease Outbreaks: Perspectives from the Coordination of the Ebola Outbreak Response in Sierra Leone.’ Perspective, vol. 4, November 2016, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5117105/pdf/fpubh-04-00254.pdf 85 See Logistics Cluster, ‘West Africa Ebola Outbreak: Concept of Operations.’ 01 September 2014, viewed on 07 January 2020, https://logcluster.org/sites/default/files/logistics_cluster_ebola_outbreak_conops_140901.pdf ! 316
! domestic NGOs. In some cases, intermediary actors were used to facilitate coordination. USAID acted as an intermediary actor between MOHSW and the US military because national command arrangements had the military in support of USAID. As a result USAID would receive requests from MOHSW via IMS meets, with USAID then directing activities to the military using a mission tasking matrix.86
Sierra Leone The Sierra Leone Government, with support from the international humanitarian community, established and implemented two main national coordination frameworks, the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and the National Ebola Response Center (NERC), in response to the outbreak. The EOC was in place from July to September 2014 and the NERC from October 2014 until the end of the outbreak. Within the EOC framework there were three main coordination groups - a national EOC, a Presidential task force, and a national task force. The mechanism was responsible for coordinating the operational and technical aspects of the response, including planning, implementation, supervision, coordination, and monitoring. To achieve the latter, the EOC had six technical components; coordination, surveillance, and laboratory; case management; social mobilization; logistics; and psychosocial care/social protection.
The NERC succeeded the EOC in October 2014 and was considered "more sophisticated and incorporated a civil-military cooperative style of coordination."87 The NERC was located in Freetown, and oversaw District Ebola Response Centres (DERCs) in all 14 districts. In taking part in the NERC and DERC command, the government was able to take the lead in directing and coordination the INGO and NGO responses.88 To strengthen the coordination leadership and address the communication gap between these groups, an Inter-pillar Action and Coordination Team (i-PACT) was established. The Presidential and national task forces continued to operate without any changes. Sierra Leone ministry representatives headed the NERC technical pillars, enabling them to fit with broader UNMEER coordination.
86 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 12. 87 O.O., et al, op. cit., p. 3. 88 C. Forestier, A. Cox & S. Horne, op. cit, p. 159. 317
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The arrival of foreign military assets became an instrumental part of the response, with a direct impact of their involvement being the establishment of more structured command and control arrangements. However, their arrival also resulted in the creation of new committees within the NERC system that some respondents of Saving Lives observed replicated existing domestic structures, particularly at the local level. The example cited was that DERCs duplicated much of the work of the District Medical Offices.89 However, these separate centres were also observed to be necessary to 'upscale' the response.90
The key outcome from coordination framework adopted in Sierra Leone was that humanitarian agencies operated in support of the local government.91 Organisations operating in Sierra Leone adopted pre-identified DFID-funded roles and were expected to adhere to the requirements of the lead agency of each pillar.92 This is not always the case, with humanitarian agencies having a tendency to overwhelm local governments' ability and developing parallel structures to coordinate a response, as was reflected in the case studies.
9.2.6 Information Management The Ebola outbreak strongly reflected the need for robust information management and sharing, especially mapping and geospatial analysis. Understanding the location of people with the virus informed local-level prioritisation, while knowledge of broader patterns and trends was an input into national-level strategic responses.93 GIS analysis was used to turn information into visual maps and pictures that provided analysis of the allocation of resources, the scale of the response and locations of greatest unmet need.94
The role of data in information services was a key lesson identified from the Ebola outbreak, however it is not a new lesson. As like during natural disasters, data sharing was not always straightforward, however there was a willingness to do it effectively as evident by the value of information management being recognised and tools being available. 95 In a situational report, WHO acknowledged the significant problems in its
89 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 16. 90 ibid 91 C. Forestier, A. Cox & S. Horne, op. cit, p. 159. 92 ibid 93 L. Hughes, N. McWilliam & A. Frankland, op. cit., p. 20. 94 ibid, p. 21. 95 ibid, p. 22. 318
! information management, stating that: “the reported fall in the number of new cases in Liberia over the past three weeks is unlikely to be genuine. Rather it reflects a deterioration in the ability of overwhelmed responders to record accurate epidemiological data.”96
Dedicated information management support was provided by MapAction, which had no previous experience in responding to a large-scale health emergency, however had provided information services in Haiti and the Philippines. Over four months, MapAction deployed 11 volunteer Geospatial Information professionals and three paid personnel to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Mali. Remote support was provided during these deployments to OCHA, UNDAC, UNMEER, other UN agencies, NGOs, clusters, remote technical communities and the governments of each country.
MapAction identified four core lessons from their involvement in the Ebola outbreak 1.! Data is a critical element of effective information management 2.! Data is only useful if it informs decisions relevant to the emergency 3.! Being on the ground co-located with service users is essential for understanding their needs and evaluating the relevance and use of emerging data 4.! In an escalating and ongoing emergency, the handover of information management systems that could be easily maintained was essential for continuation of information management.
Notably, the fourth lesson identified by MapAction is directly comparable to the Australian response to Cyclone Winston, where a dedicated handover of information management tools occurred between the JTF and the NDMO. This highlights both the importance of a dedicated information management capability during a response and adherence to governance structures to ensure information is disseminated in line with actors’ needs and requirements.
96 World Health Organization, ‘WHO: Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Report.’ 08 October 2014, p.1, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136020/roadmapsitrep_8Oct2014_eng.pdf;jsessionid=E DA292D7A31DE06478935C470479948E?sequence=1 ! 319
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9.2.7 Unified Purpose Lastly, as like during the disaster response case studies, civil-military interaction during the Ebola outbreak had "an intense focus on a common goal ... each organization involved had a common end goal of 'getting to zero (EVD cases)'. There were no competing interests, priorities or drivers."97 In addition, to counter "the absence of robust health systems at the domestic level and timely civilian-led humanitarian intervention at the international level, civil-military cooperation can prove decisive in responding to health- related humanitarian crises."98
Overall, the civil-military interaction characteristics of the Ebola response and the unity of actors towards a common goal makes the model developed for this project suitable for consideration during pandemics to enhance civil-military interaction.99 This assessment is mirrored in the 2018 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop, which noted that "pandemics represent a particularly constructive area for civil-military coordination. The severity, speed of escalation, and global nature ... offer a powerful foundation of shared incentives."100 The Ebola Outbreak strong reflects how the typology of a crisis informs an international response, however as noted, many of the civil-military interaction characteristics of the response are similar to disaster response. This challenges the paradigm that a type of situation should determine the level, nature and governance of the civil-military interface.
9.3 Operations in Dense Urban Environments - Mosul Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, was under Islamic State rule for three years until Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish Peshmerga forces began offensive operations on 16 October 2016 to reinstate Iraqi control over the Mosul governorate.101 In support of the offensive, the US-led Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF- OIR) comprising Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and others, enabled the ISF through provision of training and advising, and air strikes. The
97 C. Forestier, A. Cox & S. Horne, op. cit, p. 161. 98 A. Kamradt-Scott, et al, op. cit., 2015, p. 19. 99 A. Levine & D. Polatty, op. cit., p. 18. 100 ibid 101 Center for Civilians in Conflict and InterAction, ‘Protection of Civilians in Mosul: Identifying Lessons for Contingency Planning.’ Roundtable, 17 October 2017, p. 1, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/civic-interaction-protection-of-civilians-in- mosul-october-2017_final.pdf 320
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Iraqi-organized forces included 30,000 ISF, People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF), and Kurdish Peshmerga Forces. The ISF led the response inside eastern and western Mosul city, while the PMF and Peshmerga held territory outside the city. In terms of military progress, East Mosul was retaken on 18 January 18 2017, with operations to retake western Mosul commencing on 19 February 2017. Western Mosul had a dense population of 750,000-800,000 people, old buildings, and narrow streets which made military operations challenging and placed civilians at heightened risk. Victory over the Islamic State in Mosul was declared by Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi on 10 July 2017.102
Operations in Mosul provide an opportunity to examine civil-military interaction in dense urban environments – the UN-led humanitarian response assisted more than 1.7 million people since the commencement of military operations. Protection of civilians was at the forefront of the concept of operations for Mosul agreed by Iraqi and Coalition forces. Through ‘train, advise and assist’ and ‘build partner capacity’ missions, coalition military personnel worked with elite Iraqi forces in preparation to conduct urban operations and civilian protection. This included comprehensive humanitarian contingency planning, resource mobilization, and response preparedness measures by humanitarian actors under the leadership of the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator. While this investment saved lives and eased the impact of conflict on civilians, the approach was impacted by delays in funding to implement plans to recruit staff, scale-up teams and build camps before Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) arrived.103
Operations in Mosul were characterised by: •! Tactics of Islamic State Fighters: The Islamic State booby-trapped buildings and roads, forced civilians into areas of fighting, used people as human shields, killed anyone attempting to escape, and often denied civilians access to medical care and food once operations commenced.104 •! Munitions: The use of chemical weapons, mortars, rockets and improvised
102 ibid 103 ibid, p. 2. 104 Amnesty International, ‘At Any Cost: The Civilian Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq.’ No date, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/07/at-any-cost- civilian-catastrophe-in-west-mosul-iraq/ 321
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explosive devices (IEDs) by the Islamic State.105 ISF and Coalition use of large bombs, artillery, rockets, and mortars with wide-area effects in densely populated areas. Some units of Iraqi forces used improvised rocket-assisted munitions and unguided artillery.106 •! Complications for civilians wishing to stay or flee: Civilians faced the complex choice of having to stay in Mosul and fleeing, with both options having life- threatening. The lack of safe exit routes from the city proved extremely hazardous to civilians in the latter part of military operations, especially noting the indiscriminate Islamic State tactics.107
One of the key lessons drawn from Mosul was the need for the “Clear articulation of desired outcomes from the outset will ensure all actors operate with a common understanding of strategy and goals.”108 This experience mirrors the foundation of the process model, where operational commitment results in clearly articulated desired outcomes, overall strategy, and objectives which enables actors to effectively communicate and prioritise their efforts.109
9.3.1 Preparation In terms of preparation, some actors involved in the humanitarian response during the Mosul Offensive "lacked experience with the operational realities of an intense military operation and large-scale civilian harm in urban areas."110 Key knowledge deficiencies were the types of measures need to be taken during conflict to minimise harm to civilians, including how to engage with other actors in support of these measures. Inexperience and knowledge gaps were exacerbated by the absence of a dedicated civil-military function in some NGOs, which collectively hindered the ability of humanitarians to directly engage with military actors, and build and apply knowledge of military
105 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Iraq: ICRC strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons around Mosul,’ 03 March 2017, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/iraq-icrc-strongly-condemns-use-chemical-weapons-around-mosul 106 Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq/US-Led Coalition: Weapons Choice Endangers Mosul Civilians.’ 08 June 2017, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/08/iraq/us-led-coalition- weapons-choice-endangers-mosul-civilians 107 Center for Civilians in Conflict and InterAction, op. cit., p. 3. 108 ibid, p. 12. 109 ibid 110 Ibid, p. 10. 322
! operations to implement civilian protection measures.111 As this study showed during the case studies, knowledge and implementation of civil-military engagement is achieved through having a dedicated and deliberate civil-military interface, including coordination mechanisms, and meetings between NGOs and military counterparts.
As like the previous civil-military interaction situations covered in this project, the role of individuals played a ‘notable’ role during the Mosul Offensive. Senior UN leadership integrated into the response, achieving “a significant level of empowered leadership in both the design and implementation of the response … UN functions in lock step with the national government.”112 Individuals in key roles in the CMCoord Unit, WHO, and donor offices were also found to significantly influence operational outcomes beyond their function or institutional role.113 In contrast, other “humanitarian actors were not always able to adapt to the fluid dynamics as it became clear that alternative scenarios were playing out”114 which arose during periods of uncertainties about how people would flee the city for camps or other communities.
9.3.2 Dedicated Civil-Military Interaction Functions The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) and InterAction produced a report, titled Protection of Civilians in Mosul: Identifying Lessons for Contingency Planning following a Roundtable discussion in June 2017 that brought together Iraqi embassy officials, US policy makers and military officials, and humanitarian actors with experience in Iraq. The focus was on the measures adopted by actors to reflect on the protection issues that arose from military operations in Mosul. This part of the chapter draws heavily on this report as it covers civil affairs and civil-military aspects of operations.
The ISF's operational focus on protection of civilians placed international humanitarian law (IHL) at the centre of its concept of operations at all levels. This approach required humanitarian and military actors to make a significant investment in civil-military
111 Center for Civilians in Conflict and InterAction, op. cit., p. 10. 112 H. Fox, et al, Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016-2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges, Medecins Sans Frontieres, March 2018, p. 46, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/mosul_report_3_20_18.pdf 113 ibid 114 Center for Civilians in Conflict and InterAction, op. cit., p. 9. 323
! interaction. As a result, actors had dedicated civil-military interaction functions - UN OCHA's Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) and Civil Affairs for civilian and military actors respectively. The capacity of the UN's Civil-Military Coordination unit was increased and it played a central role in the response, leading to greater coordination between organisations. Its structure was adapted to the situation, which saw the unit report directly to the Humanitarian Coordination rather than to the OCHA Head Office, as is usually the case. Civil Affairs was also reinforced, with US Central Command (CENTCOM) adding a dedicated civil affairs staff to its Kuwait base in August 2016.115 Overall, these capabilities were found to effectively de-conflict activities between humanitarian actors and military forces. However, there were some limitations identified including that the functions did not strengthen interaction with armed actors with regards to the protection of civilians.116
While robust, UN-led civil-military coordination suffered from limited capacity and opportunity to engage on behalf of involved NGOs. Some NGOs reflected that they did not maintain direct communications with military actors, either Coalition or ISF, which resulted in weak engagement, and in some cases reduced information flow to NGOs on civilian movements to enable them to adequately prepare for their arrival. Some humanitarians involved in the response noted OCHA's role should include broader oversight and management of civil-military coordination, especially to gain engage non- traditional actors like the PMF. 117
Military forces similarly suffered from limited capacity. A reason why CTS forces were considered well-suited for operations in Mosul was that they had embedded Civil Affairs personnel during their training. However, this capability did not deploy forward which resulted in a lack of Civil Affairs capacity at the tactical level during operations.118
This highlights there is opportunity for an increase in direct interaction between NGOs and military actors, especially on issues directly relating to operations, which in this case was civilian protection. The strengthening of civil-military coordination mechanisms is
115 ibid, p. 7. 116 ibid, p. 10. 117 ibid, p. 11. 118 ibid, p. 10. 324
! considered "critical for systematic efforts to improve access and engage with armed actors on large-scale coordination ... also necessary for NGOs to maintain direct communication lines with armed actors in order to ensure acceptance of their roles, and to establish and maintain access to populations in need." 119
This commitment would address some of the passage of information challenges that occurred, including that Coalition pre-positioned 'first response' measures, such as medical kits in public sector health facilities and supplies in areas of anticipated displacement, which was not communicated and few humanitarian actors were aware of these efforts.120
9.3.3 Coordination Mechanisms Coordination was enabled through a Humanitarian Concept of Operations, which was praised by the UN because it complemented Government of Iraq planning. Where possible, Coalition forces coordinated with humanitarian actors via UN-led, civil- military coordination mechanisms and they largely stayed within the policy that civilian organisations, not the Coalition, would provide humanitarian aid directly to the population.121 However, different perspectives emerged, with some having the opinion that the Humanitarian Concept did not adequately distinguish between humanitarian and non-humanitarian objectives. This “effectively meant that the ‘humanitarian response was embedded in the military response.’” 122 Additional coordination challenges arose, including that government and humanitarian preparations to manage displacement flows were affected by variances in battle rhythms, with military operations starting before camps and screening sites had been completed.123
9.3.4 Information Management As like other civil-military situations, the importance of information management arose. Humanitarian actors were hampered in their ability to respond because they did not have a firm understanding of the situation and dynamics due to limited information collection, management, and analysis. This could have been addressed through establishing local
119 ibid, p. 13.! 120 ibid, p. 7. 121 ibid 122 H. Fox, et al, op. cit, p. 14. 123 Center for Civilians in Conflict and InterAction, op. cit., p. 9. 325
! information sources, which would have helped humanitarian actors assess needs and adapt to local operational challenges.124 Further impacting information management was that relevant and timely information from the field/tactical level did not always make it to headquarters levels to achieve ongoing information sharing and advocacy between actors to support higher levels of the response.125 A specific example identified was humanitarian actors would have been better prepared for the spontaneous flow of people with improved communication with military officials from the Coalition and ISF.126
9.4 Summary A brief examination of civil-military relationships that formed during counterinsurgency operations, pandemics, and operations in dense urban environments reflects that the factors which influence interaction are mostly consistent between operational contexts. Interaction was impacted by a lack preparation and knowledge of military capabilities, the inconsistent application of governance structures, failing to appreciate comparative advantage, and a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities within a broader strategic mission. Where there were dedicated functions, a focus on building relationships, and flexible leadership and practices, interaction was enhanced. Unity between civilian and military actors arose during the Ebola response and the Mosul Offensive, reflecting that security or conflict is not a significant contributor to the nature of civil-military interaction as existing literature reflects.127
9.5 Civil-Military Interaction Models This project now turns to examining existing models of civil-military interaction to compare and contrast the process model developed for this project with the intent to strengthen internal validity through addressing rival explanations. One of key paradigms that shapes civil-military interaction is the UN-CMCoord model of coordination, which was briefly introduced in Chapter One. UN-CMCoord is considered a model and function within this project, as reflected above where it was used by the UN in the Mosul Offensive. It is defined as:
124 ibid, p. 11. 125 ibid, p. 13. 126 Ibid, p. 9. 127 See A. Madiwale & K. Virk, ‘Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods.’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011, p. 1104, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.icrc.org/es/doc/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale- virk.pdf! 326
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The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate purse common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilited by liaison and common training. 128
The model maintains a clear distinction between civil and military spheres, which is achieved through actors adopting varying levels of coordination, from cooperation to coexistence, based on the level of violence within the operational environment. The key roles within this model are information sharing, task division, and planning.129 CMCoord is distinguished from the military function of CIMIC, where interaction is conducted to support a military mission, by providing civilian actors a means to interact with military actors that maintains a humanitarian imperative.
On the one side, co-existence minimises competition and conflict to enable actors to work in the same geographical area while on the other, cooperation focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of combined efforts between civilian and military actors.130 This means civil-military cooperation, defined within this construct as joint operations, decreases as operations progress towards combat (Figure 39 below). Actors adopt strategies, ranging from co-location and interlocutor, to achieve specified outcomes dependent on coordination aims (Figure 38).
128 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination, UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, Version 2.0, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018, p. 6, viewed on 05 January 2020, https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/%5BE- Version%5D%20UNCMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%202.0%20%282018%29.pdf 129 ibid 130 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Independent Evaluation of OCHA’s Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Final Report – Volume 1. December 2012, p. 1, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/22442 3/evidence-ocha-evaluation.pdf 327
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Figure 38: UN-CMCoord model of coordination131
Figure 39: Key Concepts of UN-CMCoord132
The specific characteristic of the UN-CMCoord model that is relevant to this project is that the model reflects that civil-military interaction is dependent on a type of operation, situation or context. This is based on the premise that "the way in which a crisis is characterized matters for the pattern of civil-military relations that subsequently develop."133 Reflection of the 2010 Pakistan floods identified that this concept manifests
131 Australian Civil-Military Centre, Same Space – Different Mandates, A Civil-Military-Police Guide to Stakeholder in International Disaster and Conflict Response. April 2015, p.7. 132 Civil-Military Coordination Section, UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian, v 2.0, p. 100, viewed on 31 December 2019, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5d147c4b4.pdf 133 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, ‘Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods.’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011, p. 1104, 328
! in behaviour. Actors who perceived they were responding to a natural disaster had a laxer approach to civil-military relations than those who viewed the response as part of a larger complex emergency and applied a stricter approach of the use of military assets.134
This model is applied through five sets of guidelines that focus on different operational settings:135 1.! Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – 'Oslo Guidelines' (2007) 2.! Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil-Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies - 'MCDA Guidelines' (2003) 3.! Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2001) 4.! IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies (2004) 5.! Country Specific Guidance: country-specific civil-military guidelines are developed by the humanitarian community for complex operating environments, including Iraq (2004 and 2008), Liberia (2006), Afghanistan (May 2008), International Security Assistance Force SOPS Afghanistan (2011), Sudan (2008), Chad (2009), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Pakistan (2010), and Haiti (2011).136 They serve two purposes: firstly building consensus within the humanitarian community on the use of military assets; and secondly, providing an agreed framework between civilian and military actors on the nature of their interaction.
As like the broader UN-CMCoord model under which they are enacted, these guidelines seek to reduce military involvement in humanitarian efforts. All direct engagement between actors is discouraged, with indirect engagement with militaries (such as
viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.icrc.org/es/doc/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale- virk.pdf 134 ibid 135 Civil-Military Coordination Section, UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, op. cit. 136 V. Metcalfe & M. Berg, ‘Country-specific civil-military coordination guidelines,’ Overseas Development Institute, August 2012, p. 1, viewed on 29 December 2019, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7767.pdf 329
! logistical support or engineering works of critical infrastructure) being a 'last resort' only to be used in 'exceptional' or 'unavoidable' circumstances.137
As reflected throughout this project, civil-military relationships are influenced by internal factors within actors rather than operational context. All of the situations examined in this project - natural disasters, counterinsurgency, pandemics and operations in dense urban environments - were found to consist of two core components - a technical response to meet needs arising from a specific situation (e.g. health, logistics or protection) and coordination of actors responding to address these needs. This means that context can be addressed, firstly through building and applying knowledge, secondly by tailoring a response, which are both components of the process model developed during this project.
The other factors that influence civil-military interaction are unconnected to the response situation, including organisational commitment, preparation, knowledge management, tailored capability and agreed and practiced governance. While it is acknowledged that the UN-CMCoord model enables adherence to humanitarian principles while ensuring actors can pursue their own goals, the use of the model is limited because it does not provide guidance or mitigate against the broad range of external factors that influence civil-military interaction. Arguably, this limits the use of the UN-CMCoord model as a holistic approach to effective civil-military interaction.
Instead, the model developed for this project is more applicable because it enables actors to build and apply agile and adaptive practices, processes and behaviours commensurate to any situation they encounter. This is evidenced by the most recent example in this project, the Mosul Offensive, reflecting progress by civilian and military actors towards achieving unity through dedicated functions and integrating efforts despite being considered a combat situation.
The second comparable model identified within the literature was developed by Sebastiaan Rietjens.138 Rietjens used a literature review on civil-military cooperation and
137 ibid, p. 2. 138 S. Rietjens, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?’ PhD diss., University of Twente, 2006. 330
! cooperative arrangements to build a process model to "support the execution of civil- military cooperation at the local level in peace support operations in response to a complex emergency"139 (Figure 40 below). The literature that informed this model were theories on cooperative arrangements, strategic alliances, networks and public private partnerships, with the author viewing civil-military cooperation through a network perspective with characteristics that fit with a pragmatic and ad-hoc approach to cooperation that matched civil-military cooperation in practice.140
The model was confirmed through an examination of three case studies based on cooperation between Dutch military forces and civilian actors in the following operations: 1.! International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, from February 2003 until January 2004; 2.! Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Baghlan, Afghanistan from August 2004 until July 2005; and 3.! Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion as part of the Kosovo Force in Kosovo from June 1999 until June 2000.
The 25 specific partnerships considered within the case studies included the removal of mines and explosives, building infrastructure (schools, fire stations and houses), and the training of policemen.
Figure 40: Process model for civil-military cooperation at the local level 141
139 ibid, p. xi. 140 ibid, p. 194. ! 141 ibid, xii. 331
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Similarities exist between Riejens' model and UN-CMCoord in terms of decision to cooperate, partner selection, and partnership design. Firstly, actors decide to cooperate based on respective missions and mandates after analysis of strengths and weaknesses that informs competitive advantage. Secondly, actors select partners to cooperate with through task-related criteria (complementary resources, compatible strategies and objectives, and suitable environmental conditions)142 and partner-related criteria (personal fit, compatible cultures, prior experiences with and reputation of partner, level of commitment, flexibility, and use of force).143 Lastly, in terms of partnership design ensuring defined roles and responsibilities, agreement on clear and realistic objectives, keeping and protecting core competencies, joint value creation, and partnership structure.144
Parallels can also be drawn between Rietjens' model and the process model developed during this project in terms of decision to cooperate, partnership implementation, transfer of tasks and responsibilities, and partnership evaluation. The decision to cooperate is as above. In implementing a partnership, actors need to focus on staffing, bringing together different cultures, autonomy to make operational decisions, and maintaining relationships. 145 When transitioning out of an operation, military actors need to transfer tasks and responsibilities to suitable civilian actors to mitigate against dependence on military assets and ensure long-term development. Evaluation of partnerships enables accountability and the process of lessons learned, and Reitjens developed an evaluation framework that provides criteria to assess the performance of civil-military partnerships, which was fully detailed in Chapter Six.
As like emerged in this project during the case studies, Reitjens identified that civil- military cooperation can be influenced by the following: •! Within military institutions: o! an absence of useful guidelines distilled from doctrine on conducting civil-military interaction
142 ibid, p.45. 143 ibid 144 ibid, p. 61. 145 ibid, p. 62. 332
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o! limited experience and expertise regarding civil-military interaction o! lack of knowledge transfer •! Ad-hoc nature of civil-military partnerships: o! lack of situational awareness of actors involved o! limited transfer of contacts with civilian actors between military rotations o! inaccessibility of military information o! limited preparations to transfer tasks and responsibilities after completion of activities •! Involvement of civilian actors in assistance activities: o! increased performance due to knowledge and expertise sharing o! local population is not fully involved o! decreased sustainability o! a lack of cohesion with social structures o! a lack of ownership o! mismatch between the assistance activities and actual needs
Based on this understanding of civil-military interaction, Rietjens made a number of recommendations, including improving military training, integrating civil-military cooperation into the overall military mission, increasing pre-deployment preparation, increasing women in higher rank positions, and increasing involvement of local population and humanitarian organisations throughout the entire process. Much of the knowledge identified by Reitjens in his thesis emerged during the course of this project, including the nature of civil-military interaction, the factors that influence interaction, and the outcomes that civil-military interaction achieves.
A similar conclusion is drawn from this project - despite the nature of the operational environment, civil-military interaction is largely controlled by partners and the manner in which they approach interaction, which in-turn heavily influences the effectiveness of partnerships.146 While the foundational knowledge was very similar between the projects, my process model differs from Rietjens by specifying how and when civilian and military actors should interact to meet the needs of an affected nation.!In doing so, it starts to fill the gap in current literature on the conditions necessary for a civil-military relationship
146 Ibid, p. xiii 333
! to succeed147 and contribute to answering the remaining questions from Rietjens’ work on factors that lead to improved civil-military cooperation, forms of interaction to maximise effectiveness, and the levels of command where interaction should take place at.148
9.6 Summary Civil-military interaction is situation dependent, however these situations are increasingly becoming complex, and in some cases unanticipated, as the international response to Ebola demonstrated. In conducting a contrast and comparison between different contexts and civil-military interaction models, this chapter reflects that the factors that influence civil-military relationships are largely consistent. As the same factors and outcomes influence and emerge from civil-military interaction, it is assessed that the model developed for this project may be applied more broadly than disaster response. This is because the model supports the application of flexible and adaptive cultural, preparation, governance and capability principles. These principles largely centre on preparation to understand comparative advantage, respecting the primacy of the affected nation (s), agile and evolving response leadership, dedicated civil-military interaction functions, and engrained governance structures, all of which emerged as necessary during all the civil-military interaction situations examined in this project. !
147 ibid 148 R. Egnell, ‘Reviews: Politics and the Military: S.J.H. Rietjens, Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?’ International Sociology, 03 September 2010, vol. 25, no. 5, p. 742. ! 334
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Chapter Ten
Conclusion & Recommendations
This project commenced with the aim to determine if there is a new way for civilian and military actors to work together during Australian responses to overseas natural disasters. It drew inspiration from the words of Elhadj As Sy, IFRC Secretary General, who identified in 2016 that there is a need for "a new way of working together ... beyond our institutional priorities, step out from our silos and to commit to working together in a spirit of true collaboration."1 This strategic thinking was placed into the context of civil- military interaction in an effort to build knowledge that brings together civilian and military actors with a unified purpose to assist affected nations.
As the project progressed, the need for research to better understand civil-military interaction has only become clearer. In August 2018, over one hundred attendees including humanitarian practitioners, academicians, and military leaders, participated in a 'Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop.' The Workshop explored challenges to humanitarian civil-military coordination in natural disaster, complex emergencies, and security cooperation activities. One of the significant points to emerge was that
"the scarcity of academic research in the humanitarian civil-military coordination field was a major concern. Without greater scientific research, these issues with most likely remain unresolved, and each new situation will be handled on a case by case basis rather than through uniform sets of rules and norms. Academic research arguably presents the greatest hope for understanding how civil-military coordination can be improved."2
However, despite the increasing, and at times, unanticipated need for civilian and military actors to come together in response to humanitarian crises, there has been limited
1 E. As Sy, ‘Resilience: saving lives today, investing in tomorrow,’ in World Disasters Report: Resilience: saving lives today, investing in tomorrow, D. Sanderson & A. Sharma (eds), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2016, p. 8. 2 A. Levine & D. Polatty, ‘August 2018 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop Summary Report’ Workshop Reports, 3, 2018, p. 5. 335
! movement in academic research on civil-military interaction. This project partially steps into this gap to answer the research question:
What civil-military interaction process model supports the conduct of an Australian response to international natural disasters?
To enable answering the overarching question, the following sub-questions were addressed: 1) How, and to what end, is civil-military interaction employed during disaster relief operations? 2) How does civil-military interaction contribute to tactical task accomplishment, operational progress and strategic objectives during disaster relief operations? 3) What outcomes does civil-military interaction generate for the military, the affected nation and civilian actors during disaster relief operations? 4) What barriers to effective civil-military interaction exist, for both civilian and military actors?
The purpose of this study was to build knowledge of civil-military interaction during natural disasters to move past the current discourse on interaction being heavily influenced by incompatible civilian and military organisational cultures, and a type of situation or environmental context. As such, I argue that civil-military interaction needs to begin before actors work together in the field to avoid the ad hoc relationships that form either out of necessity or at life-threatening points, as occurred in the West Africa Ebola Outbreak. The world is becoming more complex due to the impact of climate change and the vulnerability of people in dense urban environments and megacities – knowledge and relationships, the foundation of the process model presented, are agued to be a critical part of an effective response to uncertain and unpredicted situations.
Due to my deployment on two of the case studies and involvement in organisational learning as an operations analyst, the independence and rigour of the research may be questioned. This criticism may arise because I became an integral part of the research and leveraged my experience to request participation of ADF members in the project. This raises the consideration that I may have commenced the project with known results based on my experience and may have subconsciously guided research participants 336
! towards these results, thereby confirming my expectations. Known as the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy,’ this may cause the scientific value of the project to be questioned.3 However, without direct linkages into the ADF and knowledge of military practices, processes and literature, this project could not have been completed to the depth it has been.
Lastly, because I was visiting communities that had been impacted by natural disaster and re-living my personal experiences during data collection, the quantity of interviews became influenced by a need to manage emotional fatigue and burnout. To maintain rigour in the research, operational documentation was used. Unexpectedly, this proved more effective because it provided the specific details of civil-military coordination which was proving difficult to capture verbally due to the period of time between my research and the case studies.
In saying this, my project directly captures the voices of two populations that are not prevalent in discourse on disaster management – local communities impacted by natural disaster and the ADF. In the case of local communities, it was identified during fieldwork in Ormoc, Philippines and Koro Island, Fiji that I was the sole researcher to return to these communities to conduct follow-up. While researchers visited in the aftermath, there has been no opportunity for communities to provide their insight into the longevity and long-term effectiveness of response efforts to meet their needs. Secondly, militaries are recognised as a difficult population to study4 due to the classification of their activities and documents, and restrictions in accessing bases and locations to speak with them. In this way, my project brings valuable insight to civil-military interaction because it goes someway to capture the breadth and depth of actors that respond to natural disasters.
10.1 Civil-Military Interaction In line with existing literature, this project reflects that civil-military interaction is unique to a situation, characterised more by uncertainty than predictability despite the extensive array of policy, recommended practices, doctrine and operating procedures in place. Due to the short-notice requirements to respond to natural disasters, there was little
3 See L. Krusenvik, ‘Using Case Studies as a Scientific Method: Advantages and Disadvantages.’ Halmstad University, p.7, viewed on 06 January 2020, http://www.diva- portal.se/smash/get/diva2:1054643/FULLTEXT01.pdf ! 4 J. Soeters, P. Sheilds & S. Rietjens, ‘Introduction’ in Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies, Routledge, 2014, p. 3. 337
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consistency found in terms of the people who deployed. Similarly, there was no consistency found in the coordination structures and practices established between any of the cases examined in this study.
This means that there is no blueprint for civil-military coordination. Instead, civilian and military actors need to be able to shift into "rapid decision-making and action ... adapting and adjusting resource allocation, methods of work and information practices"5 using appropriate governance structures and supported by organisational knowledge.
In developing the model at the core of this project to build these traits within actors, three Australian responses to overseas natural disasters - Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Cyclone Pam, Cyclone Winston – were described in-depth using data collected from literature, semi-structured interviews, and a period of fieldwork. Cross-case analysis identified a set of codes, which were turned into a consolidated list of factors that influence civil- military interaction (Table 24) under broad themes of culture, preparation, capability and governance. Placing these factors into broader literature, in line with Eisenhardt’s roadmap for building theory from case studies, identified that many have been captured in existing literature. This reflects that, while the facets of civil-military interaction are unique to each situation, the factors that influence effective interaction are largely consistent and driven by organisational culture, preparation, capability and governance. A summary is provided here to highlight the factors that underpin the process model at the core of this project.
Culture Preparation Capability Governance Relationships Training & Exercises Dedicated functions Coordination Mechanisms Command & Control National, Regional and Co-location Operating Procedures Cultural Context Decision-making Knowledge & Experience Gender Participation Information Management Strategic Mission Immediate Response Teams Accreditation Civil-Military Teams
Table 24: Factors that influence civil-military interaction during disaster response
5 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, July 2015, p. 6, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/ebola-panel-report/en/ 338
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10.1.1 Culture Culture in this project was defined as the breadth of practices, structures and capabilities that on organisation puts in place to pursue its purpose and goals. Organisational culture informs operating procedures, such as templates and battle rhythms/routines, as well as capabilities acquired and maintained.6 The influence of culture on civil-military interaction was first touched upon in Chapter Two, where five perspectives of military involvement in disaster response (utilitarian, security-strategic, militarisation, functional- humanitarian, and rejection-isolation) were introduced to reflect how organisational perspective informs the way in which civilian and military actors interact. It is clear that an organisation’s values, assumptions, and behaviours impact its relations with external partners.7 Five factors emerged from the case studies and broader literature as directly influencing civil-military interaction - relationships, leadership, command & control, decision-making and mission.
Relationships: Individuals are at the core of effective civil-military interaction. Their traits, training, knowledge, experience, motivation and access to organisational memory influenced the nature and effectiveness of relationships formed. Trust, built through face-to-face respectful dialogue, is especially critical in building and maintaining relationships with Pacific Island Countries. A lack of trust between partners impedes collaborative and cooperative relationships, which reduces information sharing, hampers timely and informed decision-making, and increases the risk of duplication of efforts.
Command & Control: The command and control structure adopted during a response needs to be agile and adaptive. This includes how decisions will be made between civilian and military actors, both within an Australian response and in conjunction with external civilian actors. Uncertainty in ADF command and
6 A. Baumann, ‘Clash of Organisational Culture? The Challenge of Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Stabilisation Operations.’ The RUSI Journal, vol. 153, no. 6, December 2008, p. 72. 7 M. Gottwald, Competing in the humanitarian marketplace: UNHCR’s organizational culture and decision-making processes. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Research Paper No. 190, October 2010, p. 30, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4cb55c0ec.pdf ! 339
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control arrangements being establishment, such as the formation of Joint Task Force, can cause issues with coordination and control of force elements.
Decision-Making: Civilian and military actors hold decision-making at different levels, with examples of ‘tightly controlled’ decision-making emerging from the Australian response to Cyclone Winston in Fiji. This approach can delay decisions while also increasing the risk of misinformed decisions because of poor information flow (quality and quantity) to a single person. Shared leadership, also known as delegation, was found to influence civil-military interaction because it enabled actors on the ground to make decisions based on current information, and in-turn, optimise the use of assets.
Strategic Mission: Australian responses to overseas natural disasters would benefit from having a specified and clear strategic mission, and where possible be aligned to broader regional development goals. A strategic mission is achieved through disciplined effort (planning and conduct) that sets priorities, ensures actors work towards common goals and intended outcomes/results, and adjusts operational direction to meet an affected nation’s needs. The ADF was found to have operational missions in all three case studies, however no evidence could be located that their efforts were part of a broader strategic action plan.
10.1.2 Preparation Dedicated and resourced preparation between civilian and military actors, ideally within a broader Australian disaster management framework, is critical to support effective civil-military interaction during a natural disaster response. Preparation varied between the case studies, with no dedicated disaster response exercise identified within the ADF training and exercise continuum. Some interagency exercising is conducted within a non-combatant or humanitarian assistance scenario, however these activities do not fully expose ADF personnel to the breadth of civilian actors external to an Australian response, such as the UN and NGOs, and their position on working with militaries.
Training and Exercises: Collective training and exercises, that includes simulation through testing disaster response plans, brings together civilian and military actors to build experience and start relationship building. Simulation 340
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enables actors to apply and test existing governance, including operating procedures, to identify and remediate gaps. While there were differing opinions from military personnel about dedicated training for disaster response, it was identified that dedicated exercise will support the development of a baseline Australian JTF that brings certainty to command and control of a response.
National and Regional Context: A consistent theme that emerged from all three case studies was the need for ADF personnel to receive cultural awareness training or a cultural briefing covering religious considerations, community structures, and indigenous relationship structures, for example the Wantok system, and any impact on decision-making. The type and maturity of an affected nation’s coordination and logistical structures is also beneficial national context to support effective integration of Australian civilian and military actors into existing structures and reducing duplication of coordination mechanisms.
Knowledge and Experience: As first introduced in Chapter One, a myriad of guidelines, frameworks, operating procedures and practices surround disaster management and civil-military interaction. Individuals benefit from having knowledge of coordination structures and procedures, including a process found critical for effective civil-military interaction – the request for military assistance process known as ‘Request for Assistance.’
10.1.3 Capability As reflected throughout this project, civil-military interaction requires dedicated and systematic effort in a range of areas, achieved through tailoring the configuration, functionality, timeliness and location of an Australian response to support effective civil- military interaction. The factors that arose under this theme demonstrates how, and to what end, civil-military interaction is employed during disaster response operations.
Dedicated Functions: Civilian and military actors benefit from having a function dedicated to conducting engagement with counterparts. As noted, these functions can take many forms and no specific form was found to be more effective than another, with all leading to information flow between actors. However, one of the challenges in this area is that military functions, such as CIMIC and Civil Affairs, 341
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have come to represent all facets of civil-military interaction instead of representing a function within a broader relationship.
Co-location: The benefits of co-location of civilian and military actors emerged from all three case studies, with the co-location of DFAT and ADF personnel found to very effective because it supported planning, decision-making and prioritisation of military assets to meet an affected nations’ needs.
Gender Participation: The participation of female ADF members in all three responses had a positive impact on civil-military interaction, most notably through engaging local women in communities to identify and meet their needs.
Immediate Response Teams: Rapid response teams, including CRT, SRT, reconnaissance teams and a JTF advance party, were found to be critical for civil- military interaction because they formed forming relationships with affected nation authorities and provided information back to Australia on the situation on the ground. This information flow supports decision-making on the need for additional capability in response an affected nations’ needs.
Civil-Military Teams: Civil-military teaming to conduct needs assessments, both within an Australian response and with external civilian actors, was found to be a very effective capability to support the needs of an affected nation. In the Philippines, DFAT-ADF teaming resulted in local needs being heard, timely and informed decisions made to provide assistance, and the relay of tasks directly to military personnel who would complete the tasks. In Vanuatu and Fiji, civil- military teaming saw civilian actors using military assets to complete needs assessment, which significantly shortened the time to conduct the assessments. Teaming also addresses one of the main concerns raised by humanitarians that “the methods used by military authorities to undertake assessments and consultations with local communities may challenge their ability to provide assistance to the most vulnerable in an accountable and impartial way.”8
8 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, ‘Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods.’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011, p. 1087, viewed on 30 December 2019, https://www.icrc.org/es/doc/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale-virk.pdf 342
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10.1.4 Governance As detailed in Chapter One and outlined in-depth in Chapter Six, civil-military interaction is informed by a broad range of strategic, regional and national policy, guidelines, frameworks and recommended practices. However, many of these are non- binding, more importantly they were found to be inconsistently applied. The need for civilian and military actors to cross-reference, practice and adhere to aligned or agreed governance emerged as a strong theme from the case studies and broader literature.
Coordination Mechanisms: A variety of means are available to civilian and military actors to enable coordination during a natural disaster response. The case studies reflect consistent use of the cluster system, liaison officers and key leadership engagement. However inconstancy was identified in the use of other mechanisms including a CMOC, MNCC, HuMOCC and OSOCC, and teams to support coordination, including Humanitarian Teams and UNDAC. These mechanisms are critical to ensure oversight and coordination of actors arriving into a nation and actors need to work towards predictability in this area.
Operating Procedures: Inconsistency was also identified in the application of operating procedures between the case studies, with the use MNF SOPS at the JTF- level occurring in two of the case studies. Furthermore, no publicly available procedures to support a whole-of-government Australian response was identified from the case studies or a broader literature search, with DFAT and the ADF appearing to maintain separate operating procedures. Aligned and practice operating procedures support systematic civil-military interaction and priorisation of tasks and use of military assets.
Information Management: As emerged from existing literature, effective civil- military interaction is supported by actors being able to learn and adapt. This highlights the importance of civilian and military actors managing information to monitor and track the delivery of aid and provision of assistance. Robust information management ensures transparency and accountability, and visibility of available assets.
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Accreditation: The case studies strongly reflected the need an affected nation to be able to regulate and manage responders and donations to achieve effective civil- military interaction. Examples of teams and organisations arriving and deploying straight to an affected area, without registering with national or local authorities, were identified in all three case studies. As like other governance structures, there was no consistent application of a tool or practice to register and monitor the arrival of actors. While it is acknowledged this is a difficult process, respecting the cultural and national context should see actors adhere to accreditation and registration requirements.
10.2 Framing Effective Civil-Military Interaction At the core of this project is enabling civilian and military actors to come together to meet the needs of a nation affected by a natural disaster. By examining civil-military interaction through this lens, this famed how effective civil-military interaction was determined. Based on this, a list of outcomes from effective civil-military interaction was identified from the cross-case pattern search.
• Mutual understanding, trust and unity of effort • Relationship-focused Culture • Shared responsibility
• Pre-established relationships • Regional, national and cultural understanding Preparation • Agile and adaptive thinking • Clear and rehearsed plans, roles & responsibilities • Dedicated and systematic interaction • Accountability and predictability • Common situational awareness and understanding • Oversight of available foreign military assets Governance • Aid is documented, prioritised and accounted for • Military assets are matched with needs (capability optimised) • Integration of military efforts into broader response • Aligned procedures (needs assessments & RFA) • Faster, informed and timely decision-making • Tailored response (configuration and location) • De-conflict military and civilian efforts Capability • Single point of contact • Information sharing • Identify needs of vulnerable groups
Figure 41: Consolidated Outcomes of Effective Civil-Military Interaction
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After the factors and outcomes of effective civil-military interaction were identified from the cross-case pattern search, they were situated into broader literature. Overall, many of the factors that emerged were located in existing literature. Similarly, the outcomes that emerged were found within Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil- Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets in Natural and Man-Made Disasters. This strengthened the external validity of the factors and outcomes from the cross-case pattern search. Effort then turned to mapping the logic underpinning civil-military relationships to strengthen internal validity of the study (Figure 42 below).
Inputs Outputs Outcomes - Impact Situation Priorities Activities Participation Learning & Action Conditions
• Regional • Training, engagement • Individual skills Education & • Capability • ADF and knowledge Exercising • Mutual Development • DFAT • Common ADF: support • Information situational Understanding affected nation; • Information • AUSMAT sharing awareness • National control immediate Management • USAR • Governance • Agile leadership • Comparative assistance • Immediate • EMA • Co-location • Tailored response Advantage Natural Response • Civil-military structures • Organisational Disaster Teams teaming • Regional • Informed and learning response • Predictable • Gender Partners timely decision- • Behavioral Aus.: leadership and participation • UN making adaptation National command & • Dedicated • Predictable Interest, • NGOs control functions (e.g. • Accountable development CIMIC) goals • Accreditation
Assumptions: Activities and actions are in support of External Factors: The setting of the the affected nation/ affected populations. disaster response, weather, terrain and safety.
Figure 42: Civil-Military Interaction Logic Model
10.3 Building a Model for the Future The knowledge built from the cross-case pattern search, broader literature and situating the study within coordination theory was used to develop the process model at the core of this study (Figure 43 below), which captures necessary conditions for effective coordination including building, managing and applying knowledge, systematic use of aligned governance structures, division of labour based on comparative advantage and clear roles and responsibilities. All of which exist under agile leadership that is considerate of the primacy of an affected nation and is based on shared responsibility.
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The model was separated into two phases – preparedness and response – in recognition of the realities of civil-military practice and disaster response, whereby people, including senior leaders, can arrive in response environments with little or no training, knowledge or experience. By specifying how and when civilian and military actors should interact to meet the needs of an affected nation, my model starts to fill the gap in literature noted above. It contributes to knowledge on the necessary conditions for a civil-military relationship to succeed, factors that lead to improved civil-military cooperation and forms of interaction to maximise effectiveness. !
Capability - Decision 1.1#Localisation STEP 1: COMMIT TO DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Preparation - Process 2.1 Regional#Partnerships# STEP 2: 2.2#Education,#Training#&#Exercises BUILD & MANAGE KNOWLEDGE 2.3#Capacity#and#Timelines#of#Capability 2.4#Knowledge#Management# Governance - Output STEP 3: 3.1#CrossFReference#Governance# ALIGN & PRACTICE 3.2#Practice#and#Rehearse GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Culture - Output 4.1 Shared#Experience#& Mental#Models STEP 4: 4.2#Relationships MUTUAL 4.3#Understand#Comparative#Advantage UNDERSTANDING ! Extreme' ! !! weather' ! event'
Culture- Decision STEP 5: 5.1 Partnerships. PRIMACY OF 5.2.Adaptable.missions AFFECTED NATION
Culture - Decision 6.1 Clear.authority,.roles.and.responsibilities
Expertise STEP 6: AGILE 6.2.Shared.Responsibility. Coordination LEADERSHIP
7.1.Immediate.Response.Teams Capability - Decision 7.2.Information.and.Knowledge.Management
STEP 7: 7.3.CoFlocation. TAILORED 7.4.Dedicated.civilFmilitary.engagement.function RESPONSE 7.5.CivilFMilitary.Teaming. Governance - Process 7.6.Gender.Perspective.and.Participation
Administrative STEP 8: 8.1 Coordination.Mechanisms.&.Procedures Coordination ADHERENCE TO GOVERNANCE 8.2.Support.to.accredited.teams STRUCTURES
Culture - Endpoint
UNITY ! ! FigureFigure 43 32:: Civil Civil-Military-Military Interaction Process Process Model Model ! 346
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10. 4 Situating the Model A brief examination was conducted of different operational contexts (counterinsurgency, pandemics and urban environments) and coordination models to determine generalisability of my model across different situations and to raise the theoretical level of the study. This comparison identified that the factors which influence civil-military relationships are largely consistent between contexts, which means that my model may be applied more broadly than disaster response. This is because it enables civilian and military actors to build and apply flexible and adaptive cultural, preparation, governance and capability principles.
10. 5 Recommendations In conducting this study, the following four considerations emerged which are presented as recommendations:
1.! The international community needs to be better prepared for unanticipated situations and uncertainty. On 8 October 2005, an earthquake killed more than 73,000 people in the northern areas of Pakistan. It was known locally as 'Qa'yamat' - Urdu for 'Day of Judgment.' Within the first 24 hours of relief efforts, UN personnel (the Resident Coordinator, an UNDAC team and a UN Disaster Management Team) implemented the first use of the cluster approach to coordinate the response. There was:
"significant confusion about how the clusters would work in practice ... individual cluster lead agencies found it difficult to keep a track of the hundreds of relief agencies that descended on the country, to know their capacity, how long they would stay, who would make decisions about lines of responsibility, and so on"9
A decade after the first implementation of the cluster system, the same could be said about practices surrounding the system during the responses to all three case studies
9 S. Bullard, In Their Time of Need: Australia’s overseas emergency relief operations, 1918-2006,The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Volume VI, Cambridge University Press and Australian War Memorial, 2017, p. 467. 347
! examined in this study. As such, in preparing for unanticipated situations, civilian and military actors need to identify and address factors with an element of predictability.
This project identified three such factors. Firstly, is the national, regional and cultural environment of an affected nation because knowledge of institutions, cultural context, and capacity to respond to situations can be built through regional partnership activities. Secondly, is the type of domestic and foreign military assets best placed to support response efforts, with the timelines, capacity and command of these assets able to be mapped and a basic understanding provided at an unclassified level for civilian actors. Thirdly, is the surge of people from all walks of life – private sector, spontaneous volunteers, humanitarian and faith-based organisations – that arrive into areas wanting to help. These people often have the best intent but operate outside of governance structures and can place a burden on coordination efforts.
Enduring lessons, experience and knowledge from disaster response and humanitarian crises reflect a level of predictability that, when addressed, will enable the international community to better prepare for unanticipated and uncertain situations. Civilian and military actors need to begin a dialogue on answering key questions that will continue to arise, as they did during the Ebola epidemic. What will humanitarians ask the military to do? Who decides the parameters of military response and what informs their response? How effective are militaries in roles outside their core business of warfighting? How cost effective is a military response?10 This dialogue requires a commitment from nations, including their militaries, and humanitarian organisations to come together and build knowledge of each other – this it is not an agreement to work together, rather it is understanding respective capabilities and resources, and simulating how these may be employed in future situations.
A focus on knowledge-building will lay the foundations for relationships that will enable progress towards the alignment and practice of governance structures and develop mutual understanding. While it is recognised that militaries are political tools, raising concern that national and security considerations may “override humanitarian considerations,
10 V. Bollettino, ‘Evaluating Military Engagement in Disaster Response.’ Reliefweb, 29 August 2016, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/evaluating-military-engagement-disaster- response 348
! undermining humanitarian assistance based on need,”11 my experience from two disaster response operations and fieldwork reflects that military personnel are driven and committed to assist people in need. This results in advocating for an approach to civil- military interaction that focuses on behaviours, attitudes and practices that enable actors to adapt to varying situations.
This challenges the current paradigm of civil-military interaction which "makes a sharp distinction between complex emergencies and natural disasters in peacetime ... because the way in which a crisis is characterized matters for the pattern of civil-military relations that subsequently develop."12 Instead, it argues that knowledge - of national context, local populations, coordination mechanisms, roles and responsibilities and military capabilities - is the critical factor in effective civil-military interaction. Working relationships, based on mutual understanding and comparative advantage, are more influential than the situation actors may find themselves in.
2.! The paradigm of militaries as 'last resort' needs to be examined in context of the increasing occurrence, severity, and regional impact of natural disasters. In the aftermath of large-scale natural disasters there have been increasing calls for military forces to recognise disaster response as a core task.13 In June 2010, (then) New Zealand’s defence minister Wayne Mapp raised this issue at the Shangri-La Dialogue stating that “International experience has shown that major disasters almost immediately overwhelm local emergency services. Humanitarian relief is increasingly a core task for all defence forces … military business, not a secondary task.”14
This position is gaining strength in the Asia-Pacific region because it is both prone and vulnerable to natural disasters, with large-scale disasters having proven the potential to quickly overwhelm local capacity. In Vanuatu, it was very clear that no single actor in the region had the resources to respond to the scale of destruction caused by Cyclone Pam. 15 In the Tropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop that followed, it was
11 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, op. cit., p. 1087. 12 ibid, 1104. 13 E. Fischer, ‘ Disaster Response: The Role of a Humanitarian Military.’ Army Technology, 25 July 2011, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.army-technology.com/features/feature125223/ 14 ibid 15 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, End of Mission Report United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination Team (UNDAC) Tropical Cyclone Pam 16 March to 04 349
! highlighted that the Government of Vanuatu needed strict guidelines on the use of military assets to make assets available as early as possible.16
Australia’s geographic location is archipelagic in nature with regional partners and their territories at risk of becoming inaccessible during and after a natural disaster. This makes military assets, such as helicopters and naval platforms, critical to reaching affected communities, as was shown in the response to Cyclone Pam where helicopters proved most effective to move personnel and equipment around. This reinforces the perspective that “only the military has the manpower, equipment, training and organisation necessary to gather the relief effort required during catastrophic incident recovery.”17
Based on this, it can be argued that civilian and military actors will inevitably come together during disaster response. This position starts to challenge the concept of ‘last resort’ as introduced in Chapter Eight. Notwithstanding the challenges with implementing the concept in practice, at a minimum ‘last resort’ results in civil-military interaction commencing during a response, particularly between humanitarian actors and militaries. The challenges between civilian and military actors identified during the case studies were found to largely stem from a lack of dedicated and systematic preparation, which resulted in an absence of formed relationships and a lack of understanding of respective capabilities, processes, and practices. As such, while it is recognised that choice needs to exist in civilian actors using military assets, effective disaster management requires re-consideration of the paradigm that militaries are a ‘last resort,’ especially in the Pacific region where there is also increasing recognition of the role of militaries in providing rapid assistance to remote communities.
Re-framing engagement with militaries away from ‘last resort’ may go some way to addressing the gaps in existing guidelines, such as the role of national militaries in disaster response and how humanitarian actors should engage with them.18 It may also
April 2015. 20 April 2015, p. 4, viewed on 28 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20%20April%202015%20Vanuatu%20UNDAC% 20%20Mission%20Report.pdf 16 Pacific Community, Tropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop Report, June 2015, p. 36, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://www.spc.int/sites/default/files/wordpresscontent/wp- content/uploads/2016/12/TC-Pam-Lessons-Learned-Report.pdf 17 E. Fischer, op. cit. 18 A. Madiwale & K. Virk, op. cit., p. 1087. 350
! begin to build relationships to collectively learn from experiences and address concerns about the militarisation of humanitarian aid, where roles and responsibilities can be defined and agreed. This is as was specified by MSF during the Ebola Outbreak, noting that military personnel should not be used for crowd control or quarantine because this may cause fear among people.19
The recommendation to reconsider, or a at a minimum bring clarity to the concept of ‘last resort’ is not new, previously being proposed by scholar Peter Tatham20 after reflecting on the difficulty in operationalising the concept. He noted there are three main sets of Guidelines that inform implementing the concept – the Oslo Guidelines, the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response (APC-MADRO), and the IFRC Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance. While the guidelines are meant to be complementary, the language varies between the documents which leads to difference in interpretation and application.
Reconsidering the ‘last resort’ paradigm supports the international community becoming better prepared for unanticipated situations and uncertainty because it provides actors with an opportunity to come together before a situation. Ideally on a regular basis, at policy and practitioner level, to build relationships and share knowledge prior to working together in the field. However, this would require a change in practice, perspective and attitude between actors to realise the benefits forming relationships, especially in the context of comparative advantage. The aim is for this engagement to inform the perception that some actors have, especially humanitarian, on what militaries can do and what military people are like.
3.! Build stronger linkages between disaster management and humanitarian development. The vulnerability of nations to natural disasters due to climate change was briefly touched upon on this project. This vulnerability highlights the need for disaster preparedness and response to be more effectively linked to humanitarian initiatives that
19 S. Kimball, ‘US pledges military support for fight against Ebola in West Africa.’ DW, 16 September 2014, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/us-pledges-military-support-for-fight-against- ebola-in-west-africa/a-17926063 20 See P. Tatham, Improving the Civil-Military Dimension of Disaster-Related Humanitarian Logistics. Civil-Military Working Papers, Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (now Australian Civil- Military Centre), 01/2011.!! 351
! contribute to development goals, especially as governance structures in some nations are responsible both for response and long-term development.21
Research conducted on the response to Cyclone Winston by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) identified that "the humanitarian response to the cyclone had no substantive influence on the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development" despite "cross-sector aspirations and practical actions to strengthen the connections between humanitarian work and development."22 One of contributing reasons for this occurring was that people leading humanitarian efforts were not familiar with local-level planning, which resulted in their actions not being fed into development priorities or longer-term governance and institutional measures. A similar disconnect was identified in the response to Cyclone Pam, with food assistance provided not matching healthy food initiatives as part of broader development goals. However, there was some positive development outcomes identified from the Cyclone Winston response, with the ADF contributing to DFAT’s ‘build back better’ development program.
This reflects the need for an ADF commitment to climate change based on the influence it is having on the frequency and severity of natural disasters, and the risk that poses for regional security. Dr Robert Glasser, who served as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction and Head of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction from January 2016 to March 2018, assessed in an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Report titled Preparing for the Era of Disasters that:
“No military alliance, deployment of new weapon system will adequately protect Australian from this rapidly escalating security threat … the ADF will need to move beyond its current concept of structuring for conflict and then using the resulting capabilities for all of its tasks, to an approach that focuses on determining and assessing
21 K. Winterford & A. Gero, ‘Humanitarian response for development: lessons from Tropical Cyclone Winston.’ International Institute for Environmental Development Briefing, June 2018, p.1, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17472IIED.pdf 22 ibid ! 352
! the capabilities it will need to address the profound regional impacts of climate change.”23
One of the ways identified to achieve a direct linkage between response and development activities is for nations to have clusters, at national and sub-national levels which reach divisional levels, that remain active at all times. Known as 'evergreen clusters,' this approach would see consistent leadership, decision-making, meeting schedules and linkages between development and response planning. This effort is critical heading into the future, with the low number of deaths in the aftermath of Cyclone Pam widely credited to disaster risk reduction and development efforts.
4.! Unity of civilian and military actors should be seen as an effective means of supporting an affected nation. A broad range of situations requiring civil-military interaction were covered in this project - natural disasters, counterinsurgency, pandemics, and dense urban environments - and all demonstrate that the principle of unity maximises cooperation between civilian and military actors. This approach, which informs leadership, decision-making and functions, is a commitment to coordination and dialogue that maintains independence and distinguishes between military and humanitarian action. As noted in Chapter Eight, a focus on unity has a positive impact on civil-military interaction in terms of preservation of humanitarian space, acting in accordance with comparative advantage, and promotion of better understanding between civilian and military actors.24
As reflected in response to Cyclone Winston, the preservation of humanitarian space ensured that local leaders and institutions were engaged to distribute aid, not the ADF. This space safeguarded humanitarian principles, standards of behavior and independence between humanitarian and military activities, which shows respect for different mandates and perspective. Unity also means working together based on comparative advantage, which recognises strengths stemming from organisational leadership, capabilities,
23 R. Glasser, Preparing for the Era of Disasters, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Barton, March 2019, p. 15, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019- 03/SR%20135%20Preparing%20for%20the%20Era%20of%20Disasters.pdf?DWvHu1e1M0UMbiuK5_ A8qhOlZJr1z0qD 24 C. Bartzokis ‘Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? Humanitarian civil-military cooperation in post- conflict reconstruction.’ The Yale Review of International Studies, March 2017, viewed on 28 December 2019, http://yris.yira.org/essays/2020 353
! training and equipment. Finally, it means placing effort into building knowledge of cultures, values, structures and roles in different situations - effort that leads to mutual respect and effective working relationships.25
10.6 Future Research As briefly mentioned above, two civil-military interaction interfaces were considered within this project, which prevented an in-depth examination of civil-military relationships to support a Whole-of-Australian-Government response. A future opportunity is researching Australian natural disaster response to examine whether ADF disaster management and regional engagement efforts should be integrated into DFAT’s regional development goals and programs. This would provide insight into the feasibility of a Whole-of-Australian-Government framework for disaster management in the region. This knowledge can also be used to inform broader interagency situations, including the integration of political and military efforts in complex emergencies and conflict settings.
10.7 Conclusion In closing, I would like to touch again on the West Africa Ebola Outbreak case because I believe it provides the most insight into the future of civil-military interaction. Dr Liu, International President of MSF, repeatedly called for urgent military assistance. Her first appeal was made on 2 September 2014 to the United Nations General Assembly:26
To curb the epidemic, it is imperative that States immediately deploy civilian and military assets with expertise in biohazard containment. I call upon you to dispatch your disaster response teams, backed by the full weight of your logistical capabilities. This should be done in close collaboration with the affected countries. Without this deployment, we will never get the epidemic under control.
Her second appeal for international assistance on 16 September 2014 spoke to the unfolding response to her first:27
25 Ibid 26 J. Lie, ‘MSF International President United Nations Special Briefing on Ebola.’ Medecins Sans Frontieres, 02 September 2014, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.msf.org/msf-international- president-united-nations-special-briefing-ebola! 27 J. Lie, ‘MSF President’s remarks to the UN Special Briefing on Ebola.’ Medecins Sans Frontieres, 16 September 2014, viewed on 06 January 2020, https://www.msf.org/msf-presidents-remarks-un-special- briefing-ebola 354
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We need you on the ground. The window of opportunity to contain this outbreak is closing. We need more countries to stand up, we need greater deployment, and we need it NOW. This robust response must be coordinated, organized and executed under clear chain of command.
Today, in Monrovia, sick people are banging on the doors of MSF Ebola care centres, because they do not want to infect their families and they are desperate for a safe place in which to be isolated. Tragically, our teams must turn them away. We simply do not have enough capacity for them. Highly infectious people are forced to return home, only to infect others and continue the spread of this deadly virus. All for a lack of international response.
History shows us that civilian and military actors need to understand each other better – this study is completed in the hope that actors will recognise this need and begin building shared understanding and knowledge.
Emily M. Chapman December 2019
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Annex A: Study Participation Data collection using semi-structured interviews and discussions were conducted with a range ADF and civilian actors during the study period. These interviews are mapped below and the role listed is as per their involvement in the case studies. Participation was sought using Participant and Information Sheets tailored to each participant (ADF, NGO, local communities), with consent giving verbally where appropriate and in line ethics approval.
Ethics Approvals Granted: UNSW HREAP: HC17803 Department of Defence: Protocol 013/18 Eastern Visayas Health Research and Development Consortium: Protocol Code 2018- 006 Eastern Visasyas Regional Medical Center: Protocol 2018-015 Fiji National Health Research and Ethics Committee Review: NERC Number 2018.2.MC Vanuatu National Kaljoral Kaonsel: Research Permit
Serial Date Experience Org. Role 1 02 May 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF Helicopter Operations OP PACIFIC ASSIST Officer - MAJ 2 04 May 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF 2 RAR - LCPL 3 04 May 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF 2 RAR - WO2 4 08 May 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF JTF LO - MAJ 5 08 May 2018 OP PHILIPPINES ADF CJTF - LTCOL ASSIST 6 09 May 2018 OP PACIFIC ASSIST ADF OIC CIMIC - LTCOL 2015 OP ASTUTE OP SLIPPER 7-8 10 May 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF Air Liaison Organisation - SQNLDR & WGCDR 9 21 May 2018 HQJOC ADF J5 - BRIG 10 05 July 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF CJTF - CDRE 11 OP PHILIPPINES ADF ACCE COMD ASSIST 12 18 Oct 2018 OP FIJI ASSIST ADF SACC - WO2 13 3 Dec 2018 OP PACIFIC ASSIST ADF DA – Southwest Pacific 14 Dec 2018 OP SUMATRA ASSIST ADF Amphibious Air Liaison OP PACIFIC ASSIST Officer- SQNLDR OP FIJI ASSIST 15 1 Feb 2019 OP PHILIPPINES ADF OC RSF - MAJ ASSIST 16 6 Feb 2019 OP PHILIPPINES AUSMAT Team Leader Bravo ASSIST
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17 25 Oct 2018 Not applicable / Informal ICRC Legal Advisor Discussion 18 26 Sept 2019 Philippines DFAT DFAT Vanuatu 19 26 Sept 2019 Vanuatu DFAT DFAT Fiji 20 27 Sept 2019 Vanuatu DFAT Liaison Officer HMAS Philippines Canberra
Fieldwork – Philippines – 5 – 20 August 2018
Serial No. Activity Location Pers 21 1 Informal discussion Plan International - Tacloban 22 1 Interview and interaction with Teacher Ipil Central School 23 2 Interview and interaction with Teachers San Antonio Elementary School 24 1 Interview and interaction with Teacher Macabug Elementary School 25 4 Interview and interaction with Teachers Lorenzo Y. Palau Elementary School 26 2 Interview and interaction with Teachers Linao Central School 27 2 Interview and interaction with with Head New Ormoc City National Teacher and Teacher High School 28 3 Interview and interaction with with Teachers Logon Central School 29 2 Interview and interaction with with Teachers San Pablou Elementary School 30 3 Interview and interaction with Teachers Concepcion Elementary School 31 2 Interview and interaction with OIC and Liloan Elementary School Teacher 32 1 Dr Ruetas Tacloban 33 1 Nurse Agrer Tacloban 34 1 Interview OCHA Philippines
Fieldwork – Vanuatu, Port Vila – 26 April - 4 May 2019
Serial No. Activity Details Pers 35 1 Interview Act for Peace - Country Program Coordinator 36 1 Interview National Disaster Management Office - Operation Manager 37 1 Interview International Organization for Migration 38 1 Interview Red Cross - Disaster Manager 39 1 Interview Oxfam - PACCIL Coordinator
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Fieldwork – Fiji –August 2019
Koro Island 05 -12 Aug 2019
Serial No. Activity Village Community Members 40 2 Interaction in Community Nabasovi Village 41 1 Interaction in Community Nabasovi Village 42 1 Interaction in Community Nabasovi Village 43 1 Interaction in Community Nabasovi Village 44 1 Interaction in Community Tavua Village 45 5 Group Discussion and Tavua Village Interaction in Community 46 1 Interaction in Community Tavua Village 47 1 Interaction in Community Navaga Village 48 1 Interaction in Community Navaga Village 49 7 Group Discussion and Kade Village Interaction in Community 50 1 Interaction in Community Nausouri Village 51 1 Interaction in Community Nausouri Village 52 1 Interaction in Community Nausouri Village (District Officer) 53 1 Interaction in Community Nausouri Village
Suva
Int. Date Activity 54 14 Aug South West Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces Meeting 2019 55 14 Aug Interview – Australian Defence Attaché 56 14 Aug Interview – Patrol Boat Program 57 15 Aug The University of the South Pacific – Pacific Collection 58 21 Aug Interview (3 pers) - National Disaster Management Office
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PARTICIPANT!INFORMATION!STATEMENT!AND!CONSENT!FORM! !Civil4Military!Interaction!during!Disaster!Relief!Operations:!Building!an!Australian!Partnership!Model!for!the! Future.! Dr!Deane4Peter!Baker! ! ! 1.! What!is!the!research!study!about?! You!are!invited!to!take!part!in!this!research!study.!The!aim!of!the!research!project!is!to!develop! a! civil4military! partnership! model! that! can! employed! in! the! aftermath! of! a! natural! disaster!to! enhance!outcomes!for!an!affected!Nation.!The!project!captures!Australian!responses!to!natural! disasters!with!the!intent!to!apply!the!knowledge!in!other!Nations.!This!is!achieved!by!examining! the!applicability!and!generalisation!of!the!model!developed!from!Australian!experience!to!other! Nations!and!contexts!within!the!project.!! ! You!have!been!invited!to!participate!in!this!research!because!you!were!involved!in!disaster!relief! response.! Your! contact! details! were! obtained! through! research,! humanitarian! networks! or! operational!documentation.!!! ! 2.! Who!is!conducting!this!research?! The!study!is!being!carried!out!by!the!following!researchers:!Dr!Deane4Peter!Baker,!Professor! Clinton!Fernandes!and!Emily!Chapman!from!UNSW!Canberra,!School!of!Humanities!and! Social!Sciences.!! ! Research(Funder:(This!research!is!being!funded!by!UNSW!Australia.!! ! ADF!Endorsement:!This!research!has!been!endorsed!by!MAJGEN!PD!McLachlan,!AM,!CSC! Commander!1st!Division!and!Deployable!Joint!Force!Headquarters.!!Chain!of!command! approval!will!be!sought!if!required!for!your!participation!in!this!research.!Please!advise!if!further! command!approval!is!required.!! ! 3.! Inclusion/Exclusion!Criteria! Before!you!decide!to!participate!in!this!research!study,!we!need!to!ensure!that!it!is!ok!for!you!to! take!part.!The!research!study!is!looking!recruit!people!who!meet!the!following!criteria:! ! "! Personnel!from!Government!disaster!management!authorities!and!agencies!who! respond!to!natural!disasters.!! "! Personnel!from!Humanitarian!Organisations!that!were!involved!in!regional! preparedness!activities!in!Fiji! "! Personnel!from!Humanitarian!Organisations!that!were!involved!in!the!planning!and! response!to!Tropical!Cyclone!Winston!(Fiji).!! "! Military,!police,!NDMO,!medical!personnel!and!Local!Community!members!in!Raki! Raki,!Taveuni!Island!and!Koro!Island!(Fiji)!where!Australia!provided!disaster!relief! (delivered!goods!and!built!infrastructure).! ! 4.! Do!I!have!to!take!part!in!this!research!study?! Participation!in!this!research!study!is!voluntary.!If!you!do!not!want!to!take!part,!you!do!not!have! to.!If!you!decide!to!take!part!and!later!change!your!mind,!you!are!free!to!withdraw!from!the! study!at!any!stage.! Defence!members!are!deemed!to!be!'on!duty'!whilst!participating!in!the!study.!! If!you!decide!you!want!to!take!part!in!the!research!study,!you!will!be!asked!to:! •! Read!the!information!carefully!(ask!questions!if!necessary)Y! •! Sign!and!return!the!consent!form!if!you!decide!to!participate!in!the!studyY! •! Take!a!copy!of!this!form!with!you!to!keep.! 384
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!! ! 5.! What!does!participation!in!this!research!require,!and!are!there!any!risks! involved?! ! !If!you!decide!to!take!part!in!the!research!study,!you!will!be!asked!to!participate!in!an!interview.! You!!will!be!asked!questions!about!your!involvement!in!regional!preparedness!and/or!disaster! relief!operations!in!Fiji.!It!should!take!approximately!90!minutes!to!complete.! ! To!ensure!we!collect!the!responses!accurately,!we!seek!your!permission!to!digitally!record!the! interview!using!an!audio!tape.!If!you!would!like!to!participate!but!do!not!wish!to!be!recorded,! you!will!need!to!discuss!the!options!for!your!participation!with!the!research!team.!! !! We! don’t! expect! the! questions! to! cause! any! harm! or! discomfort,! however! if! you! experience! feelings!of!distress!as!a!result!of!participation!in!this!study!you!can!let!the!research!team!know! and!they!will!provide!you!with!assistance.!Lists!of!services!are!provided!in!the!contact!details! below!to!assist!if!necessary.!! ! ! 6.! What!are!the!possible!benefits!to!participation?! We!hope!to!use!information!we!get!from!this!research!study!to!benefit!others!who!work!in!the! field!of!disaster!relief!and!civil4military!interaction.!! ! ! 7.! What!will!happen!to!information!about!me?! By!signing!the!consent!form!you!consent!to!the!research!team!collecting!and!using!information! about!you!(role!and!position)!for!the!research!study.!You!can!elect!to!remain!anonymous!during! the!research!and!your!privacy!will!be!protected!through!removing!identifiers!and!replacing!them! with!an!assigned!code.!Your!data!will!be!kept!for!7!years!after!the!project’s!completion.!!We!will! store!information!about!you!in!a!re4identifiable!format!in!an!electronic!repository.!! ! Researchers!at!UNSW!are!required!to!store!their!aggregated!data!in!the!UNSW!data!repository,! this!is!a!system!called!ResData.!!Once!the!aggregated!data!is!deposited!into!this!repository!it!will! be!retained!in!this!system!permanently.!! ! Your!information!will!only!be!used!for!this!research!project!and!will!be!not!be!disclosed.!! ! The!information!you!provide!is!personal!information!for!the!purposes!of!the!Privacy!and!Personal! Information!Protection!Act!1998!(NSW).!!You!have!the!right!of!access!to!personal!information! held!about!you!by!the!University,!the!right!to!request!correction!and!amendment!of!it,!and!the! right!to!make!a!compliant!about!a!breach!of!the!Information!Protection!Principles!as!contained!in! the!PPIP!Act.!!Further!information!on!how!the!University!protects!personal!information!is!available! in!the!UNSW!Privacy!Management!Plan.! ! ! 8.! How!and!when!will!I!find!out!what!the!results!of!the!research!study!are?! The!research!team!intend!to!publish!and/!report!the!results!of!the!research!study!in!a!variety!of! ways.!All!information!published!will!be!done!in!a!way!that!will!not!identify!you.! ! If!you!would!like!to!receive!a!copy!of!the!results!you!can!let!the!research!team!know!by!providing! your!email!in!the!consent!form.!We!will!only!use!these!details!to!send!you!the!results!of!the! research.!!! ! 9.! What!if!I!want!to!withdraw!from!the!research!study?! If!you!do!consent!to!participate,!you!may!withdraw!at!any!time.!You!can!do!so!by!completing!the! ‘Withdrawal!of!Consent!Form’!which!is!provided!at!the!end!of!this!document.!Alternatively!you! can!ring!the!research!team!and!tell!them!you!no!longer!want!to!participate.!Your!decision!not!to! participate!or!to!withdraw!from!the!study!will!not!affect!your!relationship!with!UNSW!Canberra.!!! If!you!decide!to!leave!the!research!study,!the!researchers!will!not!collect!additional!information! from!you.!Any!identifiable!information!about!you!will!be!withdrawn!from!the!research!project.!!!
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The! research! team! will! destroy! any! information! about! you! that! was! collected! during! your! participation!in!the!study.!! ! 10.! What!should!I!do!if!I!have!further!questions!about!my!involvement!in!the!research! study?! The!person!you!may!need!to!contact!will!depend!on!the!nature!of!your!query.!If!you!require!further! information! regarding! this! study! or! if! you! have! any! problems! which! may! be! related! to! your! involvement!in!the!study,!you!can!contact!the!following!member/s!of!the!research!team:! ! Research!Team!Contact!Details! Name! Emily!Chapman!! Position! Student!Investigator!! Telephone! +61!2!6268!8910! Email! [email protected]!! ! ! Support!Services!Contact!Details! If! at! any! stage! during! the! study! you! become! distressed! or! require! additional! support! from! someone!not!involved!in!the!research!please!call:! ! Name/Organisation! Lifeline!(online!services!available!for!outside!Australia)!! Position! ! Telephone! 131114! Email! ! Website! https://www.lifeline.org.au/get4help/online4 services/crisis4chat! ! ! Name/Organisation! Lifeline!Fiji! Position! ! Telephone! +679!360!1331!(Office)! Email! ! ! ! Name/Organisation! VVCS!! Position! ! Telephone! 1800!011!046! Email! ! Website! http://www.vvcs.gov.au/! ! ! Name/Organisati All4hours!Support!Line! on! Position! ! Telephone! 1800!628!036! Email! ! Website! http://www.defence.gov.au/Health/DMH/AllHoursSupportLi ne.asp! ! What!if!I!have!a!complaint!or!any!concerns!about!the!research!study?! If!you!have!a!complaint!regarding!any!aspect!of!the!study!or!the!way!it!is!being!conducted,!please! contact!the!UNSW!Human!Ethics!Coordinator!or!Defence!People!Research!4!Low!Risk!Ethics! Panel!(DPR4LREP):! ! !!Complaints!Contact!! !
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Position! UNSW!Human!Research!Ethics!Coordinator! Telephone! +!61!2!9385!6222! Email! [email protected]!! HC!Reference! HC17803! Number! ! ! ! Position! Research!Officer!! Defence!People!Research!4!Low!Risk!Ethics!Panel!(DPR4 LREP)! Department!of!Defence! Address! BP33444017! PO!Box!7927! CANBERRA!BC!ACT!2610! AUSTRALIA! Telephone! (02)!6127!2177! Facsimile! (02)!6127!2261! Email! [email protected]! LREP!Reference! LREP!013418!! Number! ! ! Position! FNHRERC! Telephone! ! Email! ! Reference! ! Number! ! ! ! !
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Consent!Form!–!Participant!providing!own!consent!! ! Declaration!by!the!participant! ! ! I!understand!I!am!being!asked!to!provide!consent!to!participate!in!this!research!studyY! ! I!have!read!the!Participant!Information!Sheet!or!someone!has!read!it!to!me!in!a!language! that!I!understandY!! ! I!understand!the!purposes,!study!tasks!and!risks!of!the!research!described!in!the!studyY! ! I!understand!that!the!research!team!will!audio!record!the!interviewsY!I!agree!to!be!recorded! for!this!purpose.! ! I!provide!my!consent!for!the!information!collected!about!me!to!be!used!for!the!purpose!of! this!research!study!only.! ! I! have! had! an! opportunity! to! ask! questions! and! I! am! satisfied! with! the! answers! I! have! receivedY! ! I!freely!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!study!as!described!and!understand!that!I!am!free! to!withdraw!at!any!time!during!the!study!and!withdrawal!will!not!affect!my!relationship!with! any! of! the! named! organisations! and/or! research! team! members! and! there! will! be! no! detriment!to!my!career.! ! I!agree!to!be!identified!(role!and!position)!in!any!publication!arising!from!the!research.!! ! I!would!like!to!receive!a!copy!of!the!study!results!via!email!or!post,!I!have!provided!my!details! below!and!ask!that!they!be!used!for!this!purpose!onlyY! ! I!am!deemed!to!be!on!duty!whilst!participating!in!this!research.! ! Name:!______!! ! Address:!______! ! Email!Address:!______! ! ! I!understand!that!I!will!be!given!a!signed!copy!of!this!document!to!keepY! ! Participant!Signature! Name!of!Participant!(please! ! print)! Signature!of!Research! ! Participant!! ! Date! ! ! Declaration!by!Researcher*! ! I!have!given!a!verbal!explanation!of!the!research!study,!its!study!activities!and!risks!and!I! believe!that!the!participant!has!understood!that!explanation.!! ! Researcher!Signature*! Name!of!Researcher!(please! ! print)! Signature!of!Researcher!! ! ! Date! ! ! +An!appropriately!qualified!member!of!the!research!team!must!provide!the!explanation!of,! and!information!concerning!the!research!study.! ! Note:!All!parties!signing!the!consent!section!must!date!their!own!signature.! ! ! !
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Form!for!Withdrawal!of!Participation! ! ! I! wish!to!WITHDRAW! my! consent!to! participate! in! this! research! study! described! above! and! understand!that!such!withdrawal!WILL!NOT!affect!my!relationship!with!The!University!of!New! South!Wales.!!!In!withdrawing!my!consent!I!would!like!any!information!which!I!have!provided!for! the!purpose!of!this!research!study!withdrawn.!! ! Participant!Signature! Name!of!Participant! ! !(please!print)! Signature!of!Research! ! Participant!! ! Date! ! ! The!section!for!Withdrawal!of!Participation!should!be!forwarded!to:! CI!Name:! Dr!Deane4Peter!Baker! Email:! [email protected]! Phone:! +61!2!6268!8910! Postal!Address:! Building! 28! Room!211! UNSW!Canberra! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 389
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Annex B: Interview Questions The following questions were used during interviews and the fieldwork phases. They were largely developed from a literature review of ADF post-operational reporting.
Semi-structured Interviews
This is an UNCLASSIFIED interview. Please consider this classification when responding to the questions.
Please explain your position and role in with regards to Australia's engagement with Fiji, Vanuatu and/or the Philippines.
Please explain your role and responsibilities during the conduct of Australia's response to Typhoon Haiyan (Philippines 2013) and/or TC Pam (Vanuatu 2015) and/or TC Winston (Fiji 2016).
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL
1.! Did you have any experience with the Philippines/Vanuatu/Fiji prior to the conduct of the Disaster Relief (DR) operation? a.! What form did this experience take? (e.g. regional preparedness activities or Exercises or International Engagement) b.! How did this activity contribute to regional preparedness and capacity building for a DR response? 2.! Did you have any interaction with Other Australian Government Agencies or Organisations (e.g. Australian Medical Assistance Team AUSMAT) prior to the DR operation? a.! What form of engagement did this take? (e.g. training and Exercises) b.! How did these activities contribute to a Whole of Australian Government DR response?
3.! Planning Phase a.! When was an Australian response requested? b.! Was an explicit request made from the Affected Nation for an ADF response? c.! When did the ADF commence planning for the DR operation? d.! Who (ADF/Other Australian Government Agency) initiated the planning? e.! What were the indicators or warnings for commencing planning for the DR operation? f.! Who (positions/agency) was in attendance during the planning?
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g.! Which organisation led the planning? h.! What planning process was followed? i.! What is your reflection of the outcomes of the planning? i.! Command and control arrangements ii.! Operational mission and priorities iii.! ADF Force structure iv.! DFAT Force structure (Crisis Response Team) j.! Who (position/agency) informed the ADF deployment timeframe? i.! Strategic direction ii.! Other Australian Government Agency (including Head of Mission) k.! How was the ADF force structure decided upon? l.! What improvements could be made during DR operational planning?
4.! Conduct Phase Deployed Forces a.! What ADF Force Element did you deploy with? b.! How long (hours/days) after the disaster did you arrive in the Philippines/Fiji? c.! What was your mission and objectives? d.! How did this fit into the overall ADF mission and objectives? e.! How was the ADF's Area of Operations decided upon? f.! What civilian personnel/agencies/organisations/communities did you interact with during the conduct of the DR operation? i.! When did this interaction first commence? ii.! Why did this interaction commence? iii.! How often was this interaction conducted? iv.! Did you have the required level of training to conduct this interaction? (e.g. cultural awareness or CIMIC training) v.! Was there a formal process/approach in place to support this interaction? (e.g. UN Cluster Approach) •! Who (position/organisation) initiated/led this process? •! When did this process/approach come into effect? •! How effective was this process/approach? •! What improvements could be made to this process?
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g.! What Request for Assistance (RFA) process for using military/ADF assets was in place during the disaster relief? i.! Who managed this process? ii.! How effective and efficient was this process? iii.! How could this process be improved? h.! What mechanisms were in place to support passage of information between stakeholders? i.! How effective were these mechanisms? i.! When did follow-on ADF Force Elements begin arriving? i.! Who (position/agency) informed follow-on ADF Force Elements? ii.! Was this an effective approach to meet the requirements of Host Nation? j.! What positions did the ADF deploy with to conduct liaison with civilian actors? (e.g. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability or Liaison Officer Network) i.! Where were these positions physically located? ii.! What roles and responsibilities did these positions have? iii.! What effects and outcomes did these positions achieve during the DR operation? k.! How effective was the tactical command and control arrangements between DFAT & the ADF? i.! How were the ADF tasks and mission priorities set? ii.! What role should DFAT play in setting tactical ADF tasks and priorities? l.! What Battle Rhythm did you follow during the DR operation? i.! How effective were Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)? ii.! How was this Battle Rhythm aligned to the Host Nation and UN processes in place? m.! What air/land/naval tasks did the ADF complete? i.! How was the use of ADF air/land/naval assets managed and prioritised? ii.! Was this an effective use of military assets? Please explain n.! What Key Leadership Engagement (KLE) was conducted during the operation? i.! How were the effectiveness/outcomes of KLE measured? o.! How was operational progress and reporting (ADF tasks completed and effects achieved) being conducted? 392
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i.! How was this information shared with other stakeholders? ii.! Was this an effective process?
Australian-based Personnel a.! What was your understanding of Australia's political objectives during the DR response? b.! How aligned were Australian and Host Nation political objectives and mandates? c.! What was your understanding of the ADF's mission, objectives and force structure? d.! How was this aligned to Australia's political and strategic objectives? e.! Does Australia have a strategic framework in place to support the conduct of DR operations? f.! Does the ADF have an operational framework in place to support the conduct of DR operations? g.! How effective was the operational and strategic command and control arrangements between DFAT & the ADF? h.! How were the ADF tasks and mission priorities set? i.! What role should DFAT play in setting tactical ADF tasks and priorities?
5.! Post-Operational Phase (Lessons Learned & After Action Reviews) a.! Did you participate in any Lessons Learned Workshops or After Actions Reviews? b.! Have you seen the Report or any outcomes from these Workshops or Reviews? c.! What engagement has been conducted post-DR operation that may assist future regional responses during DR?
OTHER AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES - DFAT & AUSMAT PERSONNEL
1.! Did you have any previous experience in the Philippines/Vanuatu/Fiji prior to the conduct of the Disaster Relief (DR) response? Please explain a.! What form did this experience take? (e.g. regional preparedness activities or exercises or International Engagement)
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b.! How did this activity contribute to regional preparedness and capacity building for a DR response? 2.! Did you have any interaction with the ADF prior to the DR operation? a.! What form of interaction did this take? (e.g. training and exercises) b.! How did these activities contribute to a Whole of Australian Government DR response?
3.! Planning Phase a.! When did your agency/organisation commence planning for the DR operation? b.! Who (positions/agency) was in attendance during the planning? c.! How was the response from your agency/organisation decided upon? d.! What is your reflection of the outcomes of the planning? i.! Operational mission and priorities ii.! Response (people and equipment) e.! What improvements could be made during DR response planning?
6.! Conduct Phase a.! How did you arrive into the DR area? b.! Where were you deployed in the DR area? c.! What was your mission and objectives? d.! How did this fit into Australia's political and strategic mission and objectives? e.! How did this interface with the ADF's mission and objectives? f.! How effective was coordination between your agency and the ADF to support personnel and equipment movement? g.! How effective was passage of information between all stakeholders? h.! What positions did the ADF deploy with to conduct liaison with civilian actors? i.! What roles and responsibilities did these positions have? ii.! What effects and outcomes did these positions achieve during the DR operation?
DFAT Personnel i.! How were the ADF tasks and mission priorities set?
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j.! What role should DFAT play in setting tactical ADF force flow, tasks and priorities? k.! How effective was the tactical command and control arrangements between DFAT & the ADF?
Australian-based Personnel a.! What was your understanding of Australia's political objectives during the DR response? b.! How aligned were Australian and Host Nation political objectives and mandates? c.! What was your understanding of the ADF's mission, objectives and force structure? d.! How was this aligned to Australia's political and strategic objectives? e.! Does Australia have a strategic framework in place to support the conduct of DR operations? f.! How effective was the operational and strategic command and control arrangements between DFAT & the ADF? g.! How were the ADF tasks and mission priorities set? h.! What role should DFAT play in setting tactical ADF tasks and priorities?
4.! Post-Operational Phase (Lessons Learned & After Action Reviews) a.! Did you participate in any Lessons Learned Workshops or After Actions Reviews? b.! Have you seen the Report or any outcomes from these Workshops or Reviews? c.! What engagement has been conducted post-DR operation that may assist future regional responses during DR?
UNITED NATIONS & NGO, IO PERSONNEL
1.! Which Australian personnel did you interact with during the conduct of the DR operation? 2.! How often was this interaction conducted? 3.! Was there a formal process/approach in place to support this interaction? (e.g. UN Cluster Approach) 395
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a.! Who (position/organisation) initiated/led this process? b.! When did this process/approach come into effect? c.! How effective was this process/approach? d.! What improvements could be made to this process? 4.! How were the ADF tasks and mission priorities set? 5.! Who or what (position/agency/organisation/process) should inform tactical ADF tasks and priorities during DR operations?
Australian-based Personnel
1.! Did you have any interaction with the ADF to achieve movement of your organisation's humanitarian assistance into the DR area? 2.! How effective was this interaction? 3.! What improvements could be made to this process?
FIELD WORK PHASE
Please explain your position during the natural disaster response and any experience in disaster preparedness activities.
1.! What do you think enables an effective response to natural disasters? 2.! Which personnel did you interact with during the conduct of the DR operation? 3.! How often was this interaction conducted? 4.! Was there a formal process/approach in place to support this interaction? 5.! How did you/your community inform what activities (land/sea/air) the ADF completed? 6.! What Request for Assistance (RFA) process to use military/ADF assets was in place during the disaster relief? a.! Was this an effective process? b.! Who managed this process? c.! How could this process be improved? 7.! What did the ADF do in your area? 8.! What impact did ADF tasks have in your area? 9.! Was the ADF responsive to community needs? (infrastructure/engineering/goods) 10.! How effectively did the ADF work with other organisations in the area?
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