ALL EYES ON THE STREETS: HOW PROTEST MOVEMENTS INFLUENCED INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY AND THE GERMANS
A dissertation presented By
William Whitworth
to The Department of History
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the field of History
Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts April 2021
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ALL EYES ON THE STREETS: HOW PROTEST MOVEMENTS INFLUENCE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY AND THE GERMANS
A dissertation presented By
William Whitworth
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the College of Social Sciences and the Humanities of Northeastern University April 2021
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Abstract
“All Eyes on the Streets” examines the ways in which West German activists, mobilized into large protest movements, were able to shift the international image of their country during the years of the Cold War. Focusing on the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the dissertation argues that West German activists succeeded in capturing the attention of foreign officials stationed in the country. These officials, whether diplomatic staffers or other “German experts,” then wrote up memoranda on the protests that they had observed. These reports, received and read by policy makers at the highest level of government in both the U.K. and the
U.S., were highly influential in altering perceptions of Germany and “the Germans”. Whereas in the first decade of the Cold War, Germans were often considered to be dangerous militarists, these images were difficult to maintain once officials read reports describing the pacifism of thousands of committed pacifists. This dissertation thus suggests that mobilized social protest had a direct impact on discourse within political institutions and policy making in both the U.K. and U.S. In turn this suggests protest movements cannot be studied in isolation but must be understood as part of a wider political process.
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Acknowledgements
This project emerged from many hours working with Dr. Timothy S. Brown during a directed study on Sixties radicalism. A question gradually emerged in my mind- what did elites at the time make of all this sound and fury that was occurring on the streets? I am grateful for this directed study and for the subsequent guidance that Dr. Brown provided, not only in overseeing this project, but also in helping me to develop as a scholar. Most importantly, I am grateful for his advice that “perfect is the enemy of good”- perfectionism must always be countered with action. I have been immensely fortunate to have worked with my other two committee members,
Dr. Mai’a Cross and Dr. Oliver Ayers. Dr. Cross introduced me to the field of International
Affairs and its own patterns of scholarship and methodology. She also, in her own prior research, helped to develop the concept of an epistemic community, upon which I have relied so heavily here. Dr. Ayers, with whom I worked on a digital mapping project in London for the best part of six months, helped me to develop my concept of Germany as an imagined space, a space that constantly shifted in the minds of U.K.-U.S. officials. In his decisive leadership during the
Coronavirus pandemic, Dr. Ayers also provided a great lesson in crisis management of his own.
My peers at Northeastern, notably my fellow cohort members Luke, Simon and Allison, were a constant source of support and kindness during my entire five years as a graduate student there. All three provided solid, practical advice whenever I was stuck on some bureaucratic or methodical speedbump or another and provided an (at time captive) audience for various chapter drafts during the writing process. More than this, all three have been some of the best friends I have had, and I hope that they will all remain part of my life for many years to come. I am also thankful for the other graduate students at Northeastern for their support, especially for the
4 guidance and advice they gave during the dissertation reading group set up by Dr. Heather
Streets-Salter.
I am thankful for the archival staff at the National Archives in the U.K. and the U.S., the
JFK Library in Boston and the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, all of whom were extremely helpful in shaping my (at-times) scatterbrained research process. Special thanks must also go to Tugrul Irmak for hosting me during my trip to the Netherlands and helping me adjust to the pace of life there- a free bicycle is always appreciated on a visit to
Europe. My favorite archival visit was to the Labour Party Archives below the People’s Museum in Manchester, England. The staff there were a real pleasure to work with and I hope that my second visit, in 2019, will not prove to be my last.
Lastly, thanks to my family in the U.K.- mum, dad, nan, grandad, Louise, Beth, Rhi and
Rebecca for your love. At times, when my commitment to my doctorate wavered, it was your words of support that, more than anything else, kept me on the path. I’ll never forget when nan told me how happy Grandad Bill would have been about me getting this opportunity- I did this for him, for all of you, as much as for myself. Were it not for you, I would never have moved to the U.S. and met my new family- Andrew, Julie, Shawn, Sarah, and above all my wife, Candace.
Can, every day I think how lucky I was that we met. Your calmness and strength run through this dissertation- you were with me as I typed every word, made every edit, even when we couldn’t be in person together. Hopefully, we can pull it off the shelf in sixty years, read it and think back on the memories together, of our little apartment and of this crazy four years of our lives.
This dissertation is dedicated to the people of Essex.
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Table of Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………...……… 3
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………… 4
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………….... 6
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….... 7
CHAPTER ONE: Unreformed: The Ohne-Mich-Bewegung, 1950-1954…………………..... 46
CHAPTER TWO: Fearful: U.K.-U.S. Reactions to West German Nuclear Weapons Protests,
1957- 1963 ………………………………………………………...……….….……………… 97
CHAPTER THREE: Irrational: U.K.-U.S. Perceptions of the West German Sixties………... 152
CHAPTER FOUR: Naïve: The Euromissile Crisis, 1979-1985……………………………... 206
Conclusion……………………………………………………………...……………………. 247
Bibliography………………………………………………………………...……………….. 252
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Introduction:
The Impact of German Protest Movements on International Observers
“Our heart tells us… that the Germans are a fighting race, who should bear no intrinsic objection to bearing arms.”
- Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, British High Commissioner to Germany, February 16, 19521
“The Germans are essentially pacifists… And I appreciate that.”
- U.S. President George W. Bush, September 24, 20032
The reputation of the German solider had never been more inflated than in the first half of 1950s.
Despite the Third Reich’s complete defeat in the Second World War, myths of German military valor were exchanged by policymakers and their advisors across the world. In Washington D.C.’s
Capitol Hill, Congressman spoke of superior German organization in reverent tones. As
Republican Representative Leon H. Gavin put it: “Twenty-five divisions of Germans on the line in Europe would do more to stop the Communist threat and to stabilize conditions in Europe and
1 Letter from Ivone Kirkpatrick to Foreign Office, “Germany: Attitude to Rearmament,” February 16, 1952, CAB 129/49/42, British National Archives, Kew Gardens, [TNA] 2 Quoted in DW, “Bush: Die Deutschen sind Pazifisten”, Die Welt, 24 September 2003 7 in the world than anything else we can do” [emphasis added].3 In London’s House of Commons, the skill at arms of the German infantryman was taken for granted. Such myths served a concrete political purpose. During the early 1950s, politicians in both the United Kingdom and the United
States of America called for the [West] Germans to “get back in uniform” and join in the “anti- communist crusade” taking place at the time.4
Not all who spoke of German might did so approvingly. Opponents of German rearmament spoke of their “fear” of the Germans. These opponents worried that rearmament would herald a Third World War. Germany was a country that for forty years had provided the
“paramount image of the enemy” in both the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
Voices in both countries speculated that, once rearmed, the German military might embark upon a nationalist offensive to reclaim lands recently lost to the Soviet Union and Poland, risking the fragile state of peace in Europe.5 “Prussian militarism must never return… History must not repeat itself… I continue to hold grave reservations against German rearmament in view of
3 Leon H. Gavin, in “Mutual Security Act of 1954,” June 28, 1954, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 83rd Congress Second Session, vol. 100, Part 7, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), pg.9106 4 For examples of these attitudes, see Harry P. Cain, “Report by Senator Cain on his Trip to Europe,” September 11 1950, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 81st Congress, 2nd Session, vol.96, Part 11, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), pg.14508, C.O’Neil to W.D.Allen, 22 November 1950, FO 371/85057, TNA, “Report of the Western European Ambassadors Conference at Frankfurt,” February 7, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1951, vol. IV, part 1, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, eds. William Z. Slany, John A. Bernbaum, Ronald D. Landa, Charles S. Sampson, Joan Lee, David H. Stauffer and Lisle A. Rose, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), doc. 75, pg.148, Letter from Ivone Kirkpatrick to Foreign Office, “Germany: Attitude to Rearmament,” February 16 1952, CAB 129/49/42, TNA 5 Detlef Junker (Translation by Sally E. Robertson), “Introduction: Politics, Security, Economics, Culture and Society, Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations,” in Detlef Junker (ed.) The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-90, A Handbook, vol.one, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.1-28, pg.2 8 ultranationalist sentiment that still exists in Germany,” warned Brigadier General Julius Klein,
National Commander of the Jewish War Veterans, in a 1954 report to Congress.6
By the 1980s, the Germans were no longer perceived by policymakers to be militarists, and fears that German nationalists were plotting to wage the next world war had greatly diminished. Rather, voices in the U.K. and U.S. now worried that it was the Germans’ commitment to pacifism that made them an unreliable ally. By neglecting its martial heritage,
West Germany had supposedly made itself into an easy target for a future Soviet offensive.7 In contrast with their previous reputation as dangerous militarists, the West Germans were now, only three decades later, often viewed as immature, irrational and naive pacifists. These opinions could be found in popular culture: the 1984 U.S. action film Red Dawn- featuring an invasion of the United States by a motley Communist alliance of Soviets, Cubans and Nicaraguans- based its entire premise on a pacifist “Green” government coming to power in West Germany and abandoning NATO. This dissertation, however, does not focus on the image of the Germans in popular culture. Instead, it tracks the conversations of political and diplomatic elites whose job it was to observe and create policy towards the Federal Republic. For these policy makers and their advisors, the German people had also fundamentally changed.
It was the determined activism undertaken by West German protest movements committed to peace that drove this transformation of the Germans’ reputation. Social movements rallied the voices of millions of West Germans together on numerous occasions to protest
6 Julius Klein, Report on European Mission, by Brigadier General Julius Klein, Special Consultant to Subcommittee on Armed Services (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1955), pg.12 7 The names West Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Republic and FRG are all used here to refer to the democratic, capitalist German state as it existed between 1949 and 1990. East Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the GDR are used to refer to the FRG’s sister state, run along Marxist-Leninist lines, that also existed from 1949 to 1990. The unified successor state the exists today is referred to here only as “Germany”, even as it technically is a continuation of the FRG as opposed to a hybrid state. 9 rearmament, nuclear weapons and established political authority. Such was the influence of these movements in the post-1945 history of Germany that some scholars have even referred to postwar German society as a Bewegungsgemeinschaft, or social movement community. Given their importance, much has been written on the social movements. Existing scholarship has been particularly strong when exploring the intersections of political protest with memory and the process of coming to terms with the past. This theme, understandably, continues to largely be defined by the afterlives of National Socialism.8 Historical memory is, however, not the only facet of the West German social movements that has been explored- historians have examined protests through lenses as varied as those of gender studies, parliamentary politics and material consumption.9
Despite this breadth of coverage, the existing scholarship on West German activism overlooks the impact that protest movements had on the small, yet highly influential group of
German experts. This group- which I refer to as an “epistemic community” consisted of a collection of political and diplomatic policy makers and advisors drawn from the “Allied” nations of the U.K. and the U.S.10 Officials in both countries were closely connected with West
Germany for three reasons. Firstly, the Allies had created the Federal Republic, following a four- year long period of military occupation. Secondly, the Allies were the FRG’s closest military
8 Examples include Hans Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz: Germany's 1968 Generation and the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Phillip Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (eds.), Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Frank Biess, “‘Everybody has a Chance’: Nuclear Angst, Civil Defence, and the History of Emotions in Postwar West Germany,” German History, vol.27, no. 2 (Apr. 2009) 9 Christina von Hodenberg, “Writing Women’s Agency into the History of the Federal Republic: “1968,” Historians, and Gender,” Central European History, vol. 52, no.1, 2019, pp.87-106, Gerd Langguth, The Green Factor In German Politics: From Protest Movement To Political Party (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), Alexander Sedlmaier, Consumption and Violence: Radical Protest in Cold War West Germany (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016) 10 The term “Allied” originates from the military alliance of powers responsible for defeating Germany in the Second World War. In this dissertation, I use it as a shorthand term to refer to France, the U.K. and the U.S. as a collective. 10 allies and from 1955 were tied together with it under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Lastly, military forces from the U.K. and the U.S. were stationed in (or occupied) West Germany for the entirety of its existence. As a result of these close ties, governments in the Allied countries closely monitored events- such as political protests- that occurred in West Germany. The epistemic community was formed from the officials who conducted this observation. Members of the community viewed events in West Germany through a prism of preconceived images that they held of the country of Germany and the German people- these images formulated one small part of wider “causal beliefs” that the community held towards German citizens. These beliefs led the epistemic community to observe and judge
West German protest movements in the context of the German past; however, by shifting these beliefs German protesters also held the power to influence the way the Germans were to be regarded in the future.
The discourse created by members of the epistemic community as they observed West
German protest movements is extensive but has not been given much attention by scholars.
Social movement history is a field that emphasizes the need to move away from traditional forms of historical analysis and traditional historical subjects- such as elite level policy advisors.
Instead, social movement historians call for a deeper analysis of the transformative effect of protest on the lives of ordinary people.11 This tendency has been reinforced by the habit of many protest veterans to write posthumous accounts of their own activism.12 As a result, the deep impact of the various West German protests that took place during the Cold War on the mindset
11 See Priska Daphi, Becoming a Movement. Identity, Narrative and Memory in the European Global Justice Movement. (London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017), pg.114 12 See, for example, Armin D. Lehmann, Der letzte Befehl – Als Hitlers Botenjunge im Führerbunker (Bergisch Gladbach, Germany: Schiller, 2003), Hans Döring (ed.), Lothar Kreyssig: Aufsätze, Autobiografie und Dokumente (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2011), Oskar Lafontaine, Das Herz schlägt links, (Munich, Germany: Econ Verlag, 1999) 11 of traditional elites has been neglected. Work has been undertaken that examines the impact protest movements had on West German elites. Indeed, scholars have proposed that West German elites’ views towards the protests of their countrymen have played an important part in driving the process of democratization in the Federal Republic.13 Nonetheless, West Germany, for the whole of its existence, was a semi-sovereign, occupied country. A reader of the existing literature on West German protest movements would be forgiven for thinking that the forces conducting this occupation- whether bureaucrats in the U.S. State Department or British intelligence working for MI6- held no opinions on the protests at all. This was not the case.
This dissertation makes three claims. Firstly, it argues for the existence of an “epistemic community,” a small group of officials working in close contact with both the U.K. and the U.S. governments, who had a professional interest in monitoring the domestic stability of West
Germany. Said officials were not necessarily career diplomats, but their work served a diplomatic function- as part of their jobs, officials observed events that occurred in the Federal Republic and then, through the reports they produced, also formulated opinions on German matters. The opinions of the epistemic community, heavily influenced by the pre-conceived notions, or causal beliefs, of individual community members, were then spread to all willing to listen, giving this small group a diplomatic function. The epistemic community’s membership was, in one sense, diverse. Mostly formed of diplomats, the group could nonetheless include men from a wide range of professional backgrounds, backgrounds which ranged from Presidential advisors such as
Richard Perle to a host of minor officials in the bureaucracy and armed forces. This group was also very exclusive, not only because of its small size, but also because it was almost entirely white and overwhelmingly male. The main unifying factor for this professional, white group of
13 See, for example, the essays included in Gassert and Steinweis, Coping with the Nazi Past 12 men, this epistemic community, was its diplomatic role and its reputation for knowledge and expertise on West German matters.
Secondly, the dissertation proposes that, by gaining the attention of this epistemic community of German experts, “ordinary” protesters in West Germany were able to alter perceptions of both their cause and of their country by changing the causal beliefs of members.
Four “periods” of protest were particularly influential in changing these beliefs- the movements against West German rearmament in the early 1950s, the campaigns waged against atomic weapons at the turn of the 1960s, the anti-authoritarian revolt at the end of that decade and lastly, the protests against the stationing of Pershing-II missiles on West German soil that occurred in the early to mid-1980s. During these crisis periods, the U.K. and U.S. governments pressured the epidemic community to interpret where each wave of activism had arisen from, and how best to quieten it, with the aim of maintaining the stability of the Federal Republic. To solve the German crises, the elite community felt it necessary to better understand the subjects they were studying.
The shorthand concept of “the German people” was needed as a quick and easy way to refer to these subjects, who in reality were a mass of millions of individuals living in Central Europe.
During these periods of crisis, even minor events in the protest movements could have an important impact on the ways in which “the German people” were perceived to behave as a collective.
The final claim I make here is that the causal beliefs of the epistemic community gradually shifted over the four decades of the Cold War and that this shift can be seen in the way that community members spoke about the Federal Republic and the German people. This shift is one that has been noted before. Brian C. Etheridge, for example, noted that: “since the end of
World War II… images of Germany have been manufactured, contested, and co-opted as rival
13 narratives have competed for legitimacy and hegemony.”14 A group of international relations scholars have also recently published the excellent edited collection Prussians, Nazis and
Peaceniks.15 Nonetheless, what has not been stressed enough in any existing work is that the transformation of the German image always occurred in tandem with the actions of the protesters in the streets. It was the actions of thousands of committed activists who helped to refashion perceptions of the Germans away from images of Stahlheims and panzers and towards the image of peace-loving radicals, a great shift that was accompanied by a number of smaller, concurrent re-conceptualizations of the German protesters and the imagined space in which they operated.
Altogether, then, this dissertation suggests ways in which protesters in West Germany, using the conduit of an epistemic community of U.K. and U.S.-based experts, were able to transform Germany’s international image. By arguing such, I seek to support David S. Meyers’ claim a “strong relationship between the mobilization of social protest and discourse within mainstream political institutions” existed.16 Social movements cannot be simply cast to one side and studied in isolation. The official world of policymaking has always been closely linked to the world of everyday citizens and of their political activism. In highlighting this process occurring, over a span of decades, in a modern European nation, I wish to help advance the wider ambition spoken of by Daniel Q. Gillion, namely, the need to “center protest activity at the heart of the democratic process.”17 That German protesters were able to influence opinions around the world
14 Brian C. Etheridge, Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), pg. 15 Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus (eds.), Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks: Changing images of Germany in International Relations, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020) 16 David S. Meyer, “Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War,” Political Communication, vol. 12, April 1, 1995, pp. 173-192, pg.174 17 Daniel Q. Gillion, The Political Power of Protest: Minority Activism and Shifts in Public Policy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), preface xii 14 in, at the same time, a clear example of what Timothy S. Brown referred to as “the global at work locally.”18
Defining an Epistemic Community
Both the U.K. and the U.S. were, for the entirety of the Cold War, deeply involved in German domestic politics. Both countries’ presence in Germany began following the Second World War, with the defeated Reich being dismembered and occupied. The three Western Allies created a new German state in their own image, merging their military occupation zones together in May
1949 to create the Federal Republic of Germany. Many German citizens perceived this new republic to be a temporary state, an aberrant creation of the victorious Allies that was lacking in legitimacy. Many Germans took to the streets to voice their disapproval and directly challenge the legitimacy and policies of the state, and by extension the NATO powers who had created it.
As a result, U.K. and U.S. officials conflated unrest in West Germany with direct attacks upon their own governments. All political protest in the new Federal Republic was thus closely observed.
The U.K. and U.S. governments also desired a stable West Germany for strategic purposes. The titanic struggle with the Soviet Union that was the Cold War meant that NATO governments wanted West German politics to run as smoothly as possible in order to counter the perceived threat of the worldwide communist movement. Skewed by their dislike of communism, as well as their bitter memories of the Soviet imposition of dictatorship in East-
18 Timothy S. Brown, “"1968" East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History,” The American Historical Review, vol. 114, no. 1 (Feb. 2009), pp. 69- 96, pg. 70 15
Central Europe, U.K. and U.S. elites saw the USSR as an expansionist state. They worried that the government in Moscow wished to expand into West Germany, the capture of which, with its large population and giant industrial potential, would surely tip the balance of power in the Cold
War struggle. So many eyes were on Cold War Germany that the divided and symbolic city
Berlin was even referred to as the “Capital of the Cold War.”19 The perceived strategic purpose of Germany meant that West Germans could, if they shouted loud enough, achieve a degree of attention from elites in London and Washington that could not be matched by the more
“peripheral” Spaniards or Greeks (to say nothing of Australians, Peruvians or Tunisians).
The shouts of the West German protesters were heard and listened to by U.K. and U.S. elites. This category of an “elite,” is a slippery and ill-defined one. A more nuanced term is needed, and the professional group of German experts that advised policy in the U.K. and the
U.S. is more accurately conceived of as an “epistemic community”. The concept of such a community is not my own but one I have taken from the work of Peter M. Haas. Haas famously described an epistemic community as a: “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”20 In his now-seminal work, Haas expertly showcased the importance of ideas in international policy formulation by pointing to the influence knowledge- based communities were able to employ in environmental policy making. Haas also stated that epistemic communities are at their most powerful and relevant when three conditions are present:
1. When the focus of their expertise is niche, 2. When they have inner consensus and, 3. When they have access to elite-level decision making.
19 See for example, David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pg.369 20 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 1 (Winter, 1992), pp. 1-35, pg.3 16
All three of these conditions were present in Cold War West Germany. Whilst West
Germany’s geostrategic importance during the Cold War was certainly not a niche subject
(indeed, it is difficult to think of another topic which was so discussed and debated between 1950 and 1990!) the epistemic community we shall be looking at in this dissertation were considered experts of the “psychological” component of “the German problem.” The specialists whose work is examined here had the task of monitoring whether the German people were developing into good democrats and asking whether or not they would slip back into their old, “totalitarian” ways
(nuances between fascist and communist ways of thinking were often overlooked). Inner consensus within the epistemic community was surprisingly common. Indeed, consensus on
German matters even crossed the national barrier that existed between U.K. and U.S. officials.
Lastly, access to elite-level decision making was not only constant, but Presidents and Prime
Ministers alike even sought out the opinions of the German experts on numerous occasions.
Haas’ original article is now thirty years old and the concept of the epistemic community has been rethought and revitalized in the last decade. Of note here is the work of Mai’a K. Davis
Cross, who moved the concept of an epistemic community beyond the strict paradigms that had been placed upon it. Since Haas’ original writing, epistemic communities were often considered by scholars to be only made up of scientific or technical members.21 Cross expanded the definition of “knowledge” creation to include non-scientific actors and stipulated that: “the central attribute of epistemic communities is their professionalism” [emphasis original].22 This redefinition opened up the possibility of examining knowledgeable groups of professionals
21 See, for example, Elizabeth Ann Kinsella, “Knowledge Paradigms in Occupational Science: Pluralistic Perspectives,” in Gail E. Whiteford and Clare Hocking, Occupational Science: Society, Inclusion, Participation, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2012), pp.69-85 22 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later,” Review of International Studies, vol.39, no.1 (2013), pp.137-160, pg.138 17 whose specialties lay outside of “hard” science. Importantly for this dissertation, Cross pointed out that “high-level networks of diplomats may also qualify as epistemic communities.” Cross disagreed with the argument that diplomats possess too generalized knowledge to be counted as part of an epistemic community, stating instead that: “formal groupings of diplomats often transcend their prescribed role, and routinely operate as an epistemic community. Diplomats are experts at the art of negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. Their internal processes of deliberation and the professional norms that govern these processes are so important that they determine the success or failure of potential international agreements.”23 This was the case with the diplomats discussed in this dissertation, whose specific “knowledge” of Germany and the
Germans allowed them to pursue avenues normally unavailable to figures in their position.
Membership of the epistemic community of German experts was based on a combination of political standing, experience, and a general interest in German affairs. Most members of the community were members due to their profession. Of these, diplomatic residents naturally made up the spine of the epistemic community, whether based at the central U.K. and U.S. embassies in Bonn, or the web of consulates located in all major West German cities. Other members of the epistemic community were simply interested in German culture or politics. These members could be powerful figures- U.S. President Lyndon Baines Johnson, (1963-69), for example, considered himself to be an expert on “the Germans” and shared his opinions to all in the vicinity. At the same time, the epistemic community also included peripheral political figures such as the British
Labour MP Emrys Hughes, a tireless advocate for the West German protesters in the House of
Commons.
23 Cross, “Rethinking epistemic communities,” pg.157 18
Some members of the epistemic community were not overtly involved in political matters in any way. Academics such as political scientists and historians could also be part of it. Figures such as Hans Spier, who performed professional roles such as “security expert” and “defense intellectual” straddled both the academic and the political worlds, offering their advice whenever it was wanted and to whoever wanted it.24 Oftentimes these security experts would bitterly clash with diplomatic members of the epistemic community, who often saw the international affairs, military strategy and politics in a markedly different way. Once in the epistemic community, many members stayed there, even when their time in office ended. Take for example, an eighty- five-year-old U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy, who was still offering opinions on
German matters as late as 1980(!), three decades after his official stationing in the country. By this stage in their lives, community members like McCloy were considered “wise men,” whose opinions were especially sought after.25
Communities of German experts existed in both the U.K. and the U.S., and as such it is possible to speak of the existence two epistemic communities, one in each country. This dissertation also argues for the existence of an epistemic community which transcended the national boundary between both countries to speak of a singular epistemic community is not merely a matter of convenience. Rather, it reflects the extremely close ties between U.K. and
U.S. elites, with cross-collaboration frequent. International cooperation between elites was strengthened by the internationalism preached from the West German streets. As Benjamin
Ziemann wrote, “peace movements during the Cold War, with their grassroots activism, their attempts to connect across national borders... seem to encapsulate the notion of a European civil
24 See Daniel Bessner, Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018) 25 For McCloy’s 1980 activities, see Andreas Lutsch, “The zero option and NATO's dual-track decision: Rethinking the paradox,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.43, no. 7 (2020), pp. 957-989, pg.964 19 society.”26 German Protesters formed numerous connections with activists in both the U.K. and the U.S., and this led elites in all three countries to work on creating a joint response.
Transnational cooperation against political activism and subversion had a longer history stretching back to the anti-anarchist collaboration codified in the St. Peterburg protocol from the turn of the twentieth century.27
Citizens from the U.K. and U.S. did not see Germany in an identical way, and they also did not see the Germans in the way the Germans saw themselves. The U.K.’s complex and antagonistic relationship with Germany was, for example, highly unique- as John Ramsden highlighted in his fantastic monograph Don’t Mention the War.28 The transatlantic epistemic community, however, was not a part of mainstream society and its views often differed from those of “ordinary” U.K. and U.S. citizens. The considerable national differences between the
U.K. and U.S. were to an extent overcome by the shared goals and ambitions that elites in both countries had in West Germany. They were also challenged by the shared background of the international elite, as defined by its shared interests and professionalism.
Officials in both the U.K. and the U.S. also collaborated on German issues with the third victorious Allied power from the Second World War, France. Such collaboration lies outside the scope of this dissertation, but it has not been excluded from the research presented here merely for reasons of scope. Rather, elites from both the U.K. and U.S. were often far closer aligned and far more comfortable working with each other than they were with the French. Henry A.
26 Benjamin Ziemann, “A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War and their Elective Affinities”, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, vol. 49, 2009, pp.351–89, pg.351 27 See Richard Bach Jensen, The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 28 John Ramsden, Don't Mention the War: the British and the Germans since 1890 (London: Little Brown, 2006), pg.417 20
Byroade, who headed the U.S. Bureau of German Affairs, remembered that: “the British were very good about Germany; almost always we and the British were in agreement. Seldom were we in agreement with France.”29 The West Germans themselves also were less openly vitriolic towards the French than they were towards the “Anglo-Saxons,” particularly early in the Cold
War, when memory of the strategic bombing of the RAF and the USAAF was fresh. Four years’ worth of Nazi propaganda had also been directed against the U.K. and the U.S., with the soldiers of both armies (especially non-white soldiers), being accused of perpetrating horrific crimes by
Goebbels’ rumor-making apparatus.30 As a result, French symbols were less likely to be targeted by protesters than U.K.-U.S. symbols were. The final, and most important, reason for excluding
French elites from this study was that U.K.-U.S. security experts envisioned France as part of the same immediate bulwark against communism as West Germany. Indeed, NATO elites often harbored doubts regarding the reliability of the French and it was these doubts that helped to drive the organization towards a closer reliance on West Germany.31
One last factor to consider in our analysis of the epistemic community is the position of
British social democrats in the Labour Party, who played a divided role, at times aiding the efforts of the U.K. government and at other times aiding the German protesters. The Labour
Party enjoyed close ties to its “sister party” in the Federal Republic, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which helped to organize the protest movements of the 1950s and 1980s
(after 1982). Even when the SPD was in power itself, the base of the party continued to
29 Niel M. Johnson, “Oral History Interview with Henry Byroade,” September 19 and 21, 1988, Harry S. Truman Library, pg.77 30 Dan Diner, “Feindbild Amerika”: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments (Munich: Propyläen Verlag, 2002), pg.130 31 See, for example, the conversation between the British cabinet members described in Robert Crowcroft, “Labour Party Factionalism and West German Rearmament,” in Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davis (eds.), The British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy, (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2008). pp.127-144, pg.128 21 frequently take part in protests. This had a knock-on effect on the Labour Party. As the research of Talbot Imlay has shown, cooperation between individual members of Labour and the SPD could either be informal (through private correspondence and visits) or formal, (through transnational socialist organizations such as the Socialist International). Labour Party members thus played an important role in the epistemic community due to their “insider” knowledge of the
German protests. However, the relationship was never an easy one due to the opposition Labour
Party members often showed to official government policy. As Imlay noted: “socialist parties often adopted a critical stance towards their governments—and towards the understanding of state interests prevalent among their domestic political rivals. And nowhere perhaps was this stance more evident than in international politics.”32
What’s more, despite having close ties with the SPD, Labour was, when compared to the
Conservative, Democratic and Republican Parties, largely anti-German. This was thanks to the beliefs of the party base, which traditionally drew strong support from the U.K.’s large Jewish population. In the 1930s, Labour members had been shocked by the open racism and militarism of Nazi Germany, both of which went against everything the Party claimed to stand for. In 1942, anti-German Labour MPs formed the “Fight for Freedom” group to argue that Germany’s wartime crimes were not merely the fault of Hitler or the Nazis but were the responsibility of the
German people as a collective. Labour attracted so many anti-Germans to its ranks that Spencer
Mawby even referred to the post-war party as one of the two “bastions” of anti-German sentiment in the U.K, alongside the Foreign Office.33 Crucially the anti-German, outspoken and oppositional stance of the Labour Party base did not only set Labour’s members against the
32 Talbot C. Imlay, The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pg.15 33 Spencer Mawby, Containing Germany: Britain and the Arming of the Federal Republic (New York: Palgrave, 1999), pg.14-15 22
German policy of Conservative governments, but also the Labour governments of Clement
Attlee and Harold Wilson (1964-70, 1974-76). Nuances like this should be taken in mind even as we go on to discuss the epistemic community as a collective body.
Four Periods of Protest
The U.K. and U.S. epistemic communities of German experts wrote and reported constantly on
West German issues, but one issue that most drew these elites’ their attention was unrest on the streets and political action. Certainty, as Daniel Gillion noted, we should be wary of implying that protesters “forced” the attention of officials through their activism, holding them “hostage” as observers. Rather, the epistemic communities were a “strategic collectors of information” who actively sought out instances of unrest in order to learn more about the Germans, taking “strong informational cues” from the events that they witnessed.34 The attention given to the social movements by mainstream elites and the mass media, meanwhile, served to energize said movements- especially when this elite attention came across as dismissive or patronizing, as was often the case during the years of the Ronald Reagan presidency (1981-9).35
This work would not have been possible without the existence of previous scholarship that has examined the relations between foreign elites and the West German streets. Of note is
Martin Klimke’s monograph, The Other Alliance, which set out to illustrate the way the “cold- war alliance composed of students enabled them to connect to each other and form a counterpoint to their countries’ official transatlantic partnership.” Klimke also devoted space to
34 Gillion, The Political Power of Protest, pg.4 35 Meyer, “Framing National Security,” pg.176 23 analyze the perceptions of West German student’s activism from the eyes of the U.S. elite.36
Klimke’s research is excellent, but his focus is on analyzing students in the 1960s and to a lesser extent the 1950s. This dissertation, in contrast, expands its analysis to cover four broad West
German protest movements that generated a significant discourse between and among British and U.S. observers between 1950 and 1984.
Given the wide temporal span at hand and with it the number of social movements discussed, some form of conceptualization of the protests is needed. It is conducive here to think of protests in Cold War West Germany in terms of “cycles,” a concept introduced by political scientist Joyce Marie Mushaben in the 1980s. In her research, Mushaben highlighted a particular pattern. She argued that three decades of the West German Cold War- the 1950s, 60s and 70s- had seen widespread protest, and that these protests subsequently failed to achieve their objectives. Nonetheless, despite this surface-level failure, the protests in one decade directly inspired the beginning of the subsequent decade’s cycle of activism. Not only this, but Mushaben also argued that “multiple protest issues have begun to converge over three decades” and that it was this convergence that made the Pershing-II protests and Green movement of the 1980s particularly powerful.37 In other words, the protests of the 1980s represented a culmination of the previous decades’ activism. This is a common theme in much 1980s scholarship. Mushaben’s work was itself based on the research of other contemporary academics, such as Stanley
36 Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pg.7 37 Joyce Marie Mushaben, “Cycles of Peace Protest in West Germany: Experiences from Three Decades,” West European Politics, vol.8, no.1 (1985), pp.24-40, pg.25 24
Hoffmann, who spoke of the protests of the 1950s and 1960s as a way of contextualizing and understanding the activism of the decade in which they were writing.38
Where Mushaben split West German Cold War activism into decades, this dissertation identifies four distinct “movements:” the 1950s protests against rearmament and then nuclear weapons, the anti-authoritarian revolt of the West German sixties and the 1980s “Euromissiles” protests. All these movements had different aims and ambitions; it should be noted, nonetheless, that participants were not limited to one cause and often took part in numerous movements.
These participants also had their own separate reasons for marching: as Holger Nehring noted:
“the peace movement as a homogeneous body did not exist–there were frequent and tough debates about ideology, protests, and practice.”39 It is more nuanced to think in terms of a series of “causes” which served as poles of attraction for West German individuals. The strength of these poles waxed and waned over time: as David Meyer wrote, “Cycles of apparent political engagement and quiescence on a particular issue then reflect… the continuous challenges and tactical choices movements make, focusing their efforts in response to changing political circumstances. An activist concerned with peace and social justice may work for a nuclear test ban in 1963, for civil rights in 1965, against the war in Vietnam in 1967, and for women’s rights in 1969. Surely, she would recognize the continuity in these efforts.”40
38 Stanley Hoffmann, “‘Pacifism gains Clout: Growing anti-nuclear movement challenging US and Soviet strategies”, Boston Globe, September 20, 1981 39 Holger Nehring, “A Transatlantic Security Crisis? Transnational Relations between the West German and the U.S. Peace Movements, 1977–1985,” in Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.177-200, pg.179 40 David S. Meyer, “Opportunities and Identities: Bridge-Building in the Study of Social Movements”, in David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda Robnett (eds.) Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3-21, pg.12 25
The earliest major moment of protest in West Germany during the Cold War was represented by a series of large demonstrations against proposals to rearm the country that took place in the early 1950s. Beginning just five years after the conclusion of the Second World War, and one year after the founding of the Federal Republic these protests (sometimes grouped together under the name the Ohne mich-Bewegung), whose participants numbered in the hundreds of thousands, challenged the policies of the Allied authorities occupying West
Germany, as well as the legitimacy of the state and the Cold War itself. Whilst communist activists in the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did take part in the protests, the movement against West German rearmament was not a communist one- rather, activists who were involved held a variety of both political and religious affiliations. This nuance was often not appreciated in the reports written by members of the epistemic community, who tended to be deeply pessimistic. It was common for officials to, instead of appreciating the variety of motives for anti-rearmament activism, speak instead of the danger of Soviet infiltration. It was easier for elites to understand a German population that had turned to communism than one that had become pacifist so soon after the Second World War.
The second mass protest movement, the anti-nuclear weapons protests organized under the umbrella of the Kampf dem Atomtod (Struggle against Atomic Death) and the “Easter
Marches”, occurred at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. In protesting German ownership of nuclear weapons, activists were opposing both the wishes of their own government, which was actively pursuing a nuclear arsenal at the time and the wider Cold War strategy developed in
Washington, where security experts looked to supply NATO allies with nuclear weapons in order to offset some of the spiraling costs of the Cold War. Of all the protests described here, the anti- nuclear weapons protests were the only ones to enjoy any success- whilst the Kampf dem
26
Atomtod demobilized after having failed to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons on West
German soil, the Easter Marches not only continued into the twenty-first century, but also helped ensure that the West German state would develop no independent nuclear arsenal of its own.
Some U.K. and U.S. officials, meanwhile, supported the West German protests in their reporting, especially those officials who wished to block the establishment of a West German nuclear arsenal themselves. Not coincidentally, this period of anti-nuclear weapons activism in the FRG matched concurrent movements against the bomb occurring in both the U.K. and the U.S.41
The anti-authoritarian revolt of the late 1960s (known by a variety of names, including
“the Global Sixties,” or even just “1968”) has been extensively discussed in both scholarly works and activists’ memoirs.42 Less discussed have been the reactions of U.K. and U.S. elites to the events in West Germany unfolding before them. This is somewhat surprising given that U.S. institutions- not to mention personnel- were targeted extensively by the 68ers from as early as
1966 whilst the U.K. came under criticism of its own for its government’s policies in Ireland and
Nigeria. What is even more surprising is that U.K. and U.S. officials did not regard the 68er protests as entirely serious, even as individual activists in the movement, particularly “Red” Rudi
Dutschke, were demonized. The language of crisis and communist infiltration, so common in the
1950s, was replaced by an official discourse which belittled the threat at hand and even went out of its way to stress the lack of danger at hand.
41 Meyer, “Framing National Security,” pg.178 42 For five influential English-language works, see: C. Fink, P. Gassert, and D. Junker (eds.), 1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Nick Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A social history of dissent and democracy (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2003), Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, (eds.), 1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion, and Utopia (Budapest, Hungary: Central European University, 2011) and Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012) 27
The last set of protests examined here are those which took place during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. Protests arose due to NATO plans, initiated and encouraged by West
Germany’s own Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982), to station upgraded Intermediate
Range Nuclear Missiles in Western Europe as a means to encourage the Soviet Union to dismantle their own upgraded missile systems. Whilst these protests were unsuccessful, in that they did not prevent the stationing of Pershing-II missiles on West German soil, they caused a numerous headaches for the pro-missile governments in the U.K. and the U.S., not to mention the FRG itself. Despite being considered a nuisance, however, the protests were, like those of the
1960s, rarely regarded as posing an actual threat to west European security. Rather, it was easy for officials, particularly U.S. officials, to brush off the protests as being a sign of German
“neurosis” and a lack of understanding on security issues.
As Thomas Rochon pointed out in 1988, none of the West German social movements described above were even just “about” the core issue that they marched for. Also important at every stage of the protests, indeed, for the entire duration of the Cold War, were two concurrent causes and aims. Firstly, the commitment to create a new, more democratic Germany was constant. Activists used their own close personal connections as a means of opposing the large, faceless organizations- political, economic, and diplomatic, that were seen as controlling the
Federal Republic and creating a new society once the political establishment had been defeated.
By marching for a cause, any cause, activists could show their discontent with, for example, the
Springer Press, the conservative political party the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, the
Union) or even the FRG’s allies- most notably the U.S.A., who were seen as having far too much
28 control over Germany’s future.43 Timothy Brown’s conclusion that the “goal” of the anti- authoritarian revolt of the 1960s “was never to achieve top-down reforms enacted by liberal politicians but to realize new forms of collective action and social life” applies also to the
Pershing missile protesters as well as, to an extent, the activists of the 1950s.44
Secondly, the demonstrations of West German activists were never separate from wider concerns of personal insecurity stemming from the Federal Republic’s proximity to the Soviet bloc. Michael Geyer put things most succinctly when he wrote that the Germans’: “deadly intimacy with international relations turned grand questions of power politics into very personal concerns. The personal and the political had become inextricably entwined.”45 As a result of this entwining, it was impossible for the West German streets to be entirely quietened by purely material government concessions such as the construction of a comprehensive welfare state or by tax breaks. Progress towards a peaceful, secure Europe (preferably one in which the two German states were reunited) was also needed. When the policies of the U.K. and U.S. governments risked the peace of Europe and thus the security of the West Germans, as happened in every period of protest mentioned above, then both countries were themselves targeted by discontented activists.
Refashioning Perceptions
43 Thomas R. Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace: The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pg.17 44 Timothy S. Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties: The Anti-Authoritarian Revolt, 1962–1978 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pg.25 45 Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons,” in Hanna Schissler, (ed.), The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 376–408, pg.378 29
Members of the epistemic community of German experts held a number of deep-seated causal beliefs with regard to the Germans that they had gained from years (or even decades) worth of study on their subjects. These beliefs were not static but changed based on new “findings” from studies coming out of Germany. This new knowledge, so important for refashioning beliefs and perceptions, itself consisted of opinions and observations created by members of the epistemic community assigned to providing opinions on the Germans when they were asked to do so (that is, when such knowledge was pertinent to U.K. and U.S. governmental interests). These opinions were then disseminated either publicly, through interviews with media outlets and speeches in legislative assemblies, or privately, through the exchange of secret telegrams, reports, and memoranda. Specific events occurring in West Germany- such as political protests- called for immediate knowledge to be provided, immediate opinions to be given. This urgency to report on
Germany generated a large volume of reports on the Germans in a brief period. The International
Congress on the Vietnam War in February 1968 that occurred in West Berlin, for example, was reported on by diplomatic representatives of the Allies in the city, before word was spread privately to the national capitals in London and Washington D.C., where public pronouncements would be made. At every stage of the process, views on the Germans would be reformulated and reappraised to meet the changing circumstances.
The ways in which the Germans were perceived by U.K. and U.S. elites changed significantly over the course of the Cold War. These changed reflected a series of dramatic changes that were taking place in the protest movements themselves, as well as the changing geopolitical landscape of Europe during the time. In the first decade of the war, the motives of the protesting Germans were deeply distrusted by the observing officials. The epistemic community could not understand why the Germans- who they believed to be super-soldiers
30 committed to war, did not want to fight. “Just give me a brass band and a loudspeaker truck.
Then let me march... and I will have a German army of a million men behind me,” the U.S. High
Commissioner in Germany, John J. McCloy, had once boasted.46
The most common explanation for the unexpected German pacifism, or “neutralism,” that officials found themselves faced with was a simple one. For elites, the malicious impact of communism had sapped the morale of Germans as a precursor to a future invasion by the Soviet
Union, a process aided by the Germans own latent “totalitarian” affiliations. Most- but not all- members of the epistemic community who viewed the strikes and the street battles proposed that the Germans needed a strongman to keep them in check. This led to U.K. and U.S. officials throwing their support behind West Germany’s first Chancellor, the Christian conservative
Konrad Adenauer (1949-63). That U.K. and U.S. officials should adopt such a harsh attitude to the West Germans in the 1950s is rendered more understandable when the losses inflicted by
Hitler’s Germany are considered. Indeed, the Cabinet of British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan (1957-63) was formed of men who had vivid experiences of fighting Germans in the
First World War, a conflict that the Prime Minister himself (as well as his two predecessors) served in. Anne Deighton notes how wartime beliefs- such as a trust in Soviet intentions and a fear of Germany- continued to prevail among the U.K. public and prevented the British government from adopting an entirely pro-German, anti-Soviet policy. It was only the government’s believed in the importance of U.K.-U.S. cooperation, that, for Deighton, allowed it to overcome its Germanophobia. This dissertation seeks to add to this argument by observing the ways U.K. elites were not just motivated to believe in a new Germany by their need to appease
46 Cited in Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J McCloy & The Making of the American Establishment, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pg.341 31
Washington but also were convinced that the rearmament protests heralded the birth of a new
Germany.47
The 1950s were also a time when memories of the plans to reformulate the German character in a more democratic direction remained fresh. These plans, envisioned and drawn up as policy suggestions at the end of the Second World War, suggested extensive intervention by the victorious Allies into every aspect of German life, from the education system into the judiciary. As Michael R. Hayse noted, despite the successful establishment of pluralistic democracy in the FRG, “many of the reform policies that Allied planners believed were necessary... did not succeed.” Despite this failure, the fact that such schemes had been recently pursued led U.K. and U.S. officials to pay closer attention to the autocratic aspects of the
Germans’ character than they might have done otherwise.48 As a result, there was more to the dire warnings of “totalitarianism” than mere anti-communism, although the latter was without doubt a pressing concern at a time when fears of a “red invasion” were commonplace. As the
Cold War developed and solidified and the Federal Republic became more established
(particularly after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961) the urgency of such observations lessened.
Remarkable demographic changes in the West German protest movement also helped to encourage a shift in the language used to describe activists. In place of the socialist workers of the 1950s, students and middle-class activists came to the fore. As the influence of this white- collar demographic grew, U.K. - U.S. elites began to view West German political protesters not so much as a threat to democracy but more as unfortunate symptoms of it. The German activists
47 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990) 48 Michael R. Hayse, Recasting West German Elites: Higher Civil Servants, Business Leaders, and Physicians in Hesse between Nazism and Democracy, 1945 – 1955 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), pg.249 32 were now seen in two ways: either as naïve idealists, who would be harmless if not for their good nature being manipulated by the Soviets, or as an anarchic rabble lacking direction. Whilst dangerous in the immediate sense, this mob was regarded as lacking a greater cause or motivation- they were clearly not, for example, subversive elements laying the groundwork for a future world war. Altogether they were considered more of a temporary threat than a permanent one.
We can also speak of a softening of the image of the German protester, one that had much to do with the increasing visibility of women in positions of power in protest hierarchies.
Without a doubt, women had played an important part in the protests of the 1950s, a decade during which the number of healthy adult men active in German society was limited by deaths in the Second World War and the continued internment of German prisoners of war by the Soviet government. In the 1960s and 1980s, however, women often assumed important roles in the protest movements, and, importantly, these roles often found themselves in the media spotlight.
This increasing spotlight on women helped to redefine the image that British and U.S. elites had of the German protester from a masculine to a feminine one. This shift helped the men of the epistemic community begin to patronize the protesters lessened their fears of revolution- even as the Red Army Faction, led by a woman and with numerous female members, posed a very real security risk to British and U.S. representatives in West Germany.49
Not only the demographics of protest changed between the 1950s and 1980s, but also the symbology and methodology protesters employed. For example, overt displays of “Anti-
Americanism” became more common between the 1950s and the late 1960s, and then again in the 1980s. We should be careful here and note that anti-American sentiment was both more
49 For a fantastic examination of militant feminism, see: Katharina Karcher, “Sisters in Arms”? Militant Feminisms in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1968 (New York: Berghahn, 2017) 33 widespread in 1950s West Germany, and less common in 1980s West Germany, then is commonly assumed. In the 1950s, German views of the U.S. were still influenced by years of
Nazi propaganda which painted “Americanism” as “a scourge of humanity equal to or even greater than Bolshevism.”50 Anti-American attitudes could be seen in the writings of embittered intellectuals and in public opinion polls taken at the time. When the leader of the SPD opposition, Kurt Schumacher (1946-52), charged Chancellor Adenauer with being the
“Chancellor of the Allies,” he was not making a flippant statement, but rather a condemnation that would have resonated with many Germans. Meanwhile, in 1983, an overwhelming 80 percent of respondents polled stated that West Germany should cooperate as closely as possible with the United States, and 50 percent referred to the U.S. as the best friend of West Germany.51
What changed in the 1960s was the openness of anti-Americanism within the peace movement, with protesters taking to the streets being unafraid to compare the U.S’ involvement in Vietnam to the Nazi’s racial war, an attitude which led to the infamous chant “USA-SA-SS”.
In the 1980s, overt anti-Americanism increased in the movement against the deployment of
Pershing-II missiles in the Federal Republic, a time when, wrote the German historian Dan Diner
“the USA was charged with putative crimes against humanity, while Germany was fantasized as a historical victim in anticipation of the great catastrophe” [nuclear war].52 Whereas the mass of
West Germans retained a positive image of the U.S., polls taken among West German activists themselves suggested that the peace movement's image of U.S. conduct was roughly as negative as its image of the Soviet Union. Moreover, peace movement criticisms were not merely directed
50 Junker, “Introduction,” pg.5 51 Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany,” International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 52-88, pg.55 52 Diner, Feinbild Amerika, pg.142 34 against the administration of President Ronald Reagan but rather included “the United States and the American people in general.”53
Disturbed by the attitudes of their left-wing rivals, conservatives in the FRG began to embrace “the West” and U.S. ideals just as the protesters turned against them. During the times of Nazism and the Weimar Republic, German conservatives envisioned their nation as neither
“West” nor “East”, but as a third force. This continued during the early years of the Federal
Republic, before becoming increasingly rare from the 1960s onwards. Moreover, efforts to compare U.S. policies in Vietnam and Nicaragua to the crimes of Hitler were undermined by the concurrent investigations into the specifically German nature of the original crimes themselves.
For this reason, the use of blatant anti-Americanism in the 1960s and 1980s helped to undermine the threat of the German protesters in the eyes of U.S. authorities. Officials saw comparisons to
Hitler as overblown and farcical, even as they had regarded the less-overt anti-Americanism of the 1950s (which was often Nazi inspired itself) as a real threat.
Another change in West German activism that led to a reaction from U.K. and U.S. officials was the spatial shift in protests, away from the inner cities of West Germany and towards suburban and rural army bases and nuclear missile silos. The protests in the 1950s were centered in the large industrial centers of West Germany, especially the factories and streets of the Ruhr region in North Rhine-Westphalia, long a heartland of industrial activism. West Berlin was largely tranquil until the explosion of the late1960s, during which the actions of students at the Free University and the Technical University helped to push much of the city towards activism. Conservatives remained in West Berlin, however, and the city became a battleground between different forces- as Carla Elizabeth MacDougall noted, “both sides” came to perceive
53 Mueller and Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement,” pg.65 35
“the space of West Berlin as crucial for gauging the complex and shifting relations between the
United States and the Federal Republic.”54
West Berlin and the Federal capital, Bonn, remained centers of activism for the remainder of the Cold War, but by the 1980s, media attention was largely focused on protests occurring in rural environs. In 1983, NATO troops stationed in rural barracks were the target of over four- hundred protests, mostly in the form of human chains and blockades.55 This spatial shift in focus towards the military bases was reflected in the discourse of the epistemic community. Notably, the most salient after effect of the shift was that it helped to diffuse the threat of the protesters.
The reason for this is that it became apparent that the protesters offered no concrete threat to the functioning of base operations- men and material continued to move in and out of the bases, they just began using the back entrances rather than the front. Internal U.S. army memos reassured readers that the German protesters did not represent a genuine threat, but that rather protests at military bases were “more the result of a long period of peace and prosperity in Europe.”56
The process of opinion reformulation did not occur as a simple interaction between the
German streets and the Anglo-American elites but was aided and abetted by the actions of the
Federal German government. Over the years of the Cold War, the West German government shifted its description of internal unrest- whereas in the 1950s, it warned its Allied authorities of the great danger of communist infiltration, by the 1980s it was belittling the student participants and advising the Allies that the protests were best ignored. Much of this shift was caused by changes at the highest level of West German politics. The powers vested in the leaders, or
54 Carla Elizabeth MacDougall, “Cold War Capital: Contested Urbanity in West Berlin, 1963–1989,” (PhD dissertation, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, 2011), pg.232 55 Amy Austin Holmes, Social unrest and American Military bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pg.113 56 Quoted in Holmes, Social Unrest, pg.127 36
Chancellors, of the Federal Republic have led commentors such as Mary Fulbrook to refer to the country as a “Chancellor Democracy”.57 At no point in time was this more apparent than during the tenure of Chancellor Adenauer, who led West Germany in a rigidly controlled manner.
Adenauer was bitterly suspicious of any opposition to his policies, whether inside or outside of
Parliament. A brilliant political strategist, he was also able to, time and again, play up the threat posed by activists to ensure that the Allies took steps to prop up his position in the Federal
Republic (for example, by offering concessions such as an end to Nazi war-crimes trials).
Adenauer’s influence overshadowed the terms of his two immediate successors,
Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger. The coalition of the SPD and the liberal Free Democratic
Party (FDP) that narrowly came to power in 1969, and somehow stayed in control for thirteen years, held a very different view of extra-parliamentary protest and activism. The coalition government did take the fight against left-wing terrorism seriously, but a conversation of that topic, however connected to the events of 1968 it may have been, lies well outside the scope of this piece. We should also note that, however sympathetic the Brandt (1969-1974) and Schmidt governments may have been towards the activists, the SPD played an important role in helping to maintain what Alice Cooper referred to as the “relatively closed German political system,” through its very rigid policing of the type of activism respectable for party members to undertake. In this sense, the SPD helped to ensure the “largely extraparliamentary and confrontational character” of the West German protests.58
West German society, beyond the protest movements, underwent an extensive transformation between the years 1950 and 1984. Personal freedoms and the acceptability of
57 Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2014: The Divided Nation (London, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), pg.147 58 Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace. German Peace Movements since 1945, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996), pg.17 37 individual expression in a previously conformist society, greatly expanded during this time. In their impressive two-volume history of West Germany, written at the tail end of the 1980s,
Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress saw the Federal Republic as transforming over the previous four decades from “a land of shadows” into “a land of vibrant and vital substance,” thanks to the actions of ordinary Germans who “created the conditions of their own liberty”.59 Bark and Gress’ words may have been overly-optimistic, given the reappearance of many of the old “shadows” of
German nationalism and xenophobia shortly after their book was published. Nonetheless, few observers could argue with any conviction that West German citizens in 1989 were not better fed, better clothed and freer to express themselves than their fore bearers had been in 1949. This dissertation does not aim to dispute the existence of this societal transformation. Nonetheless, while Germans may have begun cutting their hair shorter and wearing jeans in the privacy of their own homes, it was when they took to the streets, bedecked in their new styles, that this change became apparent to officials stationed in the Federal Republic.60
By the 1980s, government officials and media outlets within West Germany were talking of a “wave of angst” and emotional behavior that was supposedly sweeping the country.61 The
Reagan administration coopeted this language of neurosis and naiveite with frequency, often using it to refer to all Germans- and even all Europeans- as a whole. Condemning German angst had the added benefit of covering up the tracks of the officials’ own poorly thought-out policies as they did so. Genuine German concerns about personal safety in the face of a nuclear war (a
59 Dennis Bark and David Gress, A History of West Germany, Volume I: From Shadow to Substance, 1945–1963 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989), pg.1 60 For the role jeans played in the anti-authoritarian revolt of Sixties Germany, see: Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.220-4. For jeans’ cooption by the protesters’ capitalist enemy, see Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth Century Germany, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pg.247 61 See Friederike Brühöfener, “Politics of Emotions: Journalistic Reflections on the Emotionality of the West German Peace Movement, 1979-1984,” German Politics and Society, vol.33, no.4, (2015), pp.97-111 38 nuclear war that they would have little say in starting!) were put down to cowardice- German concerns about the environment were considered evidence that the protesters were hippies who did not understand basic economic development. Thatcher’s government in Britain followed the
U.S. lead, using its own rhetoric of Teutonic excitability, which prevented practical thought. By the end of the century, few figures were surprised when a now-united Germany “sat out” NATO conflicts in the Balkans and Iraq. By the 1990s, the view of the Germans in Britain and the U.S. had fundamentally shifted- the German people were no longer seen as super soldiers desperate for their next war. Protest movements were to thank for the transformation.
Despite the changes listed above, two things did not change about the reporting of the
Germans during the Cold War. Firstly, the view that Germans were a more emotional people than citizens of both the U.K. and the U.S remained a constant feature of reporting. Benjamin
Ziemann had masterfully tracked the development of this concept of “German angst,” noting a particular habit of U.S. journalists and officials to describe Germans as not only suffering from anxiety but enjoying doing so. Not only did this reflect a longer trend of describing “dark…
Teutonic romanticism,” but it was also reflected by the comments of the West German media, which encouraged such descriptions. In the 1950s and the 1980s alike, the epistemic community, reading the media reports coming out of both West Germany and their own countries, presented the West Germans as unduly worried about nuclear catastrophe and as being too anxious to perform their assigned role as protectors in the Cold War.62
Secondly, Germans remained widely disliked and distrusted. “Let’s admit it,” wrote the provocative British critic A. A. Gill at the turn of the twenty-first century, “we all hate the
62 Benjamin Ziemann, “German angst? Debating Cold War anxieties in West Germany, 1945–90,” in Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2016), pg.116-139, pg.116 39
Germans.”63 Nicholas Ridley, Minister for Trade and Industry in Margaret Thatcher’s government, had, just a decade earlier, accused an “uppity” Germany of trying to take over
Europe and compared Chancellor Kohl (1982-98) directly to Adolf Hitler. Ridley also argued that joining a European monetary union amounted to “being bossed by a German” and stated that
“it would cause absolute mayhem in this country.”64 Doubtless, many of the members of Clement
Attlee’s 1945 cabinet would have agreed with Ridley’s sentiments. Such beliefs, however, were not confined to the U.K. President Johnson, for example, never one to shy away from a strong opinion, made no secret of his intentions on “having the Germans on my side where I can count on them as well as watch them.”65 In the 1990s, Daniel J. Goldhagen’s controversial work of history Hitler’s Willing Executioners, became a bestseller despite numerous factual errors and being written in an extremely anti-German tone.66
Source Material
The primary evidence used in this dissertation is sourced in the most part from the extensive textual records produced by U.K. and U.S. officials who observed the protests in West Germany.
Here the humble memorandum, produced by the dozen every single day by both the U.K. and
U.S. political and diplomatic establishments, serves as the most important form of documentation. In their memoranda, officials had to not only sum up the important events that were occurring in West Germany, but also, in their concluding paragraph, they had to draw wider
63 Quoted in Alan Hall, “Why do we still laugh at Germany?”, The Scotsman, July 11, 2003 64 R.C. Longworth, U.K. blushes as minister blasts 'uppity' Germans, Toronto Star, July 13, 1990 65 Quoted in Frank Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and 'the End of the Cold War,'” in Cohen, Warren I. and Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf (eds.), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963– 1968. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.173–210, pg.173 66 Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). For the response, see Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn, A Nation on Trial. The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth (New York, Henry Holt, 1998) 40 conclusions as to the significance of said events. This involved sitting in judgment on the important figures described in the report- judgments were also passed on the German people as a collective. A hypothetical memorandum written up by the U.S. consulate in Munich would, for example, describe the riotous events that had occurred on the streets that week before condemning the West Germans involved and offering wisdom about how to quieten the situation.
At each of these three steps we can spot the officials views of the German people and, by comparing her utterances with those of her predecessors, we can explore changes over time.
An important feature of the memoranda examined here is the fact that they were made for private, “eyes-only,” consumption. This factor is significant when we consider that the epistemic community was not only formed of career diplomats and bureaucrats but also elected politicians.
The public pronouncements of these politicians, taken alone, are not sufficient for an analysis of private beliefs, as matters of political exigency undoubtedly influenced speeches, interviews, etc.
In their private discussions, members of the epistemic community did not have the pressure of having to adopt a public political platform. They could thus be freer to express opinions based on their knowledge and expertise of German affairs. This is not to say, of course, that the private memoranda discussed here were free of the grandstanding and political maneuvering that characterized much of the public debate on German policy in both the U.K. and the U.S.
Members of the epistemic community were even more willing, behind closed doors, to bicker and fight with one another than in public, where the image of a united and dignified clique of experts had to be maintained.
As well as exploring memoranda, this dissertation also makes extensive use of a much- maligned and unfashionable source- the political memoir. Memoirs are, of course, propagandist accounts, which, often aim to cast their authors in the gentlest light possible, even when this is
41 not intentional. Nonetheless, memoirs of epistemic community members such as Dean Acheson are important precisely because they are written in a shamelessly subjective manner. They thus offer a tantalizing glimpse into these figures’ views of the Germans, making their thoughts and opinions- or at least the thoughts and opinions that they wished to be published- clear to identify and easy to follow. The dissertation also, where possible, makes use of political diaries of politicos such as Labour’s Tony Benn, tracking the gradual transformation of their views over time. In Benn’s case, his candid thoughts in January 1951 that: “I am unhappy and undecided about German rearmament,” had shifted by the time of a 1957 visit, during which he admitted to his diary that: “There was a little cyst or boil of anti-German feeling in me which was lanced.”67
Many of the quotes employed in the dissertation are taken directly from the legislative treasure troves that are Hansard and the Congressional Record. This is not because parliamentarians naturally formed part of the epistemic community (although political figures, such as the U.K.’s Emrys Hughes, certainly did), but rather because, in their pronouncements,
MPs and Members of Congress provide an important indication as to the prevailing views of the
Germans at any given time. Moreover, because they were influential public figures, politicians also helped to shape the opinions of their contemporaries and constituents. To break down the process, a Republican member of Congress representing Minnesota’s seventh district might be convinced to believe that the Germans were now pacifists by a member of the epistemic community. She would then make her new opinion known in Congress, in a speech which could then be picked up by the local media in Moorhead and disseminated amongst locals. The speeches of legislators, in short, are important as they acted as conduits for the beliefs of the
67 Tony Benn, The Benn Diaries: 1940-1990, (Croydon, UK: Arrow Books, 1996), pg.46 42 epistemic community to spread, thus providing us with an indication of one way that the thoughts of society as a whole began to shift.
Newspaper reports are discussed in the dissertation on occasion, mostly in the form of opinion pieces and columns. Journalists covering events in West Germany were not often part of the epistemic community themselves as they lacked the same access to decision makers that diplomats and bureaucrats enjoyed, and thus had a limited ability to influence their opinions.
Nonetheless, just as with parliamentary speeches, column inches are an important way of noting prevailing opinions on the Germans at a number of different moments during the Cold War.
Newspaper articles from some of the more reputable outlets were also a favored way for security experts and academics to discuss and gain attention for their ideas. Leading columnists such as
John Vinocur would come to be considered experts in and of themselves. Moreover, politicians would constantly bring up recent articles when speaking their respective legislatures- the pages of the U.S. Congressional Record are, for example, filled with newspaper reports that
Congressmen felt worthy of entry. In this way, a particularly damning expose by an outlet such as the New York Times, criticizing, for example, the presence of communists during a West
German anti-rearmament march, could find its way into the highest corridors of power in the
U.S. and influence numerous hearts and minds.
Academics and security experts played an important role in the epistemic community of
German experts. Academics had the potential to reach both a professional and public audience, the Cold War being a time when “civilian strategists and academic experts competed for public acceptance and political influence within the venues of professional and popular journals.”68 For
68 Meyer, “Framing National Security,” pg.184 43 this reason, secondary literature from academic journals and monographs has occasionally been employed in this dissertation as primary source material itself. Take for example, the work of
Stephan Szabo, who during the 1980s wrote The Changing Politics of German Security and edited United States-German Relations, Past and Present. Szabo worked closely with the state department in a professional capacity- he was able to use his connections to aid his research, but more importantly, he knew that his findings would be read by staffers and others interested parties. Szabo’s attempts to decipher and essentialize the “strategic culture” of the Germans, his warnings of an “emotionally charged debate” breaking out and his discussion of “German guilt” and said guilt’s role on security policy formulation are therefore important. His words carried a weight that a non-institutional academic’s word lacked.69
Source materials from the point of view of the West German activists are also examined here. Whilst the intention of this dissertation is to document the ways in which protests were recorded by outsiders to the radical scene, there are numerous recorded instances where protesters deliberately tried to gain the attention of U.K.-U.S. officials. For example, during a series of marches in summer 1967, student activists attempted to play Allied officials in West
Berlin and the Mayor of the city, Karl Albertz, off against each other. It was hard to ignore the anti-authoritarian revolt when its members were writing you letters and petitions daily.70 West
German protesters were, after all perfectly aware of the changing reputation of their nation abroad. “The Americans,” said long-time activist Petra Kelly, “who had troops fighting in
Europe, had always hoped that the Germans would become pacifistic and antimilitaristic. Now
69 Stephen F. Szabo, The Changing Politics of German Security (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990) 70 For the 1967 letter in question, see Morris to Department of State, “Berlin Students’ Open Letter to the Allies,” July 15 1967, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-69, EDU 9-3 GER B, 1/1/67, Box 344, United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland [NARA] 44 that they are becoming that, they don’t like it. But Germany is becoming a country of our dreams.”71
71 Quoted in James M. Markham, “Germany’s Volatile Greens,” New York Times, Feb.13, 1983 45
CHAPTER ONE
Unreformed: The Ohne-Mich-Bewegung, 1950-1952
“Strength is still what the Germans respect most.”
- British official C. O’Neil, November 22 195072
Introduction
In the first half of the 1950s, Germans took to the streets in their thousands to protest attempts by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to reestablish a German military force in West
Germany. “There was no social group that did not participate in the conflict,” wrote Klaus von
Shubert in his classic account of the protests which “shook up the [West German] population.”73
The disparate sets of protests against West German rearmament, commonly grouped together under the umbrella term Ohne mich-Bewegung (roughly, “count me out!” movement), had both a local and a global impact. On the national level Ohne mich gave shape to the factions that would dominate West German politics for the rest of the decade. On the national level, both the rearmament proposals and the subsequent protests became an object of international attention, being reported on and discussed around the world by a plethora of onlookers.
72 C.O’Neil (British High Commission) to W.D.Allen (German Political Department), 22 November 1950, FO 371/85057, TNA 73 Klaus von Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration–Die innere Auseinandersetzung um die militärische und außenpolitische Orientierung der Bundesrepublik 1950-1952 (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), pg.7 46
This chapter examines the way in which the Ohne mich-Bewegung helped to reformulate international opinions on the Germans. It concentrates in particular on the “epistemic community” of U.K.-U.S. officials and trend-setters that we defined in the introduction, a group who closely followed and reported on the protests in West Germany. Whilst elites within this community of experts held deep ideological differences that were highlighted in their reactions to the protests, the prevailing view in the early 1950s continued to be that “the Germans” had not yet changed their warlike ways. That said, a minority of dissenting voices covering the protests would, through their speeches and memoranda, begin to argue that Ohne mich provided evidence of a genuine German pacifism. It was this second group that laid the foundations for the belief- now widespread- that the Germans are, on the whole, a pacifist people.
For the majority of interested U.K.-U.S. officials in the 1950s, however, the Germans were considered warlike and militant. Such was the martial reputation of the Germans after two world wars that conscripting them was at first seen to be an easy task: “just give me a brass band and a loudspeaker truck. Then let me march... and I will have a German army of a million men behind me,” boasted U.S. High Commissioner [proto ambassador] to Germany, John J.
McCloy.74 Due to their militarism, the Germans were considered by many military officials and politicians in both the U.K. and the U.S. as being an important ally in the fight against communism. West Germany was considered a “frontline” state in the Cold War that elites wished to transform into a member of NATO. This was seen as vital for both the security of western
Europe and of the “free world” as a whole- as Republican Representative Leon H. Gavin put it:
“Twenty-five divisions of Germans on the line in Europe would do more to stop the Communist
74 Bird, The Chairman, pg.341 47 threat and to stabilize conditions in Europe and in the world than anything else we can do”
[emphasis added].75
The massive German protests condemning NATO’s rearmament proposals thus came as something of a shock and officials were faced with the conundrum of an unexpected German opposition to conscription. Rather than conceding that their image of the Germans was false, elites instead claimed that the protests of the German people represented nothing more than the apathy and selfishness built into the German character since the days of the Kaiser. Egged on by the West German government, proponents of rearmament believed that these character flaws, neatly summed up under the terms “neutralism” led to the protesters being manipulated by shadowy communist forces. Publicly espousing these beliefs also helped to protect an official’s career during a time of widespread McCarthyist upheaval. Not only U.S., but also British elites ran the risk of being attacked from the Senate floor by Joseph McCarthy and his adherents for any perceived leniency towards the “reds”.76
A minority of officials, however, were willing to risk a conservative backlash by welcoming the Ohne mich protests. These officials saw the protesters as having made an informed choice to reject militarism- for them the protests were evidence that the German people had “changed”. Representatives of this group called for Germans to have a greater voice in their own affairs and were even open to the idea of working with the Soviet Union and rejecting West
German rearmament altogether. Whilst in Britain supporters of the German protests came mostly
75 Leon H. Gavin, in “Mutual Security Act of 1954,” June 28 1954, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 83rd Congress Second Session, Vol. 100-Part 7, June 22 to July 2 1954, (Washington, DC: US Printing Gov. Office, 1954), pg.9106 76 See Jussi M. Hanhimaki, “The Number One Reason: McCarthy, Eisenhower and the Decline of American Prestige in Britain, 1952-4,” in Jonathan Hollowell (ed.) Twentieth-Century Anglo—American Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001), pp.104-123, pg.106 48 from the left of the Labour Party, we should be careful not to describe the pro-protest group as being made up entirely of left-wing figures. NATO Supreme Commander and future Republican
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, was one of the public voices most sympathetic to those Germans not wanting to rearm.
The key question dividing the pro- and anti-protest groups mentioned above was whether they believed that German pacifism symbolized a break with, or a continuation of, the German past. Gradually, the view that genuine pacifism was growing in Germany did begin to take hold, a change in opinions that played an important part in the attempted “normalization” of Federal
Germany in the European system in the following decades. This process is described in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. For now, however, it is important to re-emphasize that the negative view of the German protesters and the German people remained dominant. In holding anti-German views, the men of the epistemic community were no different than the mass of people in both the U.K. and the U.S.
There is a tendency among some international affairs historians, which has continued in recent years, to write of the postwar period in a unilateral or bilateral manner.77 The early 1950s, however, were years in which there was a great deal of contact between officials from the U.K and U.S., which is what allows us to speak of a joint epistemic community of German experts that transcended national boundaries. We should not make the mistake here, however, of considering that the power dynamic between U.K. and U.S. elites was equal- certainly the latter applied a considerable deal of pressure on their allies in London. Nonetheless, what came across
77 See, for example, Nicolas Lewkowicz, The United States, the Soviet Union and the Geopolitical Implications of the Origins of the Cold War (London, UK: Anthem, 2018), Kenneth Weisbrode, The Year of Indecision, 1946: A Tour Through the Crucible of Harry Truman's America (New York: Viking, 2016), James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002) 49 as British servility was often simply an agreement of opinion- as Kenneth Younger, Minister of
State at the [British] Foreign Office wrote of his superior, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin:
“Where he appears to be weak, e.g. in Germany, the reason is that he is already half in agreement with them [the U.S.] anyway.”78 The West Germans themselves respected the U.K. and the U.S. more than they respected any other country during this period- in May 1953, eighty-eight percent of a poll’s respondents stated that closer cooperation was needed with the U.S. and sixty-three percent stated it was needed with the U.K., both higher than in any other country.79
The West German anti-rearmament protests have previously been examined in numerous works.80 Michaela Hoenicke Moore’s research into elite and public attitudes towards the
Germans during the Second World War, as well as the afterlives of these attitudes, must be mentioned. Moore examines the Morgenthau-Stimson debates regarding the appropriate post-war treatment of Germany that took place in 1944-5 (Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury called for a harsh treatment of the defeated country in a plan which War Secretary
Henry Stimson bitterly opposed) and notes the formulation of a compromise between a punitive and relaxed German policy in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This uneasy compromise between being strict and relaxed with the defeated Germans drove early U.S. policy in Germany during the postwar period. The conversations described in this chapter suggest two things in relation to Moore’s work. Firstly, this compromise consisted more of a truce- the U.S.
78 Geoffrey Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger, February 1950–October 1951 (London, UK: Routledge, 2005), pg.10 79 Lily Gardner Feldman, Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation from Enmity to Amity (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), pg.34 80 For some classic accounts of the rearmament debates, see: James Hershberg, “'Explosion in the Offing': German Rearmament and American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, vol.16, no.4 (Fall 1992), pp.511-549, David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) and Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 50 diplomatic apparatus continued to be heavily divided as to the correct policy to pursue towards
Germany into the 1950s, as can be seen most notably in the clash between John J. McCloy and
Henry Byroade. Secondly, the evidence presented here suggests that figures in Britain replicated much of the bickering of their U.S. colleagues in their own discussions, bickering that was particularly notable in the ranks of the Labour Party.81
Holger Nehring’s research highlights the ways in which West German society itself was torn, caught between a rejection of conscription and a continued reverence for standing armies in general and the Wehrmacht in particular. An individual might oppose conscription for themselves and their relations, whilst still supporting the idea of a strong German military. Nehring refers to this as the “paradox” of “a dislike of conscription, but an approval of the idea of conscription,” and its implications go some way to explaining the confusion with which U.K. and U.S. officials reacted to the protests in the country. Nehring presents his paradox as a way of explaining the growth of an opposition security discourse in the FRG. The growth of this discourse is also relevant to our chapter here, as the shift in opposition tactics in Germany from disorganized street protests against rearmament into more straight-laced forms of semi-parliamentary protest that Nehring tracks helps us to understand the growing acceptability of protest in the eyes of foreign elites. It was harder to present smartly presented, organized arguments as disingenuous or selfish.82
This chapter begins by briefly recapping the events of the rearmament controversy. We will follow the decision to rearm West Germany and the subsequent period of diplomatic
81 For a condensed version of these ideas see Michaela Hoenicke Moore, “The Nazis and U.S. Foreign Policy Debates: History, Lessons, and Analogies,” in Michael Patrick Cullinane, David Ryan (eds.) U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), (pp.142–162). 82 Holger Nehring, Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–1970 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), pg.35-38 51 negotiations before summarizing the anti-rearmament protest movements. Most of the chapter then examines the U.K.-U.S. reactions to the protests, highlighting the tensions between those officials who feared that German activists were communist puppets and other officials who saw in the protests a sign of hope. The chapter concludes in May 1952, with the signing of the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. Whilst this date by no means represented the end of the rearmament protests in the FRG, (which would continue until the late 1950s), it marks the period when- in the words of David Clay Large, the debate regarding the “spirit and structure” of the German army replaced the debate over “whether Germany should rearm at all.”83 After May
1952, reporting on the situation on the West German streets markedly declined as officials became assured of at least some form of German military contribution. The discourse produced by the epistemic community, for so long defined by anxiety over the domestic stability of West
Germany was replaced by fearful fretting about the passage of the EDC through the Bundestag.
It was only after another lengthy period of negotiation that German troops finally began to be deployed by NATO in 1955.
Context: The Division of Germany
The anti-rearmament protests took place in the context of a widespread upheaval in German politics during the postwar period. The division of Germany between West and East, made official by the creation of the Federal Republic and the GDR in 1949, was a traumatic and slowly drawn out event. Not only did the division of Germany split apart families, it also resurrected memories in the country of a time when Germany had been used as a battleground upon which
83 Large, Germans to the Front, pg.7 52
European disputes were settled. Rather than being site of the battle between Protestantism and
Catholicism, the country now played host to the titanic struggle between “capitalism” and
“communism”. The action of supporting West German rearmament was seen by thousands of
Germans as supporting the division of Europe into two hostile power blocs for the foreseeable future. Rather than challenging the rapidly developing “Cold War consensus” that was emerging on the continent, German rearmament was seen as deepening it. As a result, groups who stood to gain from the continued division of Germany tended to support rearmament and those who opposed the Cold War consensus objected to rearmament.
The moderate right in Germany, represented politically by the West German leader,
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and his CDU, were the most fervent supporters of rearmament.
The Union were also the group set to gain most from affiliation with the West. The CDU’s policy of Westbindung (Western integration) involved the pursuit of close ties with both the U.S. and
Western Europe to create a democratic, yet conservative and Christian, Germany. The new
Chancellor’s choice of Bonn as the capital of democratic Germany was a revealing one- the small university town on the River Rhine lay far from Berlin, and far closer to the French border.
Reunification was not only a price to pay for creation of a democratic state, but was indeed welcomed to an extent, as East Germany, with its communists and its “Prussians,” would serve as a magnet attracting the type of Germans unwelcome in the CDU’s vision for the Federal
Republic. For conservatives in the CDU committed to the project of Westbindung, rearmament was welcomed as a way of protecting Christian, democratic Germany from the atheist forces of the East. “Asia stands on the Elbe,” warned the Chancellor.84
84 Cited in Peter Bugge, “'Shatter Zones': The Creation and Re-creation of Europe's East,” in Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle (eds.), Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.47-68, pg.59 53
Even with these security concerns in mind, Adenauer’s consistent pursuit of German rearmament may at first come across as somewhat perplexing. West Germany’s leader was, after all, not a militarist in any conventional sense of the word, having no military experience and holding a deep distrust of the “Prussian” general staff that had organized Germany’s armies during the world wars. Adenauer had even referred to the traditional German elite as being “war- hungry, unprincipled [and] militaristic.”85 What primarily drove Adenauer to support rearmament, despite this, was his belief that it would secure West Germany’s equal status with the other nations of western Europe. “My precondition for German participation in European defense was complete equality between Germany and the other European nations,” he later wrote.86 Having German soldiers serve alongside British and French troops would be evidence of political equality and the triumph of Westbindung. What’s more, Adenauer held a deeply pessimistic opinion of his fellow Germans that stemmed from his “haunted” memories of the mass support Hitler had once enjoyed. He felt that the German people could only be rallied by a nationalist cause- rearmament and the subsequent concessions of sovereignty he could squeeze from his grateful allies would serve as this cause.87
The West German founding laws, the Grundgesetz, enshrine political parties with a great degree of power as formulators and announcers of the “will of the people”. Adenauer’s Christian
Democratic Party was a powerful organization, but was also matched by a significant political rival, the SPD, which was considered to represent the will of the German democratic left.88 The
85 Cited in Jasper Heinzen, Making Prussians, Raising Germans: A Cultural History of Prussian State-Building After Civil War, 1866–1935 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pg.261 86 Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, (London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pg.270 87 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pg.378 88 Diane L. Parness, The SPD and the Challenge of Mass Politics: The Dilemma of the German Volkspartei, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pg.23 54
SPD was not only a party in the parliamentary sense, but was a movement, with numerous sub- organizations, associations and print publications. The SPD presented an entirely different vision for Europe than their conservative rivals. In contrast to the CDU, the SPD officially opposed
German rearmament from as early as December 11, 1948, publicly stating that recreating a
German military would solidify the division of Europe.89 The SPD opposed such a division and called for German reunification to set forward its own vision for a socialist bloc in the heart of
Europe that would stand proudly independent from both the U.S. and the USSR.
The creation of this socialist vision lay above all in the hands of the leader of the SPD,
Kurt Schumacher. For Schumacher, foreign policy issues such as rearmament and alliance with
NATO were fundamentally intertwined with the wider project of the creation of a socialist state at home. “The contest over foreign policy,” he claimed, “is at the same time the contest over internal policy… Foreign policy sets the limits to the possibilities of our economic and social policy.”90 Only once a social-democratic German state was established could the wider goal of “a democratic and socialist Europe, [in] which a free and unified Germany would belong as an equal partner” be achieved.91 And the creation of such a Germany was dependent on reunification. Therefore, rearmament, which threatened reunification more than any other policy, had to be opposed, especially if it was to lay the groundwork for West Germany joining NATO.
Originally, the SPD had been confident in its ability to sweep the Federal elections in
West Germany. The political right had, so social democrats believed, been utterly discredited by the excesses of the Nazi era and were effectively unelectable. A deeply ideological thinker,
89 Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration, pg.20 90 Quoted in Ronald Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949– 1966 (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pg.9 91 For a discussion of Schumacher’s goals, see Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, pg.54 55
Schumacher stated his belief that if the German people wanted “independence,” than this could only be “achieved through socialism,” and democratic socialism at that.92 In the late 1940s, the democratic-left seemed to be winning elections throughout Europe- even in the U.K., which had been a victor in the war. However, the SPD found itself pushed into opposition following the surprising success of the CDU in the 1949 elections. The party was subsequently to act as a frustrated bystander in the German rearmament negotiations. The SPD under Schumacher never utilized street protests in the way that it would in the later Kampf dem Atomtod (see chapter two), preferring to deploy parliamentary tactics to oppose rearmament. Even so, the constant calls made the SPD against rearmament- and Schumacher’s concurrent claim that a vote for the CDU was one for “remilitarization”- worsened its reputation in the eyes of pro-rearmament members of the epistemic community. As a result, whilst Adenauer’s successes were celebrated, any SPD electoral victories were greeted with dismay by this group.93
Like the SPD, German nationalists and the German far right also longed for reunification.
Reunification would serve as the first step along the path of a renewed German independence.
Their motivation was not the neutral socialist utopia of the SPD but rather a powerful, independent Germany able to command the respect that it had once enjoyed in the days of the
Kaiser. Without a doubt, some voices remained that would not have been opposed to the return of another kind of Reich. As a result of these grand ambitions, German nationalists were unwilling to sanction Adenauer’s rearmament plans. A West Germany army under NATO would not enjoy the freedom to pursue aggressive war in the East to win back the lost lands, but instead would be shackled to its defensive duties. Worse, it would be subservient to the very nations who had
92 Quoted in Joost Kleuters, Reunification in West German Party Politics from Westbindung to Ostpolitik (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pg.29 93 Alexandra Margareta Friedrich, “Awakenings: The Impact of the Vietnam War on West German -American relations in the 1960s,” (PhD dissertation, Temple University, 2000), pg.32 56 inflicted such damage upon Germany during the war, the U.K., the U.S. and the hated French. By the summer of 1951, a season in which the execution of five Nazi war criminals saw a swell of support for the nationalist cause, the radical right-wing Socialist Reich Party was polling 11% in the northern state of Lower Saxony.94
On top of the political issues mentioned above, we must also consider the religious situation in early 1950s West Germany. The division of Germany had thrown off the traditional religious balance of power in the Federal Republic, which had since the time of Bismarck been largely (two-thirds) protestant. Now in West Germany, a country which included the Catholic heartlands of Bavaria and the Rhineland, Catholics were far more prominent in both number and influence than they had been before. The united German nation and German national identity also played a far more important role in protestant identity than in Catholicism, with Catholics long having their own institutions, such as church schools, which were proudly independent from the state.95 What’s more, the prestige of the protestant churches had been damaged by the willingness with which they had collaborated with the Hitler regime.96 Protestants were more willing than Catholics to oppose rearmament for two reasons- firstly, they felt that any solidification of Cold War boundaries would permanently cut them off from their religious brothers in East Germany (ensuring continued Catholic domination of democratic German politics) and secondly because they wished to make atonement for their actions during the
Twelve Year Reich.
94 Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.69 95 Thomas Brechenmacher, “Katholische Kirche und (Anti-) Kommunismus in der frühen Bundesrepublik,” in Stefan Creuzberger and Dierk Hoffmann (eds.) “Geistige Gefahr” und “Immunisierung der Gesellschaft”: Antikommunismus und politische Kultur in der frühen Bundesrepublik, (Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), pp.191-213, pg.203-4 96 The Catholic Church, in contrast, largely considered itself a victim of Nazism- a claim that was rather unfounded. See Derek Hastings, Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009) 57
The Rearmament Proposals and Protests
Throughout the duration of the Cold War, the Soviet Union possessed more conventional military power than the United States on the European Continent. At no time was this disparity greater than in the late 1940s. NATO intelligence warned that the Soviets could field 175 divisions- the
Western Allies could field six. Worse, the Soviet Union was known to be, from 1949 onwards, gradually building up its own stockpile of nuclear weapons, threatening to end U.S. nuclear hegemony. For military figures, this deficit in numbers could only be rectified by tapping into the vast West German man pool. A strong, rearmed Germany was seen as necessary if Europe was to be made secure enough to be able to shrug off Soviet influence, which could come in the form of either a direct invasion or an indirect “subversion”. As General Eisenhower told the U.S.
President Truman and his cabinet, western Europeans “could tell Russia to go to hell if they only would get together, raise enough men, and produce enough equipment.”97
The impetus for German rearmament thus came in the late 1940s, rather than after 1950 as had once been assumed. In particular, the idea of a “forward defense” of Western Europe, involving an offensive into East Germany, became increasingly popular following the 1948
Berlin airlift. Such an offensive would necessitate some form of German involvement, and military leaders in London, Paris and Washington all quietly proposed varying forms of German conscription.98 Adenauer, for his part, argued that the Germans must be allowed to “defend their country in the event of an emergency” in the summer of 1949, months before the Federal
97 Quoted in Sebastian Rosato, Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 108 98 Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pg.253 58
Republic was founded.99 Rearmament plans were not, however, shared with the public in either the U.K. or U.S. Public opinion in both countries, not to mention West Germany’s smaller
European neighbors, was still opposed to the establishment of any German military. Not only this, but a commitment to disarming Germany and ending German militarism forever had been one of the few areas where the Western Allies and the Soviets had found themselves in agreement. Openly proclaiming support for remilitarization would certainly collapse relations with the USSR even further.100 When Adenauer asked the Allies for permission to create a federally controlled armed police force, or Gendarmerie, of 30,000 men in April 1950, his plans were rejected.101
There was an awareness among some U.K. and U.S. elites that not every German might be eager to see the restoration of a German military. Developments within the FRG hinted at an anti-rearmament opposition beginning to build. Germany’s oldest and most prestigious peace organization, the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, DFG) was, for example, resurrected in November 1946, having previously been dismantled during the Nazi period. The DFG, seeing militarism as a social issue, a problem embedded into the German character, immediately set about trying to convert Germans to pacifism and win hearts and minds.102 Allied intelligence services began closely observing German public opinion on the rearmament issue at around the same time as these DFG activities began.103 Such intelligence
99 Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1989), 114-115, pg.127 100 Wolfgang E. Heisenberg, "The reception of American deterrence theory in the federal republic of Germany and the German ‘nuclear debate’ of the 1950s", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, pp.70-83, pg.76 101 Thomas Vogel, “The Himmerod Memorandum and the Beginning of West German Security Policy,” in James S. Corum (ed.), Rearming Germany, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011), pp.3-28, pg.7 102 Andrew Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements: Framing Peace in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945–1974,” in Hara Kouki and Eduardo Romanos (eds.), Protest Beyond Borders: Contentious Politics in Europe Since 1945 (New York: Berghahn, 2011), pp.15-31, pg.16 103 See Agilolf Keßelring, Die Organisation Gehlen und die Neuformierung des Militärs in der Bundesrepublik (Berlin, Germany: Links Christoph Verlag, 2017) 59 gathering was just one small facet of a wider project of observation that attempted to assess the views of German citizens on a number of different issues. It is not unreasonable to speculate that the British establishment paid even greater attention to German public opinion at the time than it did to the opinions of U.K. citizens, as it set about the task of rebuilding a new Germany.104
Efforts to rearm West Germany were accelerated in the summer of 1950, following the beginning of the Korean War. Panic spread among some Germans who compared the situation of
West Germany to that of South Korea. The CDU press service even went so far as to describe the
Korean War as an “educational lesson” for the German people.105 Direct parallels made by panicked West Germans often pointed out that the Soviets had not needed to directly launch an invasion of South Korea but that Moscow had merely needed to direct its puppet in North Korea to do its bidding. The possibility was raised that the East Germans, like the North Koreans, would launch a limited invasion of their own, without the need for military intervention from the
Soviets. This fear was rather ludicrous in retrospect, not least because the German Democratic
Republic did not possess an army at the time. That said, the East Germans did have a militarized police force that the CIA estimated was 35,000 men strong and equipped with artillery, tank, single and engineer units. It is unknown how well this “alert police” would have performed in combat, but its numbers and equipment suggest that it could have at least driven the Allies from
West Berlin, if nothing else.106
Adenauer was willing to use the growing panic in the Federal Republic for political purposes. In the summer of 1950, he issued a memorandum to the Allied representatives in West
104 Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.8 105 Von Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration, pg.24 106 Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The US Army in Europe, 1951–1962 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2015), pg.171 60
Germany, the High Commissioners, in which he called for a larger military presence in the FRG in order to shore up the “morale” of his fellow West Germans. From this early date the
Chancellor linked rearmament to internal stability in West Germany as opposed to simply believing it to be a military necessity. Such tactics bore early fruit. Just three weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, journalist Paul Sethe noted that “the idea of German rearmament is spreading like an oil stain among the victorious powers.”107 Secret discussions between West
German “defense experts” and Allied officials began taking place from July 12.108 Finally, at a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in New York in September, U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson informed his British and French guests that the U.S. was now actively seeking to rearm the Federal Republic.
At New York, both the British and the French diplomats told Acheson he had overlooked the unrest occurring on the streets of West Germany. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin stressed “the danger of Communist-provoked disorders… The German police at the moment were weak and their morale was low,” warning of chaos if rearmament went ahead.
Nonetheless, he supported the U.S. rearmament plans, reluctantly. Schuman, in contrast, used the unrest of the West Germans as justification to entirely reject rearmament plans. “He feared,” wrote Bevin, “the effect of such a decision [rearmament] on German public opinion, a point he continued to stress throughout the conference.” After the meeting, plans to rearm the FRG became- against the wishes of officials- public knowledge on both sides of the Atlantic, including in Germany. The Soviet Union reacted to the news immediately, its leader Josef Stalin stating that he: “would not accept the renaissance in western Germany of a regular German army.” The
107 Von Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration, pg.27 108 Vogel, “The Himmerod Memorandum,” pg.9 61
Kremlin announced that it “would not tolerate” West German rearmament at all. These statements caused much fear across Western Europe, but particularly in the Federal Republic.
Acheson’s pronouncement, meanwhile, that fear of an atomic retaliation would deter a Soviet offensive did little to calm people’s feelings.
At the same time as the Soviet Union complained in diplomatic channels, a series of protest marches and demonstrations involving thousands of citizens took place across the FRG.
Whilst these protests are often grouped together, it is important to note that they by no means formed a united movement, with the only factor uniting different groups of protesters being an unwillingness to fight fellow Germans in the German Democratic Republic. Communists, church figures, intellectuals, social democrats, women’s groups, and German nationalists were involved, at times side-by-side, at times separately. Much of the opposition to rearmament was unorganized. Graffiti, for example, was daubed on “front doors, letter boxes, walls, pavements and trees,” displaying the slogan “Ohne mich!” (count me out) or simply an “F” for Frieden- peace.109 The immense popularity of anti-war works such as Helmut Kirst’s novel 08/15 and Carl
Zuckmayer’s play The Devil's General also point towards a widespread dislike of rearmament which found expression outside of any organized movement like the DFG.110
The communists were the first group to come out in large numbers against rearmament.
In May 1950, the Marxist-Leninist ruling party of the GDR, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) had staged an opulent peace rally and parade in East Berlin, involving 600,000 young people from across the world.111 The West German Communist press looked to build on the momentum of the
109 Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1988), pg.77 110 Large, Germans to the Front, pg. 45 111 Schwartz, America's Germany, pg. 114-115 62 event by releasing a series of articles in the summer of 1950, warning that German rearmament was imminent. On top of this, the SED launched what the SPD’s Herbert Wehner referred to as a
“paper offensive,” sending 400,000 brochures, leaflets and newspapers or magazines into West
Germany each month between May and July 1950.112 As a result of both of these campaigns, the
Communist press was forcibly shut down by the Federal government until December. Even so,
SED propaganda continued to arrive (two million new leaflets arrived in the months of
September and October 1950), and KPD activists organized protests in several cities, mostly in the industrial Ruhr region of Germany.
Fearing that a communist invasion was imminent, the West German police initiated a wide range of repressive measures against the KPD. These measures were organized under the name “Operation RALLY.” As soon as communist activists put up their posters, they were pulled down; no sooner were leaflets handed out, they were confiscated. Police, armed with tear gas and pistols, performed 781 “preventative arrests” in October, an action that led to thousands of
Communists rioting in Hamburg. A “Day of 100,000 Young Peace Fighters” was declared in
Dortmund but came nowhere close to attracting that number of participants. By the end of
November, the battles with the police had left the KPD exhausted and their production of posters and pamphlets condemning rearmament had been majorly disrupted. This disruption did not prevent U.K and U.S. authorities from continuing to raise the specter of Soviet infiltration and communist agitation in their coverage of the protests.113 Whilst the KPD had been ravaged, in the
GDR the SED regime continued to consolidate its hold on power, and the epistemic community
112 Dierk Hoffmann, “The GDR’s Westpolitik and everyday anticommunism in West Germany,” Asian Journal of German and European Studies, vol.2, no.1 (Dec.2017), pp.1-17, pg.6 113 See Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945–1956 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 253-256 63 feared that agents were slipping into West Germany in the ranks of newly arrived refugees and causing trouble.
Nationalist protesters soon began to raise their voice. A group of boys told a U.S. official that “they wanted no part of defending the West, that the West had hanged Germany's leaders and humiliated the German people… until the West made some move to restore German honor, the
West could jolly well defend itself.”114 Respondents to public opinion polls attacked the Cold
War from a nationalist perspective. “It is bullshit that I can now be shot to death for an Ami or an
Ivan” wrote one respondent- “we don’t fight for foreign powers” replied another. On the organized level, one of the most prominent nationalist organizations was Wolf Schenke’s “Third
Front,” heavily financed and influenced by the SED. More threatening was the Sozialistische
Reichspartei (SRP), a far-right party which earned the support of many veterans. The party’s co- founder, former army officer Otto Ernst Remer, heavily attacked "the re-militarization concept of
Adenauer and McCloy," in a series of public speeches, warning his audiences that the German army would only be used as fodder to cover the retreat of the Allies in the event of a Soviet attack.115 Even groups which were certainly not nationalist, such as the DGB, attempted- rather successfully- to make up for a lack of public interest by appealing to nationalist sensibilities, with their propaganda depicting a helpless Germany laying at the mercy of the U.S. and Soviet superpowers.116
114 Cited in the article “Nuremberg Verdicts Cool Ardor of Germany for Defending West”, November 25 1950, Saturday Evening Post, pg.12 115 Alaric Searle, “Veterans’ Associations and Political Radicalism in West Germany 1951-54: A Case Study of the Traditionsgemeinschaft Grossdeutschland,” Canadian Journal of History, August 1999, vol.34, no.2, pg.221 116 Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements,” pg.17 64
Whilst Catholics priests largely supported the government’s policy, Protestant ministers showed vigorous opposition.117 The opposition of the Protestants began at the annual Kirchentag
(assembly) of August 1950. The Kirchentag provided a space where dissenting Protestants could gather, discuss the problems with rearmament from a Christian perspective, and plan further protests. The most famous figure in the movement was Lutheran pastor Martin Niemöller.
Niemöller had spent the Second World War imprisoned in concentration camps for speaking up against the Nazi regime and signing petitions against its policies. During the Second World War, he only narrowly escaped execution. Far from an uncomplicated character, Niemöller had also been an early supporter of Hitler and “remained a German nationalist throughout his life” to the extent that his “conversion” to anti-imperialism after the war was not as clean as might be suggested.118 Yet, regardless of his past, Niemöller’s sermons against rearmament electrified audiences throughout West Germany and, as his recent biographer Matthew Hockenos reminds us “whilst the speed and extent” of the Pastor’s transformation in the 1940s is debatable, “one cannot deny the long-term changes.”119
Much of Niemöller’s importance and popularity in postwar West Germany stemmed from his religious convictions. Whereas Chancellor Adenauer attempted to mobilize religious
Germans into parliamentary majorities, Niemöller called upon the faithful to acknowledge that they had a moral and spiritual obligation to oppose the state. For the Pastor, West Germany was not a democratic state, as instead of embracing and respecting an individual’s freedom of
117 Not all Catholics in the Federal Republic supported rearmament. Opposition came mainly from various “left” Catholic intellectuals, among whom numbered Eugen Kogon, Reinhold Schneider and Walter Dirks. For more information, see Thomas Brechenmacher, “Katholische Kirche und (Anti-) Kommunismus,” pg.191 118 For a nuanced appraisal of Niemöller’s role in the wider peace movement, see Petra Goedde, The Politics of Peace: A Global Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pg.109-112 119 Matthew D. Hockenos, Then They Came for Me: Martin Niemöller, the Pastor Who Defied the Nazis (New York: Basic Books, 2018), pg.4 65 consciousness, it demanded conformity in its fight against communism. All men, even communists, were God’s children and any government that led to deep divisions between “friend and foe” had to be opposed.120 Just as such spiritual arguments drew thousands to the anti- rearmament cause, Niemöller’s “impetuousness and a certain lack of realism” that led him to make “inopportune statements, which the press blew up into inflammatory slogans,” caused a loss of support from moderate West Germans and other groups on the edge of the rearmament movement.121 Over the decades covered in the subsequent chapters, we shall see how Niemöller was able to subtly shape and shift his views to make them more appealing to everyday Germans, whilst retaining his deeply-held, religious belief in the moral obligation of both dissent and pacifism.
In October 1950, Niemöller and thirty-eight other church figures signed a letter addressed to Adenauer in which they accused the Chancellor and “the Americans” of forcing rearmament upon an unwilling West German population. The letter referred to rearmament as a “deception of the people” and called for a referendum on the issue.122 Gustav Heinemann, Interior Minister in the Adenauer government, and the most high-ranking Protestant in the country refused to condemn the letter when asked to do so by the Chancellor and subsequently resigned.123
Heinemann had his own deeply held beliefs as to the evils of war and militarism. He subsequently organized and appeared in several marches and demonstrations with Niemöller over the following two decades. Throughout 1951 an angry Adenauer consistently brought up the threat of Niemöller-Heinemann and their “agitators” in various rants. The Chancellor’s attacks
120 Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements,” pg.19 121 Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years, Translated by Paul Stevenson, (New York: Praeger, 1971), pg.238 122 Burns and van der Will, Protest and Democracy, pg.78 123 See: Special Report, “Arming is Creating Problems in Bonn,” New York Times, October 11 1950, pg.21 66 betrayed his fears that the two men would convince Protestants that the CDU was too dominated by Catholics and result in them leaving for a new party. When this party, the All-German
People’s Party, was founded, however, it proved something of a flop.124
Given the intensity of the demonstrations against rearmament, plans to recreate a German military may have stalled as soon as they began. West German Rearmament was energized, however, by events occurring in East Asia. In late November, the U.N. forces led by the U.S., which had been pushing into North Korea, experienced several defeats following the intervention of China in the conflict and a deadly North Korean counterattack. By the first week of December talk of a Chinese-North Korean victory was increasingly common as the South Korean capital,
Seoul, fell to their combined strength.125 The commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, U.S.
General Douglas MacArthur, openly speculated whether the war in the peninsula was a distraction meant to tie down U.S. forces in East Asia before the USSR launched an all-out offensive into Western Europe. Similar conclusions helped to create an atmosphere of utter panic in Washington as U.S. officials increased the urgency of their plans to defend western Europe.126
The reestablishment of a German general staff had now, however, been widely vetoed.
This was not only thanks to the opposition of the West German public, but also the French, who had suffered greatly during both world wars with the Germans. The puzzle was now how best to rearm West Germany without recreating the German military establishment. Two plans to rearm small units of German troops within a wider non-German army were subsequently advanced, namely the (U.S.) Spofford Plan and the (French) Pleven Plan. Under these plans German
124 Heinrich A. Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West: Volume 2: 1933–1990, trans. Alexander J. Sager (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.135 125 See Beisner, Dean Acheson, pg.410 126 For MacArthur’s comments, see Lutz Hoeth, Die Wiederbewaffnung Deutschlands in den Jahren 1945-1958 und die Haltung der Evangelischen Kirche, (Norderstedt, Books on Demand, 2008), pg.181 67 soldiers could be used by NATO for the defense of Europe, but there would be no German officer corps who could redirect the energies of these men against Germany’s allies. No other
NATO country, meanwhile, would be under the same restrictions. Understandably, this subservient status upset many Germans, especially German nationalists. Both the Pleven and the
Spofford Plans were developed into the spring of 1951, during a lengthy period of diplomatic negotiation, which took place at the same time, in both Bonn and Paris.
Both sets of negotiations were disrupted by nearly continuous Soviet- GDR calls for an immediate halt to West German rearmament in return for a conference on German reunification.
In November and December 1950, Moscow exchanged two notes with NATO condemning proposals to raise “whole divisions” of German troops and called for a renewal of the Potsdam negotiations.127 The East German efforts to disrupt plans to rearm the FRG began simultaneously with the “Germans to one table!” campaign, which presented itself as a means to prevent the division of the country. When this failed, the Prime Minister of the GDR, Otto Grotewohl (who was by no means the country’s leader- the most powerful East German was Walter Ulbricht, First
Secretary of the SED) sent a letter to Adenauer calling for an “All-German Council” to prepare the grounds for all-German elections. Adenauer countered that free and fair elections (that the
SED would never agree too) should occur as the first step for any possible reunification.128
Undeterred, the Soviets and East Germans continued to call for negotiations. Whilst British and
French officials were interested in these Soviet overtures, U.S. representatives rejected them out of hand.129
127 Rosato, Europe United, pg.110 128 Winkler, Germany, pg.136 129 See the reports of the Director of the Office of German Political Affairs for the U.S. point of view here, for example: Perry Laukhuff to Henry Byroade, April 6 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, European Security and
68
During these negotiations in the first months of 1951, West German demonstrations against rearmament reached their peak, in both size and intensity. After coming together in
January in Essen, where they called for a plebiscite on rearmament issue, representatives of numerous anti-rearmament groups organized a citizen’s referendum, with a “yes-no” question on the rearmament question. As part of the campaign to promote the referendum, in March over thirty organizations united at the “German Congress for Active Neutrality,” centered around
(CDU member) Ulrich Noack’s “Nauheim Circle”. The Congress, supported by Niemöller in absentia, adopted a joint proposal for German neutrality and presented it to the officials negotiating in Paris, to great public acclaim.130
Simultaneously, anti-rearmament groups passed around thousands of “neutrality cards” to
Germans. These cards, the size of business cards, served as signifiers of an individual’s dedication against conscription.131 These cards, significantly, informed a reader that the holder would fight for neither the West nor the East.132 In March 1951, fifty-six percent of the West
German population now favored German neutrality in the Cold War.133 In response to his agitation, the CDU banned Noack and a number of other activists from its ranks, and in April
1951 declared the rearmament memorandum to be illegal. Meetings were broken up and crowds dispersed. Whilst the neutralist groups lost support and would never again be united around a single cause, they had managed to widely spread their message throughout West Germany.
the German Question, eds. David H. Stauffer, John A. Bernbaum, William Z. Slany, Lisle A. Rose and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1981), doc.605, pg.1121 130 Marina Salvin, "Neutralism in France and Germany," International Conciliation, vol.29 (1951): 285-322 131 Von Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration, pg.130-1 132 For a discussion of the neutrality cards in the U.S. Senate, see: William Langer, in “Defensive Alliance with West Germany,” February 5 1951, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Vol.97, Part 1, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), pg.976 133 Von Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration, pg.148 69
Rather than fall apart in the face of this opposition, plans to rearm Germany were invigorated in July 1951 in what German journalist Ernst Friedländer termed the “second start” of rearmament. Friedländer noted that “The first start had come too suddenly and without psychological preparation. It had failed when… German mass public opinion had demonstrated unequivocal hostility.” The “fresh start” of July had to take account of this mass opinion. The
Western Allies for this reason officially concluded the Second World War by ending the state of war with Germany. This opened up the possibility for further concessions of sovereignty to be made to the Federal Republic, which could serve as useful bribes to win over the German nationalists.134 The ending of the state of war with (Federal) Germany was accompanied by the establishment of a (mostly) independent West German foreign ministry and an economic boom, the famous “economic miracle,” which would last uninterrupted into the 1960s. The “temporary state” was beginning to lay down deep roots.
The various protest movements against rearmament began to lose momentum in the fall of 1951. This general pattern did not include nationalist opposition, which continued unabated.
In October 1951, the notorious Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit (HIAG, ‘Mutual Aid
Association’ in English) was found by and to support former Waffen-SS members. These veterans and war criminals, who spent the majority of their meetings drinking enormous volumes of beer and singing their desire for a resurrection of the Reich, were resentment about their treatment following 1945 and shouted “Ohne mich!” with more enthusiasm than any other group.
Former Major General Otto Ernst Remer taunted NATO officials, promising that, should the
Soviet Union invade, he would “show the Russians the way to the Rhine” as quickly as possible.
134 Ernst Friedländer, “German Rearmament”, The Spectator, July 20, 1951, pg.6 70
Despite this, desperate to gain the support of its membership for his rearmament plans, Adenauer supported the HIAG and referred to the Waffen-SS as “soldiers like all the rest.”135
With the Chancellor gradually regaining his popularity, Moscow intervened directly. On
March 10 1952, the Soviet government sent the famous “Stalin note” to the Western Allies, calling upon all four powers to make a combined peace agreement with Germany and in the process “examine the conditions under which a unified German government… might be brought into existence as rapidly as possible.” Stalin’s proposal to reunify Germany would of course occur on certain conditions- the new Germany was to be a “peace-loving state” in which all organizations “opposed to peace and its preservation” would be banned. In other words,
Germany was to be neutralized. Once more, the British were interested in this Soviet initiative and the U.S. officials rejected it. In this they had the full support of Adenauer, who believed the
Stalin note to be disingenuous, simply intended as a way of stirring up trouble in West
Germany.136 The SPD leadership for their part wanted to postpone any further progress towards
Western integration and rearmament until Stalin’s intentions were checked for their legitimacy but were ignored.137 Scholars have speculated that the U.S. may have been so quick to reject the
Stalin note for these reasons, as a way of shaping West German domestic politics and ensuring that the pro-NATO CDU kept the SPD from power.138
The rejection of the Stalin note signaled the end of the long period of negotiations. On
May 27, 1952, the “Treaty establishing the European Defense Community” was signed by
135 Martin A. Lee, The Beast Reawakens: Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to Today’s Neo-Nazi Groups and Right-Wing Extremists, (London, UK: Routledge, 2000), pg. 65 136 Winkler, Germany, pg.136 137 Von Schubert, Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration, pg.186 138 Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), pg.166 71 representatives of West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux nations. Whilst the treaty was never ratified by the French National Assembly, it brought the question of whether West
Germany was to rearm to an end. A feeling pervaded that, whatever the protesters did, the plans for rearming the FRG continued apace. British officials, for example, noted an increasing number of Rhinelanders adopting an “I expect it will happen” attitude towards rearmament.139
One of the last marches against rearmament, the May 1952 “youth caravan” in Essen, ended in tragedy when one of the young marchers was shot by police. Rather than rise up, however, the crowd simply dispersed and went home. World peace, it seemed, was not to be brought about from German streets.
Hostility to the Protest Movements
Broadly speaking, U.K.-U.S. officials reacted to German anti-rearmament protests in two ways.
The more common reaction was one of hostility, with Allied elites believing that the street demonstrations represented the selfishness and contempt for democracy which they believed existed in the German character. A common umbrella term employed to describe these anti- democratic tendencies was “neutralist” and fear of “neutralism” was commonplace. Advocating for a neutral Germany was, for men such as Acheson, synonymous with aligning with the
Soviets; as he wrote to the U.S. embassy in London: “integrating Germany with [the] West, including defense plans... best means of ensuring Germany does not fall under Soviet domination, and eventuality which would be far from ensured against in the event of a united, demilitarized ‘neutral’ Germany.” Acheson and other observers who were worried about
139 British Land Commissioner for North Rhine-Westphalia to Kirkpatrick, “Monthly Report: February 1952,” March 5 1952, FO 1013/1326, TNA 72 neutralism saw the need to counter perceived Soviet propaganda initiatives and “win over” the protesters for democracy (and rearmament). This was to be done through the granting of concessions to the Adenauer government.140
The idea of German protesters as dangerous threats to democracy was never an entirely
U.S. one. As early as the New York foreign ministers’ meeting in September 1950, British participants shared with Acheson their similar concerns. Bevin, for example, based his objection to rearmament on the possibility of unrest occurring on the streets of West Germany. He stressed
“the danger of Communist-provoked disorders… The German police at the moment were weak and their morale was low,” warning of chaos if rearmament went ahead.141 The British High
Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, reported to the conference that “German opinion does not believe the Allies are resolved and able to resist a Russian attack. In fighting on the Allied side the Germans would not determine the course of the battle, and consequently would only be participating in a catastrophe. They are therefore tempted to be neutral and act in accordance with the advice of Soviet agents.”142 [emphasis added] Kirkpatrick was new to his position, having only become High Commissioner in the summer of 1950. He was taken aback by the worried West German reaction to the Korean War, which served to intensify within him an already present anti-German sentiment. In particular, Kirkpatrick’s reports to London would emphasize the “instability and unpredictability” of the German people.143
140 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, January 12, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, part 2, European Security and the German Problem, eds. David H. Stauffer, John A. Bernbaum, William Z. Slany, Lisle A. Rose, Charles S. Sampson (Washington, D.C: U.S. GPO, 1951), doc.70 141 Gladwyn Jebb, “Defence of Western Europe and the Use of German Resources,” 13 September 1950, CAB 21/1896, TNA 142 High Commissioners’ report, in “Tripartite Talks,” UK Delegation at New York Conference to Foreign Office, September 18 1950, CAB 21/1897, TNA 143 Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.33-4 73
Another oft-repeated theme that British and U.S. elites noted in their first-hand accounts of the German protests was the supposed apathy of the West Germans. One of the first elected representatives to voice this negative view was the U.S. Senator Harry Cain, who visited the
FRG in September 1950. Upon his return to Washington, Cain was pessimistic. “If war began tomorrow,” he reported, “most Germans would… take to their cellars and stay there.” It would be easy, in these circumstances, for Soviet tanks to crush all opposition. To solve the crisis, Cain recommended giving the West Germans a “purpose” by re-establishing their country as a key
European actor. This would rekindle the sense of unity the Germans had supposedly shown in the
1930s and 1940s, (the context of which Cain did not bring up) and thus vastly improve their fighting spirit. In other words, Cain felt that the Germans should be motivated to fight in another crusade against Communism, this time on the ‘right side’.144
“Western Germany should be armed,” said Republican Justin Leroy Johnson in the House on September 22, as “Germans have twice proved [their] ability in two great wars.” Johnson was worried about the growing rise of communism in the Federal Republic, linking it to the rearmament issue: “[Germans] know that should aggression start they will be absolutely helpless... Germans in the western zones are signing up with communistic or semicomniunistic groups. They are doing this, I am told, not because of a belief in communism, but as a result of fear that if invasion comes... they could point to the fact that previous to the invasion they had been members of Communist groups.”145
144 Harry P. Cain, “Report by Senator Cain on his Trip to Europe,” September 11 1950, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Vol.96, Part 11, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), pg.14508 145 J. Leroy Johnson, “Prompt Action in Military Defense Assistance Program Is Imperative To Maintain Peace- Delay Could Lead to War,” September 22 1950, Congressional Record, Volume 96, Part 18 74
The accusations that the German people were apathetic and lacked a cause were echoed in the U.K. Writing in the anti-Communist newspaper The New Leader, British-German journalist Frederick Augustus Voigt noted that: “German industrial labor, which is overworked and underpaid… will not fight for anyone or anything, not even itself.”146 U.K. intelligence officials in the FRG agreed. “My conclusion is not encouraging”, one agent wrote to a colleague in London. “A very strong section of public opinion, probably a majority of the population of
Western Germany, is not at present disposed in any circumstances to take up arms again” as “the
Germans are not yet convinced that a European army is, so to speak, a good firm for them to join.” Like Senator Cain, this official saw the military as the solution to the problem, rather than the problem itself. To untap “the innate German sense of duty and the idealism to which their youth is so inclined,” it was necessary to increase Allied military spending, as “strength is still what the Germans respect most.”147 Such beliefs were not confined to the epistemic community- the turn of the 1950s were a time when the public in both the U.K. and U.S. doubted the ability of the Germans to act in a responsible, democratic way. In 1949, fifty-five percent of poll respondents in the U.S. “did not believe that the Germans were capable of governing themselves in a democratic manner.”148
The British and U.S. High Commissions in Germany became increasingly worried as the level of protest on the streets increased. In November, at the same time as the front in Korea was collapsing, McCloy wrote that “The situation is not good and may be serious.”149 The
Chancellor, as he had since June, encouraged U.K. and U.S. fears to earn concessions. Adenauer
146 F.A.Voigt, “Why Germany Won’t Fight,” New Leader, 7th October 1950, LP/ID/GRM/34, Labour Party Archives, People’s History Museum, Manchester, [Henceforth LPA] 147 C.O’Neil (British High Commission) to W.D.Allen (German Political Department), 22 November 1950, FO 371/85057, TNA 148 Junker, “Introduction,” pg.13 149 McCloy to Acheson, November 17, 1950, July 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. IV, doc.417 75 presented the High Commissioners with a memorandum containing a forthright list of
“suggestions” with which to save the situation. The concessions- effectively demands- the
Chancellor asked for included an end to all industrial dismantling, war crime trials and the extradition of Germans.150 Significantly, Adenauer directly referenced the protests in his memorandum, writing that the “state of public opinion is not healthy,” and that with no agreement to his terms “it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to win over the minds of the
German people to a voluntary cooperation in the defense of Europe.”151 In an accompanying statement, Adenauer informed the High Commissioners that: “He was appealing to [them] to use
[their] influence to… restore the morale of the German people and enable them to take their part in the crusade for freedom.”152
Adenauer’s threats were amplified by the success of the democratic left in state-level elections in Germany. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) did not oppose rearmament out of principle or moral grounds, but saw it as delaying any possible reunification of East and West
Germany. It thus incorporated pacifist themes in its campaigning for a series of local elections in late 1950. U.K.-U.S. officials reacted to this electoral success with dismay, seeing it both as evidence of a rejection of their policies and as weakening their hand in the negotiations with
Adenauer. One British official noted: “Yesterday’s election in South Germany… strengthened
Adenauer’s hand against us- he can now say to us: ‘You see what I mean. Unless I have big concessions… how can I win such people over to the need for German rearmament?’” Dean
Acheson attempted to brush off Adenauer’s threats and relegate West German concerns to the
150 Adenauer, Memoirs, pg.302-3 151 Schwartz, America’s Germany, pg.149 152 Kirkpatrick to Foreign Office, “Summary of the Chancellor’s Statement,” 17 November 1950, FO 371/ 85057, TNA 76 back-burner. “Once you get a German thinking that he is the most important person in the world,” he told Truman’s cabinet, “you have done yourself a great disservice.”153
High Commissioner McCloy, in contrast, took action. McCloy’s own view of the German protests was on the whole cynical, and, just like Adenauer he considered the protesters an element to be pacified with concessions rather than listened to. That McCloy had a mercenary attitude towards the Germans is hinted at in the research of Steven P. Remy, who has highlighted the High Commissioner’s willingness to overlook the complicity of the German military and security services in Nazi-era crimes, so long as it would advance his goals in Germany.154 Once more McCloy’s policies reflect the influence of the Chancellor himself, who, in what Jeffrey
Herf referred to as his “greatest moral and political failure,” called for an end to the trials of
Nazis and their “integration” in West German society.155
In early December, the U.S. High Commissioner called upon his British and French counterparts to “not wait upon action of the [Allied] governments” and instead look to find their own solutions to fight “rapidly deteriorating German and European morale,” itself a result of
“greater success in the Communist infiltration program and [the] growth of “neutralism.”
Specifically, McCloy called on the other High Commissioners to offer a collective “package program” of concessions to the West Germans, whilst at the same time offering trips to politicians from their home countries so that the later could see the disastrous situation on the ground for themselves. McCloy’s plan for an independent High Commission initiative was
153 McAllister, No Exit, pg.198-9 154 Steven P. Remy, The Malmedy Massacre: The War Crimes Trial Controversy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), pg.255-264 155 Herf, Divided Memory, pg.379 77 thwarted by French High Commissioner Poncet, who, like Acheson, preferred to ignore German dissent so as not to give the Federal German government an inflated sense of importance.156
Perturbed by the worsening situation on the streets by February 1951, McCloy addressed his British and French counterparts at the Western European Ambassadors Conference held in
Frankfurt. Acknowledging that the Germans “apparently did not wish to create a national military force,” McCloy railed against “certain elements which were disposed to align West
Germany with the East,” [emphasis added] unfairly naming Niemöller as an example. The U.S.
High Commissioner still felt, however, that the Germans were a naturally militarist people, who
“would fight if they felt that Allied strength” could defeat the Soviets.157
In March, the U.S. executive was clearly growing tired of the opposition to rearmament in Germany. Achseon informed McCloy that the President was “very concerned about the increasing tendency to neutralism in West Germany.” McCloy subsequently passed on the message to an incredulous Adenauer, adding a threat that, “if this tendency were to prevail… a revision of American policy… would become inevitable.” The Chancellor responded by stating that “a visible display of American power was indispensable, for it alone could induce the
Germans to show their attitude towards Soviet Russia more clearly.”158 McCloy promised to pass on his message to NATO Commander Eisenhower, and began pressuring the latter to change his stance, which, as we shall see, was broadly sympathetic towards the German protesters.159
156 McCloy to Acheson, Dec. 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. IV, doc.355 157 “Report of the Western European Ambassador’s Conference at Frankfurt,” February 7, 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. IV, part 1, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, doc. 75 158 Adenauer, Memoirs, pg.315-6/ 319 159 McCloy to Acheson, March 23, 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. III, part 1, European Security and the German Question, doc.562 78
The British Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), an organization which played an important role in informing and advising government policy, commissioned one
Colonel T.W. Vigers to draw up a report exploring the attitudes of the German people towards rearmament. Vigers’ findings were melancholy in outlook, centering on sweeping generalizations of German character. “The German,” he told his readers, “has always been a cynic, but the extent to which cynicism and selfishness have developed in Germany… is almost unbelievable.” It was because of their selfish nature, the “overwhelming desire… to be on the winning side,” that the
Germans were not pulling their weight. Vigers mentioned a colorful variety of characters- workmen, veterans and businessmen, all of whom fit the image which he was seeking to promote. To solve the German crisis, Vigers’ plan was to swamp Germany with allied divisions in order to keep the locals at ease (and under close watch), although he admitted this may not be
“physically possible.” Whilst the Colonel’s cynicism towards the German people comes across as extreme, Vigers was by no means a lone voice in the wilderness but rather had access, through
Chatham House, to the British political elite.160
On June 8, McCloy resumed his own talk of a crisis, writing to Byroade that: “We cannot afford months of delay… The situation here in Germany is deteriorating… I am disturbed over the report of our public opinion survey which shows a marked decrease in the readiness of the
West German people to participate in an Atlantic Pact Army.”161 The U.S. High Commissioner increasingly saw the Germans in the same light as he saw the other peoples of West Europe- that is, of dubious reliability in the fight against communism. Earlier that month he had shouted at
French officials, telling them that the “European attitude [was] faulty, including German, due in
160 T. W. Vigers, ‘The German People and Rearmament’, International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2 (1951), pp. 151–155 161 McCloy to Byroade, June 8, 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. III, part 2, doc.90 79 my judgment not so much to failure of US propaganda but utter lack of initiative on part of local sources actively to combat Communist anti-American line themselves.” He urged the Europeans to defend the reputation of the U.S. against the perceived Soviet propaganda onslaught.162
McCloy’s anger was no longer directed against Chancellor Adenauer, however, whose popularity outside of West Germany continued to rise. Adenauer was particularly popular among observers who opposed the German protest movements. Complaining of the “cynical… German youth” in a debate in the House of Commons, British MP Frederick Bellenger noted that
Adenauer was “a very courageous man, a man who is the nearest to a statesman that I know on the European Continent, a man who has had to take decisions which were very unpopular in his own country… and is not only doing the best he possibly can for his own country… but is also trying to save, as he believes and as we believe too, Western civilization.”163
The Chancellor encouraged such opinions. At a dinner party on 3 August 1951, Adenauer described to a group of West European politicians the “internal situation in Germany.” In the course of a long speech Adenauer spoke of “dangerous elements,” aligned with the Soviet Union, and combined all the previous messages which he had been stressing into one: that the German people were in desperate need of concessions, were they not to fall to communism and take their rightful place in defense of the West.164 Such statements also had the effect of solidifying the postwar division of Germany. Selwyn Lloyd, future Conservative foreign minister, told Churchill that “Dr. Adenauer… the Americans, the French and ourselves- feel in our heart that a divided
Germany is safer for the time being.”165
162 McCloy to Byroade, June 4 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. III, part 1, doc.432 163 Frederick Bellenger in “Foreign Affairs” debate, 20 November 1951, Commons, Hansard, Volume 494, 299-301 164 Statement by the German Federal Chancellor, August 3 1951, cited in CAB 129/47/11, TNA 165 Quoted in R. Gerald Hughes, Britain, Germany, and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), pg.16 80
The Conservative cabinet that came to power in the U.K. following a snap election in
October 1951 was filled with grizzled veterans of two world wars against Germany. The new
Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, had even argued in 1940 that “Hitler is not a phenomenon, but a symptom, the expression of a great part of the German nation.” Nonetheless, the Conservatives were more pro-German rearmament than Labour had been, and so they unanimously opposed the
Ohne mich movement. The reasons for this were numerous. Churchill, the Conservative leader, spoke less of Hitler and the recent Nazi past, and more of the old Kingdom of Prussia, which he regarded as the traditional protector of Europe against “the Russians.” Other cabinet members might not have shared the Victorian outlook of the Prime Minister, but they were unwilling to jeopardize relations with the U.S. over German rearmament and were more wary of Soviet intentions than the Labour cabinet had been.166
The U.S. Congress continued to view the protests in Germany with distrust. November
1951 saw the visit of Congressman Orland Armstrong to West Germany for the purpose of studying “cooperation in the defence of Europe and the free world.” Reporting back, Armstrong noted “huge psychological barriers” of “ordinary German citizens” against rearmament, which he attributed to “gripes of a defeated people, exaggerated out of their proper importance.” He pointed out the existence of a “definite movement” led by Niemöller. This movement, said
Armstrong, was dangerous, for it was “very vocal, articulate and… respected.” The congressman also noted that rearmament protests were still “growing,” even a year after its start. To overcome
“German antagonism towards the West,” Armstrong proposed “immediate action,” and an end to
“conferences discussions and bickering.” This immediate action would introduce political equality and a peace treaty, as well as a written declaration assuring Germans that there would be
166 See Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.74-5, Eden quote found on pg.75 81
“no retreat” in the event of a future war. Armstrong also, interestingly, rejected “army” as a term that would be “psychologically unacceptable to the Germans,” preferring “defense force,” a move echoing the increasing importance of public relations in NATO discussions.
By early 1952, negotiations on a European Defence Community were progressing and agitation on the streets had lessened. There was a growing sense in Allied reports that the
Germans were now becoming “resistant” to communist propaganda. A February 1952 report by the CIA, for example, noted that “The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware that an overwhelming majority of the German people is hostile to both Communism and the USSR and that conditions are not now favorable for gaining control of West Germany through political [psychological] warfare.”167
At a NATO conference in Lisbon, the representatives called for a mass increase in troop numbers, troops who were to be primarily sourced from West Germany. Nonetheless, the Allies had to remain sensitive to public opinion. To this end, McCloy sent a telegram to Henry
Kellerman at the State Department, in which he described ways to instruct the media in how to
“facilitate operations during the coming weeks of intense public debate,” given the “real or alleged German fear of preventive war.” Instructions ranged from the need to “continue to point out the unrealistic fallacy of neutralist isolationism in Germany” to telling the media to make clear that “Faith in Western superiority and in success of Western efforts for preservation of peace should be expressed with assurance and confidence.”168
167 CIA Report, “Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany During 1952,” February 19 1952, NIE 53, A1 29, RG 263, NARA 168 McCloy to Henry Kellerman, January 31, 1952, in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol.VII, part I, Germany and Austria, eds. David M. Baehler, John A. Bernbaum, Charles S. Sampson, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986), doc.140 82
McCloy’s British counterpart, Ivone Kirkpatrick, remained one of the few pessimistic voices. Kirkpatrick had been an early and vocal supporter of West German rearmament and
Kenneth Younger attributed the High Commissioner’s desire to “get the Germans back in uniform [for] the anti-communist crusade” to the latter’s deep Catholic faith.169 In February 1952
Kirkpatrick circulated a letter to Foreign Office officials, including Secretary Anthony Eden, in which he attempted to describe the “German state of mind.” Kirkpatrick’s summary was bleak, stating that: “German opinion is ill-informed, confused and bewildered.” The High
Commissioner showed his continued belief in old views of the Germans, noting that “Our heart tells us… that the Germans are a fighting race, who should bear no intrinsic objection to bearing arms,” but admitted that they were currently “standing shivering on the brink of rearmament,” unwilling to “take the plunge.”170
Kirkpatrick described this situation as “odd… especially at a time when we notice that the Germans are showing so many of their old characteristics and faults.” Kirkpatrick divided the opponents of rearmament into two categories- reputable and disreputable. In the former group were women, protestants and students; in the latter lay Communists, speculators and
“blackmailers”. Kirkpatrick’s letter is invaluable in understanding the prevailing view of the
British political establishment towards the protests- particularly as Foregin Secretary Anthony
Eden [of the Conservative Party, who won the 1951 general election] noted in distributing the letter that he saw “no reason to dissent from Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick’s general conclusion.” In the upcoming decade, as U.S. views of the Germans improved, successive British administrations would continue to struggle with the idea of the Germans as a reformed people.171
169 Cited in Warner, In the Midst of Events, pg.67 170 Foreign Office Memorandum, “Germany: Attitude to Rearmament,” February 16, 1952, CAB 129/49/42, TNA 171 Foreign Office Memorandum, “Germany: Attitude to Rearmament,” February 16, 1952, CAB 129/49/42, TNA 83
Supporters of the West German Protesters
Not all U.K.-U.S. officials viewed the protests in a negative light. The second type of reaction to the civil unrest in West Germany was one of admiration towards the protesters who, having rejected militarism, were seen to represent a new Germany. Observers subscribing to this view, such as members of the British Labour Party and the U.S. Bureau of German Affairs, felt that the voice of the protesters had to be heard and that their claims were valid. This section focuses on the Bureau of German Affairs and the Labour Party because, in the early 1950s, these were the sections of the epistemic community most willing to listen to the concerns of the German protesters against rearmament. For these elites, it was the German armed forces themselves, not the German protesters, who posed the greatest threat to democracy in the new Republic- as
Kenneth Younger informed Bevin as early as July 1950: “Such a course [rearmament] will probably put paid to any real democratization of Western Germany since it will put the nationalists and militarists back in the saddle.”172 The narrative that the anti- protesters should be admired gained adherents more slowly in both Britain and the U.S. than the anti-protest narrative but would reappear in future periods of unrest in Germany in the 1960s and 1980s.
In the U.S., the pro-activist stance was spearheaded by the Bureau of German Affairs, led by Henry A. Byroade. Byroade was the man most responsible for the founding of the Bureau, having asked Acheson in 1949, “how many more years are we going to be running Germany out of the Pentagon?”173 After being assigned to head the new bureau himself, Byroade consistently opposed what he perceived as unfair treatment meted upon the Germans by U.S. authorities,
172 Quoted in Warner, In the Midst of Events, pg.27 173 Johnson, “Oral History Interview with Henry Byroade” 84 choosing to focus on the positive aspects of the Germans’ past. He wrote to George Marshall in
October 1950: “History has certainly proven that the German people can accept a sense of mission,” and that what they needed was “a sense of responsibility by seeing their country have a dignified role.”174
Following a telegram from McCloy to Acheson on October 18 urging German rearmament to occur in a matter of “months” should the correct “psychological preparations” occur, Byroade wrote back to the High Commissioner to note that his estimate was “the subject of concern” for the Bureau of German Affairs. “we may have been pressing unjustifiably for an immediate decision,” the Washington official wrote on German rearmament, noting that a slower approach towards the Germans was preferable given the trauma of their recent past.175 This was the beginning of a period of rivalry between the two men; in 1988, Byroade would recount in an interview his “fundamental” disagreements with McCloy from the time and that the two had a
“great argument,” stemming from Byroade’s “optimistic” view of the German people.176
Members of the epistemic community who visited West Germany for themselves often came away with a sense of sympathy for the protesters. A British intelligence agent visited West
Germany in October 1950, reporting back to London that he had a “number of conversations” with “well informed Germans” and was “greatly surprised” by his hosts’ “friendliness and kindness” and, despite acknowledging that “not all Germans are in favour of participation in
NATO,” felt that “they will have to be treated with justice.” The agent’s account argued that the
Germans had fundamentally transformed after 1945 and also rejected the idea that the Germans
174 Byroade to Marshall, October 16 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol.III, doc. 634 175 Byroade to McCloy, October 19 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol.III, doc. 230 176 Johnson, “Oral History Interview with Henry Byroade” 85 were Soviet puppets.177 In the U.K. itself, positive appraisals of the protests in Germany came mainly from figures in the Labour Party. These responses often were conditioned by a desire to call for a socialist foreign policy distant that supposedly practiced in the McCarthyist U.S.
Left-Labour praise for the German protesters was used as a way of differentiating the wisdom of the European people as a whole from the supposed ignorance of U.S. policymakers.
“The Americans are rushing things, too fast for the French & Germans, & possibly, even, too fast for British opinion” wrote Younger following the September 1950 New York meeting.178
Younger was himself told by William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, that the idea of German rearmament was “profoundly disturbing.” “I have a conviction,” wrote
Strange to Younger “possibly a foolish one which is not amenable to reason, that it is still a mistake to put arms into German hands for the purposes of war.”179 The idea of elites such as
Strang and Younger that the U.S. was bumbling into German rearmament far too early formed a component of what Jonathan Hollowell has referred to as the “air of smug pride” with which
British elites responded to McCarthyism.180 Many Labour party members distrusted U.S. intentions at least as much as those of the Soviets.181
On 29 November, the House of Commons gathered for a debate defence policy, during which Labour MP Victor Yates noted that: “The most striking omission from [today’s] speeches was any reference to the German people and to what they are thinking… I do not see how we can avoid a very great catastrophe… unless we take into consideration the actual position of
177 Joint Intelligence Bureau, “Notes for Air Marshal Sir William Elliot on Visit to Germany 7-15 October 1950”, October 20 1950, FO 371/ 85057, TNA 178 Quoted in Warner, In the Midst of Events, pg.33 179 Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.46 180 Jonathan Hollowell, “Introduction,” in Hollowell, Anglo-American Relations, xi-xvii, pg.xiii 181 Steven Fielding, “But Westward, Look, the Land is Bright: Labour’s Revisionists and the Imagining of America, 1945-64,” pp.87-104, in Hollowell, Anglo-American Relations, pp.87-104, pg.93 86
Germany, its people and the opinions they hold.” Yates continued to attack Prime Minister
Clement Attlee and Churchill, leader of the opposition, for hypocrisy, described the miserable conditions he had seen in a recent visit to Germany and finished by noting “it is reasonable to expect that a very large number of German people will not be anxious to see the opening of recruiting offices.” Another Labour MP, Elwyn Jones, supported Yates, calling for an end to proposals to re-militarize West Germany and for “an end to the process of creating a centralized, militarized police force in Western Germany which, in any event, conjures up in the minds of many Germans the possibility of the restoration of the S.S.”182
Understanding attitudes towards the German protesters received an unexpected boon in
January 1951 with the visit to West Germany of Dwight Eisenhower, newly appointed NATO
Supreme Commander. The General had visited Europe in order to gauge public feeling there:
“My first job was to go around these countries and see what they had in their hearts,” he told
Truman.183 Eisenhower came away from his visit skeptical of the utility of a European defence force, in large part due to his observations of the anti-war feelings common among the German people. For the Commander, the protesters’ feelings were genuinely held, not just the result of communist subversion. In a subtle jibe at McCloy’s ongoing efforts, Eisenhower made a point of publicly acknowledging that: “whatever German contribution was made it had to be made on a free will basis without any pressures from the outside.”184
Reporting back to Congress, Eisenhower employed historical memory of the
Revolutionary War, stating: “I for one want no unwilling contingents, no soldier serving in the
182 “First Days Debate,” 29 November 1950, Commons, Hansard, Volume 481 183 Steve Neal, Harry and Ike: The Partnership That Remade the Postwar World (New York: Scribner, 2001), pg.199 184 McCloy to Acheson, January 24 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. III, part 1, doc. 243 87 pattern of the Hessians, in any army of my command.”185 The Supreme Commander’s statement was sympathetic towards the Hessians, echoing the idea that they had been forced to fight in
North America for a cause that was not their own. Eisenhower had originally wanted German soldiers in his army, feeling that they were excellent combatants, but his concerns largely stemmed from his beliefs that reluctant Germans would actually harm military effectiveness. As he told visitors in March, “He felt it necessary that Germany attain a political status which would permit vast majority support by German people themselves… Only with such popular support basis would there be the necessary will [to defeat the USSR].”186
Politicians in the U.S. observed Eisenhower’s visit closely, subsequently adopting the
General’s view towards rearmament- for example, Republican Senator Edward Thye observed in
February that “General Eisenhower has convinced me that any discussion of Germany's contribution to a European army is probably a mistake… It can wait until the political questions are solved and until such time as the German people definitely feel they want to be a part of a western European setup.”187
Fallout from Eisenhower’s visit also encouraged the pro-protest wing of Labour. Labour discourse at the time was dominated by the issue of German rearmament. Between February and
June 1951, 237 foreign policy resolutions were passed by local Labour Party chapters- 75 of these condemned German rearmament.188 In a February 1951 defense debate in the Commons, the pro-protest group used the beliefs of the German people as evidence in their opposition to
185 Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, in C. G. D. Onslow, ‘West German Rearmament’, World Politics, Vol.3, no.4 (1951): 450–485. 186 McCloy to Acheson, March 23 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. III, part 1, doc.562 187 Edward Thye, in response to Robert A. Taft, “The European Army Project”, in Congressional Record, Senate, 82nd Congress, First Session, February 8, 1951, Vol.97, Part 1., pg.1125 188 “Local Labour Party Resolutions on Foreign Policy,” 1951, LPA 88 rearmament. MP Emrys Hughes noted: “Germany has become pacifist… I do not know how we can possibly re-arm a nation in the face of the very strong and deep opposition that comes from the German people themselves.” He later continued: “Recently I spent a day… with a German student… He said he was never going to be deluded into going into the army again, and I believe that is the opinion of a very great number of German people.” Hughes’ story highlights how West
German citizens could directly influence visiting elites.189
Hughes also emphasized the importance of working with the German socialists in their protests, noting: “I suppose that we are now to de-educate the people whom we have re- educated. The immediate result will be despair in the ranks in the Socialists of Germany, the
Socialists whom we should be supporting.”190 Backed into a corner, Attlee acknowledged that
German rearmament should only occur if certain “conditions of safety” were met- the most important of which being the express wish to rearm of the German people themselves: “There must be agreement among the Germans themselves [for rearmament] and the new German democracy must ensure that its armed forces are its servants, not its masters.” The “Attlee conditions” would now drive Labour’s official response to the rearmament issue.191
Byroade and his Department closely followed events elsewhere in the world, which helped to inform their German policy. For example, following the publication of Prime Minister
Attlee’s “conditions” for German rearmament, (the contents of which are discussed below),
Byroade wrote to Acheson informing him that he had “no disagreement,” with Attlee’s statement that: “there must be agreement with the Germans themselves,” before rearmament could occur.192
189 See the exchange between Clement Attlee and Emrys Hughes, in “Foreign Affairs,” 12 February 1951, Commons, Hansard, Vol. 484, col.113 190 Hughes, “Foreign Affairs”, col.116 191 Precis of Attlee’s Four Points, 12th February 1951, LP/ ID/ GRM/32, LPA 192 Byroade to Acheson, 21 February 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. III, part 1, doc.557, pg.1020 89
Such was the Bureau of German Affairs’ care when dealing with German public opinion, that
Byroade even attempted to interfere in State Department matters that went way beyond his own department. For example, he contacted his superiors in March 1951 asking them to ensure that the Japanese peace treaty was not too lenient, lest it create jealousy with the Germans. “I want to point out that the differences between the approach to the problem of Japan and that to the problem of Germany will require careful treatment by the Department,” he stated.193 Constantly, throughout 1951, the Bureau of German Affairs took effort to combat the idea of German exceptionalism in all fields. For example, the Deputy of the Bureau, Geoffrey Lewis, argued in
May that West Germany’s problems were just one part of wider European problems and that it would be unfair to single the country out.194
Despite the Attlee conditions, the Labour Cabinet quickly became utterly divided on the topic of West German rearmament. Whilst in the summer of 1951, pro-U.S. (Atlanticist) foreign secretary Herbert Morrison and Minister of Defence Manny Shinwell worked on a paper setting out reasons to rearm the West Germans, cabinet member Hugh Dalton noted in a direct telegram to Attlee that anti-German sentiment was rising.195 Dalton is an interesting figure as he supported the opposition movement in Germany as a result of disliking the German people, as opposed to trusting them. He openly stated his opinion that a German military would “inevitably” attract
“Nazis, SS and refugees” and that “they would think of nothing but reconquering their old
193 Referenced in Dulles to Byroade, “Japanese Peace Treaty,” March 17, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. VI, Part 1, Asia and the Pacific, eds. Paul Claussen, John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon, Neal H. Petersen and Carl N. Raether (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1977), doc.530, pg.930 194 See J. Bruce Hamilton, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, “Control of Atomic Energy in Germany,” FRUS, 1951, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, eds. Neal H. Petersen, Harriet D. Schwar, Carl N. Raether, John A. Bernbaum and Ralph R. Goodwin, (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1979), doc.243, pg.721 195 Crowcroft, R., “Labour party factionalism and West German rearmament, 1950-4,” in Corthorn, & Davis, The British Labour Party, pp. 127-44, pg.132 90 homes.”196 Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell wrote that, simply, Dalton “was against rearmament because he hated Germans.”197 Despite having different motivations from, for example, Yates and Hughes, Dalton was able to unite both other Germanophones and the sympathetic pro-protest left wing of the party into a powerful bloc to oppose official government policy.198 Even Attlee noted diplomatically that “I am very much of your view” when Dalton wrote him in July that
“the Germans had “a vested interest in a war of revenge.”199
In Washington, by September 1951 the differences of opinion between McCloy and
Byroade had developed into open division. On September 3, Byroade wrote to Acheson to
“record [his] disagreement with the general philosophy and conclusions advanced by Mr.
McCloy.” For Byroade, McCloy was pushing U.S. policy ahead in the Federal Republic with far too little consideration of German views and desires. He warned that pressing ahead with U.S. plans in Germany without consent of the locals was “an error of historic proportions.” Going further, the Byraode argued that the stability of German democracy hinged upon retaining the support of the Germans: “There is much more at stake than in this decision than the question of a few German divisions… we risk the danger of being turned against by the German people as a whole. The future prospect for democracy in Germany would surely be imperiled by such a development.” This would have a knock-on effect for the wider stability of the U.S. Cold War bloc: “we risk starting on a course that could result in the loss of all Germany, and perhaps more” [emphasis added]. For Byroade, respecting the wishes of the German people was vital for the continuation of U.S. Cold War strategy.200
196 Quoted in Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.58 197 Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton: A Life, (New York: Harper Collins, 1995) 198 Crowcroft, “Labour Party Factionalism,” pg.133 199 Quoted in Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.67 200 Byroade to Acheson, September 3, 1951, FRUS 1951, vol.III, part 1, doc.642 91
Later that month, in a meeting between U.S., U.K., French and Benelux representatives,
Byroade made the reasons why he thought the Germans had to be listened to clear. “There will, however, be a change in the relationship between the Germans and the three powers, for this relationship must be one of partnership in defense, rather than that of an occupation. The psychology of the troops, as well as their status, should be adapted to this new conception. The standards defining their position in Germany should conform to those applicable to friendly forces in a foreign country.” In emphasizing the shift from occupation to alliance, Byroade was calling a development that other figures in the U.S. administration (such as Richard Perle) would still struggle with decades later.201
In Autumn 1951, Labour were forced out of government after six years by a resurgent
Conservative Party. This had the effect of amplifying the dispute about German rearmament, which now became entwined with political rivalries in the party. Debates about German rearmament helped to ensure, in 1952, what Michael Foot described as “the most fretful and fetid spring and summer which most of us could recall”.202 With the warnings of young British Labour
MP Tony Crosland, that “Britain in future would be little more than a German satellite”, ringing in his ears, Dalton in April travelled to Bonn for a conference of European socialists.203 In
Germany he found that opposition to West German rearmament on the continent remained widespread. Delighted, he used this opposition to convince Labour’s National Executive
Committee (NEC) to reject the Paris agreements, arguing that the Germans should not be coerced into rearming against their will. The NEC obliged, issuing a statement stipulating that the
201 Memorandum of Conversation, “Contractual Arrangements with Germany,” 11 September 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. III, part 1, doc.645, pg.1215 202 Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, pg.609 203 Quoted in David Childs, The Two Red Flags: European Social Democracy and Soviet Communism since 1945. (London, UK: Routledge, 1999), pg.28 92
Germans should not be promised arms until after they had held their next elections, in order to ensure the German people a voice in affairs.204
In a subsequent debate, Eden was attacked by Hughes and Labour MP Ellis Smith for ignoring anti-rearmament sentiment “amongst the Germans themselves.” Eden replied by pointing out the Conservative government’s policy was identical to that of the previous Labour government. Attlee, worried about hopelessly dividing the Labour Party, rejected the NEC statement whilst repeating his previous call for conditions of safety. “I think,” said the former
Prime Minister, “some of our Allies have been wanting to push on too quickly with the raising of
German forces, and that is the danger… there should be as far as possible an expression of support by the German people for this linking up with the West and with E.D.C.”205 Attlee demanded a full federal election in West Germany so that the consent of the people could be given to rearmament.206 This, however, was the last mention of the “German people” or German protesters by a high-ranking member of parliament as the protest movements in Germany tailed off. Labour would remain at war with itself over German rearmament, but the following period of debate in the party would be conditioned by the Bevanites’ push for power and would revolve around the level of trustworthiness of the German government, as opposed to the German people.
Conclusion
204 Kenneth Harris, Attlee, (London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, 1995), pg.498 205 Debate on “European Situation,”14 May 1952, Commons, in Hansard, Volume 500 206 Mawby, Containing Germany, pg.8-9 93
In the 1950s, U.K. and U.S. officials developed plans to establish a West German military in the face of direct opposition from millions of Germans. This opposition, unprecedented in scope, was met with reactions of both confusion and admiration from officials on the ground and in
London and Washington. Most figures interested in the West German domestic scene at the time blamed the Soviet Union for the wave of dissent. For these officials, the Soviets supported anti- rearmament protests in the FRG to undermine NATO strategy and continue their advance into
Europe. This view was encouraged by Chancellor Adenauer, who noted that the only way to combat Soviet schemes was to offer concessions of sovereignty to the “German people,” as represented by his own government. Adopting this position allowed Allied policy makers to retain their previous perception of the Germans as a militarist people, as they saw pacifism as a result of nefarious Soviet propaganda actions.
This view was not shared by all officials interested in West Germany. From the last months of 1950 to the middle of 1952, numerous observers questioned the dominant narrative concerning the anti-rearmament protests and asked whether the German people should indeed be afforded a greater say in whether or not their country should rearm. In Washington, the Bureau of
German Affairs consistently called for a greater German say in the rearmament conversation, leading to harsh memoranda being exchanged between its head, Henry Byroade and the High
Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt. In London, dissenting voices in the Labour Party went further, noting German opposition to rearmament as a reason to halt the rearmament process altogether. Figures on the left of the party even saw halting rearmament as a preliminary step to achieve some form of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. These voices succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Attlee that “conditions of safety” had to be met were any rearmament to go ahead. After Labour lost power in 1951, dissenting voices gained increased prominence,
94 resulting in extreme splits and internal conflict within the party that helped lock it out of power for over a decade.
The level of attention Allied policy makers paid to the rearmament protesters speaks to the level of influence that ordinary Germans could exert on decision making in the early years of the Cold War. Whilst visiting West Germany in person, politicians from the U.K. and U.S. spoke to locals and observed protests and demonstrations, all of which helped to inform their views on the Germans- views that would be relayed back by officials to the national capitals. In this way, opinions passed into policy and the German protests helped lead, for example, to concessions of sovereignty. This is not to say that German-friendly policies would have been passed without protest, but that protests helped to accelerate the process and were a clear motivating factor in the discourse of Allied policy makers. In December 1952, President Truman would specifically mention the “profound significance of this demonstration of the will of the people,” regarding the proposal of the European Defense Community Treaty in the Bundestag.207
The lasting impact of the German protests in the U.K. and the U.S. lay in helping to remold the image of the Germans in the eyes of observers. Older stereotypes of Germans as warlike militarists were hard to justify in the wake of thousands on the streets shouting slogans of peace. As it became clear going into 1952 that West Germany was not about to collapse to communist pressure (especially after the ambivalent reception many Germans afforded the
“Stalin note” on unification early that year), talk of the danger of Soviet infiltration was also discredited. A more nuanced understanding of German protest movements thus gradually emerged, one which considered the concerns of the protesters and what motivated them rather
207 Harry Truman, “Statement by the President on German Steps Toward Acceptance of the European Defense Community Agreements,” December 6, 1952 95 than just discarding their actions out of hand. This greater appreciation for nuance would, as we shall see in Chapter II, come to light in the wave of protests that would rock the FRG in the late
1950s, as Adenauer and the Union stove in vain to acquire nuclear weapons for their country. For, as Alice Cooper pointed out, the Ohne mich protests left behind an enduring legacy.
They “launched peace protest as a recurrent theme in extraparliamentary protest, in part by tying it to the durable interpretive frames on which it drew, and by creating a core of activists dedicated to antimilitarist and antinuclear issues.”208
208 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, pg.81 96
CHAPTER TWO
Fearful: U.K.-U.S. Reactions to West German Nuclear Weapons Protests, 1957-1963
“While the Prime Minister was in Germany, was he conscious of the growing anxiety among the
German people that Germany might be destroyed if it became a battlefield in a future nuclear war? What steps did he take to allay that disquiet?”
- Emrys Hughes, Labour Party MP, May 16, 1957209
On 5 April 1957 Adenauer, now coming to the end of his second term as Chancellor, held a press conference in which he stated: “Tactical atomic weapons are basically nothing but the further development of artillery… we cannot dispense with having them for our troops… they are after all practically normal weapons.”210 Though the Chancellor was repeating the terms used by his military advisors, this careless statement proved to be a public relations nightmare. It seemed as though Adenauer was attempting to normalize weapons that possessed an apocalyptically destructive capacity. Only a single week later, eighteen German physicists signed the Göttingen
Manifesto, in which they resolved not to help produce or test nuclear weapons. The manifesto stated: “we believe that a small country like the Federal Republic best guarantees its own safety and contributes to world peace, by expressly and voluntarily renouncing the possession of
209 Emrys Hughes, in debate “Prime Minister and Dr. Adenauer (Talks),” May 16, 1957, Hansard, Commons, vol.570, col.572 210 Quoted in Annette Messemer, “Konrad Adenauer: Defence Diplomat on the Backstage,” in John Lewis Gaddis, Ernest May and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds.), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.236-259, pg.244 97 nuclear weapons.”211 This manifesto helped to accelerate and focus anti-nuclear sentiment in the
FRG, providing the stimulus for more than six years’ worth of intense protests, marches and demonstrations. During these protests, hundreds of thousands of West German citizens took to the streets, many demonstrating for the first time.212
This chapter examines the response of U.K.-U.S. officials to these West German protests.
Unlike the period of semi-sovereignty examined in Chapter One, by the late 1950s the Federal
Republic was effectively a sovereign nation. The erstwhile Allied High Commissioners, for example, had now been replaced with less-powerful diplomatic ambassadors. Nonetheless, thousands of NATO soldiers continued to be stationed in West Germany, and as the organization’s leading members, both the U.K. and the U.S. had an interest in continuing to follow German domestic politics.213 In their reports and memoranda, U.K.-U.S. German experts created a discourse, that continued to be dominated by images of the Germans as dangerous militarists and unreliable partners. Some officials, who observed the West Germans protests against nuclear weapons went against the norm and saw the Germans as an “apathetic” or fearful people. Indeed, for a small number of epistemic community members, the West German protesters even became potential allies in the battle against the “militarist” influences in the country.
211 Mark Cioc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defence Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)., pg.42-3. Cioc’s impressive work remains the best overview of the nuclear debate. 212 More than 200,00 protesters mobilized in the “Kampf dem Atomtod” and over 100,000 mobilized for the 1964 “Easter Marches” alone. Statistics taken from Holger Nehring, “The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold War, 1957-1964,” Contemporary British History, Vol.19, 2, (2005), pp.223-241, pg.225 213 The sizable British presence in the Federal Republic is often overlooked. As late as 1962, 55,000 British troops remained in West Germany at an annual cost of over £70 million. See Kenneth O. Morgan, Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg.217 98
The temporal span of the chapter is constructed around Gene Gerzhoy’s assertion that
“[West] Germany sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent from 1956 to 1963.”
Gerzhoy argues that the Federal German government sought to acquire an independent nuclear arsenal due to fears of a U.S. abandonment of Europe, one which would involve a separate deal being made between Washington and Moscow.214 These years also saw the existence of an active and engaged opposition which took two forms- the “Kampf dem Atomtod,” (struggle against atomic death) of 1957-8 and the “Easter Marches” which began in 1960 and reached their height four years later. Whilst historian Susanna Schrafstetter’s statement that “by the early 1960s the
West German anti-nuclear movement had lost most of its drive… all that remained was a hard core of activists participating in the annual Easter marches,” holds true in most respects, the truncated Easter Marches continued to draw the gaze and consternation of the epistemic community.215 The decisive year of change was 1963, when the Marches, now renamed the
Campaign for Disarmament, shifted in focus to becoming a movement against state institutions in general, as opposed to focusing on nuclear weapons.
The KdA and the Easter Marches were retrospectively categorized by Hanz Karl Rupp as
“extra-parliamentary opposition” (Außerparlamentarische Opposition). Rupp used the term to describe street-focused protest movements and contrast them to the parliamentary opposition to the government in the Bundestag.216 However, unlike the Ester Marches and the later 1968 protests, the KdA was both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary. The movement received the
214 Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, (Spring 2015), pg.94 215 Susanna Schrafstetter, “The Long Shadow of the Past: History, Memory and the Debate over West Germany’s Nuclear Status, 1954-1969,” History and Memory, Vol.16, No.1, (Spring/Summer 2004), pp.118-145, pg.125 216 Hans Karl Rupp, Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampfe gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren; eine Studie zur innenpolitischen Entwicklung der BRD (Köln: Pahl- Rugenstein Verlag, 1970). 99 significant backing of both the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the German
Trade Union Federation, (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; DGB). This helped to condition the way the movement was seen by foreign observers, particularly those in the British Labour
Party. It was easier to support a movement when a trusted fellow socialist party also did.
Holger Nehring has written extensively on the British and German anti-nuclear weapons movements in the 1950s, and much of his research has informed this chapter. Nehring notes that the anti-nuclear weapons protests in West Germany were never “just” about ownership of nuclear weapons. Rather, they had the wider goal of “challenging the Cold War consensus.” This is important for the chapter here, as we are not looking only at elite reactions to nuclear-weapons protests, but rather to a challenge that attacked their entire strategy in the Cold War. Nehring posits that the protests served “as indicators of diverging patterns of security within the societies of the Western alliance.” This challenge was noted with interest by U.K.-U.S. officials who had little wish for the Germans to develop any path to “security” that deviated from NATO norms.217
As with Chapter One, memoires, diaries, and autobiographies are used extensively below.
This is done in order to help gauge the thoughts and feelings of members of the epistemic community towards the Germans. The late 1950s were the heyday of the security expert and the social scientist, before the humbling experience of the Vietnam War. One interesting piece written by a security expert and discussed below is the book German Rearmament and Atomic
War by Hans Speier. Speier was a German-born sociologist who emigrated to the U.S. in 1933 in order to protect his Jewish wife from the Nazi government. As a “German expert” working for
217 See Holger Nehring, “The British and West German Protests,” and Holger Nehring, “Diverging perceptions of security: NATO, nuclear weapons, and social protest,” in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), pp.131-148 100 the U.S. government, Speier was held in high regard, and the opinions represented in his book present an important insight into the way German public opinion was studied as an almost- academic subject in the late 1950s U.S.218
West Germany’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons
Before exploring the details of the protests and the U.K.-U.S. response, we must first recount the
German effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Adenauer’s artillery statement did not come from nowhere- rather, it reflected a longer, gradual process of politicians attempting to normalize nuclear weapons. The first nuclear capable artillery pieces arrived in Germany in October 1953, joined by the atomic “Honest John” missiles in 1955.219 The arrival of these U.S. weapons was a stark and constant reminder to locals that “the physical survival of the Germans or their potential extermination in a nuclear holocaust” now “depended on the decisions [taken by] American presidents.”220 The launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik two years later increased the fears of the
Germans, as it opened up the possibility that Soviet nuclear weapons could attack the U.S. without the need for manned flights. This raised the question of an unspoken agreement whereby the U.S. and the USSR both agreed to settle their disagreements in Europe whilst leaving their homelands safe. The helplessness of the situation they found themselves in would inspire West
Germans to both fight for, and against, an independent German nuclear arsenal.
218 Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders (Evanston, IL: Rowman and Peterson, 1957). For background on Spier, see: Bessner, Democracy in Exile 219 Hans-Joachim Harder, “Guarantors of Peace and Freedom: The U.S. Forces in Germany, 1945-1990,” in Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., and Detlef Junker,(eds.), GIs in Germany: The Social, Economic, Cultural, and Political History of the American Military Presence, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.37-54, pg.50 220 Junker, “Introduction,” pg.5 101
NATO knew how destructive a nuclear war would be for Germany, having conducted an exercise titled CARTE BLANCHE in June 1955. CARTE BLANCHE stimulated a possible
East-West conflict in which tactical nuclear weapons were deployed by the “West.” Whilst the exercise resulted in a ‘victory’ for the West, this victory came at the cost of millions of civilian casualties- of whom (5.2 million) were Germans.221 NATO subsequently hid the full results of the exercise for four years; when the results were finally provided to senior German officials, one described them as “Golgotha of the German people.”222 In LION NOIR, conducted in 1957, one hundred and twenty eight hypothetical nuclear warheads were dropped on Germany- twenty by
Warsaw Pact forces and the rest by NATO.223 Once more, NATO officials deliberately muddled their reporting to German representatives to prevent Germans from having a clear understanding of the deadliness of a nuclear conflict. In December 1956, the New Look was officially codified as NATO policy (MC 14/2), after the NATO council agreed to a twenty-six-division front line in
Europe, with all troops being equipped to “wage” nuclear warfare. NATO called for a massive nuclear strike in the event of a Soviet attack- even if the Soviets never used weapons of mass destruction themselves.224
New Look stemmed from a growing U.S. infatuation with nuclear weapons. This infatuation lay in the potential of nuclear weapons to equalize the balance of power in Europe in face of the “fact” of Soviet superiority in conventional arms. By 1955 the idea that the Soviets could easily “steamroll” NATO’s forces was something of a myth. Nonetheless, this myth was
221 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “NATO and Adenauer’s Germany: Uneasy Partnership,” International Organization, Vol.15, No.4, (Autumn 1961), pp.618-629, pg.619 222 Bruno Thoß, NATO-Strategie und nationale Verteidigungsplanung: Planung und Aufbau der Bundeswehr unter den Bedingungen einer massiven atomaren Vergeltungsstrategie 1952 bis 1960 (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), pg.727 223 Ziemann, “German Angst?” pg.121 224 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision, A Memoir (London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), pg.195 102 accepted with little reservation by the administration of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower
(1953-1961).225 Matching the Soviet forces soldier to soldier was unthinkable as it would be prohibitively expensive and require and expansion of the draft. Indeed, the U.S. planned on reducing, not increasing, its presence in Europe- the army’s budget was halved between 1953 and
1959.226 At the same time, the U.K. downsized its own army by ending conscription.227 Nuclear weapons promised a degree of strategic mastery without risk to the economy or social cohesion.
The only “downside” for military planners lay in public fears of weapons of mass destruction.
The public thus had to be won over- nukes needed to appear as “conventional” as possible. In
April 1954 the Eisenhower administration stated that: “The United States considers that the ability to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons is essential for the defense of the NATO area… such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become conventional.”228
The issue of West German nuclear weapons, however, was an entirely different matter. As we have seen, memories of the Second World War proved to be a stumbling block in the effort to rearm the FRG in the first years of the 1950s. Unsurprisingly, these memories also hindered the development of a West German nuclear arsenal. When West Germany was permitted to rearm, it was forbidden from enriching uranium on German soil and from producing nuclear bombs. As the 1950s developed, however, the Eisenhower administration began looking to other NATO members to bear higher defense costs.229 Ensuring NATO pulled its weight would involve
225 See Wallace J. Thies, "Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe," in Breslauer and Tetlock, (eds) Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 158-207 226 Martin Rink, “The Service Staffs' Struggle over Structure: The Bundeswehr's internal Debates on adopting NATO Doctrine 1950–1963”, in Corum, Rearming Germany, pp.221-254, pg.234 227 Mathilde von Bülow, West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pg.71 228 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.6 229 For more on the decision making behind this “New Look” policy, see Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (London, UK: Macmillan, 1996) 103
“nuclear sharing,” a process which would give allied governments joint control over U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Of all the European NATO members, the FRG, with its economic might and frontline location, seemed the most viable candidate for nuclear sharing. For the President, the process of giving Germany access to nuclear weapons was to occur simultaneously to the continued integration of Western Europe, which, it was hoped, would prevent a nationalist resurgence.230
Adenauer consistently lobbied the U.S. for permission to create a West German nuclear force. For the Chancellor, a West German nuclear arsenal would strengthen his hand if the U.S. pulled out of Europe, prevent Soviet bullying, and cement the Federal Republic’s status in the
Western Alliance. Most importantly, German ownership of nuclear weapons would, Adenauer hoped, deter both superpowers from fighting a non-nuclear (yet devastating) war in Central
Europe. The Chancellor was not ignorant of the horror of nuclear weapons. The West German government never built underground bunkers as extensive as those of their allies because the level of destruction a nuclear war was expected to cause in the country would have made even the deepest bunkers superfluous.231 Behind closed doors, Adenauer often lectured his cabinet on the dangers of nuclear weapons. In June 1955 the Chancellor noted that New York could be
“terminated” by a single bomb, focusing on the deadly impact of radiation. In November 1956,
Adenauer referred to nuclear war as being the “doom of all humankind.” It was not ignorance of nuclear weapons’ destructive capacity but rather the cabinet’s “concomitant lack of imagination,” that drove the West German government’s quest for a nuclear weapon.232 Adenauer also
230 Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pg.99 231 Wilfried von Bredow, “Der Atomdiskurs im Kalten Krieg (1945–1962)” in, Michael Salewski (ed.) Das nukleare Jahrhundert: Eine Zwischenbilanz. (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), pp.91–101, pg.99 232 Benjamin Ziemann, “German Angst?”, pg.120-1 104 understood the feelings of insecurity his countrymen felt. In a Christmas 1958 speech, the
Chancellor remarked that "the majority of those living now have never known peace, quiet and security, a life free from fear.” For the elderly Rhinelander, however, nuclear weapons themselves were the key to this security.233
Adenauer’s closest ally on nuclear weapons policy was another giant of postwar German politics, Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauß. Strauß’ first cabinet position had been as the
FRG’s inaugural “Minister for Atomic Affairs,” and his administrative skills were vital in re- energizing German atomic research. During his time in the position Strauß had let slip, over a glass of wine, that he desired to one day ensure that the Federal Republic was in possession of its own nuclear arsenal.234 Once Minister of Defense, more than doubled the defense budget.235 He also secured a legal ruling from the German courts that West Germany could still legally obtain and use nuclear weapons, so long as they were “in self-defense.”236 Strauß was jubilant- for the
Bavarian the nuclear weapons issue was always a matter of cost efficient self-defense.237
Strauß and other senior German staff officers visited French weapons manufacturing plants in January 1957, ending their trip by signing an “agreement of close cooperation between their two countries in the field of armaments.” This was a deliberately open-ended statement which allowed for the possibility of future nuclear cooperation. Strauß then hinted in interviews that the French and Germans might cooperate to make nuclear weapons within a shared defense
233 Quoted in Eckart Conze, “Sicherheit als Kultur. Überlegungen zu einer "modernen Politikgeschichte" der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 357-380, pg.358 234 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.75 235 James S. Corum, “Adenauer, Amt Blank and the Founding of the Bundeswehr, 1950-1956,” in Corum, Rearming Germany, pg.29-54, pg.52 236 Oliver Bange, “NATO as a Framework for Nuclear Nonproliferation: The West German Case, 1954-2008,” International Journal, June 2009, Vol.64, No.2, pp.361-382, pg.365 237 Gülnur Aybet , The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 1997), pg.88 105 framework.238 Adenauer the following month informed French Prime Minister Guy Mollet
(1956-7) that the Germans would be interested in “Franco-German co-production of nuclear weapons.”239 Throughout the remainder of 1957, British and U.S. intelligence reported that cooperation between the French and Germans was being sought most vigorously in the field of missile research and development.240
April 1957 was a key month in the West German pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Not only did Adenauer give his artillery statement, U.S. medium-range missiles (that were to form the backbone of NATO’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, INF) arrived in the Federal Republic for deployment. Strauß once more visited France to promote nuclear cooperation. This was also the month much of world public opinion became aware that the West German government was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, although the extent to which negotiations had already developed remained unknown. Responding to media questioning, U.S. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles (1953-9) announced his belief that “a policy of modernizing NATO defense forces could not, in practice or logic, exclude Germany.”241 The Soviet Union, a state that had vivid memories of German aggression, made its feelings on German nuclear weapons public on April
27. It threatened that West Germany should cease its plans to acquire nuclear weapons, lest it become “one big cemetery.”242 In May, as Mollet called for an “integrated European nuclear force,” the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG, Smirnov, exchanged a series of stormy notes with
238 Aybet, Dynamics of European Security, pg.88 239 Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997), pg.150 240 Max Isenburgh to Robert Schaetzel, RG 59, Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 491, Z1.33 Countryfile France P. Weapons, 1957, NARA 241 Quoted in Bruno Thoß, “Deterrence and Defense: The Stationing of U.S. Troops in Germany and the Implementation of Forward Strategy in Europe, 1950-1967,” in Maulucci, and Junker, GIs in Germany, pp.52- 72, pg.64-65 242 Bark and Gress, History of West Germany, pg.387 106
West German Foreign Minister von Brentano.243 In these notes, Brentano not only (falsely) claimed that the Federal Republic was not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but slammed
Soviet hypocrisy on the issue.244 Soviet fears over acquisition of nuclear weapons by the
Bundeswehr undoubtedly provided an important impetus in the escalation of the Berlin crisis over the following four years.245
Following a spring of anti-nuclear protests in West Germany, matters quieted over summer and in September the Union parties won an impressive victory in the German Federal election. Then, on October 2, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, presented a plan to the
UN, in which he called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. This zone was to include both German states. The Rapacki Plan was immediately opposed by Adenauer
(who feared communist subversion), to the annoyance of some NATO officials who had seen it as a “sensible starting point” for negotiations.246 In November the French ambassador approached Adenauer with a dramatic proposal for joint cooperation with the Italians in the development of nuclear warheads. The French framed their request as a response to the recent
“Declaration of Common Purpose,” in which the U.S. and U.K. had agreed to develop their nuclear technology together.247 The Chancellor was very keen on pursuing this suggestion, especially as West Germany would finance the project, putting his government in a powerful position.248 On November 25 French-Italian-German military aides drafted a framework on
243 For Mollet’s quote, see von Bülow, West Germany, pg.145 244 Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961). Von Brentano wrote that: “if, therefore, this Government is accused by one of the strongest atomic Powers in the world of indulging in an atomic armaments race, the only sentiment it is capable of expressing is one of considerable surprise.” 245 Kitty Newman, Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pg.26 246 Charles Williams, Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), pg.450-1 247 Aybet, Dynamics of European Security, pg.89 248 Williams, Adenauer, pg.451 107 future arms cooperation, signed by the Secretaries of Defense on November 28. These moves were kept secret by Strauß.249
NATO leaders came together in December 1957 for a summit, held in Paris. At the summit, the West German delegation was noncommittal about the lengths to which the Federal
Republic would pursue an independent nuclear arsenal.250 The summit was most memorable for the decision made by NATO’s leaders to transfer the nuclear weapons delivery systems from the
U.S. to its allies- including the West Germans.251 Two months later, the U.S. National Security
Council produced a report [NSC 5803] in which they declared that despite “a lack of popular enthusiasm” in the country, “West Germany has recently indicated an interest in integrating short-range tactical missiles in its NATO-Committed forces” and had begun “research concerning nuclear weapons” with the French and Italians. The document was in favor of this turn of events, promising to “support the elimination of the restrictions… on West German contributions in the missile field,” and sell Bonn “types of material consistent with availabilities and priorities.” All of this would be done in order to build a Germany “with freedom of action in internal and external affairs, capable of resisting both Communism and neo-Nazism.”252
[emphasis mine]
In March 1958, the U.K. Defense Minister, Duncan Sandys, visited Bonn. Strauβ attempted to bring the British into his European project, but Sandys hesitated.253 To the press he refused to be drawn on the question of nuclear cooperation, saying that at the time the U.K.
249 Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pg.150 250 M.S.Handler, “German Voice Opposition to Taking U.S. Weapons,” New York Times, Dec. 19, 1957 251 Harder, “Guarantors of Peace,” pg.50-51 252 National Security Council Report NSC 5803, “Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Germany,” 7 February 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol.IX, Berlin Crisis, Germany, Austria, eds. David M. Baehler and Charles S. Sampson, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), doc.243 253 Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pg.150 108 lacked enough of its own warheads to share them. That same month, Strauβ signed a secret agreement with the French, in which the German government promised to fund French nuclear research in Alsace in return for a share of the French findings. Nuclear cooperation between the two countries was nearing its conclusion, however. The French government worried about the effects that working with the old enemy, the Germans, would have on public opinion. In the end,
President Charles de Gaulle’s rise to power in June 1958 represented a decisive end to weapons collaboration. During his time in office (1958-69), De Gaulle would direct France’s “Fifth
Republic” to pursue its acquisition of a nuclear weapon independently, for reasons of national pride and prestige, to the annoyance of the Federal German government.
On November 10, 1958, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave a fiery address in which he accused NATO of adventurism in Europe, specifically mentioning the decision to equip the
Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. This speech, in which Khrushchev called for bilateral discussions between the FRG and the GDR and declared that the later now had full sovereignty over East Berlin (thus meaning the Allies would have to re-negotiate access agreements with a state they did not recognize as legitimate) sparked the three-years long “Berlin crisis” which would come to fixate public and elite attention in Europe and North America.254 Khrushchev’s speech, far from deterring U.S. plans to arm the West Germans with nuclear weapons, actually accelerated the process, as Eisenhower and Dulles looked for a means to show Soviet observers that the U.S. remained committed to defending Europe.255 Eisenhower thus continued to support the idea of equipping Germany with nuclear weapons into the last years of his presidency. When in July 1959 Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy objected to the idea in an NSC meeting, the
254 William Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958-January 1959,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 177-205, pg.177 255 Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons, (Lanham, MY: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pg.388 109 elderly president dismissed his concerns, telling the secretary that though Germany had once been the enemy, now his focus was on fighting the Soviet Union.256 Bundeswehr troops were finally equipped with the firing mechanisms for nuclear weapons in late 1959, on condition that the warheads remained under U.S. control and that the Bundeswehr could not use them without
U.S. permission.257
With this development, U.S. enthusiasm for further concessions to the Germans began to wane. In the face of growing U.S. indifference, the German government increasingly became more combative on the nuclear weapons issue than their ally, with many members of Adenauer’s cabinet continuing to pursue an independent German nuclear deterrent. In the first half of 1960, the so-called “Inspection Plan” gained traction among NATO officials. The Inspection Plan proposed that nuclear weapons delivery systems in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia could be inspected by both sides to ensure that neither side was building up a secret nuclear weapons arsenal. The U.S. received interest in the inspection plan from France, but it was bitterly resented by the West German leadership, who told the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Lauris
Norstad, in May 1960 that he “w[ould] never agree” to the plan. For the Chancellor, inspection would open the door for future disarmament measures, culminating in U.S. disengagement from
Europe. As we have discussed, the Chancellor found such a prospect unthinkable, as he felt that a
Warsaw Pact offensive would soon follow.258 In a press conference at the end of 1960, Adenauer declared that working with the SPD on foreign policy was impossible so long as the latter
256 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) 257 Nick Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A social history of dissent and democracy (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2003), pg.35 and Martin Rink, “The Service Staffs' Struggle over Structure: The Bundeswehr's internal Debates on adopting NATO Doctrine 1950–1963”, in Corum, Rearming Germany, pp.221-254, pg.249 258 Ralph Dietl, “In Defence of the West: General Lauris Norstad, NATO Nuclear Forces and Transatlantic Relations 1956–1963,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17:2, pp.347-392, pg.360 110 continued to oppose equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, noting: “I cannot see how
[the rejection of nuclear weapons] is to be reconciled with an effective armament of the
Bundeswehr.”259
John F. Kennedy’s election as President (1961-63) saw a shift in U.S. strategic priorities.
The Eisenhower-era Doctrine of Mass Retaliation was phased out in favor of Kennedy’s policy of Flexible Response, which put less emphasis on ownership of a giant nuclear arsenal (it should be noted that despite this, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe increased by almost
5,000 under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, due to a lack of strategic cohesion and the growing distraction of Vietnam).260 This change of strategy was greeted with apprehension in
Bonn, and the West German government increasingly feared an “erosion” in the U.S. commitment to continental Europe.261 Indeed, in a reversal of Eisenhower’s planning, Kennedy was opposed to a West German nuclear arsenal. Early in Kennedy’s tenure as President, his new
Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned the U.S. Embassy in Paris that a West German nuclear weapon would “shake NATO to its foundations.”262
U.S. officials proposed the establishment of a Multilateral Force (MLF), a nuclear- equipped naval (mostly submarine) fleet manned by crews from all the NATO nations. The pursuit of MLF was, from the start, based on concerns about West Germany- the Kennedy
Administration was searching for a means to fend off any possible Franco-German nuclear cooperation. Despite earlier halting Franco-German nuclear cooperation, de Gaulle had informed
259 William R. Tyler, “Chancellor Adenauer’s New Year’s Interview on Foreign Policy,” January 5 1961, NSF, Box 74, JFK Library 260 Thoß, “Deterrence and Defense,” pg.72, David S. Yost, “The History of NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.15, no. 2 (1992), pp.228-261, pg.242 261 Bange, “NATO as a Framework,” pg.366 262 Department of State to the Embassy in France, May 05, 1961, Department of State, Central Files, RG 59, 611.51/4–1861, NARA 111
Adenauer in July 1960, that he saw no reason why the FRG could not possess nuclear weapons.263 For his part, the Chancellor threatened to “play the French card” and pursue an independent nuclear arsenal on more than one occasion.264 Kennedy and his advisors saw MLF as a way to satisfy German requests for nuclear ownership and thus prevent Bonn from pursuing this French option.265 Kennedy was even unwilling to share nuclear technology with France, lest the Germans become interested or complain of ill-treatment.266 MLF would not, despite the claims of Soviet propaganda, have left the FRG in charge of a set of nuclear weapons, but rather would have given the West German government “one of several fingers on the safety catch and trigger” of a nuclear arsenal (which they had arguably already had since 1959).267 MLF was to function as part of Kennedy’s “Grand Design,” a project to integrate West Germany further into
NATO, giving the country a creative outlet whilst simultaneously restraining its power.
Even though MLF was designed to limit German ambitions, The Federal German government was interested the project. In the words of Alice Cooper, MLF promised a “symbolic reaffirmation” of West German’s place in NATO.268 “Bonn embraced the concept wholeheartedly,” remembered Paul Nitze, a long time national security expert who during the
MLF plans was serving as Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (1961-3).269 Despite their support for MLF, the usual voices in the FRG continued to talk belligerently about acquiring nuclear weapons independently. In 1961, Adenauer and Strauß both
263 Williams, Adenauer, pg.483 264 See the recollections of Paul Nitze, who resented the Chancellor for his threats: Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg.207 265 Susanna Schrafstetter, “Auschwitz and the Nuclear Sonderweg. Nuclear Weapons and the Shadow of the Nazi Past,” in Gassert and Steinweis, Coping with the Nazi Past, pp.310-324, pg.311 266 “State Department Telegram 5245 to US Embassy United Kingdom, forwarding message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan,” May 06, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, State Department FOIA release. Contributed to NPIHP by Bill Burr. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177744) 267 Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pg.132 268 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, pg.93 269 Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg.210-11 112 publicly inferred that the FRG was still seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.270 Strauß told U.S.
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (1961-8) in November 1961 that he would have to make a decision about MLF quickly, or else West Germany would look elsewhere to achieve nuclear parity.271 The following year the Defense Ministry produced a memorandum which stated that trusting the U.S. unconditionally to defend the FRG was an “incalculable risk” and that preparation for an “independent nuclear force” should begin as soon as possible.272
The building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 dented some of the enthusiasm for nuclear weapons. For a start, the wall now dominated German political and security discourse.
Second, for all its gruesome lack of morality, the wall did stem the flow of refugees entering
West Germany from the GDR and thus did, in a horrible way, stabilize the Cold War in Europe.
The Wall’s construction also helped ensure that the Union lost votes in the September federal elections and now had to share power with the FDP. Adenauer’s prestige was also dented, and forces began to conspire to seek his resignation. For figures in the Kennedy Administration, such as Nitze, who were already committed to moving away from a nuclear-dependent strategy, the
Berlin Crisis only strengthened their resolve.273 In 1963, the Soviet Union, U.S. and U.K. signed and ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty, banning all nuclear tests above ground. This action seriously damaged the attempts of other countries to develop nuclear arsenals, including West
Germany, where there was muttered talk of a “new Versailles.” Strauβ had resigned by this point and Adenauer finally left office in October 1963. At the same time, enthusiasm in the U.S. for
MLF cooled, a decision that, as we shall cover later in this chapter, had much to do with the questioning of officials whether ordinary Germans even wanted the project. It was scrapped in
270 Hughes, Britain, Germany and the Cold War, pg.102 271 Dietl, “In Defence of the West,” pg.369 272 Bange, “NATO as a Framework,”, pg.365 273 Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg.197 113
1964. Finally, the FRG signed the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty at the end of the decade, although the question of a German nuclear arsenal has been raised intermittently since.274
The Protest Movements: The March Against Atomic Death and the Easter Marches
The drive of the Federal German government to acquire nuclear weapons was matched by the determined opposition of resistance movements organized by the SPD, DGB and ordinary
German citizens. The “Kampf dem Atomtod” (KdA) was an SPD run campaign that began in
1957. The KdA mobilized hundreds of thousands of protesters throughout Germany before dying out by 1959. The Easter Marches were annual anti-nuclear weapons protests organized by
German peace societies and modelled on British lines- in the U.K. Easter Marches between
Aldermaston and Central London had been held since the late 1950s and attracted tens of thousands of participants. Beginning in 1960, the West German Easter Marches proved far more durable than the KdA and have kept up an active presence in the twenty-first century.
Importantly for the topic at hand, whilst many of the anti-nuclear weapons protesters in Germany had survival as their primary motivation for demonstrating, critiques of the U.K. and the U.S., as well as the Cold war system as a whole, were common in a number of different groups.
Opposition to nuclear weapons in West Germany was common enough to be noticeable in
1955-56. Scattered reports of the results of CARTE BLANCHE were fearfully discussed by
German politicians, who pressured the government to clarify its position on nuclear weapons.
When the Minister of Defense, Theodore Blank, assured the Bundestag that U.S. tests in the
274 Christian Hacke, “Falsches Hoffen auf die Zeit nach Trump,” Cicero Online, July 20 2018 (https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/donald-trump-deutschland-usa-atommacht-nato-verteidigung-christian- hacke) 114
Nevada Desert had shown troops could survive a tactical nuclear attack, the opposition sarcastically asked where Germany was to get a desert of its own. In September 1956 the cabinet announced that the term of service for conscripts would be reduced by six months- both the
German and the foreign press worried that nuclear weapons would be used to fill the void left by the loss of manpower.275 The Inspector of the Bundeswehr meanwhile publicly speculated about a “refusal of duty in atomic warfare” on the part of troops who held ethical objections to the use of nuclear weapons.276
Polls also signified a widespread public aversion. In 1954, the same year as Dulles announced the U.S. policy of “massive retaliation,” an opinion poll revealed that over fifty percent of Germans believed that their country would be “the target of atomic bombs” in the event of a future war.277 Fifty-one percent of the West German public polled opposed the existence of a nuclear-capable Bundeswehr.278 The specter of the atomic bomb reminded
Germans of the still-recent events of the Second World War, during which the country had suffered horrendous damage at the hands of strategic bombing raids. Memories of the past would later be heavily utilized by protesters. “You German people, you have nearly always marched for wrong aims. At the end, there was only rubble,” went one chant.279 Sometimes, the conflation between nuclear destruction and the past was uncomfortable; a DGB poster deployed imagery of
275 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pg.249 276 Thoß, “Deterrence and Defense,” pg.64 277 Ziemann, German Angst? pg.125 278 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.42 279 Schrafstetter, Auschwitz, pg.316 115 barbed wire- an iconic feature of the concentration camps- along with the caption “No atomic weapons, no genocide!”280
Whilst anti-nuclear attitudes were present before Adenauer’s artillery comment and the
Göttingen manifesto, both events increased resistance. Before considering the chronological events of the anti-nuclear weapons protests, it is important to identify several of the key constituents involved. A driving force in the first period of protest was the SPD. As early as its
Dortmund Party Congress in 1952, when nuclear weapons were overshadowed as a political issue by German rearmament, the SPD had called “for a system of general disarmament under international control which will save mankind from the use of atomic weapons.”281 This long- standing anti-nuclear weapons platform, as well as the fact that 1957 was an election year in
West Germany helped to ensure that the reaction of the SPD following the publication of the
Göttingen manifesto was rapid. The leading SPD journals threw their support behind the scientists and SPD representatives in the Bundestag made numerous attacks on an overwhelmed government.282 The SPD efforts were not only confined to parliament. At the May Day labor celebrations, held annually and dominated by the DGB and the SPD, social democratic workers protested loudly against the CDU’s nuclear position.
Pacifist and anti-militarist feeling within the rank-and-file of the SPD was not a result of the party leadership’s meddling, but rather was genuinely felt and had deep roots. Ninety percent
280 For this and other examples like it, see Holger Nehring, “Remembering War, Forgetting Hiroshima: “Euroshima” and the West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements in the Cold War,” in Michael D. Gordin and John Ikenberry (eds.), The Age of Hiroshima, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020), pp.179- 200, pg.186 and Andrew Oppenheimer, “West German Pacifism and the Ambivalence of Human Solidarity, 1945–1968,” Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, 3‐4, (July 2004), pp.353-389, pg.373 281 Diane Rosolowsky, West Germany's Foreign Policy: The Impact of the Social Democrats and the Greens, (New York, Greenwood Press, 1987), pg.13 282 Wallace J. Thies, Why NATO Endures, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pg.173 116 of SPD supporters polled expressed disapproval with German possession of nuclear weapons.283
The base of the DGB was closely affiliated with the SPD and followed the anti-atomic campaign with enthusiasm.284 The SPD’s leader, Erich Ollenhauer, appealed to this base in a speech on
June 16, which opened the SPD’s campaign for the upcoming election. In this speech, “Security for All,” which was given in Dortmund in front of a crowd of 25,000, Ollenhauer declared: “We appeal to the German people to give a clear and decisive vote in the forthcoming election. This vote will be a vote for an end to all test explosions! And it will be a vote against ever having a nuclear weapon in the Federal Republic!” He called upon Adenauer to publicly reject arming the
Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons and accused the government of secretly plotting behind the public’s back, with some justification. However, although the speech was copied into English and distributed by leftwing groups across Europe, Ollenhauer was careful in it not to openly criticize the U.S., a strategy that had got his predecessor Kurt Schumacher into such trouble.285
The Social Democrats were joined inside and outside of parliament by a series of new allies. Gustav Heinemann folded his own party, the failed All-German People's Party, in May
1957, and joined the SPD in order to better combat Adenauer’s nuclearization plans. Immediately following his election to the Bundestag in September he was elevated to the Party’s executive committee. Hienemann would prove to be an effective part of the SPD’s fight against atomic weapons, attacking the government’s policy in the Bundestag from a Christian perspective, an angle the mostly-atheist SPD had previously been unable to pursue.286 The FDP also capitalized on the outrage over Adenauer’s statement to adopt an antinuclear passage into their party
283 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, pg.72 284 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.17-18 285 Erich Ollenhauer, “Security for All,” June 16, 1957, Germany Social and Political Developments Collection, Box 48/50, IISH 286 See, for example, Heinemann’s powerful and emotional remarks in Deutscher Bundestag, 23 January 1958, — 3. Wahlperiode — 9. Sitzung 117 platform. The FDP were more open than the SPD in attacking the Cold War consensus and spoke of their fears that possession of nuclear weapons would prolong the division of Germany.287
Religious groups joined Heinemann in criticizing Adenauer’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal.
In particular, the call made on 17 April 1957 by missionary Albert Schweitzer to end nuclear testing, “galvaniz[ed]” in the words of Michael Geyer, “an ethical opposition against nuclear arms” and mobilized religious Germans in a way that the Göttingen scientists could not.288
Famous protestants such as Helmut Gollwitzer, a Lutheran theologian, spoke out eloquently about the particular evils of nuclear weapons, whose destructive capacity far exceeded all other weapons. He argued that nuclear disarmament could be used to negotiate with the U.S. and the
Soviets to achieve reunification.289 Niemöller, now President of the resurgent DGB, continued to be a very visible presence in the peace movement. “What is the church’s message to soldiers who hold the means of mass destruction in their hand?” he asked.290 Niemöller also attempted to directly appeal to U.K. and U.S. policy makers by highlighting the threat that nuclear weapons posed to them as well. “Atomic clouds,” he stated dramatically “do not ask friend and foe… they turn against everything that lives, they threaten everything with death.” Such universal messaging helped to make up for the fact that concrete cooperation with non-Germans remained sporadic.291 Following the SPD’s closure of the KdA in 1959, the churches would pull their official support from nuclear weapons protests- this caused disappointment among religious West
287 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.41 288 Geyer, “Cold War Angst”, pg.396 289 Benjamin Ziemann, “A Quantum of Solace?”, pg.377 290 Quoted in Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.92 291 Quoted in Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements,” pg.18 118
Germans who subsequently relocated their activism against nuclear weapons outside the church organizations.292
The communists were one of the few groups to link opposition to nuclear weapons to a wider call for changes outside of West Germany. However, the influence of the KPD had been weak in the FRG even before it was declared unconstitutional in 1956. This was still a time of anticommunism, where organizations such as the International Committee for the Defense of
Christian Civilization arranged travelling shows where they would use “truth and facts” to show how expansionist “Communism presented a permanent threat of spiritual enslavement.” In the face of such propaganda, it was hard for communists to find a space to express their views at all.293 Communists did play an active part in minor political parties. One of the more important of these parties was the Alliance of Germans (Bund der Deutschen, BdD), which campaigned for a policy of West German neutrality. The BdD, heavily subsidized by East Germany, played a very active role in the campaign against nuclear weapons, putting up posters and hosting meetings- all whilst under the close watch of British intelligence.294
The media criticized the Adenauer government heavily in the weeks following the
“Artillery statement.” However, major media outlets focused on personal attacks upon Adenauer and Strauβ, rather than on the Cold War consensus. These attacks were consigned to failure given the personal popularity of both men throughout West Germany.295 Alternative media, particularly visual media, partially filled the subsequent gap. An art exhibition, for example, toured around
292 Alrun Berger, “The Historical Cultures of the 1960s’ West German Peace Movement: A Learning Process?”, in Stefan Berger and Christoph Cornelissen (ed.), Marxist Historical Cultures and Social Movements during the Cold War, Case Studies from Germany, Italy and other Western European States, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), pp.187-216, pg.193 293 Report from Bonn, “International Committee for Defence of Christian Civilisation,” February 23 1959, FO 371/146113, TNA 294 Frankfurt Consulate-General, “Report on Communist Activities,” 17 December 1958, FO 1042/31, TNA 295 Williams, Adenauer, pg.444 119
West Germany between 1958 and 1962, in which one hundred pieces of art graphically displayed the impact of a nuclear war, focusing on either ironic or graphic styles to get its message through.296 Dissenting works were also produced by intellectuals. In September 1957, twenty writers including Axel Eggebrecht and Wolfgang Weyrauch issued a public statement condemning nuclear weapons and in December, eleven academics at Heidelberg sent a letter to the Chancellor protesting his nuclear weapons policy. Intellectuals joined in street protests and rallies whilst forming an independent “Committee against Atomic Armament” in Munich.297
At times, protesters would directly base their arguments against nuclear weapons on the international reputation of Germany. In the middle of May 1958, a group of dissenting Catholics stated in a declaration: “because of Germany’s recent past and its current domestic and international situation, nuclear arms for West Germany would be a moral disaster.”298 Although the nuclear weapons protests did not possess the transnational character of the anti-authoritarian revolts of the 1960s, cooperation between West Germans and foreigners did occur. The first
Pugwash Conference was held in 1957 in response to the Russell–Einstein Manifesto of 1955, which called for a meeting of scientists to discuss the threat of nuclear weapons. Pugwash conferences, which continue today, were visited by many German attendees over the years. In
1958, physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who had performed nuclear research for Hitler, met with numerous U.K.-U.S. scientists at that year’s conference. His conversations resulted in the publishing of Living with the Bomb, in which he argued for controlled nuclear disarmament and a careful balance of power.299
296 Ziemann, “German Angst?” pg.124 297 Sean A. Forner, German Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democratic Renewal: Culture and Politics after 1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pg.306 298 Quoted in Schrafstetter, “The Long Shadow of the Past,” pg.122 299 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.88 120
Let us return to our discussion of events. Demonstrations against the Federal
Government’s nuclear weapons policy escalated at the beginning of May 1957. Strauß lectured the press on the importance of maintaining the western alliance, stating that: “NATO will be ruined if Germany does not receive nuclear weapons.” Liberal magazine Der Spiegel was not impressed, proclaiming in response: “The Britons, our second most important ally, do not seem to agree with this view… If Strauss were right in claiming that NATO must collapse without
German nuclear artillery, that would not speak for the strength of this institution.” Strauß’ tactic of using the FRG’s commitments to the West as a way of outflanking domestic political opposition had the unintended consequence of drawing the other NATO states further into the
West German nuclear debate.300
In August 1957, a month before the West German federal election, Khrushchev gave a speech intended to encourage the nuclear opposition in the FRG. Warning that the “German people” were being used as “cannon fodder” by NATO, Khrushchev accused the West German government of preparing for “atomic war [creating] an extremely dangerous situation for the peoples of Europe and the German people in particular.” He warned that if atomic war were to break out, it would be in Germany “that atomic and hydrogen bombs- which are a horrible weapon of destruction- [would] explode. The German people must and can avert the catastrophe by refusing to permit a handful of militarists and monopolists to control their fate.”301
Adenauer and the CDU nonetheless swept to victory in the September federal elections.
The Chancellor’s famous “No Experiments!” slogan typified the Union’s winning strategy of emphasising a continuation of the status quo. Adenauer’s victory was doubtless helped by a
300 Jens Daniel (Rudolf Augstein), “Die Franz-Josefs-Legende,” in Der Spiegel, 01/05/1957, Issue 18 301 Anonymous, “Khrushchev Warns U.S. Cities Open to H-Bomb Rockets”, The Boston Globe, 9 August 1957, pg.3 121 booming economy, but it also relied on painting the CDU as the party of responsibility and security in foreign and domestic politics and the SPD as dangerous, immature mavericks. Denied a parliamentary majority, the SPD could at least point to a large increase in its percentage of the popular vote. The winter of 1957-8 was not as peaceful as the Chancellor would have liked. In
December, residents of Miltenberg, Bavaria blocked U.S. attempts to station anti-aircraft rockets in their town by withholding permission for a military survey of the land, in an event that was highly publicized.302
In 1958, the anti-nuclear weapons movement in West Germany gained impetus and vitality. On January 20, SPD leaders met in Bonn to formally announce the “Kampf dem
Atomtod,” and over the following year 325,000 Germans would protest in events planned and run by the movement.303 As part of their announcement, the SPD called for an immediate end to all atomic weapons research conducted by German scientists and demanded the prohibition of nuclear weapons- including British and U.S. nuclear weapons- from German soil. In this and other ways, the KdA was from the start a movement that strove for change beyond the FRG’s borders. Its manifesto, for example, called for: “an atomic-weapon free zone in Europe” as opposed to just West Germany.304 The first major KdA demonstration took place in Frankfurt on
March 23- over a hundred thousand marched in Hamburg on April 17, while 40,000 marched in
Hannover in June.305
The precursor to the major street protests was an emotional debate on the nuclear weapons issue which took place in the Bundestag in mid-March. In this debate, a young Helmut
302 M.S.Handler, “Germans Oppose Rocket Base,” New York Times, December 18 1957, pg.12 303 Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements,” pg.18 304 Adam Seipp, “A Reasonable “Yes”: The Social Democrats and West German Rearmament, 1945-1956,” in Corum (ed.), Rearming Germany, pp.55-72, pg.68 305 Thomas, Protest Movements, pg.34-5 122
Schmidt compared Adenauer’s arming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons to Hitler’s infamous enabling law. At the time Schmidt, who would decades later lead the charge to
“modernize” NATO’s nuclear arsenal, (see Chapter Four) even considered a general strike to be a legitimate means of blocking the acquisition of nuclear weapons.306 Ollenhauer said that “nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr was against the wishes of the majority of Germans,” and warned that “Germany would be dragged into the death circle of the nuclear arms race.” The parliamentary debate was an utter defeat for both the SPD and the FDP. Four days of passionate debate failed to alter the Chancellor’s views in any discernible way and the Free Democrats’ call for a declaration of emergency and the formation of an all-party government failed to gain any traction.307
As soon as the Bundestag debate finished, several hundred workers of the Henschel vehicle works in Kassel left work to demonstrate, clashing with police. Opposition to nuclear weapons then coalesced around the notion of a public plebiscite on their ownership. This idea was first broached by Ollenhauer in the Bundestag at the end of April and garnered the support of two-thirds of Germans.308 In other polls at the time, 81% of respondents rejected the construction of nuclear missile installations on West German territory- just 15% of respondents expressed support. 71% expressed disapproval with the issue of equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear carrier systems- 21% showed support.309 May Day again saw mass demonstrations against nuclear weapons erupt in West Berlin, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf. In Munich, seventy thousand protesters whistled loudly at the news the local police had seized KdA records during a
306 K. S. Parkes, Writers and Politics in West Germany (London, UK: Croom Helm 1986), Chapter Two 307 “‘Most Modern Weapons’ for the Bundeswehr, Victory for Dr. Adenauer in Four-day Debate,” The Times, March 25, 1958 308 Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” pg.393 309 Thoß, NATO-Strategie, pg.368 123 night-time raid. In Hamburg, 150,000 protested, accompanied by a wave of strikes.310 Adenauer responded to the protests by telling a meeting of catholic workers that: “things like that [the SPD sponsored demonstrations] were common in the Third Reich and happen every day in the Soviet
Zone of Germany.”311 In a precursor to the anti-authoritarian revolt of the late 1960s, May 1958 also witnessed widespread unrest in West German universities. Student antinuclear groups staged synchronous protests in fifteen major universities across West Germany on May 20 and 21.
Altogether, crowds at these university demonstrations reached 20,000.312
The 1958 SPD conference, held in Stuttgart that May, was dominated by defense and foreign policy. Ollenhauer called for European détente and the establishment of a common
European security system which would take the place of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. His ideas were not too dissimilar from those proposed at the same time by the U.K. Labour Party and by
Rapacki.313 Small-town delegates, previously a quiet voice in the SPD in comparison to their urban counterparts, were particularly vociferous in condemning not only domestic, but also U.S., nuclear weapons stationed in the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, the May conference (in which the SDP leadership was fighting for its life against the Party’s right-wing in the face of the disastrous 1957 elections) also saw an acknowledgement of West Germany’s pre-existing contractual obligations with NATO, as well as of the necessity of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The
SPD, in other words, was changing, even before the more dramatic alterations that were to come in the following year.314
310 Williams, Adenauer, pg.458 311 Arthur J. Olsen, “Germans Protest Atomic Arms Use,” New York Times, May 2, 1958, pg.5 312 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.121 313 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, pg.60 314 Harold K. Schellenger, Jr., The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes (The Hague, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1968) 124
The summer of 1958 continued to be a time of acute nuclear anxiety in West Germany.
Matters were not helped by the actions of a U.S. statesman lecturing to a British organization. In
George F. Kennan’s BBC Reith lectures, translated into German that year, Kennan proposed a neutralization of the country as a means to calm central Europe. Activists latched onto his statements as a possible path to disengagement and thus safety from a nuclear attack.315
Meanwhile, a flood of worried calls were sent from ordinary citizens to the government, insisting that the latter construct a network of nuclear bomb shelters. The government did not build the shelters, but instead embarked upon a public information campaign intended to assuage public fears.316 Short documentary films with catchy titles such as “key to hell,” flooded the German scene in order to spread information of a slightly different kind. For all their melodrama, these films informed audiences of the dangers of both nuclear weapons and modern technology in general.317
The anti-nuclear weapons protests did little to help the SPD electorally. The Social
Democrats’ focus on the nuclear issue was unpopular in more conservative-leaning areas of the
Federal Republic, such as the western state of Rhineland-Palatinate. Here, the issue of atomic rearmament made little presence in debates, with British official Frank C. Butler noting in
August 1958 that “[T]he recent campaign against Atomic Death... scarcely even formed a subject for debate in [the West German city of] Trier.”318 The attempt of the SPD to turn local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia into a single-issue campaign on the nuclear armaments issue ended in an unexpected catastrophe.319 More success was enjoyed in the electoral campaign in Hesse in
315 Nehring, “Diverging Perceptions,” pg.138 316 “Germans Ask Bomb Shelters, Visitor Says,” LA Times, June 08, 1958 317 Ziemann, “German Angst?,” pg.124 318 See Frankfurt Consulate to Bonn Chancery, June 19 1958, FO 1042/29, TNA, quote from Frank C. Butler to Peter A. Wilkinson, August 11 1958, FO 1042/29, TNA 319 Schrafstetter, “The Long Shadow,” pg.125 125
November 1958. In spite of criticism from Adenauer, who described their refusal to equip the
“Wehrmacht” with “modern weapons” as “scandalous,” the SPD won a major victory.320 British officials, however, attributed the SPD’s success to the fact that they had deliberately kept away from the atomic weapons issue whilst campaigning. “SPD specifically refrained from raising
[the] issue of “atomic death” in order not to stimulate high participation.”321
With few electoral successes likely on the horizon, The SPD abandoned the KdA as a precursor to wider policy changes that the party introduced in its 1959 Bad Godesberg program.
The withdrawal of support by the SPD not only threatened the efforts of activists Party members but also the activism of the vast coalition of trade unionists, students and religious organizations who had signed up to the KdA and who now had the proverbial rug pulled from underneath them.322 For a year, anti-nuclear sentiment was kept alive purely by the activities of a small number of committed intellectuals. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, a German poet, began writing on the entanglement of atomic destruction and scientific calculation in the late 1950s. He did not hold back from attacking the U.S., a land of “politics and crime,” and blamed Washington for the insecurities of the age. In "Reflections in Front of a Glass Case,” he even paralleled Adolf
Eichmann and Herman Kahn, a U.S. atomic strategist.323 Psychiatrist and philosopher Karl
Jaspers referred to the bomb as a challenge to humankind of such a magnitude that its threat could barely be understood. Only by recognizing the totality of the bomb’s threat to humankind could the nations of Earth be pulled back from the brink.324 Philosopher Günther Anders warned
320 “Public Address by Dr. Adenauer”, November 18 1958, FO 1042/29, TNA 321 Anonymous, “Unclassified Telegram,” Frankfurt to Bonn, November 24 1958, FO 1042/29, TNA 322 Berger, “The Historical Cultures of the 1960s’ West German Peace Movement,” pg.193 323 Diner, Feindbild Amerika, pg.152 324 Karl Jaspers, Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen (Munich, Germany: R. Piper & Co., 1957) 126 at a 1959 student conference against nuclear weapons that said weapons had created a new age of worldwide insecurity: “Hiroshima,” he wrote “is everywhere.”325
On 18 April 1960, a small group of bedraggled protesters set off from the northern city of
Brunswick into the surrounding countryside. “It was a very hideous day,” remembered one participant, “with slush and cold. We stood in Braunschweig with a group of just over 20 people between the pillars of the church, the pastor gave us good words and then we had to go out.”326
The Brunswick protest, as well as a handful of other gatherings across northern Germany, marked the beginning of the West German Easter March movement. The Marches quickly gained in popularity- as early as 1961, events took place in seventeen cities.327 Organized by teacher
Hans-Konrad Tempel, the Easter marchers not only announced their opposition to “atomic weapons of every kind in every nation,” but also demanded the unilateral disarmament of both
German states. By 1962, Marches took place not only on Easter, but also on Hiroshima Day and
Anti-War Day (September 1).328 In 1964, more than 100,000 people marched against nuclear weapons throughout Germany.329 Individual SPD members played an important role in these
Easter Marchers, but the SPD itself devoted no funding or organization to these new anti-nuclear weapons campaigns. By 1962, social democrats such as Helmut Schmidt, who had spoken so passionately against nuclear weapons, were now stating that, “anyone who is a pacifist has no political mind.”330 The SPD’s leadership even went so far as to openly wonder whether the
325 Nehring, “Remembering War”, pg.179 326 Andreas Buro, quoted in Hamburg Journal, “Drei Tage unterwegs: Die ersten Ostermärsche“, March 28 2016, accessed from the NDR (Norddeutsche Rundfunk) website, at (https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/chronologie/Peace-Die-Anfaenge-der- Ostermarschbewegung,ostermarsch2.html) accessed on 01.17.2020 327 Nehring, “Remembering War,” pg.186 328 Thomas, Protest Movements, pg.37-8 329 Nehring, “British and West German Protests,” pg.225 330 Quoted in Kristina Spohr, The Global Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), pg.124 127
Easter Marches were a communist plot and debated whether to ban party members who participated in them.331 The Easter marchers themselves responded by (justifiably) accusing the
SPD of conducting a smear campaign and spreading misinformation. The marchers called out, for example, the baseless accusation levied against them that they were actively working to undermine “the West” to aid the Soviet Union in winning the Cold War.332
The Easter Marchers were not the only high-profile opponents of nuclear weapons after
1960. The MLF inspired protests due to its complexity and the fact that it appeared to be a way to sneak nuclear rearmament into West Germany via the backdoor. “Many of these complicated questions of multilateral, multinational forms of control and other technical questions were of no interest to the German people,” said Dr. Heinrich Krone to McGeorge Bundy in May 1963.333
One of the more influential voices to speak out against the proposals was Der Spiegel editor
Rudolf Augstein, who warned that MLF was the first step along the road to German possession of a nuclear arsenal. “Didn’t the Reichswehr’s cardboard tanks soon have iron treads?” he asked rhetorically, bringing up the memory of the Weimar years.334 German protesters were also increasingly linked into international networks. These networks represented a precursor to the events seen later in the decade. A group of Japanese anti-nuclear activists made their way round northern Germany in early 1961, appearing and speaking at a number of “anti-atom manifestations,” as the British Consulate-General in Hamburg put it.335 Attempts were made to establish transnational links between the German protesters and allies abroad, through the
European Federation against Nuclear Arms and through the International Confederation of
331 Nehring, “British and West German Protests,” pg.230 332 Thomas, Protest Movements, pg.38 333 McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum of conversation with Dr. Heinrich Krone,” May 13, 1963, NSF Box 77, JFK Library 334 Susanna Schrafstetter, “Auschwitz,” pg.311 335 Hamburg Consulate-General, “Communist Activities,” March 28, 1961, FO 1042/57, TNA 128
Disarmament and Peace. These efforts largely came to naught, hamstrung by the usual problems of funding and coordination common to many international endeavors.336
In October 1962, Der Spiegel published the embarrassing results of another ‘secret’
NATO exercise, Fallex 62. In this exercise, stimulating a Soviet surprise attack, the West had once more been victorious, yet once more West Germany had been utterly obliterated, losing over 10 million of its people. News of the fiasco was quickly overlooked as Strauß grabbed the headlines by ordering the investigation of Der Spiegel’s offices and the arrest of Augstein. He was forced to resign as Defense Minister shortly after the unconstitutional fiasco. Times were changing: West Germans read widely about the Spiegel Affair, but overlooked the nuclear catastrophe at its heart- as Mark Cioc wrote: “West Germans had learned to live in the shadows of the mushroom cloud.”337 Following the Spiegel affair and the fall of Strauß, the first period of mass anti-nuclear weapons activism in the FRG drew to a close. The Easter March campaign, now the Campaign for Disarmament, gradually shifted its priorities in 1963-4. Rather than being a movement largely concerned with the ownership of nuclear weapons, the Campaign became a full-on “extra-parliamentary opposition… informed by a critique of individual policies as well as of German democracy in general.”338 In doing so, its subsequent history belongs more in the next chapter than this one. No longer would protests and demonstrations against nuclear weapons occur for the purpose of personal and national security- nuclear weapons were now a symbol of
Germany's “democratic deficit”.339
336 Nehring, “British and West German Protests,” pg.226 337 Cioc, Pax Atomica, pg.183 338 Thomas, Protest Movements, pg.39 339 Oppenheimer, “West German Pacifism,” pg.374 129
“They Haven’t Changed:” The Reaction of the Epistemic to Events in Late 1950s West
Germany
The reactions of the epistemic community of U.K.-U.S. German experts towards the above events in West Germany were conditioned by pre-existing images of the Germans. In the late
1950s, despite the tentative change in attitudes described in Chapter One, images of the Germans as militarists and nationalists continued to hold sway amongst the majority of community members. Fears of a revival of German nationalism were commonplace and coalesced around what U.S. statesmen referred to as the “nightmare scenario:” that is, the possibility that the West
German people would feel betrayed by NATO’s passivity and rally around a nationalist leader promising to enact revenge on the Soviet Union. The pursuit of this revenge would lead to a war breaking out in central Europe- one which would see the possible deployment of nuclear weapons and place the U.K., and eventually the U.S. itself, at risk of destruction.340
The leader of the U.S., President Eisenhower, was himself wary about German nationalism. In many ways the former general continued to see the Germans as militarists.
“There was still no question about Teutonic efficiency in things military,” said Eisenhower after a 1959 trip to Bonn.341 The U.S. Ambassador in West Germany, James Bryant Conant (1955-7), agreed. He also saw the Germans as the same people that they had been under Hitler. “National traits have not basically changed in ten years and there is much history to overcome,” he wrote in 1957 [emphasis mine].342 For Eisenhower and Conant, the main force keeping the passions of
340 Frank Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in Thomas Paterson, (ed.) Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.24-56, pg.39 341 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pg.416 342 Conant, Telegraph from Bonn to State Department, January 25, 1957, Department of State Central Decimal File, 762a.00/ 1-2557, NARA 130 the militaristic Germans in check was the leadership provided by Eisenhower’s friend and confident, Chancellor Adenauer. Eisenhower was a firm supporter of Adenauer, “the man who, more than any other, has been responsible for the rapid rehabilitation of West Germany and for her solid, courageous alignment with Western philosophy.” Eisenhower wrote that he wanted to avoid any actions, including public criticism, which would have “politically disastrous” consequences for the Chancellor.343 The Eisenhower administration also invested heavily in favor of a Union victory in the 1953 and 1957 elections.344
British elites in the late 1950s were even more skeptical that the Germans had changed than their U.S. counterparts. The British Prime Minister through the period of both the KdA and the early Easter Marches, Macmillan, was a veteran of the First World War and was surrounded in his elderly cabinet by men heavily experienced in fighting Germans. To the end of his life,
Macmillan remained distrustful of his former enemies. At Adenauer’s funeral in 1967, noting the
“guard of honor, those coal-scuttled helmets,” of his hosts, the former Prime Minister remarked that “they haven’t changed.”345 Anti-German sentiment was not confined to the British political establishment, but also permeated large swathes of society in the late 1950s; as Foreign Secretary
Selwyn Lloyd commented: “There are a number of groups in this country looking for any sticks with which to beat the Germans.”346
U.K. and U.S. officials were aware of opposition to nuclear weapons in West Germany from as early as 1955. This was thanks to a plethora of public opinion polls conducted on the
343 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1965), pg.331 344 Anne-Marie Burley, "Restoration and Reunification: Eisenhower's German Policy," in Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (eds.), Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp.220-240, pg.232/237 345 Ramsden, Don’t Mention the War, pg.268 346 Selwyn Lloyd, “German Assets in the United Kingdom,” July 27, 1959, CAB 129/98, TNA 131 subject. Said polls found that doubts about rearmament were slowly shifting into an “atomic fatalism,” one that was undermining the defense planning of the West German government.347 A
USIA report written in late 1955 described a “widespread revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons so strong that it is overcome only in the contingency of prior use of atomic bombs against Western Europe.”348 Many visitors to West Germany painted the anti-nuclear sentiment in the country as representing just one part of a more generalist fatalism and apathy that they identified in the country. A U.S. education expert visiting Germany in 1956 observed that the war had resulted in a widespread distaste for politics. He noted that among German youth there was a
“reluctance to join any organization, membership in which might turn out to be a liability.”349
Descriptions of German apathy were invariably negative, but they helped to shift the conversation away from the idea of the Germans being a people itching for war at the next opportunity. Apathy was preferable to belligerence.
Sometimes, however, German apathy was not waved away, but was actively criticized.
The accusation of neutralism, as we saw in Chapter One, held that the unreliable Germans would happily strike a deal with the Soviet Union in return for concessions. Neutralism in the mid-
1950s was described as endemic in West Germany by figures such as Conant, who called upon
Adenauer to “neutralize neutralism”.350 Conant saw neutralism not so much as a conscious attempt to undermine NATO but rather as an emotional reaction to a situation that the German people did not understand. Hans Speier’s German Rearmament and Atomic Weapons was published in 1957, to educate U.S. readers on the prevailing state of opinion towards nuclear
347 Thoß, “Deterrence and Defense,” pg.60 348 Szabo, The Changing Politics of German Security, pg.54 349 Quoted in Müller, West Germans against the West, pg.13 350 James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) 132 weapons in West Germany. Speier’s prose implied that he thought nuclear weapons- which he euphemistically referred to as “modern weapons-” were a necessity and that the German public was not being rational in its rejection of them. “When asked about modern weapons,” noted
Speier, “the average German finds it difficult to remain as cool as the professional soldier.
Instead, he is likely to betray his fear of war, destruction and death” [emphasis mine]. Two things stand out here. The first is Speier’s patronizing description of the Germans as emotionally unstable, unable to ‘remain cool’. The second is the belief that fearing war, destruction and death(!) is something that the Germans should be ashamed to do, to the point of them needing to cover such an emotion up.351
U.S. officials read informational reports such as Speier’s and adjusted their policies accordingly. In the spring of 1957, as widespread dissent regarding Adenauer’s nuclear policy spread, U.S. Defense Secretary Charles Wilson held back from a plan to institute nuclear inspections in Europe for fear of exciting an already agitated West German public against the
Chancellor.352 Nonetheless, awareness of the volatility of public opinion was also the motivation behind the call for the greater integration of the FRG’s defenses. Equipping the West Germany army with nuclear weapons was even seen by top military officials such as General Robert Cutler as part of a strategy of maintaining the internal stability of the country, and thus maintaining the
U.S. strategic position in the Cold War.353
Adenauer, who had played up the threat of the far right during his first term in office, now pushed back against the image of his people as militarists often, as he feared that this
351 Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War, pg.247 352 David Tal, The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008) pg.100 353 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 354th Meeting of the National Security Council,” 6 February 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol.IX, doc.242 133 stereotype would prevent the “normalization” and equality of West Germany. In May 1957, for example, during his visit to Washington D.C., Adenauer stressed to the U.S. public the peaceful, reformed ways of the German people. The Chancellor told the Senate that: “The horrible experiences of the recent World War have left their marks on the German people. The millions of dead, the horrors of total war… all this is still alive in the minds of the German people.” Later that day, before the House of Representatives, the Chancellor went even further: “we, too, have nothing else in mind but the defense of our liberty. On my word before God, nobody in Germany plays with the idea of using force or war.”354 The West German foreign office was sure to also promote German pacifism. In January 1958, the West German Ambassador to the U.S., Heinrich
Ludwig Hermann Krekeler told an audience in Detroit that: “The German people want peace. Let me say this with great emphasis… this attitude is very deeply rooted in the German people.”355
Polish statesmen, meanwhile, were promoting a very different message- one that had little nuance and advanced a one-dimensional view of the Germans. During a visit to the U.S. in
October 1957, Rapacki warned Dulles of the “revisionist tendencies” which would be strengthened in Germany should nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr take place.356 U.S. journalist Marquis Childs noted the “universal dread” felt in Poland at the prospect of a German nuclear weapon, as well as the “suspicion and fear” with which the latest pronouncements by
Adenauer and Strauß were greeted. Worst of all, Childs reported that “The Polish belief is that
American policy-makers have encouraged, if they have not initiated, the German atomic policy.
354 Konrad Adenauer, “Address to the United States Senate,” and “Address to the House of Representatives,” May 28, 1957, Congressional Record, Volume 103, Part 6, pg.7836/ 7889 355 Heinrich Ludwig Hermann Krekeler, “Reunification and European Integration,” January 10, 1958, in News from the German Embassy, vol. II, no. 1, January 16, 1958, pg.2 356 Memorandum of Conversation, “U.S.-Polish Relations,” October 16, 1957, Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/10–1657, NARA 134
They see Adenauer as Secretary of State Dulles' star pupil in the Cold War.”357 Such pronouncements were shared in the Soviet Union. In speeches and news conferences,
Khrushchev referred to Germany using such terms as “foul creature” and Adenauer as a “fighting cock,” before going on to warn of immense suffering at the hands of Soviet hydrogen bombs should war break out. Khrushchev shared his negative views of the Germans with Allied officials, warning Nixon of “German militarists” in 1959 and informing the Vice President that should they start a war “our retaliatory actions in several hours [could] wipe from the face of the earth West Germany.”358 The question of a German nuclear weapon hung over and impeded early
U.S. efforts to reach a détente with the countries of the Warsaw Pact.
With the British, Chancellor Adenauer continued to play up the troublesome reputation of his countrymen in order to earn support. For example, at the NATO Paris conference in
December 1957, the Chancellor warned Macmillan that he was the key in keeping the passions of the Germans in check. Adenauer “knows,” wrote Macmillan, “how his people hanker after
Eastern dreams… When he is dead, he fears that people will fall for the bait.”359 By presenting himself as the sole voice of reason in Germany, Adenauer sought to utilize MacMillan’s
Germanophobia as a means to discredit all Germans who opposed his policies. This was a tactic which had worked well in the past. “The Germans are always awkward allies,” lamented
MacMillan’s predecessor, Anthony Eden, “and are likely to be more so after Dr. Adenauer has left the scene.”360 New York Times correspondent Drew Middelton noted that “London’s dilemma is that, although it dislikes strong man rule, and would like further proofs of the vigor of German
357 Marquis Childs, “The Nightmares Haunting Poland,” St Louis Post-Dispatch, June 17, 1958 358 Radio Propaganda Report, “Marshall Zhukov on the Nature of a Future War,” April 22 1960, xxviii 359 Williams, Adenauer, pg.452 360 Hughes, Britain, pg.17-18 135 democracy, it fears that only a man of Adenauer’s domineering strength can save Germany from chaos in the future.”361
Adenauer tried to present the nuclear weapons protesters in a negative light to visiting politicians. For example, he warned Dulles “that it was obviously the intention of the SPD to undermine NATO” as they were blocking the Bundeswehr from possessing “the most modern and efficient weapons” possible. Dulles was sympathetic, letting Adenauer know he was worried about the SPD’s actions. “To leave such a vital area as the Federal Republic unprotected by collective security arrangements,” the Secretary noted, “that it would become a tempting target for aggression, would represent a betrayal not only of the Federal Republic but also of others in the free world.” In a long monologue, Dulles continued that “to agree to forego the availability… of the most effective weapons would be as foolish as to have agreed to forego the use of gunpowder when this began to replace bows and arrows.” Adenauer assured U.S. officials present that there was no need to worry- the SPD would be thoroughly defeated in the upcoming elections.362
David Bruce, who succeeded Conant as U.S. ambassador to the FRG (1957-9), offered his assessment of the German situation in a February 1958 telegram to Dulles, sent just as the
KdA was getting started. “There are many signs this may be [a] year of change,” he wrote.
“Amongst [the] public, patience appears to be wearing thin with arms race… symptoms of malaise are unmistakable, and Soviets have increased opportunity to influence and exploit this climate to suit their own purposes.” In contrast to McCloy and Conants’ reactions to the protest movements, Bruce did not describe the protesters as being communists, or even neutralists, but
361 Drew Middelton, “Germany: British Doubts vs. French Logic,” New York Times, 13 March 1960 362 “Memorandum of Conversation,” FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXVI, Central and Southeastern Europe, eds. Roberta L. DiGangi, Lorraine Lees, Aaron Miller and Charles S. Sampson, doc.114 136 rather as unenthusiastic and lazy. This point was emphasised later in the telegram: “Another difficulty is that German public now appears [to] feel less urgency about [the] need for defensive effort and gives little indication of willingness [to] make sacrifices which will be required in next few years” [emphasis mine].363
Conservative German experts in the U.S. repeated many of these Warsaw Pact claims that the Germans were hard-nosed militarists. For these members of the epistemic community, however, such militarist character traits were positives, not negatives. From the Senate floor in
August 1958, Republican George W. Malone of Nevada summed up this attitude:
The Germans are a peculiar race. They will fight and they will work. They are about the
only nation left in Europe which will do that… I say to Senators that England and France
will never move out of Germany. They are afraid of Germany politically, tradewise, and
militarily. They are correct, too. They should be afraid, because the Germans will fight
and they will work.
Malone’s comments were, despite appearances, complementary, as he was arguing that the
Germans should be given the reigns of leadership in Europe to defeat communism.364
In September 1958, the Operations Coordinating Board (an organization set up to coordinate U.S. covert ops), sent President Eisenhower a report on the KdA. The report noted
“wide-spread opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany,” although, in contrast
363 David Bruce to Dulles, “Embassy Assessment of German Situation at Beginning of 1958,” February 4, 1958 364 George W. Malone, “Increase in Public Debt Limit,” August 22, 1958, Senate, Congressional Record, Volume 104, Part 15 (August 21, 1958 to August 23, 1958), Pg.19144-19153 137 to the early 1950s, “the attitude of the German population continued to be more one of resignation than of restiveness.” That said, the KdA was referred to as “a serious, although perhaps transitory problem.” The report noted that the nuclear weapons issue was exploited by the SPD who had “pulled out all [the] stops,” although it attributed the SPD’s resistance
“largely” to the lack of “other issues.”365 Other officials sent to Germany also brought back disturbing tales. In November 1958, British official H.A.H. Cortazzi described meeting a West
German journalist in Frankfurt who spoke “of a neutralist and nationalist trend among members of the CDU,” even going so far as to say “that the extreme right and the extreme left were not far apart.”366 Towards the end of his time in office, there were signs that Eisenhower was becoming jaded with this opposition that his nuclearization policies was getting. “We should ask when the hell these other people are going to do their duty,” the President told the NSC. “We have got to get tougher with them... These other NATO powers cannot go on forever riding on our coattails.”367
In the U.K., the ruling Conservative Party were themselves frustrated about Germany. In
1958, the Conservative cabinet had debated a way to prevent the West Germans from acquiring a nuclear bomb, but the final decision made was to do nothing, so as not to risk the stability of the
NATO alliance as a whole.368 Conservative policy was also constrained by the inability that
British policy makers felt they had at gauging the “current mood” inside the Federal Republic. At the British Prime Minister’s country residence, Chequers, on 14 February 1959, Macmillan,
Lloyd and several leading British officials met in preparation of Macmillan’s upcoming trip to
365 Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series, NARA 366 H.A.H. Cortazzi, “General Political Issues”, November 17 1958, FO 1042/29, TNA 367 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council,” December 11, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, vol.7, part. 1, pg. 163. 368 John P.S. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958-62: The Limits of Interests and Force, (Basingstoke, U.K., Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pg.37 138
Moscow. The group gathered at Chequers discussed West Germany mostly in terms of the ongoing crisis in Berlin, but they also discussed in detail the contemporary views and attitudes of the West German people towards nuclear weapons. The senior officials, however, determined that “the true mood of the West German people was so uncertain,” so that no British initiatives could be undertaken. It was resolved by the senior officials to wait till “if and when German opinion appeared to be shifting.”369
The disarmament wing of the U.K. Labour Party, particularly prominent within the left of the party, was an increasingly influential and powerful faction in the late 1950s. The highpoint of their success was the decision taken at the 1960 Labour Party conference to adopt unilateral nuclear disarmament into the party platform. Notably, this group was as concerned with a resurgent German militarism- this time backed with nuclear weapons- as it was with the concept of a capitalist U.S. hegemony.370 The fear of the Germans in the Labour Party was echoed in the declarations of British protesters. In January 1959, Kingsley Martin, the long-term editor of The
New Statesman, singled out Strauß and the “German generals” for criticism in a speech at the inaugural European Federation against Nuclear Arms conference in London. This critical appraisal of the Germans was surprising considering that the Federation had been founded as an organization with the purpose of coordinating the British and West German peace movements.371
On February 19, 1959, the House of Commons debated German ownership of nuclear weapons. The trustworthiness of the German character, and the degree to which Germans had
“reformed” were central topics during the debate. Phillip Noel-Baker, Labour MP for Derby-
369 Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pg.65 370 See Nehring, Diverging Perceptions, pg.136 371 Quoted in Holgher Nehring, “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957-1964”, Contemporary European History, vol.14, no.4, (2005), pp.559-582, pg.569 139
South, a passionate campaigner for disarmament who would win the Nobel Peace Prize that year, gave a long speech in which he noted “no one can believe more firmly than I in the peaceful aspirations of the post-war German generation.” Nonetheless, Noel-Baker also emphasized the fact that the Soviets had memories of a very different Germany, memories which stretched not only to Barbarossa in 1941 but also included German rearmament during the interwar period.372
In the same debate, Gaitskell, now Labour leader (1955-63) argued that it was “perfectly legitimate” to “pick on Germany” due to “history and geography.”373 Gaitskell, though not anti-
German in the way Dalton had been, would base his entire argument for a disarmed zone in
Central Europe on fear of a German crusade East to help an uprising by the people of Eastern
Europe.374
Continuing to closely observe events in West Germany, Labour used the protests of the
SPD to legitimize their own attacks on nuclear weapons. In April 1959, Konni Zilliacus, Labour
MP for Machester Gorton, pointed out that his plans for nuclear disarmament and disengagement not only had the backing of the SPD but also had a great in common with the plans that party had themselves proposed. “There is no doubt,” he continued, “that if a Government came into power in this country which tenaciously and courageous pursued this policy, it would win overwhelming support in German public opinion.”375 U.K. and German social democrats met often. In August 1959, for example, the social democratic parties of the world gathered in
Hamburg in northern Germany for the Sixth Congress of the Socialist International. The key topic at the Congress was nuclear disarmament, particularly with regards to Germany. Gaitskell gave the keynote speech, advancing his concept of a “non-nuclear club” of nations and calling
372 Phillip Noel-Baker, in “Foreign Affairs” debate, Feb 19 1959, Hansard, Commons, vol.600, col.660-667 373 Hugh Gaitskell, in “Foreign Affairs” debate, Feb 19 1959, Hansard, Commons, vol.600, col.570 374 Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pg.29 375 Konni Zilliacus, in “Foreign Affairs,” 27 April 1959, Hansard, Commons, Volume 604, Column 100 140 for assurances to be given to the USSR as the first step on the path to reunification. Gaitskell’s comments were well received by the SPD representatives, who included defense expert Fritz
Erler. Indeed, the SPD were Labour’s closest supporters at a conference in which the French, tarred by the Algerian Conflict, were marginalized.376
After the SPD dropped out of the anti-nuclear campaign, observers worried that the communists had now become the driving force in the movement. British intelligence officials stationed in West Germany to monitor “Communist activity” noted uneasily in March 1961 that the Easter marchers were directly stating that their actions were in the tradition of “the great
English marches from Aldermaston to London.” The Hamburg Consulate even reported that local communists were training new marchers in “the Aldermaston songs, now translated into
German.” Despite the alarming actions of the “communists,” officials did inform their superiors that the marches “were opposed by [the] Press, trade unions and political parties. Both the SPD and the DGB warned their members against participation.”377
It was not only the British legislative bodies that discussed West German resistance to nuclear weapons. The West German nuclear protests were also mentioned extensively in the
House of Representatives in July 1959, as it gathered to discuss the sharing of NATO’s nuclear arsenal. “There have been constant rumblings of discord with respect to the nuclear buildup-in
Britain, in Greece, in Germany, and elsewhere; and everywhere people-the plain people-are fearful of the outcome of this mad race for military superiority” noted William Meyer,
Democratic Congressman for Vermont. He was supported by fellow Democrat Edith Greene, of
Oregon, who stated “I cannot believe that the people of these countries are in any real haste to
376 Christopher Steel, “Report: VI Congress of the Socialist International,” August 11, 1959, FO 371/146113, TNA 377 See both K.R. Welbore Ker, “Land North Rhine Westphalia: Report on Communist Activities,” and Hamburg Consulate-General, “Communist Activities,” March 1961, in FO 1042/57, TNA 141 become members of the Nuclear Power Club. Surely there is vast evidence to indicate that the average person in Western Europe is too sensible to look forward with eagerness to the creation of new atomic stockpiles, and new first priority strategic targets on the soil of their native lands.”378 “Ten years ago, the suggestion that we equip a German Army with crossbows, much less with atomic bombs, would have been laughed to scorn in this Chamber,” said Democrat
Edith Greene in the House of Representatives. “I am the first to admit that the West Germany of today is not the Third Reich of 14 years ago. But who can do more than surmise that the
Germany of 14 years hence will be the Germany of today?”379
A brief outbreak of anti-Semitism in West Germany in the winter of 1959-60 encouraged a renewed wave of anti-German sentiment among the people of the U.K. The New York Times’
Drew Middleton noted the existence of “a latent fear in Britain that, no matter what was said, the
Germans had not learned their lesson… the British mass mind believes that Germans remain nationalist and militarist, that “the Germans haven’t changed.””380 The fears of the people were already present among the elite and the epistemic community, who had been watching events in the FRG warily. Macmillan openly worried about “some future nationalist leader” coming to power in West Germany and wreaking havoc through use of nuclear weapons, whilst Selwyn
Lloyd noted “it is natural to have doubts about German reliability in the long run.”381 In early
1960 a group of British defense elites, including the Chief of the Defense, First Sea Lord Charles
Lambe, and Chief of Staff, produced a “Future Policy Study” for the 1960s, in which they noted that the greatest threat to European security would arise from political developments in West
378 William Meyer and Edith Greene, “The Danger of Nuclear Armament,” July 9, 1959, Congressional Record, vol.105, House of Representatives, pg.13119-13130 379 Edith Greene, “The Danger of Nuclear Armament,” July 9, 1959, Congressional Record, vol.105, House of Representatives, pg.13130 380 Drew Middleton, “Germany: British Doubts vs. French Logic”, New York Times, March 13, 1960 381 Quoted in Schrafstetter, “The Long Shadow,” pg.124/ 133 142
Germany. “The long-term danger,” wrote the luminaries, “is of the political upset of the German regime leading to an attempt to bargain reunification against neutralism or to a resurgence of
German militarism.”382
Adenauer continued to attempt to construct a negative image of the protesters in his allies’ minds. In March 1960 he subjected U.S. ambassador Dowling- Bruce’s successor- and the head of the CIA Alan Dulles to “a lengthy, animated and sometimes heated discussion which took place after dinner.” The Chancellor criticized the “diminishing strength” of the U.S. and cited public opinion polls showing that West German confidence in a U.S. “victory” in the Cold
War had collapsed from sixty-six percent in 1952 to thirty-six percent in 1960. Adenauer was using the doubts of the West German people to gain concessions, overlooking the fact that these very concessions- such as the granting of nuclear weapons to German armed forces- were in large part responsible for the disillusionment of the German public.383 One more, however, his strategy seemed to pay off. Dowling wrote that “disillusion is spreading among younger
Germans,” and called upon the government to “take steps [to] reassure German public opinion of our continued confidence in German democracy.”384 On a trip to the U.S. in June 1960, Strauß sought to portray the anti-nuclear weapons movement in the FRG as an instrument of “Soviet psychological warfare,” and accused demonstrators of being on the Soviet payroll. Strauß urged
NATO to do more in the “political, psychological battle,” calling for “a branch of specialists in
NATO, who understand Soviet psychological warfare methods, to dissect slogans and to hit back
382 “Future Policy Study,” 24 February 1960, in CAB 129/100, pg.36, TNA 383 “Memorandum of Conversation,” March 15, 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol.IX, doc.256 384 Dowling, “Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State,” March 31, 1960, FRUS, vol.IX, doc.107 143 in defense of democracy.” The Secretary of State, Christian Herter, appeared sympathetic to
Strauß’ concerns and assured the Bavarian firebrand that he would look into matters.385
“I do not want to play on emotions or arouse prejudices tonight,” said Labour MP
Anonthy Greenwood in a 1960 defence debate. He then, however, went on to do just that, stating that “I am appalled at the suggestion that we should have German troops in Great Britain… one of the main threats to world peace is Germany's irredentist claims to her lost territories.”
Greenwood issued an emotional call to halt future military cooperation with the Germans before they embarked on their inevitable eastern adventure.386 In the face of Labour’s vicious attacks,
Foreign Secretary Lloyd was forced onto the defensive. “I saw the liberation of Belsen, but if we want to create a new Germany we have to treat her as equal without discrimination,” he said. For
Lloyd, the most important consideration was that the “key of the [nuclear] cupboard is in
American hands,” by which he meant that the Bundeswehr’s nuclear weapons could not be fired without U.S. permission.387
Despite Lloyd’s calm, British panic over German nuclear weapons reached fever pitch in
1961. After the SPD dropped out of the anti-nuclear campaign, observers worried that the communists had now become the driving force in the movement. British intelligence officials stationed in West Germany to monitor “Communist activity” noted uneasily in March 1961 that the Easter marchers were directly stating that their actions were in the tradition of “the great
English marches from Aldermaston to London.” The Hamburg Consulate even reported that local communists were training new marchers in “the Aldermaston songs, now translated into
German.” Despite the alarming actions of the “communists,” officials did inform their superiors
385 “Memorandum of Conversation,” June 20, 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol.IX, doc.259 386 Anthony Greenwood, in “Defence,” December 13, 1960, Hansard, Commons, Volume 632, Column 300 387 Schrafstetter, “The Long Shadow,” pg.124-125 144 that the marches “were opposed by [the] Press, trade unions and political parties. Both the SPD and the DGB warned their members against participation.”388 John Ramsden describes how
Germany’s attempted ascension to the MLF also “provoke[d] hysterical questions as to whether
German fingers would reach the nuclear button” in the U.K.389 The Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (CND), which had done so much to influence the Easter March movement in the
Federal Republic was also steadily moving in a more anti-German direction. In particular, the
CND was influenced by communists propagandizing in its youth organization, the YCND. The
CND newspaper Youth Against the Bomb was being edited by a CPGB member and began to express crude anti-German sentiments.390 On top of this, a series of emotional debates took place in the House of Commons over whether to allow West German tank crews access to training facilities in Wales.
In the U.S., members of the administration of the new President, Kennedy, were publicly confident about their ability to manipulate and “fine tune,” West German opinions. These attempts at fine-tuning were the reason for much of the over-the-top sentimentality that marked
U.S.- West German relations in the early 1960s.391 The ease with which the President believed that he could manipulate German public opinion can be seen in his own observations of the West
Germans, which were often patronizing. For example, the President described the German response to his famous Berlin speech to be “exciting but also disturbing,” before concluding that his speech had “unlocked irrationality and repressed hysteria.”392 What the President and his advisors referred to as their “psychological” mission in West Germany soon assumed as much
388 See both K.R. Welbore Ker, “Land North Rhine Westphalia: Report on Communist Activities,” and Hamburg Consulate-General, “Communist Activities,” March 1961, in FO 1042/57, TNA 389 Ramsden, Don’t Mention the War, pg.282 390 Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism, pg.83 391 Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” pg.43 392 Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” pg.53-4 145 importance as the military aspect of the occupation. In 1964, McGeorge Bundy, National
Security Advisor, advised Kennedy’s successor, President Johnson that: “our troop levels in
Germany are justified, finally, more by the psychological needs of the Germans than by strategic necessity.”393 The Kennedy administration’s optimism about reforming the Germans was reflected in the attitudes of the wider public. A survey conducted by the National Community
Relations Advisory Council (today the Jewish Council for Public Affairs) in 1961 did find a remarkable change in attitudes in the U.S. public’s perception of the Germans. Whereas in 1941, the five most common adjectives associated with Germans were “warlike, cruel, treacherous, hard-working and intelligent,” by 1961, they were: “hard-working, intelligent, progressive, practical and brave,” all positive terms.394
Unfortunately for Kennedy, this manipulation of opinion was at times difficult. The building of the Berlin Wall represented a particular crisis, as Germans felt betrayed by the
President. Fear raised in some quarters that the West Germans would embark on a nationalist policy of revenge, perhaps in tandem with de Gaulle’s France. Vice-President Johnson was dispatched to West Berlin, both to raise the confidence of the locals and to report back on their state of mind to Washington. Following his return, Johnson informed the President of the importance of “public opinion in West Germany,” and warned that German “despondency” over the wall could become “explosive”. The use of such imagery was particularly evocative given the period of nuclear insecurity in which the conversation took place.395 The President then voiced his discontent with West German Ambassador Grewe at the poor reception that his UN speech on
393 Quoted in Hubert Zimmermann, “Why They did not go Home: The GIs and the Battle over Their Presence in the 1960s and 1970s,” in Maulucci, and Junker, GIs in Germany, pp.96-138, pg.110 394 Shlomo Shafir, Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), pg.227 395 Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” pg.43 146 the Berlin crisis had received, among some of the media outlets in the Federal Republic.
Chancellor Adenauer himself soon wrote to Kennedy, explaining that the German public was
“confused” on security issues and that, for this reason, “utterances in the press, radio and television will probably cause us some trouble from time to time.”396
The entry of the liberal FDP into the coalition government in late 1961 did not prevent rumors of a rise in German nationalism. November, an alarmist CIA report discussed a faction in the new cabinet formed of Strauß, Schröder and a group of maverick FDP “young Turks.” This revanchist faction was, according to U.S. intelligence, plotting for a German nuclear weapon in order to increase German power and independence, leading West Germany to becoming the “key
European nation.” The report played upon many of the old images of Germans as dangerous militarists, as it described the ambitions of the group to “create a German Reich, not just an enlarged West Germany,” with the attention-grabbing word “Reich” being both underlined and capitalized. This was a false claim; whilst members of Adenauer’s cabinet did want reunification and some may have dreamt of a revision of the eastern borders, not one ever expressed a wish to pursue any creation of a Fourth Reich.397
In June 1962, President Kennedy asked Strauß whether there would be a nationalist demand in Germany for an independent nuclear force as a result of the U.S. aiding France in the creation of a French nuclear arsenal. Strauß assured the President that public opinion would remain against German possession of a nuclear weapon for so long as “NATO was effective.” He hinted, however, that MLF, or a concession like it, would be needed in order to keep the passions
396 Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy, October 4, 1961, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 78, JFK 397 Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Foreign Policy Aims of Strauss, Schroeder and some FDP Leaders," 20 November 1961, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Records Relating to Berlin, 1957-1963 box 4, POL 7 Adenauer, Chancellor Nov 20-22, NARA 147 of the German nationalists in check.398 Indeed, throughout the 1960s, Strauß inherited the mantle of Adenauer by forcefully arguing to his allies that denying West Germany concessions would encourage nationalist movements within the country.399 The minister’s comments aroused as much ire as sympathy. David Klein, who worked in the Kennedy Administration, noted that:
“The fact of the matter is that the Germans, who as a people are deeply insensitive to many things about which other people feel deeply, are sensitive when they feel they are on the short end of things.”400 In August 1962 a minor demonstration against U.S. forces took place in the center of Berlin, a city usually seen as the center of U.S. influence.401 A month later, President
Kennedy attacked von Brentano in a meeting, complaining “that there had been stories in the
[West German] press everyday criticizing the United States” and that there was “poison in the newspapers” of West Germany.402
In 1963, in the wake of increasing friendship between Adenauer and de Gaulle, Kennedy sent Adenauer a “barely veiled threat” that, should the Chancellor continue to seek a nuclear agreement with France, public opinion in the U.S. would turn against the West Germans.403 The
State Department drew up the wonderfully titled memorandum, “Dangers from a Psychotic
Germany,” which warned that a Germany isolated from other nuclear nations could embark on a destructive adventure East.404 “The Germans need to know again to feel [our] contempt” growled a seventy-one-year-old Dean Acheson. U.S. Anger towards German public opinion strengthens
398 Memorandum of Conversation, “Call of the West German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, on the President,” June 8, 1962, Box 75, JFK 399 Schrafstetter, “Auschwitz,” pg.315 400 David Klein to McGB, “Report: The CDU and US,” April 16 1963, NSF Box 77, JFK 401 Coburn Kidd to American Embassy Bonn, “Annual Review of Political Factors Affecting US Overseas Military Base System,” September 7, 1962, Box 76, JFK 402 Memorandum of Conversation: Dr. Von Brentano’s Meeting with the President, April 30, 1962, Box 75, JFK 403 Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion,” pg.115 404 Schrafstetter, “The Long Shadow of the Past,” pg.127 148
Frank Costigliola’s argument that, even before Kennedy’s tragic assassination in November
1963, “the Grand Design lay in shambles.”405
Part of the failure of the Grand Design, and the subsequent failure of MLF a year later, was because U.S. congressmen continued to monitor West German public opinion outside the remit of the Kennedy Administration. Democrat Wayne Morse of Oregon, who would later come to prominence for his objection to the Gulf of Tomkin resolution, for example, painted a picture of German reluctance to MLF: “I have not heard any clamor from the German people to become a nuclear power. They know, as the world knows, that any step in the direction of nuclear weapons for West Germany is considered by the Soviet Union to be a grave threat to her security.
Aside from that problem, nuclear weapons are very expensive. It is problematical whether that is an expenditure the German people are ready to make.”406 This critical lens was echoed by U.S. officials “on the ground” in Germany. The U.S. Consul in Bavaria, for example, reported in
February 1964 that the MLF was “a subject which is still relatively unknown to the broad public, a large part of which is hostile to the ideas of the Germans possessing nuclear weapons in any form.” Of interest here is also the description of West Germans as ignorant of the scheme and its strategic purpose. Such statements were a precursor of the patronising language towards the
Germans that became common in the latter part of the decade.407
U.K. officials continued to raise the specter of a West German nuclear arsenal when it suited them politically, well into the 1960s. Fifty-three percent of Britons polled in 1964 opposed
405 Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” pg.50/ 56 406 Wayne Morse, “Amendment of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,” November 4, 1963, Congressional Record, vol.109, Senate, pg.21007 407 Quoted in Friedrich, “Awakenings,” pg.160 149
MLF for the specific reason that it would provide “the Germans” access to nuclear weaponry.408
Harold Wilson, Labour’s leader from 1963 and Prime Minister from the following year, utilized his constituents fear of a West German nuclear weapon on more than one occasion. In 1963, he grandly stated that: “We are completely, utterly and unequivocally opposed now and in all circumstances, to any suggestion that Germany… directly or indirectly, should have its finger on the nuclear trigger.” In 1966, he was still touching upon the same theme, stating to a press conference in Moscow that: “No government of which I am head will ever agree to a German finger on the nuclear trigger,” as part of an effort to impress his Soviet hosts.409
Conclusion
The late 1950s were undoubtedly a time of rampant anti-German sentiment in both the United
Kingdom and the United States. The consistent attempts of the Adenauer government to gain possession of a nuclear bomb- whether with the U.S., with France or independently- had serious repercussions abroad. Political and diplomatic elites alike feared both privately and publicly that a charismatic, nationalist German leader would come to power in the Federal Republic in the ill- defined future and lead the country on a dangerous, independent cause. Public outrage in both countries over the MLF meanwhile made it clear that anti-German sentiment was by no means restricted to elites. However, the actions of the West Germans who protested their government’s policy did not go unnoticed. Most observers wrote that the West German public had a sense of fear and dread towards nuclear war. This fear had led to a listlessness and lack of enthusiasm for
408 Terry Macintyre, Anglo-German Relations During the Labour Governments, 1964-70: NATO Strategy, Détente and European Integration, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007), pg.34 409 Quoted Hughes, Britain, Germany and the Cold War, pg.129 150 the NATO cause- what was the point of fighting back if the apocalypse was imminent? The epistemic community heavily criticized this listlessness. Crucially, however, by constructing the image of an apathetic Germany, the epistemic community made it difficult to envisage the
Germans as militarists, who were frothing-at-the-mouth for revenge. Moreover, it could be used as evidence to oppose policies such as the MLF, which had been designed for the sole purpose of winning over West German public opinion.
The Eisenhower, Macmillan and Kennedy administrations all expressed frustration with the Germans, who they did not understand. Did they want nuclear weapons? Did they not?
Would nuclear weapons help or hinder German nationalism in the country? In the end, these questions were never answered, but, crucially, the West German domestic sphere remained stable. Indeed, the construction of the brutal Berlin Wall even ensured that West Germany in
1963 was more stable than it had been in 1957, despite six years of protests in the country. This stability helped the epistemic community to relax and not fear that a revolution was imminent.
For the community, the Germans were frustrating and ignorant, but it was increasingly unlikely that they were committed communist revolutionaries. Understanding this attitude helps to explain the community’s reaction to the events of the late 1960s protests, discussed in the next chapter.
151
Chapter Three
Irrational: U.K.-U.S. Perceptions of the West German Sixties
“Germans behave in a very irrational and immature way. This is, however, their present nature, derived from their basic insecurity and lack of confidence in themselves and their future.”
-George McGhee, United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, January
1965410
Introduction
In the second half of the 1960s, hundreds of thousands of West Germans took to the streets of their country in an “anti-authoritarian revolt” against the forces that governed contemporary
German politics and society. Of the four protests covered in this dissertation, “the German
Sixties” have been the most widely discussed among both historians and the public. The reason for this lies in their scope: the anti-authoritarian revolt was not confined to West Germany but was rather a fundamental challenge to the Cold War consensus that occurred across the globe. Activists in the Federal Republic formed just one small part “of [the] globalizing imagined communities” at the time “that cut across national boundaries.”411 That said, due to the peculiar situation that their divided country found itself in, West Germans were, in the words of
George N. Katsiaficas, among the most “internationally conscious members of the global
410 “Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State,” January 16, 1965, Central Files, RG 59, POL GER W–US, NARA 411 Timothy S. Brown, “"1968" East and West”, pg.69 152 movement.”412 Because of this, as well as the strategic importance of the Federal Republic for
NATO, the protests in West Germany were some of the most spectacular and influential in the world; as British radical Tariq Ali put it in his memoirs, “West Berlin was the capital of the Cold
War.”413 U.K. and U.S. German experts kept a close watch on the colorful events that occurred there.
Students were the most visible participants in the activism of the West German Sixties, but to describe the anti-authoritarian revolt as a “student” or “youth” protest, overlooks much of the significance of a movement that challenged established power in fields as disparate as vision, sound and sex.414 It was not just students that took to the streets of West Germany, but workers too- blue and white collar. Meanwhile, the term “Sixties” itself is misleading for a period of activism that, as the other chapters in this dissertation show, extended both before and after the decade. This chapter will limit itself to a focus on the years 1966-70, when the protests on the streets were visible and flamboyant. Demonstrations did not stop after 1970, but U.K.-U.S. elite attention shifted to ways to combat international terrorism, a conversation that fundamentally alters the conclusions drawn here. What’s more, the years 1966-70 were also the bloodiest period of the Vietnam War, a conflict that, more than any other event, helped to rally together disparate strands of protest into one coherent movement and encourage the growth of anti-U.S. sentiment.
The epistemic community closely observed the protests in late sixties West Germany, much as they had done for the earlier movements against rearmament and nuclear weapons.
However, the thoughts of this elite group (which remained mostly male and entirely white) were
412 George N. Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968, (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), pg.49 413 Tariq Ali, Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties, (London, UK: Verso, 2005), pg.239 414 See the chapter titles in Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties 153 beginning to shift. Whilst a few officials, such as U.S. Presidents Johnson and Richard M. Nixon
(1969-1974) continued to attribute the cause of the dissent in West Germany to the activities of international Communism, increasingly the language of conspiracy and subversion fell out of fashion. Not only, in the words of Alice Cooper, did “extraparliamentary political activity gradually [acquire] a “normal” and even “democratic” status,” but officials were now more likely to see the revolts as the actions of an emotional and divided, almost anarchic group of individuals.415 Increasingly, the actions of the “small” group of protesters was contrasted by the epistemic community to the support or indifference of the bulk of the West German population.
The language of immediate threat was largely dropped and with it the sense of a “crisis” that had been so strongly advanced in 1950. Protests in West Germany had become a backdrop or nuisance, when compared to the mass loss of life occurring in South East Asia.
Below we shall recap the anti-authoritarian revolt of late 1960s West Germany- with a particular eye on how protesters targeted locations and symbols associated with both the U.K. and U.S. as part of an attempt to fight “fascism under other (non-German) flags”.416 After that, we shall track the ways in which U.K. and U.S. policy makers and advisers responded to this new challenge to their government’s policies. Faced with a movement which seemed to lack a clear leadership and wide base of support, as well as many of the other features of the protests of the 1950s, the epistemic community responded to the anti-authoritarian revolt of the West
German Sixties by belittling it, emphasizing either its temporary nature or the limited scope of its ambition.
415 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, pg.115 416 For background on the term, see Belinda Davis, “New Leftists and West Germany: Fascism, Violence, and the Public Sphere, 1967–1974,” in Gassert and Steinweis, Coping with the Nazi Past, pp.210-237 154
Context: Vietnam, Germany and The Anti-Authoritarian Revolt of the Late 1960s
The specific details and chronology of the protests in late 1960s West Germany have been discussed in such depth elsewhere that there is little need to reprise them here.417 What is of interest are the ways in which the anti-authoritarian revolt directly challenged the Cold War strategies pursued by the U.K. and above all, the U.S., and how symbols and locations associated with both these countries were targeted by protesting activists. No single event was more responsible for the rise of political protest in late 1960s West Germany than the Vietnam War.
The Federal Republic began to be affected by events in South Vietnam even before the mass deployment of U.S. troops to the country. As early as the spring of 1964 the US government suggested that the West German government increase its presence in the Asian country. Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara declared in March that year that “the defense of Berlin starts at the
Mekong.”418 The West Germans, at the time led by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (1963-6), promised humanitarian aid for South Vietnam (in the form of a hospital ship) but managed to avoid putting German boots on the Vietnamese ground for the duration of the conflict. At the
1965 election, held in summer, the West Germans showed a degree of support for the
Chancellor’s humanitarian policies, but grew increasingly wary of them as the year progressed.
West German students formed the core members of the anti-authoritarian revolt. The number of students in West German universities had expanded rapidly during the 1950s and
1960s- at the beginning of the 1950s roughly 100,000 students were enrolled at West German
417 For five influential English-language works, see: Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968, Nick Thomas, Protest Movements, Klimke and Scharloth, 1968 in Europe, Tismaneanu, Promises of 1968 and Slobodian, Foreign Front 418 Quoted in Slobodian, Foreign Front, pg.82 155 universities and colleges; by the beginning of the 1960s this number had doubled, and it had doubled again by 1970, enrollments rising to almost 400,000.419 The West German universities, like their French counterparts, became overcrowded and unable to adequately respond to the needs of their students. The number of new university professors or even administrators had failed to keep up with the influx of new students, and professors were often indifferent to the situation of those placed in their care.420 In 1961, the Socialist German Student League (SDS), previously affiliated with the SPD, was forcibly split from the party by the social democratic leadership. The reasoning for this decision stemmed from the SDS’ embrace of New Left ideology and a genuine socialist alternative. This was an annoyance to the SPD leaders, who were attempting to build a mass party popular with a majority of West German voters. For the rest of the decade, the now unaffiliated SDS would form a number of political alliances with different opposition groups in West Germany, from Easter marchers to socialist communards.
Despite the importance of the SDS in catalyzing the anti-authoritarian revolt in West
Germany, the relative lack of a clear hierarchy in the movement when compared to earlier protests such as the SPD/ DGB-dominated Kampf dem Atomtod was notable. Certainly, the media, in particular the increasingly popular tabloid press, created a number of celebrities from the ranks of the activists. For example, “Red” Rudi Dutschke, a sociology student at FU Berlin since 1961 and an elected member of the SDS board from 1965, was the target of numerous outraged newspaper columnists and editorials. Despite having himself fled from East Germany,
Dutschke spoke of his cause in a markedly theoretical, Marxist manner. This way of speaking scared many onlooking officials, who accused the young activist of never shaking off his
419 Fulbrook, The Divided Nation, pg.229 420 Ian Kershaw, The Global Age: Europe 1950–2017 (London, UK: Viking, 2018), pg.231 156
“totalitarian” upbringing.421 Yet despite his way of talking, Dutschke himself both a vision and a method of organization that differed markedly from the ideals and methods of state socialists such as Lenin. Dutschke noted for example that: “Committees bound together by common experiences and personal friendship must take over the leadership of the demonstration, not organizers or functionaries.”422
A prominent factor in many students’ university experiences was personal links they had with the U.S. Thousands of West German students traveled across the Atlantic to study, and, during the first half of the 1960s, often involved themselves in the African American civil rights movement. Germans were active members of the U.S. SDS (Students for a Democratic Society, no relation) and a German SDS member, Michael Vester, even helped to write the famous Port
Huron statement.423 Having deliberately “sought out” new methods of activism, once home, West
German students shared the insights that they had learned.424 Issues of racial justice were discussed alongside tactical considerations regarding the most effective ways to conduct a protest.425 Even West Germans who had not visited the U.S. often had an intimate familiarity with the country’s culture. This familiarity was skewed however, with German radicals often over-emphasizing the importance of freedom-loving, anti-state figures such as Thereau and
Keroac in U.S. culture, in order to support their own anti-authority desires.426 Many U.S.
421 Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.46 422 Quoted in Elizabeth L. B. Peifer, “Public Demonstrations of the 1960s: Participatory Democracy or Leftist Fascism?” in Gassert and Steinweis, Coping with the Nazi Past, pp.194-209, pg.202 423 Martin Klimke, “West Germany,” in Klimke and Scharloth, 1968, pp.97-110, pg.106 424 Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.77 425 Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, ““We Shall Overcome”: The Impact of the African American Freedom Struggle on Race Relations and Social Protest in Germany after World War II,” in Grzegorz Kość, Clara Juncker, Sharon Monteith and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (eds.), The Transatlantic Sixties: Europe and the United States in the Counterculture Decade, (Bielefeld, Germany: transcript Verlag, 2013) pp. 66-97, pg.78 426 Bernd Greiner, “Saigon, Nuremberg, and the West: German Images of America in the Late 1960s,” in Alexander Stephan (ed.) Americanization and Anti-Americanism: the German Encounter with American Culture after 1945, (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp.51-63, pg.57 157 students studied in Germany themselves. Angela Davis began her postgraduate education in
Frankfurt (Main) in 1965, working under Frankfurt School doyens Theodor Adorno, Max
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. During her two years in Frankfurt, Davis was an active member of the SDS and participated in anti-Vietnam protests and marches. Although she returned to California in 1967, Davis had begun a long-lasting infatuation with both German states.427
Radical protest in the mid-1960s was by no means limited to student activists. The Easter
Marches, for example, retained a strong presence on the West German streets. For the most part, however, outside of the universities, West German public opinion continued to be supportive of
U.S. policy going into 1965. Indeed, in a poll taken that year, forty-nine percent of respondents referred to the U.S. as being Federal Germany’s “best friend,” and only nine percent chose
France, which was taking a resurgent anti-Washington direction under President Charles de
Gaulle.428 This support for the U.S. also appeared to be informed on events, not based on ignorance. In a poll in February that year, which asked whether the interviewee had heard that the United States militarily supported South Vietnam, ninety-one percent of West Germans questioned answered in the affirmative, whilst half of those interviewed blamed “the communists” for the deteriorating situation in the country.429
To earn greater attention for their cause, a small group of activists began targeting U.S. installations. A protest took place in front of the US consulate in Munich in February 1965, with activists drafting a resolution that called for an “immediate end to combat operations” in
427 Katharina Gerund, Transatlantic Cultural Exchange: African American Women's Art and Activism in West Germany (New York: Transcript-Verlag, 2003), pg.103 428 Feldman, Foreign Policy of Reconciliation, pg.34 429 Friedrich, “Awakenings,” pg.331 158
Vietnam.430 West Berlin was, however, the focal point of discontent, and was to remain so for the next decade. The city, a frontier city, or Frontstadt, in the Cold War, was home to “fiercely anti-
Communist population largely grateful for American protection” as well as “draft dodgers” and
“radical instigators”.431 In May, students at the Berlin Institute of Technology in Charlottenburg, inspired by their counterparts in Berkeley, California, staged a sizable protest.432 In June West
German activists organized a “Vietnam Summer,” with the intention of educating the wider public about the war- two months before their counterparts in the U.S. would do the same.433 In
1966, a tiny group of protesters pelted the U.S. cultural center in West Berlin, the Amerika-Haus, with eggs in protest of the conflict, an act that was “violently subdued” by municipal police.434
These efforts helped to change many West Germans’ opinions regarding the Vietnam War. By
March 1966, polls suggested that only 44 percent of West Germans believed the U.S. was defending freedom against communism in Vietnam, whilst 25 percent responded that “the
Americans” had no right to be in the country at all.435
Altogether, in 1965 and 1966, more than 100,000 demonstrators participated in the fourteen peace marches organized throughout West Germany.436 The SDS grew steadily but impressively in those two years. Rising stars in the organization such as Dutschke argued that protesters in West Germany had to reach out to revolutionary movements across the world, to
430 Slobodian, Foreign Front, pg.85 431 Timothy Brown, “A Tale of Two Communes: The Private and the Political in Divided Berlin, 1967-73,” in Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder and Joachim Scharloth (eds.) Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960-1980, (New York, Berghahn, 2011), pp.132-40, pg.132 432 For background on Berkeley and its “Free Speech Movement” at this time, see Robert Cohen and Reginald E. Zelnik, (eds.) The Free Speech Movement: Reflections on Berkeley in the 1960s (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002) 433 Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pg.33 434 Davis, “New Leftists and West Germany,” pg.214 435 Thomas, Protest Movements, pg.69 436 Slobodian, Foreign Front, pg.83 159 better fight imperialism, which was a global force.437 In February 1966, the bombing of an anti- war meeting in the student house of the Technical University helped to shift the location of protests away from the universities and into the streets. Committed activists began producing posters with graphic depictions of the Vietnam War and text harking back to the Second World
War, placing them in visible places in all major West German cities.
The U.S. bore the brunt of protesters’ ire. As poet Erich Fried wrote in January 1966:
“Vietnam is Germany/ its fate is our fate/ The Americans/ are also there the Americans.”438
Demonstrators carried banners directly comparing President Johnson to Hitler and shouted slogans such as “USA-SA-SS.” One graffiti message found at the Free University declared:
“AMI GO HOME! KILLER GO HOME!”439 The first major street demonstration of 1966 took place in February, once more outside of the Amerika-Haus, where protesters condemned “the
U.S. world police” and called for “freedom and self-determination for Vietnam.”440 Even events that seemed to relate indirectly to the U.S., such as a “Down with Japanese Imperialism” conference ended with West Germans drafting resolutions that condemned “American imperialism.”441 The SPD youth organization, the Jusos, casually predicted that 1984 would be the beginning of fascist rule in the U.S. Even the U.S.A’s impressive cultural output was directly referred to as a negative, an instrument of the country’s “imperialist” foreign policy. Encouraged by growing anti-U.S. sentiment and an SDS initiative, the “Declaration on the War in Vietnam,”
437 Kilmke, “West Germany,” pg.100 438 Quoted in Varon, Bringing the War Home, pg.34 439 Slobodian, Foreign Front, pg.86 440 Thomas P. Becker and Ute Schröder, (eds.) Die Studentenproteste der 60er Jahre. Archivführer - Chronik - Bibliographie, (Cologne, Germany: Böhlau, 2000), pg.103 441 Alex F. Macartney, “Hirohitler on the Rhine: Transnational Protest Against the Japanese Emperor’s 1971 West German State Visit,” Journal of Contemporary History, 2020, Vol.55, no.3, p.622-644, pg.629 160
Chancellor Erhard visited Washington D.C. in late December 1965 and informed the press that his government fully supported Johnson’s policy in Asia.442
Attacking the U.S. and its culture had intense shock-value, at a time when “common sense” mainstream discourse in West Germany saw the U.S. as a land of liberty and freedom and
U.S. values were worshiped “almost ritualistically.”443 In the words of Bernd Greiner, “to attack the crusader against communism as the anti-Christ was always a recipe for scandal.”444 The SDS leadership believed that scandal was to be courted as much as possible, and provocation was vital for revolt- as Dutschke explained: “Without provocation, we would not be heard… provocations are essential prerequisites for public opinion.”445 At times the shock value placed on attacking the U.S. led to a number of crass or disrespectful actions. In 1966, for example, the memorial site at Dachau concentration camp was defaced by a banner proclaiming “Vietnam is the Auschwitz of America” and condemning “American leathernecks.” It is easy to imagine the way that this banner would insult and outrage both U.S. citizens and Jewish people.446
Some activists went beyond criticism of the U.S. alone to voice disapproval of NATO as a whole. In the words of an SDS member, the [Vietnam] war “consigned the ‘free West’s’ entire arsenal of ideological legitimation to the dustbin of history.”447 Even the French, who caused no end of trouble for the other NATO states at the time, were targeted: The Amerika-Haus protests in February 1966 were preceded by a sit-down strike in front of the French Cultural Center, the
Maison Française. West German protesters also adopted the symbols and phrases of the NATO’s
442 Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, Die 68er Bewegung. Deutschland - Westeuropa - USA, (Munich, Germany: Beck, 2001), pg.37 443 Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.30 444 Greiner, “Saigon, Nuremberg, and the West,” pg.53-55 445 Peifer, “Public Demonstrations of the 1960s”, pg.119-200 446 Varon, Bringing the War Home, pg.35 447 Quoted in Slobodian, Foreign Front, pg.78 161
Cold War enemies, in particular those of the North Vietnamese and Chinese. As Quinn Slobodian notes, this was not an act of juvenile cultural appropriation by the protesters, but rather a political statement: “calling themselves “Chinese” was an act of defiance against the mainstream media’s demonization of the Chinese Cultural Revolution… To be Chinese for a West German New
Leftist in the late 1960s meant to provoke, shock, and, above all, discuss.” This nuance was easy to overlook, however, for a bemused U.K. or U.S. official observing the raucous crowds from the windows of their consulate.448
The print media during 1966 was still largely in favor of the Vietnam War. Where it existed, negative coverage was concerned not so much with the bloody pursuit of the war itself, or from the destruction wrought by U.S. bombing. Rather, the press worried about the effect that
Vietnam was having on the U.S. military presence in West Germany. In March 1966, 30,000 U.S. servicemen were suddenly pulled from the Federal Republic- without even a word of consultation with the government in Bonn. Drilled in Senate hearings, McNamara admitted that the withdrawals “probably” wouldn’t have happened without Vietnam. “Extensive discussions” subsequently broke out in the media as to the future of the U.S. military in West Germany, some of which verged on the exaggerative.449
Many West Germans began to circumvent the misleading media coverage of the Vietnam
War by visiting North Vietnam in person, arriving in the country at the behest of the North
Vietnamese government.450 Martin Niemöller, whose reputation had grown over the years and was now an international celebrity, visited Hanoi in January 1967. Whilst in the city the Pastor,
448 Slobodian, Foreign Front, pg.15-16 449 Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pg.173 450 See Harish C. Mehta, People’s Diplomacy of Vietnam: Soft Power in the Resistance War, 1965-1972, (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019), pg.57 162 who visited alongside a Rabbi an Anglican bishop, was shown bomb damage from recent U.S. raids and was impressed by the determination of the Vietnamese people in fighting their war.
Speaking to West German press outlets upon his return, the elderly Niemöller spoke of the
“supreme stupidity” of the U.S. policy in Vietnam, which was hardening opposition against the country. At Dachau concentration camp, he- somewhat unbelievably- described the war in
Vietnam as comparable “in every aspect” to the Nazi crimes that he had witnessed there.451
The efforts of the Left to search for revolutionary icons around the world were mirrored by attempts made by West German conservatives to recreate, so as to strengthen, the “West” as an ideological concept. These attempts were “characterized by a profound engagement with
German, European and U.S.-American traditions of political thought,” and included a
“rediscovery” of non-German thinkers such as Irishman Edmund Burke. As a result, for the first time in German history, conservative intellectuals made peace with and became almost wholly supportive of “the West,” a concept that their ideological fore bearers had deeply distrusted.452
Both the protesters embrace of the “Third World,” and conservatives’ embrace of the West were to have an impact on the way the Sixties protests were reported by U.K. and U.S. elites.
Erhard’s short Chancellorship came to an end in December 1966, due to a sharp recession that brought to an end twenty years of West German economic growth. The new Chancellor, Kurt
Georg Kiesinger (1966-69), was a gifted politician and self-styled intellectual who also happened to be a former Nazi Party member. This fact did not seem to dent his popularity- even if braver
451 Hockenos, Then They Came for Me, pg.253 452 See Martina Steber, “‘The West’, Tocqueville and West German Conservatism from the 1950s to the 1970s,” in Riccardo Bavaj and Martina Steber, Germany and ‘The West’: The History of a Modern Concept, (New York, Berghahn, 2015), pp.230-245 163
Germans greeted him with cries of “Kiesinger is a fascist!”453 The fall of Erhard also saw the
SPD enter into power for the first time since 1930, joining with the Chancellor’s CDU in a
“Grand Coalition.” This coalition of the political center dominated parliament, encouraging opposition, especially left-wing opposition, onto the streets. Right-wing opposition to the government also accelerated during the mid-1960s. Alongside the myriad actions conducted by socialist and liberal protesters, the late 1960s saw a brief surge in support for the far-right in West
Germany. The neo-Nazi Nationalist Party of Germany (NPD) managed an alarming degree of success in local elections, winning fifteen seats in the Bavarian Parliament in 1966 and eight seats in Hesse in 1967. In Baden-Württemberg, the party came close to gaining ten percent of the total votes cast.454 The far right, as well as posing an ominous threat to German democracy itself, also encouraged the extra-parliamentary left who saw the rise of the NPD (alongside a spate of high-profile trials of former Nazis who had evaded earlier justice) as “evidence” of the fascism of the state itself.
1967 was the most significant year in the development of the West German revolt. One of the more famous events that occurred during this year was the visit of U.S. Vice President Hubert
Humphrey to West Berlin in April. Before the Vice President’s visit, wild rumors spread of a possible assassination attempt, leading to an over-the-top police crackdown and the arrest of eleven young people- a response that accidentally supported the protesters claims that the FRG was a fascist state.455 The threatened assassination was nothing but a hoax, with the “bombs” to be thrown at Humphrey consisting of packets of flour, yet the tabloid the Berliner Morgenpost generated an atmosphere of alarm by proclaiming that: “Free University Students Complete
453 Rebecca Clifford, Robert Gildea and James Mark, “Awakenings,” in Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring, (eds.), Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.21-45, pg.31 454 Fulbrook, A History of Germany, pg.228-9 455 Davis, “New Leftists and West Germany,” pg.214 164
Bombs with Explosive Material from Peking.”456 In the end, 2,000 protesters came out to demonstrate against Humphrey, whose visit was otherwise insipid and uninspiring. The Vice
President gave a short speech at the Berlin House of Representatives and did not even attempt to engage with ordinary Berliners, whether friendly or hostile. The contrasts with JFK’s successful
1963 trip were obvious but none the less powerful for being so.457
In June 1967, linguistics student Benno Ohnesorg was shot by the West Berlin police, during a demonstration against the visit of the authoritarian Shah of Iran. This shooting had the joint effect of accelerating the pace and fury of the protests, as well as increasing the degree of popular support commanded by the protesters and the SDS.458 Mayor Heinrich Albertz attempted to cover up the police’s role in the shooting of Ohnesorg, leading to thousands of activists attending funeral services for the murdered pacifist. More and more activists now saw the “pre-
Fascist” state as directly trying to target them.459 From this stage on, protesters would not only be dressed in the t-shirts and jeans that had become ubiquitous, but also in defensive clothing- leather jackets, hard hats and even boots and parka jackets purchased from US army surplus supply stores.460 Austerely-written “Open letters” from the Berlin Senate to the student body at the FU warned that “the Allies” could soon, due to the radical student activities, move in to crack down on the activists and assume direct control of West Berlin.461
456 Stuart J. Hilwig, “The Revolt Against the Establishment Students Versus the Press in West Germany and Italy,” in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968, pp.321-349, pg.332 457 Jeremy Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pg.176 458 Martin Klimke, “West Germany,” pg.97 459 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), pg.171 460 Peifer, “Public Demonstrations of the 1960s”, pg.204 461 Professor Werner Stein, “Offener Brief an alle Studenten der Freien Universität Berlin,” July 3 1967, Student activity at the Freie Universität of Berlin Documentation, IISH 165
Another important development in June 1967- indeed, for Jeffrey Herf a “turning point,” in German history, was the outright rejection of the state of Israel by West German leftists following the former’s victory in the Seven-day War. Attacking Israel as an “agent of American imperialism,” many members of the West German left incorporated Palestine into their world analysis and made overtures to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).462 Attacks on
Israel, an ever-closer ally of the U.S., did not suggest a resurgence of antisemitism in West
Germany- a poll to measure the presence of anti-Semitic attitudes, conducted in 1965, found only
19% of the population answered anti-Semitic answers, in contrast to 34% polled in the 1950s.463
The left also “never wavered” from supporting the direct victims of Nazi atrocities.464 Rather, by attacking Israel, West German leftists saw themselves as seeking a new front along which to attack U.S. foreign policy.
At the 1967 SDS annual Conference, leading voices in the organization, including Rudi
Dutschke, called for a “propaganda of action” in West Germany, to support the “propaganda of bullets” in Vietnam and Latin America. This involved personally confronting the established powers- which included the Allied occupation force in Germany.465 Dutschke explicitly rejected pacifism, which he dismissed as “an expression of repressive bourgeois humanism.”466 Hearing that statements of the SDS, the Mayor of West Berlin, Heinrich Albertz, overreacted, and
“responded to the student movement with a rigid and provocative intransigence that was
462 Jeffrey Herf, “1968 and the Terrorist Aftermath in West Germany,” in Tismaneanu, Promises of 1968, pp.371- 385, pg.373 463 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nonconformity, Dissent, Opposition, and Resistance in Germany, 1933-1990: The Freedom to Conform, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pg.219 464 Volker Dürr, “Introduction”, in Kathy Harms, Lutz R. Reuter, and Volker Dürr, (eds.), Coping with the Past: Germany and Austria after 1945, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), pp.3-21, pg.16 465 Kilmke, “West Germany,” pg.101 466 Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements,” pg.23 166 especially inflammatory, stoking the anti-SDS hysteria, [and] endorsing police illegalities.”467
Unpopular with the British, French and U.S. authorities, Albertz lasted only until September 28
1967, when he was forced to resign.
West Berlin was far from the only site of protest during 1967. On May 08, in Munich a protest of between eight hundred and one thousand SDS activists marched on the U.S. Consulate in the city, having not received permission to do so. Police moved in to chase the protesters off, being greeted with eggs and bottles hurled from the students. Prison sentences and fines were subsequently handed out liberally.468 At a reception at the University of Munich in November, protesters: “greeted the Professors with whistles and cat-calls, dropped balloons, streamers and soap bubbles from the gallery, threw paper bags containing confetti, made frequent interjections, and occasionally shouted their slogans [including “Ohnesorg, Ohnesorg.”] in chorus.” The outgoing university rector at the time accused the demonstrators of not being students at all, but rather outside agitators [the possibility of East German subterfuge was raised] and directly compared the situation at the University to that “immediately before the National Socialists seized power.” All of the professors who were present, meanwhile, spoke of their shame “that the incidents had been witnessed by foreigners.”469
Still, we should be careful not to overestimate the degree to which West Germany was in
1967 a country in revolt. Even if we examine the views of students alone, a poll taken that year showed a majority in favor of the Emergency Laws, new proposals that would allow the German government to assume great powers in a time of crisis. (The SDS despised the emergency laws
467 Geoff Eley, “The Past Under Erasure? History, Memory, and the Contemporary,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol.46, no.3, (2011), pp.555–73, pg.563 468 Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany, pg.83 469 G. H. Baker to British Embassy in Bonn, “Unrest in Munich Universities,” November 27 1967, FCO 1042/126, TNA 167 due to their similarity to the infamous Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, which had been used to hollow out German democracy in the early 1930s.) In a vital divergence with the earlier protests of the 1950s, the SDS had a difficult time convincing the large West German industrial workforce to join in the anti-authoritarian struggle- many workers took the opinion that:
“students were supposed to study, not to demonstrate.”470 A survey conducted in July 1966 even saw forty-four percent of university students agree that the Third Reich “had its strong points” and more than half argue that there should be less discussion of historical German crimes and more discussion of foreign war criminals.471 The Christian Democratic student union in 1967 was barely smaller in size than the Socialist German League. Millions of West Germans were hostile to the students and retained a strong affinity with the U.S. and NATO.472 Large demonstrations, such as a march against the Vietnam War on October 21, often failed to excite a violent confrontation or provoke a physical response “because of the excellent behavior of the police.”473
This “excellent” police behavior was certainly not present at a demonstration on
November 27, conducted to protest the trial of Fritz Teufel, activist and member of the infamous socialist commune Kommune 1. The demonstration, of over a thousand activists, was illegal, and was broken up “with the help of water-hoses and truncheons.”474 A subsequent raid upon the
Greek military mission in West Berlin heralded a period of increased activism.475 Heading into
470 Torsten Oppelland, “Domestic Political Developments I: 1949-69”, in Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949: Politics, Society and Economy Before and After Unification, (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp.74-99, pg.97 471 Detlef Siegfried, “Don’t Look Back in Anger: Youth, Pop Culture and the Nazi Past,” in Gassert and Steinweis, Coping with the Nazi Past, pp.144-160, pg.147 472 Kershaw, The Global Age, pg.234 473 C. L. G. Mallaby to David A. S. Gladstone, “Student Unrest in West Berlin,” November 27, 1967, FCO 1042/126, TNA 474 Patrick R. Metcalfe to David A. S. Gladstone, “Student Unrest,” December 4, 1967, FO 1042/126, TNA 475 Greece was both a military dictatorship and a member of NATO, a fact that seemed to many West German activists to signal the hypocrisy of the Western alliance. 168
1968, a year in which only thirty-two percent of students expressed satisfaction with the West
German political system, attacks on U.S. institutions in the Federal Republic became more overt.476 “Life in Berlin took on a definite Anti-American tone,” remembered Hans Tuch, Public
Affairs Officer at the United States Information Services (USIS). He went on to describe how the unfortunate Amerika-Haus in West Berlin was ransacked for two consecutive weeks.477
Protesters moved on from projectiles such as rotten eggs to pelt the unfortunate cultural center with cobblestones, under the slogan “only an act of destruction is an act of liberation.”478 The ambitions of the protesters in 1968 became clearly global: West German activists that year produced a map of Europe sans borders and boundaries, yet united in revolt.479 The West German movement provided practical aid, inspiration and encouragement to movements elsewhere in
Europe, most notably in the Netherlands.480
The Tet Offensive conducted by the National Liberation Front (NLF) of Southern
Vietnam early in 1968 encouraged a wave of activism in West Germany as four U.S. Consulates were targeted in February alone. In Frankfurt am Main, one thousand SDS members rioted and attempted to storm the U.S. Consulate in the city whilst calling for “weapons for the Viet Cong.”
Facing a police force equipped with watercannon, the rioters responded by throwing fireworks.
The Consulate stood, but many of its windows were broken. In Munich, forty protesters took over an exhibition being held on February 08 at the U.S. Consulate. Once inside the building, they unfurled a giant NLF flag and began chanting “Johnson, murderer.” Security forcibly
476 Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2010), pg.387 477 Quoted in Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy,” pg.106 478 Jarausch, After Hitler, pg.172 479 Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.26 480 Rimko van der Maar, ““Johnson War Criminal” Vietnam War Protesters in the Netherlands,” in Klimke, Pekelder and Scharloth, Between Prague Spring and French May, pp.103-115, pg.103 169 dragged the protesters from the scene. In Hamburg, a giant force of mounted police and canine units guarded the U.S. Consulate tightly. The activists thus marched through the streets and, in an atmosphere of absolute violence, units of the Bundeswehr were even deployed.481
Events in West Berlin overshadowed the those occurring in the other West German cities.
There, the famous International Vietnam Congress took place in the city in mid-February 1968 and was attended by thousands of activists from all over the globe, including Tariq Ali and Dale
Smith from the radical U.S.-based “Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee” (SNICC). Ali remembered that the Belgian economist Eric Mandel spoke at the Congress, “putting the war in a global perspective and assuring the assembly that the United States would be defeated, if not in
1968, then in a few years’ time, and ‘it will be a far bigger defeat than Dien Bien Thu.’482 He spoke, too, of the changing mood all over Europe.”483 Later in the Congress, Dutschke made a speech linking the struggle against the United States in Vietnam with the battles against the established order in Europe. The march through Berlin to close the conference was originally intended to end at the U.S. McNair military base. Dutschke fanaticized about storming the base’s barracks and initiating an uprising with the help of Black Panthers stationed among the U.S. forces there. Once, as we shall see, the U.S. military got word of the plan, the Bishop of Berlin and Gunther Grass intervened to convince Dutschke to change the route and keep things peaceful. In the end, fifteen to twenty thousand activists marched peacefully throughout Berlin, proclaiming the imminent victory of the North Vietnamese in their war.484 In their concluding
481 Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany, pg.155-6 482 The famous victory achieved by Vietnamese forces over the French in the spring of 1954. 483 Ali, Street-Fighting Man, pg.243 484 Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany, pg.159 170 declaration for the Congress, activists called for “cooperation” between the U.S. and Western
Europe to be “broken” and for NATO to be “crushed”.485
By this stage, opposition to the Vietnam War was becoming increasingly common and acceptable in the West German political establishment. Sixty seven percent of West Germans aged sixteen to twenty-five now said they approved of the anti-war protests, while sixty percent of the general public now disapproved of the war. Forty two percent of the public believed that
U.S. troops were committing atrocities.486 Against the wishes of its Party Chairman, Willy
Brandt, the SPD adopted a critical resolution on the War at its party convention in Nuremberg in
March 1968, even as the government that the party formed an essential component- and that
Brandt even represented as foreign minister- continued to support President Johnson’s strategy.487 Meanwhile, the Vietnam War had replaced ownership of nuclear weapons as the dominant issue of concern for the West German peace movement. For example, the Easter
March of 1968 was completely dominated by Vietnam, with nuclear weapons relegated as a topic to the sidelines.488 Issues only loosely connected to the Vietnam War, such as the question of whether the German government should “offset” some of the costs of the U.S. occupation force in the FRG, now became dominated by Vietnam. German officials belatedly informed their U.S. counterparts that any offset payments the German government would be considered by protesters to be funding the Vietnam War- and thus be “guilt[y] by-association.”489
Dutschke called for his fellow activists to adopt a “global strategy” and vision, noting that “the globalization of revolutionary forces is the most important task of the whole historical
485 Nehring, Politics of Security, pg.259 486 Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany, pg.70 487 Friedrich, “Awakenings,” pg.333 488 Schrafstetter, “Auschwitz and the Nuclear Sonderweg,” pg.317 489 Friedrich, “Awakenings,” pg.273 171 period that we live in.”490 He put his words in action, visiting cities outside of West Germany such as Amsterdam, where he called upon an audience of “several hundred students” to take on the “war machine” and attack NATO bases throughout western Europe.491 On April 11, Dutschke was shot in the head by right-wing terrorist Josef Bachmann, barely surviving. Following
Dutschke’s shooting and Martin Luther King Junior’s assassination in the U.S., April 1968 saw the worst of the violence in West Germany. 50,000 protesters took to the streets, coming up against an incredibly high number of police officers- 21,000 in all. In the span of five nights of protest, more than 1,000 activists were arrested and 400 injured in violent scuffles.492 The radical
Karl-Dietrich (K. D.) Wolff visited Parisian university campuses in April 1968 as a
“representative” of the West German SDS, and thus helped to prepare for the revolutionary events that would break out in France the following month. Franco-German student leader
Daniel Cohn-Bendit went so far as to claim that the French May owed its existence to West
German activism.493
By April and May of 1968, public opinion polls noted that 10 percent of West Berlin’s population considered student unrest to be the most important problem facing the city. By July,
60% of the city’s residents considered the situation there to be “very serious” or “rather serious,” whilst 54% of poll respondents reported that they felt “anxious” at political developments, the highest proportion of anxious residents since 1961. Only a quarter of West Berlin residents polled during the summer of 1968 said that they thought the “Allies were doing all that they could,” for the city.494 Preventing the passage of the infamous Emergency Laws, due to be
490 Quoted in Kimke, “West Germany,” pg.101 491 Van der Maar, “Protests in the Netherlands,” pg.109 492 Kay Schiller, “Political Militancy and Generational Conflict during the ‘Red Decade’.” Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, Vol.11, No.1, (2003), pp.19-38. 493 Timothy Scott Brown, Sixties Europe, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pg.119 494 “Public Opinion Poll, Berlin,” Summer 1968, FCO 33/213, TNA 172 debated in parliament at the end of May, was a major motivation for West German activists. The laws were designed to increase the power of the West German executive branch in a time of crisis. Before the Emergency Laws passed, crisis powers were available only to the occupying
Allies, not to the government in Bonn. The Laws thus constituted part of a longer process of the transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Government. Nonetheless, memories of the Weimar
Republic, which ended up being ruled by Presidential decree under Article 48 of the constitution, as opposed to parliament, remained fresh. As a result, the powers granted to the government in the Emergency Laws were widely distrusted. The May 1968 march to Bonn in protest the Laws included tens of thousands of Germans, many of whom were not students or affiliated with the
SDS in any way.495
The ratification of the Emergency Laws by the Bundestag at the end of May denied the campaign against them of much of its fighting spirit and unity. Even before this, there is some evidence to suggest that the anti-authoritarian threat lost some of its fire and threat after April.
Police once more began to step back from the use of force, calming tensions. Media reports of the protests began to take a lighter tone, characterizing students as “fun-loving” and “comically well-behaved,” as opposed to being threats to the republic. A reporter’s radio tapes from the
International Vietnam Congress are telling- expecting something big to happen, the reporter sounded almost disappointed at the lack of a physical confrontation between police and activists.496 Some activists, after the failure of the French 1968 in July, began to embrace a slower path to political transformation. There is a tendency to regard this slower path, famously characterized by Rudi Dutschke as the: “long march through the institutions” as a sudden
495 Kershaw, The Global Age, pg.241 496 Peifer, “Public Demonstrations of the 1960s,” pg.200 173 embrace of reform over revolution. However, this overlooks the subversive direction that the said march was meant to take- as Dutschke himself openly stated: “the long march through the institutions is the subversive use of the contradictions and possibilities within and outside the political-social apparatus, so as to destroy this apparatus in a long process.”497 The tensions that this long march would generate would come to fruition in the 1980s protests over the stationing of Pershing II nuclear missiles in West Germany.
Other activists threw their efforts into non-German causes. The Biafran War became a topic of major concern in West Germany; indeed, more West Germans donated money to Biafra than residents of any other state, barring the U.S. It was the U.K., not the U.S. that was targeted by pro-Biafra activists in the FRG. Indeed, in September 1967, a group of Igbos gave a positive demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, praising the neutral role of Johnson’s government in the Biafran War and condemning the more interventionist British and Soviets.498
A plethora of groups, with names such as “Committee for Action to Assist Biafra” sprung up in
West Germany in 1967-8. They organized demonstrations at a number of locations associated with the U.K., even including gas stations owned by British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell
(an Anglo-Dutch company). The two companies were targeted not only for their association with the Westminster government but also for their continued efforts to extract oil from Nigeria as war raged around them.499 In 1969, pro-Biafran activists in West Germany would, as we shall see, even go so far as to target the British Prime Minister himself during the latter’s visit to Bonn.
497 Quoted in Jan-Werner Müller, “What Did They Think They Were Doing? The Political Thought of the (West European) 1968 Revisited”, in Tismaneanu, Promises of 1968, pp.73-102, pg.77 498 Florian Hannig, “West German Sympathy for Biafra, 1967–1970: Actors, Perceptions and Motives,” in A. Dirk Moses and Lasse Heerten (eds.) Postcolonial Conflict and the Question of Genocide, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 217-238, pg.218-19 499 Christina Gerhardt, Screening the Red Army Faction: Historical and Cultural Memory (New York: Bloomsbury, 2018), pg.30 174
Some SDS members began to move closer to the standardized Marxism-Leninism as practiced in the “real, existing” socialist countries of East-Central Europe. “Breaking out” of
Cold War boundaries had always been an objective of the activists, but now some looked to cross to the other side of the trenches altogether. SDS delegates, for example, travelled to the World
Youth Festival in Sofia, Bulgaria, in July 1968, although their unruly disrespect for authority did cause tension with the Festival’s organizers. Following the debacle caused at the festival, the overwhelmingly pro-Eastern Bloc faction of SDS was expelled from the main organization. This group also lost a deal of respect following the Soviet crushing of the Prague Spring the following month.500
The gradual fracturing of the SDS, and the West German left in general, after May 1968 did not lead to a lessening of its internationalism. Rather, as Timothy Brown notes, the desperate search for models to reunite the movement led to “a turning away from the German past toward a future constructed out of non-German materials.”501 In the summer of 1968, for example, a number of radical West German students attended summer camps in Cuba. This visit, and others like it, was closely monitored by various NATO intelligence services, yet the relationship between the Cubans and radicals was not as close as some feared. British intelligence remarked that “while welcoming student protest in principle, the Cubans have been critical of student anarchy.”502 In September, unrest erupted during the visit of Senegal’s President Senghor to
Frankfurt to receive the Book Trades’ peace prize, whilst West German students participated in an “International Assembly of Revolutionary Students’ Movements,” in New York City. West
Germany had also become an international “nucleus” for protest music, with concerts held within
500 Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.35-43 501 Brown, West Germany and the Global Sixties, pg.111 502 “Student Protest, 1968-69,” September 1969, FCO 68/128, TNA 175 the country drawing crowds from across Europe, including the U.K. The International Essen
Song Day (Essener Songtage) in September 1968 pulled in forty thousand attendees to a festivity of folk and protest.503
Violent protests had by no means disappeared, even if they were becoming rarer. Violence tactics by protesters and police were used again in November 1968, at the CDU Party Congress.
During this famous event, the Chancellor was slapped by activist Beate Klarsfeld who was disgusted at his Nazi past. Much of Kiesinger’s career as a Nazi had been covered up and was only exposed by East German “brown books,” which were published for the specific purpose of revealing Nazis still working in the Federal German state.504 Klarsfeld, like thousands of her peers, was upset about the complicity of the West German state in this cover up. Her assault on the Chancellor was subsequently broadcast around the world, and along with Klarsfeld’s subsequent Nazi-hunting activities, won her widespread approval in the U.K. and the U.S.- approval which extended to Capitol Hill itself.
What’s more, even as protests on the streets began to simmer down, West German politics at the highest level was being transformed. Christian Democracy, for so long the dominant political force in West Germany, was beginning to fall apart at the seams. As the New Left called for citizens to “demand the impossible,” and even the SPD spoke of “daring more democracy,” the steady economic growth and sound, sensible governance that Christian Democracy claimed to represent seemed to now be, in the words of Ronald J. Granieri, little more than “weak
503 Detlef Siegfried, “Music and Protest in 1960s Europe,” in Klimke and Scharloth, 1968 in Europe, pp.57-70, pg.63 504 For background on the brown books, see Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), pg.8 176 gruel.”505 In 1969, Gustav Heinemann, who as we have seen in previous chapters was a longtime opponent of U.S. plans in Europe, was elected President of the Federal Republic. Heinemann did not disguise his commitment to societal transformation once in this (largely ceremonial) position.
Declaring a “changing of the guard,” Heinemann noted that NATO should not be considered as the final resting point of German foreign policy and called for the government to work its way out of the two-bloc Cold War system.506 In his inaugural address, Heinemann declared himself to be a “citizen-president” of an “ideologically neutral state” and claimed to understand “even the radical group of restless students.”507
Heinemann’s election was soon overshadowed by the Federal elections that occurred in
West Germany that September. The formation of an SPD-FDP coalition resulted in the country receiving its first socialist Chancellor, Willy Brandt. The new government not only spoke in a radical language- even the FDP, who were going through a brief period of “let[ting] themselves be carried by the mighty current of the new age of movement in world politics, of spiritual searching, of radical chic and the happy breaking of taboos”- but also acted on its proclamations, quickly issuing an amnesty for political protesters and introducing new legislation protecting citizens' rights to demonstrate.508 For the SPD leadership, one of the most pressing concerns was
“inner security” and the protection of the fragile West German democracy. This was to be done not only through traditional routes such as the police and the courts, however, but also through
505 Ronald J. Granieri, “Politics in C Minor: The CDU/CSU between Germany and Europe since the Secular Sixties”, Central European History, vol.42, no.1, (March 2009), pp.1-32, pg.28 506 Werner D. Lippert, The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik. Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma, (New York: Berghahn, 2010), pg.26 507 David Binder, “Heinemann, Sworn in Bonn, Vows to Serve Peace,” New York Times, July 02 1969 508 For the description of the FDP during this time, see Denis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, Volume Two: Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1991, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), pg.92 177 the cultivation of democratic attitudes among the public and, crucially, international cooperation on domestic affairs.509
Brandt, who had been referred to as the “German Kennedy” for his youthfulness and charisma, was a master at winning support for his policies from non-German audiences.510 The
SPD-Liberal coalition’s most famous and lasting legacy was its Ostpolitik, its rapprochement with the countries of east-central Europe, countries that Germany had once sought to dominate via military conquest. Brandt’s famous Kniefall in Warsaw, during which he fell down in sorrow before a monument commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, was as important for what it told the world about changing attitudes inside West Germany as it was for German-Polish relations. As Marion Dönhof remembered: “many people both inside and outside of Germany thought that this was the real birth of a new Germany.”511 The 68ers had promised to fight for an end to the Cold War consensus and division on Europe and now, so it seemed, the Federal
German government was working towards that aim as well.
The election of Brandt also allowed the mainstream West German press to move further to the left. That the West German mainstream had moved in a decisively anti- Vietnam War direction can be seen in reactions to the horrific Mỹ Lai massacre, news of which became public in November 1969.512 The West German press switched almost overnight into an overwhelmingly anti-U.S., anti-war direction. Much of the responses to the massacre drew
509 For an overview of the SPD- FDP government’s aims, see: Karrin Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight against West German Terrorism”, Central European History, vol.43, no.1, (2010), pp.117-147, Peter Pulzer, “Political Ideology,” in Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson and Peter H. Merki (eds.), Developments in West German Politics, (London, UK: Macmillan, 1989), pp.78-98 510 Sassoon, One Hundred Years, pg.330 511 Marion Dönhoff, Foe into Friend: The Makers of the New Germany from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt, trans. G. Annan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pg.135 512 For an exploration of U.S. news coverage of My Lai, see Charles M. Rowling, Penelope Sheets and Timothy M. Jones, “American Atrocity Revisited: National Identity, Cascading Frames, and the My Lai Massacre,” Political Communication, vol.32, no.2 (2015), pp.310-30 178 comparisons with Germany’s Nazi past, with mainstream newspapers employing such charged terms as “war of extermination,” “scorched earth” and even “final solution.” The most virulent anti-U.S. statements did not come in the columns of editorials but rather were found in letters sent in by ordinary West Germans in their tens of thousands.513 This move to the left helped to damage the radical cause, however, as it sapped the radicals’ claims to be fighting an indifferent mainstream culture.
After limping through a series of crises and experiencing dwindling support over the previous two years, SDS finally dissolved as an organization in March 1970. The dissolution of
SDS, coming five months after the closure of Kommune I was both a symptom and cause of the fragmentation of the anti-authoritarian revolt. The most committed of the 68ers formed a number of disparate organizations, or K-Gruppen, each dedicated to one variant of Marxism or another.
There were, for instance, Stalinist, Maoist and even Albanian-oriented K-Groups. The membership of these groups was tiny (although some of the groups had better luck recruiting blue-collar workers than the 68ers had enjoyed) and they barely appeared on the radar of the occupying powers. Nonetheless, the K-Groups were also dedicated to their causes and formed a core nucleus of activists who led a series of left-wing protests in the 1970s.514 The Jusos were largely defeated at the SPD Congress of May 1970. As reported by Ambassador Jackling, the
Congress was a triumphant lap of victory for Brandt, Wehner and especially Schmidt. Schmidt easily defeated a Juso candidate to win re-election as SPD Vice-Chairman.515 His rise to power in the SPD, based on his excellent skill as a leader and administrator, would leave the increasingly
513 Greiner, “Saigon, Nuremberg, and the West,” pg.53 514 Pulzer, “Political Ideology,” pg.89 515 Roger Jackling, “SPD Party Congress,” May 15 1970, FO 1042/303, TNA 179 left-wing base of the party with a centrist leadership. This development was to have important ramifications come the early 1980s, as well shall see later in the dissertation.
In June 1970, a small group of educated, middle class West German students founded the
Red Army Faction (RAF), an organization that would go on to commit a number of high-profile murders over the following two decades. As the actions of the RAF lie outside the scope of a
“protest movement”, I have not included an analysis of their actions here. Nonetheless, the RAF does provide a representation of the gradual changes that were occurring in the German left at the beginning of the 1970s. Whilst the protesters who turned to terrorist methods in the early
1970s were a “tiny minority,” what is more significant is that, they soon became “the most visible method of protest” against imperialism, drawing the attention of interested onlookers such as the epistemic community.516 We thus leave our analysis at the turn of 1971. Once more, it must be stressed that this year certainly did not see an abrupt end to street protests in West
Germany. Nonetheless, the formation of the social-liberal coalition, the breakup of the SDS and the gradual rise in terrorism in West Germany all slowly came together to end the specific moment that was the anti-authoritarian revolt of 1968. The mass protests, against the Vietnam
War or the Emergency Laws, slowly dwindled in size. Certainly, new movements such as the ecology movement continued to grow in strength. But the days of the great, umbrella protests formed from a coalition of different actors, all brought together by SDS, were over.
The U.K.-U.S. Reaction to West German Protests
516 Thomas, Protest Movements, pg.163 180
The architects of the U.S’ deepening presence in Vietnam long viewed West Germany and the
West Germans as part of their strategy in South East Asia. In May 1964, Robert McNamara pressured Brandt to convince the German people of the necessity of the conflict in Vietnam.
Employing domino theory, he urged that “the German people need a clear explanation of why it is in their interest to help out in Vietnam… In a real sense Berlin is directly affected by what happens in Saigon.”517 Brandt promised to provide said explanation to his compatriots. As, over the following five years, it became increasingly clear that people in the Federal Republic rejected such explanations and opposed the role that they were supposed to play as supportive allies, tensions between Washington and Bonn grew.518
Although U.K. and U.S. German experts usually advised policy, rather than making it themselves, one of the figures in the U.S. administration with the strongest views on the
Germans was the President himself. In his excellent account of the President’s attitudes, Frank
Costigliola described Johnson- who often boasted “I know many Germans,” as viewing the
German people with “admiration, apprehension and a touch of condescension.” Johnson did pursue close relations with the Federal Republic, but this strategy was “out of fear as well as fondness.” The President would use such turns of phrase as “having the Germans on my side where I can count on them as well as watch them,” and told National Security Advisor Walt W.
Rostow that “If you let the Germans isolate themselves, they will do crazy things.”519
The language of German irresponsibility, which employed tropes of an overly bleak and emotional “Teutonic” behavior, had been in use since 1949 and was commonly accepted by the
517 Friedrich, Awakenings, pg.309 518 For an overview of the role of Vietnam in relations between the U.S. and Europe in general, see Eugenie M. Blang, Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961–1968, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011) 519 Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson,” pg.173 181 mid-1960s. As the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic, George McGhee, wrote to
Washington in January 1965: “Germans behave in a very irrational and immature way. This is, however, their present nature, derived from their basic insecurity and lack of confidence in themselves and their future.” At the same time, he complained to Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State (1961-69) that: “the Germans can be very irritating at times in their excitability, indecisiveness and constant need for reassurance.” Worst of all, McGhee recommended no policy changes in Germany, but rather proposed waiting out periods of dissent, which would inevitably be replaced with calmer moments- the Germans lacking the emotional maturity to stay in one state of mind for long.520
The thoughts of men like McGhee were not isolated statements made by individuals.
Rather, intelligence institutions came to similar conclusions. A USIA report published in
February 1966 regarding “popular misconceptions” about the Vietnam War noted that most West
German citizens saw the South Vietnamese government as little more than a puppet regime utterly unable to motivate its citizenry. That the report was written to describe German
“misconceptions,” suggests that the USIA did not take the West German objections to the war entirely seriously, instead blaming any criticism of the Vietnam War on a lack of information on the part of the Germans.521 In August, the organization detected that “a noisy left-wing minority opposes everything we do and is impervious to any explanation of US policy.”522
520 “Letter From the Ambassador to McGhee to Secretary of State Rusk,” and “Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State,” both January 16, 1965, Central Files, RG 59, POL GER W–US, NARA 521 Mehta, People’s Diplomacy, pg.73 522 Quoted in Martin Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy: The West German Student Movement and the Western Alliance,” in Belinda Davis, Carla MacDougall, Martin Klimke & Wilfried Mausbach (eds.), Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, (New York: Berghahn, 2010), pp.105-132, pg.108 182
Patronizing attitudes were also present in the diplomatic corp. In 1975, looking back on the protests, McGhee remembered: “[The Vietnam War] hurt us with the students, but it didn't hurt us with the great majority of Germans. The Germans never really understood the issue very clearly. They'd had no real experience in that part of the world. They mainly regretted us having gotten involved in it in that it might force us to decrease our interest in European defense.”523
The U.S. press also disseminated rather disparaging reports regarding the West German protesters. Philip Shabecoff, reporter for the New York Times, noted in August 1966 that West
German students “are beginning to show signs of political activism.” At the same time, nonetheless, he pointed out “the movement is localized and still limited, and protests are restrained, diffuse and largely ineffectual. By American standards student radicalism is in its mildest form. There is no Berkeley in West Germany.”524
In the U.K., the Labour Party returned to power in 1964, following a thirteen-year spell in opposition. The reaction of Harold Wilson’s government to the protests in West Germany mirrored Labour’s slow response to the wave of anti-Vietnam sentiment sweeping campuses in the U.K. at the time. By the end of 1966, British students had largely condemned the government’s support for U.S. policy in Vietnam as either contemptible or desperately out of touch. Nonetheless, Wilson, even as he was heckled as a “fascist pig” in the streets, ignored the students and dissent inside his own Party till as late as 1968- the students simply didn’t carry enough political power or votes to command his attention.525 At the same time as public attitude towards “the Americans” was souring in the U.K., opinions on the Germans had improved markedly since the xenophobic outbreak of Germanophobia in 1960-1. By 1967, in a Gallup
523 “George C. McGhee oral history interview,” conducted by Paige E. Mulhollan, July 1, 1969 LBJ Library 524 Philip Schabecoff, “German Students Turning to Politics,” New York Times, August 07, 1966 525 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, (London, UK: HarperCollins, 1992), pg.459 183 opinion poll, seventy-one percent of U.K. citizens asked said they had an attitude towards the
Germans between ‘fairly’ and ‘very good’. Public voices pushed the Wilson government to improve relations with West Germany, even as they called for a distancing from Washington’s policies. In another 1967 poll, asked “If you had to choose between France and Germany as the chief ally of this country, which would you choose?”, 49% of those asked opted for Germany and
22% for France.526
Whilst the extra-parliamentary left struggled to catch the attention of foreign observers, many people outside of West Germany did look upon the growth of the German right with alarm.
The rise of the NPD across West Germany was seen as particularly ominous by British officials in Stuttgart due to the support the party was able to leverage from the sizable class of German workers.527 U.S. observers were worried about the NPD’s pronouncements that, to solve the economic downturn West Germany faced in 1966, all payments made towards the stationing of
GIs in the country should be immediately ended.528 In the House of Commons, Eldon Griffiths of the Conservative Party (1964-92) warned his listeners that whilst “the great majority of Germans are wedded at the moment to their democratic institutions,” the rise of the “NPD is certainly a sign of restlessness.” Interestingly, Griffiths linked the rise of the far-right with activity in the democratic left. “Another example of German restlessness,” he said, “is the current pressures in the SPD… the disillusion of many of the party’s left wing.” The reason that Griffiths felt able to link the two together was simple and patronizing. The MP stated that: “the Germans are a people
526 Macintyre, Anglo-German Relations, pg.4/ 34 527 R.P Heppel, “Unrest within and Leftwing Political Activity outside the SPD,” November 21, 1967, FO 1042/113. TNA 528 Stephen L. Fischer, The Minor Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany: Toward a Comparative Theory of Minor Parties (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pg.146 184 who appear, more than most, to need an ideological content, a theme, to which they can devote themselves.”529
The complacency and condescension of U.K.-U.S. officials towards left-protests was not universal. Some figures wished to reform NATO policies to meet what they viewed as a generational challenge. For example, in December 1966, Harlan Cleveland, America’s permanent representative to NATO, sent a telegram to the State Department, in which he called upon his government to: “reformulate our collective aims in a way that fits the increasing fluid international situation, and is more likely to appeal to the generation that does not remember why we got into the Atlantic Alliance to begin with.”530 Official complacency was also challenged by the uptick in political activism in West Germany at the beginning of 1967. “Radical activity by
Free University students took a new turn during the 1966-7 winter semester,” reported the U.S. mission in West Berlin. “In November and December, a small group of anarchistic leftists, calling themselves Maoists, created several serious disturbances at the FU and in downtown
Berlin. The Berlin Maoists do not limit themselves to protests against the FU administration or
US Vietnam policy. Instead, they call for violent opposition to all forms of authority now existing in the West.”531
Under close observation by U.S. military officials were the attempts of the German SDS to operate a desertion campaign targeting U.S. soldiers. The massive U.S. presence in West
Germany peaked in 1954, when three-hundred thousand GIs were stationed in the country. This number dropped slightly soon after but hovered at the quarter of a million mark up until the
Vietnam redeployments that began in 1966. Even so, the U.S. military apparatus in West
529 Eldon Griffiths, in “Foreign Affairs,” December 6, 1966, Hansard, Commons, vol.737, col.1257 530 Macintyre, Anglo-German Relations, pg.110 531 Quoted in Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy,” pg.108-9 185
Germany remained extensive- moreover the soldiers, often draftees, had relatively poor morale.
In 1967 the SDS proclaimed U.S. military installations in West Germany as legitimate targets for protest activities. Activists tried to establish contact with GIs, discuss the war, and supply them with information on desertion and other means of resistance. In 1967, SDS chairman K. D. Wolff claimed that the SDS was channeling 150 GIs out of the country every month.532 A support network for these GIs, to look after them once they left the Federal Republic, stretched from
Amsterdam to Sweden.533 Still, although by the early months of 1968 a half of all deserters from the army came from U.S. troops stationed in West Germany, the U.S. High Command considered the impact of the desertion campaign to have been “rather small” and the State Departments
Office of Research and Analysis concluded that: “anti-US organizations are finding the deserters less profitable for propaganda purposes than they imagined.”534
Upon his return to Washington from West Berlin, Vice President Humphrey lashed out at the reception he had received there, noting that “Europeans are selfish,” and accusing them of being irresponsible and jealous of “U.S. power.” This outburst, unusual for the typically- sanguine Humphrey, suggests the degree to which dissenting West Germans could get under the skin of officials.535 That said, in public the Vice President struck a conciliatory tone, stating that:
“At the heart of our effort must be a special outreach to the younger generation of Europeans.
From all indications, the younger generation of Europe- just as our own younger generation- is idealistic, restless, outward-looking, and willing to give far more than it takes. We must increase
532 Alexander Vazansky, An Army in Crisis: social conflict in the U.S. Army in Germany, 1968–1975, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2019), pg.233 533 Van der Maar, “Protests in the Netherlands,” pg.105 534 Quoted in Klimke, The Other Alliance, pg.184 535 Quoted in Suri, Power and Protest, pg.176 186 our contacts with this younger generation and do a far better communication job than we have done so far.”536
A British fact-finding team was sent out to West Berlin in spring 1967, meeting with
“people in the Free University, including the rector and some leading students,” in order to gauge recent “political developments.” The group noted that all the recent trouble stemmed not from politics at all, but rather university administration. “The events involving the Free University are striking similar to the pattern which, for example, developed in Berkeley in 1964 and at LSE earlier this year,” the report concluded, in that faculty had no time for students and students felt
“ignored and let down.” This point was then made explicit: “It is misleading to give the impression that the troubles are largely the work of a group of politically left-wing extremists.
This accusation was banded about during the LSE troubles as well, and rather smacks of
“international conspiracy” theories. The fact is that all the ingredients for trouble already exist in the Free University.” The team’s findings ended on an optimistic note: “in the context of recent
German history, we should be encouraged by signs that a politically aware, left-inclined university generation may be emerging.”537
West German officials, particularly in West Berlin, frequently attempted to convince their allies of the seriousness of the situation. When, in April 1967, U.K. and U.S. military officials stationed in West Berlin asked Mayor Albertz about “the students,” the mayor spoke of a “very serious” crisis developing in the city. Albertz warned of the existence of a “hardcore” group of students, and told the military officials that he “expected further serious trouble in the next few
536 Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy,” pg.109 537 Richard Vinen, 1968: Radical Protest and Its Enemies (New York: Harper, 2018) 187 weeks.”538 In the monthly tripartite meeting of the Allies on 9 June, the French representative noted that the situation had reached a point where the Allied powers should start considering possible reactions and strategies to confront continuing student unrest. Two weeks later, the FU student government addressed the Allies commanders directly in a letter. Demanding that the
Allied powers should safeguard the democracy and security of the city, the student body argued that it was not the existence of an extra-parliamentary opposition and the exercise of their constitutional rights that were harmful to the democratic order of Berlin, but the actions of the
Senate. American officials, however, chose to ignore the open letter to prevent the opening up of a dialogue between students and Allied officials and thus grant more public attention to student protest.539
U.K. and U.S. officials in West Berlin suspected that the West Berlin Senate would happily put the blame for any crackdown on the Allies, if they could. For example, when students at the Free University asked the Senate for permission for a march in June 1967, the
Senate turned to the British to see if they would oppose it. “If we refuse permission for the demonstration,” U.K. officials informed the Embassy in Bonn, “the Senate will no doubt let it be known that, but for us, they would have allowed it. For this reason... we are not opposing the demonstration.”540 That same month, university professors ate dinner with U.K. diplomat J.L.
Stevenson, and, “with vehemence,” spoke of the “student unrest in Berlin,” which was “much more serious than most people seemed to reali[z]e.” The professors explicitly compared recent compromises with the students to the “situation in 1932/33,” (when the government gifted the
Nazi Party power), something that “struck” the official and stayed in his and his wife’s mind
538 Commandants’ Informal Meeting with Governing Mayor at the Villa Lemm,” April 21 1967, FO 1042/116, TNA 539 Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy”, pg.112 540 B.C.P, “Student Demonstrations,” June 12 1967, FO 1042/125, TNA 188 after the dinner had concluded.541 Willy Brandt was more relaxed. Meeting with McGhee on July
18, Brandt told the U.S. Ambassador that there was no “crisis” in West Berlin and that, indeed, most West Berlin residents felt that there was “no immediate danger.” Brandt pointed to this relaxed atmosphere as a problem in and of itself, connecting it to a wider “public apathy”. The
West German Foreign Minister was essentially downplaying the threat of the Berlin activists by ignoring them.542
British elites were also busy downplaying the threat from the protesters. One official stationed in the Federal Republic, H. I. Duck, wrote to London that “Having seen Herr Dutschke on television, I wold take all his statements with a pinch of salt. I do not believe that the SDS has succeeded… in “bringing about a general political consciousness” among German students…
“between the fronts of student opposition and the Government, there is not only the indifferent mass of the population but a pretty large indifferent mass of students… the vast majority… being too busy studying to indulge in politics.” One reason Duck was not worried was the lack of support offered to the students by the DGB: “The Representatives of the Trade Unions, on whom the SDS had been counting for support, dismissed their efforts as idealistic fantasies and a forthright trade union official, in his open-necked shirt, accused the SDS members of never having set a foot inside a real factory.”543
Certainly, these relaxed views were not universal. U.S. diplomat Brandon Grove, stationed in West Germany, later wrote that 1967 “was a terrifying and disorienting time.”544 The
541 J.L. Stevenson, “Student Unrest,” June 12, 1967, FO 1042/125, TNA 542 Embassy in Germany to the Department of State., “Meeting with Brandt,” July 18, 1967, Central Files, RG 59, POL GER W–US, NARA 543 H. I. Duck to Gladstone, August 14, 1967, FCO 1042/126, TNA 544 Brandon Grove, Behind Embassy Walls: The Life and Times of an American Diplomat, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2005), pg.133 189
British Consulate-General in Frankfurt reported in November 1967 that the city was under threat from a growing left-wing faction. “The most vocal of the malcontents,” the report warned, “are to be found among students and “intellectuals.”” Still, the author of the report, one Alexander H.
Ballantyne, noted that the danger of these rowdies was not as bad as it might appear to be on the surface: “Indeed one is struck by the disunity of these dissidents, as well as their unconstructive, almost anarchical approach.” Ballantyne had no time to discuss the reasons for the unrest, merely noting that: “the reason lying behind the discontent… are too obvious to require repeating(!)”
This flippant comment speaks to a level of resignation with which officials were reacting to the unrest in West Germany, even before 1968 itself.545 The same month, a British report from
Munich sympathized with the “plainly political” message of the activists but found the
“demonstrations… insistence on Ohnesorg, etc” to be “a poor method of conveying to the public exactly what it is the students claim,” as it generated only hostility from the German public. In this sense, the British diplomat was taking up the patronizing role of critic of the demonstrations, a neutral observer who was aware of the contentious issues at hand, but also at the same time above them.
By 1968, US officials were increasingly dedicating time and resources to monitoring the
West German student movement. For example, political officer Dennis Kux, stationed in Bonn from 1966 to 1969 was specifically assigned the task of monitoring the political attitudes of students from the American embassy. In Hamburg, U.S. official Robert Humphrey even joined an anti-Vietnam demonstration in order to spy and provide an inside account of the demonstrators’ strategies.546 A tired and paranoid President Johnson was convinced that the
545 A.H. Ballantyne to A.A. Stark, November 29, 1967, FO 1042/113, TNA 546 Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy”, pg.111 190
Pueblo incident in January 1968- during which a U.S. Navy intelligence vessel was captured off of the coast of North Korea- and the concurrent beginning of the Siege of Khe Sanh in Vietnam represented a concerted effort by worldwide communism. He proposed that the next blow would be felt in West Berlin. In this the President was way off of the mark- the North Koreans and
North Vietnamese had acted independently. Nonetheless, the conflation of events in North Korea and Vietnam with events in Germany is indicative of the President’s thought process at the time.547 In February, catching wind of Dutschke’s plan to storm one of their bases in West Berlin,
U.S. authorities made it clear that they would shoot activists who attempted such an action.
The House of Lords made numerous references to the protests in West Germany during a debate on “Youth and the Nation” in February 1968. The twin issues of youth relations and relations with Germany were often conflated in the late 1960s U.K. Wanting better relations with the Germans was regarded as a policy young Britons wanted- Cabinet Minister Richard
Crossman arguing in 1968, for example, that: “‘nobody hates this more than I do but I am sixty, we are out of date. Nothing would appeal to the younger generation more than a dramatic action to set aside the old feud against the Germans.”548 In the Lords debate on youth, the Earl of Arran interrupted a pro-youth speech given by Lord Chancellor Gerald Gardiner, to ask “whether he is suggesting that the West German students are right in protesting against the American effort in
Vietnam? Does he seriously think that the same students would be happy under a Communist régime?” That Arran saw the West German youth as a casual point of reference- to bring up without context- speaks to the level of familiarity which the Lords would have had to events ongoing in West Germany at the time as well as to the perceived relationship between Germans
547 Bernstein, Guns or Butter, pg.473 548 Macintyre, Anglo-German relations, pg.33 191 and youthful protest.549 For Arran connections between U.K. and German youth was dangerous and would undermine British society.
Visiting the U.S. in March 1968, former Chancellor Erhard was forced to adopt an apologetic tone when meeting with Rusk. Erhard spoke of “a malaise in Europe” and “much uneasiness in Germany” due to the Vietnam War and apologized to Rusk for the “stupid people who shouted that the U.S. should end the war in Vietnam”. The Secretary of State warned that the U.S. effort in Vietnam was all that was preventing “a militant band of communism in Asia”, one whose victory was sure to plunge the region into chaos. Erhard promised “to speak more often to his own people on these issues,” and assured Rusk that present feeling was “anti-war” and not “anti-American.” The conversation between the two hints at a degree of jumpiness on the part of Rusk towards prevailing attitudes in Germany, yet despite this, the Secretary of State addressed Erhard and referred to the German people in a haughty and patronizing manner.550
The same month as Erhard visited Washington, several West German protesters were also on the move. The destination of these activists was the U.K., where they took part in a large anti-
Vietnam War demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Grosvenor Square, London. Their appearance- as part of a crowd of roughly 10,000 people- attracted the attention and ire of first the British press, and then parliamentarians. Speaking in the House of Commons, Conservative
MP Stephen Hastings falsely accused shadowy East German “organizations” of sponsoring the students’ trip, forcing the Attorney General, Labour’s Elwyn Jones (1964-70), to stress that the
Germans “went away immediately afterwards” and promise that “in future steps will be taken to
549 “Youth And The Nation,” February 21, 1968, Hansard, Lords, vol.289, col.417 550 Memorandum of conversation, “The Climate in Europe and the U.S.” March 21 1968, Central Files, RG 59, POL 7, GER W, NARA 192 see that individuals are not allowed into this country for demonstrations if it is thought that they will abuse that facility to foment disorder and cause injury and damage.”551
In May 1968, the desertion campaign, which had enjoyed greater success since March, finally succeeded in grabbing the full attention of U.S. authorities. This was due to the existence of an ominous sounding “International Desertion Day” that the SDS was planning being leaked to officials. The Embassy in Bonn, once it got wind of the Day, pressured the West German government to put a stop to it. The Federal Government subsequently gave local bodies permission to investigate whether any “solicitations to desert” were occurring and prosecute the perpetrators accordingly.552 In the end, a number of calls to desert were placed around important
U.S. facilities although participation in a desertion rally to finish the day was depressingly low.553
The protests against the Emergency Laws were brought up in the House of Commons by
Frank Allaun, MP for Salford East and member of the Labour Party. A committed pacifist, Allaun had an important presence in the British Peace Movement and had helped to organize the
Aldermaston Marches in 1957. Allaun’s comments on West Germany were normally to do with ownership of nuclear weapons- as late as 1969 he was repeating old fears in claiming: “it seems to me that we are helping West Germany to get that finger on the trigger... ever since about 1948, we have been putting arms into their hands and now it seems that we are putting nuclear arms into their hands... I would not put much reliance on certain military gentlemen that I have met in
West Germany.”554 Referring to the Emergency Laws the previous year, Allaun asked the
551 “Grosvenor Square Demonstration (German Students)”, April 29, 1968, Hansard, Commons, col.791-2 552 Klimke, The Other Alliance, pg.184 553 Vazansky, An Army in Crisis, pg.235 554 Frank Allaun, “Defence,” March 04, 1969, Hansard, Commons, vol.779, col.271 193
Minister for Disarmament, Fred Mulley (1967-9), whether he was “aware of the danger involved in these totalitarian, if not Fascist, powers? Will Her Majesty’s Government refuse to sanction these dictatorial measures, which are bitterly opposed by the trade unions, the peace movement and the students throughout West Germany?” Mulley in return accused Allaun and the protesters of “grossly exaggerat[ing] the character of the proposed emergency laws… my hono[u]rable
Friend’s description of them is less than just.”555
Following the Grosvenor Square demonstration, the U.K. press ran front-line headlines suggesting that Britain was on the cusp of revolution. Such sensationalism was not limited to the tabloids- in April, The Guardian claimed that “it does look as though the politics of protest among the young is taking a universally revolutionary tenor.”556 The broadsheet press also criticized activists at radical universities such as LSE or Essex for “unthinkingly copying” the actions of continental radicals rather than taking a (supposedly more mature) British approach to protest.557 Education Secretary Edward Short went so far as to blame the entire occupation of
LSE that occurred in January 1969 on a “tiny handful” of foreigners.558 For figures in the U.K. establishment, West Germany and the West Germans served as prime examples of the threat posed to traditional British behaviors.
Still, even more alarming stories could be found in the overwhelming anti-German columns found in the tabloids.559 Some publications even stirred up strange rumors of an
“invasion” of revolutionary Germans coming to British shores, playing a part in a wider legacy
555 “West Germany (Emergency Laws)”, May 20, 1968, Hansard, Commons, vol.765, col.30 556 Nick Thomas, “Protests Against the Vietnam War in 1960s Britain: The Relationship between Protesters and the Press,” Contemporary British History, vol.22 (2008), pp.335-354, pg.343 557 Holger Nehring, “Great Britain,” in 1968 in Europe, pp.125-136, pg.132 558 Sassoon, One Hundred Years, pg.384 559 Macintyre, Anglo-German Relations, pg.33 194 of British invasion literature that stretched to before the First World War. These efforts intensified once Rudi Dutschke, stable (but shaken and no-longer the man he had been,) was granted a temporary residence permit to live in the U.K. in December 1968, West Germany now being considered too dangerous. However, this residency was only granted on the condition that the young radical renounce all of his political activities. That the British government imposed such a draconian measure on a man whose traumatic injury had left him with occasional epileptic fits speaks to the undue fear which Dutschke’s reputation had generated.
Departing his post in May 1968, just as tensions were boiling over in France, George
McGhee wrote his “Final Report on Germany” to the President. Perhaps wishing to present a legacy of success, McGhee wrote that “the internal situation in Germany remains relatively stable.” In particular, he was calm about the threat posed by the extra-parliamentary left, noting that: “Student unrest, although troublesome, has not resulted—and should not—in a threat to the government as in France;” moreover, “Although there is a strong anti-Viet Nam sentiment among the youth, this has not resulted in any appreciable overall anti-Americanism. We still have a reservoir of good will among the German people”. The only concern McGhee spoke of was the rise of the political right and the NPD; “The greatest threat” he wrote, is that [student unrest] may produce a right-wing reaction.” Lastly, McGhee echoed every U.S. statesman in the postwar period when he spoke of an atmosphere of disquiet: “There is, however, an underlying apprehension largely arising from uncertainties in the general world situation.”560
In Washington, the Department of State formed a ‘Student Unrest Study Group’ in mid-
1968 to come to terms with the international implications of the events of the ‘French May’ for
560 George Crews McGhee, “Final Report on Germany,” May 31 1968, National Security Files, Country Files, Germany, vol. 15, LBJ. 195
U.S. foreign policy. The report was presented eight months later, too late to be of much use to either Johnson or his Democratic Party. McGhee, who chaired the report, wrote that internationally, students had “toppled prime ministers, changed governments [and] ruined universities.”561 The report did not attribute the student unrest to the machinations of the communists, however, noting that the “anti-Communist” new left was condemned by Moscow officials who “actually opposed on doctrinal grounds certain major student uprisings, e.g. in
France, Belgium and West Berlin.”562 Kiesinger, in the company of Brandt, told Dean Rusk and the new Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, on June 26 that “There is a two-fold anti-
Americanism in Germany… On the extreme left are the students and the anti-Vietnam group.
They are unimportant. It is not at all comparable to French student unrest. But they do poison the situation in Berlin... The other anti-Americanism is right-wing neo-Nazi… foolish nationalists.
Certain circumstances could make them dangerous too.” Rusk responded that he understood the basis for Anti-Americanism up to a point, but that the alternative to an assertive U.S. foreign policy was isolationism and that this wouldn’t be good for Germany.563
Johnson told Strauß in a private conversation in July that “he had always believed that whenever a situation arose that tended to separate the boys from the men the Germans could be found on the proper side.” Strauß spoke negatively about the 68-er protesters, just as he had earlier bemoaned the anti-nuclear protests of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Bavarian mentioned that his countrymen: “showed a greater and greater tendency to enjoy life in the shadow of the greater world conflicts, removed from exercising responsibility on world politics.
561 Klimke, “A Growing Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy”, pg.105 562 Quoted in Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pg.399 563 Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., “Report of conversation between Kiesinger and Rusk at Bonn,” June 26 1968, Central Files, RG 59, POL GER W–US, NARA 196
They were content to let the United States do the job. On top of that, many raised their voices in criticism of the actions of the United States. It was extremely important to bring Europe back to a greater sense of responsibility and engagement,” to which the President nodded agreement and said, “the whole world must be brought to exercising greater responsibility.”564
In September 1968, Denis Laskey, the second highest-ranking British official in Bonn, wrote to the head of the Foreign Office's Western European Department, Hugh Morgan. Laskey noted that “the psychological roots of the Berlin malaise” ran deep, so deep that economic incentives such as tax breaks could not solve the problem. In order to rescue the morale of the city, and West Germany as a whole, Laskey called for the U.K. and U.S. to “bear a greater load…
Obviously, we cannot interfere in the details of the city administration but there may be scope for greater emphasis on the Allied presence in and responsibility for Berlin.” Laskey mentioned that
Rusk’s failure to visit the city had been a key reason for the discontent seen there and “for this reason,” he supported the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Wilson to Bonn and West Berlin, despite the ongoing chaos on the streets.565
U.S. Ambassador Lodge also felt it vital that the U.S. leaders should visit West Germany.
In October, he drew up a pessimistic memorandum on discussing the Federal Republic, which heavily criticized the “weak leadership” in the country. Lodge, who gave the memorandum to
Nixon in secret at a Madison Square Garden rally (Nixon was then still campaigning for the
Presidency) spoke of a collapse of “German self-confidence,” which, alongside the lack of leadership, had left the Federal Republic on the verge of being “take[n] over” by the Soviets and made into “another Finland.” The reason for the Soviet threat lay in the ability of the communists
564 “Meeting with Finance Minister Strauss,” July 25 1968, Meetings Notes File, Box 3, LBJ. 565 Laskey to Morgan, “Berlin Morale,” September 23, 1968, FCO 33/213, TNA 197 to exploit German “emotions” which “understandably [ran] deep” in the country.566 If Nixon were to win the election, said Lodge, he would be best advised to visit at the earliest possible opportunity. In the rest, Nixon did defeat Hubert Humphrey, and made sure to include West
Germany as part of his 1969 tour of Europe.
Visits by highest-ranking elites to West Germany continued to be sites of contention.
Prime Minister Wilson, facing a domestic economic crisis which had plunged his approval ratings into the low twenties, traveled to Bonn in February 1969.567 By 1969, Labour’s hold on power in the U.K. was now so tenuous, and the Prime Minister was so now disliked in his own party that Foreign Minister Michael Stewart even informed the German Foreign Ministry that
Wilson would have to slow down his government’s improvement of relations with the Federal
Republic so as to reassure Labour’s “traditionally anti-German” base!568 As it turned out,
Wilson’s trip to Bonn provided few opportunities for the Prime Minister to prove his anti-
German credentials. Nor was the trip restful- rather, it was marred by protest, with the Prime
Minister’s car being attacked by over two-hundred young activists, who pelted it with pig’s blood.569 These activists were not protesting the Vietnam War (Wilson having avoided British entanglement in South East Asia) but rather the ongoing conflict in Biafra, in which the British supported the Nigerian government. “It seems possible that many Germans find a psychological compensation in protesting against all allegations of genocide in Nigeria for their failure to make similar protests in Germany under Hitler” noted the British Foreign Office.570 The British
Ambassador, Roger Jackling (1968-72), waxed poetic on the issue: “Who can say in what
566 Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., “Germany,” October 31, 1968, NSC Files, Country Files- Europe, Germany Vol. I, Box 681, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, [RNPL] 567 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pg.503 568 Macintyre, Anglo-German relations, pg.25 569 “Wilson-Besuch: Warten auf Blücher,” Der Spiegel, February 2 1969 570 Karen E. Smith, Genocide and the Europeans (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 198 proportion Schadenfreude at the discomfiture of a rival Colonial power and the subconscious wish to hang on others the albatross of Rassenmord [genocide] that bears so heavily on German necks, contributed to the intensity of involvement in [Biafra]?”571 Such an analysis was patronizing and simplistic not entirely baseless- Florian Hannig’s recent research has highlighted ways in which “the success of the pro-Biafran campaign was made possible by… Germans’ projections of their personal stories onto the unfolding events.” Indeed, one chant included in the
Biafran War protests proclaimed, “A for Auschwitz, B for Biafra!”572
Nixon worried that his own February 1969 trip to West Germany would be a dull affair, or even marred by protest. In particular, he was concerned about the Berlin leg of the trip.
Kennedy and Johnson (the latter as Vice President) had, after all, made successful journeys to
West Berlin and the former was still considered a hero there. The Federal German ambassador to the U.S., Rolf Friedemann Pauls, attempted to calm the President’s notoriously-fragile ego during a pre-trip meeting by assuring him that there was “a recent German television program in which 84% of all Germans voiced their satisfaction at President Nixon’s election.”573 In the event, Nixon’s visit went well and the President was greeted by chants of “he-he-he, Nixon is ok,” upon his arrival in West Berlin.574 “We had feared antiwar demonstrations, and a few took place during this trip, but none could mar the overwhelmingly friendly reaction of the large crowds that greeted us everywhere we went... Whenever possible, I took impromptu walks or plunged into the crowds to shake hands and meet people” wrote the President in his memoirs.575
571 Quoted in Lasse Heerten, The Biafran War and Postcolonial Humanitarianism: Spectacles of Suffering, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pg.199 572 Hannig, “West German Sympathy for Biafra,” pg.218. Chant is quoted on pg.231 573 “Memorandum of Conversation,” January 31, 1969, NSC Files, Country Files- Europe, Germany Vol. I, Box 681, RNPL 574 Lippert, Economic Diplomacy, pg.24 575 Richard Nixon, RN. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pg.369 199
During his trip, Nixon met with Chancellor Kiesinger privately. In this meeting, the
Chancellor attempted to counter some of the most damaging perceptions of the Germans by informing the President that “we and our people are realistic. The people are firm and will not waiver, but they are not emotional” [emphasis mine]. This pleased Nixon, who warned Kiesinger that the Soviets would look for any ways they could to undermine NATO.576 Later, in a more crowded meeting including a number of other officials, the Chancellor pointed out a recent public opinion poll showing “76 percent of the German people stand for closest cooperation with the U.S. This is the highest favorable response ever recorded.”577 Perhaps because of this support given by the mass of the population, the actions of those who did protest continued, in many quarters, to be ridiculed or not taken seriously. Brandon Grove acknowledged the passion of the protesters but opined that they lacked any greeter cause of strategy. He asserted that: “The demonstrators’ yells of frustration in the end had the force and transitoriness of a passing gale…
I recall the movement as self-centered, a lark for many of the demonstrators, and unfocused by the leadership beyond expressing their hatred of a German bourgeoisie and creating turmoil for its own sake… There was a hollowness at the movement’s epicenter.”578 In other words, for all of the obvious energy and passion of the students, for Grove they lacked a greater cause to follow.
In March 1969, Karl Dietrich Wolff made an appearance before the U.S. Senate itself, having been summoned to determine his immigration status. Wolff refused to follow the appropriate format and, unprompted, spoke of the “emergence of a new institutional fascism both in West Germany and the United States” and called the senators “a bunch of criminal mobsters,”
576 “Private Conversation between Chancellor Kiesinger and President Nixon,” February 26, 1969, NSC Files, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Box 834, RNPL 577 “Record of 12 o’clock Session, Chancellor’s Office” February 26, 1969, NSC Files, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Box 834, RNPL 578 Grove, Behind Embassy Walls, pg.134 200 an action that was greeted with support by radicals back home and horror by German conservatives.579 Wolff’s appearance, in a tattered coat, outraged the Senators. Republic Strom
Thurmond, of South Carolina, shouted “the witness is not excused, the witness is not excused,” as Wolff left the room, accompanied by a group of thirty radicals.580 U.S. authorities subsequently instructed a group of FBI officials to carefully monitor Wolff’s every move.581
Speaking to the House of Representatives in July 1969, Congressman John Rarick, a
Louisiana Democrat and conservative (who would go on to run for President as candidate of the
American Independent Party in 1980), noted “radical” West German students as part of an
“international communist conspiracy” that was “attack[ing]” the U.S.582 Rarick was certainly not indicative of the average Congressman at the time- he referred to use of the term “racist” as being part of a communist “thought-control plot” and in 1972 and 1973 would even go on to address the far-right German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion) during visits to the FRG- yet his words as a representative undoubtedly carried weight. That same month, the Chancellor again bored the U.S. Ambassador, now Kenneth Rush (1969-72), with a slew of positive public opinion polls, before arguing, somewhat unbelievably, that “anti-Americanism was certainly non-existent in Germany.” Unrest was raised as a topic of conversation, but only in technical terms of students and “alienated” youth- the political goals of the protesters were not considered.583
British Foreign Office officials drew up a paper, “Student Protest,” in October 1969, that attempted to “survey student unrest, and, in particular, to sift any evidence of international
579 Waldschmidt-Nelson, “We Shall Overcome”, pg.86 580 “German Student Leader Walks Out on Thurmond,” New York Times, March 15 1969 581 Greiner, “Saigon, Nuremberg and the West,” pg.51 582 John R. Rarick, “Challenge to America, 1969,” July 2 1969, Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Vol.115, Part 14 (July 2, 1969 to July 14, 1969) pg.18346 583 Kenneth Rush, “Ambassador Rush’s Initial Call on the Chancellor,” July 25, 1969, RG59, Central Files 1967– 69, POL 17 US–Ger W, NARA 201 coordination between the various extremist student movements.” The paper mentioned the West
German students as, along with other western European students, tending to be “violent, nihilistic and bitterly opposed to the existing social order.” In particular, the student problem in the Federal Republic was attributed to the fact that there were a number of “perpetual students” who could attend “any university they choose” for “as long as they wish,” and were thus able to live a life of protest unburdened by reality. West German students were also considered to be problematic due to their “middle-class” background, although this point was not expanded upon.
The “philosophy” guiding the students- Marcuse was explicitly mentioned- was described as being both “incoherent and destructive” and “Armageddon before the millennium.”584
The report did acknowledge that there was “no evidence so far to suggest,” that the protests were part of one concerted, centrally directed communist plot. “In view of the volatile and fissiparous nature of student politics,” the report’s authors declared, “effective international links are unlikely.” Nonetheless, it noted the ways in which the West German SDS, “represented by disciplined gangs at demonstrations abroad,” had developed a reputation as “European experts in riot methods and they have been known to instruct foreigners in the construction of weapons.” As well as this, the SDS trained “agitators,” to “attack police cordons in phalanx formation,” and deployed their nefarious methods “in the London riot of March 17, 1968.” A concluding bulletin made clear that the British officials writing the report considered that “the roots of student protest are in frustrated idealism.”585
Nixon wanted Chancellor Kiesinger to win the September 1969 election, and even sent him a congratulatory telegram after the event (the CDU won the most votes but were denied
584 “Student Protest, 1968-69,” September 1969, FCO 68/128, TNA 585 “Student Protest, 1968-69,” September 1969, FCO 68/128, TNA 202 power by the FDP’s support of the SPD). The President also complained that the State
Department bureaucrats were pro-Brandt and supported the German socialists- invoking the spirit of the McCarthyist era in which he served as Senator and Vice President.586 In 1972, Nixon kept his powder dry and did not openly endorse either Brandt or the CDU’s candidate, Rainer
Barzel. Despite Nixon’s skepticism, other U.K. and U.S. elites were caught up in the feelings of euphoria and a new beginning that greeted the results of the 1969 election. U.S. Ambassador
Kenneth Rush wrote of a feeling of “change and excitement,” that reminded him of “the New
Deal Thirties.”587 The U.S. leadership was also, however, perfectly aware that the new SPD government did not offer the threat to their Cold War strategy that, for example, a Schumacher government in the 1950 would have done. Brandt was by no means more prepared to condemn the war- in private- than his predecessor had been. Indeed, Nixon’s National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger later recalled that “Brandt and Wilson volunteered no comment [on the Vietnam
War] and made sympathetic noises when Nixon outlined our Vietnam strategy.”588
Conclusion
Despite the revolutionary and political goals of the West German 68ers, their movement failed to elicit the same worried reaction from U.K. and U.S. elites that the earlier movements against rearmament had done. The reasons for this are three-fold. Firstly, the reduced presence of traditional communists in the movement and lack of a clear leadership or structure to the revolt,
586 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From ''Empire'' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), pg.171-2 587 Quoted in Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and its Impact on the Federal Republic's Relationship with the West,” in Wilfried Loth and George Soutou (eds.), The making of détente. Eastern and western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75 (New York: Routledge, 2008) pp.117–132, pg.118 588 Quoted in Sassoon, One Hundred Years, pg.345 203 outside of a number of media bogey-men, confused officials who were used to combating organized communist movements and led to a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the elites about what the protesters stood for. Secondly, the youthful demographic of the activists encouraged efforts to belittle and patronize them. Lastly, the small size of even the largest protests, as well as the “indifferent” mass of German citizenry that opposed the protests or supported the visit of for example, President Nixon, helped elites to brush them under the carpet.
This is not to say that the actions of the Sixties protesters did not, at least for a period, help to generate a discourse of crisis in the meetings and memoranda of U.K.-U.S. elites.
Together with racial tensions in the U.S., the losses suffered in the Vietnam War, as well as the rampant inflation that was beginning to bite in both the U.K. and the U.S., the student protests in
West Germany were one part of a greater headache that afflicted policy makers in London and
Washington D.C. The Federal Republic may have been only a small, peripheral member of
NATO, but the domestic stability of the world’s second largest exporter of goods, and the front- line of any future conflict with the Warsaw Pact remained critical.
Moreover, the West German protesters proudly displayed the symbols and chanted the names of Washington’s cold war enemies. Unable to see beyond the Cold War binary, President
Johnson viewed the activists in West Berlin as part of an impressive communist conspiracy that could be traced through Hanoi, Pyongyang and to the gates of the Kremlin itself. Worried West
German elites, such as university rectors or local senators, fed these fears to earn support for their own ineffectual responses. Despite the wishes of the more unscrupulous members of the
West Berlin Senate, however, there was little danger of the U.K. or the U.S. ever directly intervening against the anti-authoritarian revolt with their own occupying forces. Such a
204 response would have been seen as an overreaction against a movement that was perceived as a collection of aimless students- as unfair as this assumption no doubt was.
All of the sound, color and bluster of the “1968” occurred alongside (and at times perhaps even drowned out) a parallel transformation that was occurring in German society at the time.
This transformation is poetically described by Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer in the following terms: “many Germans began to extricate themselves from the armor that had hardened them against the pain they had inflicted [during the Hitler period]… Effectively, many
Germans were undergoing something akin to a conversion, a remaking of a sense of themselves, of body and soul. Germany was becoming a different country.”589 In their dismissive commentary of the anti-authoritarian revolt as a juvenile and anarchic mess, the epistemic community overlooked this deeper, and in many ways far more significant, development that was already making their representation of the Germans obsolete.
589 Jarausch and Geyer, Shattered Past, pg.9 205
Chapter IV
Naïve: The Euromissile Crisis, 1979-1985
“The nuclear threat is a terrible beast. Perhaps the banner carried in one of the nuclear demonstrations here in Germany said it best. The sign read, ‘I am afraid.’ Well, I know of no
Western leader who doesn't sympathize with that earnest plea. To those who march for peace, my heart is with you. I would be at the head of your parade if I believed marching alone could bring about a more secure world.”
- U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the Bundestag, June 9, 1982 590
Introduction
The 1970s were a time of stability in Europe, and contemporary observers could be somewhat forgiven for thinking that they had put the worst of the Cold War behind them.591 Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) between U.S. and Soviet representatives signified a genuine desire to find a solution to the nuclear arms race and its accompanying security dilemma that had driven much of the 1950s and 1960s. Ostpolitik had proven to be an effective tool for diffusing tensions between West Germany and the states of the Warsaw Pact and opening up economic ties that increasingly bound them. The Brezhnev Doctrine and the crushing of the Prague Spring, meanwhile, had stabilized the Marxist-Leninist regimes from the possibility of internal
590 Ronald Reagan, “President Ronald W. Reagan's Address Before the Bundestag in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany ,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1982: January 1 to July 2 1982, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), pg.757 591 Meyer, “Framing National Security,” pg.187 206 subversion and revolution. Certainly, a number of societal and ecological crises afflicted Western
Europe during the 1970s, most stemming from ever-increasing economic problems. Yet despite these crises, the international situation on the continent remained calm, especially when compared to the time of the Berlin Crisis or the Korean War.592
Despite the existence of détente, however, both superpowers continued to compete with one another. The Soviet Union’s leadership embarked on the controversial decision to deploy new SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe. Noting this development in a speech at the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Helmut Schmidt, West German
Chancellor since an espionage scandal toppled Willy Brandt in 1974, stated that the new imbalance of power could only be rectified through an upgrade of NATO’s own arms. For
Schmidt, the upgraded SS-20s represented “a costly signal which conveyed a revisionist Soviet determination to weaken or destroy foundational principles of West Germany’s security calculus.” Senior West German officials, such as Jürgen Ruhfus, Schmidt’s personal security advisor, pressured the Carter Administration, as well as the British and French, to modernize
NATO’s nuclear arsenal so as not to leave the Federal Republic open to Soviet threats and thus the possibility of German neutrality, or “Finlandization.”593
After a period of debate, NATO decided on 12 December 1979 upon a “two-track” strategy. This involved preparing to modernize its own weaponry whilst pursuing arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. If negotiations between the two power blocs were to fail, the double track policy called for the stationing of numerous new INF missiles throughout Western
Europe. All in all, four hundred and sixty-four cruise missiles and one hundred and eight
592 Christopher Coker, “The ESDP: A Threat to the Transatlantic Alliance?” in Thomas L. Ilgen (ed.) Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), pp.59-70, pg.61 593 Lutsch, “The zero option,” pg.963 207
Pershing-II rockets were to be deployed in a variety of nations, including the FRG. These new missiles would have the range to target Soviet naval bases in the Baltic, such as Kaliningrad, but would be unable to damage Soviet population centers in Leningrad or Moscow. Western leaders were confident that they could negotiate some form of compromise with the USSR. Soon after double track was announced, however, an increasingly unstable Leonid Brezhnev directed Soviet troops to invade Afghanistan. A shocked U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977-81), decided in return to boycott the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow. Negotiations on nuclear disarmament now seemed a long way off and the “Second Cold War” had begun in earnest.
The West German government was determined not to let this new Cold War interfere with the recent successes of Ostpolitik and the connections that this policy had helped them to form with the Warsaw Pact. However, at the same time as they called for a restoration of détente, the social-liberal leaders of the Federal Republic also continued to advocate for the deployment of nuclear weapons on German soil as a way of forcing the USSR to the negotiation table. Few government advisors or security experts expected what was to happen next as within two years a massive movement of ordinary West German citizens who opposed the missile deployments emerged. This oppositional wave, often referred to at the time as the “peace movement,” was a motley coalition that included Christian, ecological, feminist, Marxist and social democratic groups within it, united only in their desire to prevent the Pershing II deployments. Its place of protest was not only the traditional battleground of West Berlin, or the well-trodden streets of
Hamburg and Bonn. The peace movement also branched out to rural Germany, taking its protests and activists to a number of small towns were NATO military bases were located.
Altogether, millions of West Germans took to these streets and fields to protest the
Pershing-II deployments. In purely numerical terms, these protests far dwarfed those that we
208 have already covered in this dissertation, especially those of the last major wave of activism in
1968. The cultural imprint left behind by the protests was also impressive, so impressive in fact that Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman, writing in the early 1990s, considered the movement to be “the most important mass-based challenge to NATO in its entire history.”594 This comes across as surprising, given that the West German activists failed to achieve their primary goal of preventing the deployment of the Pershing-II missiles. What’s more, the protests never commanded the respect or even the fear of the epistemic community of U.K. and U.S. German experts either inside or outside of the country. These elites considered the protesters to be a disorganized and emotional rabble, one ungrateful for the protection NATO provided them. Even when violence was anticipated, it did little to convince the members of the epistemic community that any change in the missile deployment policy was upcoming or necessary.
The reason that the West German peace movement of the 1980s was never taken entirely seriously by the epistemic community had much to do with its demographics. The anti-missile protesters were often young, middle class idealists, as opposed to grizzled veterans of factory disputes. Women played a visible role in the leadership of the movement, something that failed to impress the overwhelmingly male epistemic community. The signs carried by the protesters, which readily admitted the demonstrators fears and anxieties did little to convince the epistemic community that what they were witnessing wasn’t just an example of German angst being played out on a dramatic scale. The protesters also often went out of their way to avoid violence
(perhaps with memories of 1967-8 fresh in mind), making them even easier to ignore and belittle. Their impotence was made all to clear at the military bases at which the activists chose
594 Steven K. Smith, Douglas A. Wertman, US-West European Relations During the Reagan Years: The Perspective of West European Publics, (London, UK: Macmillan, 1992), pg.58 209 to demonstrate, where they were unable to prevent the functioning of even everyday operations.
Separated from the streets they new best, activists were unable to command the space around them, and even spectacular displays of coordination such as human chains posed no real threat to
U.K. and U.S. troops and their missiles.
Pershing-II: Proposals and Protest
Whilst the 1970s may have been a decade of détente and stabilization, numerous domestic protests had continued to occur in the Federal Republic. There were many political protests which attempt to directly carry on the legacy of 1968, but the impossibility of the societal revolution they called for became more and more apparent each year. Ecological activism, especially movements against nuclear power, posed a more promising opportunity. West German activists had been involved in extensive anti-nuclear protests in the 1970s, but these had been organized not against nuclear weapons, but rather, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In July 1977, West German protesters traveled hundreds of miles to take part in a demonstration at the Superphénix nuclear power station in Creys-Malville, France. Media reports warned that the Federal Republic was becoming “ungovernable” when, two months later, 30,000 protesters demonstrated at a nuclear reactor in Kalkar, near the German-Dutch border.595
Needless to say, many of the activists involved in these nuclear power protests would later participate as prominent members of the anti-nuclear weapons peace movement. At an environmental activism conference in the fall of 1980, actors performed a play in which
595 Andrew S. Tompkins, Better Active Than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), pg.1 210 performers representing the environmental movement tried hard to revive a fainting woman, representing the peace movement.596
Chancellor’s Schmidt’s proposal for a two-track negotiation and “modernization” of
NATO’s INF was not destined to become alliance policy, despite the prestige that West
Germany’s leader had built up since coming to office. A period of internal debate on the plans followed Schmidt’s call to action. The leading power and most important decision maker in the alliance, however, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, threw his political support behind the dual-track deployment. For Carter, pushing through a policy as seemingly sensible and straightforward as dual-track through NATO would serve as a means to rectify the authority that he had lost on security issues. Carter was mistrusted by key allies on security ever since his campaign for the
1976 presidential election, in which he promised to work toward the abolition of nuclear weapons and the Cold War framework.597 However, the lack of respect shown towards him mostly stemmed from controversy over the issue of a NATO neutron bomb, a weapon that could destroy organic life whilst leaving infrastructure intact. The Carter administration flipped- flopped over whether to approve or ban development of such a weapon, leaving European leaders- most notably Schmidt- defending a weapon that they never themselves wanted, only for the U.S. government to reject its use shortly after.598
The new U.K. Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990), also openly proclaimed her support for Schmidt’s nuclear weapons policy. In her support of Schmidt, Thatcher, who once described it as unthinkable that the U.K. should end its own nuclear weapons program, was not
596 Mueller and Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement,” pg.80 597 Meyer, “Framing National Security,” pg.180 598 Philipp Gassert, “Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for Political Cooperation,” in Patel and Weisbrode, European Integration, pp.154-176, pg.163 211 breaking with, but rather continuing, the policy of the previous Labour government and Prime
Minister Jim Callaghan (1976-9). Callaghan was a close friend of Helmut Schmidt and, ever since the famous meeting of the two men with Carter and the French President Giscard d'Estaing
(1974-81) in Guadeloupe in 1979, had been an enthusiastic advocate of the Chancellor’s plans.
For her part, Thatcher pressed the Italian and Dutch governments to accept their own share of the proposed nuclear weapons, even as public opposition in those countries grew. Such a policy fit in with the Prime Minister’s wider strategy of accelerating the Cold War and increasing pressure on the Soviet Union, as well as projecting British power to check the country’s recent decline.599
As a result of the support of the U.S., U.K. and West German governments, NATO defense ministers on December 12, 1979, finalized their plans to install nearly six hundred nuclear missiles in numerous countries throughout Western Europe by the year 1983. Efforts would be made to reach out to the Soviet Union and engage in extensive negotiations, with the aim of removing the upgraded Soviet SS-20 INF missiles. Following this December NATO meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (1977-1980) declared that: “I believe that our governments can be proud of this memorable achievement and that the free people of the alliance will show overwhelming support for the decisions made here today.”600 David Aaron, serving on the U.S. National Security Council, later reflected that the new missiles were an “afterthought” at the meeting and that “the political implications of… deployment were not foreseen.”601
Soviet leaders were worried about the strength of the Pershing-IIs and even speculated that the missiles had the ability to reach Moscow and penetrate deep into the earth (the Pershing-
599 Mathias Haeussler, Helmut Schmidt and British-German Relations: A European Misunderstanding (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pg.184 600 Quoted in Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace, pg.3 601 Quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, “Missile Deployments Shake European Politics,” Science, New Series, Vol. 223, No. 4637 (Feb. 17, 1984), pp. 665-667, pg.665 212
IIs could, in actuality, do neither of these things).602 Still, the CPSU leadership had little desire to negotiate and bargain for their removal. Rather, Communist Party officials seized upon what appeared to be a fantastic chance to highlight NATO militarism and aggression and earn victories in the ongoing propaganda war. In October 1979, the Soviet Union launched a massive propaganda campaign against NATO’s proposed missile deployments. Soviet leader Brezhnev specifically called out European social democrats, in particular the SPD, and accused them of aiding and abetting Washington’s aggressive Cold War strategy.603 The CPSU central committee instructed Soviet media to run a campaign talking about the need to preserve peace and détente in Europe, whilst organizing a “European Forum for Disarmament and Security,” in Belgium to mobilize West Europeans against “attempts by reactionary circles of NATO to undermine the
SALT II Treaty by introduction of Eurostrategic weapons”.604 If the strategy was pursued correctly, the new NATO missiles would be unable to be deployed whilst the new SS-20s could remain in place.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the boycotting of the Moscow Olympics and the formulation of the belligerent “Carter Doctrine” (which stated that the U.S. would use force to protect national interests in the Persian Gulf region) created a sense of dread in the Federal
Republic, one that had not been present, in such an acute form, since the 1960s. The number of
West Germans who, when polled, responded that they considered another world war to be
“possible” or “probable” in the next three years stood at forty-nine percent in January 1980, the highest it had stood at since 1962 (the year of the Cuban missile crisis, and, as we saw in Chapter
602 Yost, “NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy”, pg.252 603 Spohr, The Global Chancellor, pg.105 604 Gerhard Wettig, “The last Soviet offensive in the Cold War: emergence and development of the campaign against NATO euromissiles, 1979–1983,” Cold War History, vol.9, no.1, 2009, pp.79-110, pg.88 213
Two, a time of acute nuclear anxiety in the FRG).605 To try and calm the situation, convince their populations that they were on the side of peace and protect the progress began by Ostpolitik a decade earlier, Chancellor Schmidt and President d’Estaing issued a joint statement in February
1980, calling for both superpowers to protect the fragile détente which had been built up in the
1970s.606
The forces that would come to oppose the missile deployments from within West
Germany were slowly taking shape. In January 1980, a diverse collection of ecological social movements and citizen’s action groups united into the “Green Party” (Die Grünen, Greens) in order to participate in the federal elections to be held in October that year. The Green movement, which had been founded a year earlier, was always riven by internal divisions between conservatives and leftists, pragmatists and idealists. However, what united the diverse parts of the movement into one party was a shared commitment to a number of key issues, most notably the environment, but also decentralization, a greater participation of citizens in society and pacifism.607 By opposing the principle that economic growth should be sought after and nurtured by the state, a principle which the CDU, SPD and FDP had all adhered to since 1949, the Greens were in many respects one of the most radical rivals that the German establishment found itself faced with, both inside and outside of parliament.
Despite the birth of the Greens, as well as the increasingly uncertain international situation, the domestic situation continued to look good for Schmidt. Indeed, polls suggested that his domestic popularity in the first months of 1980 was as high as Adenauer’s had been at his
605 Frank Biess, German Angst: Fear and Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020), pg.291 606 Winkler, The Long Road West, pg.327 607 Jarausch, After Hitler, pg.178 214 peak. In federal elections held in October, in which he ran against the veteran CSU politico
Franz-Josef Strauß, Schmidt increased both the vote share and number of Bundestag seats held by the SPD. The warning signs were there, however. The SPD’s moderate gains had been overshadowed by the FDP’s incredible 11 percent of the popular vote, shifting the balance of power in the coalition in the right and causing an immediate reaction in the SPD left. In 1972,
15% of Social Democrats indicated willingness to campaign for the party during the election- this number had shrunk to 8% by 1980.608 More than half of West Germans feared that the superpowers were about to initiate the Third World War, one in which they would be willing to use nuclear weapons.609 On the campaign trail the sixty-one year old Schmidt had been feverish and physically exhausted.610
The beginning of the West German anti-Pershing movement is usually taken to be shortly after the 1980 election, with the famous “Krefeld Appeal” that was issued in November
1980. This appeal, composed by former Bundeswehr General Gert Bastian, called on the federal government to end its support for NATO's Dual-Track Decision and sought to create a unified anti- nuclear missile movement. In its slogan that “Nuclear death threatens us all” (Der Atomtod bedroht uns alle) the Krefeld Appeal was also appealing to an international audience, although at first knowledge about it outside of Germany was limited. A simultaneous petition campaign was launched to collect signatures in order to force the government to reverse its pro-missile policies.
Over the following four-year period, more than five million Germans signed this petition, although a number of high-profile figures, including many social democrats, refused to sign the
608 Quoted in Steve Breyman, Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), pg.41 609 Spohr, The Global Chancellor, pg.112 610 Haeussler, Helmut Schmidt, pg.189 215 appeal for the perceived one-sidedness of its approach to the Cold War (there was no condemnation of the Soviet Union or mention of events in Afghanistan or Poland).611
The same month as the Krefel Appeal was launched, in the November 1980 Presidential elections in the United States, incumbent Jimmy Carter was defeated by the Republican and long-standing anti-communist Ronald Reagan. Reagan had, during his campaigning for the
Presidency, accused the Carter administration of letting the Soviet Union build up a massive superiority in conventional military strength. Once in power, the new President’s administration set about attempting to offset this supposed Soviet superiority via any means possible. One method of levelling the playing field involved getting the Europeans to “pay their fair share” in
NATO’s defense by increasing their military budgets. Another method would involve ensuring that the U.S. arsenal of nuclear missiles would be as larger, if not larger, than the Soviets’. Both of these methods would lead to an increase in tensions between Washington and the peoples of
Western Europe, tensions only flamed by Reagan’s famously flamboyant, at times even millenarian, rhetoric.612 The President, alongside key advisors such as Casper Weinberger and
Alexander Haig, soon became iconic figures in rallying and sustaining the West German peace movement.613
In public opinion polls, Reagan consistently was ranked the least popular post-1945 president by West German respondents.614 Peace movement activists who were questioned by media insisted that they were not anti-American, but rather, anti-Reagan. Dislike of Reagan did not come just from an opposition to the U.S. military buildup and stationing of nuclear weapons.
611 Frank Biess, German Angst, pg.315 612 See Thies, “Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe” 613 Benjamin Ziemann, “The Code of Protest: Images of Peace in the West German Peace Movements, 1945– 1999,” Contemporary European History, vol.17, no.2 (2008), pp.237-261, pg.249 614 Nehring, “A Transatlantic Security Crisis?”, pg.187 216
It was the President (and his advisors) rhetoric, which suggested a renewed U.S. assertiveness in the Cold War, that most worried West Germans.615 Peace movement publications did not only argue that widespread possession of nuclear weapons may accidentally lead to destruction. They also feared that the U.S. might deliberately initiate a nuclear attack in the hope of winning the
Third World War. One peace pamphlet stated that: "The new U.S. government under President
Reagan... wants to lead the U.S. toward control of the whole world, [and] is ready to use nuclear war, including in Europe, for this end.”616 Exaggeration was common. For example, Gunter
Gaus, a close friend of Willy Brandt, said in 1981 that: “If U.S. Pershing missiles were stationed in West Germany, although 50 percent of the West Germans do not agree to such an interpretation of the meaning of NATO, West Germany would become an American province in the meaning the term 'province' had in the Roman Empire.”617 The new President’s knowledge of the role nuclear weapons played in NATO diplomacy was also often questioned by his allies.
Former British defense minister Denis Healey even claimed that Reagan seemed to be ignorant
“of the most fundamental facts on which nuclear strategy must be based.”618
It was only after an Easter 1981 march in Brussels, during which over a hundred thousand
Europeans from a variety of countries protested the proposed missile deployments, that there was a marked coalescence and intensification of the peace movement. A protest had been planned for the NATO meeting in the city back in December 1979, but it had failed to gain much traction outside of Belgium. The protests of April 1981 were far more vibrant. Demonstrators marched through the center of Brussels and proceeded onwards to the NATO headquarters, where they
615 Claire Trean, “The Pacifist Tide in Europe: Not so much anti-American as anti-Reagan”, Le Monde, October 20, 1981 616 Mueller and Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement,” pg.81 617 Quoted in John Vinocur, “Anti-Americanism in West Germany Appears in Many Guises,” New York Times, July 05, 1981 618 Gassert, “Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration?”, pg.171 217 loudly proclaimed their call for a nuclear-weapons free Europe.619 The Brussels protest included many West Germans- indeed, the three largest groups of activists at the march were Belgians,
West Germans, and British citizens. The West German peace protests then returned home to the
Federal Republic and began to organize their own demonstrations and marches against nuclear missiles there.620
Before describing the subsequent events that occurred in the Federal Republic, let us take a moment to consider what exactly constituted the “West German peace movement” of this time.
The anti-missile protests that developed in early 1980s West Germany were the largest discussed in this dissertation, both in terms of pure size and in terms of diversity. Capturing the essence of the protests is difficult to do, as they were extremely decentralized. Much of the activism that occurred in the early 1980s, both inside and outside of the Federal Republic, differed from earlier periods of protest in that movement leaders stressed the need for “locally focused direct action” and “community based politics” and often ignored the party and national levels of decision making entirely. As Geoff Eley noted, this renewed focus on the local on the part of the left, represented a “crisis” for the practice of democratic socialism as usual. The effects of this change were very visible during the Pershing-II protests. Veteran Social Democrats- many of whom had participated in the SPD led Kampf dem Atomtod- demonized the unaffiliated citizens’ protests. In return, citizen activists accused the SPD of being undemocratic and battled attempts by the Party to corral or control the anti-Pershing movement. 621
619 Matthijs van der Beek, “Beyond Hollanditis: The Campaigns against the Cruise Missiles in the Benelux (1979- 1985),” Dutch crossing, vol.40, no. 1 (January 2016), pp.39-53, pg.45 620 Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace, pg.5 621 Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), pg.9-10/ 419 218
At the same time as they were being criticized by outsiders, the SPD leaders came under increasing pressure from within the ranks of their own party. The SPD was a fundamentally different party in 1980 than it had been in 1959, let alone 1950. During the SPD’s decade in power in the 1970s, a mass recruitment drive took place. This recruitment meant that students,
(many of them the most committed left-wing voices in the party) academics and white-collar workers now constituted two-thirds of all SPD members, outnumbering blue-collar workers. The new white-collar Party members were often anti-capitalist and even anti-American, in contrast to the more conservative SPD base.622 The fight against the stationing of the Pershing missiles grew increasingly popular among these new members, culminating in a revolt against the party leadership following the downfall of the Schmidt coalition.
Women played an increasingly visible role in the higher echelons of the peace movement.
The most famous female activist of the time- by some distance- was Petra Kelly. Kelly was a frequent target of conservative media outlets both inside and outside of West Germany. She was described by a 1982 piece by the Washington Report: as personifying: “the inextricable interconnection between U.S. and European “peaceniks.””623 Not only were more and more women leading the anti-missile movement of the 1980s, but the movement also deployed a gender analysis of the crisis. For example, at the blockade of a U.S. missile base in September
1983, Kelly held up a sign stating: “Father State Makes Mother Earth Kaput”.624 Young people also played a more visible role than ever before. 85 percent of the protesters in West Germany were under the age of 35, a far higher proportion than in other countries with large anti-INF movements, such as Britain or the Netherlands.625
622 Spohr, The Global Chancellor, pg.14 623 “The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Movement,” The Washington Report, June 1982 624 William Drozdiak, “West German Protesters Blockade U.S. Base,” Washington Post, September 2, 1983 625 Smith and Wertman, US-West European Relations, pg.62 219
Let us return to our chronological recounting of the protests. In spring 1981, as thirty-five percent of the West German population voiced “war” as their greatest fear (second place was
“illness with just nineteen percent) the vociferous anti-nuclear weapons movement began to have an influence on Schmidt.626 On May 17, 1981, the Chancellor berated left-wing protesters at an
SPD event in Wolfratshausen for failing to hold the USSR accountable for its role in the nuclear buildup.627 Around the same time, the cover of the popular West German magazine Stern showed an American nuclear missile the heart of a dove of peace and the Jusos rediscovered their radical voice, criticized the SPD national leadership for permitting ''Americanization'' of their party. The liberal Suddeutsche Zeitung, warned its readers that anti-Americanism was becoming an
“abominable fashion.”628 In June, at a Congress of the German Evangelical Church in Hamburg,
100,000 demonstrators protested the government’s nuclear weapons policy, having been encouraged to do so by Protestant Youth peace committees. When German Defense Minister
Hans Apfel arrived at the Congress he was booed by the assembled crowd.629 Demonstrations continued to gradually spread throughout West Germany. Nuclear missiles were not the only weapons being protested at the time; on August 29, in Pirmasens, a Palatinate town of 45,000 residents, 5,000 protesters marched against a local U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. The very same day, in West Berlin, 30,000 demonstrated against the neutron bomb and small group marched against the Pershing deployments in Bremen and Hanover. All of these protests were watched with suspicion by conservative news outlets in the United States.630
626 Biess, German Angst, pg.291 627 Spohr, The Global Chancellor, pg.123-4 628 For an overview of all of these events, see Vinocur, “Anti-Americanism in West Germany” 629 Trean, “The Pacifist Tide” 630 Jeffrey G. Barlow, “Moscow and the Peace Offensive,” The Backgrounder, (a Heritage Foundation publication), May 14, 1982 220
In September, 60,000 demonstrators came out to protest the visit of U.S. Secretary of
State Alexander Haig to West Berlin. Haig was a particularly disliked target of the protesters, due to his blithe statement that “there are things worse than war,” in which he was presumably referring to communist domination. New York Times columnist John Vinocur, on location in West
Berlin, noted that banners welcoming the U.S. official included “Haig the vulture, hang him higher,” and “Should the calves welcome their butcher?”631 Even if municipal authorities hurriedly informed the watching world that the protesters were just a small minority, it couldn’t be disguised that, “the Berliners who had hailed President John Kennedy 18 years ago, now stayed put in their homes.”632 Both of the ruling parties in the Social-Liberal coalition were embarrassed that their youth organizations played a leading role in the anti-Haig protests.633 That same month, a researcher for the (West German) Allensbach Institute for Opinion Research described a “wave of angst” sweeping through the country.634
By October 1981, an incredible 300,000 West Germans marched to Bonn to call for
“disarmament and détente in Europe.”635 Peace propaganda posters at the event showed the
Pershing and SS 20 missiles hanging “like the sword of Damocles” over the head of an innocent child.636 Another 200,000 marched in Brussels- the following month, 400,000 (!) activists took to the streets of Amsterdam. By this stage, fifty-nine percent of West Germans polled said that they felt in agreement with the anti- INF demonstrators.637 In 1982, the European Nuclear
Disarmament (END) campaign began. By this stage, many figures in the protest movement
631 John Vinocur, “Violence in Berlin Marks Haig’s Visit, New York Times, September 14, 1981 632 Trean, “The Pacifist Tide” 633 John Vinocur, “Ruling Parties’ Youth Wings Plan to Protest Haig’s West Berlin Visit”, New York Times, September 9, 1981 634 Brühöfener, “Politics of Emotions,” pg.97 635 Jarausch, After Hitler, pg.178 636 Benjamin Ziemann, Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007), pg.201 637 Smith and Wertman, US-West European Relations, pg.59 221 believed apocalypse to be just around the corner. “The destruction of mankind has begun,” argued Günter Grass.638 Belief that, unless the peace movement acted, destruction would be imminent, gave the marches against the Pershing-II deployments an almost millenarian quality.
Such fears were, as we shall see, judged to be irrational, even idiotic, by U.K. and U.S. representatives. They were, nonetheless, based in entirely rational concerns for the safety of both
Germany and the planet as a whole- it is not irrational to declare that a nuclear war and the subsequent fallout (in a literal sense) would make humanity’s continued existence problematic.
President Reagan visited West German in June 1982. Mortified West German officials
(West Berlin’s Mayor, Richard von Weizsäcker, had called on Berliners to welcome Reagan and not “forget their friends,”) could only watch as hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Bonn and West Berlin, marching against Reaganite and NATO policies. In the weeks preceding the visit, banners bearing anti-Reagan slogans, including the vintage “Ami go Home” suddenly seemed to adorn every rooftop and balcony in West Berlin. On the day of the visit itself, the peaceful protests of the day before had degenerated into pitched street battles that resulted in numerous injuries of both protesters and police.639 A total of half a million West
Germans marched in Bonn and West Berlin that month.640
The same month, arms control negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union finally began in Geneva, Switzerland. In July, the chief U.S. negotiator at Geneva, Nitze, took a well- publicized “walk in the woods” with his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky. During this walk,
Nitze proposed giving up on Pershing-II deployments (but keeping the cruise missile deployments) if in return the Soviets dismantled some, not all, of their SS-20s. The proposal was
638 Quoted in Pulzer, “Political Ideology,” pg.91 639 Carla MacDougall, ““We too are Berliners:” Protest, Symbolism and the City in Cold War Germany,” in Davis, MacDougall, Klimke & Mausbach (eds.), Changing the World, pp.83-104, pg.92-6 640 Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace, pg.5 222 not welcomed by many in Washington, but in any case, the Soviets themselves turned it down.
This was the closet that arms control talks would get to a satisfactory conclusion for many years.
The activists in the peace movement most committed to “violent pacifism” founded the
“Federal Conference of Independent Peace Groups” (“Bundeskonferenz unabhängiger
Friedensgruppen,” BUF) in 1982. Membership of the Federal Conference was mostly drawn from a number of anarchist and squatting groups and largely looked to commit acts of destroying property and offending mainstream society.641 In the most general sense, there was a greater willingness to destroy property and fight the police in West Germany than in the rest of Europe, reflecting the wider history of confrontation that we have tracked in the preceding chapters.642
On the first day of October 1982, a vote of no confidence forced Chancellor Schmidt from office and Helmut Kohl became West Germany’s first CDU Chancellor since Kurt-Georg
Kiesinger in the late 1960s. The Kohl government mostly continued the missile policy of the previous administration, as well as its Ostpolitik, with few major changes in either area. As Kohl himself said: “In questions of foreign policy, there were only the smallest of differences between
Helmut Schmidt and me.”643 Even in domestic politics, where some conservatives in Germany longed for a “spiritual-moral turn” against the changes wrought in society since 1968, Kohl’s government found itself unable to reverse most of the major reforms introduced by the social- liberal coalition, reforms which were now deeply embedded into West German society.644
Still, the change of personnel that the CDU victory brought with it saw the replacement of social democrats who, at least to some degree, believed that the Soviets wanted peace with men
641 See Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study, (London, UK: Longman, 1997), part 2 642 Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace, pg.188 643 Feldman, Foreign Policy of Reconciliation, pg.38 644 Jarausch, After Hitler, pg.178 223 like Alfred Dregger, Party Chairman of the CDU in the Bundestag. Dregger was a committed anti-communist who was convinced that the Soviet leadership wished to spread revolution around the world and was currently planning for a “blitzkrieg” in Western Europe. Kohl accused the “ungrateful” Germans of “disappointing” the U.S. people with their “anti-Americanism,” and saw the “political struggle over the missiles” as a “struggle for the soul of the alliance” itself.645
The obstinacy of such views only served to catalyze the peace movement, especially as more and more Social Democrats now felt empowered to take part in it.646
With Schmidt out of office (he remained on the backbenches of the Bundestag for another four years) and the right-wing of the Party chastened, the SPD were now free to adopt an unambiguous anti-missile platform. Brandt, Erhard Eppler (president of the German Evangelical
Church Assembly) and Oskar Lafontaine now led the fight against the new government’s policies.647 Eppler was the effective leader of the anti-nuclear wing of the SPD and a “bitter opponent” of Schmidt.648 Lafontaine was the young mayor of the city of Saarbrücken (1976-85), who had developed a national reputation through his outspoken speeches in opposition of the
Pershing-II deployments. In his speeches and proclamations, Lafontaine resuscitated the spirit of
Schumacher and Ollenhauer, and called for the SPD to “return to the principles that guided the party’s foreign policy in the 1950s.”649 To the consternation of the British and French
645 Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach and Marianne Zepp “Introduction: The Nuclear Crisis, NATO’s Double-Track Decision, and the Peace Movement of the 1980s,” in Christoph Becker-Schaum, Phillip Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach and Marianne Zepp. The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace, (New York: Berghahn, 2016), pp.1- 36, pg.6-7 646 Judith Michel, ““Die Angst kann lehren, sich zu wehren” – Der Angstdiskurs der westdeutschen Friedensbewegung in den 1980er Jahren,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, Vol.38, (2010), pp.246- 69, pg.264 647 Saskia Richter, “The Protagonists of the Peace Movement,” Becker-Schaum, Gassert, Klimke and Mausbach, The Nuclear Crisis, pp.189-206, pg.192 648 Rudolf Bahro, “The SPD and the Peace Movement,” New Left Review, vol.1, no.131 (Jan/Feb 1982), pp.20-31, pg.28 649 Quoted in Rosolowsky, West Germany's Foreign Policy, pg.13 224 governments, figures in the SPD such as Willy Brandt also began to call for the Anglo-French nuclear arsenals to be included in the wider INF negotiations, reviving the 1950s plans for a general European arms settlement.650
In the winter of 1982-83, attention in West Germany was increasingly focused on the small towns of rural Germany which were rumored to be the site of any future Pershing II deployment. For example, media outlets in Germany began to rumor that the Pershing missiles would be deployed somewhere near the town of Bitburg, nestled in the wooded Eifel hills, which was also home of the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing of the U.S. Air Force. Several hundred residents protested in Bitburg in November 1982, worrying the conservative Bitburg authorities, who feared that “outside agitators” would begin flocking to their rural idyll. Residents of small towns like Bitburg were worried that outsiders would protest the missile deployments too vigorously and upset the U.S. forces stationed there. These fears stemmed from the economic importance of the U.S. soldiers for the small German towns. Even protests that did take place in these places
“avoid[ed] direct anti-U.S. attacks” to “focus on the general horror of nuclear weapons.”651
In 1983, 9,327 demonstrations protesting nuclear weapons would take place in West
Germany.652 Despite this, however, and despite all of the marches and passions that the missile debate evoked, heading into the March 1983 Federal elections, the biggest issue for most people in the country was the poor state of the economy, with two and a half million West Germans unemployed, amounting to ten percent of the total workforce. The Greens, however, ran a campaign which focused almost solely on issues of nuclear weapons and international alliances.
This campaign included an “International Tribunal Against First-Strike and Mass-Destructive
650 Whitney to Washington, “INF: Congressional Research Service Report,” August 1983, FCO 33/6620 651 Bradley Graham, “Nuclear Missile Foes Quietly Zero in on West German Town,” The Washington Post, December 12, 1982 652 Biess, German Angst, pg.323 225
Weapons” in Nuremburg (the site of the post-Second World War Nazi war crimes trials) and a touring rock concert that crossed West Germany to raise awareness of a number of political issues. Just as millions of West Germans were shocked and offended by the Greens’ campaigning, millions more found their message to be convincing.653 In the event, the March elections were a victory for the Union, who increased both their number of seats and their percentage of the popular vote. The Green Party was also triumphant, their strong campaigning pushing them over the Bundestag vote threshold with five and a half percent of the popular vote.
However, this success weakened the Green movement in that it accelerated a growing conflict between the realists in the party, or Realos, and the more radical wing of the Greens, the Fundis.
Questions over whether, for example, the Party should accept or seek to overturn West
Germany’s NATO membership prevented the Green movement from mobilizing its full strength either inside or outside of the Bundestag (there was also a clash between green, red and brown
“Greens-” that is, ecological, socialist and conservative Greens. Membership in these groups by no means excluded membership in the others).654
In June 1983, a car carrying Vice President George Bush was pelted with rocks and rotten eggs by a small group of protesters, who had separated from a larger, peaceful demonstration occurring in Krefeld.655 The Vice President sat with Chancellor Kohl in a garage, besieged, whilst they waited for the protests outside to quieten down.656 That month, less than a third of
West Germans who were polled expressed “confidence in American leadership.”657 Genscher, still West German Foreign Minister, attempted to calm tensions (and also position himself as a
653 James M. Markham, “Germany’s Volatile Greens,” New York Times, Feb.13, 1983 654 Fulbrook, A History of Germany, pg.177 655 Robert C. Toth, “Crucial Deadlines Near for New NATO Missiles,” Los Angeles Times, 25 July 1983 656 Phillip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, To Build a Better World: Choices to End the Cold War and Create a Global Commonwealth (New York: Twelve, 2019), pg.129 657 Szabo, The Changing Politics of German Security, pg.51 226 flexible negotiator) by publicly calling for a resurrection of the “walk in the woods agreement.”
This did nothing to win over the protesters, whilst succeeding in upsetting figures in the U.S.
State Department, such as Richard R. Burt, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs.658
An even more upsetting event for U.S. policy makers came in August, when Green party politician Frank Schwalba-Hoth, a state legislator in the Hesse Parliament (Lantag), interrupted a reception presided by Lieutenant General Paul S. Williams, that had been arranged to honor U.S. troops in Hesse. Schwalba-Hoth procured half a pint of his own blood from inside his coat pocket, before pouring it onto the unfortunate General, shouting “Blood for the bloody army!” as he did so. The parliamentarian was then tackled by a U.S. officer and expelled from the event.
The Hesse Greens stood by the actions of Schwalba-Hoth, stating that he had acted to prevent:
“the preparation of a war in Central Europe through the stationing of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles.” The Green Party did state that the protest was not directed “against the American people, but against the insane armament of the American Government.” Other West German politicians were, however, mortified. Foreign Minister Genscher (1974-92), apologized to
Secretary of State George P. Shultz (1982-9) via telegram, humbly asserting that President
Reagan's firm commitment to disarmament “should put to shame those involved in this inexcusable and unworthy behavior.” The Social Democratic premier of North Rhine-Westphalia,
Johannes Rau stated that: “The behavior of Greens deputies toward American soldiers in the
Hesse legislature has made me and the great majority of the German deeply dismayed and ashamed,” and asked for “the pardon of those affected and of the American people.”659
658 See Burt’s comments and concerns in A. J. Hunter to P. J. Weston, “Federal German Policy on INF,” July 29, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 659 James M. Markham, “Bonn Contrite over Activist who Spilled Blood on General,” New York Times, August 5 1983 227
Protesters and media outlets began in late summer to refer to the fall of 1983 in West
Germany as a “hot Autumn”, given the intensity of anti-nuclear weapons activism predicted to occur during the season. Despite the massive protests that were soon to emerge however, the hot
Autumn got off to a relaxed start. A massive blockade of the U.S. military base at Mutlangen in early September, attended by Gunther Grass, Heinrich Boll, and Lafontaine, was conducted without incident and in a “very love-and-peace atmosphere.” The West German police, unwilling to make martyrs of the demonstrators, were happy to provide them with space, so long as things remained peaceful.660 An “anti-war day,” held on September 01 across the country also went peacefully, despite the vivid imagery employed on the day by groups such as the Jusos, who drew direct links between the nuclear and Nazi holocausts.661 The DGB organized a number of events, but none attracted more than 10,000 participants, in part because the federation explicitly ruled out the use of a general strike, dampening expectations before the events even began.662 In contrast to the quiet September, an overwhelming number of protesters took place in the demonstrations of October 1983. Across Europe as a whole, three million activists took to the streets. One million of these were in West Germany- 400,000 marched in Bonn and Hamburg,
250,000 in Stuttgart, 150,000 in Neu-Ulm and 100,000 in West Berlin. Neu Ulm, a small, peaceful town in Swabia, saw more demonstrators than West Berlin due to the missile base located there- a glimpse into the changing space of protest in 1980s West Germany.663
On December 10, 1983, “several thousand” activists demonstrated at Mutlangen base near Stuttgart, encircling it. One hundred protesters even managed to briefly break through the protective police cordon, but they were beaten back soon after. At the same time, in Frankfurt,
660 Claire Trean, “West Germany waits for a ‘Long Hot Autumn’”, Le Monde, September 11, 1983 661 For an example, see Biess, German Angst, pg.319 662 Jock Taylor, “Peace Movement Activities on 1 September,” September 2, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 663 Statistics taken from Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace, pg.6 228 one thousand protesters clashed with police “at the entrance to a US military installation where the demonstrators believed technicians made parts for the Pershings.” Movement leaders, admitted, however, that the low turnout at these protests was not just a result of the horrible
December weather, but also a general pessimism and loss of hope on the deployment issue.664
The siege of Mutlangen base continued into 1984, but the protesters were by now deeply unpopular with local residents, who resented the end of their rural idyll. By October 1984, a series of poorly attended demonstrations suggested that the life had well and truly gone out of the anti-missile movement. Despite Heinrich Böll’s insistence that: “The peace movement is not getting smaller, but is growing,” numbers told a different story. In Stuttgart, where organizers had predicted that between 40,000 to 70,000 activists would demonstrate, police estimated the crowd to be 20,000. In Hamburg, where 100,000 were expected, only 20,000 showed up, while in Bonn no more than 10,000 activists braved the atrocious weather. By this stage almost half of the Pershing missiles were now in place.665
In the end, it was negotiations between the superpowers that resulted in the dismantling of the Pershing-IIs. In an event that would have seemed unthinkable four years previous, the missiles were removed in 1987 by mutual agreement between all parties involved. The world had, in the meantime, not come to an end. Memories of the protests, meanwhile, remained long after the West German activists cause had failed, and the missile protests have become one of the defining features of post-war German history. Moreover, the West Germans had managed to grab, however, briefly, attention to their cause from around the world. Memories of the protests would thus remain in these countries, too. The following section explores how the epistemic
664 Anna Tomforde, “German Protesters Consider Strategy”, Boston Globe¸ December 11, 1983 665 Tyler Marshall, “Low Turnout Marks W. German Protest”, Los Angeles Times, October 21, 1984 229 community of U.K. and U.S. officials responded to the protests at every stage they occurred, to better understand the afterlives the protests left behind in both states.
The Reactions of U.K.-U.S. elites to the Anti-missile Protests
During the 1970s, the epistemic community of German experts in the U.K. and the U.S. continued to have an interest in ensuring that West German domestic matters remained stable and that the front line of the Cold War remained secure. Nonetheless, it was clear that the balance of power in Europe was shifting. U.K. foreign office officials in the 1970s watched with jealousy as the Federal Republic, seemingly immune from the economic crisis that swept through Western
Europe, played an increasingly important role in NATO. These officials speculated “whether in
American eyes the German lift going up may not sooner or later pass the British lift coming down.”666 Continued mistrust of German intentions fueled this jealousy- even the British
Ambassador in Bonn, Oliver Wright, remarked that: “Germany’s reliability as an ally was ‘less than complete’.”667 The British media were just as envious as the political establishment of
Germany’s relative rise. “Schmidt cannot lift a teacup in Bonn without saucers rattling in
Washington” cried the Times, “As Europe counts for more and more, Britain seems to count for less and less.”668
The social-liberal coalition government in the FRG was aware of West Germany’s changing status but did its best to keep both the U.K. and the U.S. closely tied to domestic
German affairs. Schmidt’s government wanted to ensure the backing of two powerful allies in a
666 Luca Ratti, Not-So-Special Relationship: The US, The UK and German Unification, 1945-1990 (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pg.143 667 Quoted in Lutsch, “The Zero Option,” pg.963 668 Quoted in Haeussler, Helmut Schmidt, pg.193 230 time during which domestic terrorism became a common occurrence in West Germany. In the words of Karrin Hanshew, the wily Chancellor “very deliberately cultivated a spirit of international cooperation in the area of domestic security.” Security experts (who can be considered members of our epistemic community) from West Germany, France, Britain, Sweden,
Italy, and the United States met annually in the West German town of Wiesbaden, where they collaborated on the best ways to fight organized crime, or terrorism. These meetings were important for normalizing West Germany’s reputation with its NATO allies (and Israel, who helped mold West German counter-terrorism forces) but they were also significant in that they kept these allies up to date with, and interested in, the domestic stability of the Federal
Republic.669
From the start, the debate over the Pershing-II missile deployments would be inseparable from matters of West German politics. U.S. officials felt from 1979 that the Pershing-II deployments were more for the purpose of keeping the West Germans happy than they were for defense: “I was personally never persuaded that we needed [the new INF] for military reasons. I was persuaded reluctantly that we needed [them] to obtain European support for SALT. This was largely because Chancellor Schmidt made such a big deal out of the so-called Eurostrategic imbalance.”670 The anti-nuclear weapons movement also had the indirect consequence of bringing both the U.K. and the FRG closer together despite these jealousies. Extensive demonstrations against nuclear weapons occurred in the U.K. as well as West Germany and both countries’ governments collaborated on the appropriate way to respond to them. For example, fold-out pamphlets distributed by the Bonn government explaining its nuclear weapons policy to
669 Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?”, pg.127 670 Quoted in Breyman, Why Movements Matter, pg.6 231 the protesters copied their contents directly from British government leaflets handed out in the
U.K. The West German government openly acknowledged this, claiming that they admired the
British leaflets’ “popular appeal and ease of reading.”671
Fears of an international anti-bomb coalition did not entirely match onto the realities on the street. Despite Petra Kelly’s claim that she “fought for hope”, with colleagues in the U.S., actual contact between the German and U.S. peace movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s was sporadic. At the end of 1981, a European delegation did attend a conference in the U.S. organized by the nuclear FREEZE campaign. This conference, however, failed to excite much passion, with U.S. peace activist Ed Glennon referring to it as “unfocused [and] uninteresting.”672 West German women took part in numerous protests overseas, including the anti-cruise missile “Women’s Peace Camp” formed at the RAF base in Greenham Common in
Berkshire, U.K.673 In the spring of 1982, eleven European peace activists, including representatives from West Germany, toured fifty-two cities in the U.S., where they addressed crowds and demonstrations and alerted them to the protests occurring in Europe.674
In 1983, an international “fast for life” protesting nuclear missiles took place simultaneously in the U.S., Canada, France and West Germany, featuring activists from all four countries. The motley group opposed all nuclear weapons, including the U.K’s Trident system and toured from embassy trying to gain attention for their cause whilst starving.675 International anti-nuclear weapons activism was made difficult by the variety of national nuclear weapons
671 Alyson J.K. Bailes to M.A. Pakenham, “FRG Information Campaign on INF,” August 26, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 672 Glennon quoted in Nehring, “A Transatlantic Security Crisis?”, pg.193-4. Petra Kelly quote found on pg.199 673 David K. Willis, “The women who worry Mrs. Thatcher,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 20, 1983 674 Nehring, “A Transatlantic Security Crisis?”, pg.196 675 T. T. Macan to H. H. Tucker, “The “Fast for Life” Anti-nuclear Movement,” September 01 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 232 policies. To argue against nuclear weapons in France or the U.K., countries with their own nuclear arsenals, was a different issue than in West Germany, which lacked a nuclear arsenal of its own.676 In the face of problems like these, West German activists continued to stress their strong links to the U.S. peace movement and, in doing so, claim that they were “with America against America.”677
At a Protestant church synod, held in Hamburg in June 1981, the former SPD mayor of
West Berlin Heinrich Albertz, now a Protestant pastor, made a contentious statement. He noted that, since 1945, “Germany” had been and remained “an occupied country”. He thus directly argued against the statements of the government and the SPD leadership that the Federal
Republic was an equal partner of its NATO allies.678 Albertz had by this stage turned away from his previous opposition to activism and now embraced/ played a leading role in the peace movement.
In a July 1981 column for the New York Times, John Vinocur attempted to understand the
“anti-Americanism” sweeping through West Germany. “The tag-words” he wrote, “run together and blur - pacifism, neutralism, anti-Americanism; the definitions and explanations often collide.
But even so, something seems to be there.” Mentioning Max Weber, Vinocur spoke of a long history, “the notion that Germany is a special entity between East and West has been more of a constant in German thought of the past 150 years than any special admiration for or spiritual relationship with the United States.” This history was being resurfaced in the anti-missile movement: “Although it was Mr. Schmidt who pressed Washington to make the original missile
676 For a sense of these different national contexts, see Andrew J. Rotter, Hiroshima: The World's Bomb, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), pg.301-2 677 Nehring, “A Transatlantic Security Crisis?” pg.186 678 Nehring, “A Transatlantic Security Crisis?”, pg.186 233 decision, a fact generally disregarded in the debate, the demonstrators and peace-marchers see the proposed missiles as an American attempt to ‘Europeanize’ a possible nuclear war with
Moscow. The issue has been discussed from many angles… Each turn has produced new suggestions that the United States is warlike and without integrity.” Vinocur concluded by warning: “Most American diplomats in Bonn believe that the missile controversy and the anti-
American tone are issues West Germans must resolve themselves… if the distrust is permitted to fester, the reaction in Washington could be a new kind of American isolationism… The next time anyone has to be rescued in Europe… the Americans may not be available to do it.”679
By the time of the Haig visit in September 1981, West German officials were growing increasingly worried that the “anti-American” rhetoric and symbology of the protests in the
Federal Republic would be noted and condemned in the U.S. “I hope Americans won't overrate the significance of the demonstration [against Haig],” an adviser to Chancellor Schmidt told John
Vinocur. He then added, “As a private citizen, I am terribly embarrassed by it.”680 Certainly, Haig seemed unperturbed, defending the demonstrators’ right to protest in a speech and calling his reception “the warmest [one] I’ve received.”681
Despite the wishes of nervous officials, the protests continued to make waves across the
Atlantic, where they found more worried audiences than the Secretary of State. Writing in the
Boston Globe in the same month as the Haig protests, Harvard political scientist Stanley
Hoffmann attempted to categorize and define the protest movement. Hoffmann concluded that the movement against the Pershing deployment was “above all, a kind of revolt of young people against the “politics as usual” of their elders, a kind of generational revolt, as in 1968.” Despite
679 Vinocur, “Anti-Americanism in West Germany” 680 Quoted in Vinocur, "Haig’s West Berlin Visit" 681 Vinocur, “Violence in Berlin” 234 the nuance of his analysis, Hoffmann himself patronized the German protesters, in much the same way as government officials were doing. He noted that Europeans’ “sophistication in the theology of US-Soviet strategic doctrines is limited,” leading them to excitable and over- emotional reactions on nuclear issues. For Hoffmann, the Germans were particularly emotional, even to the extent of “political delusion,” as they searched to “find a new identity”. By describing the German protests as such, Hoffmann shifted the issue from nuclear weapons and onto the Germans’ soul-searching following their Nazi past.682
British diplomat ADS Goodall lunched together with Eppler, who he had known since the
1960s, and referred to as “a leading figure in the peace movement,” on December 3, 1981. At the lunch, Eppler decried Schmidt and Wehner as being out of touch and spoke of the “profound transformation” that the peace movement was driving in the SPD. The greatest success of the peace movement was in “put[ing] pressure on the Chancellor,” who in turn “put pressure on the
Americans” to change their nuclear weapons policy. “President Reagan’s 18 November speech” said Eppler, “would never have been made if the Americans had not come to realize that the peace movement had to be taken seriously.” In other words, Eppler was claiming that the peace movement in Germany was directly shaping U.S. policy at the executive level.683 “I get the impression that many politicians live in a world that no longer exists,” argued Eppler in 1982.684
Eppler may have believed that the U.S. officials were taking the peace movement
“seriously,” but statements taken from these officials themselves suggests otherwise. Richard
Perle was a key advisor to Ronald Reagan, serving as the President’s Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. Looking back at the events of early 1980s, Perle later
682 Hoffmann, “Pacifism gains Clout” 683 ADS Goodall, “Talk with Erhard Eppler,” December 9 1981, FCO 33/4832, TNA 684 Quoted in Pulzer, “Political Ideology,” pg.89 235 commented that the Germans were “deeply neurotic on security issues.”685 In 1989 he remembered that: “During the INF negotiations the Germans were a source of constant pressure.
At NATO meetings you couldn't get past the “Guten morgen” before they would urge the abandonment of one NATO position or another.”686 For Perle the West German fears and obstructive actions were not rational but emotional and, above all, an annoyance. They got in the way of the more “serious” negotiation process that was occurring between U.S. and Soviet representatives. The West Germans, in other words, were for Perle little more than ungrateful and fearful children.
He was not alone in holding such views. Indeed, Perle’s direct superior, Caspar
Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense (1981-7) had no desire to listen to any European opposition which disagreed with his plans to “defeat” the Soviet Union. Weinberger saw the
European governments as having a duty to convince, or at least quieten, their dissenting populations. Even figures in the U.S. who were sympathetic towards the aims of the anti-missile protesters could adopt a patronizing attitude towards the West Germans. “We fought World War I in Europe, we fought World War II in Europe, and if you dummies let us, we'll fight World War
III in Europe,” said pacifist U.S. Rear Admiral Gene La Roque.687
Officials were more willing than ever, in the time of the Euromissile protests, to appropriate the language and concerns of the protesters. In June 1982, President Reagan, asked about opposition to nuclear weapons on French television, described himself as the leader of the
U.S. nuclear freeze movement, despite the animosity that the freeze movement’s actual leaders, as well as members, felt towards his policies. This point was made apparent when, less than a
685 Ziemann, “German Angst?” pg.116 686 Richard Perle, “Don’t Let Germany Run the Alliance,” The Washington Post, May 28, 1989 687 Quoted in Gwyn Kirk, “Why Women?” Social Justice, vol.46, no.1 (2019), pp.23-36, pg.24 236 week later, one million people would take to the streets of New York City to explicitly opposed the Reaganite arms buildup.688 The same month, before the Bundestag in Bonn, the President went further. “To those who march for peace, my heart is with you. I would be at the head of your parade if I believed marching alone could bring about a more secure world,” he patronizingly addressed the West German activists. In particular, he reached out “to the 2,800 women in Filderstadt” who had signed an arms control petition- never fear, he told them, “I understand your genuine concerns. The women of Filderstadt and I share the same goal. The question is how to proceed. We must think through the consequences of how we reduce the dangers to peace.”689
Writing in his memoire, General Edward Rowny, U.S. Ambassador at the Geneva arms control negotiations, directly attributed Nitze’s famous “walk in the woods” to the pressures built up by the West German peace movement. Rowny described the situation thus: “Paul Nitze, our chief negotiator of INF, believed that Kohl could not overcome the pressures against deployment.
Nitze felt that if the [CDU] accepted missiles on German soil it would fail to win the elections.
This, he believed, would seriously jeopardize the future of NATO. As a result, Nitze took his celebrated “walk in the woods” with Yuli Kvitsinsky.” For Rowny, the walk in the woods proposals would have been a disaster for the U.S., and so he reflected bitterly that: “Nitze’s lack of faith in the steadfastness and will of the German people almost cost us dearly.”690 Whilst accusing Nitze’s policy of being entirely based around public opinion is unfair, the Ambassador
688 Meyer, “Framing National Security”, pg.173 689 Reagan, Public Papers, pg.757 690 Edward Rowny, It Takes One to Tango, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992), pg.156 237 did inform the British Secretary of State, Geoffrey Howe, in 1983, that considerations of public opinion and news headlines did shape his negotiating strategy.691
Margret Thatcher spoke of Chancellor Kohl and herself enjoying a “true meeting of minds,” with the latter expressing that his coming to power in West Germany had created ''a great feeling for cooperation'' between the U.K. and the FRG.692 Nonetheless, the British establishment continued to see the German government through the lens with which it judged the majority of the population. Note, for instance, the observation of S. W. J. Fuller of the U. K’s Department of
Defense in the summer of 1983 that: “we need to keep the Germans (by which he meant the West
German government) calm. Their public position has been erratic in recent weeks.” The German government, in particular Genscher, had for Fuller been guilty of “serious wobbles” in recent pronouncements that threatened to “rebound in the public debate” thanks to “significant media interest,” all of which provided the Soviet Union with a “propaganda meal.”693
James M. Markham, a New York Times foreign correspondent based in Europe, covered the buildup to the 1983 elections in a way that belittled and demeaned the Green movement.
Markham referred to the Greens as “a mercurial coalition of young environmentalists, antinuclear pacifists, feminists and retreaded Marxist-Leninists,” the adjective mercurial suggesting that the Green coalition was a fickle one. “If the Greens had their way,” wrote
Markham, “the defense of West Germany, which today is the Continental cornerstone of the alliance, would be left to small-scale civilian guerilla units,” a similar to the situation to that described at the beginning of the following years Hollywood hit Red Dawn. The reason that the
691 “Call on the Secretary of State by Ambassador Paul Nitze, U.S. INF Negotiator,” July 07, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 692 Alexander MacLeod, “Thatcher, Kohl, see Eye to Eye,” The Christian Science Monitor, November 02, 1982 693 S. W. J. Fuller, “INF: Secretary of State’s Meeting with FRG and Italian Foreign Ministers,” August 26, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 238
“longhaired, punkish” Greens had found such success, said Markham, was that Germans had a
“weak sense of national identity” and were desperately searching for a new identity. Not, in other words, due to legitimate concerns with NATO’s defense strategy or the degradation of the environment. Markham ignored the anti-communist bent in the Green movement and instead accused it of placing “the United States in the role of the aggressor in the arms race and the
Soviet Union as a passive, almost benign force whose main sin is being plodding and bureaucratic.” He concluded that the driving ambition of the Greens was to “shake off American tutelage” in the FRG. Markham’s coverage of the movement was misleading, but would have reached a wide audience through the New York Times, an audience that would have included many elite-level decision makers in the U.S.694
The results of the election, with Chancellor Kohl confirmed as West Germany’s leader, were welcomed in London and Washington. “Our view since the German elections on 6 March has been that the Federal Government are determined to go through with INF stationing,” wrote
Jock Taylor, the U.K. Ambassador to the FRG (1981-4). However, he did worry that the German government would publicly appear to give concessions to the protesters in order to ease their activism. This was also a concern of the U.S. Embassy, who told the British that they “have real cause for concern about how far the Germans will go in their public efforts to demonstrate flexibility.” Overall, Taylor concluded that there would be “a number” of “violent incidents” in the coming months but believed “that they will stop well short of a serious breakdown in public order.” The only thing to fear continued to be “wobbliness” on the part of the Federal German government.695
694 Markham, “Germany’s Volatile Greens” 695 Jock Taylor, “German views on INF,” August 11, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 239
By the time Ambassador Taylor was writing, a violent incident had already occurred- namely, the assault upon Vice President Bush’s car in Krefeld. Reflecting on the incident, Bush was surprised that the protesters were able to get so close. “Our secret service would have shot them!” he exclaimed. Nonetheless, for Bush the protests were also a sign of the strength of West
German democracy. He country, said Bush, had done “penance” for its sins in the Second World
War, “at some point you should let a guy up.”696 Other officials were, however, more pessimistic about the situation in the FRG. “If the stoning of Bush’s car in Krefeld was any sign, we could see blood in the streets before it’s over,” said one White House aide in July 1983.697 One U.S. embassy official confided in his British friend that, whilst the majority of U.S. elites were keeping a cool head, “the dominant voices in Washington are increasingly those of the security policy professionals like Burt or Perle, who have little understanding of German domestic political considerations.” Interestingly, for this official, the President would be understanding of the true nature of events, if only he could get away from his “technocratic advisors.”698
That same month, Richard R. Burt addressed a meeting of NATO’s Special Consultative
Group on Arms Control. The majority of the meeting was taken up by discussion of the latest trends in public opinion. Burt spoke of the positive progress made toward missile deployment but issued a warning. “Any call to defer implementation of the modernization program, for which the Allies had to expect the Russians to press hard” he lectured, “should be rejected.
NATO could not allow its public opinion to be seduced in this way” as “there was a risk of the
1979 decision being dismembered.” Note the focus on seduction as opposed to earlier themes of subversion and violence. The West German, Belgian, Dutch, U.K., Greek and Norwegian
696 Zelikow and Rice, To Build a Better World, pg.129 697 Interviewed in Toth, “Crucial Deadlines” 698 See A. J. Hunter to P. J. Weston, “Federal German Policy on INF,” July 29, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 240 notables at the meeting all admitted to “increasing political difficulties” within their countries, but their solution was simply to “convince… public opinion” that NATO was “serious” about its plans, something that the protesters would have no doubt already been aware of. Burt then argued that an “anxious” public should be kept focused on the “broad points” of NATO strategy so as not to be “distract[ed]” by Soviet overtures. The British representative, Cartledge, called for all of the countries present to “coordinate their public lines” so as to better win hearts and minds.
He spoke of Britain’s own success in combating the Greenham Common protesters, for which he drew a congratulation from Burt. All men present agreed that whilst the summer had been quiet, a storm was coming in Autumn.699
There was a belief amongst the epistemic community by this stage of the protests, that the best way to deal with the activists was not to ignore them entirely, but to present a sympathetic ear to their concern and then quietly sideline their requests. This was the day, for example, that the British embassy in Bonn reacted to the 1983 “fast for life,” which, as discussed earlier, was an international movement with a branch in Bonn. In their report on the fasters, one official described them as failures, noting that: “their considerable efforts to gain publicity for their cause have had rather modest results.” The official described the activist’s “discomfort” with the
Embassy’s refusal to negotiate with them but they also stated: “It seems to us important that we should not be accused of refusing to engage in dialogue with these people: to do so would be to make a public relations rod for our own back… only if these modest visits turn into substantive demonstrations… shall we decline to enter into negotiations, and, if necessary, ask the police to take appropriate action.” The British Embassy was clearly not concerned with the efforts of the
699 “U.K.’s Summary Record of the Meeting of NATO’s Special Consultative Group (On INF Arms Control), Brussels, July 26, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 241 fasters, despite their sacrifices. Interesting as well was the ease with which this official felt they could contact the West German police and gain support if it was needed.700
In September 1983, U.S. Major Anthony Moravola, the soldier responsible for public relations at the United States base at Mutlangen, refused to be drawn into whether demonstrations were due to increase at the base during the “hot Autumn” that had been prophesized. Mutlangen had already enjoyed a brief, peaceful, siege in early September and the
West German protesters had now become familiar neighbors to the soldiers on base. Despite the importance of his role in liaising with the media, Moravola came across as bored during a conversation with Claire Trean of Le Monde, even chewing gum whilst Claire asked her questions. In “any case,” said Moravola, the demonstrations were none of his concern as “West
German police are the only body responsible for what happens outside the base. If we have to come out, we’ll come out.” The Major’s attitude is indicative of a U.S. military that, in learning the lessons of the 1960s, was now content to ignore the clamoring of West German protesters occurring outside of their bases and barracks.701
U.K. ambassador Taylor wrote that the protesters had been so committed to not antagonizing the police that they had even damaged their cause. He noted “the effort the peace movement’s organizers have been making in recent weeks to advertise and prove their non- violent intent,” which came “at the cost of somewhat neglecting the substance of their cause.”
Nonetheless, he did strike a slightly cautious note: “Only a fraction of the peace movement’s potential resources were deployed and any deductions about larger demonstrations later this autumn would be premature.”702
700 T. T. Macan to H. H. Tucker, “The “Fast for Life” Anti-nuclear Movement,” September 01 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 701 Trean, “West Germany waits” 702 Jock Taylor, “Peace Movement Activities on 1 September,” September 2, 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 242
Following the conclusion of the “Hot Autumn,” Many NATO officials celebrated the eventual deployment of the Pershing-IIs as a victory over the peace movement. The U.S. ambassador to NATO, who saw the struggle against the protests in military terms and spoke of
“the final battle of the Cold War”, stated, for example, that the battle “was won in 1983, when
NATO stayed together on INF deployment.”703 Nonetheless, this victory had come at a cost, and in many ways the final deployment of the Pershing missiles did not occur in the way planned back in 1979. For example, a third of the Pershing-II missiles were, originally, meant to be constantly travelling throughout the Federal Republic, in order that they couldn’t be targeted by the enemy. West German public opposition forced this idea to be abandoned, making the
Pershing-IIs “sitting ducks” in the event of a Soviet first strike. As NATO discounted a first strike of its own, this effectively made the missiles worthless.704
Changes in the global balance of power, in particular the rise of Japanese economic might, also played a part in how U.S. policy makers viewed the Germans. In early 1984,
Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Under Secretary of State, accused the Europeans of being selfish,
“consumed by their own problems,” and threatened that “the center of gravity of American foreign policy [is shifting] from the transatlantic relationship toward the pacific basin and particularly Japan.”705 Younger officials in the U.S. hierarchy no longer saw Germany the significant front in the Cold War, but rather, “one of many areas of potential danger and conflict” around the world.706 The President, perhaps with memory of the failure of Barry Goldwater’s aggressive 1964 campaign for the Presidency lingering his mind, markedly relaxed his rhetoric
703 Smith and Wertman, US-West European Relations, pg.51 704 Yost, “NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy”, pg.252 705 Smith, “Missile Deployments,” pg.667 706 David Gress, Peace and Survival: West Germany, The Peace Movement and European Security, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), pg.162 243 regarding nuclear weapons in 1984, also a Presidential election year in the United States. Reagan memorized and repeated the phrase, "nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought," and, in his 1984 State of the Union address, expressed his goal of abolishing nuclear weapons altogether.707
The CIA paid close attention to trends in the West German media, in particular what agency memoranda referred to as “leftist media,” to the extent that officials even created a secret research paper on the topic. Whilst the paper was published in April 1984, it dealt with events in
Germany stretching as far back as the 1960s in its analysis. The overall conclusion the CIA reached was pessimistic, with the paper stating that: “The pro-American media in West Germany will remain hard pressed to counter the flamboyant leftist press” and that “The United States, in our opinion, faces formidable obstacles in trying to improve its image with leftist West German journalists.” In particular, the CIA felt that coverage of the nuclear weapons protest had been one-sided against the U.S. and had encouraged pro-Soviet, anti-NATO sentiment; “The leftist media... have accorded wide-ranging coverage to the German peace movement and its mass antimissile rallies and protests at U.S. military installations… leftist media criticism of NATO policy almost certainly has helped break the West German consensus on security policy, which has lasted for more than two decades.”708 The CIA report promoted the idea that West Germans were uneducated about important foreign policy issues and were easily led by the mischievous media. “We believe,” noted the report, “that the West German media mold public opinion primarily in the foreign policy area, where the public has little expertise [and where] judgments are based almost exclusively on news reports.” This area of public ignorance included the
707 Meyer, “Framing National Security,” pg.183 708 CIA Report, West Germany: The Role and Influence of the Media, April 1984, Secret/NOFORN 244 nuclear weapons issue.
Conclusion
For reasons as varied as alliance politics, security concerns and Cold War strategy, in the early
1980s, the U.K., U.S. and West German governments were all committed to the goal of deploying Pershing-II intermediate range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic. Hundreds of thousands of West German protesters, fearful of losing their lives in a nuclear conflagration, were just as determined to prevent the missile deployments from occurring. In the pitched battles in the cities and countryside of West Germany that subsequently occurred, the protesters failed to prevent the missile deployments. They succeeded, however, in convincing U.K. and U.S. policy elites of the genuine and deeply held commitment of “the Germans” to peace. Unlike in the
1950s, or even to an extent in 1968, the epistemic community of German experts had not feared a revolution breaking out in the FRG. There was little talk of communist subversion, even though discussion of the latest Soviet propaganda campaigns was frequent. Few officials by this stage, however, feared that the Germans would launch a violent campaign to overthrow the government. Rather, the Soviet propaganda was an annoyance, which, whilst it certainly made the missile deployments more difficult, did not threaten the core of NATO’s position in the
Federal Republic.
Germany itself was not the central battleground of the Cold War, as it had been in 1961, and even to an extent in 1968. Now it was just one of numerous hot spots, and the West German protesters were considered just one of many rebellious forces opposing NATO policy around the world. One way to track this development is to note the frequency with which West German activists were now subsumed in a more general category of “European” in the reporting of the
245 epistemic community, alongside the Dutch, Belgians and French. It was not necessarily German pacifism that men such as Perle, Weinberger complained about, but rather “European pacifism”.
The Germans had lost their particular importance, a trend accelerated by the increasingly transnational nature of the missile protests, with European travelling to their neighbors to participate in marches and demonstrations. In the reports of U.K. officials this development was- for the obvious geographical reasons- less pronounced. Nonetheless, even here British officials tended to talk of the French and West Germans in the same breadth, whilst tying their own position closer to that of the U.S, and as we have seen above, U.K.-U.S. collaboration on
German issues remained extensive.
There was an awareness that the protests occurring in West German exceeded those elsewhere in size and intensity, especially by 1983. In this year, the epistemic community did worry about “German wobbliness” and the need to “steady the Germans’ nerve” as the date for the missile deployments approached.709 1983 was also, as we have seen, an election year, and the specter of a “Green wave” in the Bundestag was worrying. This created, however, a strong sense of togetherness with the conservative German government. There was a sense, in the conversations between Washington, London and Bonn of a joint effort of manning the walls in solidarity to defeat the upcoming tide of protest. This allowed the community to celebrate the
“victory” of the Pershing deployments alongside the West German government. Members of the epistemic community would continue to bemoan anti-U.S. statements in the West German media for the rest of the decade, but this was very different from fearing that the West German government would launch an invasion eastward. The epistemic community had shelved its
“nightmare” scenario for good.
709 U.K. Defence Department to Moscow, Washington, NATO, and Bonn, “INF: US Negotiating Position,” August 1983, FCO 33/6620, TNA 246
Conclusion
An Ever-Changing Identity: Images of Germany and the Germans in the Twenty-First
Century
“"Germans need a crisis to get their juices flowing. They have an incredible need to stay strong and keep stable.”
- U.S. Executive in Berlin, 2011710
Time and again during the Cold War, strategies designed by U.K. and U.S. officials to win the conflict were opposed not only by citizens in both countries, but also by millions of West
Germans. West German activism was at first surprising, then expected for the epistemic community of German experts who job it was to monitor public opinion in the Federal Republic.
Most U.K. and U.S. figures who followed the West German domestic scene took a dim view of the protests, which they saw as obstacles to their governments’ plans. Such views were encouraged by a succession of West German governments, who looked for U.K. and U.S. support in stabilizing their domestic positions. Nonetheless, whereas in the 1950s many officials in the epistemic community warned their governments that the West German protesters posed an acute security threat, by the 1980s it was common to speak of the activists as being a mere nuisance, who would be sympathetic if not for their perceived ignorance. This change was due to a number of changes in the protest movements themselves. These including a changing demographic in members of the social movements, which contrasted with the fixed demographic of the white, male, epistemic community. The changing membership of the protest movements
710 Robert Marquand, “Germany – the new mini-superpower,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 01, 2011 247 occurred alongside a change in the ways protests were conducted, in the messages the protests carried and in the space in which the protests operated.
Not only did officials in the epistemic community change the way in which they discussed West German protest movements, they also changed the ways they discussed the
German people as a collective. During the 1950s, at the same time as the epistemic community considered the anti-rearmament and anti-nuclear weapons activists in West Germany to be communist subversives, they speculated that the German people as a whole “hadn’t changed” and retained the “authoritarian character” and “militarist tendencies” which were supposedly national traits. The common wisdom than became that the Germans were “scared” and that their fears made them into apathetic and untrustworthy allies. By the 1980s, as the West German protest movements were referred to in increasingly benign terms, the German image had also softened. The epistemic community pointed out how the Germans were committed to peace, but now also referred to them as “insecure,” naïve and “wobbly” on important security issues. The
Germans were still an annoyance to NATO’s Cold War doyens, but for different reasons than they had been. The idea of a German military resurgence fell out of fashion- rather, officials bemoaned the fact the Germans did not seem to consider military issues much at all.
This transformation in the reputation of the Germans would not have occurred without
West Germany’s spectacular Cold War-era social movements. Everyday German citizens, taking to the streets in their millions, managed to grab attention from the U.K. and U.S. epistemic community and refashion perceptions of their country in both countries. Hundreds of U.K. and
U.S. elites were stationed with their countries’ diplomatic services in West Germany already, where they only had to look outside of a consulate window to see the thousands of protesters in the streets below. Other members of the epistemic community journey hundreds of miles to West
248
Germany to be there in person, where they spoke to and about protesters and their activities.
Whatever the source of their findings, members of the epistemic community would then communicate them to their respective governments. views that would be relayed back by officials to the national capitals. Ordinary German protesters had their voices amplified through the existence of these intermediaries.
The changing reputations of the German protester and the German citizen did not occur in a smooth or linear fashion. European and North American public opinion also continued to conflate German identity with Nazism and militarism long after the epistemic community ceased doing so. In the 1970s, for example, covering the West German state’s response to domestic terrorism, the French, U.K. and U.S. medias all raised dramatic claims of a return of “fascism” to
Germany, openly doubting whether the German people had moved on from their “authoritarian” past.711 Fans of the English national football team continued to sign provocative songs about the
Germans’ Nazi past into the 1990s, whilst a German accent in a Hollywood film was invariably a stamp of villainy at least up until the time of the 1988 action hit Die Hard. Nonetheless, there was no particular public surprise or sense of betrayal in either country when the German government refused to send a contribution to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq- this stands in contrast to the reputation of the French “surrender monkeys,” who became symbols of ridicule in both the
U.K. and the U.S.712
Were this dissertation written in 2005, it could comfortably end here, having taken us through an examination of the Germans’ changing reputation from militarists to pacifists.
However, in the intervening years between the Iraq War and 2021, much has happened to once
711 Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?”, pg.136 712 See Chris Patten, Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain, and Europe in a New Century, (New York: Henry Holt, 2006) 249 more shift the reputation of the Germans abroad. Just as with the events described in the dissertation above, German activists and the German government have been the forces most responsible for this shift. Germany’s first female Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was elected the countries leader in 2005 and has since proven to be a giant of politics in the twenty-first century.
Merkel’s political dominance at home and her impressive reputation outside of the country challenges the very existence of the traditional masculine vs. feminine dichotomy that I described above, where the female presence in the protest movement lessened the degree to which it was taken seriously. The gulf between Merkel, who is not afraid to wield German power when she deems it necessary to do so, and the “women of Filderstadt” to whom President
Reagan once appealed to, is wide indeed.
Germany’s strict leadership in the Eurozone crisis, during which the German government and the European Central Bank in Frankfurt imposed fierce austerity measures on its European neighbors, resurrected the old image of the stern-faced, imperialist German lording over the smaller countries of Europe. During a visit of Chancellor Merkel to Athens, the swastika was paraded around and burnt, alongside effigies of the Chancellor, dressed in the regalia of an
Oberführer and often sporting a small moustache.713 A couple of years later, during the European refugee crisis, Merkel’s government was seen as too liberal by many Germans for its open-doors, welcoming policy. The subsequent rise of nativists, right-wing street protests has been a reminder to countries around the world that German nationalism is by no means a spent force. The epistemic community of U.K. and U.S. German experts continues to exist in the Federal
Republic, although the cooperation between both countries on German affairs is not what it once
713 Noah Barkin and Harry Papachristou, “Greek police clash with protesters during Merkel visit,” October 09, 2012, accessed on the Reuters website, (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-merkel/greek-police-clash- with-protesters-during-merkel-visit-idUSBRE8980BV20121009), on 12.28.2020 250 was before 1989. Doubtless, however, hundreds of emails continue to be sent each week around interested audiences discussing the latest developments within the FRG and advising the Johnson and Biden administrations how best to respond to them.
Going forward, then, into the future, the patterns that are discussed in this dissertation will continue. Ordinary Germans, for a variety of motives, will continue to come out on the streets of their cities, towns and villages to march for or against issues important to them. In doing so they will continue to have the power to convince onlookers what it means to be German in the twenty first century. Now, however, the plethora of news sources available to people around the world via the internet makes it possible for these people to draw sophisticated conclusions regarding events in Germany without needing the medium of the epistemic community at all. German experts these days face an increasingly difficult task in earning and keeping an audience, and have an ever smaller chance of altering governmental policy, especially when faced with administrations that openly disavow experts, such as that of U.S. President
Donald Trump (2017-21). It remains to be seen how the epistemic community will reinvent itself to face this challenge. In the meantime, the protests in Germany will continue as the
Bewegungsgemeinschaft continues to meet and address new challenges, just as it has every decade since 1949.
251
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