XXXIX ICMH CONGRESS, TORINO, 2013

“JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF WARFARE”

ABSTRACT

Prof. Dimitar MINCHEV () Bulgarian Artillery in Support of Infantry during WWI

At the beginning of WWI in 1914 the Bulgarian Government contemplated Bulgarian intervention in order to continue what it saw as its liberation mission in Macedonia. However, the country was still exhausted by the , so neutrality was the most acceptable idea. The next year, on October 1, 1915, Bulgaria entered in the war on the side of the Central Powers.1 The Bulgarians would fight three main campaigns: = attacking into Serbia in 1915, = attacking into Romania in 1916, = and holding a line against Entente forces based at Salonika, Greece, from 1915 through 1918. At the time of the mobilization in 1915 three field armies were formed, concentrated as follows: 1st Army at the Northwest Bulgarian border for offense against the Serbian army in the Nish region; 2nd Army at the Southwest border to advance against the Serbian army in Macedonia; 3rd Army at the Dobrudzjan border, to deter and observe the Romanian army. The strategic reserve consisted of four divisions – 2nd, 10th, 11th, and 12th.

The Campaign Against Serbia

Serbian army deployed defensively while expecting support from the Allies, who had landed troops at Salonika. It concentrated 150 battalions, 25 squadrons, and 316 guns against the Bulgarians. The opposing forces were at parity in infantry,

1 The only book in English that deals specifically with this campaign is C.E.J. Fryer, The Destruction of Serbia in 1915 (New York, 1997). but the Bulgarian artillery had a 2:1 superiority over the Serbs, even more so at the front of 2nd Bulgarian Army.

October 1, 1915, 1st Army advanced after a mighty artillery assault. It destroyed the opposing Serbian troops, and forced the Serbian army to retreat. The divisional artillery prepared the offense and supported the infantry advance, meanwhile engaging in counterbattery fire. On the far right flank the artillery supported the forcing of the Timok River. Infantry-artillery cooperation was satisfactory. In the course of the fighting, the artillery supported the infantry attack deep in the enemy’s defense zone. In a number of cases the artillery regimental commanders organized unified command of the artillery with the divisions. The artillery assault was planned in detail. The artillery personnel showed high morale and great stamina during the bad weather of the Balkan winter in Macedonia’s rugged terrain. The main obstacles for the artillery were the bad weather and the muddy roads. The lessons learnt showed that, from the very beginning of the operation, during the planning period the artillery should be carefully allotted among the different axes of operations, in order to prevent wasting time transferring guns from one area to another.

2nd Army advanced in Macedonia, inflicting blows in the direction of Bosilegrad-Vranja, Kjustendil-Skopje, and Tsarevo selo-Kochani. The infantry and the artillery regiments advanced in columns through rough mountainous terrain, with no roads, in muddy, rainy and foggy weather. From October 1 to 3 Serbia’s forward strongholds were seized. About October 10 the Serbian Army was defeated in the border area, and was pursued to Vranja- Kumanovo-Skopje. By the end of October Kumanovo-Vranja and Skopje were seized. 2nd Army found itself driving between the Serbian and the French troops. After the seizure of Skopje the Serbian troops retreated through Albania and Montenegro to the Adriatic shore.

2nd Army’s artillery was decentralized and acted under the combat orders of the infantry, supporting the brigades, the regiments, and the battalions. In some cases – such as attacking fortified positions and strongpoints – attempts were made to concentrate the fire of a whole division’s artillery. Usually the assault started after a short, but intense artillery bombardment, and was supported by the artillery from the same positions. The artillery was often stationed in the infantry’s immediate rear; in such cases it occupied positions close to the roads, quickly prepared the necessary firing data, and after a short registration and fire corrections, started the bombardment. During an advance through the enemy’s positions in depth, the artillery moved and fired by batteries and platoons. The infantry provided artillery forward observers, who supported liaison with the infantry, not only selecting targets, but searching for and selecting new battery positions and roads for the artillery. Combat experience forced the infantry commanders to seek cooperation with artillery. Communications, especially telephone connections, used to be the weak point.

The main body of the artillery advanced amidst the columns of the main forces, while sending batteries in the advanced guards. Combining field with mountain batteries in the columns gave positive results. In certain sectors mountain artillery was insufficiently powerful. The main targets for the artillery were fortified positions, enemy personnel, and enemy artillery. The artillery, although fighting and moving in a mountainous terrain, without roads, in severe weather, succeeded in fulfilling the mission of supporting the infantry.

The Campaign Against Rumania

The attack in the Northern front against Rumania started in the autumn of 1916. The Bulgarian Supreme Command made seizing the Tutrakan fortress its first mission.2 This was a modern field fortification, consisting of a main defense line backed by several smaller positions, a second defense line, and artificial obstacles. On the eve of the battle the Rumanian garrison numbered about 40,000 men and 156 guns, supported by an airplane, and a great many machine-guns. There was both mobile and fixed artillery in the forces and forts.3

The assault was planned by the main forces of 3rd Army. The main assault force was the 4th (Preslav) division, whose commander, General Kiselov, was also appointed commanding general of the advancing troops. Fourth (Preslav) division consisted of two infantry brigades and 4th Artillery (5th and 15th Artillery Regiments), twelve batteries of 4 guns each. The division was reinforced with two artillery battalions (16 guns) from 3rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment. One brigade from

2 On the campaign, see Glenn Torrey “The Battle of Turtucaia (Tutrakan) (2-6 September 1916): Romania's Grief, Bulgaria's Glory”, East European Quarterly 37:4 (2003), 379-402 and Glenn Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2011). 3 Anguelov, A. Odrin – Tutrakan, artilerijski dejstvija, S., Armejski voennoizdatelski fund, 1926, p.51. 1st () Division also participated in the assault, with 4th Artillery Regiment (24 guns) and a howitzer battalion from 1st Howitzer Artillery Regiment. In order to reinforce the assault with heavy artillery, 2nd Heavy Artillery Regiment was added, consisting of two 12 cm and three 15 cm slow-shooting, and two 15 cm fast- shooting batteries. Bulgarian forces consisted of 32 infantry battalions, 34 batteries, 4 squadrons, and 1 engineer battalion, totaling 55,000 soldiers, 132 guns, and 53 machine-guns. The plan called for a fast, surprising blow in the center of the defense, aiming at piercing the front line and seizure of the fort. The main mission of the heavy group was to suppress the Romanian artillery. The field artillery would accompany the infantry, supporting it as it went.

After a 45-minute artillery bombardment the artillery achieved the expected results: the enemy artillery was almost silent and the Rumanian infantry was so shaken it retreated from the first trench line. At 08.10 the Bulgarian infantry started their attack, and the field artillery advanced behind. Two hours later fort 6 fell. By 11.30 forts 5, 7, and 8 also fell, and the field artillery changed its positions.4

Despite some weaknesses, cooperation between infantry and artillery was good, and ensured seizure of the fortress in only 36 hours. Time shortage pressure prevented complete reconnaissance, the reason the attack was postponed for one day, a judgment that should be assessed as correct.

The

From December 1915 until the end of the war, at Dojran and at the Bulgarian- Greek border area both sides entrenched, defending with only limited attacks.5 As little ground changed hands both sides took the opportunity to prepare thorough defenses. The activities of the artillery west of Dojran, in the sector of the 9th (Pleven) Division, were interesting, and worth discussion and study. This division fought defensive battles from the beginning of 1917 to the autumn of 1918. At times the division held a vast front – from the Vardar River to Dojran – but in 1918 its sector was narrowed to 14 km. Commanded by General Vladimir Vazov, the 9th Infantry Division (arguably Bulgaria’s best), together with the artillery, organized a solid defense. That is why, despite repeated attempts by far stronger forces, the

4 Anguelov, A. ibid., p. 45, 46. 5 Alan Wakefield and Simon Moody Under the Devil's eye : the British military experience in Macedonia, 1915-18 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2011) is a modern if Anglo-centric history of the campaign. enemy was not successful in piercing the defense. The artillery played important role in the stubbornness of the defense.

The battery positions were very carefully chosen and considered the nature of the artillery (gun or howitzer) and the missions that were required. All batteries were effectively hidden from direct observation. Artillery reconnaissance and observation were directed toward: targets and activities of the enemy infantry; observation of the enemy artillery and spotting the Bulgarian artillery fire.

The course of two years’ defensive battles developed the different methods for artillery fire. The basic types of fire used at Dojran in support of infantry were curtain fire (fixed barrages), destructive fire, harassing fire, and the fire attack. Curtain fire was the most successfully developed and applied. Its purpose was to block the attacking enemy infantry. It started 300 meters before the barbed wire obstacles of the defense. The artillery planned a continuous barrier fire in three lines: the first line before the barbed wire of the front position; the second line before the first trench of the main position, and the third line before the second trench of the main position. The sectors of the curtain fire were divided among the batteries in such a way that no ground would remain uncovered by the artillery. Critically, the battery sectors were usually overlapped. The curtain fire was divided into four versions, depending on the possible options of the enemy’s attack. This was done to achieve higher density of fire in case of an enemy attack in a particular sector; then the fire of all the artillery was concentrated there. Each battery had one main and various alternate barrage lines. The guns stayed routinely laid for their basic barrage so gunners could simply load and fire to cover their highest priority defensive sector. After a long and systematic training the divisional artillery achieved a one minute response time. Barrages were standardized at three minutes quick fire followed by seven minutes at 3-4 shots per gun. The speed of fire was regulated by the platoon and gun commanders. Each gun was supposed to cover a front of 40-50 meters. Where possible, the field gun curtain fire would be supported by the one of the howitzer batteries.

Conclusions and lessons learned for the artillery in WWI

During WWI some lessons about usage of artillery became clear; these were codified into regulations, norms, and organizations. To Bulgaria, those were a natural continuation of the principles and of the achievements of the Balkan Wars, although WWI was obviously less successful for Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the activities of the Bulgarian artillery during WWI were an interesting combat experience, from which we can make important conclusions on the combat employment of artillery and of the trends in its development. Most notably, the war demonstrated the increasing importance that artillery played in combat. That is why it started to be used en masse; for that, command and management were centralized. But to increase infantry firepower, regimental artillery was begun, with light and medium trench mortars and infantry guns. Trench mortars were subordinated to battalion commanders, while the remaining artillery had centralized control. The appearance of the armored vehicles caused the appearance of anti-tank artillery; aircraft caused the appearance of anti-aircraft guns.

In offense and defense, the artillery had a double subordination. Each first echelon battalion had at its disposal an artillery section, which was still a part of the artillery regimental group. Artillery groups were attached to the infantry, but their management was centralized by the senior artillery commander. Use of covered battery positions became standard, and furthermore batteries entrenched their guns, personnel, and shells.