Matthew Mallia 1
The 2015 Society for Army Historical Research Essay Prize Competition
First-Prize Winner
'Galloping at Everything': Wellington and the British Heavy Cavalry Charge at Waterloo.
Matthew Mallia University of Malta
By the Napoleonic Wars, the importance and effectiveness of cavalry, alt- hough dwindling, was still felt on the battlefield. The vast majority of military commanders of the period utilised their cavalry regiments to their utmost ability. This does not seem to be true for the Duke of Wellington, arguably the most successful and ultimately victorious general of Napoleon's Wars. In- deed, historians have often cited the phrase 'galloping at everything' as proof of Wellington's indictment of the poor discipline demonstrated by the cavalry service.1 How far is this view correct? In the following, Wellington's relation- ship with his cavalry in the Peninsular War will be briefly discussed. This will then follow onto a discussion on whether Wellington was proven right - or wrong - in his views when compared to the heavy cavalry charge at Waterloo.
1 See, for example: Peter Snow, To War with Wellington: From the Peninsula to Waterloo (London, John Murray, 2011) p. 156; Michael Glover, Wellington as Military Commander (London, B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1968) p. 225
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However, to understand this, one must first give an overview of Wellington's tactics in battle.
Wellington was, primarily, a defence-oriented general. This is not to say that his campaign movements were defensive.2 Rather, in pitched battle, Wel- lington seemed to excel in choosing the best ground for his troops to defend - ground 'with secure flanks and in which the main line of battle could be concealed in dead ground until the enemy [was] within range of the devastat- ing volleys which were the pride and most effective counter-blow of the Brit- ish infantry.'3 This was, in many ways, 'archetypal of his defensive battles.'4 Marshal Soult - along with the rest of Napoleon's staff at Waterloo who had experienced Wellington's tactics in the Peninsula - seem to have learnt their lesson when they cautioned Bonaparte on the morning of Waterloo,5 only to receive the reply: 'Because you've been beaten by Wellington you consider him to be a good general. I say that he's a bad general and that the English are bad troops. It will be a lunchtime affair!'6
Through observation, one can say, arguably, that Wellington's preference and strength lay in his use of infantry. Just as Napoleon was naturally associ- ated with his cannons, Wellington had his infantry. In the Peninsula, the British infantry acted as the 'backbone' of Wellington's army.7 The importance he placed in his infantry is best summed up in the following anecdote. After
2 See Glover, Wellington, p. 121-147 3 ibid., p. 148 4 Gordon Corrigan, Wellington: A Military Life (London, Hambledon and London, 2001) p. 314 5 Glover, Wellington, p. 149 6 Andrew Roberts, Napoleon the Great (London, Allen Lane, 2014) p. 759 7 Philip Haythornthwaite, British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, 1792-1815 (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2008) p. 3
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Quatre Bras, just as the infantry was safely moved towards the rear, Welling- ton remarked to the Earl of Uxbridge (who was, at the time, in command of the cavalry and the horse artillery): 'There is the last of the infantry gone and I don't care now.'8 This was said just before Uxbridge blundered, leaving the rearguard Horse Artillery trapped by French cavalry.9 From this it is clear that Wellington placed his infantry at a higher level than his cavalry. Indeed, this view does not seem to be limited to Wellington's thoughts. Almost fifteen years after the end of the war, an anonymous officer of dragoons wrote: 'The British infantry has been recognised by all as the best in Europe: the excel- lence of the artillery is incontestable...The cavalry alone has been excepted from the boon of unmixed eulogium, and has even been censured by many as not having fulfilled its allotted share in the great contest.'10 This view was certainly emulated in Wellington’s dispatches, as will be seen from the follow- ing.
The phrase 'galloping at everything' was used by Wellington in a letter to Lieutenant General Sir R. Hill on the 18th of June, 1812, after a cavalry action at Maguilla a few days previously which ended in heavy losses and a general British rout: 'I have never been more annoyed by Slade's affair [Slade being the Brigadier General leading the 700-odd cavalry-men], and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping
8 Glover, Wellington, p. 229 9 ibid., p. 229 10 Mark S. Thompson, The British Cavalry in the Peninsular War: by an Officer of Dragoons, 1831 (Poland, Amazon Fulfillment, 2015) p. 1
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at every thing, and their galloping back as fast as they can gallop on the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy - so little that one would think they cannot manoeuvre, excepting on Wimbledon Common...'11 This was not the first time Wellington expressed his negative views on the cavalry's actions. On the 30th of March, 1811, after the battle of Campo Maior on the 25th, Wellington wrote to Marshall Sir William Beresford, noting 'the undisciplined ardour of the 13th dragoons, and 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry', a quality 'not of the description of the determined bravery and stead- iness of soldiers confident in their discipline and in their officers.' Wellington also describes - as he did a year later when describing the events at Maguilla - the cavalry 'galloping as fast as their horses could carry them over a plain, af- ter an enemy to whom they could do no mischief when they were broken'.12
This negative view of cavalry, in the Peninsula at least, was not completely unfounded. The Peninsula, as Michael Glover writes, is not good cavalry country.13 However, to understand properly why Wellington wrote what he wrote, one must first understand the cavalry's general role in any of Welling- ton's campaigns. Three main functions are generally given to cavalry. First, there is the maintenance of outposts, a role Wellington assigned to all regi-
11 Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington During his Various Campaign in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 (Vol. IX) (London, John Murray, 1838) p. 238 12 Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, K.G., During his Various Campaign in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 (Vol. VII) (London, John Murray, 1837) p. 400 13 Glover, Wellington, p. 223
Matthew Mallia 5 ments of cavalry.14 In this the cavalry often did sterling work, despite the lack of praise given in Wellington's dispatches.15 Second, British cavalry was em- ployed - if victorious in battle - in chasing down a broken enemy (this, howev- er, the cavalry had little opportunity of doing). When in battle, however, the only real and possibly effective role cavalry played was in shock action.16 The latter depended heavily on the right timing, the right command, and the right conditions.17 Therefore, a dichotomy is visible between what the cavalry was expected to do on a regular basis throughout a campaign, and what it did on the battlefield. In the latter, the British cavalry seemed 'deficient'.18 In 1804, Wellington wrote that the
'formation and discipline of a body of cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experience and patience in the persons who attempt it...At the same time nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more expensive, and nothing more useless than a body of regular caval- ry...insufficiently disciplined.' 19 This highlights the importance Wellington gives to order in cavalry action, conditioned primarily by good command from capable officers, and sufficient training.
14 Philip Haythornthwaite, Napoleonic Heavy Cavalry & Dragoon Tactics (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2013) p. 7 15 Richard Holmes, Wellington: The Iron Duke (London, Harper Perennial, 2007) p. 118 16 Glover, Wellington, p. 224 17 Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 46 18 Glover, Wellington, p. 224 19 Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 20
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Experience was, at least for Wellington, vital in preserving order among cavalrymen, especially in moments of difficulty: 'Few troops will bear a sur- prise and a general panic; and at all events young cavalry are much more eas- ily affected by these circumstances, and the effect upon them is much more extensive and more sensibly felt...than similar circumstances operating upon infantry in the same state of discipline.'20 Furthermore, the quality of training in recruits coming out to the Peninsula was poor, particularly in outpost du- ty.21
However, the cavalry's main defect, at least from what we can gather from
Wellington's writings, was mainly concerned with the officers, primarily those at the brigade level.22 The new officers in the Peninsula 'had little notion of their duties.'23 Wellington's focus of criticism on the officers is made clear in the above extract written after Maguilla - 'I have never been more annoyed than by Slade's affair.'24 This, and other events of similar nature, all had to do with the loss of order after charging. 'Shock action [i.e. charging] was the ma- noeuvre on which the cavalry most prided itself, but here again its training was insufficient to reap the benefits of the splendidly executed charges.'25
The British cavalry regiments at Waterloo involved in the heavy cavalry charge were divided into two brigades: Sir William Ponsonby's Union Brigade (including the First/Royal Dragoons, the Irish Inniskillings, and the Scots
20 ibid., p. 50-1 21 Glover, Wellington, p. 224 22 ibid., p. 226-7 23 ibid., p. 224 24 Emphasis is my own. 25 Glover, Wellington, p. 225
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Greys), and Lord Somerset's Household Brigade (including the First and Se- cond Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and the King's Dragoon Guards).26 The inexperience of cavalry mentioned above is found most explicitly in the Scots Greys who had not seen battle since 1794.27 Even though Uxbridge had 'exhaustively drilled the cavalry in Belgium',28 training on the drill ground and experience on the battlefield are not one and the same.
At 13:30, around two hours into the battle - and just before d'Erlon, in command of the I Corps, launched his infantry columns - a mass of soldiers was spotted on Napoleon's right.29 A captured courier admitted to Napoleon that the troops were Bülow's Prussian corps advancing to assist Wellington, and were not - as Soult had suggested - Grouchy's troops.30 Pressed with time, d'Erlon's Corps was ordered to attack, with its left-most division focus- sing on the farmhouse of La Haye-Sainte.31 The rest of the Corps came into contact with Picton's 5th Division.32 It was at this moment, when the battle 'hung in the balance',33 that Uxbridge ordered the charge of the heavy caval- ry. The Household Brigade largely came into contact with the French infantry and cuirassiers near La Haye Saint,34 while the Union Brigade struck the main force of 'six brigade columns in echelon' and a couple of thousand tirailleaurs
26 Peter & Dan Snow, The Battle of Waterloo Experience (London, Andre Deutsch, 2015) p. 32 27 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (London, The Bodley Head, 2014) p. 123 28 Robert Kershaw, 24 Hours at Waterloo: 18 June 1815 (Great Britain, WH Allen, 2014) p. 182 29 Saul David, All the King’s Men: The British Redcoat in the Era of Sword and Musket (London, Penguin, 2013) p. 470 30 ibid. 31 ibid., p. 471 32 ibid., p. 472 33 Snow, To War, p. 287 David, All the King’s Men, p. 472 34 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 185
Matthew Mallia 8 in open order.35 Uxbridge's timing was critical. It was clear to those present at the battle that the charge had practically saved Picton's force of infantry. Cap- tain A. Clark Kennedy, of the Royal Dragoons, claimed that 'the charge of the cavalry at the critical moment had recovered' the advantage gained by the French. 'Had the charge been delayed two or three minutes, I feel satisfied it would have probably failed'.36 A French conscript with the 25th Line Regi- ment recalled how the Greys 'killed great numbers and threw [us] into confu- sion.'37 Around two thousand prisoners were taken by the British and d'Er- lon's attack was shattered.38 Captain Duthilt, of the 4th of the Line, later wrote: 'Just as it is difficult for the best cavalry to break into infantry who are formed into squares and who defend themselves with coolness and daring, so it is true that once the ranks have been penetrated [i.e. the French], then resistance is useless and nothing remains for the cavalry to do but to slaugh- ter at almost no risk to themselves. This is what happened...'39
The cavalry's success, however, soon turned into 'pure blood lust'.40 Ma- jor de Lacy Evans, Ponsonby's aide-de-camp,41 wrote how the men 'were out of hand. The enemy fled as a flock of sheep across the valley - quite at the mercy of the dragoons.' 'The helplessness of the enemy offered too great a temptation to the dragoons'.42 Seeing defenceless cannon, Colonel Hamilton ordered the cavalry onto the Grand Batterie, shouting 'Charge! Charge the
35 David, All the King’s Men, p. 471 36 Snow, To War, p. 287 37 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 186 38 Snow, To War, p. 288 39 Holmes, The Iron Duke, p. 241-2 40 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 192 41 ibid., p. 188 42 ibid., p. 191
Matthew Mallia 9 guns!’43 The French took opportunity of this mistake, and sent in three regi- ments of cavalry, including lancers, which totalled to a number of nearly 2,400.44 De Lancy wrote: 'Everyone saw what must happen. Those whose horses were best or least blown got away. Some attempted to escape back to our position by going round the left of the French lancers.'45 The British caval- ry was surrounded, and had to engage in single combat as the men found themselves 'intermingled with the enemy.'46 Cornet Gape of the Scots Greys wrote: 'The men were only too impetuous, nothing could stop them, they all separated, each man fought by himself.'47 Their horses tired and their mo- mentum gone, each individual cavalryman had to find a way out of French hands on their own.
Total Deployed Killed Wounded Household Brigade: 1090 95 248 Union Brigade: 1181 274 310
End of battle casualties. Source: Digby Smith, Charge! Great Cavalry Charges of the Napoleonic Wars (London, Greenhill Books, 2007) p. 299
Seeing what had happened to the heavy cavalry on his right, Fred Ponsonby - a cousin of the Ponsonby in charge of the Union Brigade - or- dered his unit of the 12th Light Dragoons to assault a French infantry unit, as
43 ibid. Snow, To War, p. 288 44 David, All the King’s Men, p. 474 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 193 Snow, To War, p. 288 45 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 193 46 Keegan, Face of Battle, p. 123 47 ibid.
Matthew Mallia 10 to 'take the pressure off the beleaguered heavy dragoons.' The initial attack was successful, but again the same mistake was committed. The Light Dra- goons went too far in and were surrounded by French cavalry. F. Ponsonby later wrote: 'I know we ought not to have been there, and that we fell into the same error which we went down to correct, but I believe that this is an error almost inevitable after a successful charge.'48 This mistake resulted in the loss of around 450 of the dragoon's men.49
'The cavalry had done it again.'50 The British heavy cavalry had pushed too far into the French ranks and suffered unnecessary casualties as a result.
Was Wellington, who had on numerous previous occasions reflected on this tendency of cavalry to carry on deep into enemy troops, proven right? In short, the answer is yes. In his letter to Hill after Maguilla, Wellington ob- served that: 'All cavalry should charge in two lines, of which one should be in reserve; if obliged to charge in one line, part of the line, at least one-third, should be ordered beforehand to pull up, and form in second line, as soon as the charge should be given, and the enemy has been broken and has re- tired.'51 Indeed, the British cavalry at Waterloo had committed the same mis- take done at Maguilla - that is, they had let their over-confidence turn a po- tentially successful charge into a disaster. Wellington immediately realised this. He is said to have told Uxbridge after the latter's return from the attack:
48 Snow, To War, p. 289-90 49 ibid., p. 291 50 ibid., p. 288 51 Gurwood, Dispatches (Vol. IX), p. 238
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'Well, Paget, I hope you are satisfied with your cavalry now.'52 Uxbridge him- self also realised his mistake later on in leading the first wave of cavalry: 'I committed a great mistake in having myself led the attack. The car- rière once began, the leader is no better than any other man; where- as, if I placed myself at the head of the 2nd line, there is no saying what great advantages might not have accrued from it. I am less par- donable in having deviated from a principle I had laid down for my- self, that I had already suffered from a similar error in an affair..., where my reserve, instead of steadily forwarding as I had ordered, chose to join in the attack, and at the end of it I had no formed body
to take advantage with.'53 Had the Earl ridden in the second wave he might have been able to exercise more control on the first wave and might have been able to control it better.54 More blame, however, should be put on the individual officers leading the attack, for Ux- bridge had timed the charge perfectly.' Uxbridge was, furthermore, nowhere near experienced enough to be able to command the large body of cavalry present at Waterloo. Nor was he Welling- ton's first choice, for the latter had requested Stapleton Cotton (a veteran of the Peninsular War and one of Wellington's finest cavalry commanders) but had to contend himself with Uxbridge at the request of the Prince Regent and the Duke of York.55 When led by capable commanders, the cavalry would do wonders. Cotton is chief among these. After he ordered the charge at Sala-
52 Snow, To War, p. 290 53 ibid., p. 289 Glover, Wellington, p. 230 54 Snow, To War, p. 289 55 Glover, Wellington, p. 228-9
Matthew Mallia 12 manca at the critical moment and ensured victory, Wellington expressed his praise: 'My God, Cotton! I never saw anything so beautiful in all my life. The day is yours!'56
Wellington was proven right; the cavalry did 'gallop at everything'. The term 'gallop' here cannot be taken literally. Indeed, the terrain would not al- low the heavy cavalry to gallop, and only a trot - at most a canter - was reached before making contact.57 Yet, the charge was not a failure. Welling- ton had, effectively, lost his heavy cavalry58 (it being reduced to less than half of its effective strength).59 But Napoleon was running out of time. The Prus- sians were steadily advancing. True, the failure of d'Erlon's Corps to put up a strong enough resistance can be attributed to the fact that - even though Na- poleon had said many times that 'Infantry, cavalry and artillery are nothing without each other' - the French infantry was not supported by the necessary cavalry nor artillery.60 One can also add to this the idea expounded by the French military engineer Rogniat that the success of the British charge can be contributed to the inexperience and 'irresolution' of the French infantry: '[The Cavalry] owed its partial success solely to the inexperience of our foot sol- diers, who, being but newly formed into battalions, had not, as yet, acquired the unity and ésprit de corps which constitutes the strength of the infantry.'61 But it was still a successful attack which 'swept the ridge clear of 11,000
56 Snow, To War, p. 164 Glover, Wellington, p. 228 57 Corrigan, A Military Life, p. 321 Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 46 58 Glover, Wellington, p. 230 59 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 202 60 Roberts, Napoleon, p. 764 61 Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 40
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French infantry.'62 Furthermore, as already mentioned above, the right timing of the cavalry attack saved Picton's division from d'Erlon's large body of men. More importantly, however, Napoleon 'was back to where he had started at 11:30 that morning.'63 Yet, the fact still remains that Uxbridge -and certain of- ficers of the heavy cavalry - blundered. The 'almost total loss of the heavy bri- gades at this early stage in the battle could well have been fatal to Welling- ton's chance of success.'64 In 1813, Wellington wrote the following: 'Our cav- alry never gained a battle yet. When the infantry have beaten the French, then the cavalry, if they can act, make the whole complete, and do wonders; but they never yet beat the French themselves.'65 This observation seemed to hold true for the majority of Wellington's battles.
Some days after the battle of Waterloo, Wellington stated: 'The cavalry of other European armies have won victories for their generals, but mine have invariably got me into scrapes.'66 This does not seem to be a fair conclusion, especially after Waterloo. However, it is true that infantry always played a more critical role in Wellington's battles. The cavalry, it seems, committed the same mistake time and time again. One can say Wellington seemed to be disappointed by this 'endemic'67 mistake, found throughout the British caval- ry's actions in Napoleon's Wars. This is not to say, however, that cavalry was not valued by Wellington.68 The problem lay in discipline, and order. It was
62 Kershaw, 24 Hours, p. 202 63 ibid., p. 203 64 Glover, Wellington, p. 230 65 ibid., p. 231 66 Snow, To War, p. 290 67 Elizabeth Longford, Wellington (London, Abacus, 2001) p. 315 68 Wellington wrote: 'nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry.' (Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 20)
Matthew Mallia 14 with this in mind that Wellington, in 1811, observed: 'once cavalry lose their order it is impossible to restore it. For this reason I am always inclined to keep the cavalry out of action, as long as possible.'69 Wellington sums up his posi- tion on cavalry perfectly in the following: 'Our cavalry is the most delicate in- strument in our whole machine. Well managed it can perform wonders, and will always be of use, but it is easily put out of order in the field. None of our officers are accustomed to the manoeuvres of large bodies of cavalry; and if any accident were to happen to a large body, such as a brigade of our caval- ry, while we should be forward in the plains, we are gone.'70
69 ibid., p. 51 70 Glover, Wellington, p. 231
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Final World Count: 3073
Bibliography: (in no particular order)
Elizabeth Longford, Wellington (London, Abacus, 2001)
Peter Snow, To War with Wellington: From the Peninsula to Waterloo (London, John Murray, 2011)
Saul David, All the King’s Men: The British Redcoat in the Era of Sword and Musket (London, Penguin, 2013)
Robert Kershaw, 24 Hours at Waterloo: 18 June 1815 (Great Britain, WH Allen, 2014)
Andrew Roberts, Napoleon the Great (London, Allen Lane, 2014)
Iain Gale, Scotland Forever! The Scots Greys at Waterloo (Edinburgh, Birlinn Ltd., 2015)
Mark S. Thompson, The British Cavalry in the Peninsular War: by an Officer of Dragoons, 1831 (Poland, Amazon Fulfillment, 2015)
Philip Haythornthwaite, Napoleonic Heavy Cavalry & Dragoon Tactics (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2013)
Philip Haythornthwaite, British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, 1792-1815 (Ox- ford, Osprey Publishing, 2008)
Gordon Corrigan, Wellington: A Military Life (London, Hambledon and Lon- don, 2001)
Richard Holmes, Wellington: The Iron Duke (London, Harper Perennial, 2007)
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Richard Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London, Harper Perennial, 2001)
John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (London, The Bodley Head, 2014)
Digby Smith, Charge! Great Cavalry Charges of the Napoleonic Wars (Lon- don, Greenhill Books, 2007)
Michael Glover, Wellington as Military Commander (London, B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1968)
Peter & Dan Snow, The Battle of Waterloo Experience (London, Andre Deutsch, 2015)
Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wel- lington, K.G., During his Various Campaign in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 (Vol. VII) (London, John Murray, 1837)
Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wel- lington During his Various Campaign in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 (Vol. IX) (London, John Murray, 1838)
Trinity College was pleased to launch the Robert Walker Prize for Essays in Law in 2013. The prize is named after an Honorary Fellow of the College, Lord Walker. The prize is named after an Honorary Fellow of the College, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court and former law student at Trinity. Lord Walker has for many years been a supporter of Law at Trinity, meeting students at College social events and, more formally, judging moots (legal debates) and helping to connect the practice of law with its academic study. The Robert Walker Prize has three objectives: to encourage students with an interest in Law to explore that interest by researching, considering and developing an argument about a legal topic of importance to The Society of Army Historical Research runs an annual essay prize competition to reward excellence in historical research on the British Army. The competition is open to both University Undergraduates and School Sixth Form Students regardless of nationality and country of residence. There are two categories of entry: 'Undergraduate' and 'Sixth Form'. The winner in each category will receive a prize of £300 and the runner up a prize of £100; both will also receive an engraved commemorative glass. The essay does not have to be written "from scratch"; the Society is happy to consider essays already written, for example as course work, as long as they meet the criteria for entry and have not been published elsewhere either electronically THE ESSAY: The essay (research paper) shall be original and unpublished, in the English language and of no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes or endnotes. Papers previously submitted for class assignments are encouraged. A reasonable amount of illustrative and tabular material will be welcome. The 2015 meeting will be held in London, England, from July 8-10, 2015. Additionally, the winner will be invited to submit the essay for publication in the Society's journal, Terrae Incognitae. Recent essay award winners and papers include: Paul W. Mapp, "French Reactions to the British Search for a Northwest Passage from Hudson Bay and the Origins of the Seven Years' War" (2000); published in Terrae Incognitae 33 (2001). During such a challenging year, particularly for schools, teachers and students, TSL are delighted to have received a record 1,350 entries in our 2021 International Schools Essay Competition! 290 Teacher Champions from 213 schools, across 59 countries around the world, have enabled their students to share their ideas to help protect the Earth’s precious biological diversity. The prizes. One overall Grand Prize trophy winner will receive a free international trip to a TSL Summit, including £500 spending money. The Top 10 essay medallists will receive eco-friendly e-medals with redeemable gift tokens included. All participating Teacher Champions, Essay Finalists & Honourable Mentions, and International Debate participants, will receive personalised e-certificates. The Society of Army Historical Research runs an annual essay prize competition to reward excellence in historical research on the British Army. The competition is open to both University Undergraduates and School Sixth Form Students regardless of nationality and country of residence. There are two categories of entry: 'Undergraduate' and 'Sixth Form'. The winner in each category will receive a prize of £300 and the runner up a prize of £100; both will also receive an engraved commemorative glass. The essay does not have to be written "from scratch"; the Society is happy to consider essays already written, for example as course work, as long as they meet the criteria for entry and have not been published elsewhere either electronically or in print. The Society for Army Historical Research is a learned society, founded in 1921 to foster "interest in the history and traditions of British and Commonwealth armies, and to encourage research in these fields." It is one of the oldest societies of its kind. Past members include notable British Field Marshals Wavell, Auchinleck and Templer. The current president is Lieutenant-General Sir Barney White-Spunner and Major-General Ewan Carmichael is Chairman of its Council. The Patron of the Society is Field... The BERKELEY PRIZE Competition was established in 1998, made possible by a generous gift of JUDITH LEE STRONACH to the Department of Architecture in the College of Environmental Design at the University of California, Berkeley. My essay focused on incorporating elements of sustainable design. Since then I have spent most of my career in the sustainability and energy efficiency space. This year I won the Royal Society of the Arts’ (RSA) Inclusive Living brief, for my project Bee-Able. Bee-Able is a system designed to tackle inaccessibility in the city, aiming to make our cities more inclusive and accessible for everybody, via satirical design interventions, accessibility rating and way-finding technology.