Matthew Mallia 1 The 2015 Society for Army Historical Research Essay Prize Competition First-Prize Winner 'Galloping at Everything': Wellington and the British Heavy Cavalry Charge at Waterloo. Matthew Mallia University of Malta By the Napoleonic Wars, the importance and effectiveness of cavalry, alt- hough dwindling, was still felt on the battlefield. The vast majority of military commanders of the period utilised their cavalry regiments to their utmost ability. This does not seem to be true for the Duke of Wellington, arguably the most successful and ultimately victorious general of Napoleon's Wars. In- deed, historians have often cited the phrase 'galloping at everything' as proof of Wellington's indictment of the poor discipline demonstrated by the cavalry service.1 How far is this view correct? In the following, Wellington's relation- ship with his cavalry in the Peninsular War will be briefly discussed. This will then follow onto a discussion on whether Wellington was proven right - or wrong - in his views when compared to the heavy cavalry charge at Waterloo. 1 See, for example: Peter Snow, To War with Wellington: From the Peninsula to Waterloo (London, John Murray, 2011) p. 156; Michael Glover, Wellington as Military Commander (London, B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1968) p. 225 Matthew Mallia 2 However, to understand this, one must first give an overview of Wellington's tactics in battle. Wellington was, primarily, a defence-oriented general. This is not to say that his campaign movements were defensive.2 Rather, in pitched battle, Wel- lington seemed to excel in choosing the best ground for his troops to defend - ground 'with secure flanks and in which the main line of battle could be concealed in dead ground until the enemy [was] within range of the devastat- ing volleys which were the pride and most effective counter-blow of the Brit- ish infantry.'3 This was, in many ways, 'archetypal of his defensive battles.'4 Marshal Soult - along with the rest of Napoleon's staff at Waterloo who had experienced Wellington's tactics in the Peninsula - seem to have learnt their lesson when they cautioned Bonaparte on the morning of Waterloo,5 only to receive the reply: 'Because you've been beaten by Wellington you consider him to be a good general. I say that he's a bad general and that the English are bad troops. It will be a lunchtime affair!'6 Through observation, one can say, arguably, that Wellington's preference and strength lay in his use of infantry. Just as Napoleon was naturally associ- ated with his cannons, Wellington had his infantry. In the Peninsula, the British infantry acted as the 'backbone' of Wellington's army.7 The importance he placed in his infantry is best summed up in the following anecdote. After 2 See Glover, Wellington, p. 121-147 3 ibid., p. 148 4 Gordon Corrigan, Wellington: A Military Life (London, Hambledon and London, 2001) p. 314 5 Glover, Wellington, p. 149 6 Andrew Roberts, Napoleon the Great (London, Allen Lane, 2014) p. 759 7 Philip Haythornthwaite, British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, 1792-1815 (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2008) p. 3 Matthew Mallia 3 Quatre Bras, just as the infantry was safely moved towards the rear, Welling- ton remarked to the Earl of Uxbridge (who was, at the time, in command of the cavalry and the horse artillery): 'There is the last of the infantry gone and I don't care now.'8 This was said just before Uxbridge blundered, leaving the rearguard Horse Artillery trapped by French cavalry.9 From this it is clear that Wellington placed his infantry at a higher level than his cavalry. Indeed, this view does not seem to be limited to Wellington's thoughts. Almost fifteen years after the end of the war, an anonymous officer of dragoons wrote: 'The British infantry has been recognised by all as the best in Europe: the excel- lence of the artillery is incontestable...The cavalry alone has been excepted from the boon of unmixed eulogium, and has even been censured by many as not having fulfilled its allotted share in the great contest.'10 This view was certainly emulated in Wellington’s dispatches, as will be seen from the follow- ing. The phrase 'galloping at everything' was used by Wellington in a letter to Lieutenant General Sir R. Hill on the 18th of June, 1812, after a cavalry action at Maguilla a few days previously which ended in heavy losses and a general British rout: 'I have never been more annoyed by Slade's affair [Slade being the Brigadier General leading the 700-odd cavalry-men], and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping 8 Glover, Wellington, p. 229 9 ibid., p. 229 10 Mark S. Thompson, The British Cavalry in the Peninsular War: by an Officer of Dragoons, 1831 (Poland, Amazon Fulfillment, 2015) p. 1 Matthew Mallia 4 at every thing, and their galloping back as fast as they can gallop on the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy - so little that one would think they cannot manoeuvre, excepting on Wimbledon Common...'11 This was not the first time Wellington expressed his negative views on the cavalry's actions. On the 30th of March, 1811, after the battle of Campo Maior on the 25th, Wellington wrote to Marshall Sir William Beresford, noting 'the undisciplined ardour of the 13th dragoons, and 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry', a quality 'not of the description of the determined bravery and stead- iness of soldiers confident in their discipline and in their officers.' Wellington also describes - as he did a year later when describing the events at Maguilla - the cavalry 'galloping as fast as their horses could carry them over a plain, af- ter an enemy to whom they could do no mischief when they were broken'.12 This negative view of cavalry, in the Peninsula at least, was not completely unfounded. The Peninsula, as Michael Glover writes, is not good cavalry country.13 However, to understand properly why Wellington wrote what he wrote, one must first understand the cavalry's general role in any of Welling- ton's campaigns. Three main functions are generally given to cavalry. First, there is the maintenance of outposts, a role Wellington assigned to all regi- 11 Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington During his Various Campaign in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 (Vol. IX) (London, John Murray, 1838) p. 238 12 Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, K.G., During his Various Campaign in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 (Vol. VII) (London, John Murray, 1837) p. 400 13 Glover, Wellington, p. 223 Matthew Mallia 5 ments of cavalry.14 In this the cavalry often did sterling work, despite the lack of praise given in Wellington's dispatches.15 Second, British cavalry was em- ployed - if victorious in battle - in chasing down a broken enemy (this, howev- er, the cavalry had little opportunity of doing). When in battle, however, the only real and possibly effective role cavalry played was in shock action.16 The latter depended heavily on the right timing, the right command, and the right conditions.17 Therefore, a dichotomy is visible between what the cavalry was expected to do on a regular basis throughout a campaign, and what it did on the battlefield. In the latter, the British cavalry seemed 'deficient'.18 In 1804, Wellington wrote that the 'formation and discipline of a body of cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experience and patience in the persons who attempt it...At the same time nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more expensive, and nothing more useless than a body of regular caval- ry...insufficiently disciplined.' 19 This highlights the importance Wellington gives to order in cavalry action, conditioned primarily by good command from capable officers, and sufficient training. 14 Philip Haythornthwaite, Napoleonic Heavy Cavalry & Dragoon Tactics (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2013) p. 7 15 Richard Holmes, Wellington: The Iron Duke (London, Harper Perennial, 2007) p. 118 16 Glover, Wellington, p. 224 17 Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 46 18 Glover, Wellington, p. 224 19 Haythornthwaite, Cavalry Tactics, p. 20 Matthew Mallia 6 Experience was, at least for Wellington, vital in preserving order among cavalrymen, especially in moments of difficulty: 'Few troops will bear a sur- prise and a general panic; and at all events young cavalry are much more eas- ily affected by these circumstances, and the effect upon them is much more extensive and more sensibly felt...than similar circumstances operating upon infantry in the same state of discipline.'20 Furthermore, the quality of training in recruits coming out to the Peninsula was poor, particularly in outpost du- ty.21 However, the cavalry's main defect, at least from what we can gather from Wellington's writings, was mainly concerned with the officers, primarily those at the brigade level.22 The new officers in the Peninsula 'had little notion of their duties.'23 Wellington's focus of criticism on the officers is made clear in the above extract written after Maguilla - 'I have never been more annoyed than by Slade's affair.'24 This, and other events of similar nature, all had to do with the loss of order after charging. 'Shock action [i.e. charging] was the ma- noeuvre on which the cavalry most prided itself, but here again its training was insufficient to reap the benefits of the splendidly executed charges.'25 The British cavalry regiments at Waterloo involved in the heavy cavalry charge were divided into two brigades: Sir William Ponsonby's Union Brigade (including the First/Royal Dragoons, the Irish Inniskillings, and the Scots 20 ibid., p.