Book Reviews

Matrika Prasad Koirala. 2008. A Role in a Revolution. Lalitpur: Jagadamba Prakashan.

Matrika Prasad Koirala (M.P.) was an outstanding personality of , who dominated Nepali politics for a full eight years from 1947 to 1955. During the first four years he was supreme leader of the anti-Rana movement, and during the last four years he was the Prime Minister (in two terms for more than two and half years). His first four years were a story of success, whereas his last four years were a record of failure, though he was a powerful head of the government and enjoyed the confidence of the King throughout most of those years. He led the successful anti-Rana movement as its supreme commander, but his activities as Prime Minister were controversial and a sign of failure. After 1955, his political career virtually ended, though King Mahendra nominated him as a member of the upper house of parliament in 1959, only to encounter the absolute majority of . In the 1980s M.P. once again tried to come back in politics through election to the national legislature but he did not succeed. M.P. died in 1997, but now he is with us through his memoir entitled A Role in a Revolution. I myself (along with some of my friends in the History Department at Tribhuvan University) was fortunate enough to have carried out a tape-recorded interview with M.P. for the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS) in the 1980s. This interview covered some crucial issues which he faced and tackled during the anti-Rana movement and during his tenure of office as a Prime Minister. While taking his interview, we were quite impressed by his sharp memory as when he narrated the story of his father’s activities, and also described his own role during the anti-Rana movement and as Prime Minister. We requested him to write a memoir to provide first-hand information about this crucial period of the from 1947 to 1955. He smiled and said, “Well, if the government puts me in jail for six months, my memoir will be complete.” We are glad to know that he wrote this memoir, but, as mentioned in the preface of the book, a reputed (I would like to say irresponsible) publisher from lost his original manuscript (p. vii). M.P.’s courage must be highly applauded because he

Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2): 389–421 December 2008 © Mandala Book Point 390 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 took great pains to rewrite his memoir, which has now been published in book form. Prior to reviewing the contents of the book, we must congratulate and thank Ganesh Raj Sharma for his painstaking efforts to produce this volume, along with his ten-page preface which includes his own analyses of one or two political issues. One, on the basis of his conversation with M.P. Sharma, which has also been entrusted with this responsibility by M.P.’s wife, as he had already produced a significant volume on the autobiography of B.P. Koirala (M.P.’s younger half brother) and on the basis of his interview with B.P. himself. In a way, Sharma has become a unique person by producing two volumes on two brothers, two Prime Ministers and two big personalities of modern Nepal. M.P.’s memoir is not complete. As the name of the book suggests, it contains M.P.’s experiences as a leader of the democratic movement against the Ranas from 1947 to 1951, along with his own family background and a critical overview of the Rana regime. A large number of documents, ninety two in total, have been attached as an appendix in part two of the book, from which we can extract a rough picture of the political history of Nepal from 1951 to 1955, especially on issues in which M.P. was involved. But for that to be useful, one must have a detailed knowledge of the events of those fateful years. Divided into nine sections, the first part of the memoir focuses on three main aspects of Nepali history. They are M.P.’s childhood and youth along with his father’s exiled life in and afterwards; the positive and negative aspects of Rana rule; and finally the democratic movement starting with the formation of the NNC (Nepali National Congress) and ending with the Delhi Compromise. M.P. admits that his father (Krishna Prasad Koirala) was very sophisticated and lavish in his habits, but later on became very austere. He would not smoke, though he was the sole distributor of all brands of imported cigarettes in Nepal; he would never even touch a dice, shells or cards, even though gambling was officially and openly permitted for several days a year. But the irony of history is that such a man in just one stake “gambled away his whole life's earnings” (p. 5), and chose to live an exiled life in India. M.P. describes his father’s miserable condition in India and also his younger brother’s (Hari) death of cholera at Bettia “for want of proper treatment” (pp. 6–8). He appreciates his father’s decision to give up all facilities, including a house provided by the Maharaja of Kolhapur, since he was fighting against the atrocities of a Maharaja (of Nepal) (pp. 8–10). M.P. recollects how, upon the death of Chandra Book Reviews 391

Shamsher, the new Prime Minister immediately summoned his father to Nepal, but tells us how he (Krishna Prasad) again suffered at the hands of the next Prime Minister resulting in his painful death inside the jail. M.P. writes, “Albeit, the policemen surrounded even the dead body and stood guard until his mortal remains were consumed by the funeral pyre and his body was reduced to ashes” (pp. 68–69). Writing about himself, M.P. describes his school life in India including his meeting with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru as a school boy. He gives a brief account of the national education of India initiated by Gandhi and Tagore (pp. 47–48), and a glimpse of the civil disobedience movement of 1930 in which he himself was involved (pp. 51–58). His employment under the Rana regime, first as an apprentice and then as translator, is discussed in detail, and an interesting incident that took place on the day of his appointment is narrated in an attractive way (pp. 63–64). He tells us how he was relieved from his job two months after his father’s arrest in 1942 and how the Prime Minister subsequently reacted when the Director General, upon the advice of M.P.’s English boss, requested reconsideration of his sacking, by saying “Tell your Angrej (Englishman) it is our Nepali politics which he is incapable of understanding” (p. 67). Giving a brief picture of the Rana regime, M.P. rightly calls it a time of “plots, assassinations, and fights for power within the family,” and says that the ruling family looted the entire property of the nation, seeing it as their own estate (p. 19). He gives the example of Padma Shamsher, who was Prime Minister for less than three years and took more than six million rupees in cash when he left for India (p. 21). But his mention of a Rana having two million acres of land in birta holdings must be an exaggeration (p. 21). M.P. is judicious in making a critical appreciation of the Rana Prime Ministers. He gives credit to Jang Bahadur for granting political asylum to Chand Kuwar and Hazrat Mahal, and taking back the Naya Muluk lands in the Tarai from the British. He considers this as “permanent achievements for the nation” (p. 24). He also has words of praise for other Prime Ministers who undertook certain reform-oriented activities for the country. So much so that he even appreciates the attempt of Mohan Shamsher Rana in getting Nepal admitted to the in 1955 (p. 28). Not to forget that it was against Mohan that the Nepali Congress launched the movement and ended Rana rule. Coming to the socio-political aspects of the Rana rule, M.P. narrates some of his personal experiences with the Rana government, and 392 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 mentions how people (including high officials) lived in a state of terror. When Krishna Prasad Koirala told Juddha Shamsher that the Ranas were interested only in “three B’s,” namely Bank, Birta and Building, his elder brother (possibly Kali Dass Koirala), who was just promoted to Sardar was very afraid that he might lose his job (pp. 33–34). M.P. gives credit to the Prachanda Gorkha and Praja Parishad organizations who revolted against the Rana regime before Nepali Congress. Most historians argue that King Tribhuvan had a secret connection with Praja Parishad and donated some money to it. But M.P. writes that King Tribhuvan “flatly denied (his) participation and knowledge of it. The money he gave to Mr. Bhakta (Dharma Bhakta Mathema – a leader of Praja Parishad) which was found during the searches was for the specific purpose of Mr. Bhakta’s marriage” (p. 37). However, he admits that “King Tribhuvan had moral sympathy with any effort against the Ranas to set up a popular representation in the governance of the country” (p. 37). To close his narration about the Rana rule, M.P. argues that the “tallest claim the Rana clan has made is the preservation of independence of the country” (p. 38). In reality, and ironically, “they kept the country locked in, including its independence” (p. 41). The last four sections of the book form the most significant part of the memoir as they are the most relevant to the title of the book. In over one hundred pages, M.P. analyzes the history of the democratic movement, especially focusing on his role in it. M.P. also mentions certain events beyond his role in order to maintain coherence in the memoir. Although these events have been discussed on the basis of secondary sources, readers will still find new information in them (though this should still be verified by primary sources). M.P. starts his analysis of the Nepali democratic movement with B.P. Koirala’s press statement of October 1946 and the formation of the Nepali National Congress (NNC) in January 1947. He, however, does not mention the foundation of All India Nepali National Congress, which was established on the last day of October 1946. M.P. gives great importance to the Biratnagar Jute Mill Strike (1947). He claims that it was due to his active role in the strike that he was made working president of NNC without being a primary member of the party (p. 84). Most writers believe that he was forced to resign just three months after his appointment, because of opposition from members representing Kathmandu. But M.P. insists here that he voluntarily resigned. However, he admits that D.R. Regmi was made president to represent Kathmandu (p. 95). M.P. also Book Reviews 393 argues that Shri Prakash Gupta prepared four different drafts of the 1948 Constitution (p. 94). This is new information and should be verified by other sources. On the clash between B.P. Koirala and D.R. Regmi, the author writes, “while B.P. Koirala was insistent D.R. Regmi was no less a stickler. There was no honourable way out” (p. 98). However, M.P. joined the Koirala group “finding the juridical side in B.P.’s favour and in consideration that Mr. Regmi was more of an academic politician than a man of action” (p. 99). Later on, after the NNC split into two factions, M.P. tried to make a compromise with Regmi but it failed because “Regmi was adamant” (p. 103). We have read in books that after NNC was banned, a few youths from Kathmandu founded the Praja Panchayat to fight against the Rana regime through constitutional means. M.P. claims that this organization was founded on his advice (p. 100). Similarly, our history books only mention that M.P. was elected president of NNC in the Daravanga Convention of March 1949, but M.P. claims that B.P. Koirala and Gopal Prasad Bhattarai were also candidates for the post. The election was held by secret ballot, and M.P. won with an overwhelming majority (p. 102). At about the same time, M.P. had talks with a trusted Mir Subba from Mohan Shamsher for a compromise between the Congress and the Ranas (pp. 102–103). This attempt failed because of the negative attitude of the Rana premier. The merger of NNC and the Nepal Democratic Congress (NDC) that took place in April 1950 is described in detail. M.P. has his own arguments for his being chosen as the president of the new party – Nepali Congress (NC) as against the claim of B.P. Koirala (pp. 106–112). The new party replaced the words “Constitutional and peaceful means” by “all possible means” in their objectives (p. 110). M.P. reveals how NDC leaders made a false claim that they had the royal seal by King Tribhuvan to form a provisional parallel government (p. 112). M.P. admits that even before the Bairgania Conference (in September 1950), NC had collected sufficient quantity of arms, but he stood for violence only “as a last recourse” and that also only in the form of mass insurrections (p. 112). He presents K.I. Singh as an opponent of B.P. Koirala from the beginning: He also mentions how Singh opposed the idea of empowering a single man to launch the movement under the assumption that B.P. would be that man (pp. 118–119). M.P. expresses the difficulty he had in maintaining the secrecy of party decisions, because of the presence of an undercover Rana agent in disguised form. However he refuses to mention his name as he says “I cannot furnish 394 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 specific proof or evidence for the same” (p. 118). M.P. also emphasizes two incidents – getting the contact and commitment of Rudra Shamsher at Palpa, which B.P. Koirala successfully conducted (p. 124), and a mission to create a feeling of terror among the Rana authorities in the capital led by Ganesh Man and Sunder Raj, which, however, failed because of a betrayal by a driver (p. 126). King Tribhuvan’s refusal to give royal assent to punish the culprits is also narrated (p. 127). When describing the royal flight to the Indian Embassy in November 1950, M.P. confirms the rumor, through King Tribhuvan, that leaving Gyanendra in the palace was intentional and not accidental (p. 128). He also mentions a rumor that Mohan consulted the British envoy after the royal flight, and when the latter assured him that the new king will be recognized, Gyanendra was proclaimed the new ruler (p. 129). However M.P. is not correct to say that Gyanendra remained King from 7 November 1950 to 14 February 1951 (p. 132), because after Mohan’s declaration of 8 January 1951 he remained Tribhuvan’s representative only. The author has presented Tribhuvan’s side of the story regarding the mistake committed by Mohan after the royal flight (p. 129), but in my opinion his version is difficult to accept as at that time the King was a prisoner at Indian Embassy, if not at the royal palace. In the chapter titled “Revolution” M.P. has analyzed in detail the story of the 1950 Movement after the royal flight to Indian Embassy. The reader is grateful for his ability to recollect day-to-day events. In the beginning, the revolutionary force was unable to gain permanent control of any major district, but later on it succeeded in capturing important areas from government forces. M.P. is correct to say that “The close of November was not very hopeful for us” (p. 152), but “the month of December definitely brought us brighter beams of hope” (p. 161). Especially significant in this regard was the capture of Biratnagar in the east and Nepalgunj in the west. M.P. also describes the surrender of government forces at Palpa as “a great event in the history of the insurrectionary upsurge led by the NC...the fall of Palpa shook the Ranas to the roots” (p. 167). At that time, when revolutionary forces were losing battles against the Rana army, the NC leaders wanted to meet the King at New Delhi to get a press statement from him in support of the movement. NC leaders also wanted to meet Indian leaders to ask for their support in logistics. “Both of our purposes were badly defeated,” writes M.P. (p. 144). He indirectly questions the so-called favourable attitude of the Indian government towards the NC, and writes, “we were in a deep pit from where there was no escape. There certainly was a feeling amongst us Book Reviews 395 that we had been brusquely let down, if not betrayed” (p. 144). Despite the indifferent attitude of the then Indian government, the revolutionaries were firmly committed to their duties. M.P. has duly acknowledged the valuable contribution of a number of revolutionaries in the two month armed struggle against Rana rule, including the commanders of the Mukti Sena such as Puran Singh, G.B. Yakthumba and others. M.P. has also written a translation of a revolutionary song which was often played on Democratic Radio, established in Biratnagar (p. 162). But his translation does capture the actual wording of the song. In my opinion, the translation of the song should be as follows:- O Nepalis! March forward! Waving the flag of revolution! Waving the flag of revolution Come on elder and younger sisters Come on elder and younger brothers Let us work together for the salvation of our Nepal Let all of us be united for the progress of our homeland The NC started armed struggle against the Ranas with the support and cooperation of the Indian government, but M.P. argues that Indian support was half-hearted from the very beginning. When the Rana government, realizing its helplessness, opened negotiations with the Indian government, the attitude of India towards the NC completely changed. M.P. has portrayed this episode beautifully in the chapter entitled “The Delhi Parley.” He points out the change in attitude of the Indian Prime Minister after he met two Rana generals, sent by the Rana Prime Minister to negotiate at Delhi. He also gives Nehru’s statement in the Indian parliament as evidence that the Indian leader “held the view that complete old order was not possible but a completely new order also was not in his mind” (p. 172). M.P. mentions NC helplessness in these words, “In Delhi, we never sat across the table to iron out our differences and the so-called tripartite conference as such never took place. The representatives of the Government of India would convey to us the views of the Ranas and of course the King was out of the picture till the finalisation of the parley” (p. 176). But, even at this critical juncture, the NC, under M.P., successfully solved the question of political prisoners, ensured the party’s right to nominate all the popular representations in the interim cabinet, and got significant portfolios of home and finance (pp. 178–179). Humiliated by the Indian government, M.P. was also defied by his own partymen when they refused to accept him as their leader in the interim cabinet. But M.P. rejects this allegation and writes, “In order to 396 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 keep the prestige of the Nepali Congress aloft and to keep the ranks closed up and to pave an easier path for the inner political struggle now to begin inside Nepal I had preferred to place myself out of power, and exert my energy to the organisational wing only” (p. 182). He was further disappointed, when his proposal to include either M.B. Shah or Surya Prasad Upadhaya in the Cabinet was opposed by B.P. Koirala and Subarna Shamsher (p. 182). In name, M.P. was the supreme commander of the revolution, but in practice his younger brother (B.P.) emerged as the real hero. At this humiliating point, M.P. ends his memoir-cum- autobiography. The author has given a list of events that occurred after the royal flight (pp. 168–169). However the list contains some mistakes. Gyanendra was installed as King on 7 November (not on 8 November); M.P. gives the impression that the insurrection started even before Tribhuvan reached Delhi, when it was not so. Mohan Shamsher’s first statement came on 24 December, (not on 24 November) and the first batch of prisoners were released on 17 January 1951 (not on 13–14 January). Moreover, M.P. fails to mention that more than 50 percent of released prisoners refused to come out of jail until the political settlement was finalized. In addition, there is a major pen error on p. 130, where the author writes “Padma” instead of “Mohan” (31st line). Part two of the book consists of ninety-two documents which are given as appendices. All of them, except the first and the last, are related to the history of Nepal from 1951 to 1955 – a period when M.P. became Prime Minister three times. This part of the book may be read as a supplement to the memoir sections dealing with the later part of M.P.’s political career. These documents clearly show the Indian government’s influence and interference on Nepali affairs during the reign of King Tribhuvan. Three documents are produced in original form. They are the cabinet proceeding of April 1951 (pp. 194–195), Tribhuvan’s letter to M.P. in August 1952 (p. 260) and Mahendra’s letter to M.P. as a crown prince in March 1955 (p. 370). The first two letters are in English, prepared by Indian personnel, and the third is in Nepali, to demonstrate Mahendra’s attempt to end Indian involvement in Nepal’s administration. Again there are some letters written by Nehru to Tribhuvan (pp. 200–202, 229–230, 231–232), addressing the latter as “My dear friend” forgetting formal protocol to address the head of the state. Similarly, M.P. had sought permission of the Indian advisor to Nepal, quoting provisions of the Indian Constitution, to remove a minister from the cabinet (p. 241). Book Reviews 397

A number of letters had been exchanged between M.P. and Nehru on different aspects of Nepali politics, which include (a) resolution of a dispute between M.P. and B.P. Koirala (pp. 208–210), (b) Tanka Prasad’s demand for a coalition cabinet (p. 210), (c) Nehru’s dissatisfaction on the delay of Constituent Assembly election (p. 244), (d) M.P.’s detailed information about the reorganization of administration in Nepal (pp. 211–217) and (e) the discourtesy shown by an INA (Indian National Army?) crew to the prime minister and ministers of Nepal (pp. 249–250). Many voices were raised against the Indian Ambassador, Chandeshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, by Nepali leaders, including B.P. Koirala, for his active interference in Nepali affairs. However King Tribhuvan and M.P. repeatedly requested the Indian Prime Minister for his renewal, which is new information for readers (pp. 258–259). It is worth mentioning one specific letter written by Nehru to M.P. on 8 May 1954, because it gives a number of instructions to M.P. as the Prime Minister of Nepal, which include (a) Nehru’s draft of an aide- memoir for its approval by Nepal, (b) a warning to M.P. not to say anything that would irritate China, (c) the presence of Indian representatives in talks between Nepali and Chinese officials, (d) instructions to the Nepal Government to give up extra-territorial rights in Tibet as well as a 10,000 rupees tribute and (e) a threatening note to remain careful about the U.S. (pp. 294–297). All these points clearly demonstrate Nehru’s dictatorial attitude towards Nepal. However, one positive aspect of the letter should be mentioned, and that is Nehru’s instruction to Nepali ministers to keep in touch with their people (p. 297). There are also some letters written by Nepali ambassadors in New Delhi (Vijaya Shamsher and Mahendra Bikram) which focus on proposed diplomatic relations between Nepal and China. One remarkable point of these letters is the desire or condition of China to hold the talks in Kathmandu and in secret, against the instructions of Nehru. These letters also mention some objectionable articles on Nepal published in two newspapers, Searchlight and The Statesman, as well as the statement of D.R. Regmi (foreign minister) on Tibet, which the Indian government called a “silly” statement. But these documents do not mention the contents of these articles or the statement. A number of brief letters (more than two dozen) written during the last days of M.P.’s prime ministerial tenure have also been reproduced. They deal with M.P.’s deteriorating relations with the Crown Prince and ministers (Tanka Prasad and Bhadrakali Mishra) (pp. 346–373). However these letters do not give any new information to the reader. 398 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008

On the whole, the documents produced in part two of the memoir give scattered information on Nepali politics from 1951 to 1955. They may be used by researchers as primary sources. A review of M.P.’s memoir is not complete until we mention the ten- page preface of Ganesh Raj Sharma, the undeclared editor of the book. Sharma argues that “M.P. was not as regular nor as expressive in his response to ideas and events as B.P. was” (p. viii), but, instead, “was a store house of knowledge about the personalities and events of Nepali politics, which remained unrevealed unlike in the case of B.P. Koirala” (p. ix). In my opinion, the memoir is more regular, if not more expressive, than B.P.’s Atmabrittanta, which is quite irregular in chronological terms. Sharma is correct to say that “M.P. was appointed Prime Minister in 1951 on the suggestion of Nehru,” but his claim that M.P. was removed from office in 1955 because of India’s displeasure, as he along with King Tribhuvan opposed the aide-memoir sent by Nehru, is debatable (p. ix). He has produced a different version of the aide-memoir which reads, “... especially on matters of Nepal’s relationship with Tibet and China, special advice will be sought from the Government of India” (p. xi), whereas Nehru’s draft of the same speaks only about “consultations” with the Government of India (p. 298). On the basis of information supplied by M.P. and Rishikesh Shah, Sharma argues that Nehru had given tacit consent to King Mahendra for the royal takeover of December 1960, though it was limited only to the removal of B.P. Koirala and not the dissolution of the parliament (pp. xi–xii) This point also seems to be debatable, in view of Nehru’s strong public condemnation of the coup. There is one more debatable point in the preface, and that is the so-called understanding between “King Birendra and B.P. Koirala to bring M.P. Koirala to power as a stop-gap in the transition from the partyless Panchayat system to a multiparty parliamentary democracy” (p. xii). B.P.’s question about the possibility of M.P.’s becoming Prime Minister (p. xii) prevents Sharma from reaching such big conclusions. However, in the conclusion part of his preface, Sharma seems to have strictly followed the duty (dharma) of an editor, when he says “The same period and the leadership roles have been described somewhat differently by his brother, B.P. Koirala. As the person tasked with bringing the memoir of both M.P. and B.P. into publication, I have been careful to ensure that their words are held sacrosanct other than in basic editing, so that both brothers reach out to the readers in their own words and as they wished” (p. xv). Sharma, however, does not elaborate the points of Book Reviews 399 difference between the two brothers, the narration of which would have greatly benefited readers and researchers. To point out some technical shortcomings, the documents in part two are not numbered, nor are the sections in part one. This may create difficulties for researchers who wish to acknowledge them as sources. Similarly, readers may have been interested to see some rare photos of those days, but the book contains none. Even so, the memoir is a significant contribution to the study of the 1950 movement and the following four years. It is especially helpful to researchers as a source book. Tri Ratna Manandhar Tribhuvan University

Saubhagya Shah. 2008. Civil Society in Uncivil Places: Soft States and Regime Change in Nepal. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.

There are very few popular criticisms of civil societies but many of non- governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nepal. Serious critical interpretations of civil society are usually lacking here. Nepal’s recent regime transition from monarchism to republicanism, touted nationally and internationally, has also been without deep scholarly attention beyond project based conflict analysis and a quantitative formulation of causal variables of the conflict. Saubhagya Shah’s monograph is important in this regard since it attempts to critically analyze the role of civil society in the regime change of 2006, commonly known as Jana-àndolan II. In this research, regime change is portrayed as a handover of political authority by the king to political parties immediately after the mass protests of April 2006. The monograph starts by unpacking the word “civil society,” the concept behind it and its various avatars based on recent literature. This survey includes heavyweight Western theoretical interpretations such as those of Hobbes, Durkheim, Hegel, Kant, Marx, Montesquieu and Gramsci. The survey shows that the term “civil society” actually gained currency in western academia and policy circles in the late Cold War period to further a liberal economic and political agenda in the East and South. It has also become an agenda of development aid flowing from western governments to developing countries. Such a flow has taken place in the name of human rights, democracy, good governance, social capital, sustainable development and so on. The social formations which 400 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 receive these grants are usually non-state actors including NGOs, popular forums, networks, grassroot organizations, and professional and cultural associations. The author argues that civil society, while operating in the interests of the West, has also acquired an anti-state connotation in the developing world, challenging the dominance and reach of the state. But, in its neo- liberal form, civil society has also been working like the state facilitating service delivery at the “local level,” particularly in the wake of “failing” states. Therefore, we usually see two forms of civil society with respect to the state: an anti-state civil society (as a site of dissidents’ struggles or popular protests) and a pro-state civil society (as a partner of state agencies and their service delivery activities). The author has also conceptualized civil society with respect to the state and in contrast to family and the market providing its class and other cultural attributes. This is a common framework to define the elusive concept of civil society. The famous Gramscian interpretation defines civil society as a site of consensus and hegemony of dominant groups to legitimize their rule. The same site has also become an arena of subaltern groups to generate their counter-hegemonic discourses and actions. Therefore two theoretical positions of civil society, pro-state and anti-state, are possible. The metaphysical existence of civil society in the West was itself transformed into a practical political ideology to forge hegemonic consensus for serving western post-Cold War interests. This interpretation is the author’s analytical framework to analyze civil society’s action in Jana-àndolan II. The growth of new self-ascriptive civil societies beyond traditional associational forms such as guthã, parmà, and óhikur in Nepal has been regarded uncritically as an unmitigated blessing for democracy. Such growth, according to the author, is rapidly dissolving boundaries between NGOs, civil society and political movements in the pursuit of ethnic, religious and regional aspirations and contestations. This interpretation of civil society, beyond the pro-state versus anti-state dichotomy, provides an understanding of its mobilization techniques through the generation of agency from such associational forms. According to the author, civil society’s mobilization technique is usually based on epistemic claims and the legitimization of those claims by actors of local to international level as seen during Jana-àndolan II. Its polymorphous technique, meaning the absence of definite organizational form and permanent political movement, has helped in this pursuit. Civil society in Nepal during the regime change generated their strength and moral authority for Book Reviews 401 mobilization through their claim to scientific knowledge recognized by western epistemic formations as well as universal values such as selflessness, impartiality and the resultant occupation of the moral high ground. While presenting civil society as a conceptual framework the author makes an important point about civil society, namely the importance of understanding source of strengths and power (agency) beyond any organizational structure. The first topic of the monograph is “Civil Society” whilst the second is the “Regime Change,” about which the author presents details of the events that took place in Nepal during 2005–06 prior to the collapse of the monarchy. I will not go in those details here. However, it is relevant to mention that the author has interpreted King Gyanendra’s moves, such as dismissing the elected Prime Minister, frequently changing cabinets and ultimately adopting absolute power through military-backed emergency proclamation, as an outcome of political upheavals and uncertainty rather than a reflection of the King’s own motives. It has also been argued that the King’s failure was primarily due to his misguided choices of aides. The regime was overwhelmed by agreements made among the opposition and frequent protests from civil and political groups. Events are presented in detail in the monograph under ‘Oppositional Preparation,’ but in some places events are not described in chronological order. For example, there is the sense that civil society protests took place only after the agreement made between SPA and Maoists in India, which is not true. The author has also argued that the agreement was finalized under Indian auspices and after Western assent but without sufficient discussion on it. It also seems that there were a lot of different factors involved and that the King’s ruling group was very active during the mobilization periods. Then obviously a question arises: Why did the King remain so passive while all oppositional forces were preparing for massive protests through civil society mobilization? Although the answer is not explicitly mentioned in the monograph, it could be because either the King underestimated the opposition or lacked any capacity and legitimacy to counter those moves. But what about civil society representatives who supported his move? They might have been very weak and could not make any authoritative claims for mobilization as oppositional civil societies did through claims about knowledge and epistemic legitimacy, universal values and the moral high ground. The author also looks at the issue of how Nepali civil society carved a niche in the peace process. However, the author tracks their involvement only during the later part of the insurgency. As stated by the author, a 402 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 self-proclaimed civil society came into political negotiations mainly during the first peace talks between the Maoists and Deuba government in 2001. After that there were many forms of civil society organizations along with titles such as peace, dialogue, facilitation, democracy, development as they were named by themselves. This was also period when peace and conflict were a principal focus of foreign aid. It is worth mentioning that in this environment, a leading group in political mobilization called Civic Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP), also mentioned by the author, consciously denied the civil society label and also publicly refrained from accepting any foreign grants for mobilization. This is very interesting and remains a matter for more detailed analysis, which is missing in this study. However, the author has mentioned elsewhere that civil society organizations were planning their activities in a highly strategic way. The level of strategic awareness and understanding of polymorphous power, as well as of universal values and the high moral ground might have been higher in the case of CMDP. The author highlights the close relationship between civil society organizations and political society (political parties) in Nepal, each legitimizing each other and reinforcing each other’s strengths and actions towards the regime change. Although the critical role and assistance of civil society in producing change has been recognized by the three major political parties in Nepal, the question of which civil society counted as legitimate differed in interpretation among the parties themselves. In other words, it is more about which civil society is linked with which political party. Hence, the author has rightly indicated the partisan nature of civil societies with respect to relations with the Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxit Leninist), Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) respectively. Shah has further emphasized that the NC and UML were relatively silent after the regime change (i.e. King’s handover of power to the political parties after the 19-day general strike and mass protests) while the Maoists, in contrast, were loud and continued to be vocal even after the handover. It is perhaps surprising that a Maoist party was justifying the role of civil society more strongly than any of the other so-called more liberal parties. Therefore, there was a great diversity in political aims and positions as well as strong political dynamics within civil society organizations working for regime change. However, the author has failed to explore such diversity and instead put all of them in a single category. Studying the internal political dynamics within civil society is important because it may explain the varied political aims and motives of organizations for engaging in regime change. The author has Book Reviews 403 also discussed the contribution of other formations such as the media, development NGOs, and professional groups within civil society for regime change. However Shah is silent on another broad category: the private sector/business group outside the two conventional categories of state and civil society. An analysis of the motives of various groups for joining or not joining in political action may explain the underlying purpose of their involvement and their tendency of being sometimes silent and, at other times, vocal. The author’s argument in this monograph can be summarized as follows: there were three forces behind the regime change – civil society for moral authority, political parties for political muscle and the international community, mainly India and the West, for providing international legitimacy and various other support. It could be argued that the formulation of such a framework is inadequate to understand all actions and objectives for regime change, because all three blocs are composed of highly diverse groups or individuals. For example, constituents of civil society were very diverse, sometimes having opposite positions toward regime change as discussed above. Similarly, political parties also had differing positions towards the monarchy. The same was also true for so-called external forces or the international community which was broadly categorized as India and the West. Stating that the West wanted to remove monarchy to further their religious aims (opposing the Hindu monarchy to help spread Christianity through the secular state) and also mentioning a historical conflict of Indian political elites with the Nepali monarchy is simplistic, if not completely misleading, towards understanding their position in regime change. Similarly, an inadequate understanding of the extreme diversity in these three actors in regime change – civil society, political parties and the international community is not, in fact, useful when portraying a complete picture of regime change in Nepal. While discussing the political economy of civil society in Nepal, the author has critically analyzed the support base and linkages from sub- national level to supra-national level. This has helped civil society to strengthen their external agenda and interest particularly on the themes of democracy, development and security. The author’s critical analysis of these linkages, which are usually labelled as typically neo-liberal civil society behavior, may not cover all civil society organizations active during the change of 2006. Many of them either did not have any direct institutional linkages with donors or were equally critical of such neo- liberal formations who advocated for popular resistance and struggle. 404 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008

Therefore, depicting civil society in developing countries as an outcome of the political logic of late capitalism through projects of governance and democracy may be useful for a general characterization of NGO–donor relations and their interests and objectives. But it may not be an adequate interpretation of their actions during regime change. The radical connection, that is the connection of civil society with the Maoist party, nevertheless, is a very interesting point made by the author, which requires further exploration. As such, how these formations materialized, even when civil society and the Maoist party have different ideological stands is a question on which future research could possibly be undertaken. Despite the limitations, this research is important in highlighting the under-explored issue of the relationship between civil society and regime change in Nepal. The author has a critical outlook on such political issues without explicitly putting in his own normative positions on civil society and regime change. Of the many frameworks through which to understand civil society, such as liberal, Marxist/critical and analytical, the author is critical towards a liberal understanding of civil society although in many places these categories are mixed up. It is therefore confusing to understand which type of civil society he critiques in both the theoretical discussion and later sections. As discussed before, the research has ignored the political dynamics and diversity of political positions/motives for being engaged in regime change between and within three major actors of regime change, namely civil society, political parties and foreign forces. Shah portrays it as if they all worked as a single block. The author has strongly argued for an engagement with foreign forces in regime change through civil society. But it is not clear whether or not the main external actor, India, operated through civil society. I think the author’s limited source of information for research may be the cause behind these limitations in his analysis. His source of information is confined to newspaper reporting (here comes the politics of media) and his own observations and perspectives towards events, including interviews he carried out with a few actors. If he had expanded his source of information to include at least studies of the dynamics inside civil society, the diversity and broader picture of civil society in regime change could have been elucidated. Nonetheless, the research published in this monograph is a good contribution to understanding one major aspect of recent social-political change in Nepal. Sharad Ghimire Martin Chautari Book Reviews 405

Bishwambher Pyakuryal, Dadhi Adhikari and Deependra Purush Dhakal. 2008 [2002]. Is Foreign Aid Working? An Analysis of Aid Effectiveness and Growth (revised edition). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point.

In its annual economic review released at the end of 2008, the World Bank concluded that the food and fuel price increases of the previous twelve months had pushed an estimated 130–155 million additional people into poverty – mostly in the developing world (World Bank 2008). What is more, the global financial crisis had significantly diminished the short-term economic prospects for developing countries, it said, making necessary new World Bank aid commitments of up to $100 billion over the next three years. Also in 2008, the Government of Nepal re- emphasized the role of foreign aid in building a post-conflict, new Nepal when it hosted the Nepal Donor Consultation Meeting (NDCM) in February (Government of Nepal 2008). In light of these events, it would appear that the issue of foreign aid — around the world and in Nepal — continues to be an important one and one that is worthy of investigation. But what is the quality of ongoing investigation on foreign aid, particularly work that is coming out of Nepal? Here I review one publication entitled “Is Foreign Aid Working? An Analysis of Aid Effectiveness and Growth” by Bishwambher Pyakuryal, Dadhi Adhikari and Deependra Purush Dhakal, a book first published in 2002 and recently released in a revised edition, on the basis of which I try to derive some general conclusions on the current state of foreign aid research in Nepal. Low levels of resource generation due to low growth, a declining savings rate, rising expenditure, and poor public sector management have made foreign aid necessary for Nepal. The book considers data from 1950/51, when Nepal first utilized foreign assistance, to 2004/05, to find that on average, the share of foreign aid in total national expenditure has been 27 percent during this time – a much higher proportion in the case of development expenditure. While the country’s first donors provided aid in the form of grants, the globally shrinking stock of assistance available resulted in an increasing proportion of aid coming in as low-interest loans until the early 2000s, after which the proportion of loans in total aid fell again (possibly due to low levels of internal resource mobilization). This has meant that debt servicing, compounded by a gradual depreciation of the value of the Nepali rupee against the American dollar, has used up significant amounts of finances which could otherwise have been invested 406 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 in development. The book reviews donor assistance between 1990 and 1998 to find that aid was more frequently channeled into agriculture, forestry and fisheries, energy and transport, social development and health during this time. According to the authors, aid should not be considered to be intrinsically good or bad. Briefly touching on the global experience so far, they note that the empirical evidence regarding aid effectiveness is mixed. While the common argument is that external capital is necessary in low- income countries in order to close the gap between investment and domestic savings in order to generate growth, much does, in fact, depend on the local context. According to the World Bank, development assistance tends to be more productive in countries with sound policy environments and institutional structures. In Nepal, the authors consider aid to have been successful overall since it has contributed to economic growth. Aid has been less able to facilitate economic policy autonomy, though, and poverty reduction has not been commensurate with aid inflows. The book goes on to consider the major reasons why in spite of its many achievements, aid has not performed better. Globally, while donors claim to be contributing to prosperity, democracy and peace, in practice they are not making enough funds available to be able to do so. Aid in real terms has in fact been declining to the poorest countries, alongside rising military spending worldwide. The book also claims that “aid has been politicized for (the) last couple of years than it was historically so” (p. 2). In Nepal, aid flows are marked by wide disparities between commitments and disbursements, both on the part of bi- and multi-lateral donors. Between 2002 and 2005, for instance, total aid disbursement was 44.3 percent less than the total commitment of foreign assistance (which comprised of shortfalls of 40 percent and 50.7 percent, respectively, in grants and loans).1 This makes planning difficult. Donors undertake inadequate homework in the design of projects, often duplicating activities and inappropriately prioritizing goals and objectives. Sometimes, they impose impossible conditionalities. Donors also indulge in the “extravagant extraction of project money…in consultancy and

1 Aid flows are significantly more volatile than one would expect them to be. According to one recent global estimate, aid is five times more volatile than GDP for the average developing country, and three times more volatile than exports (Kharas and Linn 2008). Book Reviews 407 advisory fees” (p. 56) and since they do not always record their aid in the government budget, channeling some of it through NGOs, the government is not always aware of what is going on. But the problem is not just one-sided. Donors in Nepal are confronted with inadequate leadership on the part of the government, weakly functioning institutions, an underpaid civil service and unsatisfactory public expenditure management and data recording systems, even at the National Planning Commission and Finance Ministry, though recent donor-supported initiatives, including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), have ameliorated the situation somewhat. And yet, “corruption is suspect in several stages of project implementation” (p. 62). Since this assessment was commissioned by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to form the basis of Nepal’s first Foreign Aid Policy, it is not surprising that the book devotes an entire chapter to recommendations. Amongst others, it calls on donors to increasingly invest their resources in Nepal’s priority sectors as identified by Nepalis, help create an enabling environment for attracting foreign direct investment and private capital inflow, particularly in energy and tourism, and promote knowledge and technology transfer with a view to promoting self-reliance and sustainability. The book also recommends for joint programming and trust funds, more effective project planning and implementation, for which both the government and donors should be responsible, as well as decentralized decision-making in aid planning and administration. On corruption, it calls on the government to strengthen financial transparency. Given that some of the book’s recommendations went on to influence the government’s foreign aid policy in 2002 (and may also have contributed to the revised policy of 2008), it appears to have made a difference. But in general, the book lacks depth. Published in 2008 but presenting data only up to 2004/05, its analysis is outdated. Nepal’s foreign aid landscape is so vastly different now than it was in 2002 that it is not clear why the authors did not choose to write a new book rather than update the previous edition. Nor does the book devote much attention to the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, considered to personify the world’s post-Cold War aid framework, with important (and in my view, very positive) implications for Nepal.2 When the authors

2 The Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness, enshrined in the Paris Declaration of 2 March 2005, is an international agreement between developed and 408 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 recommend for improved impact assessment of foreign aid, they fail to draw on the rich literature that already exists on the issue.3 And when they recommend for the imposition of user fees in community managed projects to promote sustainability, they do not appear to be aware that a number of development agencies have been pointing out the potential hazards of such a move for some time now.4 Having eliminated user fees in health in January 2008, though, the Government of Nepal, now led by the CPN-Maoists, does not appear to be inclined to pursue this particular suggestion for the time being.5 In relation to other developing countries, the amount of foreign aid Nepal receives is, in fact, relatively small. Moreover, Nepal’s poor absorptive capacity means that it is only able to use up about a half of the aid that donors make available. Nonetheless, development assistance is likely to play a role in building a New Nepal which is why it is important that there is more research on the issue in the days ahead. Having compared the contents of this particular book with other recent publications on foreign aid in Nepal, it seems that future research will be more useful if it focuses on more specific issues within the overall area of foreign aid (e.g., Tiwari 2007), while retaining financial autonomy from those donors whose performance is being assessed (e.g., Khanal and Acharya 2008). Since the causes of aid ineffectiveness are multiple, it will also be important to move beyond purely economic analysis to take into account other dimensions of the problem. Saubhagya Shah’s recent anthropological assessment of the incentive structures and values that

developing countries to increase aid harmonization, alignment and management for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. 3 See for instance, Savedoff et al. (2006). 4 For instance, research conducted by Oxfam in South Asia has found that user fees often exclude poor people from access to essential services (Narayan 2006). 5 According to Pyakuryal, Adhikari and Dhakal “there are basically no major differences among the political parties with regard to the policy regime and overall development of the country” (p. 42). They thereby imply that Nepal’s financial constraints serve to dilute the ideological differences that exist between the parties when they deal with the donor community. To some extent, this is what must happen in any donor-dependant country. But in Nepal’s present context, this view may be exaggerating the extent to which the major parties are willing (and able) to accommodate one another’s’ standpoints on development issues. Book Reviews 409 guide development assistance goes some way in this direction (Shah 2008). But while Pyarkuryal, Adhikari and Dhakal predict a bright future for aid “into the next millennium” (p. 42), Shah’s outlook is significantly more pessimistic, lamenting how aid “erode(s) the dignity and credibility of Nepali norms, institutions, and leaders” (p. 38). So which one is it: more aid for Nepal from now on, or not? Some might say, it depends on the circumstances. Similarly, it is by no means essential that everyone always agrees with each other on issues of aid and development. But these apparently contradictory perspectives on the future of aid is, in my view, also a reflection of the disciplinary divide that exists within the Nepal’s foreign aid research community, between economists and non-economists, who are not conversing very much with one another.6 This is connected to another divide, namely that which separates development practitioners, who tend to feel constrained to defend a country’s development record, from development academics, who may be more inclined to criticize it.7 Robert Chambers terms this a cultural divide and calls for a “third culture” which places the people at the heart of the investigative process. I agree. It seems to me, therefore, that only if we start producing third culture research on foreign aid (that is at once independent, well-informed and up-to-date) will we begin to come up with clearer answers on the future of aid in Nepal.

References Government of Nepal. 2008. Foreign Aid Policy 2008: A Working Draft of the Revised Foreign Aid Policy 2002. Available at: www.ndcm.2008.gov.np/ fap.php. Kanbur, Ravi. 2002. Economics, Social Science and Development. World Development 30(3): 477–486. Khanal Dilli Raj and Laxman Acharya. 2008. Role and Effectiveness of Foreign Aid under PRSP in Nepal. Kathmandu: IPRAD and ActionAid Nepal. Kharas, Homi and Johannes F. Linn. 2008. Better Aid: Responding to Gaps in Effectiveness. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Narayan, Swati. 2006. Serve the Essentials: What Governments and Donors Must Do to Improve South Asia’s Essential Services. New Delhi: Oxfam International.

6 This is a common problem in the field of development studies, on which much has been written (e.g., Kanbur 2002). 7 Devendra Raj Panday refers to this thought when discussing the reasons for Nepal’s failed development (Panday 1999). 410 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008

Panday, Devendra Raj. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: The Mission and the Maladies. Kathmandu: NESAC. Savedoff, William D., Ruth Levine and Nancy Birdsall. 2006. When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives through Impact Evaluation. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Shah, Saubhagya. 2008. Civil Society in Uncivil Places: Soft State and Regime Change in Nepal (Policy Studies 48). Washington, D.C.: East West Center. Tiwari, Sailesh. 2007. Putting Money Where the Mouth Is: Does Aid to Nepal Finance what the Donors Say They Want to Finance? Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy 2(1): 1–16. World Bank. 2008. Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Shizu Upadhya Kathmandu

Sanjay Upadhya. 2008. The Raj Lives: India in Nepal. New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing.

The unity and diversity of the sub-continent have guided India’s relations with its South Asian neighbors. One needs going no further than to read the Declarations issued by successive SAARC summits to see the guiding influence of the unity factor. They refer regularly to the common values of the member states, the profound common civilizational continuum of great antiquity which constitutes the historical basis for sustaining harmonious relations in the region. Like unity, diversity has always been important defining and determining feature of the region. This feature of diversity has been more important particularly since 1947, for after this, these differences widened as political systems diverged, economies that had hitherto been part of one unit went their separate ways, and even in terms of culture each nation emphasized their uniqueness in the effort to build a distinct national identity. Independent India’s neighborhood policy had choices, or what looked like choices. One possibility for India was to emphasize and therefore make the required effort to accept the diversity in unity argument, so as to cultivate good relations. There were many arguments in support of this too. For instance, quite apart from the general benefits of a cordial external environment, to which the compulsions of being a SAARC Book Reviews 411 member state were added in 1985, there was the later argument that for India’s rise to stature in the world good neighborly relations were a prerequisite. This meant going an extra mile, or that India giving more than it would get. The other possibility was benign neglect, a seriously considered option within official circles. This meant that if the neighbors were anxious to go their own way, and emphasize diversity at the cost of unity, India would also be happy to go its own way. In fact, of course, these choices were largely for policy planning papers or for theorizing. In the real world there was never a situation in which you could say, well now, I think I’ll exercise choice B instead of A. For Nepal, similarly, there were choices. On the one hand, the Nepali leaders could use arguments about dependence on India, the latter’s bullying tactics or interference in internal affairs to bolster their own political position or to promote national solidarity or both. The closeness of relations as they developed after 1947 was enough to generate an inexhaustible supply of incidents that could be used for this purpose. And on the other hand, they could put economics first and emphasize the developmental dimensions of bilateral relations which could lead to cooperation in fields like industry, agriculture, and the promising hydro- power. This could also lead to a more constructive and cooperative evolution of relations among the two countries. But again, there was never really a choice. Remained in Kathmandu, one could never decide to stay away from India’s stifling embrace, or as an alternative, go in for a cooperative relationship. These choices exist only if the two parties can declare that their past is over, and for them everything starts anew so that in the future they can make the correct choices. Sanjay Upadhya in The Raj Lives rightly reminds us, and this is the starting point of his book, that you can’t do this for that, that the relationship has a long history which has influenced issues, ideas and individuals and that consistent patterns and underlying attitudes have defined the Nepali mindset. So his book does not intend to break new grounds but to portray India’s role in Nepal on the basis of his personal experience and information available in the public domain. He presents a dispassionate description of the history of the relationship, and in doing so, when he refers to India’s preponderance and adds that Nepali politics provides the best arena for inquiry because here India’s influence has been conspicuous, detrimental and untenable, we need to take it seriously. The author starts with the rise of modern Nepal in the second half of the 18th century, its subsequent expansion eastward and westward until, 412 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 inevitably, it ran up against an already expanding power of the South, the East India Company. Nepal came off second best in the encounter, lost much of the territory gained recently and, with battered national psyche, was left looking inwards to ensure its survival as a nation. But the British kept out of the internal turmoil of the mid-19th century which brought Jang Bahadur Kunwar and the Ranas to power, reducing the Monarch to a rubber stamp. A century later, when the King saw an opportunity to get back to power, India did not do the same. Given the background – the active participation of Nepali leaders in the Indian independence movement, their close ties to Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders and the support India extended for democratic change in Nepal – this was not surprising. In any case King Tribhuvan regained the Monarch’s power under the Delhi Compromise, and worked out with help and guidance from Nehru. This stage was set for Nepali leaders of all hues to believe that, whenever anything happened in Nepal’s domestic politics, India must have had a hand in it. And when Nehru arrived in Kathmandu in June 1951 he promptly gave his hosts an extended lesson on how to conduct their domestic affairs, further entrenching this idea as a grievance. Other grievances also built up alongside. The Nepalis thought that after the British retreated from the sub-continent, areas which they had taken from Nepal in the encounter with the East India Company should now revert. When an Indian military mission arrived in the 1950s to train the Nepali army, considering the proven fighting qualities of the latter, their pride was hurt. When Tenzing Norgay climbed Mount Everest India claimed he was Indian. This hurt their pride too. The 1954 treaty on harnessing the waters of the Koshi, one of Nepal’s biggest rivers, led to accusations, for it seemed primarily to benefit India. Then India’s role as Nepal’s principal development partner also came under fire. All this aid, it was said, was only to keep Nepal from diversifying its foreign relations. One of the major grievances, seen as the symbol of the perpetuation of the Raj and of India’s domination, was the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, especially the exchange of letters with that Treaty which brought Nepal into India’s defence perimeter. The next stage began in December 1960 when King Mahendra announced that he had used his emergency powers to take over the administration. Nehru seemed upset, saying that it was a setback to democracy, and a complete reversal of the democratic process. But such is the nature of the bilateral relationship, says the author, that the Monarch Book Reviews 413 could have taken this step with the knowledge if not actual connivance of New Delhi. However Mahendra took Nepal’s relations with China up another notch soon thereafter; he was in China to celebrate the 12th anniversary of the Revolution; Nepal and China signed a border agreement as well as an agreement that China would help construct a road from Kathmandu to the Tibet border. As if in a response, India began giving help to Nepali rebels. To make things worse (though the author does not mention this item) there was the October 1962 pronouncement by Marshal Chen Yi of China that in case any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal, China would side with the latter. This was much openly welcomed in Kathmandu. The chain of controversy became more complicated when Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh chose a 1969 visit to Nepal to talk about the ‘special relations’ between the two countries; a few years down the road and King Birendra called for recognition of Nepal as a Zone of Peace, meaning the end of any kind of security relationship with India. By 1988 Nepal was in open violation of the 1950 Treaty when it signed an agreement with China for the purchase of weapons. This situation was further aggravated as the purchased weapons included anti-aircraft guns, suggesting that they were for defence against any air attack by India. By now most things that happened in political Nepal had acquired an Indian angle. When Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao arrived in Kathmandu in October 1992 he not only faced black-flag demonstrations but seemed to attach more importance to his meeting with the King than with the now democratically-elected government, although India’s hand was clearly to be seen in the movement to restore democracy at the end of which elections had been held. If political leaders were killed India’s hand was seen; when there was a vote in Parliament the Indian Ambassador’s hand was seen in the outcome. The second half of the book largely elaborates the central themes already developed about the pervasive nature of India’s hand in Nepal’s economic, political and developmental concerns. To mention just a few examples, when there was domestic instability in the mid-1990s India was accused of fomenting it in preparation for a military invasion; the expansionist nature of India’s policy was easily seen in the publication of a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh map showing Nepal included in a ‘Greater India,’ not to mention Bharatiya Janata Party Vice-President K.R. Malkani’s reference to the mistake India had made in not accepting King Tribhuvan’s offer to merge Nepal with India; then Indian actor Hrithik Roshan made, or was alleged to have made critical remarks about 414 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008

Nepal, leading to extensive violence against theaters showing Indian films. The focus of these chapters is on taking Nepal’s history from 1999 to 2006 rather than on dealing intensively with how India interfered with the events that moved that history forward. For by the end of the period others too – in the main, the British, of course, the Americans, the UN, and China – had entered the scene. The last chapter is a summing up. Firstly, India had generally been more comfortable with the monarchy, because although authoritarianism has thrived on anti-Indianism it is democracy that has done more to fan the flames. Raising fears of the southern neighbor has been a proven political tool in Nepal. On the other hand, speculates the author right at the end, maybe India has concluded secret agreements with the Monarch, the political leaders and with the Maoists. Secondly, so far as bilateral issues are concerned each one of them becomes a problem, whether it is border management, trade and transit facilities, cooperation in the critical water sector or the more critical security questions. And behind it always is the 1950 Treaty, seen by the average Nepali as a serious infringement of national sovereignty. This litany must lead many readers to conclude that maybe benign neglect was best. But here, at the very end, the author gets it right again. While most would have concluded on an optimistic note, saying that if such and such steps were taken the relationship could be put on a new track, and then give a list of steps, his parting line is that history and geography have conspired to perpetuate the Raj in Nepal, meaning things will always be about the same in the future. Some things in the book are not quite accurate. It is mentioned that the East India Company got permission to recruit Nepali soldiers; actually Nepal was always against this and on occasion even put to death those Nepali soldiers who returned from British employment. There is a reference to the 1950 Treaty requiring ‘effective measures’ if either country faced a security threat. Actually this phrase was in the exchange of letters, which was kept secret for some years after the signing of the Treaty. There are a few others. But these are rather minor points in a book, which does deserve to be taken seriously by readers on both sides of the border for its balanced and comprehensive account of the relationship. Book Reviews 415

Well-organized and clearly printed, the book is well-produced: subheadings divide up each of the ten chapters into convenient sections. There is not only a reference section, and notes arising from the text, but also a Who’s Who, a glossary, a bibliography and an index, all of which are very useful.

I.P. Khosla Editor-in-Chief, South Asian Survey s[i0f vgfn, emns ;'j]bL / d'Qm l;+x tfdfª . lj=;+= @)^% . /fHo k'g;{+/rgf /fhgLlts, cfly{s / ;f+:s[lts b[li6sf]0f . sf7df8f}F M dfl6{g rf}tf/L . hgcfGbf]ng–@ n] d'VotM tLgj6f k|lqmofx¿sf] cGTo u¥of] . /fh;+:yf / tGq, s]Gb|Ls[t PsfTds /fHo / bzjif]{ ;z:q o'4 . oL cGTox¿ dxTjk"0f{ lyP h;n] g]kfnsf] /fhgLlts, cfly{s / ;fdflhs If]qdf bL3{sflng k|efj kfb{y] . cGTo cfk}Fmdf dxTjk"0f{ x'g'sf] ;fy} gofF k|lqmof / k|0ffnLsf] yfngL ug{ emg\ dxTjk"0f{ tyf clgjfo{ lyof] / 5 klg . ljutdf g]kfnL ;dfhsf] OGb|]0fL :j¿knfO{ hlxn] klg Pp6} /¨df b]Vg rfxg] zf;s ju{x¿sf cfd b[Zox¿ of] cfGbf]ngkl5 ax'/+uL 5 eg]/ x]g{ yflnP . gofF ;+/rgfdf k'/fgf c;dfg, lje]bsf/L cEof; / dfGotfx¿ gbf]xf]l/g] u/L leGb} :j¿ksf] /fHo Joj:yfsf] ;+:yfut ljsf; ug'{kg]{ 7"nf] sfo{ef/ g]kfnL /fhgLlt / af}l4s j[Qdf b]vf k¥of] . b]znfO{ gofF ;+/rgfdf k'gM lgdf{0f, JofVof / kl/efiff ug'{kg]{ b]lvof] tfsL sxfnL nfUbf] åGå gbf]xf]l/of];\ . gofF ;+/rgfsf] k|of; ljutdf gePsf x'Fb} xf]Ogg\ . lj=;+= @)#& ;fndf g]kfnnfO{ kfFr ljsf; If]qdf afFl8Psf] lyof] . d"ntM of] …ljsf;Ú / k|zf;lgs ljefhg lyof] . k|Voft e'uf]nljb\ 8f= xs{ u'?ªn] @% lhNnfsf] gofF ;+/rgfsf] cjwf/0ff aflx/ NofP . klxnf] k~rfotL ;'wf/jfbsf] gofF ;+/rgf lyof] eg] kl5Nnf] ax'bnLo k|hftflGqs sfndf cfly{s ldtJolotf ckgfpg NofOPsf] cjwf/0ff lyof] . oL cjwf/0ffx¿, cEof; u/]/} jf cEof; gu/]/, hgcfGbf]ng–@ kl5 c;fGble{s 7xl/P . åGåsfndf rfvnfUbf] s'/f s] lyof] eg] ufpFsf hgtf ;z:q åGåaf6 hlt k|tfl8t lyP, zx/L af}l4s ju{x¿ Tolt lyPgg\ . åGån] zx/nfO{ ufFHb} / k|efj kfb}{ hfFbf a'l4hLjLx¿nfO{ lrGtg ug{ afWo kf¥of] . åGå lgsf;sf h'lQm / bL3{sflng zflGt :yfkgf ug]{ Pp6f pkfo lyof] /fHosf] k'g;{+/rgf ug'{ . h;sf] 416 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 ax;n] Jofkstf klg kfof] . ljleGg If]qx¿nfO{ hftLo / Eff}uf]lns cfwf/df 5'§ØfP/ dfcf]jfbLn] o'4 rsf{Psf] s'/fn] klg ;a}nfO{ gofF l;/faf6 ;f]Rg afWo kf¥of] . @)^@ / ^# sf] cfGbf]ngkl5 ;ª\3Lo /fHo agfpg] ;+sNk cGtl/d ;+ljwfgdf bh{ eof] . o;} ;Gbe{df Jofjxfl/s cg'ej gu/]sf] b]zsf] ;ª\3Lo :j¿k s:tf] x'g] < s] sf] cfwf/df x'g] < To;df df+;k]zLx¿ s;/L eg]{ < k|fyldstf s] s] x'g] < eGg] cfd lh1f;fnfO{ d]6fpg / To;nfO{ Jojxfl/s ¿k lbg lj4fg\x¿åf/f ul/Psf] ldlxg]tsf] pkh xf] /fHo k'g;{+/rgfM /fhgLlts, cfly{s / ;f+:s[lts b[li6sf]0f . of] k':ts /fhgLlts, cfly{s / ;f+:s[lts b[li6sf]0faf6 n]lvPsf] 5 . oBlk oL tLg}j6f kf6fx¿ Pscfk;df cGt/;DalGwt ljifo x'g\ h;nfO{ o; k':tsdf 5'§f5'§} ¿kdf ulxl/P/ JofVof, ljZn]if0f / ;+Zn]if0f ul/Psf 5g\ . k':tsdf tLgj6f n]vx¿ ;dfj]z 5g\ . …/fHo k'g;{+/rgfsf] efjL /fhgLlts uGtJoÚ zLif{ssf] k|yd n]v s[i0f vgfnsf] 5 . …u0ftflGqs g]kfnsf] cy{–/fhgLltsÚ zLif{ssf] bf];|f] n]v emns ;'j]bLsf] 5 eg] …;dfgtf, ;ª\3Lotf / ax';f+:s[lts /fi6«jfbÚ zLif{ssf] clGtd n]v d'Qm l;+x tfdfªsf] 5 . oL n]vx¿ ljZn]if0ffTds z}nLsf 5g\ . cg'ej clhtn] k':tssf] k|fSsyg n]v]sf 5g\ . o;df pgn] k':ts / ax;sf] cfjZostf, n]vsx¿sf] d"n ax; / lgisif{x¿ ;l6s 9ª\un] k|:t't u/]sf 5g\ . o;af6 n]vsf] af/]df klxn] g} ;fdfGo hfgsf/L kfpg ;lsG5 . ;fy}, o;df efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHosf] ;jfnnfO{ /fhgLlts, cfly{s / ;f+:s[lts b[li6sf]0faf6 ulx/f] ljZn]if0f u/]sf] kfOG5 . k|:t't k':tsdf n]vsx¿n] k'g;{+/rgfsf] kl/efiff, o;sf] ;}4flGts kIf, o;sf] sfof{Gjog, ljleGg ;fdflhs ;d"xx¿sf] cfsfª\Iff, kf6L{x¿sf] b[li6sf]0f / k'g;{+/rgfsf k|lqmofx¿sf] af/]df /fhgLlts kIfaf6 pNn]v u/]sf 5g\ . cfly{s kf6f]af6 ltgn] g]kfnsf] cy{–/fhgLlts Oltxf;, cy{–/fhgLlts b[li6sf]0f / ljrf/wf/f, cfly{s ¿kfGt/0fsf k|:tfj tyf ;ª\3Lo cfly{s k|0ffnLsf ;+/rgfsf af/]df k|sfz kf/]sf 5g\ . To;}u/L ;f+:s[lts b[li6sf]0faf6 gofF ;ª\3Lotf lsg cfjZos 5 < o;df wd{, hflt efiff / ;f+:s[lts clwsf/sf af/]df :yflkt ul/g'kg]{ dfGotfx¿sf af/]df ljZn]if0f u/]sf 5g\ . n]vx¿ p2]Zo / ljifoj:t'sf] ulx/fO;Dd k'u]sf 5g\ . efjL aGg] g]kfnsf] ;ª\3Lo 9fFrfnfO{ v'/fs k|bfg ug{ of] k':ts n]lvPsf] k|:6 x'G5 . nf]stflGqs u0f/fHo, ;ª\3Lo /fHo lgdf{0fsf cfwf/, ;dfg'kflts k|ltlglWfTj, ;Qf ;fem]bf/L, ax'eflifs /fHo gLlt, ;dfg'kflts k|ltlglwTj, ;sf/fTds lje]b, cfly{s ¿kfGt/0f, ljsf;, j[l4, lghLIf]q / ;/sf/n] ug'{kg]{ nufgL / x:tIf]k, e"ld–Joj:yf / o;sf] ;dfg ljt/0f, C0f ;xof]u, ;f+:s[lts ;dfgtf, hftLo, Book Reviews 417

Iflqo ;dfgtf, ax';f+:s[ltsjfb, wd{lg/k]Iftf / /fi6«jfbh:tf dxTjk"0f{ ;jfnx¿ of] k':tsdf ;dfj]z 5g\ . k'g;{+/rgf ug{'kg]{ sf/0fx¿sf] af/]df n]vsx¿n] rrf{ u/]sf 5g\ . ljutsf /fHo / kf6L{x¿n] alxis/0fdf kf/]sf ;d'bfox¿, lglZrt hft, wd{ / efiffsf] If]qdf ePsf Psn jr{:jsf] s'/f klg o;df pNn]v ul/Psf] 5 . ljutsf sdLsdhf]/Lx¿, jt{dfg ljZjkl/j]zdf cEof; ePsf ljleGg ;sf/fTds tyf gsf/fTds pbfx/0fx¿sf] rrf{ klg o;df 5 . jt{dfg g]kfnsf] ljZn]if0f u/]/ efjL ;ª\3Lo ;+/rgfdf oL s'/fx¿ x'g'k5{ eGg] tYout ts{x¿ cufl8 ;fg'{sf ;fy} ljutsf tLtf cg'ejx¿ / efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHox¿df x'g'kg]{ dL7f d'2fx¿sf] ljwfut ulx/fOdf uP/ n]vsx¿n] rrf{ u/]sf 5g\ . x/]s cWofodf ljleGg zLif{s / pkzLif{sx¿ lbP/ ljZn]if0f u/]sf] kfOG5 h;n] p2]Zo / ljifoj:t'nfO{ k|i6 u/]sf 5g\ / ulx/fO;Dd k'¥ofPsf 5g\ . k':tsdf hDdf cf7j6f tflnsfx¿ 5g\ . /fi6«÷/fHox¿sf] cjwf/0ffdf Jofks kl/jt{g cfPsf] / o;sf] 7fpF ax'/fli6«o /fHon] lnPsf] s'/f vgfnn] pNn]v u/]sf 5g\ . of] g]kfnsf] ;Gbe{df /fi6«–/fHonfO{ a'em\g] / gofF :j¿k agfpg] gofF l;/f xf] . o;sf] Joj:yfkg klg hl6n ;jfn xf] . vgfn n]V5g\, æclxn]sf] d'2f ju{ k|wfg xf]Og, klxrfg k|wfg xf]Æ -k[= #–$_ . To:t} ;'j]bLn] klg klxrfgljgfsf] ;ª\3Lotfsf] cy{ 5}g eGg] ts{ u/]sf 5g\ . oxL tYonfO{ tfdfªn] ax';f+:s[lts /fi6«jfbsf] sf]0faf6 ts{ u/]sf 5g\ . o;n] efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHodf klxrfgsf] ;jfnn] k|fyldstf kfpg' k5{ eGg] lgisif{ lgsfn]sf] 5 . t/ g]kfnsf] ;Gbe{df klxrfg dfq} k|wfg xf]Og a? b'a} k|wfg x'g\ . o; k':tsdf u/LaLsf] /]vfd'gL /x]sf tfdfªx¿sf] ;ª\Vof ^! / r]kfªx¿sf] ^& k|ltzt -k[= !!!_ /x]sf] tYo k|:t't ul/Psf] 5 . ;fy} e"ldxLg ls;fgx¿sf] ;ª\Vof klg tflnsfdf b]vfOPsf] 5 . o;n] juL{o ;jfnnfO{ sd cfFSg gx'g] b]lvG5 . a? b'j}nfO{ ;Fu;Fu} n}hfg'kg]{ oyfy{tf oxL k':tsdf k|:t't 5 . n]vsx¿n] ljleGg kf6L{x¿sf] 3f]if0ffkqdf pNn]v ePsf ;jfnx¿nfO{ ljZn]if0f u/]sf 5g\ . h:t}M /fHo k'g;{+/rgf, cfly{s kf6f] / ;ª\3Lo OsfO{x¿sf] af/]df kf6L{x¿sf] 3f]if0ffkqsf] ljZn]if0f o;df 5 . ;ª\3Lotfsf] vfsf ;DaGwdf dfcf]jfbL c¿ kf6L{x¿eGbf :ki6 eP/ xf]nf n]vsx¿n] o;nfO{ k|fyldstfdf /fv]sf 5g\ . ;ª\3Lotfsf] dfusf af/]df klxn]b]lv g} ljleGg ;fdflhs ;d"xx¿n] p7fpFb} cfPsf] s'/f vgfn / tfdfªn] pNn]v u/]sf 5g\ . ;'j]bLn] dfcf]jfbLnfO{ dfq} pb\w[t u/]sf 5g\ . o;af6 s] b]lvG5 eg] ;a}eGbf a9L ;ª\3Lotf cflbjf;L, hghflt / dw];Lx¿nfO{ rflxPsf] 5 . of] dfu @)$^ ;fnsf] hgcfGbf]ngeGbf 418 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 klg klxn]b]lvsf] xf] / clxn] o;n] d"t{¿k kfof] eGg] b]lvG5 . ;a} /fhgLlts bnx¿n] g]kfnsf] cv08tfnfO{ Wofgdf /fv]sf] s'/f k':tsdf pNn]v 5 . ;ª\3Lotfsf gfddf jf ax'/fi6«jfbsf gfddf :jtGq /fHo gagfpg o; k|lta4tfn] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]Nb5 . t/ cv08, ef}uf]lns / ;ª\3Lotf k|fylds dfq} xf]Og, clgjfo{ ;jfn klg xf] . efiffsf af/]df b'O{j6f n]vsx¿sf] ;dfg wf/0ff kfOG5 . efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHodf q}eflifs gLlt ckgfpg'k5{ eGg] dfGotf ToxfF 5 . wd{–lg/k]If x'g'k5{ eGg] ;fdfGo 5nkmn vgfnn] u/]sf 5g\ eg] tfdfªn] o;nfO{ Jojxf/df g} k|of]u ul/g'k5{ eGg] ts{ ub}{ o:tf] n]v]sf 5g\, æbz}+ vr{sf] gfddf Ps dlxgfsf] tna l;Q}df ljt/0f x'g' ;|f]tsf] emg\ 7'nf] b'?kof]u eof]Æ -k[= !$!_ . tfdfªsf] of] egfOn] wd{–lg/k]If elgP klg Pp6f wd{ dfGg] ;d'bfosf] rf8kj{nfO{ dfq /fHon] a9L dxŒj / k|fyldstf lbPsf]tkm{ nlIft 5 . lgZro klg o;n] Jojxfl/s ¿k lng s]xL ;do nfUnf t/ oxL l:ylt ;w}+ /Xof] eg] wd{–lg/k]Iftf s]jn sfuhdf dfq ;Lldt /xg] 5 . ;+:yf cGTo eP klg ;+:sf/ cGTo gePsf] o;af6 :ki6 b]lvG5 . lzIff, :jf:Yo, hLjg j[Qsf]if, vfB ;'/Iff, vfg]kfgL, ljB't, ;+rf/ / snsf/vfgfdf ;dfg kx"Fr k'Ug /fHon] e"ldsf v]Ng' k5{ eGb} s[lif, pBf]u, snsf/vfgf / lgdf{0f If]qsf dhb'/x¿sf] hLljsf]kfh{g dfdnfdf /fHon] x:tIf]k ug'{kg]{ lhls/ n]vsx¿sf] 5 . cf}Bf]lus ljsf;, ko{6g, hn>f]t, a}+lsª / Jofkf/ If]qdf lghL If]qn] nufgL ug'{k5{ eGg] pNn]v 5 . e"ldsf] k'glj{t/0f x'g'kg]{, :yfgLo k|fs[lts >f]t ;fwgx¿ :yfgLo ;d'bfon] g} ef]urng ug{ kfpg] Joj:yf ug'{kg]{ ts{ ul/Psf] 5 . ljsf;sf ;+efjgfdf ko{6g ljsf;nfO{ d'Vo hf]8 lbg'kg]{ tyf g]kfnsf] ljsf;sf] df]8]n c¿ b]z;Fu gldNg] x'gfn] g]kfnL df]8n g} tof/ kfg'{k5{ eGg] ts{ n]vsx¿sf] 5 . ;'j]bLn] k/lge{/tfsf] lgs[i6 pbfx/0f b]vfpg vf]h]sf 5g\ . j}b]lzs ;xfotf / C0fn] k/lge{/ agfPsf] ;Gbe{nfO{ pgn] o;/L pNn]v u/]sf 5g\, æx'Fbf x'Fbf ufpF3/df rkL{ agfpg]b]lv k|wfgdGqLsf] sfof{no ;hfpg] ;Ddsf sfddf a}b]lzs ;xof]u / C0fn] sfd ug{ yfNof]Æ -k[= (%_ . a}b]lzs C0f / ;xof]u klg cfjZos 5 t/ o;nfO{ s;/L 36fpg ;lsG5 eGg] alnof] cfwf/ vf]Hg' kg]{ s'/f k':tsdf cf}+NofOPsf] 5 . d"ntM clxn]sf] ljZjJofkLs/0f Psflwsf/ kF"hLjfbL k|s[ltsf] xf] eGg] cfd dfGotf 5 ; k/fl>t–kF"hLjfb lj:tf/ eof] eGg] / o;sf] ;dfwfg ;dfhjfbL cy{–/fhgLltdf vf]Hg] . km]l/ kF"hLjfbL ljZjJofkLs/0faf6 klG5g gldNg], o:tf] cSs/df k/]sf] u/La b]zsf] gofF cfly{s df]8]n s] xf]nf < n]vsn] Book Reviews 419 gofF cfly{s df]8]n :Kfi6 b]vfpg' kYof]{ . ;dfhjfbdf guP/ klg dn]lzof, l;Fufk'/ / >Lnª\sfh:tf ;fgf b]zx¿n] b|'t ultdf ljsf; ul//x]sf 5g\ . kF"hLsf] nufgL rqmLo k|0ffnLdf g]kfnd} eP / o;sf] ahf/ lglZrt eP cfTdlge{/ cy{tGqtkm{ d'n's pGd'v x'g ;S5 . ;ª\3Lo /fHox¿ klg cfTdlge{/eGbf …vf;f lge{/Ú gxf]nfg\ eGg ;lsGg . w]/} s'/fx¿df /fHon] x:tIf]k ug'{k5{ eGg] ts{ k':tsdf 5 t/ /fHonfO{ cfjZos kg]{ kF"hL ul/a hgtfn] s;/L ;~ro ul/lbg ;S5g\ < km]/L C0f / ;xof]usf] rlqmo k|0ffnLdf km:g] kf] xf] ls < ;ª\3Lo /fHox¿df /fli6«o kF"hL nufgLsf] 7fpF v's'nf] 5f]8\g'k5{ h;n] nufgL / k'gMnufgL ug]{ 7fpF kfcf];\ . ;'j]bLsf] ts{ 5, æ;fDojfbL, ;dfhjfbL, pbf/jfbL / klxrfgjfbL ;a}nfO{ Ps} 7fpFdf pEofpg' k5{Æ -k[= &*_ . oL jfbLx¿sf] ;w}+ åGå rln/xG5 . o:tf] cj:yfdf ;a} Ps 7fpFdf pleg s;/L ;Snfg\ < logLx¿sf] ax;sf] lgisif{ lvr8L gxf]nf eGg ;lsGg . k/Dk/fut a]nfotL df]8nsf] nf]stGqeGbf b]z / kl/l:yltcg';f/sf] gofF nf]stflGqs df]8n vf]Hg'k5{ eGg] ts{ vgfnsf] 5 . :jLh/Nof08sf] pbfx/0f lbFb} nf]stflGqs ljlw / k|lqmof, ;dfj]zLk"0f{ ;xeflutf, ;sf/fTds lje]bsf gLlt efjL ;ª\3Lo ;+/rgfdf /flvg'kg]{ ;jfn x'g\ eGg] ts{ vgfnn] u/]sf 5g\ . ;dfgtfd"ns ax';f+:s[lts /fi6«jfbsf] gofF df]8]n x'g'kg]{ ts{ klg plQs} alnof] 5 . efjL ;ª\3Lo ;+/rgfdf tLg tx– s]Gb|Lo, k|fb]lzs / :yfgLo x'g'k5{ eGg] k|:tfj o; k':tsdf ul/Psf] 5 . ;fy} ;ª\3Lo ;+/rgfdf ;a} ;d"xsf] cfsfª\IffnfO{ s;/L ;'lglZrttf ug{ ;lsG5 / o;sf] /fhgLlts tyf ;fdflhs–;f+:s[lts kIf / ljlw s] x'g] eGg]af/] k':tsdf /fd|/L pNn]v ul/Psf] 5 . ;ª\3Lotfn] b]z g6'lqmg], emg\ alnof] x'g] of] n]vsx¿sf ljZjf; 5 . ;ª\3Lo /fHox¿df k'gu{7g / k'g;{+/rgfnfO{ v'Nnf /fVg'k5{ eGg] ts{ k':tsdf 5 . o;sf] cy{ ;ª\3Lo PsfO{x¿nfO{ ultzLn agfpg' k5{ EfGg] xf] . t/ o;n] ;ª\3Lo OsfO{x¿ l56f]l56f] kl/jt{g ug'{kg]{ cl:y/ l:ylt gcfpnf eGg rflxFF ;lsGg . ;ª\3Lo /fHosf gful/sx¿sf] ;femf k|sf/sf] gful/stf x'g'k5{ eGg] dfGotf /fd|f] 5 . ;femf gful/stfn] g]kfnLTj / Pstfsf] efjgf emNsfpF5 . o;af/] tfdfªsf] egfO 5, ælxdfn, t/fO{ / kxf8sf gful/sx¿ Pscfk;df ldn]/ a;]sf] of] Oltxf; xfd|f] Pstfsf] klxnf] cfwf/ xf]Æ -k[= !%)_ . t/ pgn] ts{ u/]h:t} lxdfn, kxf8 / t/fO{ ldn]/ a;]sf] eGg ;lsg] cj:yf rflxF xf] eg] Pp6} agfp x} Û sf] gfddf Toqf] 7"nf] cfGbf]ng rls{g gkg]{ lyof] . ce}m kxf8 / t/fO{ Pp6} agfp x} Û sf] gfddf åGå rln/x]sf] 5 . o;af6 ldn]/ a;]sf]eGbf klg hah{:tL ldnfOPsf] k|i6 x'G5 . t;y{ o;nfO{ Pstfsf] klxnf] cfwf/ dfGg 420 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008

;lsFb}g ls < a? Pp6f bl/nf] /fli6«o Pstfsf] jf /fi6«jfbsf] lgdf{0fn] dfq} efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHox¿nfO{ Pstfsf] ;'qdf afFw]/ /fVb5 . k|:t't k':tsdf tLg} hgf n]vsn] cfly{s lje]bsf] d'2fnfO{ ;fdflhs Gofo;Fu} hf]8]/ x]g'{kg]{ pNn]v u/]sf 5g\ . klxrfg k|wfg xf] eGbfeGb} klg wgL u/Lasf] lje]b d]6fpg'k5{ eGg] ts{ pgLx¿sf] 5 . cfly{s a[l4 / ljsf;sf] ljt/0fdf ;dfgtf / ;dtf x'g'k5{ eGg] ts{ ;xL 5 . To:t} ;dfgtf df}lns clwsf/sf] ¿kdf x'g'k5{ eGg] ts{ klg plQs} bx|f] 5 . o;n] x'g]vfg] / xF'bfvfg]sf] b"/L sd ug{df ;xof]u k'¥ofpF5 . ax'/fli6«o /fHosf] jsfnt k':tsdf ul/Psf] 5 t/ c;kmn ePsf /fHox¿sf pbfx/0f lbP/ t;f{pg vf]h]h:tf] klg b]lvG5 . ljutdf h:tf] /fhgLlts cl:y/tf efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHodf x'g gx'g] ;'emfj n]vs vgfnsf] 5 . v'Nnf kF"hLjfbL /fhgLlts, cfly{s / ;fdflhs Joj:yfsf kIfdf vgfn b]lvG5g\ . ;'j]bL ;dfhjfbL cy{–/fhgLlts Joj:yfsf] kIfdf plePsf 5g\ eg] tfdfªn] dfcf]jfbLsf] ;ª\3Lotfn] j}wtf kfPsf] ts{n] lgikIf x'g vf]Hbf vf]Hb} klg otflt/ 9Ns]sf] efg x'G5 . tfklg k':tssf tLg}j6f n]vx¿ pTs[i6 5g\ . k':tsdf s]xL sdhf]/ kIfx¿ klg 5g\ . klxnf] n]vsf] pkzLif{sx¿df Ps¿ktf 5}g . s'g} zLif{sdf …af]N8Ú ul/Psf] 5 eg] s'g}df 5}g . o; n]vdf lgisif{ klg 5}g . olt nfdf] JofVof / ljZn]if0fsf] lgisif{ x'g'kYof]{ . bf];|f] n]vdf n]vsn] lqe'jgnfO{ …lbNnL knfogÚ eGg] zAb k|of]u u/]sf 5g\ . o;nfO{ knfog eGg gldNnf lsgeg] pgL ;w}Fsf nflu uPsf lyPgg\ . ;f]xL n]vdf …ljZjsLs[t,Ú …ljZjoLs[t,Ú …ljZjoLs/0fÚ h:tf zAb 5f]6\ofpg vf]Hbf zAb ljs[t ePsf 5g\ . cg'R5]b s'g} Hofb} nfdf / s'g} Hofb} 5f]6f 5g\ . tflnsf @=! df hldgsf] ljt/0fsf] l:ylt b]vfpFbf n]vsn] afx'g÷If]qLsf] b]vfPsf 5}gg\ . t'ngfsf] nflu Tof] klg b]vfPsf] eP /fd|f] x'GYof] . clGtd n]vdf ljåfg\sf] kl/efiffn] nfdf nfdf 7fFp cf]u6]sf] efg x'G5 . s]xL sdL sdhf]/Lx¿ x'Fbfx'Fb} klg ljZn]if0ffTds z}nLdf n]lvPsf] k|:t't k':ts pTs[i6 5 . efjL ;ª\3Lo /fHodf x'g'kg]{ u'bL s'/fx¿sf af/]df n]lvPsf n]vx¿ ;do ;fk]If 5g\ . /fHo k'g;{+/rgf;DaGwL ahf/df kfOg] c¿ k':tsx¿n] lglZrt vfsf l;kmfl/; u/]sf x'G5g\ t/ of] k':tsn] oxL g} x'g' k5{ eGg]eGbf klg o:tf] x'Fbf / oL ljifoj:t'x¿ efjL ;+/rgfdf ;dfj]z u/fpFbf 7Ls xf]nf eg]/ ax; cufl8 ;f/]sf] 5 . k':tssf] cfsf/ klg pko'Qm lsl;dsf] 5 . se/ l8hfOgdf cd"t{ snf ;dfj]z 5 . k':ts w]/}eGbf w]/} kf7sx¿sf] xftdf k'uf];\ eGg] x]t'n] xf]nf o;sf] d'No ?= !%) dfq} 5 . of] k':tssf] ljifoj:t', cfsf/ tyf ;a} b[li6sf]0fn] lgs} ;:tf] b]lvG5 . ljz]if u/]/ k'g;{+/rgf, ;ª\3Lotf;DaGwL Book Reviews 421 cWo]otf, cg';Gwfgstf{, lh1f;', /fhgLlt1 / cleofGtfsf nflu of] k':ts lgs} pkof]uL 5 . …gofF g]kfnÚ s:tf] x'g] eGg] rsf]{ ax; rln/x]sf] a]nf k|sflzt o; s[ltsf] ;fGble{stf lgs} 5 . ofd axfb'/ k'g sf7df8f}+