COLLOQUIUM 3

RHETORIC, REFUTATION, AND WHAT SOCRATES BELIEVES IN PLATO'S GORGIAS

HENRYTELOH

ABSTRACT I argue that Socrates employs rhetoric on Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles in the Gorgias. Moreover, in each conversation, Socrates distinguishes good from bad rhetoric, and he uses good rhetoric on his interlocutors. Socrates, I main• tain, believes that good rhetoric is a techne because it aims at the health of the soul. Finally, I defend the view that good rhetoric is a techne against the criticisms of Brickhouse and Smith, and Roochnik, as well as the fact that in the Gorgias Socrates does not tum his interlocutors to a life of philosophy.

I aim to show that Socrates extensively uses rhetoric in the Gorgias; in fact, it is reasonable to categorize a large part of what Socrates does in that dialogue as rhetorical. Socrates uses rhetoric as part of his philosophical and educational task to attempt a care of his interlocutors' souls ('l'uxa{). I further aim to show that Socrates recognizes that he uses rhetoric, and that he implies that the sort of rhetoric which he uses is a real art ('rEXVTl) of rhetoric. To support this claim I argue that in each of his conversations with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, Socrates distinguishes good from bad rhetoric where the former aims at the good of an interlocutor's soul, and the latter is only a repertoire of techniques for persuasion, which serve whatever aim a rhetorician may have. To accomplish my task I will argue the following for each of Socrates' three conversations: (a) that Socrates uses rhetoric, (b) that he thinks his rhetoric to be an art, and (c) he believes that his use of this art aims to improve the souls of his interlocutors. A result of my interpretation is that Socrates' words and deeds "chime in harmony together" (Laches 193d-e ). The art he talks about is the art he uses. A number of interpreters believe that the Gorgias constitutes a condem• nation of all rhetoric, and it is one of my aims to show that this position is mistaken 1 Martha Nussbaum says the following in The Fragility of Good• ness.2

1 Many commentators believe that Socrates condemns rhetoric. See among others, Thompson 1894, xiv-xviii; Zeller 1876, 190; Pater 1920, ch. 4; Rendalll977, 165; Cushman 1958, 231; Jaeger 1943, 1851. Kaufman 1979, 115-125 states that Plato's condemnation of 58 HENRYTELOH

The last part of the dialogue [Phaedrus] breaks with the Gorgias' general condemnation of rhetoric, describing a 'true' rhetorical art in which a central place is given to the knowledge, through experience, of the souls of individu• als. (268a-b) Presumably Nussbaum would agree that Socrates states or implies the "general condemnation of rhetoric" in the Gorg. If we conjoin Nuss• baum's claim with my arguments that Socrates uses rhetoric, and knows that he uses rhetoric, then Socrates is a hypocrite who condemns what he uses. Socrates is no better than any other relativistic rhetorician who tries to outmuscle his opponents. 3 Can we save Socrates from this charge? I think we can. My distinction between good rhetoric (the art of rhetoric) and bad rhetoric (no art at all) will exonerate Socrates from the charge of hypocrisy; Socrates practices the art of rhetoric which aims at the care of the soul, while he condemns a rhetoric which is only concerned with tech• niques for persuasion. 4 Moreover, we can explain why Socrates implies praise of one type of rhetoric with Gorgias, namely, the real art, and con• demns another with Polus, namely, the empirical knack (Ef.ll"t:ctp{a) which only consists ofthe techniques for persuasion (see Gorg. 450b-c, 452e). 5

rhetoric is conditional, but he also believes that the rhetoric Socrates practices is defective. Kaufman says that dialectic and rhetoric are complementary, but he does not say what this means. Black 1958, 365-369 argues that Socrates only attacks Gorgias' view of rhetoric; a position with which I agree. He goes on to assert that the same view of rhetoric is found in both the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, a view which I deny. Among those who realize that the Gorg. is mostly rhetoric are Lewis 1986, 195-210, and Tarrant 2002, 61-78. Roochnik 1995, 82 denies that there is a sharp distinction between rhetoric and philosophy, and that Socrates is ambiguous in his hostility to rhetoric. As we will see, I disagree with the latter claim. A. Spitzer 1975, 15-21 holds the position closest to mine. She distinguishes true from false rhetoric, and correctly sees that Socrates is the true rhetorician. Moreoever, she sees that Socrates addresses different characters differently in order to care for their souls. She does not, however, analyze Socrates' use of rhetoric or address the issue of techne. Stauffer 2006, 80, 133 mentions once that Socrates uses rhetoric on Polus, and he mentions that Socrates uses rhetorical punishment on Callicles, but neither of these claims is devel• oped, and on p. 160 he states that Socrates is unwilling to take up a new good rhetoric. Stauffer is too concerned with his claim that Socrates wants Gorgias to embrace the new rhetoric, to see clearly that Socrates does it. 2 Nussbaum 1979, 227. 3 The connection between rhetoric and relativism is the following: the best way to per• suade the people is to tell them what they want, but what they want changes from context to context. 4 I say that Socrates aims at care because it is clear to him that he faces an uphill battle which he well might lose. The reason he might lose is that his interlocutors are corrupted by society, and filled with imperialistic desires for power. 5 This is in opposition to Roochnik's position. See Roochnik 1995, 87 and 1996, 189.