Select Committee on COVID-19: First Interim Report

Home , Amanda Stoker, Anne Ruston, Coronavirus Australia, Credlin, Jacqui Lambie, Janet Rice

The Senate

Select Committee on COVID-19

First interim report

December 2020

ISBN 978-1-76093-173-5 (Printed Version)

ISBN 978-1-76093-173-5 (HTML Version)

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Membership of the committee

Chair Senator Katy Gallagher ALP, ACT

Deputy Chair Senator James Paterson LP, VIC

Members Senator Perin Davey NATS, NSW Senator the Hon Kristina Keneally ALP, NSW Senator Rachel Siewert AG, WA Senator Murray Watt ALP, QLD Senator Jacqui Lambie JLN, TAS

Substitute Members Senator Amanda Stoker LP, QLD (for Senator Paterson on 15 and 17 September 2020) Senator Slade Brockman LP, WA (for Senator Paterson on 22, 24 and 29 September 2020)

Participating Members Senator Patrick Dodson ALP, WA Senator Mehreen Faruqi AG, NSW Senator Sarah Hanson-Young AG, SA Senator Malarndirri McCarthy ALP, NT Senator Nick McKim AG, TAS Senator Rex Patrick IND, SA Senator Janet Rice AG, VIC Senator Jordon Steele-John AG, WA Senator Larissa Waters AG, QLD Senator Peter Wish-Wilson AG, TAS Former Senator Richard Di Natale AG, VIC

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Secretariat Ms Jeanette Radcliffe, Committee Secretary Dr Jane Thomson, Former Committee Secretary Mr Antony Paul, Principal Research Officer Mr Alan Raine, Former Principal Research Officer Ms Natasha Rusjakovski, Principal Research Officer Ms Pothida Youhorn, Former Principal Research Officer Ms Samantha Bradley, Senior Research Officer Mr Michael Finch, Senior Research Officer Ms Jade Monaghan, Research Officer Mr Jordan Knapp, Administrative Officer

Committee web page: www.aph.gov.au/select covid-19 PO Box 6100 E-mail: [email protected] Parliament House Ph: 02 6277 3892 Canberra ACT 2600 Fax: 02 6277 5706 iv

Table of contents

Membership of the committee ...... iii Table of abbreviations and acronyms ...... ix Executive summary ...... xi Recommendations ...... xv Supporting findings ...... xvii

Chapter 1—Introduction ...... 1 COVID-19 cases in Australia ...... 2 The scrutiny role of the committee ...... 2 Purpose of this report ...... 3 Conduct of the inquiry ...... 4 Acknowledgements ...... 4

Chapter 2—Preparation and initial response...... 7 Initial response in January 2020 ...... 7 Pandemic planning and preparation...... 9 Pandemic planning prior to COVID-19 ...... 10 The government's initial COVID-19 plan ...... 11 National Medical Stockpile ...... 12 Closing Australia's international borders ...... 14 Extension of travel restrictions...... 14 Self-isolation and quarantine requirements ...... 16 Australians stranded overseas ...... 17 Containment measures for cruise ships ...... 23

Chapter 3—Health response part I: managing COVID-19 in Australia ...... 31 The overarching health strategy ...... 32 Clarity in the strategy being pursued by National Cabinet ...... 32 Adoption of social distancing measures ...... 35 Lack of transparency behind key medical decisions...... 39 COVIDSafe app ...... 43 Access to a successful vaccine candidate ...... 45 An Australian Centre for Disease Control ...... 49

Chapter 4—Health response part II: aged care ...... 53 Responsibility for the aged care crisis ...... 54 How the crisis unfolded ...... 54 The Australian Government's refusal to accept responsibility ...... 56 Preparation and planning for COVID-19 ...... 57 Failure to anticipate shortages of staff and PPE ...... 60 Response to heightened community transmission in Victoria ...... 62 The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission ...... 64

Chapter 5—Economic response part I: The immediate economic fallout and response .... 69 The jobs impact of stage 3 lockdown ...... 70 The fiscal response to the economic crisis ...... 72 The design of JobKeeper ...... 75 Casual employees ...... 76 Temporary visa holders ...... 76 Local government ...... 77 Australian companies owned by foreign sovereign entities ...... 77 University workers ...... 77 Timing of JobKeeper ...... 78 Justification for exclusions ...... 79 The $60 billion costing mistake ...... 79 Decision to remove JobKeeper and other relief from the childcare sector ...... 81 JobSeeker ...... 82 Coronavirus supplement ...... 83 Permanent increase for JobSeeker ...... 84 Economic impact on women ...... 86 Early access to superannuation ...... 88 Access to paid pandemic leave ...... 92

Chapter 6—Economic response part II: the recession and the Australian jobs crisis ...... 95 The need for ongoing fiscal stimulus and job creation measures ...... 96 The Australian economy prior to COVID-19 ...... 96 Australia in recession: economic outlook over the forward estimates ...... 97 The ongoing need for fiscal stimulus and job creation ...... 98

The 'JobMaker' plan ...... 99 Missed Opportunities for Economic Recovery ...... 102 Social Housing ...... 103 Childcare as a measure to boost economic participation ...... 104 Renewable energy as a source of job creation...... 106 A manufacturing future in Australia ...... 107

Chapter 7—National governance, coordination and communication ...... 109 National Cabinet ...... 109 Communication around the need for school closures ...... 112 Internal border measures ...... 113 National Cabinet as a vehicle for secrecy ...... 115 The National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board ...... 116

Chapter 8—Looking ahead ...... 121 Concluding comments ...... 121 Future direction of the inquiry ...... 122

Coalition Senators' dissenting report ...... 123

Australian Greens Senators' additional comments ...... 169

Appendix 1—Timeline of key decisions and announcements ...... 183

Appendix 2—Public hearings and witnesses ...... 189

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personal protective equipment PPE Prime Minister’s Office PMO Reserve Bank of Australia RBA Royal Commission into Aged Care Aged Care Royal Commission Quality and Safety Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of Disability Royal Commission People with Disability Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 committee St Basil’s Home for the Aged St Basil’s Traveller with Illness Checklist TIC Western Australia WA World Health Organisation WHO

Executive summary

Background On 23 March 2020, the Senate established the Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) to scrutinise the Australian Government’s (government) health and economic response to COVID-19. The committee has broad terms of reference and is due to provide its final report by 30 June 2022.

This interim report sets out the committee’s initial findings with a focus on the government’s preparedness for a pandemic, the speed and efficacy of its health response, the economic response packages prior to the 2020–21 Budget, as well as the issues emerging from the initial phase of the pandemic including the aged care crisis and the lack of national co-ordination, governance and transparency of decision making.

The report does not focus on decisions taken by the states or territories as this falls outside of the terms of reference of this committee.

The establishment of the committee has allowed opposition and crossbench Senators to continue to engage constructively in the national interest to improve the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In publishing this report, the committee hopes that it can be used by the government to ensure that weaknesses in the initial phases of the response can be strengthened moving forward.

The report is principally based on evidence provided to the committee via 37 public hearings, 505 written submissions and answers to questions on notice provided by government departments, agencies and other witnesses.

Preparation and initial response While Australia has avoided the worst of the potential health outcomes, as at 8 December 2020 there have been over 27 987 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Australia and 908 people have died. More could have been done to prevent illness and this tragic loss of life.

The government did not have adequate plans in place either before, or during the pandemic. Not only did it fail to heed warnings prior to COVID-19 about the National Medical Stockpile of personal protective equipment, there were inadequacies in its approach to pandemic planning exercises. In its COVID-19 Response Plan developed in February, the government did not contemplate the closure of international borders and failed to properly prepare the aged care and disability sectors for the pandemic.

In relation to international border measures, there was much more the government could have done to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The early travel restrictions on four high risk countries were not extended beyond China, Italy, Iran and Korea until 20 March, by which point case numbers had risen to over 60 000 in Europe (excluding Italy) and over 10 000 in the United States. The Ruby Princess debacle, which occurred despite ‘bespoke arrangements’ under the command of the Australian Border Force, saw hundreds of passengers with COVID-19 spread the virus across the country. Efforts to bring Australians stranded overseas home have been woefully inadequate throughout the pandemic—as at 24 November 2020 there were still over 35 000 Australians unable to get home.

Health response The national health strategy was not explained clearly to the public until late July. Throughout most of March the Prime Minister appeared reluctant to fully embrace social distancing measures and confused the public with messages suggesting that things could carry on as normal. The lack of any clear strategy in this critical period ultimately saw New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria take the lead on a decision to go into a national lockdown.

Issues with the government's leadership of the health response persisted throughout the pandemic. The COVIDSafe app, which was supposed to be 'like sunscreen' and enable the states and territories to reopen, failed to meet its download target, suffered performance issues and to date has only identified 17 close contacts. Australia has lagged behind other countries in securing access to a vaccine and is yet to reassure the community it has a plan to deal with major logistical hurdles. Medical advice behind key decisions has been kept secret from the public and attempts by the committee to seek more information have been deliberately frustrated.

The government is responsible for significant failings in the aged care sector prior to, and during the pandemic. As at 9 October 2020, 683 Australians had died from COVID-19 in aged care facilities—accounting for 74.6 per cent of all deaths from COVID-19 in Australia. 1 The pandemic exposed and exacerbated long-running problems in the sector. The government was unprepared; failing to anticipate crippling staff shortages and a high volume of requests for personal protective equipment (PPE). It failed to learn important lessons from early outbreaks at residential aged care facilities in NSW and was too slow to respond to escalating community transmission in Victoria. The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission should have done more to keep residents safe.

1 Department of Health, 'COVID-19 outbreaks in Australian residential aged care facilities', www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/covid-19-outbreaks-in-australian- residential-aged-care-facilities-9-october-2020 1.pdf (accessed 12 October 2020).

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The committee is disappointed that, rather than accept its mistakes in leading the health response and keeping aged care residents safe, the government has repeatedly sought to avoid taking responsibility and shift blame onto the states. The Prime Minister also created confusion and splintered federal cooperation by criticising state and territory decisions to close schools and impose domestic border restrictions.

Economic response In terms of the government's economic response, the JobKeeper initiative has been critical in staving off the worst-case scenario. However, the government's initial reluctance to embrace a large-scale wage subsidy meant it opted for an early access super scheme which will see $41.9 billion taken from the retirement savings of those workers who were the hardest hit by COVID-19. It did not conduct any analysis of the gendered impact of the pandemic, nor did the government consider gender impact in designing key measures like the early access super scheme and JobKeeper.

The ongoing uncertainty about the inadequate permanent rate of JobSeeker remains a handbrake on economic recovery and a source of unnecessary anxiety for the 1.5 million Australians relying on unemployment payments to survive. The government could have fixed this in the 2020–21 Budget but they chose not to.

Australia is now in a deep recession after entering 2020 with slow growth, falling business confidence and a prolonged period of stagnant wages. Economic forecasts paint a stark picture, with unemployment projected to remain above pre- pandemic levels throughout the forward estimates.

In this context, the economic recovery measures announced in the government's recent budget are not enough to create jobs and restore the Australian economy to full employment. To make matters worse, the government signalled its intention to pull back on economic stimulus measures and focus on fiscal discipline once unemployment falls below 6 per cent. The committee urges the government to adopt further measures aimed at job creation, including investment in social housing and reforms to childcare aimed at boosting economic participation.

To ensure Australia is better prepared for future outbreaks of COVID-19 or another pandemic, the committee makes the following recommendations.

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Recommendations

Recommendation 2 3.62 The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission an independent review into expenditure on, and design of, the COVIDSafe app.

Recommendation 4 5.74 The committee recommends that the Australian Government monitor the economic impact of reducing the Coronavirus Supplement and report back to the Senate with any data on the impact of the reductions.

Recommendation 5 5.75 The committee recommends that the Australian Government permanently raise the rate of JobSeeker at the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook or in the 2021–22 Budget.

Recommendation 6 7.41 Considering the significant public expenditure on the National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board (NCCAB), the committee recommends that the Australian Government make all reports of the NCCAB public, along with all declarations of actual and perceived conflicts of interest made by commissioners.

Supporting findings

Preparation and initial response

Interim finding 2.1 The Australian Government should have responded to COVID-19 with greater urgency in January 2020 and begun preparations for a possible pandemic.

Interim finding 2.2 Pandemic planning pre-COVID-19 was not adequate. Australia's planning for a pandemic had assumed an influenza-type virus. This left us unprepared when that wasn't the case. The Australian Government's initial COVID-19 response plan adopted in February contained key gaps, including failures to contemplate the closure of international borders, and the neglect of the aged care and disability sectors.

Interim finding 2.3 The Australian Government failed to act on warnings regarding the inadequacy of its National Medical Stockpile prior to the bushfires and the pandemic.

Interim finding 2.4 The Australian Government should have acted earlier and with more consistency on decisions to extend travel restrictions and impose strict quarantine measures on international arrivals. It is unclear which level of government was responsible for compliance with home quarantine arrangements for returning travellers between 1 February and 28 March—when compulsory hotel quarantine arrangements were mandated. There were no compliance checks taken throughout this time.

Interim finding 2.5 As at 24 November, there were 36 875 Australians registered with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as being stranded overseas as wishing to come home to Australia. The Australian Government should have been putting in place plans for Australians stranded overseas to return home after international borders were closed in March. The Australian Government knew of the escalating crisis for Australians overseas and did not adequately prepare or plan for their safe return. There remains a number of options that the Australian Government could utilise—including expanding commonwealth-funded quarantine facilities,

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chartering flights or using the Royal Australian Air Force fleet—to assist stranded Australians in getting home.

Interim finding 2.6 The Ruby Princess outbreak occurred following the Prime Minister announcing that arriving cruise ships would be 'directly under the command of the Australian Border Force' with 'bespoke arrangements' in place. The Australian Government did not follow its legislated responsibilities on human quarantine. The Australian Government did not follow its legislated responsibilities on human biosecurity, with officials from the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment failing to administer Traveller with Illness Checklists and follow other key protocols designed to identify and manage active cases of COVID-19. The Australian Government is still unable to identify which Australian Government official granted pratique for passengers to disembark the Ruby Princess on 19 March 2020.

Health Response Part I: Managing COVID-19 in Australia

Interim finding 3.1 The Australian Government's overarching strategy to deal with COVID-19 was not explained clearly to the public until late July—more than four months after strict sanctions were placed on the way Australians lived their lives. The lack of a clear strategy on how to respond to COVID-19 in Australia affected early decision making by the Australian Government, which ultimately saw the states and territories, in particular New South Wales and Victoria, take charge and force the national lockdown on 30 March.

Interim finding 3.2 The $5.24 million COVIDSafe app has significantly under-delivered on the Prime Minister's promise that the app would enable an opening up of the economy in a COVID safe manner. The app was launched with significant performance issues and has only been of limited effectiveness in its primary function of contact-tracing.

Interim finding 3.3 The Australian Government has lagged in securing vaccine deals and needs to do more to catch up. It also overstated its progress towards securing access to a vaccine in August when it prematurely announced a deal with the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca.

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Health Response Part II: Aged Care

Interim finding 4.1 The aged care sector experienced a COVID-19 crisis which resulted in unacceptably poor outcomes, including hundreds of tragic and preventable deaths. The Australian Government failed to accept full responsibility for the aged care crisis, despite being the primary source of funding and the principal regulator of the sector. The crisis had catastrophic consequences for many elderly Australians and their families.

Interim finding 4.2 Australia's aged care system was in crisis before the pandemic arrived. Lack of access to health care staff, inadequate staffing levels, and lack of access to personal protective equipment and infection control training were all problems that predated COVID-19 and that had been outlined to the government in various reports over several years including in the 2019 Aged Care Royal Commission's report titled Neglect. The Australian Government failed to develop a COVID-19 plan for the sector, which was unprepared and ill-equipped to protect the safety of residents when the pandemic hit. The committee does not accept the argument put to it by the Minister and senior officials that once community transmission of COVID-19 occurs, outbreaks and deaths in aged care are inevitable.

Interim finding 4.3 The committee does not accept claims by the Australian Government that it was unable to anticipate the situation which occurred at St Basil's Home for the Aged and other Victorian aged care facilities. The Australian Government failed to learn from earlier outbreaks at aged care facilities in New South Wales, particularly in relation to surge staffing capacity, personal protective equipment and infection control.

Interim finding 4.4 The Australian Government failed to respond quickly enough to protect elderly Australians living in aged care facilities. The Victorian Aged Care Response Centre should have been stood up before 25 July when there was already 294 infections and 26 deaths. A more urgent response from the Australian Government could have prevented the significant loss of the lives of elderly Australians.

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Interim finding 4.5 The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission (ACQSC) failed to use all available regulatory powers to ensure the safety of aged care residents. The ACQSC placed too much reliance on self-assessment surveys by aged care service providers to gauge the sector's preparedness for keeping elderly Australians safe. ACQSC assessors perform essential work and should not have suspended all unannounced visits during the pandemic.

Economic Response Part I: The immediate economic fallout and response

Interim finding 5.1 The Australian Government's reluctance and delay in adopting a large-scale wage subsidy distorted the design of its economic packages. The Australian Government's decision to rely on the retirement savings system for economic stimulus will have long term consequences for millions of Australians.

Interim finding 5.2 The Australian Government designed JobKeeper in a way which unnecessarily and deliberately excluded over one million Australian workers from the scheme. The Australian Government should have expanded JobKeeper eligibility to include more Australian workers when the $60 billion costing error was identified. If JobKeeper had been designed to include more Australian workers, more jobs could have been saved.

Interim finding 5.3 The rate of JobSeeker is inadequate at $40 per day. The committee is concerned that the Australian Government is withdrawing fiscal support too early in the recovery phase by reducing the Coronavirus Supplement at the end of September 2020 and again in January 2021, and that this will have negative consequences for the economy.

Interim finding 5.4 The Australian Government should have undertaken analysis of the gendered impact of the decisions it made when responding to the pandemic. This would have improved the information available to decision makers and ensured that specific impacts were considered before finalising fiscal or policy measures.

xx Interim finding 5.5 In the first six months of the pandemic, the Australian economy was supported by the private savings of the people who were hit hardest by COVID-19 restrictions. The early access superannuation scheme is Australia's largest economic response to the pandemic after JobKeeper. More than 2.7 million Australians have accessed the scheme and the Department of the Treasury estimates $41.9 billion will be withdrawn from superannuation accounts by December 2020. This will cost Australia's retirement income system more than $100 billion over the long term.

Interim finding 5.6 The Australian Government refused to put in place a paid pandemic leave scheme at the earliest opportunity in order to protect workers and protect lives. The Australian Government only acted following the aged care crisis and in response to a concerted public campaign and significant evidence that low paid workers were continuing to attend work despite being unwell.

Economic Response Part II: The recession and the Australian jobs crisis

Interim finding 6.1 Economic forecasts over the forward estimates paint a grim economic reality for the years ahead. The Australian economy was weak prior to COVID-19, and recovery from the recession will take a long time. The economy cannot afford for the Australian Government to prematurely withdraw fiscal stimulus measures and jeopardise the recovery.

Interim finding 6.2 In the six months since it was first announced, the Prime Minister's 'JobMaker Plan' has promised much but delivered little. Two major initiatives under the JobMaker brand—HomeBuilder and the Hiring Credit—significantly overstated the likely job creation impact.

Interim finding 6.3 The Australian Government's JobMaker plan should have included investment in social housing and reforms to childcare to promote jobs and economic recovery. The Australian Government should consider these and other opportunities to get Australia back to full employment, including new policies to promote onshore manufacturing capability and renewable energy as sources of job creation.

xxi National Governance, Coordination and Communication

Interim finding 7.1 Despite claiming the protection of cabinet processes, the National Cabinet has not functioned in accordance with longstanding Westminster conventions on cabinet government in relation to collective responsibility and solidarity. The Prime Minister's public criticisms of certain state premiers' decisions (school closures and internal border measures) fractured the national response and created unnecessary public confusion and anxiety. The Australian Government has improperly applied cabinet conventions to avoid transparency in relation to decisions made by the National Cabinet.

Interim finding 7.2 The $6.5 million National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board lacks transparency, has access to cabinet documents without commensurate accountability, has not released any work publicly, and has failed to demonstrate how conflicts of interest are managed for commissioners.

xxii Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The Department of Health first became aware of undiagnosed pneumonia in the People's Republic of China on 31 December 2019. 1 On 25 January 2020, the first case of COVID-19 was detected in Australia. 2 Eight weeks later on 18 March, the Governor-General declared a human biosecurity emergency under the Biosecurity Act 2015. 3 1.2 To respond to the threat posed by the virus and limit its spread, the Commonwealth, state and territory governments implemented a range of extraordinary health and economic responses, including unprecedented restrictions to enforce social distancing, border control measures, and high levels of government spending. 1.3 From March 2020, the pandemic fundamentally changed our way of life. For its part, the Parliament accepted the need for swift and serious action and worked across party lines. While the opposition and crossbench expressed concerns about certain aspects of the Australian Government's (government)4 response, all members of parliament and Senators recognised the need to facilitate the passage of key government legislation aimed at supporting Australians during the crisis. 1.4 The Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020 (package) was introduced to Parliament on 23 March 2020. 5 The package gave legislative effect to the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including its economic response, as announced between 12 and 22 March. 6 The package focused on four key areas: targeted payments to households; cash flow assistance to small and medium sized businesses; investment support through

1 Department of Health (DoH), answers to written questions on notice, 22 May 2020 (received 24 June 2020), p. 1.

2 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), Submission 3, p. 3.

3 DPM&C, Submission 3, Attachment 1, p. 9; Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) Declaration 2020 (Cth), 18 March 2020.

4 Unless otherwise stated, 'the government' refers to the Australian Government throughout this report.

5 House of Representatives, Votes and Proceedings, No. 51, 23 March 2020, p. 827; Journals of the Senate, No. 47, 23 March 2020, p. 1548.

6 Explanatory Memorandum, Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020, p. 1.

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an increase to the instant asset write off; and support for regions and communities disproportionately affected by COVID-19. 7 1.5 A third package announced on 30 March established a new wage subsidy in the form of 'JobKeeper', which provided a $1500 fortnightly wage subsidy to eligible employees of businesses that could demonstrate a sufficient decline in revenue during the pandemic. 8 1.6 The government's fiscal support announced in March equated to $194 billion across the forward estimates, representing 10 per cent of annual GDP. 9 Provisions of the bill provided the Minister for Families and Social Services with the broad discretion to extend the coronavirus supplement to other income support payments by legislative instrument. 10

COVID-19 cases in Australia 1.7 As of 8 December 2020, there have been 27 987 cases of COVID-19 in Australia, of which 25 450 individuals have recovered. 11 To date, 908 people have died from COVID-19 in Australia, of which three-quarters have been from aged care facilities. 12

The scrutiny role of the committee 1.8 The Parliament met for a single day on 23 March to consider the government's economic response to the pandemic. Due to concerns that further meetings would risk spreading the virus, the Parliament agreed through the two chambers to substantially reduce the number of planned sittings. 13 The Senate

7 Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Minister for Finance, Senate Hansard, 23 March 2020, p. 1788.

8 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, '130 billion JobKeeper payment to keep Australians in a job', Transcript, 30 March 2020.

9 Department of the Treasury, Overview – Economic Response to the Coronavirus, 31 March 2020, treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Overview- Economic Response to the Coronavirus 2.pdf (accessed 19 November 2020).

10 Explanatory Memorandum, Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020, p. 14.

11 DoH, Coronavirus (COVID-19) at a glance – 8 December 2020, 9 December 2020, https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-8-december- 2020 (accessed 9 December 2020).

12 DoH, Coronavirus (COVID-19) at a glance – 8 December 2020, 9 December 2020, https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-8-december- 2020 (accessed 9 December 2020).

13 See comments about the revised sitting calendar by the Hon Christian Porter MP, Leader of the House, House of Representatives Hansard, 23 March 2020, p. 2893.

suspended its schedule of sittings until 11 August 2020, but each House agreed to resolutions providing flexibility for them to meet before then if required. 14 1.9 In the absence of a regular parliamentary sitting schedule, on 8 April the Senate established the Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) with extremely broad terms of reference: 'the Australian Government's response to the COVID- 19 pandemic and any related matters'.15 1.10 With Parliament not expected to meet for another four months, the committee was established so that it could discharge the parliamentary oversight that Parliament itself was not able to carry out via regular means. 1.11 There was no opposition to the Senate resolution establishing the committee. 16 The government said it welcomed this oversight of its decisions. 17 1.12 At the first public hearing, the Chair, Senator Katy Gallagher, observed that the committee 'is not your typical Senate committee'. She explained: This committee is a key vehicle to provide accountability, transparency and scrutiny of the Australian Government's response to the pandemic for the Australian people. Over the next [26] months we will work tirelessly to shine a light on every aspect of the national response. 18 1.13 Throughout its inquiry, the committee will look back to scrutinise the programs and policies that have already been implemented by government. It will also look ahead to short and long-term risks and opportunities for Australia's economic recovery and management of the pandemic.

Purpose of this report 1.14 This interim report sets out the committee's early findings on the government's response to COVID-19. 1.15 This report focuses on some of the major issues arising from the first eight months of COVID-19 in Australia. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive examination of the many issues raised with the committee in written submissions, correspondence and hearings. The committee may choose to

14 Journals of the Senate, No. 47, 23 March 2020, p. 1462; House of Representatives Votes and Proceedings, No. 51, 23 March 2020, pp. 826–827.

15 Journals of the Senate, No. 48, 8 April 2020, pp. 1480–1484. See comments about the proposal to establish the committee by Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1870; and by Senator Katy Gallagher, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1904.

16 Journals of the Senate, No. 48, 8 April 2020, pp. 1480–1484. The resolution establishing the committee provides for its membership and procedures.

17 See comments by Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Leader of the Government in the Senate, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1867, p. 1885, and pp. 1908–1909; and by Senator James Paterson, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1897.

18 Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 1. 4

revisit some of these issues and report on them in greater detail throughout the inquiry period. 1.16 The committee's oversight work is not limited to its reports. The committee has also held a substantial number of public hearings and accepted a large body of written evidence from government and the community.

Conduct of the inquiry 1.17 The committee is due to present its final report by 30 June 2022, but also intends to present interim reports like this one over the course of its inquiry. The pace and nature of the inquiry will reflect the evolution of the pandemic and the government's response. The committee's intentions for the future of its inquiry are discussed further in Chapter 8. 1.18 The committee has held 37 public hearings and one private hearing thus far. While videoconferencing was used at every hearing, each one was based in Canberra with appropriate physical distancing and other COVID safe measures observed. The dates of the hearings and witnesses who gave evidence at each public hearing are listed in Appendix 2. 1.19 The committee called for written submissions to be lodged by 28 May 2020. After continuing to receive a great deal of interest from the public, the committee decided to formally re-open the submission period. As at 9 December 2020, the committee has accepted 505 written submissions. All published submissions are available on the committee's webpage. 19 This is in addition to:

 558 published documents containing more than 1800 answers to questions on notice;  124 other published documents including tabled documents, correspondence and additional documents;  two separate form letters received from 1700 individuals and 117 individuals respectively; and  hundreds of pieces of correspondence.

Acknowledgements 1.20 The committee thanks all those who have provided evidence to the inquiry. In particular, the committee acknowledges the substantial efforts of public servants to assist the committee and appear at hearings, often at short notice, amidst high pressures and large workloads. 1.21 More broadly, the committee recognises all those who have come together in the face of this pandemic. Doctors, nurses and other medical staff have dedicated themselves to treating Australians under immense pressures. Public servants have worked hard to develop and deliver critical supports like JobSeeker and

19 www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary Business/Committees/Senate/COVID-19/COVID19/Submissions.

JobKeeper. Employers and employees, businesses and unions, teachers, cleaners, aged care workers, supermarket staff, delivery drivers, and so many other members of our community have worked together—often in very difficult circumstances—to keep our community safe whilst maintaining essential services. 1.22 The committee also acknowledges that as COVID-19 first spread, our country was already weathering another crisis. The 2019–20 summer saw bushfires devastate our environment, damage livelihoods, and, most regrettably, take the lives of fellow Australians. 1.23 While Australia has fared better than many other parts of the world so far, the COVID-19 pandemic is not over. The committee will continue to scrutinise the government's response to the pandemic and encourage a strong recovery that is fair, inclusive and does not leave people behind.

which ministers were briefed and when on the unfolding developments in China. 2.6 The Australian consulate in Shanghai, which is responsible for the Hubei province and the city of Wuhan, sent only three cables to Canberra regarding the outbreak between 2 and 20 January 2020. 6 These cables referred to publicly available material, and provided limited additional information from private sources such as direct discussions with Chinese authorities or the World Health Organisation (WHO). 7 2.7 The information relied upon by the government in January 2020 does not appear to have extended beyond this information, which we now know had some limitations and may not have presented a full picture of the early stages of the outbreak in China. 8 2.8 It is unclear when key Cabinet ministers were briefed about this 'watching mode'. The committee was told the CMO 'informally briefed' the Minister for Health sometime before 19 January, and that formal briefings to government started on 19 January. 9 However, despite repeated requests from the committee, further details regarding early briefings have not been provided. 10 2.9 Other countries—particularly certain countries in Asia that were affected by previous pathogens—responded to news of undiagnosed pneumonia in Wuhan with more urgency than Australia. Media reports in various Asian publications discussed concerns about the potential for a serious outbreak, 11 and, for example, travellers from Wuhan to Changi airport in Singapore were subject to

6 Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, pp. 50–51; Andrew Greene and Georgia Hitch, 'Australian diplomatic cables from China detail early confused weeks of coronavirus emergency', ABC News, 31 August 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-31/coronavirus-diplomatic-cables-show-early-confused-weeks- covid-19/12401064 (accessed 31 August 2020).

7 Ms Adamson, Secretary, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, pp. 50–51.

8 Regarding the limitations of the public advice see, for example, Dr Raina MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2. Also see Dr Peter Collignon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 3.

9 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 3.

10 See for example: DoH, answers to written questions on notice, 28 April 2020 (received 26 June 2020), document no. 154, [p. 1].

11 Mr Ross Daniels, Ms Sharon Smith, Dr Lee Coaldrake and Mr Samuel Daniels, Submission 344, p. 3.

Pandemic planning prior to COVID-19 2.14 Before the emergence of COVID-19, the government had a series of plans in place to address disasters, including the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (updated in August 2019). 17 2.15 However, the committee received evidence suggesting Australia's pandemic planning prior to COVID-19 had some deficiencies. 2.16 Dr Raina MacIntyre, who has been involved in pandemic planning for over 20 years in Australia, suggested that since the 2009 pandemic 'some things have changed in the way we think about broad expertise', and that in the early months of the pandemic 'we had very narrow expertise driving the agenda'. 18 2.17 Appearing in a private capacity, Mr William Bowtell AO, an architect of Australia's public policy response to the AIDS pandemic, questioned how the government allowed itself to be 'caught seemingly unaware' and suggested the effectiveness of preventative pandemic planning 'has not been good'.19 2.18 Dr Norman Swan testified before the committee that: This virus has behaved the way viruses and infections have behaved for centuries...[O]ne knows that the virus always wins, that this was coming, that it was serious and that the modellers, not necessarily Australian modellers but overseas modellers, were showing very early that the only thing that works to control it, and they've modelled all the variables— testing, isolation, quarantine—is social distancing when you've not got a vaccine and you've not got a treatment. We were behaving as though it was influenza. Our pandemic planning was around influenza. 20 2.19 It is also not clear that the government conducted adequate preparatory pandemic exercises. Some media reporting indicates that Australia has not run a large-scale pandemic simulation exercise since 2008. 21

17 Karen Elphick, Australian pandemic response planning: a quick guide, Australian Parliamentary Library, 28 April 2020, www.aph.gov.au/About Parliament/Parliamentary Departments/ Parliamentary Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick Guides/AustralianPandemicResponsePlanning (accessed 28 August 2020).

18 Dr MacIntyre leads the Biosecurity Program at the Kirby Institute at the University of New South Wales and gave evidence in a private capacity. See, Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 5.

19 Mr William Bowtell AO, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 13. Also see, for example, Australian Medical Association, Submission 86, p. 5.

20 Dr Norman Swan, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 15.

21 Dylan Welch and Alexandra Blucher, 'Australia ran its last national pandemic drill the year the iPhone launched. Did that harm our coronavirus response?', ABC News, 20 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-20/coronavirus-australia-ran-its-last-pandemic-exercise-in- 2008/12157916 (accessed 28 August 2020); Adam Kamradt-Scott, 'Opinion: I helped prepare Australia's pandemic plan and so far it's unfolding reasonably well', The Sydney Morning Herald,

2.20 Dr Murphy rejected the suggestion that the last pandemic planning drill occurred over a decade ago as 'completely untrue', citing an exercise in May 2019 on a pandemic in a cruise ship coming into Sydney.22 2.21 However, the Ruby Princess cruise ship outbreak raises serious questions about the efficacy of the pandemic planning drill referred to by Dr Murphy. The fact that infected passengers disembarked a cruise ship without public health measures being enforced and subsequently became the major source of community transmission implies that this exercise was either inadequate or not used to inform the real-life response when the pandemic occurred.

The government's initial COVID-19 plan 2.22 In February, the government developed the Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19 Plan). 2.23 However, there were clear gaps in this plan. For example, it did not contemplate closure of international borders, as highlighted in a submission from the Grattan Institute. 23 2.24 The government stated in its COVID-19 Plan that it would be responsible for aged care. 24 However, the government failed to develop a COVID-19 plan specifically for the aged care sector. 25 In its special report, Aged care and COVID- 19, the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety found that measures implemented by the government 'were in some respects insufficient to ensure preparedness of the aged care sector'. 26 2.25 The government also neglected the needs of people with disability in its initial planning and response. In a report released in November 2020, the Royal

1 April 2020, www.smh.com.au/national/i-helped-prepare-australia-s-pandemic-plan-and-so-far-it- s-unfolding-reasonably-well-20200331-p54fhf.html (accessed 28 August 2020).

22 Dr Murphy, CMO, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 13; 'Australian Government Response to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing report: Diseases have no Borders: Report on the Inquiry into Health Issues across International Borders, August 2018, pp. 20–21, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/diseases- have-no-borders-report-on-the-inquiry-into-health-issues-across-international-borders (accessed 28 August 2020).

23 Grattan Institute, Submission 230, p. 20.

24 The plan provides, at paragraph 4.1.4, that ‘The Australian Government will also be responsible for residential aged care facilities; working with other healthcare providers to set standards to promote the safety and security of people in aged care and other institutional settings; and establishing and maintaining infection control guidelines, healthcare safety and quality standards’. See DoH, Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 2020, para. 4.1.4.

25 Mr Peter Rozen QC, Counsel Assisting, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Aged Care Royal Commission), Transcript of Proceedings, 10 August 2020, p. 8367.

26 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 11.

and ventilators. 33 The stockpile of masks also increased substantially, at a total cost of $3.2 billion. 34 2.30 The need to rapidly increase the quantity and type of items held in the stockpile implies that it may not have been appropriately stocked. Indeed, Dr Murphy told the committee that there were certain scenarios for which Australia would not have had enough PPE. 35 2.31 Health expert Dr MacIntyre gave warnings before the COVID-19 pandemic hit that 'the stockpiling has failed to have anywhere near the required masks and respirators for health workers'.36 She added: A year ago I presented research we'd done to the chair of the [Communicable Diseases Network Australia] which showed that, if there were a serious epidemic in Sydney that lasted six months, we'd need 30 million respirators for Sydney alone. This wasn't heeded clearly, and then we had the bushfires. So we were in a bad situation with the stockpiling of the masks. We can't make that mistake again. 37 2.32 The DoH acknowledged there have been some concerns about PPE supplies, including of masks, 38 and gowns. 39 It also told the committee that of the 2865 requests made by aged care service providers to access PPE from the NMS between March and mid-August, only 1324 were approved. 40 2.33 Peak bodies raised serious concerns directly with the committee about the availability or distribution of PPE. 41 The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners said its members reported being encouraged or compelled to

33 Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary, DoH, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020, pp. 24–25.

34 DoH, answers to written questions on notice, 10 July 2020 (received 19 August 2020), document no. 283, [p. 7].

35 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 5.

36 Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2; Dr Collignon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 9; Mr Bowtell, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 14; Ms Annie Butler, Federal Secretary, Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 26.

37 Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2.

38 DoH, answers to written questions on notice, 28 April 2020 (received 4 June 2020), document no. 90, p. 1.

39 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 11.

40 DoH, answers to questions on notice, 28 August 2020 (received 21 October 2020), document no. 530, pp. 1–2.

41 See e.g., Australian Medical Association, Submission 86, p. 15; People with Disabilities Western Australia, Submission 116, p. 8; Australian Nursing and Midwifery Foundation, Submission 125, p. 9; Rural Doctors Association of Australia, Submission 411, p. 4; Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 8.

residents. 48 In the period from 1 February to 20 March, Australia's number of reported cases of COVID-19 grew from 12 to 872. 49 2.37 The committee heard testimony from Mr Bowtell that following the travel ban placed on China, 'there ought to have been a similar ban, or very strong restrictions, put on travel for people coming in from the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States'.50 2.38 On 13 March—one week prior to Australia extending restrictions to travellers from all countries—there were 1264 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the US, 594 in the UK, and over 13 000 in Europe (excluding Italy), including 2965 in Spain. 51 By the time travel restrictions were extended on 20 March, the number of cases had risen to over 60 000 in Europe (excluding Italy), 10 442 in the United States and 3277 in the United Kingdom. 52 2.39 It is unclear why it wasn't until 18 March that the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) stated that 'the risk for importation from the USA and Europe (including the UK) was now considered high, as is potentially the risk from other countries where ascertainment may be poor'.53 2.40 By that point, the AHPPC had become ambivalent about the need for travel restrictions as long as universal quarantine continued, citing low levels of international travel by foreign nationals and recommending that travel restrictions be either lifted completely or applied equally to all countries'. 54

48 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on Coronavirus Measures', Media Release, 20 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-0 (accessed 26 August 2020).

49 DoH, States & Territories Report, 17 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel- coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/coronavirus-covid-19-current-situation-and-case-numbers (accessed 18 November 2020).

50 Mr Bowtell, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 17.

51 WHO, COVID-19 Situation Report – 60, 13 March 2020, www.who.int/docs/default- source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200313-sitrep-53-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=adb3f72 2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

52 WHO, COVID-19 Situation Report – 60, 20 March 2020, www.who.int/docs/default- source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200320-sitrep-60-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=d2bb4f1f 2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

53 'Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) coronavirus (COVID-19) statement regarding travel restrictions on 18 March 2020', 19 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health-protection-principal-committee-ahppc-coronavirus- covid-19-statement-regarding-travel-restrictions-on-18-march-2020-0 (accessed 29 July 2020).

54 'Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) coronavirus (COVID-19) statement regarding travel restrictions on 18 March 2020', 19 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health-protection-principal-committee-ahppc-coronavirus- covid-19-statement-regarding-travel-restrictions-on-18-march-2020-0 (accessed 29 July 2020).

2.41 It is also unclear exactly when the government first became aware of an elevated risk associated with travellers returning from the USA and Europe. It is equally unclear when the government became aware of risks from some countries with limited ability to ascertain transmission levels. This lack of clarity can be attributed to the government's refusal to prove the committee with access to key documents such as AHPPC minutes which would provide that information. 55 2.42 Given how important the initial border closures have turned out to be, the government should not have waited so long to extend them to other countries where the risk was high or unknown. 2.43 Dr MacIntyre described border controls as 'the single most important measure', 56 while Dr Murphy told the committee on 23 April that of the decisions made by government, 'the most important early decisions were related to border measures'. 57 This is in conflict with the ambivalent advice released by the AHPPC on 18 March. 2.44 There are also important questions over why Australia did not engage in other risk mitigation measures at international airports. Mr Bowtell told the committee in a hearing on 25 June that in his view: …over February there ought to have been a much higher degree of border surveillance, temperature checking and assessment at our international airports. That was done in Singapore, Hong Kong and other hub airports on the way to Australia. 58 2.45 In light of the importance of border measures and Dr Murphy's evidence on 23 April that 'two-thirds of cases in Australia are reported as being overseas acquired', 59 the government should have acted prior to 20 March to extend travel restrictions beyond China, Iran, South Korea and Italy.

Self-isolation and quarantine requirements 2.46 From 1 February, returning travellers from China were required to self-isolate at home for 14 days. 60 The same mandatory self-isolation requirement was implemented when restrictions on travellers from Iran, South Korea and Italy came into effect. However, it was not until 16 March that the government

55 The committee was refused access to AHPPC minutes from 26 February 2020. See DoH, answers to questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 19 August 2020), document no. 284.

56 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2.

57 Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 12.

58 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 17.

59 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, Opening Statement, p. 1, document no. 19, (tabled 26 May 2020).

60 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Updated travel advice to protect Australians from the novel coronavirus', Media Release, 1 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/updated-travel-advice- protect-australians-novel-coronavirus (accessed 4 September 2020).

announced all overseas travellers would be required to self-isolate for 14 days on arrival.61 2.47 At no stage were compliance checks undertaken to ensure these requirements were being adhered to, nor is it clear which level of government would have been responsible for monitoring these arrangements. 2.48 The lack of home quarantining arrangements for most international arrivals between 1 February and 16 March is directly at odds with the arrangements put in place one month earlier for Australians stranded in Wuhan and Hubei, for whom the government had organised flights and mandatory quarantine. 62 2.49 Further, mandatory hotel quarantine requirements were not introduced until 28 March—10 days after the AHPPC's advice of 'the imposition of universal quarantine'. 63 In that 10 day period, new daily case numbers grew from 122 to 464 and another seven Australians died of COVID-19. 64 2.50 Given the government recognised the importance of quarantine arrangements as early as 1 February, it should not have waited until 16 March to require that international travellers self-isolate and until 28 March to mandate hotel quarantine. 2.51 Additionally, clear lines of responsibility for quarantining arrangements and compliance arrangements should have been agreed upon and enforced when those decisions were initially taken.

61 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Coronavirus measures endorsed by National Cabinet', Media Release, 16 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/coronavirus-measures-endorsed-national- cabinet (accessed 17 September 2020).

62 Mr James Griffiths and Ms Amy Woodyatt, 'China goes into emergency mode as number of confirmed Wuhan coronavirus cases reaches 2,700', CNN, 27 January 2020, edition.cnn.com/2020/01/26/asia/wuhan-coronavirus-update-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed 26 August 2020).

63 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Release, 27 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-270320 (accessed 17 September 2020).

64 See DoH, Coronavirus (COVID-19) current situation and numbers, 7 December 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/coronavirus- covid-19-current-situation-and-case-numbers (accessed 7 December 2020); WHO, Australia Situation, December 2020, covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/au (accessed 3 December 2020).

per week to 4900 by 27 September and 5500 by 11 October. 69 The Prime Minster stated: I would hope that those who are looking to come home, that we'd be able to do that within months and I would hope that we can get as many people home, if not all of them by Christmas. 70 2.56 On 26 November 2020 DFAT additionally told the committee that the weekly cap was '5625 arrivals, rising to 6745 arrivals with the resumption of arrivals into Melbourne on 7 December'. 71 2.57 The large number of Australians stranded overseas is directly linked to the restrictions on international arrivals into Australia. In a hearing on 24 September, DFAT told the committee that '[t]he introduction of the caps has posed a significant challenge for those Australians overseas'. 72 2.58 Following a meeting of the National Cabinet on 13 November, the Prime Minister announced the government will be extending the international air passenger caps until 31 January 2021 and that 'since 18 September 2020 the list of registered Australians has grown from 26 200 to 35 637'. 73 Additionally, on 26 November 2020, DFAT told the committee that 'as at 24 November there were 36 875 Australians overseas registered with DFAT as seeking to return,' including 8 070 who were classed as being 'vulnerable'. 74

69 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 18 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-sydney-nsw-5 (accessed 22 September 2020).

70 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 18 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-sydney-nsw-5 (accessed 16 November 2020).

71 Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 10.

72 Dr Webster, First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, pp. 47 and 49.

73 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet', Media statement, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

74 Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, pp. 10–11.

2.59 The number of Australians stranded overseas wishing to return home has grown incrementally since the introduction of the international arrival cap—and continues to grow. These numbers include:

 18 August—18 800; 75  2 September—23 000; 76  13 September—25 000; 77  18 September—26 200; 78  24 September—26 800; 79  13 October—29 100; 80  20 October—32 300; 81  28 October—33 700; 82  13 November—35 637; 83 and  24 November—36 875. 84 2.60 On these growing numbers, it is clear the Prime Minister's promise to get as many, if not all of these stranded Australians home by Christmas is no longer

75 Dr Webster, First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, p. 47.

76 Elias Visontay and Christopher Knaus, ' National cabinet: 23,000 stranded Australians hope for easing of arrival caps, The Guardian, 4 September 2020, www.theguardian.com/australia- news/2020/sep/04/national-cabinet-23000-stranded-australians-hope-for-easing-of-arrival-caps (accessed 16 November 2020).

77 Nour Haydar, 'Federal Government says hotel coronavirus quarantine boost could get overseas Australians 'home by Christmas'', ABC News online, 13 September 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020- 09-13/peter-dutton-kristina-keneally-australians-stranded-covid-19/12659308 (accessed 16 November 2020).

78 Dr Webster, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Hansard, 28 October 2020, p. 63.

79 Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 40.

80 Tom McIlroy and Ronald Mizen, 'Waiting list for Australians stuck overseas passes 29,000', Australian Financial Review, 13 October 2020, www.afr.com/politics/federal/waiting-list-for- australians-stuck-overseas-passes-29-000-20201013-p564ks (accessed 16 November 2020).

81 Katina Curtis, '"Complex equation": Stranded Aussies' Christmas wish may not be granted', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 2020, www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/complex-equation- christmas-wish-may-not-be-granted-for-stranded-aussies-20201020-p566xt.html (accessed 16 November 2020).

82 Dr Webster, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Hansard, 28 October 2020, p. 63.

83 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet', Media statement, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

84 Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, pp. 10–11.

possible. Even if these numbers stopped growing, with continued weekly flight caps of around 5500 the backlog of stranded Australians is simply too large. 2.61 Despite the government's clear constitutional responsibilities for incoming arrivals and quarantine, 85 the government has been reluctant to accept full responsibility for the plight of Australians wanting to return home, with the Prime Minister explaining the passenger cap policy as a decision of National Cabinet intended to ease pressure on the states over a stretched hotel quarantine system. 86 2.62 The Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs told the committee on 24 September that there are no legal barriers preventing the government from providing federal quarantine arrangements. He also stated there was a standing offer to increase quarantine capacity and that the government would provide states and territories 'whatever they need' to do so. 87 2.63 The Prime Minister has not provided any explanation of why the government did not put in place the resources and planning needed to assist Australians to return home as borders closed in March instead of choosing to shift responsibility back onto stranded Australians themselves. 2.64 When questioned in July about the proposal to restrict people entering Australia, the Prime Minister stated, 'there's been many opportunities for people to return. If they're choosing to do so now, they have obviously delayed that decision for a period'. 88 2.65 The Prime Minister's attempts to shift responsibility back on individuals is emblematic of the personal experiences described to the committee. Appearing in a private capacity, Mrs Claire Burles gave evidence that: The only advice we have received from Home Affairs [Department of Home Affairs] or Smartraveller is that we had not attempted to come home soon enough and that there is no assistance available for citizens in our situation. In my most recent conversation with the Australian

85 The Australian Border Force (ABF) is responsible for incoming arrivals. In relation to quarantine, section 51(ix) of the Australian Constitution lists quarantine as a Commonwealth head of power.

86 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 10 July 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-10jul20 (accessed 28 September 2020).

87 Mr Michael Pezzullo AO, Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 51.

88 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 8 July 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-8 (accessed 15 October 2020).

consulate the only resources they provided me with were the locations of homeless shelters. 89 2.66 The shocking accounts from Mrs Burles and other witnesses of being directed to homeless shelters or told to take out loans was confirmed by DFAT's evidence to the committee on 24 September that 'where they have nowhere to live we provide them a list of homeless shelters, or we are able to provide loans as well to enable them to sustain themselves while we work to get them on flights'. 90 2.67 Mrs Deanne Vowels explained to the committee that she had been told by Australian consular officials that: There's nothing we can do. We get hundreds of calls a day just like yours, so we can't do anything about yours. Have you set up a GoFundMe page? Ask your friends and family for help. 91 2.68 These accounts—confirmed by the department responsible—demonstrate that the government's efforts to support Australians overseas during COVID-19 have been woefully inadequate. 2.69 In the same hearing, the Chair asked the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet why the government could not open its own quarantine facilities, as it had done so previously. The department suggested this was a result of the government's limited public health capacity, but admitted it had not taken any steps to test the market for privately contracted health workers, nor was it aware of any requests to repurpose government property as a quarantine facility. 92 2.70 On 15 October, the government announced it would use the Howard Springs quarantine facility in the Northern Territory to facilitate the return of Australians stranded overseas. 93 2.71 This demonstrates that the government had the capacity to provide quarantine arrangements and should not have sought to characterise the cap on international arrivals as a function of state and territory capacity constraints. 2.72 By the time it announced the increase in the cap and the use of Howard Springs for quarantine capacity, it had been more than seven months

89 Mrs Burles is an Australian stranded in Canada and hoping to return to Australia. See, Mrs Claire Burles, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 7.

90 Ms Adamson, Secretary, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 44.

91 Mrs Deanne Vowels, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 1.

92 Mr Lachlan Colquhoun, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, pp. 32–33.

93 Andrew Probyn, Stephanie Borys and Georgia Hitch, 'Howard Springs coronavirus quarantine facility to be expanded in bid to get more Australians home', ABC Live Blog, 15 October 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/howard-springs-coronavirus-quarantine-expanded-australians- home/12769796 (accessed 15 October 2020).

the Hon Greg Hunt, Minister for Health—included an exemption allowing cruise ships which had departed for Australia by a certain date to enter port.97 2.76 Three days after the announcement, a cruise ship—the Ruby Princess—docked in Sydney and passengers disembarked the ship on the same day. The Ruby Princess had been allowed to dock under an exemption in the Determination of 18 March, as it had departed New Zealand before the time and date in the Determination. On 23 April, it was reported that approximately 10 per cent of all cases in Australia had been linked to the Ruby Princess. 98 2.77 On 15 April, the New South Wales (NSW) Government established the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, which handed down its final report on 14 August. 99 The Special Commission of Inquiry found that:

 of 1682 passengers from Australia, 663 (39.4 per cent) contracted COVID-19;  of the 1148 crew, 191 (16.6 per cent) contracted COVID-19; and  28 people associated with the Ruby Princess have died. 100 2.78 The Special Commission of Inquiry noted that '[t]he human consequences of the scattering upon disembarkation have not yet played out'. 101 It also noted that the original source of the then 114 reported cases from the COVID-19 outbreak at North West Regional Hospital in Tasmania was most likely to be one, or both, of two inpatients admitted to the hospital with COVID-19 acquired on the Ruby Princess.102 2.79 The question of which jurisdiction and department was responsible for allowing passengers to disembark the Ruby Princess and for subsequent quarantine measures remains unresolved despite repeated requests by the committee for this question to be answered by relevant Australian Government agencies

97 Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) (Emergency Requirements) Determination 2020 (Cth), 18 March 2020.

98 Paige Cockburn, 'How the coronavirus pandemic would look in Australia if Ruby Princess had never docked', ABC News, 23 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-23/coronavirus-across- australia-if-ruby-princess-never-docked/12172314 (accessed 10 August 2020).

99 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, www.rubyprincessinquiry.nsw.gov.au/ (accessed 10 August 2020).

100 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, New South Wales (NSW) Government, 14 August 2020, p. 265. The 28 deaths comprise 20 deaths reported in Australia and eight deaths reported in the United States.

101 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, p. 16.

102 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, p. 266. The outbreak of COVID-19 at North West Regional Hospital is the subject of an ongoing review established by the Premier of Tasmania on 24 July 2020. On 5 August 2020, the Tasmanian Health Minister advised the Special Commission of Inquiry advised that there had been 138 confirmed cases associated with the outbreak, including 10 deaths.

including the Australian Border Force (ABF) and the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE). 2.80 Government departments explained to the committee their role in relation to cruise ships arriving in Australia:

 DAWE advised that it is responsible for detecting items and goods that could pose a risk to Australia's animal, plant or environmental biosecurity; 103  the Australian Government's CMO is responsible for human biosecurity; 104 and  ABF advised that it is responsible for the customs and immigration process. 105 2.81 In relation to cruise ship and vessel clearances, Mr Andrew Metcalfe AO, Secretary of DAWE, advised that 'pratique' (the legal authorisation to allow passengers to disembark a vessel) is granted by a biosecurity officer from DAWE. 106 2.82 Prior to the Ruby Princess docking, DAWE was provided with four human health updates between 16 March to 18 March which clearly indicated that the number of passengers who had become ill, or showed signs of illness, had significantly increased—from 53 on 16 March to 128 on 18 March. 107 This surge in ill passengers alone should have provided DAWE with reason to pause and consider raising the matter with NSW Health or the government CMO. 2.83 Despite a dedicated inquiry investigating the circumstances related to the Ruby Princess and direct questions from the committee, it remains unclear precisely when and who granted pratique. Passengers commenced disembarking the ship at 6.30 am on 19 March 2020, but the document advising the vessel operator that pratique had been granted was lodged at 7.39 am. 108 Furthermore, evidence suggests that an ABF officer had also boarded the ship and a crew member of the Ruby Princess had asked this officer whether the vessel had clearance to disembark, to which the ABF officer responded 'yes'. 109

103 Mr Andrew Metcalfe AO, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE), Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 1.

104 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 1.

105 Mr Michael Outram APM, Commissioner, ABF, Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 4.

106 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 6.

107 DAWE, answers to questions on notice, 29 April 2020 (received 5 May 2020), pp. 1–22.

108 Ms Emily Canning, First Assistant Secretary, Biosecurity Operations Division, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, pp. 6–7.

109 Mr Outram, Commissioner, ABF, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 8.

2.84 The committee accepts that NSW Health had provided a preliminary health approval for passengers to disembark. This approval was primarily based off a desktop review of documents provided by the Ruby Princess through DAWE's Maritime Arrival Reporting System. However, while NSW Health failed to recognise active cases of COVID-19 onboard the Ruby Princess, NSW Health was not onboard on the morning of 19 March and could not have played a role in the decision to let the Ruby Princess passengers disembark. Australian Government agencies were onboard the ship, and federal protocols and procedures to identify potential human health risks onboard cruise ships at the time of arrival into Australia, and to confirm the assessments made by NSW Health were carried out. 2.85 Key to these protocols was the administration of Traveller with Illness Checklists (TICs). TICs were designed by the DoH for use by DAWE biosecurity officers at air and seaports in Australia. TICs are administered to ill passengers arriving in Australia in order to identify active cases of, or potential exposure to, a variety of listed human diseases. Negative indications from the checklist— including the presence of symptoms such as fever and coughing—would require a biosecurity officer to then liaise with local health officials to provide further advice on treatment or quarantine for the relevant passenger. 110 2.86 Beyond the administration of TICs, DAWE biosecurity officers are also required to interview officials onboard arriving cruise ships in order to ascertain the health situation at the time of arrival, and also verify the medical records that form the basis of NSW Health's pre-arrival assessment. In totality, these protocols form an important fail-safe in the management of human biosecurity risks at our borders by verifying the health status of passengers prior to the granting of pratique and the disembarking of passengers. 111 2.87 This is particularly relevant in the case of the Ruby Princess, where the rapidly deteriorating health situation onboard the vessel was obscured from NSW Health officials due to delays in updating medical records and passenger logs. Evidence before the Special Commission of Inquiry demonstrates that there had been a surge in ill patients onboard the vessel in the period after NSW Health had made their assessment and before government officials boarded the ship in the early hours of 19 March. 112 2.88 Secretary Metcalfe has subsequently admitted that DAWE biosecurity officers at the Port of Sydney failed to follow any of the aforementioned procedures on the morning of the arrival of the Ruby Princess. Further, evidence before this

110 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, Exhibit 114, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, pp. 13–14.

111 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 3.

112 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess Auscript, NSW Government, 22 April 2020, pp. 92–93.

committee suggests that it had in fact been the practice of officials at the harbor for some period of time to ignore these protocols in the interest of saving time. 113 2.89 As such, an important aspect of the government's policy and procedure surrounding human biosecurity was ignored by officials during the nascent stages of a global pandemic, despite the clear risk posed by passengers returning on cruise ships. 2.90 The actions of Secretary Metcalfe's officials meant that passengers were allowed to disembark the Ruby Princess without a) the relevant health documentation being verified by officials, b) the ship's captain and medical staff being interviewed to ascertain the health situation onboard the ship at the time of arrival, and c) ill patients being triaged by administration of the TICs. Secretary Metcalfe's claim that his officials relied on the health assessment made by NSW Health is troubling, 114 given the fact that his officials had not made contact to confirm NSW Health's findings until after passengers had commenced disembarking the vessel. 2.91 If officials onboard the Ruby Princess had been interviewed—per protocol—or if current health records had been examined—per protocol—it is highly likely that the significant increase in illness onboard the vessel would have been identified, and the appropriate safeguards regarding treatment and quarantine put in place. The revelations of the government's laissez faire approach to its own policy leaves open the possibility of fundamental flaws in the application of biosecurity procedures at every port in Australia. This in turn poses a threat to the health of our community, the sustainability of our native flora and fauna, and the livelihoods of many in the agricultural industry, which would be crippled by the entry of disease into our ecosystem. 2.92 Further, the government has thus far failed to identify who provided pratique to the Ruby Princess under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth). The granting of pratique is an important aspect of biosecurity management at our seaports and airports, providing the legal approval for a vessel to disembark passengers and goods. This clearance should only be granted upon the completion of the required protocols and procedures around biosecurity and human biosecurity and can only be granted by officers authorised under the Biosecurity Act 2015. 115 2.93 Evidence before the committee indicates that passengers were allowed to disembark prior to the granting of pratique, and that permission to disembark was first given by an ABF official, despite them not holding the authority to do so. Further, per previous comments, pratique was granted without appropriate protocol having been followed with respect to human biosecurity, and

113 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, pp. 1–2.

114 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 2.

115 See, Biosecurity (Negative Pratique) Instrument 2016 (Cth), 7 June 2016.

ostensibly before direct contact had been made with NSW Health to confirm their assessment. 2.94 Despite the best efforts of the committee, the government has been unable—or unwilling—to explain who granted pratique, and on what basis. 2.95 It is the opinion of the committee that the failure of DAWE and ABF officials to follow government protocol and procedure in relation to the arrival of the Ruby Princess directly led to the further spread of COVID-19 in the Australian community. It is further the committee's opinion that steps must be taken to strengthen Australia's border security arrangements insofar as they relate to the responsibility of human biosecurity to ensure that instances such as this are not repeated. 2.96 It is also concerning that passengers were allowed to independently make their way home to self-isolate. The likelihood of COVID-19 spreading rapidly amongst passengers and crew on cruise ships was not a new scenario. The Diamond Princess, a cruise ship quarantined at a port in Japan, had its first case of COVID-19 detected on the ship on 1 February.116 By 20 February, the confirmed cases had increased to 634 passengers. 117 The circumstances relating to the Diamond Princess provided clear lessons that should have been implemented prior to the disastrous outcomes as a result of the Ruby Princess. 2.97 Additionally, as outlined earlier in this chapter, a pandemic planning exercise had been conducted with the DoH and the NSW Ministry of Health concerning a cruise ship entering Sydney.118 The fact that the circumstances of the Ruby Princess unfolded in the way they did implies that past exercises may not have been adequate, or that these past exercises were not used to adequately inform the real-life response. 2.98 The committee will continue to seek answers on the government's handling of the Ruby Princess, including:

 why government officials would not appear before the NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into the incident;  what the 'bespoke arrangements' which the Prime Minister said were in place 'under the direct command of the Australian Border Force' for cruise ships such as the Ruby Princess actually were;  why passengers commenced disembarking prior to formal pratique being granted, and who advised them to do so;  why protocols designed to work in concert with the work of NSW Health were ignored;

116 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, p. 46.

117 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, p. 47. The total number of people on the cruise ship was 3711.

118 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 13.

 why passengers on the Ruby Princess were not placed in hotel quarantine, similar to the passengers on the Diamond Princess; and  whether the government's actions in relation to the Ruby Princess aligned with what had been agreed during the pandemic planning exercise run in May 2019 concerning a cruise ship entering Sydney.

Chapter 3 Health response part I: managing COVID-19 in Australia

3.1 On 25 January, the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Australia, with three further cases confirmed later that day. By 30 January, this had increased to nine cases, with the World Health Organisation (WHO) reporting 7818 total confirmed cases worldwide, including 82 cases reported in 18 countries outside of China. 1 3.2 On 2 March, Australia saw its first community transmission of COVID-19, bringing the total number of confirmed cases to 33. 2 3.3 Australia's cumulative total cases hit triple digits on 10 March, with a daily increase in reported cases of 13. From that point, the total number of cases rose rapidly until 28 March, when the daily increase in reported cases peaked at 464 and the cumulative total hit 3626. 3 3.4 Prior to 27 February, the Australian Government's (government) main focus appeared to be on border control measures in the hope of containing the virus and preventing widespread community transmission in Australia. 3.5 However, between 27 February and mid-March, it became increasingly clear that containment strategies alone would not be sufficient in preventing the spread of COVID-19 in Australia. Specific strategies would be required to 'flatten the curve', improve contact tracing, and build up the National Medical Stockpile (NMS) in an attempt to save lives.

1 World Health Organisation (WHO), Novel Coronavirus Situation Report 10, 30 January 2020, www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200130-sitrep-10- ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=d0b2e480 2 (accessed 17 November 2020).

2 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, and Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Joint Statement, Update on COVID-19 in Australia – Community Transmission, 3 March 2020.

3 Department of Health (DoH), Total COVID-19 cases and deaths by states and territories, www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/coronavirus- covid-19-current-situation-and-case-numbers (accessed 18 November 2020).

…in the event of a pandemic... the goal is to slow its spread if it gets to Australia, but with the number of countries that are now affected, we have to be realistic about the likelihood of containment strategies into the weeks ahead. 7 3.11 Statements released only a week later by the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) recommended a focus on 'domestic containment and preparedness', 8 but fell short of clearly articulating any overarching strategy. 3.12 On 11 March there was a noticeable shift in language with a focus on 'sustained community transmission'. In a press conference, the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) stated: If we develop sustained community transmission, then the models can predict how long it might take to develop a peak. And again, those models depend on how well you contain during the development of the sustained community transmission. So there are a variety of potential models, but a pandemic or an epidemic in Australia could last as short as 8 weeks, or as long as 14 to 16 weeks.9 3.13 On 16 March, the then Deputy CMO, Professor Paul Kelly, pointed to modelling from New South Wales (NSW) Health and Germany indicating that between 20 per cent and 60 per cent of Australians could become infected, with a mortality rate of 1 per cent. 10 3.14 Modelling released by the Department of Health (DoH) in April 2020 and undertaken by the Doherty Institute additionally predicted an infection rate of between 11.6 per cent and 89.1 per cent, depending on what mitigation strategies were imposed. 11

7 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister of Australia, 'Press conference', Transcript, 27 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-4 (accessed 26 August 2020).

8 See for example, the AHPPC statements made on 4 and 11 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/committees-and-groups/australian-health-protection-principal-committee- ahppc (accessed 26 August 2020).

9 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, 'Press conference', Transcript, 11 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-8 (accessed 26 August 2020).

10 See, Professor Paul Kelly, Deputy CMO, DoH, 'Press conference', Transcript, 16 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/deputy-chief-medical-officers-press-conference-about-covid-19-on-16- march (accessed 19 October 2020).

11 DoH, Impact of Covid-19: Theoretical modelling of how the health system can respond, 7 April 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/impact-of-covid-19-in-australia-ensuring- the-health-system-can-respond (accessed 19 October 2020).

3.15 Based on these comments it appears that up until mid-March the government was preparing for significant levels of community transmission within Australia. 3.16 Amid increasing public debate on what strategy should be pursued, the Prime Minister announced in April that 'Australia will continue to progress a successful suppression/elimination strategy'. 12 The announcement may have been intended to clarify the government's strategy but caused more confusion as it merged two distinct strategies. 3.17 At its first public hearing on 23 April, the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee), Senator Katy Gallagher, asked DoH what strategy the government was pursuing—herd immunity, containment, suppression or elimination. 13 Ms Caroline Edwards, then Acting Secretary of DoH confirmed that they were 'trying to reduce the number of infections', but did not specify any particular strategy. 14 3.18 In May, DoH clarified that the National Cabinet had endorsed a strategy of suppression with the potential for elimination. 15 Further information was provided on 24 July when the AHPPC announced that 'the goal for Australia is to have no community transmission of COVID-19, strengthening the current suppression strategy'. 16 3.19 The clearest statement on Australia's strategy from the Prime Minister wasn't made until 4 September, some eight months after the first cases in Australia, when he announced that, 'National Cabinet has agreed to a suppression strategy for COVID-19 with the goal of no community transmission'. 17

12 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures' Media Statement, 16 April 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-160420 (accessed 31 August 2020).

13 Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 25.

14 Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 26.

15 DoH, answers to written question on notice on 28 April 2020 (received 12 May 2020) document no 20, p. 18.

16 AHPPC statement on strategic direction, 24 July 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health- protection-principal-committee-ahppc-statement-on-strategic-direction (accessed 26 August 2020).

17 'National Cabinet', Media Statement, 4 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet- 040920 (accessed 10 September 2020).

3.20 On 26 June, Senator Gallagher asked a question on notice about the Victorian Health Minister's public comment that 'National Cabinet agreed to a suppression strategy not an elimination strategy'. However, the DoH refused to provide any information in relation to: (a) when that decision had been adopted by National Cabinet; (b) if the decision was made based on AHPPC advice; and (c) what materials were relied on in making that decision. 18 In light of this refusal to provide information, there is no evidence that the strategy articulated by the Prime Minister on 4 September was the same strategy adopted early on by the government. 3.21 The government's strategy to respond to community transmission was not clear until at least July. It appears, based on public statements by Ministers and officials, that the government had initially considered a different strategy at the onset of the pandemic that would have resulted in a much higher number of infection rates, prior to the National Cabinet deciding to adopt strict social distancing measures in late March 2020. 3.22 The committee is concerned that a clear strategy was not put in place until some months into the pandemic. The lack of a clear COVID-19 strategy would have affected early decision making and partially explains the constantly changing, confusing and chaotic days in early March of ever-tightening social restrictions culminating with the states and territories and, in particular, NSW and Victoria, forcing a national lockdown at the National Cabinet meeting on 29 March.

Adoption of social distancing measures 3.23 Throughout March, the Prime Minister gave mixed messages on the role and importance of social distancing in reducing community transmission and, at times, appeared to cast doubt on the need for such measures. 3.24 On 3 March, amid escalating public concern and increasing COVID-19 infections in Australia, the Prime Minister declared that people could 'go about their daily business' and that he was 'looking forward to going to places of mass gatherings such as the football'. 19 3.25 Dr Norman Swan gave evidence to the committee that this was 'the dominant message from governments, particularly the Federal Government' prior to 16 March. Dr Swan suggested:

18 DoH, answers to questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 20 July 2020), document no. 242, p. 2.

19 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 3 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-6 (accessed 4 September 2020).

They seemed to be obsessed with not panicking the community, because they said, '80 per cent of people have a mild disease; it's only a small number of people who do have [the] disease.'20 3.26 On 13 March the Prime Minister announced the first restrictions on mass gatherings in response to an AHPPC recommendation. 21 However, he declared that he still intended to go to the football the next day, 22 despite growing criticism. He only reversed this once a senior Minister, Peter Dutton MP, tested positive for COVID-19 following a trip to the United States and had attended cabinet meetings with the Prime Minister. 23 3.27 On 18 March, Dr Brendan Murphy was asked his views on a two to four-week shutdown on society. He stated that this action was not recommended and that '[i]t does not achieve anything'. 24 3.28 Dr Murphy's views aligned closely with comments from the Prime Minister on the same day that 'there is no two-week answer to what we're confronting'. 25

20 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 18.

21 DoH, 'Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) coronavirus (COVID-19) statement on 13 March 2020', www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health-protection-principal- committee-ahppc-coronavirus-covid-19-statement-on-13-march-2020-0 (accessed 31 August 2020).

22 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press conference with Premiers and Chief Ministers', Transcript, 13 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-premiers-and-chief-ministers- parramatta-nsw (accessed 31 August 2020).

23 Katina Curtis, 'Scott Morrison will not attend the Cronulla Sharks over fears attendance would be misinterpreted' 7 News, 7news.com.au/lifestyle/health-wellbeing/pm-warns-of-challenging- months-ahead-c-742482 (accessed 31 August 2020).

24 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, 'Press conference', Transcript, 18 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-9 (accessed 28 July 2020).

25 The Hon Scott Morrison, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference,' Transcript, 18 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-9 (accessed 19 October 2020).

3.29 Increasingly stricter social distancing restrictions on non-essential gatherings, and on businesses listed as 'non-essential', 26 were adopted by National Cabinet on 18 March, 27 23 March 28 and 25 March. 29 3.30 During this period there was confusion over constantly changing information and inconsistent messages from the Prime Minister about the rules for 'essential' and 'non-essential' activities. 3.31 For example, questions arose as to why hairdressers were permitted to remain open but beauty salons, some of which also operated hairdressing salons, were required to close. While barbers and hairdressers were allowed to remain open, the government placed a 30-minute limit per customer, which was then changed the following day due to concerns that the time limit was not workable. 30 3.32 At times, the Prime Minister's attempts to explain the situation only added to the confusion. On 18 March he listed certain 'essential' activities and explained 'everything else is non-essential'. However, on 24 March, in response to questions over the meaning of an 'essential worker', he unhelpfully suggested that 'everyone who has a job in this economy is an essential worker'. 31 This was in direct conflict with state leaders' requests for non-essential workers to work from home if possible. 3.33 The increasing restrictions between 18 March and 25 March were followed by the decision from National Cabinet on 30 March to place a two-person limit on indoor and outdoor gatherings. Australians were encouraged to stay home and only permitted to leave the house for an 'essential' purpose. 32

26 Non-essential businesses were required to close. A separate list of businesses, while not required to close, had such strict conditions placed on their operation, also closed their doors.

27 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Statement, 18 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/ update-coronavirus-measures (accessed 31 August 2020).

28 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Statement, 22 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-220320 (accessed 31 August 2020).

29 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Release, 24 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-24-March-2020 (accessed 31 August 2020).

30 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Further statement on hairdressers, barbers and funerals from National Cabinet', Media Release, 26 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/further- statement-hairdressers-barbers-and-funerals-national-cabinet (accessed 31 August 2020).

31 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference - Australian Parliament House', Transcript, 24 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-5 (accessed 16 November 2020).

32 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet Statement', Media Statement, 29 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-statement (accessed 31 August 2020).

3.34 Based on the public comments of the Prime Minister, ministers and the Commonwealth CMOs, it is clear that in March government representatives were reluctant to pursue stricter social distancing measures which might result in a wide-scale national lockdown. 3.35 Without access to key documents, the committee speculates that this reluctance was due to either: concerns over the economic consequences of such restrictions being put in place; or, a failure to fully recognise the extent of the risk that COVID-19 posed to Australians' health. 3.36 As discussed earlier in this chapter, comments by the Deputy CMO anticipating infection levels of between 20 to 60 per cent suggests the goal of 'no community transmission' eventually adopted by National Cabinet was not part of the government's initial plans at the onset of the pandemic. 3.37 In a hearing with key medical experts, Dr Raina MacIntyre, the head of the biosecurity program at the University of New South Wales, told the committee she thought NSW and Victoria had 'led the charge for a national shutdown': I think, yes, that the two chief health officers in New South Wales and Victoria, particularly, were very strong in leading us out of that. 33 3.38 It had also been reported during the lead up to National Cabinet's decision on 30 March that Victoria and NSW were calling on the government to announce stronger restrictions. 34 3.39 In an episode of the ABC program Four Corners aired in April, the Premier of Victoria, the Hon Daniel Andrews MP and the Premier of NSW, the Hon Gladys Berejiklian MP, both made comments confirming that they had been working together on such an approach. Premier Andrews stated: I made a judgement, and, Gladys made a judgement as well, that this thing needed a big jolt. We needed to take a big step. 35 3.40 While Premier Berejiklian made the following comment: Premier Andrews and I did talk and both of us had similar concerns representing the two largest States. We felt we had to act quickly and strongly and I'm glad we did. 36

33 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 12.

34 Janine Graham, 'Coronavirus crisis: Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews leads the charge for a Stage 3 lockdown', Canberra Times, 26 March 2020, www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6698303/vic- premier-andrews-finds-an-ally-in-charge-for-a-stage-3-lockdown/ (accessed 4 September 2020).

35 'The Cost of Coronavirus', Four Corners, 20 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/4corners/4cs economy 2004/12165974 (accessed 15 October 2020).

36 'The Cost of Coronavirus', Four Corners, 20 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/4corners/4cs economy 2004/12165974 (accessed 15 October 2020).

3.41 Several submitters including the Grattan Institute also commented on the different approaches adopted by the Commonwealth and states and territories: The Commonwealth continued to take a more cautious and risk-tolerant approach to the introduction of widespread infection control measures. The states and territories, particularly NSW and Victoria, were more risk-averse and enacted more comprehensive measures such as school closures to prevent spread of infection and to reduce the prospect that public hospitals, the responsibility of states, would be overwhelmed. 37 3.42 The committee accepts that the decision for a stage 3 lockdown was an important one which has, without doubt, saved lives, prevented the spread and reduced the community transmission of COVID-19 across Australia. 3.43 This critical meeting on 30 March and the decisions that followed are a clear example of the federal system of governance in Australia working in the national interest.

Lack of transparency behind key medical decisions

Recommendation 1 3.44 The committee recommends that the Australian Government publish all previous and future minutes of the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee to provide the public with access to the medical advice behind all decisions affecting the community's safety, livelihoods and personal freedoms. 3.45 The AHPPC has been the key body advising governments on the public health response to COVID-19 in Australia. 3.46 The AHPPC is chaired by the CMO and is comprised of all state and territory Chief Health Officers. 3.47 Although the AHPPC pre-dates the COVID-19 pandemic, in response to the pandemic it instituted daily meetings from 30 January 2020 and was appointed a subcommittee of the National Cabinet on 17 March. 38 3.48 The decision to make the AHPPC a subcommittee of the National Cabinet automatically resulted in its advice not being available to the public unless specifically authorised by the National Cabinet. 3.49 As a result, the advice provided to National Cabinet by the AHPPC is unnecessarily secretive. AHPPC statements are only released after being

37 Grattan Institute, Submission 230, p. 24.

38 DoH, 'Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC), www.health.gov.au/committees-and-groups/australian-health-protection-principal-committee- ahppc (accessed 26 August 2020); and DoH, answers to question on notice, 28 April 2020 (received 12 May 2020), document no. 20, p. 10.

approved by the National Cabinet members and no minutes of meetings have been made publicly available since 26 February. 3.50 There is no public record for the majority of meetings of the AHPPC. Despite holding several hundred meetings in the first eight months of the pandemic, only 65 statements have been released to the public.

3.51 As discussed later in Chapter 8, the government has used National Cabinet's status as part of the Federal Cabinet to refuse committee requests for important information including:

 minutes of all AHPPC meetings;  the date National Cabinet first agreed to a suppression strategy; and  the DoH's position on internal border measures. 39 3.52 Without public access to AHPPC minutes, there is no way for the public to understand what issues the AHPPC was considering and what decisions were made when. It also means there is no reassurance that the government has followed the best medical advice when making critically important decisions affecting every Australian. 3.53 In the committee's first hearing on 23 April, the Chair asked DoH whether all recommendations of the AHPPC related to COVID-19 have been adopted. DoH didn't answer the question, instead responding with: The AHPPC has regularly put forward advice on Australia's health response to COVID-19 for consideration by all Australian Governments. AHPPC statements are publicly available at this link… 40 3.54 Expert witnesses presented compelling evidence to the committee that AHPPC advice should be publicly available. For example, Mr William Bowtell AO stated: In relation to public health matters, the default position should be that all of these considerations and deliberations are made public…. When there is so much information coming in and the decisions are so critical and people pay with their lives when the decisions are not so good, we need the widest possible input...41 3.55 The AHPPC's published statements fall short of the standard set by the United Kingdom's Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies which publishes its minutes of meetings and supporting documentation. 42 3.56 Given the profound impact of the advice provided by the AHPPC and the decisions of National Cabinet, the committee agrees that advice provided by the AHPPC should be publicly available. The committee suggests that publishing the minutes of the AHPPC would be analogous to the publication of the Reserve

39 DoH, answers to questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 19 August 2020), document no. 284; DoH, answers to questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 20 July 2020), document no. 242; and DoH, answers to questions on notice, 2 June 2020 (received 19 August 2020), document no. 290.

40 DoH, answers to questions on notice, 23 April 2020 (received 19 May 2020), document no. 47.

41 Mr William Bowtell AO, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, pp. 14–15. See also Dr Norman Swan, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 16.

42 Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, Submission 310, p. 7; and www.gov.uk/government/groups/scientific-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage-coronavirus- covid-19-response (accessed 1 September 2020).

Bank of Australia's (RBA) board meeting minutes; with these minutes providing the Australian public with transparency, accountability and information regarding the decisions the RBA is making. 3.57 The shifting messaging around social distancing in early March, school attendance and mask use are examples where greater transparency around the reasoning behind AHPPC decisions would be useful. 3.58 In relation to mask use, at a press conference on 5 March, Dr Murphy stated that 'there is no reason to put a mask on when you're walking around the shops'. 43 This message continued to be reiterated, with the Prime Minister making the following statement on 24 April: National Cabinet noted the AHPPC advice that wearing of face masks by the general population is not currently recommended. Should significant community transmission in Australia occur, mask wearing in public is an available option. 44 3.59 However, on 25 June Dr MacIntyre, who has conducted 'the largest body of clinical research on face masks and respirators in the world',45 told the committee that the use of face masks as a tool to reduce the transmission of COVID-19 was 'cheap, effective and low risk', as well as 'a no brainer'. 46 3.60 Dr Norman Swan told the committee he had reviewed statements made by National Cabinet but was still unable to understand why they were not recommending the use of face masks in public. 47 Dr Swan posited that National Cabinet's advice was not consistent with the review in the medical journal, The Lancet, and commented that 'we deserve to know' the evidence underpinning the National Cabinet's advice. 48 3.61 The committee agrees with the view expressed by key expert witnesses that information provided by the AHPPC should be made publicly available, similar to other countries, to assist in understanding decisions, allow greater transparency and ensure public cooperation with health measures.

43 Dr Murphy, CMO, 'Press conference', Transcript, 5 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press- conference-parliament-house-3 (accessed 9 September 2020).

44 The Hon Scott Morrison, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Statement, 24 April 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-24april20 (accessed 9 September 2020).

45 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 4.

46 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 4.

47 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 16.

48 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 16.

reached about seven million, 53 still short of the 40 per cent (10 million) registrations that the government had been aiming for. 3.66 Mr Randall Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer of the Digital Transformation Agency (DTA), advised the committee that as of May 2020 the government had spent $1.5 million on developing the app. 54 By 29 October, Mr Brugeaud advised the Senate that in total $5.24 million had been spent on development, professional services and operational costs. 55 It is not clear how much has been spent in total on the app, but media reports indicate that a proportion of the $64 million advertising spend under the government's CovidSafe Strategy was also allocated to promoting take-up of the app in addition to the $5.24 million in development and operational costs. 56 3.67 Despite more than $5 million spent so far and the Prime Minister's repeated promises on the capacity for the COVIDSafe app to reopen the economy safely, it has delivered extremely limited tangible results to date. 3.68 As of 26 October, the app had identified only 17 close contacts with COVID-19 who would not have otherwise been captured by manual contact tracing. 57 3.69 Not only has the COVIDSafe app under-delivered in terms of its effectiveness with contact tracing, it has also experienced issues with its performance. In answers to questions on notice, the DTA provided Bluetooth testing results which indicated that, as at 26 April, communication between two locked iPhones was 'poor'; the app only picked up between 0 per cent and 25 per cent of all Bluetooth pings. 58

53 Senator the Hon Michaelia Cash, Minister for Employment, Skills, Small and Family Business, Senate Hansard, 24 August 2020, p. 42.

54 Mr Randall Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer, Digital Transformation Agency (DTA), answers to questions on notice, 6 May 2020 (received 13 May 2020), document no. 28, p. 10.

55 Mr Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer, DTA, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Hansard, 29 October 2020, p. 63.

56 See, for example, Jonathan Kearsley and Luke Cooper, 'Coronavirus: Government's COVIDSafe app could have cost 'tens of millions' for zero tracing results,' 9News, 20 July 2020, www.9news.com.au/national/coronavirus-covidsafe-app-could-have-cost-contact-tracing-millions- in-advertising-government-health-news/bd69cbbe-ad14-4547-baf9-eb81aead1198 (accessed 21 October 2020).

57 Mr Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer, DTA, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Hansard, 29 October 2020, p. 61.

58 DTA, answers to questions on notice, 22 May 2020 (received 5 June 2020), document no. 98. See also DTA, answers to written questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 10 July 2020), document no. 182.

3.74 There are currently over 42 COVID-19 vaccine candidates undergoing clinical evaluation. 63 However, given that only 20 per cent of vaccines that reach clinical trials succeed, 64 the government will need to secure as many deals as possible to ensure timely and large-scale access to a successful candidate. 3.75 It is also important to account for the fact that even successful vaccine candidates may not be enough to eradicate the virus. As Dr MacIntyre told the committee on 25 June: It's in our national interest to diversify vaccine procurement and encourage domestic manufacturing, because one vaccine candidate may be safer or more effective than another. And, if we put all our eggs in one basket, there will be a risk. 65 3.76 Australia was relatively slow off the mark to secure any vaccine deals. On 14 August, the committee asked why Australia was lagging behind 12 other countries which had signed 27 agreements to get access to a potential vaccine. 66 Dr Murphy responded: We are in active, commercial-in-confidence, discussions and negotiations with a very large number of vaccine providers. 67 3.77 On 19 August—five days after the committee hearing on vaccines—the Prime Minister announced that: Australians will be among the first in the world to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, if it proves successful, through an agreement between the Australian Government and UK-based drug company AstraZeneca. Under the deal, every single Australian will be able to receive the University of Oxford COVID-19 vaccine for free, should trials prove successful, safe and effective. 68 3.78 However, a statement from AstraZeneca made on the same day clarified that it had only signed a 'Letter of Intent' with the government and that further steps

63 See, WHO, 'What we know about COVID-19 vaccine development', Report, 6 October 2020, www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/risk-comms- updates/update37-vaccine-development.pdf?sfvrsn=2581e994 6 (accessed 22 October 2020), p. 18.

64 See, WHO, 'What we know about COVID-19 vaccine development', Report, 6 October 2020, www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/risk-comms- updates/update37-vaccine-development.pdf?sfvrsn=2581e994 6 (accessed 22 October 2020), p. 16.

65 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2.

66 Senator the Hon Kristina Keneally, Committee Hansard, 14 August 2020, p. 24.

67 Committee Hansard, 14 August 2020, p. 24.

68 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, and the Hon Karen Andrews MP, Minister for Industry, Science and Technology, 'New deal secures potential COVID-19 vaccine for every Australian', 19 August 2020, Media Release, www.pm.gov.au/media/new-deal-secures-potential-covid-19-vaccine-every-australian (accessed 22 October 2020).

remained including other contractual agreements and arrangements with a selected manufacturer who can produce the vaccine locally. 69 3.79 On 7 September—almost three weeks after announcing a deal had already been struck—the government announced it had secured production and supply agreements with the University of Oxford/AstraZeneca and the University of Queensland/CSL vaccine candidates. 70 3.80 For most Australians access to the 84.8 million doses covered by these deals will be delayed, with only 3.8 million doses (enough for 1.9 million people) available from January and February 2021. This may be a direct result of Australia waiting to sign a deal until after the United States, 71 India, 72 and Europe 73 had already secured 1.7 billion doses of AstraZeneca. 3.81 On 5 November, Health Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, announced new vaccine deals with Novavax (40 million doses) and Pfizer/BioNTech (10 million doses). 74 3.82 Minister Hunt noted that, unlike Australia's other three vaccine candidates, the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine is a messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) type vaccine and provides an important degree of diversification in our vaccine strategy. On 10 November, Pfizer announced that its phase three clinical trial indicated the vaccine candidate was more than 90 per cent effective in preventing COVID-19, leading to media reports characterising it as a 'frontrunner'. 75

69 'AstraZeneca Australia & New Zealand response to the COVID-19 pandemic', Statement, 19 August 2020, www.astrazeneca.com.au/media/press-releases/2020/australia-and-new-zealand- covid-19-response.html (accessed 22 October 2020).

70 The Hon Scott Morrison, Prime Minister, 'Australia secures onshore manufacturing agreements for two COVID-19 vaccines', Media Statement, 7 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-secures-onshore-manufacturing-agreements-two-covid-19- vaccines, (accessed 5 November 2020).

71 Aakash B, Guy Faulconbridge, Kate Holton, 'US secures 300 million doses of potential AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine', Reuters, 21 May 2020, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-health- coronavirus-astrazeneca-idUSKBN22X0J9 (accessed 9 November 2020).

72 Divya Rajagopal, 'AstraZeneca & Serum Institute of India sign licensing deal for 1 billion doses of Oxford vaccine', The Economic Times, 4 June 2020, economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/astrazeneca-serum- institute-of-india-sign-licensing-deal-for-1-billion-doses-of-oxford- vaccine/articleshow/76202016.cms?from=mdr (accessed 8 December 2020).

73 ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP 20 1438.

74 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Australia secures a further 50 million doses of COVID- 19 vaccine', Media Statement, 5 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt- mp/media/australia-secures-a-further-50-million-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine, (accessed 5 November 2020).

75 Olivia Willis, Belinda Smith and Tegan Taylor, 'COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer Pfizer has made a big announcement — here's what to make of it', ABC News Online, 10 November, available at

3.83 However, Australia does not have the domestic manufacturing capability to produce mRNA-type vaccines like the Pfizer/Biotech candidate at scale, nor can we store and distribute mRNA vaccines at the required temperatures (which can be up to negative 80 degrees Celsius). 76 Additionally, at only 10 million doses Australia's agreement with Pfizer would be nowhere near sufficient to cover the full population, as any vaccine would require 2 doses per individual. 77 3.84 The committee supports the government's efforts so far to secure access to a potential vaccine, but remains concerned that the government's efforts to date are not enough. On 5 November, Dr MacIntyre suggested that 'we should diversify further', and reiterated that until vaccines are rolled out, 'we won't know which ones are the safest and most efficacious'. 78 3.85 While the committee hopes that one of Australia's four vaccine deals pays off, it is also unclear if we will be ready to distribute the tens of millions of vaccines required to immunise the population. On 5 November, Minister Hunt conceded that 'the roll-out of a potential COVID-19 vaccine is a significant logistical challenge', and indicated that the government was in the process of inviting suppliers to participate in a limited tender process. 79 3.86 With the first vaccines potentially ready to be rolled out in January, it is deeply concerning that the government is only now starting to take action to address the logistical challenges involved in distribution. There is also a lack of transparency around how the limited number of early access vaccines would be allocated across the health and aged care workforces, as well as high-risk populations including elderly Australians and people with pre-existing chronic conditions. 3.87 The government is also yet to articulate a clear plan for the event that a vaccine is unable to fully eradicate COVID-19. Britain's Chief Scientist,

www.abc.net.au/news/health/2020-11-10/covid-vaccine-pfizer-what-you-need-to-know- coronavirus/12866750 (accessed 10 November 2020).

76 Associate Professor Archa Fox, 'Australia may miss out on several COVID vaccines if it can't make mRNA ones locally', the Conversation, 4 November 2020, available at theconversation.com/australia- may-miss-out-on-several-covid-vaccines-if-it-cant-make-mrna-ones-locally-148996, (accessed 5 November 2020).

77 Ms Caroline Edwards, Deputy Secretary, DoH, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Hansard, 26 October 2020, p. 8.

78 Stuart Layt, 'Experts hail addition of two more vaccines to Australia's virus 'portfolio', The Age, 5 November 2020, available at www.theage.com.au/national/queensland/experts-hail- addition-of-two-more-vaccines-to-australia-s-virus-portfolio-20201105-p56bvd.html (accessed 6 November 2020).

79 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Australia secures a further 50 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine', Media Statement, 5 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon- greg-hunt-mp/media/australia-secures-a-further-50-million-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine, (accessed 5 November 2020).

Sir Patrick Vallance warned in October this year that there was a need to provide the public with a 'realistic picture' about the potential efficacy of any successful vaccine, and that even if a vaccine became available in early 2021 COVID-19 could become endemic. 80 To date, there has been little discussion of this reality with the Australian community.

An Australian Centre for Disease Control

Recommendation 3 3.88 The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish an Australian Centre for Disease Control to improve Australia's pandemic preparedness, operational response capacity and communication across different levels of government. 3.89 Australia is the only member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to not have a Centre for Disease Control (CDC) or equivalent body. 81 According to the Australian Medical Association (AMA), since the United States first established its CDC in the aftermath of World War II, the CDC model 'has become the benchmark for disease control and prevention and provides world-wide resources, surveillance and research'. 82 3.90 In 2012−13, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing found that a CDC 'could assist in encouraging more uniformity, improved efficiency and better coordination between public health departments'. 83 In March 2013, it recommended that the government commission an independent review to assess the case for a CDC. The government rejected this recommendation in August 2018. 84 3.91 In a hearing on 25 June, the committee heard from Dr MacIntyre that Australia had been disadvantaged by not having a CDC, 'mainly because the operational

80 See, Nicola Davis, 'Covid vaccine will not be available in UK until spring, says Vallance', The Guardian, 20 October 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/19/covid-vaccine-will-not- be-available-in-uk-until-spring-says-vallance (accessed 22 October 2020).

81 Dr Antony Bartone, Federal President, Australian Medical Association (AMA), Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 24.

82 AMA, 'Australian National Centre for Disease Control (CDC) – 2017', 4 Jan 2017, ama.com.au/position-statement/australian-national-centre-disease-control-cdc-2017 (accessed 9 November 2020).

83 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Diseases have no borders: Report on the inquiry into health issues across international borders, March 2013, p. 134.

84 Government Response, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Diseases have no borders: Report on the inquiry into health issues across international borders, August 2018, p. 28.

response capacity—the bums on seats, the people who can get up, go into the field and investigate an outbreak—is in the states and territories'. 85 3.92 Dr Peter Collignon also agreed there were benefits of a CDC, although he noted that his preference would be for the European model, which does not have laboratories and instead focuses on 'having a coordinating centre that's there for getting and disseminating information in a timely fashion'. 86 3.93 In its opening statement to the committee, the AMA argued: Many leading experts agree with the AMA that an Australian Centre for Disease Control would offer advantages in being prepared for and responding to infectious diseases and pandemics. There have been at times a lack of consistent public health COVID-19 advice from governments, particularly in the early stages of this pandemic. This caused communication challenges for the community as a whole. 87 3.94 The Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation supported the AMA's call for an Australian CDC, noting that 'it could go some way to alleviating a number of the concerns that our members have had around PPE [personal protective equipment]'. 88 They also gave evidence that 'our planning for a future pandemic wasn't what we thought it was' and that a CDC could have provided clearer guidelines on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). 3.95 As this report shows, Australia's response to COVID-19 has been undermined by tragic failures in aged care, a lack of pandemic preparedness and deficiencies in the NMS. There have also been issues with secrecy over the medical advice to governments and mixed messages from national leaders on social distancing, school closures and state border measures. 3.96 As the AMA explained to the committee, 89 an Australian CDC could address some of these concerns: (1) It would be permanently resourced at a sufficient level during non- pandemic periods to be ready for the next pandemic when it occurs. (2) It would research, manage and provide rapid risk assessment of communicable diseases and provide scientific briefings, surveillance reports, policy advice and public education about potential disease threats and prevention measures.

85 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 8.

86 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 8.

87 Dr Antony Bartone, President, AMA, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 24.

88 Ms Annie Butler, Federal Secretary, Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 26.

89 Dr Bartone, President, AMA, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 24.

(3) It would oversee stockpile sufficiency of PPE and medicines, and manage escalation plans to ensure stockpile sufficiency during pandemic outbreaks. 3.97 With regards to Dr MacIntyre's point about the decentralised nature of Australia's operational response capacity, a CDC could also be well-placed to improve surge workforce capacity, which has been overstretched in the aged care sector, as well as in quarantine facilities. 3.98 Given the submissions from the AMA and other key stakeholders and experts, there is a strong case that the government should establish an Australian Centre for Disease Control, with a model to be determined in close consultation with key stakeholders including in the aged care sector and the states and territories.

Chapter 4 Health response part II: aged care

4.1 Outbreaks of COVID-19 in residential aged care settings have produced Australia's poorest COVID-19 outcomes to date. As at 9 October 2020, cases in aged care facilities represented only 7.5 per cent of all cases in Australia yet accounted for 74.6 per cent of COVID-19 deaths. 1 4.2 In the Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) the Department of Health (DoH) provides, in relation to responsibility for the safety and security of people within aged care facilities: The Australian Government will also be responsible for residential aged care facilities; working with other healthcare providers to set standards to promote the safety and security of people in aged care and other institutional settings; and establishing and maintaining infection control guidelines, healthcare safety and quality standards. 2 4.3 The Australian Government (government) failed to adequately prepare the aged care sector for COVID-19, was too slow to respond to issues with outbreaks in residential aged care facilities, and failed to accept full responsibility for the sector despite being the government responsible for funding and regulating aged care in Australia. 4.4 The government's mismanagement of the sector resulted in the Senate taking the rare step of censuring the Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, for failing to recall basic and tragic facts about aged care residents, dismissing deaths as a 'function' of aged care, and 'failing to take responsibility for the devastating crisis in the aged care sector'. 3 4.5 This chapter discusses:

 the government's refusal to accept responsibility for the aged care crisis during COVID-19;  issues relating to preparation in light of the known vulnerabilities within the aged care sector;  lessons from early outbreaks in New South Wales (NSW) aged care services;  the government's response to increased community transmission in Victoria; and

1 Department of Health (DoH), 'COVID-19 outbreaks in Australian residential aged care facilities', www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/covid-19-outbreaks-in-australian- residential-aged-care-facilities-9-october-2020 1.pdf (accessed 12 October 2020).

2 DoH, Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), March 2020, p. 17.

3 Journals of the Senate, No. 66, 3 September 2020, p. 2297.

4.10 On 9 July, the Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, wrote to aged care providers telling them they had 'responded incredibly well to the unprecedented challenges of COVID-19'. 7 4.11 On the same day, St Basil's Home for the Aged (St Basil's) in Melbourne confirmed its first case of COVID-19 in a resident. The virus spread rapidly and by 21 July, the entire staff and management had to be isolated, leaving 115 residents in the care of a small number of surge staff contracted by the government, with reports of residents going hungry and being left in soiled sheets. 8 4.12 In the period between 9 July and 11 September, COVID-19 outbreaks occurred at over 200 Victorian residential aged care facilities, 9 with 1917 confirmed cases and 557 deaths from COVID-19. 10 4.13 Horrific stories emerged about inhumane conditions during this period. As a recent article in the Lancet detailed: A 95-year-old woman in a Melbourne care home was left with ants crawling over a wound on her leg. Other residents had not had food or water for 18 [hours]. There were faeces on the floor. Hundreds of residents were locked in their rooms for weeks as relatives were shut out from visiting their loved ones. 11 4.14 On 27 July, the Australian Defence Force deployed three nurses into the Eppington Gardens residential aged care facility in response to a critical staff shortage. When they arrived, 'no staff on the night shift were familiar with the facility or the residents', and 'it was apparent that infection control procedures were problematic'. 12 4.15 Communication with the families of aged care residents was a problem throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. As Counsel Assisting told the Aged Care Royal Commission:

7 Aged Care Royal Commission, Transcript, 10 August 2020, p. 8375, at [35].

8 Chip Le Grand, ‘Victoria's 'guarantee': St Basil's aged care centre debacle will not happen again’, the Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 2020, www.smh.com.au/national/victoria-s-guarantee-st-basil-s- aged-care-centre-debacle-will-not-happen-again-20200729-p55gn0.html (accessed 16 November 2020).

9 DoH, COVID-19 outbreaks in Australian residential aged care facilities, 2 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/covid-19-outbreaks-in-australian- residential-aged-care-facilities-2-october-2020.pdf (accessed 24 November 2020).

10 DoH, COVID-19 Infographic Collection, November 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/collections/coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-infographic-collection (accessed 24 November 2020).

11 Sophie Cousins, ‘Experts criticise Australia's aged care failings over COVID-19’, the Lancet, 24 October 2020, Volume 396, Issue 10 259, pp. 1322–1323.

12 Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, 18 August 2020 (received 10 September 2020), document no. 369.

We all saw the images on the news of relatives camped outside Newmarch House in April, seeking the most basic information about their loved ones. Tragically, we have seen similar scenes outside homes during the recent outbreaks in Melbourne. Once again, some families have been unable to ascertain even whether their loved ones are alive or dead. 13 4.16 The issues experienced by the sector were heard in some detail by the Aged Care Royal Commission in special COVID-19 hearings between 10 and 13 August. The Aged Care Royal Commission was so concerned by what it heard that it published Aged care and COVID-19: a special report on 1 October, concluding that immediate action was required by the government across a number of areas including a national aged care plan for COVID-19 and the deployment of accredited infection prevention and control experts into residential aged care homes. 14

The Australian Government's refusal to accept responsibility 4.17 In his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) on 21 August, Minister Colbeck was reluctant to accept that the government was accountable for the tragic outcomes experienced in the aged care sector during the COVID-19 outbreak. 4.18 When asked if it was the government's responsibility to keep aged care residents safe during a pandemic, Minister Colbeck declined to provide a yes or no answer and instead offered that the government was responsible for 'the setting of the standards and, through the ACQSC, the application of the standards'. 15 4.19 When the Chair put it to Minister Colbeck that 'you're saying it's not your job to keep people in residential aged care safe from the pandemic', he replied that: Well, in combination with the states, it's everybody's responsibility to prevent the spread of the virus. 16 4.20 These attempts to obfuscate the government's primary responsibility for aged care are not supported by fact. In response to questioning from the Chair on whether it is the government's responsibility 'to establish and maintain infection control guidelines, healthcare standards and quality standards for residential aged-care facilities' Minister Colbeck responded in the affirmative. 17 4.21 Further, the Aged Care Royal Commission states in its report on COVID-19: The Australian Government is responsible for 'aged care services', as defined in our Letters Patent. The development and implementation of aged

13 Aged Care Royal Commission, Transcript, 10 August 2020, p.8375 [35].

14 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 3.

15 Committee Hansard, 21 August 2020, p. 4.

16 Committee Hansard, 21 August 2020, p. 4.

17 Committee Hansard, 21 August 2020, pp. 3–4.

Commission of the inevitability of outbreaks in aged care in areas where there was community transmission of the virus. 24 4.25 The committee is concerned by this evidence and how it may have impacted on decisions about how to respond to the COVID-19 crisis in aged care in Victoria in June, July and August 2020. 4.26 The committee does not agree that the outbreaks and deaths that occurred in residential aged care facilities were an inevitable function of community transmission, nor does it agree that they could not have been anticipated. 4.27 A large body of evidence concerning the inadequacies of Australia's aged care system existed prior to the pandemic. In an interim report tabled in October 2019, titled Neglect, the Aged Care Royal Commission described the aged care system to be 'fragmented, unsupported… underfunded' and 'poorly managed', and reported a high number of complaints in relation to hygiene at facilities. 25 4.28 The inadequacies of the aged care sector were also well known to key stakeholder groups in the sector. 26 The COVID Safe Elders Group, a group of concerned family members of residents in aged care, expressed grave concern 'that the already under-resourced, rigid and barely functioning aged care sector has been unable to cope'. 27 4.29 As noted in Chapter 2, health experts had provided warnings well before the emergence of the pandemic that the National Medical Stockpile of personal protective equipment (PPE) had insufficient numbers of masks and respirators for health workers. 28

24 Dr Murphy, Witness Statement, Aged Care Royal Commission, 12 August 2020, www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/08/witness-statement-of- dr-brendan-murphy-to-the-royal-commission-into-aged-care-quality-and-safety.pdf (accessed 24 November 2020).

25 Aged Care Royal Commission, Interim Report: Neglect, Volume 1, 2019, p. 1. Also referred to in COVID Safe Elders Group, Submission 81, p. 2.

26 See for example: COVID Safe Elders Group, Submission 81, p. 2; Quality Aged Care Action Group Inc., Submission 385, pp. 3–4; Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation, Submission 125, p. 15; Australian Disability and Aged Care OPCAT Working Group, Submission 392, pp. 15–16; and Aged Care Crisis Inc., Submission 398, p. 2.

27 COVID Safe Elders Group, Submission 81, p. 2.

28 Dr Raina MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2. Also see, for example, Dr Peter Collignon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 9; Mr William Bowtell AO, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 14; Ms Annie Butler, Federal Secretary, Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 26.

4.30 The Aged Care Royal Commission also highlighted that training on the use of PPE across the aged care sector 'is a matter that requires urgent attention by the government' and key stakeholders.29 4.31 Once the pandemic hit, the government failed to properly prepare the sector. Counsel Assisting the Aged Care Royal Commission argued that 'neither the Commonwealth Department of Health nor the aged care regulator developed a COVID-19 plan specifically for the aged care sector'. 30 4.32 In its special report into aged care and COVID-19, the Aged Care Royal Commission found there was 'a clear need for a defined, consolidated, national aged care COVID-19 plan'. 31 Furthermore, the Aged Care Royal Commission found that: While the AHPPC [the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee] acknowledged this significant issue, it is now clear that the measures implemented by the Australian Government on advice from the AHPPC were in some respects insufficient to ensure preparedness of the aged care sector. Confused and inconsistent messaging from providers, the Australian Government, and State and Territory Governments emerged as themes in the submissions we have received on COVID-19… At a time of crisis, such as this pandemic, clear leadership, direction and lines of communication are essential.32 4.33 Key stakeholders in the sector continue to raise the same concerns that were raised prior to the pandemic, such as the very low staffing levels and the lack of training and skilled workers within the aged care sector. The Queensland Nurses and Midwives Union observed that '[t]he aged care workforce is depleted under usual circumstances and the chronic understaffing and widespread lack of skills in the sector is worrisome in the face of a global pandemic'. 33 4.34 The COVID Safe Elders Group noted similar concerns and provided an example of a residential aged care facility where the staff to resident ratio is 'one to 30 or

29 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 24.

30 Mr Peter Rozen QC, Counsel Assisting, Aged Care Royal Commission, Transcript of Proceedings, 10 August 2020, p. 8367.

31 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 11. The plans referred to by the Aged Care Royal Commission were the Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) and the National Guidelines for the Prevention, Control and Public Health Management of COVID-19 Outbreaks in Residential Care Facilities in Australia.

32 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 11.

33 Queensland Nurses and Midwives Union, Submission 136, p. 23.

occurring. DoH, in answer to a question on notice from this committee, advised that less than half of the 2865 requests for PPE made by residential and in-home aged care service providers between March and mid-August were approved.39 4.39 In its special report on COVID-19, the Aged Care Royal Commission commented that: Insufficient supplies of PPE and infection control training for the aged care workforce were the subject of evidence in the form of union surveys and accounts. We heard of workers being told they could only use one glove rather than two, and a guideline at a residential aged care facility that only permitted two masks per shift. 40 4.40 In addition to the issues with access to PPE, the government also failed to learn crucial lessons from the earlier outbreaks in relation to impacts on staff, particularly where almost an entire workforce had to be removed and isolated as had been the case in Newmarch House. 4.41 The outbreak at St Basil's was significant. On 8 July, St Basil's confirmed its first positive case of COVID-19 and 10 weeks later there had been 183 confirmed cases of COVID-19 from St Basil's, of which, 91 staff members (49.7 per cent) had been infected with COVID-19 and 44 residents had died. 41 4.42 At the peak of the outbreak, the entire workforce at St Basil's had to be stood down due to either contracting COVID-19 or being a close contact of someone who had. 42 4.43 Appearing before the committee on 21 August, Minister Colbeck testified that the government had not anticipated what occurred at St Basil's, 43 despite advising aged care providers on 29 June that 'up to 80 to 100 per cent of the workforce may need to isolate in a major outbreak'. 44

39 DoH, answers to questions on notice, 28 August 2020 (received 21 October), document no. 530, p. 1–2.

40 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 25.

41 DoH, COVID-19 outbreaks in Australian residential aged care facilities, snapshot as at 11 September 2020, p. 12, www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/09/covid-19- outbreaks-in-australian-residential-aged-care-facilities-11-september-2020.pdf (accessed 12 October 2020).

42 Dana McCauley, 'Health department to offer carers $5000 payments to move to Melbourne', The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 2020, www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/health-department-to- offer-carers-5000-payments-to-move-to-melbourne-20200820-p55nlw.html (accessed 13 October 2020).

43 Committee Hansard, 21 August 2020, p. 15.

44 Senator Katy Gallagher, Chair, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2020, p. 15. Refer also to the transcript of the Aged Care Royal Commission, 12 August 2020, p. 8655,

…if we had stood up the Victorian Aged Care Response Centre earlier on— if we had been aware and had prior warning that the public health response may have been compromised—that's something that might have prevented some of the spread amongst facilities by responding more quickly. 48 4.49 Dr Murphy also acknowledged that if the Victorian Aged Care Response Centre had been established one week earlier, 'we may have been able to respond better' to the two major outbreaks that resulted in the entire workforce of two aged care facilities being stood down. 49 4.50 When pressed by the committee on the measures put in place by the government during the month of June, Minister Colbeck pointed to the fact that some advice was provided to the sector around infection control.50 4.51 Beyond sending this advice to aged care facilities, the committee is concerned that no evidence could be provided to demonstrate that the government took any further action to protect Australians living in Victorian aged care facilities during the month of June. 4.52 Evidence from the Aged Care Royal Commission also suggests that the government was too slow to act in mandating the use of masks for aged care workers in Victoria, which did not occur until 13 July. 51 Dr Murphy conceded that, '[i]n hindsight, you could have implemented that earlier, absolutely'. 52 The Aged Care Royal Commission questioned whether this was a matter of hindsight: Masks are a very cheap and effective method of slowing the spread of COVID-19… one or two cases, as they started to increase in June, should have been an alert that this is potentially a problem… There was no guidance provided by the AHPPC to aged care providers in this crucial period between 19 June 2020 and 3 August 2020. 53 4.53 On 7 August, the Australian Medical Association (AMA) demanded the mandated use of filter respirator masks for the care of any COVID-19 patient,

48 Committee Hansard, 29 September 2020, p. 3.

49 Committee Hansard, 29 September 2020, p. 4.

50 Committee Hansard, 21 August 2020, pp. 6–7.

51 Aged Care Royal Commission, Transcript of Proceedings, 13 August 2020, p. 8693, agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-08/13%20August%202020%20- %20Transcript.pdf (accessed 13 October 2020).

52 Aged Care Royal Commission, Transcript of Proceedings, 13 August 2020, p. 8694, agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-08/13%20August%202020%20- %20Transcript.pdf (accessed 13 October 2020).

53 Aged Care Royal Commission, Transcript of Proceedings, 13 August 2020, p. 8694, agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-08/13%20August%202020%20- %20Transcript.pdf (accessed 13 October 2020).

and that there 'were also occasions when regulators failed to engage critically with information received or follow through with necessary action'. 58 4.58 However, the ACQSC appears reluctant to use these new powers. 4.59 From 1 January to 12 August 2020, it received 5934 complaints, predominately in relation to residential care. 59 From 1 January to 4 August, the ACQSC made 229 decisions of noncompliance with relevant standards. 60 As of 29 September, the ACQSC had issued 21 Notices to Agree during COVID-19. 61 4.60 The ACQSC issued five sanctions in the January to March quarter across Australia. 62 However, no sanctions were issued between April and June 2020, 63 and no sanctions were issued in Victoria between 1 June and 21 August 2020. 64 4.61 While the committee recognises sanctions are not the only enforcement tool available to the ACQSC, it questions why the Commission issued so few sanctions when there were so many complaints and non-compliance decisions. 4.62 The committee also does not agree with the ACQSC's decision to suspend unannounced visits and replace them with 'short notice visits' from 16 March until 1 June, after which it conducted both unannounced and short-notice visits. 65 4.63 In April, the ACQSC only conducted 12 short-notice visits. 66 The committee acknowledges the need to minimise the risk of bringing infections into aged care services. However, given the ACQSC oversees nearly 2700 aged care services

58 Ms Kate Carnell AO, Inquiry into events at Earle Haven, Department of Health, 11 November 2019, p. 5.

59 ACQSC, written answers to questions on notice, 21 August 2020, (received 2 October 2020), document no. 442, [p. 3].

60 ACQSC, answers to written questions on notice, 7 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 424, [p. 4].

61 Ms Anderson, Commissioner, ACQSC, Committee Hansard, 29 September 2020, p. 15. A Notice to Agree is issued to providers whose noncompliance has resulted in the AQCSC considering revoking their approval to deliver aged care through a sanction. The Notice to Agree sets out the actions a provider is required to do (including necessary timeframes). Where a provider fails to agree, their approval is revoked: www.agedcarequality.gov.au/aged-care-performance/notices-agree (accessed 14 October 2020).

62 ACQSC, Sector performance report, January–March 2020, p. 1.

63 ACQSC, Sector performance report, April–June 2020, p. 2.

64 ACQSC, answers to written questions on notice, 21 August 2020, (received 2 October 2020), document no. 442, [p. 2].

65 ACQSC, answers to written questions on notice, 7 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 424, [p. 1].

66 ACQSC, answers to written questions on notice, 7 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 424, [p. 1].

this figure is inexplicably low when measured against the risks faced by the vulnerable elderly population residing in these facilities and the ACQSC's responsibility to ensure they are cared for safely. 4.64 The small number of visits is concerning because the ACQSC was otherwise reliant on a self-assessment tool completed by aged care providers 'to help guide a service's own assessment of readiness against best practice and undertake a critical check of their outbreak management plan'. 67 The ACQSC assessed risks based on these survey responses and followed up any concerning survey responses by contacting or visiting the service. 68 4.65 On 4 August, there were 117 residential and home care service providers with one or more confirmed case(s) of COVID-19. 69 Of those, 112 provided a self- assessment survey response. 70 Of the 112 aged care services, on the question about service readiness in the event of a COVID-19 outbreak:

 33 reported 'best practice';  78 reported 'satisfactory'; and  one reported they were in need of improvement. 71 4.66 The ACQSC told the committee that, based on regulatory intelligence including self-assessment survey responses, it undertook site visits at 13 of the above 117 services between 1 March and 4 August 2020. 72 4.67 The committee questions whether self-assessment is the best or most accurate way to determine if an aged care service provider is prepared for a COVID-19 outbreak. 4.68 The committee is concerned that from 1 March to 4 August, the ACQSC undertook site visits of only 11 per cent of aged care providers with one or more confirmed case(s) of COVID-19. 73

67 ACQSC, answers to questions on notice, 21 August 2020, (received 6 October 2020), document no. 445, [p. 1].

68 Ms Anderson, Commissioner, ACQSC, Committee Hansard, 4 August 2020, p. 11.

69 ACQSC, answers to questions on notice, 4 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 422, [p. 1].

70 ACQSC, answers to questions on notice, 4 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 422, [p. 1]. The ACQSC noted that the other five survey responses were being followed up.

71 ACQSC, answers to questions on notice, 4 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 422, [p. 1].

72 ACQSC, answers to questions on notice, 4 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 422, [p. 1].

73 ACQSC, answers to questions on notice, 4 August 2020, (received 28 September 2020), document no. 422, [p. 1]. The 11 per cent is calculated based on the 13 site visits to 117 services.

4.69 The committee is also concerned that more than one-quarter of ACQSC employees are employed under temporary contracting arrangements. 74 As at 31 August, the ACQSC employed 657.33 full time-equivalent staff members, of which approximately 27 per cent were contractors. 75 In answers to questions from the Chair about the ACQSC's high reliance on contractors, Ms Anderson explained there was '…an expectation by government that overall numbers of public servants will be kept at a particular level' and that this impacted on how staff were employed. 76 4.70 The disastrous outcomes within the aged care sector during COVID-19, in combination with the high number of complaints and the lack of regulatory action taken by the ACQSC suggests it has failed to avoid repeating past mistakes. It was only last year that the Earle Haven Inquiry found the ACQSC had missed early warning signs and failed to engage critically with information received. This appears to have played out once again during COVID-19 with terrible consequences for aged care residents and their families.

74 Ms Anderson, Commissioner, ACQSC, Committee Hansard, 29 September 2020, p. 15.

75 Ms Anderson, Commissioner, ACQSC, Committee Hansard, 29 September 2020, p. 15.

76 Ms Anderson, Commissioner, ACQSC, Committee Hansard, 29 September 2020, p. 16.

Chapter 5 Economic response part I: The immediate economic fallout and response

5.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and associated public health response had an immediate impact on the Australian and global economy. 1 5.2 As the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, reflected '[w]e have never seen an economic shock of this speed, magnitude and shape'. 2 5.3 The Australian Government's (government) COVID-19 economic response was announced across three separate packages over an 18-day period. The first package at $17.6 billion was designed without any serious consideration of the impact of escalating social restrictions to come. 5.4 Within just 10 days a second economic package was announced. At $66.1 billion, it was three times the size of the first package, and doubled unemployment payments and other social security payments with the introduction of the Coronavirus Supplement of $550 per fortnight. The package also included measures encouraging Australians to withdraw some of their retirement savings early where sufficient financial support was absent from the government. 5.5 The third and final package in March, announced on the same day National Cabinet agreed to a stage 3 lockdown, was final recognition by the government that the economic consequences of the strict social distancing restrictions would cause economic meltdown across the domestic economy with massive job losses and widespread business closures unless the government introduced a wage subsidy—as many other countries had already done. 5.6 The Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) agrees that the combined effect of these responses have been crucial in saving jobs, providing much needed financial support to those surviving on the lowest of incomes and helping those businesses impacted by the COVID-19 restrictions to survive through the crisis. 5.7 Whilst welcoming the economic packages, the committee believes that there were issues with the timing and scale of the packages, and the government should have responded earlier to calls for a widespread wage subsidy.

1 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), Submission 3, p. 13.

2 Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2020, p. 2.

5.8 The focus in early March on smaller fiscal measures and enabling access to hard- earned private savings for Australians experiencing financial hardship as the primary measure of stimulus, rather than the large scale fiscal intervention that was required, delayed the response and will carry long-term consequences for millions of Australians. 5.9 In this chapter, the committee considers:

 the jobs crisis following the stage 3 lockdown;  the shift in the economic response during March;  the design of JobKeeper and the impact of exclusions;  the adequacy of JobSeeker and Centrelink's capacity to handle a sudden spike in the number of Australians on unemployment support payments;  ongoing issues in relation to the early access superannuation scheme; and  the delay in establishing a national system for paid pandemic leave.

The jobs impact of stage 3 lockdown 5.10 For many Australian businesses and workers, the fallout from public health measures from the pandemic was swift and brutal. 5.11 By the end of March, 66 per cent of businesses surveyed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) had suffered a reduction in turnover or cash flow as a result of COVID-19. One in ten businesses reported not trading and of these, 70 per cent were closed due to COVID-19. 3 5.12 By April, the number of employed Australians had fallen by a total of 594 300— including 220 500 from full-time employment and 373 800 from part-time employment. 828 300 people were unemployed and the underemployment rate had increased to 13.7 per cent. 4 5.13 The severe decline of hours worked was unprecedented in the living memory of Australians. The total number of monthly hours worked fell by a staggering 164 million hours (8 per cent), 5 and around 700 000 Australians were working 'zero hours for economic reasons' but were still counted as employed. 6

3 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Business Indicators, Business Impacts of COVID-19 (Week commencing 30 March 2020), www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/business-indicators/business- indicators-business-impacts-covid-19/week-commencing-30-march-2020 (accessed 8 October 2020).

4 ABS, Labour Force, Australia, 14 May 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/ employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/apr-2020#:~:text=Seasonally%20 adjusted%20estimates%20for%20April,Employment%20decreased%20to%2012%2C418%2C700. (accessed 23 November 2020).

5 ABS, Labour Force, Australia (April 2020), www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and- unemployment/labour-force-australia/apr-2020 (accessed 8 October 2020).

6 See, Dr Kennedy, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2020, p. 3. Economists warned that Australia's official unemployment data did not fully quantify the number of unemployed people during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example,

5.14 From February to May 2020, the number of Australians receiving income support through JobSeeker and Youth Allowance (other) doubled from around 815 000 to 1.64 million. 7 5.15 From April, JobKeeper—the wage subsidy scheme—was supporting 850 000 organisations to pay 3.3 million working Australians a wage to live on in the absence of normal business operating conditions. 8 5.16 Particular industries bore the full impact of the social distancing restrictions with tourism, accommodation and food services, arts and entertainment and aviation the first to feel the full economic impact of the lockdown, with hundreds of thousands of Australians losing their jobs and facing a very uncertain future, many for the first time in their working lives. 5.17 Within the industries that experienced the most rapid and severe declines in employment, women, young people and casuals were the hardest hit. 5.18 In just three weeks between 14 March and 4 April 2020, the number of Australian jobs fell by 25.6 per cent in accommodation and food services and 18.7 per cent in arts and recreation services. 9 According to evidence from the Department of the Treasury: Women and younger people have been over-represented in the falls, and a lot of that is around the structure of the industries that have been most affected—arts and recreation, retail, accommodation—areas where employment was more dominated by… women—and by young people. 10

Mr Saul Eslake noted that the measured unemployment rate had become 'a particularly misleading guide to the true condition of the labour market during the current downturn'. This is attributable to the 'large number of people counted as 'employed' even though they have worked zero hours; and the large number of people who have been stood down or retrenched from their employment, are not 'actively looking for work', and hence are recorded as being 'not in the labour force', rather than employed.' See, Mr Eslake, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 2.

7 Department of Social Services, answers to questions on notice on 22 May 2020 (received 2 June 2020), document no. 75, p. 2.

8 Department of the Treasury, The Jobkeeper Payment: Three-month review, June 2020, p. 17.

9 Dr Kennedy, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2020, p. 2.

10 Dr Kennedy, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 9 June 2020, p. 11.

the need to support rather than stimulate'. 15 This view aligns with the clear reluctance of the government to embrace a hard lock down of the economy in late February and early March. 5.22 By mid-March many other nations around the world had begun to adopt large- scale wage subsidy programs. On 20 March, the Government of the United Kingdom announced the 'Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme' under which it would pay 80 per cent of workers' salaries, for all employers, up to £2500 per month. 16 5.23 Similarly, the Danish Government implemented a 'wage compensation scheme' to pay 75 per cent to 90 per cent of workers' wages for businesses that would have had to fire 30 per cent or more of their employees due to COVID-19. 17 The New Zealand Government adopted a 'targeted wage subsidy scheme for workers in adversely affected sectors' as early as 9 March. 18 5.24 In contrast, the government was not receptive to a wage subsidy until it was clear that there was no other option to saving jobs in light of the escalating social restrictions and their economic implications. 19 5.25 Five days before finally agreeing to calls for a large national wage subsidy scheme and announcing JobKeeper the Prime Minister, when asked if he would consider a scheme like the United Kingdom's, said: We are already providing money to businesses through the BAS arrangements and one of the weaknesses of the system that you're advocating for is that it has to build an entirely new payment system for that to be achieved, which is never done quickly and is never done well. 20

15 Grattan Institute, Submission 230, p. 22.

16 The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, 'The Chancellor Rishi Sunak provides an updated statement on coronavirus', Speech, 20 March 2020, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-chancellor-rishi- sunak-provides-an-updated-statement-on-coronavirus (accessed 13 October 2020).

17 The Danish Government, Ministry of Finance, Denmark's Convergence Programme 2020, May 2020, p. 25, en.fm.dk/media/18058/denmark-s-convergence-programme-2020.pdf (accessed 13 October 2020).

18 The Hon Grant Robertson, Minister for Finance, New Zealand, 'Cabinet approves Business Continuity Package in response to COVID-19', 9 March 2020, www.beehive.govt.nz/release/cabinet-approves-business-continuity-package-response-covid-19 (accessed 13 October 2020).

19 See, for example, Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Minister for Finance, 'Sky News – First Edition', Transcript, 27 March 2020, www.financeminister.gov.au/transcript/2020/03/27/sky-news- first-edition (accessed 2 September 2020).

20 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press conference – Australian Parliament House, ACT', Transcript, 25 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament- house-act-250320 (accessed 2 September 2020).

5.26 In a hearing on 2 July, economists told the committee the government had not gone hard enough or early enough in its economic response. Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director of Market Economics said the government's response to COVID-19 had been 'timid' and 'stingy' 21. Dr Richard Denniss, Chief Economist of The Australia Institute, made the point that: …the fact that unemployment is rising and that underemployment and hidden unemployment are so substantial is in itself proof that the stimulus isn't big enough.22 5.27 The government was also slow to enact targeted measures designed to fill gaps in its immediate response packages. For example, following concerns about a significant proportion of the arts sector being ineligible for JobKeeper, on 27 March industry groups and the opposition called for a rescue package. 23 On 25 June—three months after these calls—the government belatedly announced a $250 million package for the creative economy. 24 In a hearing before the committee on 30 June, the Office for the Arts conceded that guidelines had not yet been developed and it would take 'several months' before the first payments would start going to affected organisations. 25 5.28 To understand why the government was initially reluctant to adopt large-scale fiscal intervention, the Chair wrote to the Department of the Treasury on 30 April requesting its economic modelling and scenario work on the response to COVID-19. The government refused to provide this important economic data, 26 and have claimed public interest immunity over its release.27 5.29 This refusal to provide key documents to the committee and to allow for appropriate scrutiny and transparency has significantly impacted on the committee's ability to interrogate some of these key decisions.

21 Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 1.

22 Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 14.

23 See the Hon Anthony Albanese MP, House of Representatives Hansard, 23 March 2020, pp. 2774–2775.

24 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, '$250 million JobMaker plan to restart Australia's creative economy,' Media Release, 25 June 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/250-million-jobmaker-plan- restart-australias-creative-economy (accessed 23 November 2020).

25 Dr Stephen Arnott, First Assistant Secretary, Office for the Arts, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, Committee Hansard, 30 June 2020, p. 29.

26 Dr Kennedy, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, correspondence received 6 May 2020.

27 Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Minister for Finance, correspondence received 18 June 2020 (tabled in Senate 18 June 2020).

 all employees of local government (194 000 people) – including workers in many childcare centres, libraries and arts and recreational facilities;  all employees of companies owned by foreign governments – including several thousand Dnata workers who were stood down in May; and  all employees of universities – while universities were not explicitly named as an exclusion, the government made multiple changes to the rules to deliberately exclude universities from receiving JobKeeper payments.

Casual employees 5.34 Many inquiry participants opposed the decision to exclude casuals who had not been with their employer for at least 12 months. 30 The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) called the requirement 'arbitrary' and highlighted figures from the ABS suggesting that approximately one million casual employees (about 40 per cent of all casuals) were ineligible for JobKeeper.31 5.35 The requirement also had a disproportionate effect on some of the industries hardest hit by the pandemic. 32 For example, 64 per cent of employees in the accommodation and food sector are employed casually, 33 while employees in the arts and entertainment industry typically move between jobs rather than stay with a single employer.34 5.36 Submitters also commented that young people and women are more likely to be employed casually and are more vulnerable because they work in industries that have been hardest hit by the pandemic. 35 This is discussed further at the end of this chapter.

Temporary visa holders 5.37 Temporary visa holders were directly excluded from JobKeeper, 36 with three quarters of a million workers affected. 37 The Australian Council of Social Service

30 See, for example, Universities Australia, Submission 275, p. 15; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 150, p. 9; Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 31.1, pp. 8–9; Australian Nursing and Midwifery Foundation, Submission 125, p. 21; Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network, Submission 121, pp. 11–13.

31 ACTU, Submission 122, p. 3.

32 See, for example, ACTU, Submission 122, p. 3.

33 ACTU, Submission 122, p. 4.

34 Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 118, pp. 2 and 7–8.

35 ACTU, Submission 122, pp. 2–3.

36 See, for example, Combined Refugee Action Group, Submission 108, [p. 1]; Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, Submission 247, p. 2; Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network, Submission 121, pp. 10–11; Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 31.1, pp. 8–9.

37 ACTU, Submission 122, p. 4.

told the committee that many in this situation are not able to return to their country of origin because 'they cannot get a flight or it is unsafe to do so'. 38 5.38 This exclusion meant that temporary visa holders were left without any options for financial support from the government, leaving them to rely on friends or charities to help them meet their living costs.

Local government 5.39 Local governments employ 194 000 people, all of whom were excluded under JobKeeper eligibility rules. 39 At least 20 per cent of these workers—around 39 000 people—work in jobs that are dependent on revenue from council business, rather than rates and grants. 40 These jobs include local government run childcare services, arts and entertainment venues, and recreation centres. 41 5.40 Without any access to JobKeeper payments, the Australian Local Government Association estimated that up to 55 000 council jobs could be lost. 42

Australian companies owned by foreign sovereign entities 5.41 Employees of companies owned by sovereign entities were excluded from JobKeeper. As a direct result of this exclusion, thousands of Australian aviation workers faced job losses, including over 5500 staff in aviation catering and ground handling business Dnata. 43

University workers 5.42 No university was eligible for JobKeeper despite a revenue shortfall of $3.1 billion to $4.8 billion in 2020, 44 and announced job losses of 4729 staff. 45 According to evidence tendered by Universities Australia: The Government has repeatedly sought to craft legislative instruments specifically to exclude universities from the scheme, while publicly maintaining that universities would be eligible on the same terms as other businesses or not-for-profit organisations.46

38 ACOSS, Submission 130, p. 3.

39 ACTU, Submission 122, pp. 4–5.

40 Australian Local Government Association (ALGA), Submission 429, p. 3.

41 ALGA, Submission 429, pp. 3–5.

42 ALGA, Submission 429, pp. 3–4.

43 See, for example, Kate Burgess, 'JobKeeper: Aviation workers rally for support', The Canberra Times, 10 June 2020, www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6788036/thousands-excluded-from-jobkeeper- after-company-was-sold-to-a-foreign-government/ (accessed 4 September 2020).

44 Universities Australia, Submission 275, p. 15.

45 Mr Dom English, First Assistant Secretary, Higher Education Division, Department of Education, Skills and Employment (DESE), Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, p. 48.

46 Universities Australia, Submission 275, p. 15.

5.43 Universities Australia has solid evidence behind this claim, with the government making three separate amendments to JobKeeper rules relevant to the higher education sector–each of which excluded universities that had previously been hoping to successfully apply for JobKeeper. 5.44 In a decision on 5 April, the Treasurer announced that all charities registered with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) would be allowed to qualify for JobKeeper under a threshold test requiring a 15 per cent drop in revenue–as opposed to the threshold of 30 per cent for other businesses. Just three days later, the Education Minister announced that this 15 per cent rule would not apply to universities, despite their status as ACNC registered charities. 5.45 On 24 April, the government made further changes to JobKeeper rules which allowed it to reject a pending application from La Trobe University. 47 5.46 Finally, on 1 May the government announced a rule change forcing universities to use the six-month period between January and June for the JobKeeper turnover test. These restrictions did not apply to any other entities, which could use any month or quarter between April and September 2020. 48

Timing of JobKeeper 5.47 Employers accessing JobKeeper are required to pay their employees for each fortnight they intend to claim, and are then paid by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) on a monthly basis in arrears. The fact that businesses receive JobKeeper in arrears has created major cash flow issues for many businesses. 49 5.48 These issues were exacerbated by the awkward initial timing of JobKeeper, perhaps as a consequence of the government deciding to adopt the wage subsidy program relatively late following its two earlier economic support packages. 5.49 The first week of JobKeeper payments came into effect on 30 March, but employer enrolment did not take place until 20 April and the first payments in arrears did not occur until early May. This timing was of major concern for businesses who were still trying to figure out if they were even eligible for the program.50

47 Tim Dodd, 'Treasurer shuts down universities' JobKeeper loophole', The Australian, 25 April 2020, available at www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/treasurer-shuts-down- universities-jobkeeper-loophole/news-story/fbfddb63a079ad168bec42c67d552a40 (accessed on 9 November 2020).

48 Universities Australia, Submission 275, p. 15.

49 See, for example, Business NSW [New South Wales], Submission 129, p. 3.

50 See, for example, Business NSW, Submission 129, p. 3.

5.50 Timing issues also created problems for seasonal tourism businesses that were affected by the requirement for staff to have been employed on 1 March 2020. 51 5.51 Had the government begun planning for a major wage subsidy like JobKeeper as part of its initial economic response, it could have avoided the chaos of trying to design and implement a wage subsidy to apply retrospectively. It also could have provided businesses with greater certainty over whether they would be successful in applying for the program.

Justification for exclusions 5.52 At no point did the committee receive any clear rationale for why so many categories of workers were excluded from JobKeeper, beyond the Treasurer's argument that 'we had to draw the line somewhere'. 52 5.53 The government also repeatedly used the claim that exclusions were a product of the limited time it had to develop the JobKeeper program, and that a review in June would revisit these decisions. However, this turned out to be nothing more than a false hope for excluded workers. The review conducted by the Department of the Treasury in June did not consider changes to the eligibility test for workers excluded from the scheme. 5.54 In the committee's view, unnecessarily excluding many of the people and sectors hardest-hit by the pandemic undermined the economic benefits of JobKeeper and its goal of keeping as many workers employed as possible. 5.55 The committee requested information from the Department of the Treasury on how many workers' jobs could have been saved by removing these exclusions, but never received any of the figures even after the JobKeeper review was released in July. 5.56 What is clear is that despite JobKeeper, the number of people on unemployment payments doubled in March and April and has remained at dramatically elevated levels to this day.

The $60 billion costing mistake 5.57 On 22 May, the government announced that there had been a massive costing error which had led to an overestimation in the expected cost of JobKeeper by 46 per cent or $60 billion. 53

51 See, for example, Australian Tourism Industry Council, Submission 162, p. 8.

52 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'Interview with Ali Moore, ABC Melbourne Mornings,' Transcript, 8 April 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg- 2018/transcripts/interview-ali-moore-abc-melbourne-mornings (accessed 24 November 2020).

53 The Department of the Treasury and the ATO, 'JobKeeper Update,' Media Release, 22 May 2020, treasury.gov.au/media-release/jobkeeper-update (accessed 24 November 2020).

5.58 Despite this mistake the government refused to expand eligibility requirements to cover workers who had been unfairly excluded. 5.59 The original government forecasts had suggested that about 6 million people would access JobKeeper, costing $130 billion. 54 For a demand driven program this turned out to be a substantial overestimate. 5.60 Instead, the government announced that it expected about 3.5 million people to receive JobKeeper, at a reduced cost of around $70 billion. 55 5.61 The Department of the Treasury and the ATO explained there had been 'a reporting error in estimates of the number of employees likely to access the JobKeeper program'.56 5.62 The correction came after the government had reiterated its initial forecast to the committee on multiple occasions, 57 including at a committee hearing on 21 May 2020 where government officials did not provide any indication that the forecast was wrong and would be publicly corrected the following day. 58 5.63 The Treasurer had previously justified excluding more than one million casual workers from JobKeeper using the rationale that 'at $130 billion…we had to draw the line somewhere. This is a massive call on the public purse and it is a debt that the country will pay for years to come'. 59 5.64 The Grattan Institute observed that the revision 'arguably makes room to expand the eligibility of the scheme.' 60

54 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, and the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, '$130 billion JobKeeper payment to keeps Australians in a job', Media Release, 30 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/130-billion-jobkeeper-payment-keep-australians-job (accessed 4 September 2020).

55 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'Interview with Patricia Karvelas, ABC TV', Transcript, 22 May 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/transcripts/ interview- patricia-karvelas-abc-tv (accessed 7 September 2020); Department of the Treasury and ATO, 'JobKeeper update', Media Release, 22 May 2020, treasury.gov.au/media-release/jobkeeper-update (accessed 7 September 2020).

56 Department of the Treasury and the ATO, 'JobKeeper update', Media Release, 22 May 2020, treasury.gov.au/media-release/jobkeeper-update (accessed 14 October 2020).

57 See, for example, DPM&C, Submission 3, p. 14; Department of the Treasury, answers to questions on notice, 28 April 2020 (received 7 May 2020), document no. 7, [p. 2]; Department of the Treasury, answers to questions on notice, 8 May 2020 (received 19 May 2020), document no. 51, p. 6.

58 See, Ms Meghan Quinn, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group, Department of the Treasury, and Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 21 May 2020, p. 32.

59 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, quoted by Senator Katy Gallagher, Committee Hansard, 9 June 2020, p. 25.

60 Grattan Institute, Submission 230, p. 27.

5.65 However, despite being granted powers by the Parliament to expand eligibility for JobKeeper through regulation, the Treasurer decided not to use this $60 billion error as an opportunity to include some of the workers and businesses that had been unfairly excluded from JobKeeper and in doing so save more jobs. 5.66 Instead, the government maintained its hard-line position on JobKeeper exclusions with the then Minister for Finance, Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, claiming the $130 billion forecast 'wasn't a spending target.'61 5.67 The committee is concerned that, notwithstanding the urgency with which JobKeeper was designed, the Department of the Treasury forecasts were out by such magnitude. It resulted in the government making decisions based on information that turned out to be highly inaccurate. 5.68 On becoming aware of the error, the government had the opportunity to extend JobKeeper to workers who had unfairly been excluded but refused to do so.

Decision to remove JobKeeper and other relief from the childcare sector 5.69 When JobKeeper was announced on 30 March, eligible early childhood education and care (ECEC) services were to receive payments like any other JobKeeper recipient—over a six-month period from 30 March to 27 September. 5.70 On 2 April the government also announced the Early Childhood Education and Care Relief Package, which it said would provide free childcare services to around one million families during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as supporting the sector to 'make it through to the other side of this crisis'. 62 5.71 However, on 8 June the government decided to end both of these critical support measures. ECEC workers were told they would no longer be eligible for JobKeeper payments from 20 July, while struggling families were told their free childcare would come to an end on 12 July. 63 5.72 For ECEC workers this was perceived as 'a really low blow' as they had counted on receiving JobKeeper payments until 27 September, as the government had previously promised. 64

61 Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Minister for Finance, Committee Hansard, 9 June 2020, p. 25. Also see Dr Kennedy, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 9 June 2020, p. 35.

62 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, and the Hon Dan Tehan MP, Minister for Education, 'Early childhood education and care relief package', Media Release, 2 April 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/early-childhood-education-and-care-relief-package (accessed 13 October 2020).

63 See discussion with DESE, Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, p. 33.

64 Ms Jessica Liersch (an early childhood educator of 12 years) told the Committee that the decision to remove this lifeline was 'a really low blow' for the educators who were relying on the initiative for

5.79 The images of Australians lining up at Centrelink shocked the nation and were a dramatic representation of the immediate economic and human cost of the social distancing restrictions in place to save lives. 5.80 As noted in paragraph 5.14, the number of Australians receiving unemployment payments doubled between February and May 2020 from around 815 000 to 1.64 million. 67 It has remained roughly at this elevated level for the past 28 weeks. 68 5.81 Services Australia acknowledged issues around Australians accessing services in a hearing on 30 April, with the Chief Executive Officer testifying that 'there was some extreme poor performance early on.' 69 This system failure caused unnecessary distress to hundreds of thousands of people at a time when they were already reeling from losing their jobs. 5.82 Services Australia did not directly answer questions about what advice it provided to government on the anticipated increase in demand. This is another example of the failure to provide key information to this committee during the course of this inquiry. 70

Coronavirus supplement 5.83 As part of the second economic response package, the government announced a Coronavirus Supplement which effectively doubled the JobSeeker payment to $1100 per fortnight. It also significantly boosted other payments including Youth Allowance, Parenting Payments, the Farm Household Allowance and Special Benefit payments. 71

www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-24/centrelink-minister-stuart-robert-not-anticipate-coronavirus /12080612 (accessed 8 October 2020).

67 Department of Social Services, answers to questions on notice on 22 May 2020 (received 2 June 2020), document no. 75, p. 2.

68 The latest data shows that approximately 1.5 million Australians remain on JobSeeker and Youth Allowance (other). See Department of Social Services, fortnightly report for income support recipients by payment type as of 13 November 2020 (received 20 November 2020).

69 Ms Rebecca Skinner, Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia, Committee Hansard, 30 April 2020, p. 14.

70 Services Australia, answers to questions on notice on 30 April 2020 (received 12 May 2020), document no. 21, p. 1; Services Australia, answers to question on notice, 30 April 2020 (received 15 May 2020), document no. 33, p. 1.

71 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, and the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'Supporting Australian workers and business', Media Release, 22 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/supporting-australian-workers-and-business (accessed 9 October 2020).

5.84 The Coronavirus Supplement was due to finish on 24 September 2020 but on 21 July the government announced that it had decided to extend the payment at a reduced rate of $250 a fortnight until 31 December 2020. 72 5.85 The Minister for Families and Social Services, Senator the Hon Anne Ruston, was unable to answer the committee's questions on the economic impact of reducing the Coronavirus Supplement at a time when more than two million Australians are relying on it. 73 5.86 Despite the fact that JobKeeper was funded in the October budget to run until March 2021, the government decided at the time not to extend the Coronavirus Supplement beyond the end of December 2020. It is unclear why the government chose to single out recipients of social support payments in this way. 5.87 At the time, this decision not to extend the Coronavirus Supplement in line with the extension to JobKeeper appears to have been in direct conflict with evidence from the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, Dr Kennedy who told the committee: Jobseeker and JobKeeper have been designed to work together to put what I regard as a historically significant income floor under the whole community. 74 5.88 Requests from the committee for access to the modelling done to inform the government's decisions about the payment were also rejected on the basis they formed part of Cabinet deliberations. 75 5.89 On 11 November, just one month after the budget the government announced that the Coronavirus Supplement would be extended again at a reduced rate of $150 a fortnight until 31 March 2020. 76

Permanent increase for JobSeeker

72 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'JobKeeper Payment and income support extended', 21 July 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/media-releases/jobkeeper- payment-and-income-support-extended (accessed 18 November 2020).

73 Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 48.

74 Committee Hansard, 21 May 2020, p. 12.

75 Department of the Treasury, answers to questions on notice, 21 May 2020 (received 9 June 2020), document no. 102, p. 9.

76 Services Australia, Coronavirus Supplement, updated 10 November 2020, available at www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/services/centrelink/coronavirus-supplement (accessed 11 November 2020).

5.90 It has been widely acknowledged for years, by business and community stakeholders alike that the permanent rate of JobSeeker at $40 a day is totally inadequate, often forcing recipients to live well below the poverty line. 77 5.91 The committee agrees that the original rate of JobSeeker is inadequate. 5.92 Research from the Australian National University's Centre for Social Research and Methods shows that the introduction of the Coronavirus Supplement and the JobKeeper payment 'reduced measures of poverty and housing stress, with both now below what they were prior to COVID-19'. 78 5.93 However, the researchers also found that this 'protective impact has been reduced somewhat by the July policy announcement to make these supplementary payments less generous'. 79 5.94 The Grattan Institute has argued for a sustained increase to the JobSeeker rate to around $750 a fortnight on the basis that the 'Coronavirus Supplement has been very important for sustaining spending and incomes through this period'. 80 5.95 The committee is concerned that the further reductions in the supplement just after Christmas will plunge almost two million recipients of the supplement into greater financial hardship at a time when the economy needs sustained fiscal stimulus to protect jobs and businesses. 5.96 The committee recommends that the government monitors the economic impact of reducing the coronavirus supplement and reports back to the Senate with any data on the impact of the reductions. 5.97 The committee urges the government to permanently increase the rate of JobSeeker from its current rate of just $40 a day at the earliest opportunity— either in the upcoming Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook or in the 2021–22 Federal Budget.

77 See, for example, ACOSS, Submission 130, p. 3.

78 Ben Phillips, Matthew Gray and Nicholas Biddle, 'COVID-19 JobKeeper and JobSeeker impacts on poverty and housing stress under current and alternative economic and policy scenarios', 29 August 2020, p. ii, available at csrm.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files /docs/2020/8/Impact of Covid19 JobKeeper and Jobeeker measures on Poverty and Financial Stress FINAL.pdf (accessed 9 November 2020).

79 Services Australia, Coronavirus Supplement, updated 10 November 2020, available at www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/services/centrelink/coronavirus-supplement (accessed 11 November 2020).

80 Mr Brendan Coates, Director, Household Finance Program, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 21.

5.102 The NFAW told the committee in its opening statement on 22 September that there was an 'absence of anything like a gender lens in our national stimulus response'. 86 5.103 The Office for Women, the pre-eminent source of expert gender policy advice within government, provided evidence it was not consulted by the government on the design of the key early policy responses to COVID-19 including early access to superannuation, JobKeeper and the Coronavirus Supplement. 87 5.104 In addition to failing to consult key stakeholder groups on the design of stimulus measures, key policy agencies, including the Department of the Treasury, failed to conduct gender-based modelling of key policies being initiated under their purview. 5.105 For example, despite long-standing advice to successive governments in the Women's Economic Security Statement that women experience unequal outcomes in superannuation–typically retiring with half the balance of men – no modelling was conducted by government on the long-term gendered impact of the COVID-19 early release of superannuation program.88 5.106 Failure to incorporate known inequities, such as those in superannuation outcomes, has promoted greater disparity. eS4W asserted in its submission that their analysis of Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and ATO data found women, who already retire with 47 per cent less super than men, 89 withdrew 4.5 per cent of their balance on average compared to 2.5 per cent for men accessing the scheme. 90 5.107 Other long-running gender inequities were ignored in the formulation of stimulus measures, such as the gender pay gap, and the ongoing accessibility of affordable childcare. 5.108 Gendered employment patterns are well known to government, such as the higher proportion of women engaged in casual employment. 91 However, these conditions were not incorporated into the government's wage-subsidy response which excluded over one million casuals.

86 Associate Professor Sally Moyle, NFAW, Committee Hansard, 22 September 2020, p. 21.

87 DPM&C, answers to question on notice, 22 September 2020 (received 15 October), document no. 484, [p. 1].

88 Department of the Treasury, answers to questions on notice, 21 August 2020 (received 9 September 2020) document 367, p. 3.

89 eS4W, Submission 179, p. 6.

90 eS4W, Submission 179, p. 7.

91 For example, see ABS, Gender Indicators, Australia, November 2019, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/ people/people-and-communities/gender-indicators-australia/latest-release#economic-security (accessed 9 November 2020).

5.109 The government's iterative changes to its economic response policies have also been criticised over the course of the committee's inquiry by participants for neglecting to correct for, or even adding to, disadvantage for women. 92 5.110 For example, sector-specific stimulus measures such as HomeBuilder have skewed heavily in favour of men, 93 while calls for greater investment in sectors like childcare, which have an overrepresentation of both female workers and an impact on women's employment participation, have gone unheeded. 5.111 The government is still yet to correct its failures to properly identify and correct for the gender impact of COVID-19. Despite record expenditure in the 2020–21 Budget, industries with higher representation of women continue to be overlooked for targeted jobs stimulus. As Grattan Institute Chief Executive Officer Ms Danielle Wood has highlighted: Women are the majority in a lot of those sectors: childcare, aged care and more than 50 per cent in hospitality, the arts and tourism. Those sectors are really hard hit and there are no direct measures to help them in the budget. 94 5.112 The committee strongly shares the view of eS4W that: Moving forward we encourage the Government to apply a gender lens on all policies… Women's economic empowerment will be essential if we are to ensure effective and sustainable economic recovery from COVID-19 in Australia. 95 5.113 Australian women would benefit if the government committed to undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the gendered impact of its decisions, and incorporated that understanding into its responses, when designing and implementing policies in response to the pandemic.

92 See, for example, Associate Professor Sally Moyle, NFAW, Committee Hansard, 22 September 2020, pp. 22.

93 Mr David Richardson, Senior Research Fellow, The Australia Institute, Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, pp. 14–15.

94 Quoted in Wendy Tuohy, 'Tripple whammy: "Budget overlooked women when they needed it most,"' The Age, 11 October 2020, www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/triple-whammy- budget-overlooked-women-when-they-needed-it-most-20201009-p563n0.html (accessed 23 November 2020).

95 eS4W, Submission 179, p. 9.

5.118 The government initially expected (before temporary visa holders were able to access the scheme) that 1.5 million people would withdraw $27 billion up to 24 September. 102 By 30 July, the government had revised its estimate to $41.9 billion in withdrawals before 31 December 2020. 103 5.119 These withdrawals will have a long term effect on Australians' retirement funds. 104 On 2 July, Industry Super Australia estimated that '395,000 people under-35 have eroded their super balance', and that 'about 480,000 Australians across all age groups could have wiped out their super, even before the second tranche opens'. 105 Dr Denniss told the Committee the effect of these withdrawals on young people 'would be devastating and cumulative'. 106 5.120 According to modelling by Industry Super Australia, a 25-year-old who accesses the full $20 000 available under the scheme could lose more than $95 000 from their retirement balance. 107 5.121 Some people did not want to access their super, but felt they had no other choice due to a lack of other economic support. 108 The committee heard from workers who were reluctant to withdraw from their super but felt it was necessary in the face of the loss of hours and work during the pandemic. 109 5.122 The ACTU submitted that the scheme 'forces workers who are already suffering the most to do the heaviest lifting to support themselves'. 110 This claim is

102 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, and the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Joint Press Conference, 22 March 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg- 2018/transcripts/joint-press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-0 (accessed 16 October 2020); and Nassim Khadem 'More than 360,000 Australians apply for early release of superannuation under coronavirus assistance scheme', ABC News, 6 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-06/australians-access-their-super-early-coronavirus- covid19/12125328 (accessed 16 October 2020).

103 Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2020, p. 17.

104 See, for example, Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 118, pp. 12–13.

105 Industry Super Australia, 'Super wipe out: Almost 500,000 Australians have emptied their nest eggs', Media Release, 2 July 2020, www.industrysuper.com/media/super-wipe-out-almost-500000- australians-have-emptied-their-nest-eggs/ (accessed 3 September 2020).

106 Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 16.

107 ACTU, Submission 122, p. 13.

108 See, for example, Ms Jo Briskey, National Political Coordinator, Parliamentary Affairs, United Workers Union, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, pp. 28–29; Dr Richard Denniss, Chief Economist, The Australia Institute, Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 16.

109 Mr Adam Quill, Industrial Member, Pubs & Clubs, United Workers Union, Ms Josephine Annink, Industrial Member, Casinos, United Workers Union, and Mr Chris Ball, Industrial Member, Casinos, United Workers Union, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, p. 32.

110 ACTU, Submission 122, p. 13.

supported by analysis from AMP, the Department of the Treasury and Women in Super. 5.123 In the first two weeks of the scheme, AMP received applications from 52 379 of its clients for early release of their superannuation. Most of these were from people working in accommodation and food services, arts and recreation services and manufacturing. Seventy per cent of applicants had a super balance of $50 000 or less, and the average withdrawal amount was $8300. 111 5.124 Data provided by the Department of the Treasury in mid-July showed that approximately half of all people accessing their superannuation early were aged under 35. People aged 26 to 30 had the most applications approved (425 300) and withdrew a total of $3.14 billion. 112 5.125 Women in Super analysed early release data for 32 per cent of the applications made to 30 June and found that 20 per cent of women in the 25 to 34 age group applied to withdraw their super, and that women who applied had lower average balances than men. 113 5.126 At an estimated $41.9 billion, the size of withdrawals relative to other economic measures shows that the Australian economy has been propped up by the retirement savings of the working people who were already shouldering much of the economic hardship during the pandemic. 5.127 This will come at an enormous long-term cost to Australia's retirement income system. The committee was surprised to learn the Department of the Treasury never modelled the impact of the early withdrawal super scheme on the retirement income system. 114 However, financial modelling conducted in August by exchange-traded fund provider BetaShares showed that the $30 billion withdrawn at that point would cost the retirement system between $100 to $130 billion. 115

111 AMP, AMP analysis reveals industries with highest proportion of early super withdrawal applicants, 13 May 2020, corporate.amp.com.au/newsroom/2020/MAY/amp-analysis-early-super- withdrawal (accessed 15 October 2020).

112 Department of the Treasury, answers to question on notice, 19 June 2020 (received 10 July 2020) document no. 185, p. 2.

113 Ms Catherine (Cate) Wood, National Chair, Women in Super, Committee Hansard, 22 September 2020, pp. 27–28.

114 Mr Jeremenko, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2020, pp. 17–18.

115 Betashares, 'Misguided policy': Early super withdrawals to cost future governments and taxpayers more than $100 billion, 17 August 2020, www.firstlinks.com.au/noticeboard/betashares-17-08-20 (accessed 16 November 2020).

quoted as saying 'about 80 per cent' of the new infections in that state were from 'transmission in workplaces, including in aged care.' 119 5.134 It took the government five months from the onset of the pandemic to finally agree to a paid pandemic scheme and even then it only applied to Victoria. On 3 August the government announced a $1500 payment would be available to Victorian workers who were required to isolate due to COVID-19 and who did not have access to sick leave. 5.135 Two days later, on 5 August, the Prime Minister publicly announced that other states and territories could enter a paid pandemic leave arrangement with the government but it would be negotiated on a state by state basis. 120 5.136 The government's failure to implement a national paid pandemic leave scheme from the onset of the pandemic was unacceptable and put Australians lives at risk including those workers surviving on the lowest incomes. For many of those workers, staying home from work if they were unwell was not a choice they could afford.

119 'Workplace coronavirus transmission driving Victorian case numbers, including in aged care', ABC News, 19 July 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-19/workplace-coronavirus-transmission-in- victoria-in-aged-care/12470704 (accessed 14 October 2020).

120 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Interview with Ray Hadley, 2GB', Transcript, 5 August 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-ray-hadley-2gb-3 (accessed 14 October 2020).

Chapter 6 Economic response part II: the recession and the Australian jobs crisis

6.1 The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Australian economy will be long- lasting. 6.2 The Department of the Treasury has forecast that the pandemic will result in an Australian economy that is smaller, with higher unemployment and substantially lower business investment going forward than would otherwise have been the case. 1 6.3 Record low wages growth, already being experienced by Australians in the years prior to the pandemic, is forecast to persist over the forward estimates with impacts felt beyond the medium term. 2 6.4 The budgetary impact of COVID-19 will be equally long-lasting. The deficit for the 2020–21 financial year is a record high of $213.7 billion, with the Department of the Treasury projecting $480.5 billion of cumulative deficits over the forward estimates and net debt expected to increase to almost one trillion dollars over the same period. 3 Budget repair will only occur once the economy has recovered from the worst impacts of COVID-19. 6.5 With such a depressed economic and fiscal outlook, the Australian Government (government) needs to ensure that the decisions it makes facilitate as rapid and sustainable an economic recovery as possible. 6.6 With almost one million Australians unemployed and unemployment forecast to remain above pre-COVID levels over the forward estimates, the government's focus must be on driving job creation and improving job security. 6.7 Fiscal support measures must be targeted for maximum effectiveness: on measures that lift productivity and participation, increase consumer and business confidence, and support those who have suffered the worst impacts of COVID-19. 6.8 This chapter considers some of the smaller economic measures and programs that the government has put in place with the stated intention of supporting the economy and facilitating job creation. It includes discussion on:

1 Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Federal Budget, Budget Paper One, Statement 2: Economic Outlook.

2 Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Federal Budget, Budget Paper One, Statement 2: Economic Outlook.

3 Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Budget, Budget Paper Number One, pp. 1–6.

The Australian economy prior to COVID-19 6.13 The economy was struggling before the pandemic hit. The December quarter 2019 National Accounts release from the ABS showed that quarterly growth slowed from 0.6 per cent to 0.5 per cent; the private economy did not grow at all; annual consumption growth was growing at its slowest pace since the Global Financial Crisis; and total private business investment continued to go backwards, declining for three consecutive quarters. 7 6.14 Increased wage growth was not on the horizon even before the impact of COVID-19. Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Deputy Governor, Dr Guy Debelle said on 26 November 2019 that 'wages growth has declined noticeably since 2012' and wages growth was expected 'to remain largely unchanged at its current level over the next couple of years'. 8

Australia in recession: economic outlook over the forward estimates 6.15 Nearly three decades of uninterrupted economic growth in Australia came to an end when the economy entered a recession after suffering the deepest economic contraction since the Great Depression. 9 6.16 Recessions have a devastating impact on employment, and the sudden and severe economic shock associated with the COVID-19 pandemic was no different. The sharp contraction in economic activity experienced in the March and June quarters had a shocking and immediate impact on the number of Australians in employment. In just one month, more than one million Australians either lost their jobs or had their working hours reduced to zero. 10 6.17 In its release for the June quarter 2020 National Accounts, the ABS said that 'the global pandemic and associated containment policies led to a 7.0 per cent fall in GDP [Gross Domestic Product] for the June quarter'. 11 This followed a fall in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 0.3 per cent in the March quarter of 2020. 12

7 ABS, National Accounts, December 2019.

8 Dr Guy Debelle, 'Employment and Wages,' Transcript, 26 November 2019, www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2019/sp-dg-2019-11-26.html (accessed 23 November 2020).

9 Shane Wright, 'Australia in recession: biggest economic contraction since the great depression', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 September 2020, www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-in-recession- biggest-economic-contraction-since-great-depression-abs-confirms-20200902-p55rk4.html (accessed 16 November 2020).

10 See, Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Budget, Budget Paper No. 1, p. 1.

11 ABS, 'Economic activity fell 7.0 per cent in June quarter'' Media Release, 2 September 2020, www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/economic-activity-fell-70-cent-june-quarter (accessed 23 November 2020).

12 ABS, 'Economic activity fell 7.0 per cent in June quarter,' Media Release, 2 September 2020, www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/economic-activity-fell-70-cent-june-quarter (accessed 23 November 2020).

6.18 Recent economic analysis from the RBA and the Department of the Treasury suggest the government's existing economic response measures will not be sufficient to address persistently high levels of unemployment and low wages growth.13 Additionally, according to forecasts by both the RBA and in the recent Budget, unemployment is expected to peak at 8 per cent in the December quarter of this year and remain higher than pre-pandemic levels for the next four years. 14 6.19 Wage growth is also forecast to remain sluggish, with the budget papers projecting wages will grow at just 1.25 per cent in this financial year and 1.5 per cent in the next, 15 and the RBA saying 'wages growth is also expected to remain very weak in the near term'.16 6.20 The budget papers also state that the impact of COVID-19 on the economy and on tax receipts will be 'long-lasting', with lower population growth from lower net overseas migration during COVID-19 weighing 'on the economy into the medium term'. 17

The ongoing need for fiscal stimulus and job creation 6.21 With forecasts for Australia to experience a slow and potentially uneven economic recovery, and ongoing uncertainty about the timing and scale of the global economic recovery, policymakers and experts have repeatedly warned about the dangers of withdrawing fiscal stimulus too quickly. 18 6.22 On 28 May, the Governor of the RBA, Dr Philip Lowe testified that: More generally, right through the next year or so, I think the economy is going to need support from both monetary and fiscal policy. There are certain risks if we withdraw that support too early. I know, from the Reserve Bank's perspective, we're going to keep the monetary support going for a

13 See for example, RBA, Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2020; ABS, Labour Force, Australia, October 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force- australia/latest-release (accessed 23 November 2020).

14 See for example, RBA, Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2020; ABS, Labour Force, Australia, October 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force- australia/latest-release (accessed 23 November 2020); Commonwealth of Australia, 2020-21 Budget, Budget Paper No. 1, pp. 1–8.

15 Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Budget, Budget Paper No. 1, pp. 1–8.

16 RBA, Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2020; ABS, Labour Force, Australia, October 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest- release (accessed 23 November 2020).

17 Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Budget, Budget Paper No. 1, pp. 5–9

18 See for example, The Australia Institute, Poverty in the age of coronavirus: the impact of the JobSeeker coronavirus supplement on poverty, 20 July 2020, www.tai.org.au/content/poverty-age-coronavirus- impact-jobseeker-coronavirus-supplement-poverty (accessed 23 November 2020).

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6.28 On 26 May the Prime Minister announced a 'JobMaker plan for a new generation of economic success, that can guarantee the essentials that Australians rely on'. 24 6.29 It was described by the Prime Minister as a 'plan' or an 'agenda' but a document defining the plan, or setting out the agenda, was not publicly available for scrutiny until the budget was delivered in October. 6.30 According to the government's own documents, the $74 billion JobMaker Plan 'will boost economic growth, create jobs, invest in our future industries and skills, remove red tape, guarantee essential services and restore confidence in a stronger recovery'. 25 6.31 Measures included in the 2020–21 Budget under the 'JobMaker' title include infrastructure, a hiring credit for unemployed young people, the Second Women's Economic Security Package, and investment in research and development. 26 6.32 However, in the six months since the Prime Minister launched JobMaker, the plan has failed to mature beyond low-detail announcements and branding. Of the two initial pillars of the JobMaker plan—industrial relations reform and improvements to VET funding arrangements—little progress appears to have been made. 6.33 Much of the Prime Minister's focus on vocational education and training reform was also not new. For example, his inclusion within JobMaker of plans to change the 'fundamentally flawed' National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development between the states and the Commonwealth simply repackaged a recommendation of the government's Joyce Review from April 2019. 27 6.34 Further, it became evident to the committee that key departments had not been consulted or even informed of the JobMaker plan prior to its announcement. In a hearing on 6 August with the Department of Education, Skills and Employment, the department indicated it first learned about JobMaker when it

24 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, National Press Club address, 26 May 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/address-national-press-club-260520 (accessed 8 October 2020).

25 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget 2020–21, Fact Sheet, October 2020.

26 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget 2020–21, Economic Recovery Plan for Australia: JobMaker – Creating jobs and rebuilding our economy, October 2020, budget.gov.au/2020- 21/content/download/glossy jobmaker.pdf (accessed 20 October 2020).

27 See, the Hon Stephen Joyce, Strengthening Skills: Expert Review of Australia's Vocational Educational Training System, April 2019, pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/strengthening-skills- independent-review-australia-vets.pdf (accessed 23 November 2020).

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was announced publicly by the Prime Minister, and that it was not clear who the lead agency was. 28 6.35 During the 11 August hearing, committee members and the Chair raised concerns in relation to the lack of available detail regarding JobMaker. In particular, the committee queried the number of jobs that would be created and what industries the jobs would be created within. 29 6.36 The committee is concerned by evidence it received revealing that, in its haste to announce measures to support job creation, the government may be exaggerating the benefits to employment associated with its JobMaker package. 6.37 In promoting both the HomeBuilder scheme and the JobMaker Hiring Credit, official government documents and their responsible ministers have claimed large numbers of jobs will be created or supported through these respective programs. 30 However, when these claims have been appraised by expert groups or critically examined by the committee, evidence has suggested that significantly fewer jobs are anticipated to be created or supported. 31 6.38 When HomeBuilder was announced in June, the government claimed in its associated media release that 140 000 direct jobs would be supported.32 In response to a question on notice to the committee, which sought to interrogate

28 Ms Nadine Williams, Deputy Secretary, Skills and Training, Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Committee Hansard, 6 August 2020, pp. 3–5.

29 Senator Katy Gallagher, Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, p. 7; Senator Sarah Hanson-Young, Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, p. 21.

30 See for example, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, National Press Club address, 26 May 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/address-national-press-club-260520 (accessed 8 October 2020); the Hon Scott Morrison MP, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP and the Hon Michael Sukkar MP, 'Homebuilder Program to Drive Economic Activity Across the Residential Construction Sector,' Media Release, 4 June 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/homebuilder- program-drive-economic-activity-across-residential-construction-sector (accessed 23 November 2020).

31 See for example, Dr Richard Denniss, 'The Coalition dishes out jobs for the boys while women carry coronavirus' economic burden,' The Australia Institute, 10 June 2020, www.tai.org.au/content/coalition-dishes-out-jobs-boys-while-women-carry-coronavirus- economic-burden (accessed 23 November 2020); Geoff Hanmer, 'HomeBuilder might be the most- complex least-equitable construction jobs program ever devised,' The Conversation, 5 June 2020, theconversation.com/homebuilder-might-be-the-most-complex-least-equitable-construction-jobs- program-ever-devised-140162 (accessed 23 November 2020); Brendan Coates, Matthew Cowgill and Tim Helm, 'JobMaker is nowhere near bold enough. Here are four ways to expand it,' The Conversation, 10 November 2020, theconversation.com/jobmaker-is-nowhere-near-bold-enough- here-are-four-ways-to-expand-it-148980 (accessed 23 November 2020).

32 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP and the Hon Michael Sukkar MP, '"Homebuilder" Program to Drive Economic Activity Across the Residential Construction Sector,' Media Release, 4 June 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/homebuilder-program-drive-economic-activity- across-residential-construction-sector (accessed 23 November 2020).

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6.43 The committee urges the government to consider additional measures to create jobs and facilitate economic recovery. This section singles out two measures which received strong support across a range of submissions as well as in expert testimony. It also identifies other opportunities for economic recovery which warrant consideration by government. The committee intends to pursue these opportunities in more detail over the course of its inquiry.

Social Housing 6.44 Submitters including the Grattan Institute, Australian Council of Social Service and the Impact Investment Group suggested that the government should have considered complementing the HomeBuilder scheme with investment in social housing. 37 According to the Grattan Institute, social housing is one of the most effective forms of economic stimulus available because of the speed with which governments can generate construction activity through direct investment: [The 2008–09 housing stimulus program] delivered on its objectives within the budget that was provided, and it did so very rapidly. One of the real advantages of something like social housing is that, while it can be hard to build a tunnel under the Yarra River, you can build a four-storey apartment very quickly. The one observation I'd make in comparison to HomeBuilder is that, to the extent that HomeBuilder does support employment, it will be in the outer suburbs of our major cities…. Therefore social housing could arguably complement that program and provide that stimulus that we do need. 38 6.45 It is also noteworthy that in June 2020, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development recommended in its Economic Forecast Summary that the government invest in social housing. 39 6.46 Submitters also suggested that broader social housing investment was an important measure to support vulnerable members of the community during COVID-19. As the Grattan Institute argued in June:

37 See for example, Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 130; Impact Investment Group, Submission 138; Grattan Institute, Submission 230. See also, Brendan Coates, Money for social housing, not home buyers grants, is the key to construction stimulus, Grattan Institute, 1 June 2020, grattan.edu.au/news/money-for-social-housing-not-home-buyers-grants-is-the-key-to- construction-stimulus/ (23 November 2020); Dr Katrina Raynor, Professor Alan Pert, Professor Rebecca Bentley, Associate Professor Robert Crawford and Dr Ilan Wiesel, 'Investing in Social Housing During a Pandemic,' University of Melbourne, 10 June 2020, pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/investing-in-social-housing-during-a-pandemic (accessed 23 November 2020).

38 Mr Brendan Coates, Director, Household Finance Program, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 23.

39 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Economic Forecast Summary', Australia Economic Snapshot, June 2020, p. 139.

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At the most recent Census (2016), more than 116,000 people were homeless, up from 90,000 a decade earlier. COVID-19 has shown us that if we let people live in unhealthy conditions it can help spread disease – affecting everybody's health. 40 6.47 The government did not contribute any funding towards investing in new social and affordable housing in the 2020–21 Budget. 41 6.48 A report by the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute in November noted that for state and territory governments, 'social housing has featured as a key plank of the economic recovery platform', but that 'there has been no new direct allocation of funding for social housing by the Australian Government, which contrasts with the Global Financial Crisis, where $5.2 billion ($6.5 billion in 2020 dollars) was allocated to the Social Housing Initiative'.42 6.49 In his Budget in Reply speech on 8 October 2020, the Federal Opposition Leader proposed a repair program for social housing. 43 To date, the government has not responded to this announcement. 6.50 Noting the evidence from the Grattan Institute and others regarding social housing's effectiveness as economic stimulus, a program to commence urgent repairs and maintenance on Australia's housing stock would be a positive stimulus measure to provide work for tradespeople, in addition to the social benefit of fixing these houses. 6.51 The committee is concerned that by relying on the HomeBuilder program as its sole initiative to stimulate residential construction, the government has missed significant opportunities for a more rapid and effective stimulus in the form of direct investment in social housing.

Childcare as a measure to boost economic participation 6.52 In a hearing with economists on 2 July, the committee received evidence from Mr Koukoulas and Dr Denniss on the critical importance of the childcare sector to Australia's economic recovery, both in relation to boosting workforce participation and lifting the wages of a predominantly female workforce. 44

40 Brendan Coates, Money for social housing, not home buyers grants, is the key to construction stimulus, Grattan Institute, 1 June 2020, available at grattan.edu.au/news/money-for-social-housing-not- home-buyers-grants-is-the-key-to-construction-stimulus/ (accessed 9 November 2020).

41 See, Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Federal Budget.

42 Chris Mason, Michael Moran and Amber Earles, 'Policy coordination and housing outcomes during COVID-19', AHURI Final Report No. 343, November 2020, p. 3.

43 The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and the Hon Jason Clare MP, 'Social Housing Repair program to keep Tradies Working,' Media Release, 7 October 2020, anthonyalbanese.com.au/24211-2 (accessed 23 November 2020).

44 Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director, Market Economics, Committee Hansard, 2 July 2020, p. 5.

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6.53 Investment in the childcare sector represents a highly effective form of expenditure. According to the Victoria University's Centre of Policy Studies, net government spending of $2.8 billion on additional childcare services would create 135 000 new jobs by 2030, making it almost 20 times more effective at job creation per million dollars spent than tax cuts. 45 6.54 In August 2020, the Grattan Institute proposed that the government 'boost the Child Care Subsidy and improve its design so that second-earners take home more pay from additional hours of work'. 46 6.55 Before the COVID-19 crisis, a typical Australian woman with pre-teenage children worked an average of 2.5 days a week. The Grattan Institute found that the 'workforce disincentive rate' saw primary carers (predominantly women) faced with the choice of either staying home or working a fourth or fifth day in the week with almost no additional take-home pay once the cost of childcare was taken into account. The Grattan Institute also found that high out-of-pocket childcare costs were an issue for families who had lost jobs or income due to COVID-19. 47 6.56 Under the Grattan Institute's proposal, a $5 billion investment would increase GDP by $11 billion per year through increased workforce participation and would generate $150 000 in higher lifetime earnings for a typical Australian mother. 48

45 Dr Janine Dixon, 'A comparison of the economic impacts of income tax cuts and childcare spending' Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University, 15 October 2020, www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/A%20comparison%20of%20the%20economic%20impacts%20of %20income%20tax%20cuts%20and%20childcare%20spending%20%5BWEB%5D.pdf (accessed 23 November 2020).

46 Danielle Wood, Kate Griffiths, and Owain Emslie, 'Cheaper Childcare' A practical plan to boost female workforce participation', Grattan Institute, August 2020, grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Cheaper-Childcare-Grattan-Institute-Report.pdf (accessed 9 November 2020).

47 See, Danielle Wood, Kate Griffiths, and Owain Emslie, 'Cheaper Childcare' A practical plan to boost female workforce participation', Grattan Institute, August 2020, grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Cheaper-Childcare-Grattan-Institute-Report.pdf (accessed 9 November 2020). See also, Ryan Batchelor, 'The Impact of COVID-19 on Women and Work in Victoria,' McKell Institute, mckellinstitute.org.au/research/articles/the-impact-of-covid-19- on-women-and-work-in-victoria/ (accessed 23 November 2020); David Richardson and Dr Richard Denniss, 'Gender experiences during the COVID-19 lockdown,' The Australia Institute, 1 July 2020, www.tai.org.au/content/gender-experiences-during-covid-19- lockdown (accessed 23 November 2020).

48 Danielle Wood, Kate Griffiths, and Owain Emslie, 'Cheaper Childcare' A practical plan to boost female workforce participation', Grattan Institute, August 2020, grattan.edu.au/wp- content/uploads/2020/08/Cheaper-Childcare-Grattan-Institute-Report.pdf (accessed 9 November 2020). See also, 'COVID's toll on women – why Australia needs a Gender Impact

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6.57 In its 2020–21 Budget, the government did not announce any reforms or further investment in the childcare sector. 49 6.58 However, in his Budget in Reply speech on 8 October 2020, the Leader of the Opposition proposed that the government:

 eliminate the $10 560 child care subsidy cap to remove the disincentive to work a fifth day in the week;  lift the maximum child care subsidy rate to 90 per cent; and  increase the child care subsidy rates with taper rates attached dependent on income. 50 6.59 The committee urges the government to consider proposals put forward by the Grattan Institute, the federal opposition and others to generate jobs, support female participation in the workforce and foster accelerated economic growth by investing in a stronger and more accessible childcare system.

Renewable energy as a source of job creation 6.60 The committee received several submissions that outline the importance of energy policy and investment in policies to deal with climate change as part of the economic recovery, and to create jobs. For example, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) submitted: Ensuring reliable and sustainable energy to existing industry is critical in avoiding large scale closures. Creating new industries that take advantage of Australia's world-class renewable energy and minerals industries to produce zero emissions metals and mineral products can create thousands of jobs in regional Australia and position our nation at the forefront of low- carbon economic activity. 51 6.61 The Farmers for Climate Action wrote that 'Australia can emerge from the economic recovery phase a global leader: becoming a renewable energy superpower…' 52 6.62 Beyond Zero Emissions echoed similar sentiments, stating that a plan to make Australia a renewable energy superpower would 'address the nation's employment and infrastructure needs while reducing greenhouse gases'. 53

Statement,' Broad Agenda, 4 August 2020, www.broadagenda.com.au/2020/we-need-a-gender-lens- on-public-policy-more-than-ever/ (accessed 23 November 2020).

49 See, Commonwealth of Australia, 2020–21 Federal Budget.

50 The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, 'Speech – Budget in Reply,' Transcript, 8 October 2020, anthonyalbanese.com.au/anthony-albanese-speech-budget-in-reply-parliament-house-canberra- thursday-8-october-2020 (accessed 23 November 2020).

51 Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Submission 122, pp. 18–19.

52 Farmers for Climate Action, Submission 157, p. 2.

53 Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 158, p. 2.

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6.63 The Australia Institute in their submission stated that: Australia's inconsistent, volatile, and fragmented energy policies have been a major source of financial distress and investment uncertainty for the manufacturing sector over the past two decades 54 [and that] the reconstruction of our economy as we recover from COVID-19 offers us an historic policy opportunity to green our electricity grid and revitalise our manufacturing sector. 55 6.64 Dealing with the uncertainty around energy policy will be key to economic recovery and job creation. The committee urges the government to consider new policies which will address uncertainty for investors in renewable energy and facilitate direct job creation in our regions. The committee intends to examine this issue closely in future hearings.

A manufacturing future in Australia 6.65 The pandemic has identified serious issues with Australia's international supply chains and local manufacturing capability. The unprecedented disruption by COVID-19 to the global trade of essential medical supplies and other goods of strategic and national interest has highlighted the need for Australia to revitalise its manufacturing sector. While the government has taken some early steps towards this, much more needs to be done to address supply chain issues and create new job opportunities for the 1.5 million unemployed Australians. 6.66 President of the ACTU, Ms Michele O'Neil, told the committee in a hearing on 23 June that: There were also many other manufacturing supply chains that were affected by our lack of domestic capacity. It affected construction and also the energy sector, where there were critical gaps that were exposed by the sudden closure of our borders. 56 6.67 On 1 October, the government announced a 'Modern Manufacturing Strategy', providing $1.5 billion in funding to 'make Australian manufacturers more competitive, resilient and able to scale-up to take on the world'. The key policy in the strategy is $1.3 billion in grants over 10 years to support projects within six National Manufacturing Priorities.57

54 The Australia Institute, Submission 148, p. 19.

55 The Australia Institute, Submission 148, p. 20.

56 Committee Hansard, 23 June 2020, p. 30.

57 The Hon Scott Morrison MP and the Hon Karen Andrews MP, 'Transforming Australian Manufacturing to Rebuild our Economy,' Media Release, 1 October 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/transforming-australian-manufacturing-rebuild-our-economy (accessed 23 November 2020).

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6.68 However, while the recent investment is welcome, it has been justly criticised for a very slow roll-out of funding, 58 and the government's plan remains silent on other untapped opportunities to fix supply chain issues and grow our domestic manufacturing base. 6.69 For example, on 8 October 2020, the federal opposition proposed a number of measures that the government ought to consider adopting to aid in the economic recovery and build up the requisite workforce skills to enhance Australia's manufacturing capacity. 59 These proposals include implementing a comprehensive National Rail Manufacturing Plan, a Defence Industry Development Strategy, and the introduction of an Australian Skills Guarantee. 6.70 An Australian Skills Guarantee would improve the skills-base of Australian workers and provide longer-term productivity improvements for the economy by requiring at least 1 in 10 jobs on all medium and large Commonwealth- funded infrastructure projects and major defence projects to be filled by an apprentice, trainee or cadet. 60 6.71 The committee urges the government to consider these proposals and lift its commitment to building Australia's manufacturing capability.

58 See for example, Matt Johnson, 'Too little, too late: Government criticised over delays to manufacturing spending,' The New Daily, 25 October 2020, thenewdaily.com.au/finance/small- business/2020/10/25/manufacturing-spending-government/ (accessed 23 November 2020).

59 The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, 'A future made in Australia – a plan for good, secure jobs,' Media Release, 8 October 2020, anthonyalbanese.com.au/anthony-albanese-media- release-a-future-made-in-australia-a-plan-for-good-secure-jobs-thursday-8-october-2020 (accessed 23 November 2020).

60 The Hon Richard Marles MP, the Hon Tanya Plibersek MP, the Hon Catherine King MP and the Hon Brendan O'Connor MP, 'Labor's Australian Skills Guarantee', Media Release, 8 October 2020, www.tanyaplibersek.com/media/media-releases/media-release- marles-plibersek-king-o-connor-labor-s-australian-skills-guarantee-thursday-8-october-2020/ (accessed 23 November 2020).

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7.4 The National Cabinet was announced on 13 March by the Prime Minister in a joint press conference with all premiers and chief ministers. 3 According to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), it was to operate under longstanding conventions of Cabinet government, including the guiding principles of collective responsibility and solidarity.4 7.5 Since March 13, the National Cabinet has been used to coordinate the health response across state boundaries and allow input on nationally important decisions, particularly about the public health responses and the economy. 5 7.6 Some of the decisions made and issues addressed by the National Cabinet during the early months of the pandemic included:

 decisions on social distancing measures;  receiving confidential briefings from the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Treasury Secretary and the head of the Productivity Commission about the economic recovery;  managing a process for commercial and residential tenancies and a moratorium on evictions;  commissioning a National Review of Hotel Quarantine and adopting its recommendations;  agreeing numbers for caps on international arrivals; and  establishing the Mental Health National Cabinet Reform Committee. 6 7.7 Under Australia's federal system of governance, many of the key decisions made by the National Cabinet fell under the states and territories' areas of responsibility. These included declarations to enforce social distancing

3 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 13 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-premiers-and-chief-ministers-parramatta-nsw (accessed 4 November 2020).

4 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), Submission 3, p. 8.

5 See for example, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet,' Media Statement, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2 (accessed 23 November 2020); the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet,' Media Statement, 23 October 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-1 (accessed 23 November 2020).

6 See for example, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update Following National Cabinet Meeting,' Media Release, 29 May 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-following-national- cabinet-meeting (accessed 23 November 2020); the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures,' Media Release, 27 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-270320 (accessed 23 November 2020); the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Further statement on hairdressers, barbers and funerals from National Cabinet,' Media Release, 26 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/further- statement-hairdressers-barbers-and-funerals-national-cabinet (accessed 23 November 2020); the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet Update,' Media Release, 26 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-update (accessed 23 November 2020).

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measures, school closures, moratoriums on evictions and operational responsibility for the health system. 7 7.8 The Australian Government (government) continued to be responsible for international border and quarantine measures, and the national economic response to the pandemic. 7.9 Perhaps as a result of the fact that National Cabinet met virtually during these months, the Prime Minister was often the first spokesperson following these meetings and provided information about matters which fell squarely within the management of the various state and territory governments. 7.10 The Prime Minister effectively acting as first messenger from the meeting created problems with the consistency of information and the accuracy of advice being presented to the public. 7.11 Considering the heightened health anxiety across the community, along with the hundreds of thousands of Australian workers losing their jobs, public interest in these press conferences was extremely high. 7.12 The Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) believes that mixed messaging, particularly during March and April, and at times unhelpful interventions into state matters by the Prime Minister (school closures and domestic border issues), worked to undermine the purpose of the National Cabinet and unnecessarily increased confusion and anxiety across the Australian community. 7.13 At times, the Prime Minister singled out individual states led by Labor premiers for criticism over decisions to impose internal border measures. This fractured the national response, fostered unnecessary partisanship and ultimately led to a breakdown in the National Cabinet as a consensus body. 7.14 The committee is also concerned that the government has used the National Cabinet as a vehicle to avoid transparency over its decision making. 7.15 By August, the Prime Minister acknowledged that the National Cabinet would no longer operate as a consensus body. 8 However, the government has continued to assert that all deliberations of the National Cabinet are subject to

7 See for example, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Further statement on hairdressers, barbers and funerals from National Cabinet,' Media Release, 26 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/further-statement-hairdressers-barbers-and-funerals-national-cabinet (accessed 23 November 2020); the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet Update,' Media Release, 26 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-update (accessed 23 November 2020).

8 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference,' Transcript, 4 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act- 040920 (accessed 24 November 2020). See also, Peter Conran AM, DPM&C, Review of COAG Councils and Ministerial Forums – Report to National Cabinet, October 2020.

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longstanding Westminster conventions protecting them from disclosure. 9 The committee does not accept this claim and will continue to seek access to documents previously denied to the committee on the basis that the National Cabinet was protected from disclosure from its status as a committee of the Federal Cabinet.

Communication around the need for school closures 7.16 On 13 March, the Prime Minister indicated that decisions around school closures 'would be made by the states and territories', but would be based on a consistent national approach. 10 7.17 On Sunday 22 March, immediately prior to a National Cabinet meeting, the New South Wales (NSW), Victorian and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) governments pre-emptively announced that its schools would close from Tuesday, 24 March and transition to online education. 11 7.18 After the National Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister announced that, '[a]ll leaders agreed that children should go to school tomorrow',12 directly contradicting the previous announcements by state and territory governments. 7.19 The ACT Deputy Chief Minister, Yvette Berry MLA, later tweeted that the ACT Government's decision 'won't change' and 'I don't know why the PM suggested otherwise'. 13 Victoria also proceeded as planned and brought school holidays forward.14 NSW Premier the Hon Gladys Berejiklian MP announced the

9 DPM&C, answers to questions on notice, 21 September 2020 (received 15 October 2020), document no. 483, p. 1. See also, Dr Tamara Tulich, Professor Bill Reilly and Professor Sarah Murray, 'The National Cabinet: Presidentialised Politics, Power-sharing and a Deficit in Transparency', AusPubLaw, 23 October 2020, auspublaw.org/2020/10/the-national-cabinet-presidentialised-politics- power-sharing-and-a-deficit-in-transparency/ (accessed 23 November 2020).

10 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference with Premiers and Chief Ministers,' Transcript, 13 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-premiers-and-chief-ministers- parramatta-nsw (accessed 23 November 2020).

11 See for example, 'Statement of the Premier', Media Release, www.premier.vic.gov.au/statement- premier-61 (accessed 2 September 2020).

12 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Release, 22 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-220320 (accessed 2 September 2020).

13 Katherine Murphy and Sarah Martin, 'Confusion reigns over Australian coronavirus school closures after Morrison press conference', The Guardian, 22 March 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/22/victoria-nsw-lockdowns-scott-morrison-coronavirus- national-cabinet (accessed 2 September 2020).

14 'Statement of the Premier', Media Release, www.premier.vic.gov.au/statement-premier-61 (accessed 2 September 2020).

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following day that NSW schools would remain open, but that 'for practical reasons, parents are encouraged to keep their children at home'. 15 7.20 In a hearing on 25 June, Dr Swan cited this incident as an example of a contradiction which had confused people through mixed messages. 16

Internal border measures 7.21 In late March, five states and territories imposed border measures on interstate travel. Tasmania was the first mover, with Premier Gutwein announcing that from 20 March, all non-essential travellers to Tasmania would be required to quarantine for 14 days. 17 This was followed with similar announcements from the Northern Territory, South Australia, Western Australia (WA) and Queensland. 18 7.22 In late May, the Prime Minister criticised these border measures, claiming that 'the expert medical advice at a national level never recommended internal borders within Australia' and that 'it's not good for the economy'. 19 7.23 The Prime Minister's commentary implied there was no medical basis for these restrictions. However, on 21 June Deputy Chief Medical Officer Dr Nick Coatsworth clarified that 'the AHPPC actually hasn't had a position on border closures' and that 'we will continue to leave that to state first ministers'. 20 7.24 When Queensland and South Australia announced on 30 June that they would not reopen borders to Victoria over concerns about increasing community transmission, the Prime Minister made critical remarks through the media, suggesting 'you can't just shut Australia up every time there's an outbreak'.21

15 'New COVID-19 restrictions begin as schools move towards online learning', Media Release, 23 March 2020, www.nsw.gov.au/media-releases/new-covid-19-restrictions-begin-as- schools-move-towards-online-learning (accessed 2 September 2020).

16 Dr Norman Swan, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 15.

17 The Hon Peter Gutwein MLA, Premier of Tasmania, Media Release, 19 March 2020, www.health.tas.gov.au/news/2020/Important information about new COVID-19 response measures (accessed 5 November 2020).

18 See, Rebecca Storen and Nikki Corrigan, 'COVID-19: a chronology of state and territory government announcements (up until 30 June 2020),' Research Paper – Parliamentary Library, 22 October 2020, www.aph.gov.au/About Parliament/Parliamentary Departments/Parliamentary Library/pubs/rp/rp2021/Chronologies/COVID-19StateTerritoryGovernmentAnnouncements (accessed 23 November 2020).

19 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Interview on Sky News Live', Transcript, 27 May 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-sky-news-live (accessed 23 November 2020).

20 Dr Nick Coatsworth, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, 'Press Conference,' Transcript, 21 June 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/deputy-chief-medical-officer-press-conference-about-covid-19-on-21- june-2020 (accessed 5 November 2020).

21 Michael Fowler, 'Get some perspective': PM calls out premiers for closing borders to Victoria', The Age, 30 June 2020, www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/get-some-perspective-pm-

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7.25 Despite South Australia and Tasmania also implementing strict domestic border control measures, the Prime Minister reserved his harshest criticism in public comments to the Premier of Queensland and the Premier of WA. 7.26 On 10 September, the Prime Minister initiated what the Queensland Labor Premier described in Parliament as a 'coordinated campaign' in which he 'intimidat[ed]' and 'bull[ied]' her. 22 7.27 The Prime Minister later noted that it was 'hard to draw any … conclusion' other than that Premier Palaszczuk's decision to refuse a particular exemption application for a person to enter Queensland from the ACT was 'inhumane'. 23 7.28 Whilst there were thousands of heartbreaking cases across Australia of families separated and unable to be together due to domestic border restrictions, it is unclear why the Prime Minister chose to single out the Queensland Premier in the way in which he did. It is possible that the Queensland state election, held at the end of October, may have influenced the Prime Minister's comments. 7.29 One month later on 8 October, the Prime Minister described Labor Premier McGowan's decision to keep the WA border shut as 'not the Australian way', accusing him of 'locking people in the state so they [wouldn't] spend money in other parts of this country'. 24 7.30 On 12 June, the Prime Minister and his Attorney-General decided to join Mr Clive Palmer's case in the High Court against the WA border measures. The Prime Minister rejected a direct plea from the WA Premier to discontinue the government's intervention in Mr Palmer's case. 25 7.31 The Prime Minister later changed his position on 1 August but failed to provide any justification other than that he 'didn't want there to be any anxiety in Western Australia', 26 suggesting his chief concern was popular opinion in the state.

calls-out-premiers-for-closing-borders-to-victoria-20200630-p557q4.html (accessed 5 November 2020).

22 The Hon Annastacia Palaszczuk MP, Premier, Parliament of Queensland Hansard, 10 September 2020, p. 2369.

23 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Media Interview with Sky News, 10 September 2020 www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-peta-credlin-sky-news-live (accessed 5 November 2020).

24 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Interview with Ben Fordham, 2GB, 8 October 2020, available at www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-ben-fordham-2gb-12 (accessed 10 November 2020).

25 Ms Stephanie Foster, Deputy Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, p. 27.

26 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Interview with Oly Peterson, 6PR, 7 August 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-oly-peterson-6pr (accessed 9 November 2020).

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7.32 This change in position came immediately after the case had been heard, 27 with the government actively considering changing its mind while simultaneously arguing its position against WA's border measures in the High Court. 28 Information about the cost of this intervention has not been provided to the committee despite requests for it. 29 7.33 On 11 August, Acting Chief Medical Officer, Professor Paul Kelly said that WA's border closure 'has no doubt been somewhat protective', indicating that the Commonwealth understood that domestic border closures had prevented the spread of the virus.30 In light of this statement it is concerning that the Prime Minister was openly pushing premiers to open up their borders despite their local health advice not to do so. 7.34 In the end the illusion that National Cabinet was a consensus-making body with solidarity amongst members collapsed and on 4 September, in a press conference about state border measures the Prime Minister said National Cabinet 'needed to evolve' because 'we've decided that this notion of 100 percent, absolute consensus on any issue is not a way that the National Cabinet can indeed work'. 31 7.35 The Prime Minister's criticism of state border measures and partisan attacks on Labor premiers undermined the ability of National Cabinet to work as a Westminster-style cabinet exercising solidarity and collective responsibility. The committee sees this as a failure of leadership from the Prime Minister at a time when the country desperately needed genuine cooperation rather than partisanship and division.

National Cabinet as a vehicle for secrecy 7.36 On multiple occasions the government has refused to provide information relating to the National Cabinet, including:

 the date National Cabinet first agreed to a suppression strategy;32

27 Ms Foster, Deputy Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, pp. 27–28.

28 Ms Foster, Deputy Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 11 August 2020, p. 27.

29 Attorney-General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 11 August 2020 (received 3 September 2020), document no. 346, p. 1.

30 Professor Paul Kelly, Acting Chief Medical Officer, 'Press Conference,' Transcript, 11 August 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/acting-chief-medical-officer-press-conference-about-covid-19-on-11- august-2020 (accessed 23 November 2020).

31 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Press Conference, 4 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act- 040920 (accessed 5 November 2020).

32 Department of Health, answers to questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 20 July 2020), document no. 242, p. 2.

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 briefings to National Cabinet from the Treasury Secretary and the Chair of the Productivity Commission; 33 and  whether any ministerial or parliamentary staff, or members of the Australian Health Principal Protection Committee had attended National Cabinet meetings. 34 7.37 The government justifies the level of secrecy provided to National Cabinet meetings on the basis that it has been constituted as a 'Cabinet Office Policy Committee'. 35 7.38 However, when asked about this in a hearing the Secretary of DPM&C, Mr Philip Gaetjens, could not explain some of the inconsistencies in this position. For example, as a committee of the Federal Cabinet, National Cabinet should require full Cabinet endorsement of certain decisions. When the asked by the committee if this was the case, DPM&C failed to directly answer the question, instead providing an unhelpful reference to the Cabinet Handbook which, at the time, made no mention of National Cabinet. 36 7.39 Following the Prime Minister's announcement on 4 September that National Cabinet would no longer be a completely consensus-driven body, the Chair requested that DPM&C and the Department of Health reconsider its previous decisions to refuse the committee access to important information. To date, neither department has changed its position. 37 7.40 The committee is concerned that the government has improperly claimed the protection of cabinet when refusing access to requested information. The government cannot apply these rules in relation to non-disclosure unless it also intends to accept the rules in relation to collective responsibility and solidarity which, from a public statement by the Prime Minister, it clearly is not prepared to do.

33 Productivity Commission, answers to questions on notice, 10 September 2020 (received 24 September 2020), document no. 418, p. 1.

34 Department of Health, answers to questions on notice, 22 May 2020 (received 20 August 2020), document no. 291, p. 1.

35 Mr Philip Gaetjens, Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020, p. 9.

36 Mr Gaetjens, Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020, p. 9.

37 Department of Health, answers to questions on notice, 7 September 2020 (received 6 October 2020), document no. 449, p. [1]; DPM&C, answers to questions on notice, 21 September 2020 (received 15 October 2020), document no. 483, p. [1].

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7.46 According to DPM&C, the proposal for the NCCC originated in the Prime Minister's office and DPM&C only became aware of the proposal on 19 March–six days before its establishment was publicly announced by the Prime Minister. DPM&C also provided no advice to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) on the capacity of the Australian Public Service to coordinate the COVID- 19 recovery or if there was any need for the NCCC. 43 7.47 The NCCAB operated for some time without any terms of reference. After being announced on 25 March 2020, it held its first meeting two days later. 44 However, terms of reference for the NCCAB were not published until 1 May. 45 7.48 Whilst it is unclear who recommended the establishment of the NCCAB, it is clear that the commissioners were chosen by the Prime Minister and were not appointed by Cabinet. 46 There was no independent process for considering the appointments and, according to DPM&C, it never provided any shortlist of potential commissioners to the PMO. 47 7.49 The expertise and commercial backgrounds of the commissioners has raised significant concern about actual, perceived or potential conflicts of interest.48 The Chairman of the NCCAB, Mr Neville Power, has remained throughout his role as Chair a director of Strike Energy and the Perth Airport Corporation. 49 Mr Bao Hoang, a more recent appointment, maintains an interest in an aged-care allied health organisation which holds a significant federal aged care contract in relation to COVID-19. 50 7.50 DPM&C was unable to clearly explain the role of Mr Andrew Liveris, who continued to serve as a director of Saudi Aramco while chairing the NCCAB 's manufacturing taskforce. A leaked interim report from the taskforce

4–6; 350 Australia, Submission 300, pp. 3–4; Lock the Gate Alliance, Submission 307, pp. 1–5; and Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 301, pp. 4–14.

43 DPM&C, answers to questions on notice, 5 June 2020 (received 20 October 2020), document no. 512, p. 1.

44 Mr Neville Power, Chairman, NCCAB, DMP&C, Committee Hansard, 4 June 2020, p. 1.

45 DPM&C, answers to written questions on notice, 22 May 2020 (received 10 June 2020), document no. 108, p. 2.

46 Ms Foster PSM, Associate Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020, p. 29.

47 DPM&C, answers to questions on notice, 5 June 2020 (received 23 October 2020), p. 1.

48 See for example: Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 31.1, p. 7; Transparency International Australia, Submission 124, p. 5–6; Australian Council of Social Services, Submission 130, p. 2; Australian Marine Conservation Society, Submission 154, p. 2; and Farmers for Climate Action, Submission 157, p. 5.

49 Mr Power, Chairman, NCCAB, DMP&C, Committee Hansard, 4 June 2020, p. 26.

50 Mr Malcolm Thompson, Head of Taskforce, NCCAB, DPM&C Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee Hansard, 20 October 2020, p. 22.

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recommending gas subsidies raised serious concerns. 51 However, DPM&C told the committee that Mr Liveris had not initially been required to follow the same conflict of interest process as commissioners because he was not a commissioner but rather an 'appendage'. 52 It is unclear how the term 'appendage' in the context of public sector governance is defined, as it is not a commonly-used term. 7.51 Mr Gaetjens told the committee that the commissioners 'have gone through a rigorous declaration of-interests process'. 53 However, the government has refused multiple requests from the committee for more information on these disclosures on the grounds of the commissioners' personal privacy. 7.52 Considering the $6.5 million price tag for the NCCAB and the unusual access it has to cabinet processes, the committee finds this refusal to provide information and accountability to the Senate unacceptable. 7.53 According to DPM&C, staff working for the NCCAB have full access to relevant Cabinet documents and regularly brief commissioners on these. 54 7.54 The NCCAB also appears to have been influential in providing input to the Prime Minister on the government's overall communication strategy. 7.55 On 15 May the NCCAB published a limited tender contract for market research with Mr James Alan Reed, a former researcher with the polling firm Crosby- Textor, for $541 750.55 A redacted version of Mr Reed's research brief released under FOI includes the 'effectiveness and credibility of spokespeople' and 'awareness of and attitudes towards government measures'. 56 7.56 On 20 October, DPM&C confirmed that the results from Mr Reed's research had been provided to the PMO. 57 However, it refused a request by the committee for Mr Reed's 'series of reports' on the basis that this would 'inhibit the ability of DPM&C' to provide advice and coordinate communications. Considering the significant expenditure on these contracts the committee finds this refusal to provide information to the Senate on the use of public funds unacceptable.

51 Mr Stephen Long, 'Government's COVID Commission manufacturing plan calls for huge public gas subsidies', ABC News, 21 May 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-21/leaked-national-covid- commission-gas-manufacturing-report/12269100 (accessed 7 September 2020).

52 Mr Peter Harris, Chief Executive Officer, NCCAB, DMP&C, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020, p. 31.

53 Mr Philip Gaetjens, Secretary, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020, p. 4.

54 DPM&C, Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee Hansard, 20 October 2020, p. 9.

55 Austender, Contract Notice CN3681646.

56 DPM&C, FOI Disclosure Log, FOI/2020/102, p. 24, available at www.pmc.gov.au/ government/departmental-foi-disclosure-logs.

57 DPM&C, answers to questions on notice, 4 June 2020 (received 20 October 2020), document no. 495, p. 5.

Chapter 8 Looking ahead

Concluding comments 8.1 In examining the first eight months of 2020, the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) considers the question: could the Australian Government (government) have done better in its response to COVID-19 to safeguard the lives and livelihoods of Australians, and how? 8.2 The committee is firmly of the view that more should have been done. 8.3 In coordinating the national health response, at times the government made mistakes in failing to act with enough urgency, providing unclear and inconsistent messaging, refusing to accept timely responsibility for vulnerable sectors of the community, and attempting to avoid transparency over important decision-making processes. 8.4 The government's response to the economic fallout of the pandemic was held back by an initial reluctance to adopt a large-scale wage subsidy. This reluctance saw the government use the retirement savings of Australians hardest hit by the pandemic to fund $41.9 billion in economic stimulus through the early access super scheme. A lack of any gender analysis on key policy measures meant that women—who had been disproportionately affected by the pandemic—were left behind by the response. 8.5 Importantly, there is still immediate action that the government needs to take with respect to both its health and economic response to the pandemic, which would have a measurable impact on the lives and livelihoods of Australians. 8.6 On the vaccine front, much more needs to be done to secure early access to a diverse range of vaccine candidates. We cannot afford to continue to lag other countries in this regard. Significant unresolved logistical challenges in how vaccines will be manufactured and distributed must also be addressed with the greatest possible urgency. 8.7 In the aged care sector, the government needs to quickly implement recommendations from the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety's Special Report on COVID-19 and demonstrate that it has learned from the tragic outcomes of its management of the sector so far. 8.8 The committee will continue to focus on the aged care sector in future hearings and, if necessary, will consider the option of a dedicated report on the government's approach to preparing, regulating and supporting residential aged care facilities prior to and during the pandemic.

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8.9 On the economic front, much more needs to be done to protect and create Australian jobs. Australia's economy was underperforming prior to the pandemic and is now in a deep recession, with economic forecasts suggesting that even with the latest round of budget measures the recovery will be painfully slow. The government should consider adopting a range of new measures including reforms to childcare subsidies and investment in social housing.

Future direction of the inquiry 8.10 The committee has already held 37 public hearings, many of which called on government witnesses. They have enabled relatively contemporaneous scrutiny of the government's response and served as an important source of information for the public during uncertain times. For the longer term, the hearings are also contributing to a substantial body of evidence that the committee can draw upon in future reports. 8.11 The committee is due to present its final report on or before 30 June 2022, which provides a substantial period for inquiry. The committee will not wait until mid- 2022 to produce further reports and recommendations; it intends to inquire into and scrutinise the government's response throughout this period. Of course, public hearings held in the interim will also gather important evidence from the community and hold the government to account. 8.12 While this chapter provides an indication of how the committee intends to conduct this inquiry, it is not determinative. It is important to recognise that the committee is only eight months into a 27-month inquiry, and that the pandemic has the potential to change suddenly and significantly. The pace and nature of the inquiry will reflect the course of the pandemic and the government's response.

Senator Katy Gallagher Chair

Coalition Senators' dissenting report

Observations about the committee process 1.1 Parliamentary oversight of executive decision making is a core feature of our system of government. It is founded on the principle that decision makers will spend taxpayers' money more wisely, and consider encroachments on the rights and freedoms of their citizens more carefully, in the knowledge that they will be subject to scrutiny after the fact. Parliamentary oversight is an indispensable part of effective government. 1.2 During the COVID-19 crisis, governments spent more money and asked of citizens more sacrifices than in any time since World War II. Robust oversight is an essential component of the Australian Government's (government) response to ensure that those sacrifices have been worthwhile. 1.3 The Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) was appropriately established on bipartisan basis when it was clear the sitting of the parliament would be disrupted and the normal oversight functions of the Senate and its committee would be limited. Electing a non-government chair and a government deputy chair, and incorporating Senators from across the chamber ensured that all Australians were represented on the committee. 1.4 In the issues it pursued and the questions asked, the committee generally upheld the bipartisan spirit that it was founded upon. Genuine investigation of issues of concern to Australians has been vigorously pursued and policies of government have been properly tested. Hearings were well chaired by Senator Gallagher and were respectfully conducted. At times, the committee demonstrated its understanding of the pressures on public servants by scheduling hearings around the very significant demands on their time. 1.5 Unfortunately, this spirit has not always been reflected in the majority report. While it is to be expected that different conclusions will be drawn from different philosophical perspectives and genuine disagreement is unremarkable, gratuitous partisanship and point scoring is not constructive. 1.6 In the most serious global pandemic in a century, it would be unreasonable to expect perfection in the response by any government. A better test is how governments adapt to rapidly changing circumstances in an evolving environment. Are problems quickly identified and dealt with? When new evidence comes to light, is it swiftly incorporated and acted upon? 1.7 Unfortunately, in its criticism of the government's COVID-19 response the majority report has also cast aspersions on the tireless work of our public servants. The public service has been crucial in driving and co-ordinating the Team Australia fight against COVID-19 and making partisan reflections on

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them does not usefully contribute to the scrutiny work of this committee in evaluating the performance of the government. 1.8 In evaluating the effectiveness of the collective response to COVID-19 in Australia, we should be very mindful of the international experience. The best benchmark to compare Australia's health and economic response is not a theoretical alternative, but the actual experience of other similar countries grappling with the same challenges. Australians can be rightfully proud that our performance in this crisis is the envy of much of the world, and that we are in a tiny group of countries who have effectively limited the spread of COVID-19 and weathered the economic storm relatively successfully. 1.9 In this respect, government Senators differ from the majority report on a number of findings as set out below.

Preparation and initial response

Response to interim finding 2.1 1.10 Coalition Senators recognise that 2020 has been a difficult year for Australia and the world as we faced a pandemic which no country in the world anticipated and for which no country was completely prepared. 1.11 And yet Australia has had a strong and decisive approach in implementing a number of key measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and to protect the health and well-being of every Australian. 1.12 Thanks to the work of the Commonwealth government, the states and territories, health workers and all Australians, we are now in the position of as good a health and economic position as we could have hoped. 1.13 The government quickly expanded our health system's capacity and capability, expanded intensive care capacity, trained-up surge staff for clinical care and public health functions, significant expansion of the National Medical Stockpile and reviewed infection control practices. 1.14 The government also established new and innovative communicable disease control strategies and measures. 1.15 The National Incident Room has played a central role in Australia's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It has now been operating continuously for 13 months. 1.16 Victoria has reported 38 consecutive days of no locally acquired cases. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia have reported over 100 consecutive days of no locally acquired cases outside of quarantine.

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1.17 Since the beginning of the epidemic over 10 181 500 COVID-19 tests have been conducted across Australia, and every Australian who has presented themselves for testing deserves our thanks. 1.18 The government is monitoring all vaccine candidates in clinical trials. 1.19 Australia has relied on the best scientific advice in formulating the vaccine strategy, negotiating advanced purchasing agreements with four companies to create a diverse portfolio of potential vaccines which, if approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration, would result in 134 million doses available for distribution. 1.20 This will be the biggest ever vaccine rollout in history, and Australia is in an enviable position. It is too early to declare victory but there is much to celebrate. 1.21 Coalition Senators note that the Commonwealth government acted quickly as information about a novel coronavirus developed. 1.22 For example, before the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic on 11 March 2020, the government had already:

 made 'Human coronavirus with pandemic potential' a Listed Human Disease under the Biosecurity Act 2015 on 21 January, enabling the use of enhanced border measures should they be needed;  applied travel requirements and restrictions first to foreign nationals who were in mainland China, and subsequently to people travelling from Iran, Italy and South Korea;  activated the 'Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)'; and  established a new National Cabinet, made up of the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers to address the country's response to COVID-19. 1.23 Coalition Senators note that the government has continually taken a strong and decisive approach in responding to COVID-19. This has been informed by the latest technical and scientific advice from the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) and its Standing Committees, in particular the Public Health Laboratory Network and the Communicable Diseases Network Australia. 1.24 The AHPPC, chaired by the Australian Government Chief Medical Officer, has worked to achieve consensus decisions at every stage. 1.25 The government's national strategy balanced the economic and social costs of proportionate suppression against the potential human and economic costs associated with widespread disease, such as the number of lives lost and an overwhelmed healthcare system. 1.26 Coalition Senators acknowledge that this strategy bought Australia valuable time to prepare and bolster hospital and public health capacity to manage the

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disease; an activity we continue. It is also estimated to have prevented at least an additional 16 313 deaths in Australia had we taken a different approach. 1 1.27 The relatively low number of COVID-19 cases in Australia is the result of the swift and successful implementation of public health measures. 1.28 Australia's relative success at controlling the pandemic is a testament to our excellent, and well prepared, health system, the high-level expertise and dedicated efforts of all national health sector players including public health laboratories, surveillance systems, public health units, and academia. 1.29 The sharing of information and the translation of research into policy, for example the modelling and epidemiological analysis has been crucial to informing decisions that guide the response. 1.30 Coalition Senators note that relatively new powers under the Biosecurity Act 2015 have been tested for the first time, including declaring a human biosecurity emergency to give the Health Minister the ability to take decisive action to prevent the entry, emergence, establishment and spread of COVID-19. 1.31 Coalition Senators acknowledge that Australia can't afford to be complacent as the pandemic continues to evolve globally. 1.32 Even as effective vaccines become available and domestic and international borders reopen, Australia must remain vigilant. We must continue our efforts to closely monitor cases, quarantine contacts and to urge community adherence to physical distancing and infection prevention measures.

Response to interim finding 2.2 – part 1 1.33 Australia has an excellent health system and is rightly well prepared for such an influenza pandemic. The national health sector's preparations prior to COVID- 19 included:

 strong governance and expert technical and scientific advisory structures through the AHPPC and its Standing Committees the Communicable Diseases Network Australia ( 'CDNA') and the Public Health Laboratory Network, the National Health Emergency Standing Committee;  existing surveillance systems—the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System and capacity for sentinel (GPs) and syndromic (hospital emergency departments) surveillance to detect and monitor cases;  excellent public health laboratory testing capacity and capability across all states and territories, with strong collaboration through the public health laboratory network; the World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating

1 Dr Fiona Stanaway, University of Sydney, 'Australian COVID-19 response may have saved 16,000 lives’, Medical Journal of Australia, 5 October 2020, insightplus.mja.com.au/2020/39/covid-19- australian-response-may-have-saved-15-000-lives/.

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Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza —one of five centres across the world and the National High Security Quarantine Laboratory that is a high level containment facility ready to handle, identify and characterise high risk pathogens (this laboratory was second to China in growing the COVID-19 virus) both of these laboratories funded by the Australian Government; this is complemented by the Australian Animal Health high security laboratory in Geelong (where critical work on COVID vaccines has been possible)  the National Medical Stockpile—a strategic reserve of pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment;  the robust, nationally agreed and evidence-based health sector plan to guide the response to an influenza pandemic (the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza);  an Australian Government funded contract in place with Australia's only onshore vaccine manufacturer—Seqirus —to ensure Australia a rapid supply of pandemic influenza vaccine;  pandemic Influenza viruses are a Security Sensitive Biological Agent— laboratories holding the virus are regulated to minimise access to prevent bio-crime and bioterrorism, and are also Listed Human Diseases under the Biosecurity Act 2015 enabling border measures to be rapidly implemented to minimise risk of spread;  strong linkages to research and academia—we have for many years commissioned modelling and translate research into policy to strengthen the evidence base around planning, response and implementation of public health measures—grants provided by the Australian Government through Centres of Excellence of the National Health and Medical Research Council and the Medical Research Future Fund; and  when audited by the WHO in 2017 (Joint External Evaluation of Australia's compliance with International Health Regulations core requirements), the Australian health sector preparedness and response capacity and capability to respond to all-hazards was rated highly; the review team leader said that the scores received by Australia were as high as any country had recorded in the JEE. 2 1.34 This standard of preparedness is in line with other comparable countries, with exceptional results.

Response to interim finding 2.2 – part 2 1.35 Coalition Senators do not agree that Australia was underprepared to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

2 World Health Organization, 'Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulations Core Capacities of Australia’, Report, 1 December 2017, www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO-WHE-CPI- REP-2018.8/en/.

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1.36 The relatively low numbers of cases in Australia is a testament to the preparedness and response planning that was in place and the excellent response capacity and capability of the national health sector and other jurisdictional and Commonwealth agency players. 1.37 Australia's focus on pandemic influenza reflects that fact that pandemic influenza is an undeniable threat that all nations have prepared for. It is the basis for all large-scale pandemic planning internationally at the WHO. 1.38 The WHO and Department of Health closely monitors the human-animal interface—the greatest risk of emergence of a novel pathogen is at this interface where for example, humans closely interact with live animals such as at the wet markets in Asia. 1.39 We have seen this risk eventuate before from the emergence of influenza H5N1 in poultry to the emergence of the 2009 influenza pandemic H1N1 that emerged in swine. 1.40 As news of the first cases of COVID-19 were reported in the city of Wuhan, China between December 2019 and January 2020, the causative agent had not yet been identified and cases were then reported as a viral pneumonia. 1.41 From the symptoms and what we know about emergence of viruses at the human animal interface it was an educated assumption that the virus was likely to be an influenza virus or influenza-like virus. 1.42 Coalition Senators note that at the time this was not an unreasonable assumption and Australia was not alone in making it. 1.43 Given the assumptions that the virus was an influenza virus, pragmatically, Australia was able to utilise the existing planning and preparedness in place to launch the response to COVID-19 including the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza. 1.44 As more information became available and the virus was identified as a coronavirus, Australia was able to rapidly customise its response and target measures to better meet the characteristics of the virus. Within weeks of the identification of the SARSCoV-2 virus, Australia had launched its specific Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19). 3 1.45 On 11 March 2020, the Prime Minister announced a comprehensive $2.4 billion health package to protect all Australians, including vulnerable groups such as the elderly, those with chronic conditions and Indigenous communities, from

3 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)’, Publication, 18 February 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/australian-health-sector-emergency-response-plan-for- novel-coronavirus-covid-19.

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COVID-19. The package provides support across primary care, aged care, hospitals, research and the national medical stockpile. 4 1.46 This is why we have the 'initial action' stage in our response plans, as it is not uncommon to have to act before much is known about the disease agents—there is no time to wait as the disease will continue to spread and cause otherwise avoidable morbidity and mortality. 1.47 Once more is known about the disease agent, and its clinical severity and transmissibility, then the response progresses to the 'targeted action' stage where resources and public health interventions can be used more efficiently and effectively to minimise morbidity, mortality and burden on the health system.

Response to interim finding 2.2 – part 3 1.48 Coalition Senators acknowledge that initial response plans are based on available information, which for COVID-19 was initially limited as the first cases of the disease are reported. 1.49 Having the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza already in place meant that Australia was pre-prepared for initial response and adaptation in the face of a novel respiratory virus. 1.50 Plans are based on the best technical and scientific evidence available at the time and are 'living documents' that will be amended and updated as more information is available particularly around the clinical severity and transmissibility. 1.51 This planning cycle of continuous improvement and building on lessons learnt domestically and internationally is in line with contemporary best practice emergency response. 1.52 Even now the AHPPC reviews the public health interventions regularly in light of emerging scientific evidence to ensure Australia is directing its efforts in the most efficient and effective way to protect the health of all Australian and preserve our health system for those that need it most. 1.53 Implementing border measures has always been part of the suite of response measures considered in the response to COVID-19. 1.54 It should be noted that the WHO (and many like-minded countries) did not support border closures as part of a pandemic response. Our early, forward

4 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, '$2.4 billion health plan to fight COVID-19’, Media Release, 11 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/24-billion-health-plan- fight-covid-19.

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leaning measures in this regard are evidence of our ability to quickly respond, with governments acting on the evolving health advice. 1.55 The Biosecurity Act 2015 has been available to enable the border measures that the Commonwealth decided to implement; indeed, the use of this Act to control borders was clearly contemplated in its drafting. 1.56 In all preparedness and response planning there is serious consideration given to the groups of the Australian population that are most vulnerable, including those that will potentially suffer the most severe complications if they were to become infected with COVID-19. 1.57 At risk groups such the elderly (and those in residential aged care settings) and those Australians living with disabilities have been considered in the planning and response to COVID-19 from the outset. 1.58 Where additional or more targeted public health measures are required for specific at-risk groups additional planning is done to minimise the risk for these Australians. 1.59 As more has been learnt about the COVID-19 virus, more targeted planning has been undertaken and specific plans are available for these vulnerable groups. 1.60 Coalition Senators note that on 18 February, the Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) was released, which expressly addressed the needs of vulnerable groups in Chapter 6.5 Coalition Senators reject the assertion that the government's COVID-19 response plan failed to consider these vulnerable groups.

Residential care settings 1.61 Residential care settings, such as aged and disability care, were identified early in the pandemic as high-risk environments for COVID-19. The health and wellbeing of aged and disability care residents has been considered in the deliberations of the AHPPC throughout the pandemic. 1.62 On 6 March 2020, Minister Colbeck convened an all-day sector wide planning forum to assist in the aged care sector preparedness. This involved providers, consumers, families, health unions and the Department. It led to the early implementation of surge workforce and a range of other measures. 6

5 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)’, Publication, 18 February 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/australian-health-sector-emergency-response-plan-for- novel-coronavirus-covid-19.

6 Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, 'Australian Government and the aged care sector working together to tackle COVID-19 challenges’, Media Release, 6 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard-

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1.63 On 30 March 2020, the AHPPC published a statement identifying specific groups at increased risk of serious illness from COVID-19. The statement identified group residential settings as being at higher risk of outbreaks. 7 1.64 On 13 March 2020, the CDNA published detailed national guidelines for the prevention, control and public health management of COVID-19 outbreaks in residential care facilities in Australia. The guidelines were developed in consultation with communicable diseases experts, incorporating advice from key global health agencies such as the WHO and Centres for Disease Control. The development of these guidelines was informed by the CDNA guideline National Influenza Outbreaks in Residential Care Facilities in Australia. 8 1.65 These guidelines were subsequently reviewed and updated on 30 April 2020 and 14 July 2020 to reflect emerging evidence and improved understanding of COVID-19. 1.66 Other matters relating to the government's actions on aged care are dealt with later in this report.

Disability sector 1.67 Coalition Senators note that Australians living with disability are generally at greater risk of more serious illness if infected by COVID-19. This can be due to a high prevalence of comorbidities including chronic conditions or a weakened immune system. 1.68 The National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) rapidly implemented a range of temporary measures to support National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) participants, such as providing low-cost assistive technology, including smart devices, so participants could access telehealth services; the ability to claim for the cost of PPE; and greater plan flexibility.

Timeline of COVID-19 support for people with a disability in 2020: 5 March Minister Robert wrote to NDIA and Services Australia to request planning for COVID response. That same day, a Disability COVID taskforce was set up in the NDIA.

colbeck/media/australian-government-and-the-aged-care-sector-working-together-to-tackle-covid- 19-challenges.

7 Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, 'AHPPC Advice to National Cabinet on 30 March 2020’, Media Release, 31 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health- protection-principal-committee-ahppc-advice-to-national-cabinet-on-30-march-2020.

8 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'CDNA national guidelines for the prevention, control and public health management of COVID-19 outbreaks in residential care facilities in Australia’, Publication, 13 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/cdna-national- guidelines-for-the-prevention-control-and-public-health-management-of-covid-19-outbreaks-in- residential-care-facilities-in-australia.

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11 March Prime Minister Scott Morrison announces a comprehensive $2.4 billion health package to protect all Australians, including vulnerable groups and people with a disability, from COVID-19. 13 March Residential aged care facilities guidelines were released. This supports young people living in residential aged care facilities. 13 March The Commonwealth implements a dedicated MBS item for pathology tests for COVID-19. This is to ensure access to rapid COVID testing. MBS funded pathology tests for COVID-19 can be requested by all medical practitioners and must be bulk billed, that is provided at no cost to the patient. 16 March Minister Ruston and the Department of Social Services held a round table with about 10 Disability Representative Organisations (DROs) to discuss responses to COVID-19. 16 March Online COVID-19 infection prevention and control training for care workers, including disability care workers, went live. 18 March Extraordinary meeting of DRC (Disability Ministers) to discuss COVID 19 response (they also met on 9 April 2020, 11 May 2020 and 24 July 2020). Health officials attended this meeting to outline current guidance and access to infection prevention control training and the National Medical Stockpile. 19 March Minister Ruston held a Carer Gateway Service Providers COVID-19 Update with the CEOs from 10 peak organisations. 29 March Commonwealth announces a range of mental health supports to help Australians through COVID including:  $14 million to bolster the capacity of digital and telephone mental health services to provide additional support to vulnerable populations including people with complex mental health needs; and  $28.4 million to allow an additional year for people with a psychosocial disability to transition to the NDIS. 30 March Minister Ruston held a COVID-19 roundtable with about a dozen Australian Disability Enterprises. 31 March Minister Ruston met with Disability Discrimination Commissioner Ben Gauntlett. 2 April The Advisory Committee on the Health Emergency Response to Coronavirus (COVID-19) for People with Disability was established.

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3 April Ministers Hunt, Robert and Ruston announced that the Australian Government would urgently develop a response plan to focus on people with disability during coronavirus. 5 April NDIS participants to receive priority home delivery from some of Australia's leading supermarkets. 9 April $90.7 million announced to support people with disability as part of a broader community support package, including the establishment of a dedicated phone line for people with disability. 16 April National Cabinet agreed to release the COVID-19 Management and Operational Plan for People with Disability. 17 April The Australian Government's Management and Operational Plan for COVID-19 for People with Disability was released 23 April Announced changes to student visa work conditions to ensure continuity of health workforce, including in the disability sector. 27 April New support items available for SIL providers where an NDIS participant is diagnosed with COVID-19, flexibility to purchase of low cost AT and downloadable access request forms to ensure eligible Australians can continue to apply for access to the NDIS. 1 May Minister Ruston and the Department of Social Services held a round table with about 10 Disability Representative Organisations (DROs) to discuss responses to COVID-19. 11 May Disability Ministers Meetings (all State and Territory ministers) to coordinate COVID response. 15 May National Mental Health and Wellbeing Pandemic Response Plan announced with specific funding to support vulnerable groups including mental health and wellbeing of carers. 12 June The NDIS moved to a post-pandemic phase from 1 July 2020, including the conclusion of some temporary measures 17 July Minister Hunt announces 1 million masks from National Medical Stockpile for disability care workers in Victoria. 29 July Allowing participants and providers in New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria to claim the cost of PPE and access additional cleaning supports. 11 August Proactive outreach to NDIS providers, measures to ensure workforce supply and mechanism for a clinical first response for cases or outbreaks amongst providers and/or residential care settings. 19 August Daily publication of data on COVID-19 infection rates for NDIS participants and workers commenced.

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21 August NDIS providers in Victoria and NSW can directly claim the costs of PPE from the NDIA through an hourly allowance. The Victorian Government announced the establishment of the Disability Response Centre to coordinate and manage outbreaks and keep residents safe. 22 August Participant and provider access to PPE extended to restricted areas of Queensland. 4 September Australian and Victorian Government provide $15 million Mobility Reduction Payment for NDIS providers to reduce the movement of support workers between residential disability facilities. 8 September The third iteration of the Disability Operational and Management Plan was endorsed by the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee. A substantial number of actions have been implemented under the Plan, including:  publishing the Coronavirus: Outbreak preparedness, prevention and management guidelines for NDIS providers;  producing COVID-19 infection control training for care workers across all health care settings, including disability;  publishing guidance materials on testing, returning to school and individual COVID 19 health plans as well as guidance for in-home providers, health professionals, carers and support workers; and  establishing the COVID-19 Health Professionals Disability Advisory Service helpline. 2 October Minister Robert announced extension of temporary COVID measures until 28 February 2021. 30 November As at 30 November, the Department of Health, through the NMS, has dispatched approximately 600 000 masks, 40 000 gloves, 10 000 gowns, 45 000 goggles and face shields to the NDIA and to individual NDIS participants. Source: The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Anne Ruston, Minister for Families and Social Services, the Hon Stuart Robert MP, Minister for the NDIS and Government Services, 'Disability Royal Commission Public Hearing COVID-19 Hearing Report, Media Release, 30 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/disability-royal-commission- public-hearing-covid-19-report.

Response to interim finding 2.3 1.69 Coalition Senators acknowledge that the Department of Health made decisions over several years to ensure that Australia has a balanced and diversified NMS, in consultation with the states and territories.

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1.70 The arrangements in place to administer the NMS were, and have always been, prepared to play a crucial role in responding to a national health emergency. 1.71 Australia has not at any time during this pandemic been in a position where clinically recommended PPE has not been supplied to a health worker. This cannot be said for a number of other high-income countries. 1.72 Coalition Senators highlight that more than half a billion masks were secured by the Department of Health to ensure continued supply over the coming months. 9 1.73 Masks dispatched from the National Medical Stockpile includes:

 more than 50 million masks to State and Territory health departments to support the acute care sector; 10  more than 19 million masks to aged care through both states and territories for distribution and directly for urgent dispatches to facilities; 11 and  almost 600 000 masks to the NDIA and direct to National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) participants. 12 1.74 More than 28 million masks have been dispatched to Victoria from the National Medical Stockpile. 1.75 The National Medical Stockpile has supplied over 17 million to aged care facilities in Victoria. 13 1.76 Modelling for both baseline and high-case scenarios shows the National Medical Stockpile has sufficient stock of masks to meet anticipated demand from its priority distribution groups.

9 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Interview with Peta Credlin on Sky News about COVID-19’, Transcript, 6 April 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt- mp/media/interview-with-peta-credlin-on-sky-news-about-covid-19.

10 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Greater virus protection for aged care workers’, Media Release, 28 July 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/greater-virus- protection-for-aged-care-workers.

11 Department of Health, Australian Government 'COVID-19 outbreaks in Australian residential aged care facilities’, Report, 4 December 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/covid-19- outbreaks-in-australian-residential-aged-care-facilities-4-december-2020.

12 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Anne Ruston, Minister for Families and Social Services, the Hon Stuart Robert MP, Minister for the NDIS and Government Services, 'Disability Royal Commission Public Hearing COVID-19 Report, Media Release, 30 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/disability-royalcommission-public-hearing-covid-19-report.

13 Department of Health, answers to questions on notice, 4 August 2020 (received 21 October 2020), document no. 517, p. 1.

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Response to interim finding 2.4 1.77 Coalition Senators note that the Commonwealth government acted swiftly to establish international border controls, including making the difficult decision to implement travel restrictions on international movements. This, combined with mandatory quarantine, has allowed for the isolation and management of imported cases to prevent local outbreaks. 1.78 On 21 January 2020, 'human coronavirus with pandemic potential' was listed as a Listed Human Disease under the Biosecurity Act 2015, enabling the use of enhanced border measures. Coalition Senators note that this was ahead of the WHO declaring the novel coronavirus outbreak a 'Public Health Emergency of International Concern' on 30 January 2020. 1.79 It is important to note that the intention for restrictions on international travel is not to eliminate the appearance of any new cases of COVID-19. Instead, it helps to lower the number of new cases to levels that can be effectively managed by our health system. 1.80 Prior to the implementation of mandatory hotel quarantine, starting 1 February 2020, international travellers were required to self-isolate in their homes which was scaled up as more countries were identified, through to the implementations of mandatory hotel quarantine on 28 March. 1.81 Compliance with home quarantine and the implementation of hotel quarantine was an agreed responsibility of the states and territories. This has never been in dispute and reflects the availability of public health and other resources on the ground in the states and territories. 1.82 Coalition Senators note it was very clear that the state and territory governments had the statutory authority for compliance checks of returning travellers undertaking self-isolation at home. 1.83 For example, the Victorian Chief Health Officer Brett Sutton's State of Emergency directions, signed on 16 March 2020, specifically set out the self- isolation requirements for overseas travellers returning home in Victoria and the applicable penalties for non-compliance. 14 1.84 Similarly, the NSW Health Minister Brad Hazzard MP noted on 16 March 2020 that the NSW Chief Health Officer may issue an order to forcibly require compliance with the self-isolation requirements of Australians returning home from overseas.15

14 The Hon Daniel Andrews MP, Premier of Victoria, 'State of Emergency Declared in Victoria over CoVID-19’, Media Release, 16 March 2020, www.premier.vic.gov.au/state-emergency-declared- victoria-over-covid-19.

15 The Hon Brad Hazzard MP, NSW Minister for Health and Medical Research, 'Special state powers triggered to combat coronavirus’, Media Release, 16 March 2020, www.nsw.gov.au/news/special- state-powers-triggered-to-combat-coronavirus.

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Timeline of changes in international travel restrictions and travel advice 19 January The then Chief Medical Officer Dr Brendan Murphy announced the Department of Health was aware of the cases of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) from the Wuhan region in China and was watching developments closely. It was noted that any ill passengers reported on incoming flights would be met on arrival and assessed by biosecurity officers. 16 21 January The NSW Government began enhanced screening measures for passengers arriving at Sydney Airport on direct flights from Wuhan. Flights were met by Australian Border Force ( 'ABF') officers and biosecurity officers from NSW Health. Passengers were given information and asked to identify themselves if they have symptoms such as a fever, with NSW Health officials to follow-up with passengers suspected of having the virus. 17 23 January The Prime Minister announced the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ( 'DFAT') raised the level of travel advice for Wuhan to level 3: 'reconsider the need to travel'.18 The following day, DFAT raised the level of travel advice for Wuhan and Hubei Province to level 4: 'do not travel'.19 26 January The first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Australia. The level of travel advice for China overall was raised to level 3: 'reconsider your need to travel'. Human coronavirus with pandemic potential would now be a Listed Human Disease under the Biosecurity Act 2015, enabling the use of enhanced border measures. The CMO convened a national teleconference of the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee ( 'AHPPC') to inform state and territory authorities and to coordinate further national action. 20

16 Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Chief Medical Officer’s statement on novel coronavirus’, Media Release, 19 January 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/chief-medical-officers- statement-on-novel-coronavirus.

17 Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Chief Medical Officer’s media conference about novel coronavirus’, Transcript, 21 January 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/chief-medical-officers-media- conference-about-novel-coronavirus; NSW Ministry of Health, 'NSW Health advice to travellers returning from Wuhan, China’, Media Release, 21 January 2020, www.health.nsw.gov.au/news/Pages/20200121 00.aspx.

18 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference – Parliament House, ACT’, Transcript, 23 January 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-parliament-house-0.

19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'COVID-19 – Travel advice level changes’ www.smartraveller.gov.au/news-and-updates/covid-19-travel-advice-level-changes.

20 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Update on novel coronavirus in Australia’, Media Release, 26 January 2020,

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29 January The AHPPC adopted a highly precautionary approach and made the following recommendations which were accepted by the government:  people who have been in contact with any confirmed novel coronavirus cases must be isolated in their home for 14 days following exposure; and  returned travellers who have been in the Hubei Province of China must be isolated in their home for 14 days after leaving Hubei Province, other than for seeking individual medical care (including school children). 21 31 January The Health Minister stated that border screening and health measures are in place and that daily meetings were occurring between all federal, state and territory chief medical officers to assess the latest evidence and consider further action. 22 Dr Murphy noted that the World Health Organization strongly recommended that countries do not ban flights from China at that point in time. 23 1 February The Commonwealth announced that effective immediately, foreign nationals (excluding permanent residents) who are in mainland China from 1 February will not be allowed to enter Australia for 14 days from the time they have left or transited through mainland China. Australian citizens, permanent residents and their immediate family members who have been in mainland China may still enter but will be required to self-isolate for 14 days. 24 DFAT raises the level of travel advice for China to level 4: 'do not travel'.

www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/update-on-novel-coronavirus-in- australia.

21 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, the Hon Dan Tehan MP, Minister for Education, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Press conference at Parliament House about novel coronavirus’, Transcript, 29 January 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt- mp/media/press-conference-at-parliament-house-about-novel-coronavirus.

22 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Update on novel coronavirus’, Media Release, 31 January 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg- hunt-mp/media/update-on-novel-coronavirus.

23 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Press conference at Parliament House about novel coronavirus’, Transcript, 31 January 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/press-conference-at-parliament- house-about-novel-coronavirus-0.

24 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Home Affairs, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Updated travel advice to protect Australians from the novel coronavirus’, Media Release,

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20 February The travel ban from China was extended to 29 February. People who have been in contact with someone confirmed to have coronavirus must also self-isolate for 14 days from the time they were in contact with that person. The Prime Minister notes that the Commonwealth will continue to consider developments in China and advice from the AHPPC as they meet and review health and travel arrangements on an ongoing basis. 25 24 February Travel advice for Japan and South Korea was raised to level 2: 'exercise a high degree of caution'. 26 26 February Travel advice is lifted to 'level 2: exercise a high degree of caution', for northern Italy and additional advice is put in place for travel to Iran.27 29 February The travel advice for all of Italy was raised to 'level 2: exercise a high degree of caution', and 'level 3: reconsider your need to travel' for specified regions in Italy. Foreign nationals (excluding Australian permanent residents) who were in Iran from 1 March would not be allowed to enter Australia for 14 days. The Travel advice for Iran raised to 'level 4—do not travel'. The travel restrictions to Iran were based on advice from the AHPPC that the COVID_19 outbreak in Iran may be one of the largest outbreaks outside of Hubei Province in China. 28

1 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/updated-travel-advice-protect-australians-novel- coronavirus.

25 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Continuing travel ban to protect Australians from the coronavirus’, Media Release, 20 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/continuing-travel-ban-protect-australians-coronavirus.

26 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Press conference at Parliament House about coronavirus (COVID-19), Transcript, 24 February 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/press-conference-at-parliament- house-about-coronavirus-covid-19.

27 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Doorstop interview at Parliament House about coronavirus (COVID-19), Transcript, 26 February 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/doorstop-interview- at-parliament-house-about-coronavirus-covid-19.

28 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Press conference at Parliament House about coronavirus (COVID-19), Transcript, 29 February 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/press-conference-about-coronavirus- covid-19-with-the-chief-medical-officer; the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Update on novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in Australia’, Media Release, 29 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-novel-coronavirus-covid-19-australia.

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5 March Foreign nationals (excluding Australian permanent residents) who are in South Korea will not be allowed to enter Australia for 14 days from the time they have left or transited through the Republic of Korea. Travel advice for the Republic of Korea raised to 'level 3—reconsider your need to travel' and 'level 4—do not travel' for Daegu because of the significant outbreak of COVID-19 in that location. 29 11 March Travel advice and bans were extended to Italy. Australians and permanent residents exempt from those travel bans would be subject to the 14-day isolation period. 30 13 March The travel advice for all Australians travelling overseas was raised to level 3: 'reconsider you need for overseas travel at this time'. The Prime Minister and Dr Murphy noted that the reason for this travel advice is that the health risks from the COVID-19 pandemic were increasing and overseas travel has become more complex and unpredictable. 31 15 March The National Cabinet had its first meeting. The Prime Minister announced a universal precautionary self-isolation requirement of 14 days on all international arrivals to Australia to come into effect from midnight. 32 19 March Australia has closed its borders to all non-citizens and non- residents. The entry ban took effect from 9.00 pm on 20 March. Only Australian citizens, residents and immediate family members can travel to Australia, with limited exemptions applying. 33

29 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Update on novel coronavirus in Australia’, Media Release, 05 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-novel-coronavirus-covid-19- australia-0.

30 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press conference - Australian Parliament House, ACT’, Transcript, 11 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament- house-act-8.

31 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, 'Advice on coronavirus’, Media Release, 13 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/advice-coronavirus.

32 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Transcript - Press Conference’, Transcript, 15 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/transcript-press-conference.

33 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Home Affairs, 'Border restrictions’, 19 March 2020, Media Release, www.pm.gov.au/media/border-restrictions.

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24 March The Commonwealth implemented a 'do not travel' ban on Australians travelling overseas under the Biosecurity Act 2015 in order to avoid travellers returning to Australia with coronavirus and contracting coronavirus while overseas. Exemptions would be managed by the ABF. 34 27 March The National Cabinet agreed that all travellers arriving in Australia will be required to undertake their mandatory 14-day self-isolation at designated facilities. The hotel quarantine system will be implemented under state and territory legislation and enforced by state and territory governments, with the support of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and ABF where necessary. 35

Response to interim finding 2.5

Current jurisdictional arrangements to bring Australians home 1.85 Coalition Senators further note that on 13 November 2020, the National Cabinet agreed to continue to prioritise the return of Australians. 1.86 Since the onset of the pandemic over 414 000 Australians have returned home on commercial flights and 69 flights were facilitated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). 36 1.87 Since 18 September 2020, around 10,900 Australians registered with DFAT have returned to Australia. However, since 18 September 2020 the list of registered Australians has grown from 26 200 to 35 637. Between now and Christmas an additional 27 000 Australians are expected to return home. 37 1.88 The National Cabinet agreed that international air passenger caps have played an important role in ensuring that each of the states and territories' quarantine system can protect Australians at home. 1.89 The Commonwealth will be extending the international air passenger caps until 31 January 2021 for Sydney, Brisbane, Perth, and Adelaide, with further increases to be made if and when additional quarantine places become available.

34 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures’, Media Release, 24 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-24-March-2020.

35 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures’, Media Release, 27 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-270320.

36 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet’, Media Release, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2.

37 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet’, Media Release, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2.

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1.90 Caps and other arrangements will be implemented on a weekly basis and, in consultation with the relevant jurisdiction, an over-allocation by up to 10 per cent above caps will be allowed.

The current jurisdictional arrangements as of 13 November 2020 are as follows Jurisdiction Arrangements ACT 360 passengers over two flights before Christmas NSW Weekly cap of 3000 passengers into Sydney NT Finalising arrangements with the Commonwealth to increase capacity at Howard Springs Quarantine Facility from the current 500 per fortnight SA Weekly cap of 1000 passengers into Brisbane and increased surge efforts to 300 vulnerable Australians per week TAS 450 Australians over three flights before Christmas WA Weekly cap of 1025 passengers into Perth VIC Cap of 160 passengers arriving each day Source: The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet’, Media Release, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2; The Hon Daniel Andrews MP, Premier of Victoria, 'A Stronger Quarantine Program to Protect What We’ve Built’, 30 November 2020, www.premier.vic.gov.au/stronger-quarantine-program-protect-what-weve-built.

Safely increasing quarantine caps can facilitate bringing more Australians home to their families 1.91 Coalition Senators note that to safely facilitate the return of Australians travelling abroad, the risk of COVID-19 being reintroduced into Australia must be vigilantly mitigated through the continued implementation of an effective quarantine system that prioritises the health of returning Australians and protects the general community. 1.92 These health obligations by their nature unfortunately constrain the volume of Australians being able to return home at any one point in time. It should not be lost on anyone how critical this task is and how devastating the consequences are if there are failures in the quarantining of return travellers, as the experience in Victoria has shown. 1.93 Evidence presented to the committee by Dr Murphy in April 2020 outlined the importance of our border control measures to our success in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic: Border controls, including the most recent and most restrictive border measure, which is to formally quarantine in hotels every returned traveller,

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have been quite challenging for government, but I think they have been one of the biggest reasons for our success. 38 1.94 Notwithstanding the failures of hotel quarantine in Victoria, we can still be proud of the fact that Australia has largely avoided the worst impacts of the virus compared to that seen internationally, and our success to date must continue to be jealously guarded. 1.95 An effective hotel quarantine system which facilitates the safe return of Australians from abroad requires significant public health resources, which is predominantly within the purview of the states and territories. 39 The practical administration of quarantine is a coordinated effort between the Commonwealth and state and territory governments via the National Cabinet process. 1.96 Coalition Senators reiterate that from the beginning of mandatory hotel quarantine, the Commonwealth has consistently offered to provide Australian Defence Force (ADF) support to assist the state and territory enforcement authorities manage the logistical requirements at hotel quarantine facilities. 40 1.97 The hotel quarantine failures in Victoria has for several months constrained the capacity of Australians to be able to return home than there otherwise could have been. On the question of the impact of the shutdown of Melbourne Airport on the ability of Australians to return home, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet gave this evidence to this committee: … it has had a very significant impact because, prior to the closure of Melbourne Airport, it was taking approximately 26 per cent of international arrivals. So the impact has been commensurate with the proportion that they were taking prior to having to go offline. 41 1.98 It was further submitted to the committee that the shutdown of Melbourne Airport had in fact triggered the caps being put in place by the other states and

38 Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 6. See also: Dr Raina MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 12.

39 Ms Alison Frame, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, pp. 28–29.

40 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on Coronavirus Measures’, 27 March 2020, Media Release, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-270320; the Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference – Australian Parliament House, ACT’, Transcript, 27 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament- house-act-270320.

41 Ms Frame, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 17.

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territories, and that from the beginning of hotel quarantine there were no caps on arrivals in place and it was being managed by the states and territories.42 1.99 Coalition Senators are of the view that the state and territory governments bear responsibility for the caps that their jurisdictions have put in place to manage the intake of Australians returning home. The states and territories should continue to positively engage with the National Cabinet and consider increasing those caps so that more Australians can return home to their families safely— with the advice of the medical experts always in mind. 1.100 Coalition Senators note that the reopening of Melbourne Airport to international travellers on 7 December 2020 is a welcome development that will facilitate the safe return of more Australians.43 1.101 Moreover, Coalition Senators highlight that evidence to the committee has demonstrated domestic border closures are a significant restraint on the capacity of hotel quarantine facilities. The Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications gave evidence to this committee that it had been advised by various states that, as a result of COVID- 19 outbreaks, hotel quarantine facilities were being used to enforce domestic border closure requirements.44 Acting Chief Medical Officer Professor Paul Kelly submitted to the committee: There has been an effect from the domestic border closures in that way. Some states have needed to decrease the number of people they have been receiving from overseas because there are others in hotel quarantine.45 1.102 The AHPPC has never advised the National Cabinet that states and territories close their borders, and yet throughout the pandemic some states have closed their borders to other states to varying degrees including in circumstances where there was no community transmission. On 20 May 2020, the then deputy chief medical officer Professor Paul Kelly acknowledged that he saw no medical reason why state borders were still closed.46

42 Ms Christine Dacey, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 17.

43 The Hon Daniel Andrews MP, Premier of Victoria, 'A Stronger Quarantine Program to Protect What We’ve Built’, 30 November 2020, www.premier.vic.gov.au/stronger-quarantine-program-protect- what-weve-built.

44 Ms Dacey, Deputy Secretary, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 17.

45 Acting Chief Medical Officer, Professor Paul Kelly, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 17.

46 Professor Paul Kelly, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, 'Press conference’, Transcript, 20 May 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/deputy-chief-medical-officer-press-conference-about-covid-19-on-20- may-2020.

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1.103 As a result of domestic travellers being required to take up the limited space in hotel quarantine facilities there has been a direct impact restricting how many Australians can return home overseas. 1.104 Additional evidence was given to the committee that, in recent times, the availability of commercial flights to bring passengers home has not been a causative factor that restricts how many Australians can return home. Rather, it is the public health capability to maintain an effective hotel quarantine system that constrains the capacity of quarantine facilities.47

Response to interim finding 2.6 1.105 As Mr Bret Walker SC's Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess's Final Report stated: Given its lack of medical or epidemiological expertise, it is well for the public good that the ABF (and, for that matter, the Department of Home Affairs) do not bear any responsibility for the Ruby Princess mishap … To repeat, neither the ABF nor any ABF officers played any part in the mishap.48 1.106 The suggestion that there has been wrongdoing by the Australian Border Force is completely wrong. 1.107 The ABF does not have a role in relation to clearing people on health grounds. The ABF does not employ doctors and nurses at airports or at seaports. The ABF, who have gone above and beyond in this response, have worked day and night to keep Australians safe.

Health Response Part 1: Managing COVID-19 in Australia

Response to interim finding 3.1 – part 1 1.108 Coalition Senators dispute the finding that the Commonwealth's overarching strategy was not explained clearly until late July. 1.109 The national COVID-19 communication activities began in early 2020. The campaign ran across all media channels and included topics on COVID-19 symptoms, physical distancing, respiratory and hand hygiene, testing and self- isolation requirements, support for older Australians, movement and other restrictions, mental health support and the COVIDSafe app.49

47 Mr Simon Duggan, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Ms Alison Frame, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Committee Hansard, pp. 29-30.

48 Mr Bret Walker SC, Commissioner, Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, 14 August 2020, p. 27.

49 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, '$2.4 billion health plan to fight COVID-19’, Media Release, 11 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/24-billion-health- plan-fight-covid-19.

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1.110 This campaign was supplemented by almost daily media conferences, from late January, featuring the Health Minister, CMO and Deputy CMOs. Daily updates were provided, and the strategy clearly outlined. Ministers and the CMO and Deputy CMOs have appeared regularly in a wide array of social media to further provide updates and respond to questions. 1.111 The Prime Minister announced the suppression strategy in a press conference on 16 April 2020.50 1.112 On 6 May 2020, the Pandemic Health Intelligence Plan (PHIP) was published on the Department of Health website.51 The PHIP states that on 16 April 2020, the National Cabinet agreed that the national strategy would continue to be one of suppression, with potential to eliminate the virus in some areas of the country. 1.113 Coalition Senators note the National Cabinet has endorsed a national strategy of suppression, with a goal of 'no community transmission'. 1.114 The suppression strategy enables balance between adequately controlling virus transmission, and minimising economic, social and other health disruption. 1.115 A goal of 'no community transmission' enables localised and proportionate actions whilst maintaining the recognition of ongoing risk. 1.116 When cases do emerge, swift public health action is required to identify, contain and end transmission chains. Australia has built its public health capacity throughout the pandemic to better achieve this.

Response to interim finding 3.1 – part 2 1.117 On 20 January 2020, the National Incident Room was activated in response to the threat of COVID-19. 1.118 Coalition Senators note that Australia's response to COVID-19 has been guided by the expertise of the CDNA and the AHPPC, of which public health and communicable disease experts, and the Chief Health Officer of each state and territory are members, respectively. These committees met more frequently to respond strongly to the worsening epidemiological situation, enabling strong decision making. 1.119 With the greatest risk of COVID-19 being importation from overseas, the Commonwealth acted decisively to close international borders and introduce quarantine measures.

50 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press conference - Australian Parliament House, ACT’, Transcript, 16 April 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament- house-act-15.

51 AHPPC, Department of Health, 'Coronavirus (COVID-19) in Australia - Pandemic Health Intelligence Plan’, Publication, 6 May 2020, www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/05/coronavirus-covid-19-in-australia- pandemic-health-intelligence-plan 1.pdf.

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1.120 On the advice of CDNA and AHPPC, throughout March and April 2020, Australia implemented a series of public health measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These measures were broadly aimed at:

 reducing introduction and transmission of COVID-19 in the community;  protecting vulnerable population groups including older Australians and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island communities; and  building and safeguarding Australia's health system capacity. 1.121 Social distancing, gathering restrictions, and the message to 'stay home unless doing essential activities' were all recommended during March 2020 by the AHPPC. 1.122 This proportionate range of measures were a collective decision of the National Cabinet, informed by the health advice, which was being updated daily at AHPPC. All state and territory first ministers were part of and endorsed the national response. 1.123 State and territory governments have primary operational responsibility for emergency management and public health in their respective jurisdictions, which is based on the medical advice from their respective Chief Health Officers. 1.124 Domestic border issues, and public health interventions within states and territories are a jurisdictional matter and are at the discretion of the individual jurisdiction.

Response to interim finding 3.2 1.125 The COVIDSafe app is working and is being used by state health officials as part of contact tracing. It is an additional tool that helps supplement the contact tracing process and helps keep people safe through early notification by health officials of possible exposure. 1.126 Over 7.1 million Australians have downloaded and registered on the app, as of 30 November 2020.52 1.127 NSW has reported that it has successfully accessed the App to identify around 80 close contacts, including 17 contacts not identified by manual contact tracing. 1.128 In one instance, their access to App data revealed a previously unrecognised exposure date at a venue in NSW, resulting in the identification of an additional 544 contacts that may have otherwise gone undetected (including two people who were confirmed to have COVID-19).

52 The Hon Stuart Robert MP, Minister for Government Services, 'A stronger COVIDSafe app for Australians’, 30 November 2020, Media Release, minister.servicesaustralia.gov.au/media- releases/2020-11-30-stronger-covidsafe-app-australians.

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1.129 The Government welcomes the fact that our caseload has been so low in most jurisdictions the app has not had to be used. 1.130 Unfortunately, evidence to the committee revealed that the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services had informed the Commonwealth that they had paused using COVIDSafe App data on 16 July 2020 citing concerns over privacy legislation. The Victorian Government did not recommence using the COVIDSafe App Data until 1 August 2020. This exact period was during the height of the second wave in Victoria.53 1.131 Ongoing improvements are made to the app through regular updates on the app stores. On 30 November 2020, the Minister for Government Services announced a significant update is in progress to improve Bluetooth performance through a new Bluetooth protocol called Herald. Testing shows the protocol provides for excellent performance of all encounter logging under all phone conditions and will continue to work on more than 96 per cent of Apple and Android phones.54 1.132 The code for the update has been made available to the public via Github to enable the tech community an opportunity to provide feedback ahead of the release to the Apple App Store and Google Play Store. 1.133 The Government continues to support and encourage state and territory governments to use the app to supplement their contact tracing process.

Response to interim finding 3.3 1.134 Coalition Senators note that a safe and effective vaccine developed by the medical experts and approved by our regulatory bodies will be a significant step for Australia and the world at large in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic. It should be welcomed that the Commonwealth engaged early and proactively to secure access for Australians to promising vaccine candidates. 1.135 Coalition Senators note that on 18 February, the government announced $2 million in funding to support Australia's researchers to understand and respond to the outbreak of COVID-19. The Commonwealth provided funding from the Medical Research Future Fund for an open and competitive grant opportunity to develop a coronavirus vaccine.55

53 Department of Health, answers to written questions on notice, 4 August 2020 (received 28 September 2020), document no. 423, pp. 17-18.

54 The Hon Stuart Robert MP, Minister for Government Services, 'A stronger COVIDSafe app for Australians’, 30 November 2020, Media Release, minister.servicesaustralia.gov.au/media- releases/2020-11-30-stronger-covidsafe-app-australians.

55 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Backing important coronavirus research’, Media Release, 18 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/backing- important-coronavirus-research.

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1.136 As part of the Commonwealth government's $2.4 billion health package to address COVID-19, $30 million from the Medical Research Future Fund was allocated for vaccine, anti-viral and respiratory medicine research.56 1.137 Coalition Senators note that the government currently has five separate agreements for the supply of COVID-19 vaccines, and that through these five agreements the government has invested $3.3 billion, which will strengthen Australia's position to access safe and effective vaccines when they become available.57 1.138 Coalition Senators also note that the government has invested $363 million in support of research and development, to contribute to the global effort to find successful vaccines and treatments to stop the spread of COVID-19. 1.139 Coalition Senators note that all vaccines must pass different stages of research trials to prove they are safe and effective to be approved for use by our regulatory bodies, and as such the government's five agreements cover a range of different vaccine candidates. 1.140 The government's five vaccine agreements cover the following.58

 The University of Oxford/AstraZeneca, with 3.8 million doses set to be delivered to Australia in early 2021, and 30 million doses manufactured in Australia between early 2021 in monthly batches through to September 2021. CSL will manufacture these doses on behalf of AstraZeneca.  The University of Queensland/CSL vaccine, with 51 million doses being available from mid-2021. These doses will be manufactured in Australia by CSL.  The Novavax vaccine, with 40 million doses to be made available in Australia during 2021, and Australia having the option to purchase an extra 10 million doses.  The Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine, with 10 million doses being available from early 2021 with Australia having the option to purchase additional doses where supply is available. These doses will be manufactured offshore.  Australian participation in the COVAX Facility—a global effort to support rapid, fair and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines—which will enable Australia to purchase doses for Australia as they become available. This participation includes an upfront payment of $132 million to allow the

56 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, '$2.4 billion health plan to fight COVID-19’, Media Release, 11 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/24-billion-health- plan-fight-covid-19.

57 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Australia’s vaccine agreements’, 4 December 2020, www.health.gov.au/australias-vaccine-agreements.

58 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Australia’s vaccine agreements’, 4 December 2020, www.health.gov.au/australias-vaccine-agreements.

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purchase of 25 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines for the Australian population, and an additional $80 million to support vaccine access for up to 94 lower-income countries through the Facility's Advanced Market Commitment.

Health Response Part 2: Aged Care

Response to interim finding 4.1 1.141 Coalition Senators note that the Commonwealth Government regulates and funds the care of older Australian in the home and in residential care facilities. 1.142 States are responsible for the management of public health, hospitals, and pandemics. 1.143 The Commonwealth government continues to work with states and territories to protect our most vulnerable senior Australians in aged care. 1.144 Coalition Senators note the Commonwealth has provided more than $1.6 billion to assist senior Australians in aged care during the COVID-19 Pandemic.59 This includes boosting quality and safety monitoring, support for retaining the care workforce, providing an additional surge workforce, assistance to the sector with additional costs and providing unlimited resources to COVID impacted facilities, funding to support older Australians stay at home and funding for a Victorian Aged Care response centre.

Response to interim finding 4.2

Long term Challenges 1.145 One of the Prime Minister's first decisions was to establish the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety on 8 October 2018.60 1.146 When the pandemic hit, the Prime Minister wrote to Commissioners (on 31 March 2020 and asked them to take into account the COVID-19 pandemic in the conduct of their inquiry. 1.147 In particular, the Prime Minister asked that Commissioners give consideration to the effect of the pandemic when seeking information from governments or

59 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, 'Budget 2020-21: Record health and aged care investment under Australia’s COVID-19 pandemic plan’, Media Release, 6 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/budget-2020-21-record-health-and- aged-care-investment-under-australias-covid-19-pandemic-plan.

60 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference with the Minister for Health and the Minister for Senior Australians & Aged Care’, Press Conference, 09 October 2018, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-minister-health-and-minister-senior-australians-aged- care.

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people who are at the front line of the fight against the pandemic in order to ensure that they could do their work without distraction. 1.148 Coalition Senators note that on 25 July, the Commonwealth had established the Victorian Aged Care Response Centre.61 A key focus of the Centre is to unify the effort across every aspect of the aged care sector during the pandemic. The Centre has staff from Commonwealth and Victorian government agencies, working together to manage the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in aged care facilities.

Aged Care Plan 1.149 Coalition Senators note the Commonwealth has been continuously building on our response to COVID-19 in residential aged care since January 2020, in consultation with the aged care sector and with the state and territory government's health authorities. This has included:

 specific infection control guidance for residential aged care combined with freely available training for the aged care workforce;  visitation restrictions combined with guidance to enable residents to remain safely connected to their family and community;  rapid provision of PPE, clinical expertise, and additional skilled workforce to support the provision of care and contain transmission in the event of an outbreak;  in-reach pathology testing for COVID-19 and access to telehealth to ensure residents continue to safely receive needed healthcare. 1.150 The Government issued specific guidelines to the sector on 13 March from the Communicable Disease Network of Australia and it was updated twice, including on 14 July.62 The Commonwealth's plan was in place since January. 1.151 On 21 August, the National Cabinet endorsed the Commonwealth, State and Territory Plan to Boost Aged Care Preparedness for a Rapid Emergency Response to COVID-19.63 This plan sought to strengthen preparedness for responding to a rapid escalation of COVID-19 in the aged care sector.

61 The Hon Richard Colbeck MP, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, 'Victorian Aged Care Response Centre’, Media Release, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard- colbeck/media/victorian-aged-care-response-centre.

62 Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, 'Government welcomes Aged Care Royal Commission’s COVID-19 report recommendations’, Media Release, 1 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard- colbeck/media/government-welcomes-aged-care-royal-commissions-covid-19-report- recommendations.

63 Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, 'Government welcomes Aged Care Royal Commission’s COVID-19 report recommendations’, Media Release, 1 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard-

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1.152 The plan has been developed in consultation with jurisdictions and comprises a high-level series of actions for Commonwealth, state and territory governments to strengthen aged care emergency response preparedness. 1.153 Actions included, but are not limited to:

 Ongoing assessment of the preparedness of aged care providers to respond to outbreaks of COVID-19, including a risk profiling tool developed by the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission to inform emergency response planning.  An Audit of State and Territory Emergency Response Capabilities to support the establishment of a joint aged care emergency response.  Additional face to face infection control training.

Aged care workforce 1.154 Coalition Senators note that aged and health sector workforce numbers have been impacted by community transmission of COVID-19, and notes the Commonwealth has invested $101 million for a surge workforce and infection control training for aged care workers.64 1.155 To assist the sector the Commonwealth has activated a surge workforce, ADF, AUSMAT and is delivering masks and face shields to aged care facilities.

PPE 1.156 Coalition Senators note that the Commonwealth has been working with the states and territories to ensure that aged care facilities have sufficient supplies of personal protective equipment. As of 1 October 2020, the National Medical Stockpile has provided aged care facilities with approximately:

 17 million masks  4 million gowns  11 million gloves  4 million goggles and face shields  85 000 bottles of hand sanitiser  160 000 clinical waste bags.65

colbeck/media/government-welcomes-aged-care-royal-commissions-covid-19-report- recommendations.

64 Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, 'Funding boost for aged care set to strengthen defence against COVID-19’, Media Release, 11 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard-colbeck/media/funding-boost-for-aged- care-set-to-strengthen-defence-against-covid-19.

65 Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians, 'Funding boost for aged care set to strengthen defence against COVID-19’, Media Release, 11 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard-colbeck/media/funding-boost-for-aged- care-set-to-strengthen-defence-against-covid-19.

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Response to interim finding 4.3 1.157 Coalition Senators note that the Commonwealth has worked with all state and territory governments on COVID-19 outbreak management plans specific to residential aged care facilities which have been enacted as required. 1.158 Coalition Senators note the Commonwealth government's commitment to the reform of the aged care sector to ensure the future workforce for the sector is fit for purpose. As the direct employers of the workforce, the Aged Care Workforce Industry Council and industry are intended to drive the bulk of these reforms. 1.159 The Commonwealth government has provided significant funding support to the Aged Care Workforce Industry Council in this. Up to 30 June 2020, the Commonwealth government has provided $2.6 million in funding to support the work of the Council,66 and $10.3 million has been allocated in Budget 2020-21 to support the Workforce Industry Council reforms.67

Response to interim finding 4.4 1.160 Coalition Senators note the Victorian Aged Care Response Centre is a joint operation of the Victorian and Commonwealth governments established on 25 July 2020.68 1.161 The Response Centre will be led by an executive team including clinical and operational leads, enabling a rapid response as required. It will include staff from Department of Health, Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, DHHS, Emergency Management Australia, Emergency Management Victoria, Australian Medical Assistance Teams ( 'AUSMAT') and Defence. The Response Centre will support Victorian residential aged care facilities in improving infection prevention and control approaches and understanding PPE requirements.69

66 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Aged care workforce strategy’, 12 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/health-topics/aged-care/aged-care-reforms-and- reviews/aged-care-workforce-strategy.

67 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Budget 2020-21: Aged Care – supporting Workforce Industry Council reforms’, Fact Sheet, 6 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/budget-2020-21-aged-care-supporting-workforce- industry-council-reforms.

68 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australian, 'Victorian Aged Care Response Centre’, Media Release, 25 July 2020, www.health.gov.au/ministers/senator-the-hon-richard-colbeck/media/victorian-aged-care- response-centre.

69 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'About the Victorian Aged Care Response Centre’, 17 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/initiatives-and-programs/victorian-aged-care-response- centre/about-the-victorian-aged-care-response-centre.

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1.162 A key focus of the Response Centre is to unify the effort across every aspect of the aged care sector during the pandemic. 1.163 Widespread community transmission of COVID-19 in Victoria meant that we needed a centralised, co-ordinated approach to protect and care for all people living in aged care facilities and care for aged care residents who have tested positive to COVID-19. 1.164 The Response Centre will also support our aged care workforce with the knowledge, skills and experience to protect themselves while they care for some of the most vulnerable people in our community. 1.165 Coalition Senators note that Commonwealth government has accepted all six recommendations of the Royal Commission Special COVID report and on 30 November 2020 it reported to parliament on the implementation of these recommendations.70

Response to interim findings 4.5 1.166 The work of the strengthened independent Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission (ACQSC) remains key to important reform of the sector. Coalition Senators note that the ACQSC has significantly increase site visits to aged care services throughout 2020. 1.167 As of 1 September 2020, the ACQSC conducted more than 1,100 site visits to aged care services since January including 410 visits to check infection control practices, and the ACQSC modified its regulatory program in March 2020 to focus additional effort where it is needed most to ensure providers are keeping aged care consumers safe.71 1.168 Between 16 March and 14 August 2020, a total of 487 unannounced and short- notice visits were undertaken to aged care services across all stated. Unannounced visits were changed to short notice visits for 11 weeks from 16 March but recommenced in June 2020. 1.169 The regulator continues to use the full range of its regulatory activities to ensure the safety and well-being of aged care consumers.

70 Department of Health, Australian Government, 'Australian Government Implementation Progress Report on the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety report – Aged Care and COVID-19 – a special report', Publication, 30 November 2020, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/australian-government-implementation-progress- report-on-the-royal-commission-into-aged-care-quality-and-safety-report-aged-care-and-covid-19- a-special-report.

71 Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, Australian Government, 'Statement from Ms Janet Anderson PSM – Significant growth in regulator activities relation to aged care in the context of COVID-19', Media Release, 1 September 2020, www.agedcarequality.gov.au/news/media- centre/statement-ms-janet-anderson-psm-significant-growth-regulatory-activities-relating-aged- care-context-covid-19.

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1.170 Commissioner Janet Anderson PSM has communicated to aged care providers her expectation that they will continue to minimise the risks and impact of a potential COVID-19 outbreak in their aged care service. 1.171 Coalition Senators note that on 2 December 2020, the ACQSC released a new comprehensive guide for use by residential aged care providers in supporting their workers, care recipients and family members, and visitors to prevent, prepare for and manage an outbreak of COVID-19.72 1.172 Coalition Senators welcome the comments by Commissioner Anderson that the aged care sector cannot afford to be complacent and must do all that it can to prepare for future outbreaks of COVID-19, even as Australians transition to a COVID-normal.

Economic Response to COVID-19 Part 1: The immediate economic impact and response

Response to interim finding 5.1 1.173 Coalition Senators reject the assertion that there was a delay in the government's adoption of measures to lessen the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 1.174 The $130 billion JobKeeper payment was announced on the 30 March 2020.73 This was less than a month after the COVID-19 virus was declared a pandemic by the WHO (on 11 March 2020), and only two weeks after the first domestic restrictions on gatherings were announced on 16 March 2020.74 1.175 Coalition Senators also note that the advice from Treasury—as stated publicly by Secretary Kennedy—was to put in place the expanded coronavirus supplement. The government acted in line with this advice by announcing the coronavirus supplement on 22 March 2020.75 1.176 As Secretary Kennedy also noted, this gave the government time to properly design the JobKeeper scheme, which was a unique Australian response that

72 Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, Australian Government, 'Staying alert and on guard – an imperative for aged care services during the global pandemic', Media Release, 2 December 2020, www.agedcarequality.gov.au/news/media-centre/commission-media-release-staying-alert-and- guard-imperative-aged-care-services-during-global-pandemic.

73 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, '$130 billion JobKeeper payment to keep Australians in a job', Media Release, 30 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/130-billion-jobkeeper-payment-keep-australians-job.

74 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Coronavirus measures endorsed by National Cabinet', 16 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/coronavirus-measures-endorsed-national-cabinet.

75 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, Media Release, 22 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/supporting-australian-workers-and-business.

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lacked the flaws of other schemes, such as the UK-style scheme supported by the Australian Labor Party.76

Response to interim finding 5.2 1.177 Coalition Senators reject the assertion that JobKeeper unnecessarily excluded Australian workers. 1.178 The JobKeeper Payment was designed to apply consistently across a range of business sizes, structures, and industries, and to target support to those entities who had been significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. 1.179 It was also designed to deliver support quickly and at scale, which is why eligibility criteria needed to be as simple as possible and draw on existing tax and revenue concepts and definitions. 1.180 This is reflected in the short time between the announcement of the scheme and payments being received by Australian employers. 1.181 The JobKeeper Payment was announced on 30 March 2020, legislation to implement the scheme was introduced and passed by the Parliament on 8 April 2020, and the first payments by the ATO to employers were made from the first week of May 2020. 1.182 Coalition Senators note the success of the JobKeeper scheme, with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) estimating that JobKeeper reduced total job losses by 700 000 between April and July 2020.77 1.183 Coalition Senators also acknowledge the appropriateness of the government's decision to extend JobKeeper for a further 6 months, until 28 March 2021. The extension will target support to those businesses that continue to be most significantly impacted by the economic effects of COVID‑19.

Response to interim finding 5.3: 1.184 Coalition Senators reject the claims that the JobSeeker payment is inadequate and that the government is withdrawing fiscal support too early. 1.185 Coalition Senators note that the government introduced the JobSeeker Payment in March 2020, to simplify the income support system and maintain incentives for people to find employment and support themselves to the greatest extent possible. 1.186 This was a critical step in simplifying and modernising Australia's welfare system. Offering a single payment for working-age people, a single set of rules and a single set of rates will be simpler and easier for people to access.

76 Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Treasury, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2020, p. 19.

77 Mr James Bishop and Ms Iris Day, 'How Many Jobs Did JobKeeper Keep?', Reserve Bank of Australia, p. 25 www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2020/pdf/rdp2020-07.pdf

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1.187 JobSeeker is a safety net for people while they are looking for, or unable to work. It is not designed to be long-term income on an ongoing basis. 1.188 Everyone who receives the new JobSeeker Payment is eligible for some form of additional assistance from the welfare system. 1.189 It is the responsibility of the government to ensure our social security and welfare system is sustainable into the future, so that it can continue to provide support to those most in need. 1.190 The Coronavirus Supplement is a temporary measure introduced to ensure assistance is provided to people in need at this time of crisis. Coalition Senators note that the Commonwealth relaxed a number of criteria to ensure that those who find themselves unemployed through no fault of their own can still access JobSeeker, such as relaxing the partner income threshold to $3,070 per fortnight.78 1.191 The emergency income support measures the Commonwealth government put in place at the outset of the coronavirus pandemic were always targeted, temporary and scalable. 1.192 Decisions around welfare have to balance a range of considerations—including providing a safety net, incentivising work, and being fiscally sustainable. 1.193 Providing additional financial support through social security is just one of the ways the Australian Government is helping support individuals, communities, and the economy through these testing times.

Response to interim finding 5.4 1.194 Coalition Senators note the government's policies are carefully examined on their merit for society as a whole and that the government consult with a range of agencies and stakeholders. 1.195 One of our greatest concerns at the outset of the pandemic was shutting down communities and keeping people in homes where we know home is not always the safe place it should be. That is why, very early in the pandemic, the Commonwealth government committed $150 million for the COVID‑19 Domestic and Family Violence Support Package.79 1.196 $130 million of that support package was allocated to state and territory governments to help support crisis accommodation, frontline services and

78 Senator the Hon Anne Ruston, Minister for Families and Social Services, Questions without notice, 12 May 2020, Hansard, p. 2049.

79 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Women, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Senator the Hon Anne Ruston, Minister for Families and Social Services, '$1.1 billion to support more mental health, Medicare and domestic violence services', Media Release, 29 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/11-billion- support-more-mental-health-medicare-and-domestic-violence-services-0.

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perpetrator intervention programs. All States have now received the full allocation of funding. 1.197 Coalition Senators recognise that women made up the majority of Australians who lost their jobs early in this crisis. These jobs have started to come back, with more than half of jobs created since May filled by women. 1.198 Coalition Senators note the government is determined to see female workforce participation reach its pre-COVID-19 record high again (61.5 per cent January 2020), and to see the gender pay gap reach its record low again (13.9 per cent November 2019). 1.199 As part of the Budget, the government announced the second Women's Economic Security Statement which includes $240 million in measures and programs, such as:

 new cadetships and apprenticeships for women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics;  support for female founders and entrepreneurialism; and  a new Respect@Work Council to support women's safety.80

Response to interim finding 5.5 1.200 Coalition Senators reject the suggestion that the government left Australians to fend for themselves for six months. 1.201 Coalition Senators note that the $130 billion JobKeeper payment was announced on the 30 March 2020.81 This was less than a month after the COVID-19 virus was declared a pandemic by the WHO (on 11 March 2020), and only two weeks after the first domestic restrictions on gatherings were announced on 16 March 2020.82 1.202 Coalition Senators also note that by 22 March 2020 the government had already announced economic measures worth $189 billion to deal with the impact of COVID-19.83 1.203 This included an economic stimulus package of $17.6 billion announced on 12 March, which included $4.8 billion for payments to pensioners, social security,

80 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'Budget Speech 2020-21', Transcript, 6 October 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/speeches/budget-speech-2020-21.

81 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, '$130 billion JobKeeper payment to keep Australians in a job', Media Release, 30 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/130-billion-jobkeeper-payment-keep-australians-job.

82 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Coronavirus measures endorsed by National Cabinet', 16 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/coronavirus-measures-endorsed-national-cabinet.

83 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'Supporting Australians workers and business', Media Release, 22 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/supporting-australian-workers-and-business.

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veteran and other income support recipients and eligible concession card holders. The package also included $6.7 billion to boost cash flow for employers through payments of up to $25,000 to businesses with a turnover of less than $50 million, and $1.3 billion for eligible employers to apply for a wage subsidy of 50 percent of their apprentice's or trainee's wage.84 1.204 Coalition Senators note that the early access to superannuation was endorsed by the Retirement Income Review, and that the scheme is providing Australians who have been adversely impacted by the COVID-19 health crisis much needed support.85 1.205 Coalition Senators further note that the $100 billion is a relatively small fraction of the $3 trillion currently invested in superannuation.86

Response to interim finding 5.6 1.206 The Commonwealth Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment supports eligible workers, including casual workers, who are required to self‑isolate or quarantine, who do not have leave access to paid entitlements (because it is not available or has been exhausted) and are required to self-isolate. 1.207 All states and territories have been offered similar support if they consider that they are disaster affected and are willing to enter into a cost-sharing agreement with the Commonwealth Government to extend the payment to their jurisdiction. 1.208 It is a matter for state and territory governments to determine if they are disaster affected and need to seek assistance from the Commonwealth. 1.209 The Government is working collaboratively with the states and territories to deliver support to businesses and workers to help them through the COVID-19 pandemic. 1.210 It was clear that the unfolding disaster in Victoria was being driven by high rates of workplace and community transmission of COVID-19. Coalition Senators note this is why, on 3 August, the Commonwealth introduced the $1500 Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment to provide support to workers required to

84 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'Supporting Australians workers and business', Media Release, 12 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/economic- stimulus-package.

85 Retirement Income Review - Final Report, Publication, July 2020, pp. 21-22, treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/p2020-100554-complete-report.pdf.

86 Retirement Income Review – Final Report, Publication, July 2020, p. 24 treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/p2020-100554-complete-report.pdf.

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quarantine as instructed by health officials.87 It is available for workers who need to isolate because they have COVID-19, are a close contact of a person with COVID-19, or who have to care for someone under 16 who needs to isolate, who has no paid leave entitlements (or have exhausted their paid leave entitlements). 1.211 Coalition Senators note that the Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment was introduced at about the same time stage 4 restrictions were announced in Victoria as a result of the escalating crisis. 1.212 On 26 August 2020, the Government announced that Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment arrangements would be extended to include Tasmania, following agreement with the Tasmanian Government. 1.213 On 28 August, the Commonwealth announced it would extend eligibility arrangements for the payment to include people who live in New South Wales and South Australia, but work in Victoria, and Victorians who were directed to self-isolate on or after 5 July 2020. 1.214 On 16 September the payment was extended to Western Australia, on 18 September to NSW, and on 23 October to Queensland and South Australia. 1.215 The overwhelming majority of claims have been made by Victorian workers, with more than 10 300 claims granted and $15.5 million being paid as of 23 October 2020.88 1.216 The Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment is available through Services Australia, and can be claimed on multiple occasions as needed. 1.217 The offer of similar support has been extended to all states and territories if they consider they are disaster affected and need to seek assistance from the Commonwealth. 1.218 Keeping Australians in work and business in business is the only way forward for a stronger economic recovery once the COVID-19 crisis passes.

87 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference – Australian Parliament House, ACT', Transcript, 3 August 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament- house-act-3aug20.

88 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, the Hon Stuart Robert MP, Minister for the NDIS, the Hon David Littleproud, Minister for Agriculture Drought and Emergency Management, 'Pandemic leave disaster payment for Queensland workers', Media Release, 23 October 2020 www.pm.gov.au/media/pandemic-leave-disaster-payment-queensland-workers.

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Economic Response to COVID-19 Part 2: The recession and the Australian jobs crisis

Response to interim finding 6.1 1.219 Coalition Senators reject this assertion about the state of the Australian economy prior to COVID-19. 1.220 Coalition Senators point out that before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Australian economy was growing faster than all of the G7 economies bar the US.89 1.221 Coalition Senators acknowledge the harm the COVID-19 pandemic has caused to the Australian economy. However, the government's actions have successfully cushioned the economic blow, and supported affected Australian households throughout the pandemic. 1.222 According to the 2020–21 Budget, Australia's unemployment rate is set to peak at 8 per cent in December 2020.90 This is substantially below the 15 per cent unemployment that Treasury analysis indicated would have occurred if not for the JobKeeper Payment.91 1.223 The relatively healthy state of Australia's economy is reflected in the fact that 648 500 jobs have returned to the labour market since employment fell to its lowest level in May 2020.92 1.224 Coalition Senators reiterate that it was the appropriate decision to extend JobKeeper for a further 6 months, until 28 March 2021 when the situation in Victoria had worsened and the economy in that state had gone into full lockdown in August 2020. The extension will target support to those businesses, particularly in Victoria but in all states, that continue to be most significantly impacted by the economic effects of COVID‑19 through to recovery in the months ahead.

Response to interim finding 6.2 1.225 Coalition Senators do not agree with the claim that the JobMaker plan has under delivered.

89 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'National Accounts - December Quarter 2018', Media Release, 6 March 2019, joshfrydenberg.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Treasurer-Media- Release-National-Accounts-December-quarter-2018.pdf.

90 Australian Government, 'Budget 2020-21 Overview', Publication, budget.gov.au/2020- 21/content/overview.htm.

91 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'JobKeeper payment supporting millions of jobs', Media Release, 14 April 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/media- releases/jobkeeper-payment-supporting-millions-jobs.

92 Senator the Hon Michaelia Cash, Minister for Employment, Skills, Small and Family Business, Questions without notice, 2 December 2020, Senate Hansard, p. 50.

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HomeBuilder 1.226 Coalition Senators are of the view that the government's HomeBuilder program has been an enormous success, with applications already in excess of 27 000. This has supported the construction industry through the crisis, and increases the opportunities for Australians to buy their most important asset.

 ABS building approvals data for October 2020 have shown the highest level of detached housing approvals (at 10 692) since February 2000.93  In October 2020, the number of loans for the construction of a new dwelling increased 11.5 per cent, up 82.8 percent through the year, reaching a record- high level (at 6 631).94  Loans to first home buyers in October increased 3.4 per cent, up 48.1 per cent through the year, the highest level (at 13 481) since October 2009.95

JobMaker Hiring Credit 1.227 Coalition Senators also acknowledge that the JobMaker Hiring Credit will accelerate growth in employment during the recovery by giving businesses incentives to take on additional young jobseekers aged 16 to 35 years old. 1.228 This will help young people access job opportunities and rebuild their connection to the labour force as the economy recovers. 1.229 JobMaker Hiring Credit will support 450 000 jobs and is appropriately targeted.96 1.230 Coalition Senators note that ABS data, from March to October 2020, shows there has been a 4.2 per cent decrease in the number of jobs for those aged between 15‑34. In contrast, over the same time the decline in jobs for those aged 35+ has

93 The Hon Michael Sukkar MP, Minister for Housing, 'Homebuilder delivers strongest housing approval numbers in 20 years', Media Release, 1 December 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/michael-sukkar-2019/media-releases/homebuilder-delivers- strongest-housing-approval#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20Australian%20Bureau%20of,February %202000%2C%20with%2010%2C692%20approvals.

94 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Lending indicators', 3 December 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/finance/lending-indicators/latest-release.

95 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Lending indicators', 3 December 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/finance/lending-indicators/latest-release.

96 Department of the Treasury, 'Jobmaker | 2020-21 Budget', website, budget.gov.au/2020- 21/content/jobmaker.htm#:~:text=It%20is%20expected%20that%20around,lift%20consumption%20i n%20the%20economy.

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only been 0.1 per cent.97 That is, the impact on younger workers is much greater than for older workers. 1.231 Australian labour market economist Jeff Borland has stated the design of JobMaker looks well-crafted to create extra jobs.98

Response to interim finding 6.3 1.232 Coalition Senators dispute the insinuation that the government has not done enough to promote jobs and economic recovery. 1.233 As Treasury has forecast, the unemployment rate is set to peak at 8 per cent in the December quarter of 202099—substantially below the 15 per cent that would have occurred if not for the government's JobKeeper plan.100 1.234 Coalition Senators also reject the suggestion that the government has neglected childcare and social housing.

Childcare 1.235 As Australians return to work, businesses reopen and children return to classroom learning, the Government will resume the Child Care Subsidy (CCS) to support families to access affordable childcare. 1.236 In 2020–21, the government will pay approximately $9 billion in Child Care Subsidy (CCS) payments.101 The relaxed activity test for families impacted by COVID-19 was extended to 4 April 2021.

Social housing 1.237 Coalition Senators note that every year the Commonwealth provides more than $7 billion in Commonwealth Rent Assistance and support to the states and territories to deliver social housing through the National Housing and Homelessness Agreement (NHHA).

97 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Labour Force, Australia', 19 November 2020, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest- release.

98 Professor Jeff Borland, Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 'JobMaker is smart policy addressing an urgent problem', 12 October 2020, www.ceda.com.au/Digital- hub/Blogs/CEDA-Blog/October-2020/JobMaker-is-smart-policy-addressing-an-urgent-problem.

99 Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 'Opening statement - Economics Legislation Committee', 26 October 2020, treasury.gov.au/speech/opening-statement-economics- legislation-committee.

100 The Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, Treasurer, 'JobKeeper payment supporting millions of jobs', Media Release, 14 April 2020, ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/media- releases/jobkeeper-payment-supporting-millions-jobs.

101 The Hon Dan Tehan MP, Minister for Education, 'Budget 2020–21: Investing in Education and Research' Media Release, 6 October 2020, ministers.dese.gov.au/tehan/budget-2020-21-investing- education-and-research.

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1.238 Under the NHAA, the Commonwealth provides around $1.5 billion a year to the states and territories to deliver on housing outcomes and ensure the ongoing suitability, supply and maintenance of social housing for Australians.102 1.239 The Government expects to spend around $5.5 billion on Commonwealth Rent Assistance in 2020-21, which will continue to provide support to families and low-income tenants to meet the costs of renting.103 1.240 The Government also supports the community housing sector through the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation ( 'NHFIC') program which has approved almost $1.6 billion of housing loans under the Affordable Housing Bond Aggregator, supporting the delivery of more than 2,200 new social and affordable dwellings and the refinancing of a further 6,300 existing dwellings.104

National governance, coordination and communication

Response to interim finding 7.1 1.241 The National Cabinet has worked effectively to respond to COVID-19. The new National Federation Reform Council agreed to by Premiers, Chief Ministers, and the Prime Minister, will change the way the Commonwealth and states and territories effectively and productively work together to address new areas of reform.

Guiding Principles of the National Cabinet105  The National Cabinet comprises the Prime Minister (Chair), the State Premiers and the Territory Chief Ministers.  The National Cabinet operates according to the longstanding Westminster principles of collective responsibility and solidarity.  The precise structure, shape and operation of the National Cabinet are matters for its members.  The National Cabinet does not derogate from the sovereign authority and powers of the Commonwealth or any State or Territory. The Commonwealth and the States and Territories, as appropriate, remain responsible for implementing outcomes agreed by the National Cabinet.

102 Department of Social Services, National Housing and Homelessness Agreement, www.dss.gov.au/housing-support-programs-services-homelessness/national-housing-and- homelessness-agreement.

103 Department of Social Services, Budget Statements 2020-21, p. 55 www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/10 2020/portfolio-budget-statements-2020-21- budget-related-paper-no-1-12-social-services-portfolio.pdf.

104 The National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation (NHFIC), www.nhfic.gov.au/.

105 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government, 'Cabinet Handbook – 14th edition', 19 October 2020, www.pmc.gov.au/resource-centre/government/cabinet-handbook.

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 Expert advisers may be co-opted to inform National Cabinet deliberations as appropriate.  The National Cabinet meeting schedule is determined by agreement between members.  Members, when absent, should be represented in the National Cabinet meetings only by other Ministers acting in their position and only where agreed by the Cabinet Secretary.  All proceedings and documentation of the National Cabinet remain strictly confidential.

National Cabinet Reform 1.242 On 29 May 2020, National Cabinet agreed the cessation of the COAG model, continuation of the National Cabinet and inception of the National Cabinet Reform Committees, an enhanced role for the Council of Federal Financial Relations, and establishment of the National Federation Reform Council. 1.243 Once a year, the National Cabinet, CFFR and the Australian Local Government Association will meet in person as the National Federation Reform Council with a focus on priority national federation issues such as Closing the Gap and Women's Safety. 1.244 Coalition Senators note the comments regarding the National Cabinet by the following state premiers:

 Premier Mark McGowan I could talk for hours about the national cabinet…It's a thousand times better [than COAG]. It's nimble, it's not stage-managed, you actually talk for real about issues. It elevates the states and gives us a greater say nationally.106  Premier Daniel Andrews National cabinet is working well, with all first ministers focused on fighting the coronavirus pandemic…Once we are through to the other side of this crisis, I expect COAG will look significantly different.107 My view would be that COAG is basically finished, or should be … while it's for the PM to make announcements, I certainly don't want to go back to the days of COAG where we all go up to Canberra or Sydney or wherever it is, we have a pretty turgid meeting where we don't decide much, then we

106 Ms Victoria Laurie, 'Mark McWho now Mr 89 per cent', The Australian, 13 June 2020, www.theaustralian.com.au/weekend-australian-magazine/why-wa-premier-mark-mcgowan-is- riding-high/news-story/cfcdeb5ffb96bcdfa398d0019bf6a5fd.

107 Mr Richard Ferguson and Mr Yoni Bashan, 'Coronavirus: Premiers back Scott Morrison on call to keep crisis cabinet', The Australian, 14 April 2020, www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/coronavirus-premiers-back-scott-morrison-on-call-to- keep-crisis-cabinet/news-story/4384d8ab24cf2a5410a660909c71b708 .

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all line up and do a press conference where we at best are polite about each other, and at worst it's a conflict model that doesn't really work.108  Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk The Prime Minister is really listening to the states, he is responding, and the level of co-operation is phenomenal.109 What we have seen at the national level [is] unprecedented co-operation and decision-making … I want to commend the way in which the Prime Minister is chairing the meetings, he is doing an outstanding job bringing all of the states together and listening … I think it is really important here, the Prime Minister is listening to the states and he is responding.110

Response to interim finding 7.2 1.245 Coalition Senators dispute the claim that the National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board (NCCAB) lacks transparency and accountability. It should be noted that the NCCAB is an advisory body, not a decision-making body. 1.246 The NCCAB sits within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and is bound by the usual governance protocols and processes, including in relation to procurement. 1.247 Coalition Senators highlight that the NCCAB has appeared before the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 no less than three times during the course of this inquiry; on the 13 May 2020, 4 June 2020, and 11 August 2020. The NCCAB has also appeared before the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee for the budget estimates hearings on 20 October 2020. The NCCAB is subject to other normal transparency mechanisms of other government agencies, including freedom of information requests and public reporting of contracts.

108 Mr Patrick Carlyon, 'Why Dan Andrews was the leader we needed during a pandemic', Herald Sun, 22 May 2020, www.heraldsun.com.au/coronavirus/why-dan-andrews-was-the-leader-we-needed- during-a-pandemic/news-story/107ab061fffa8183b5958e62de77e104.

109 Mr Richard Ferguson and Mr Yoni Bashan, 'Coronavirus: Premiers back Scott Morrison on call to keep crisis cabinet', The Australian, 14 April 2020, www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/coronavirus-premiers-back-scott-morrison-on-call-to- keep-crisis-cabinet/news-story/4384d8ab24cf2a5410a660909c71b708.

110 Ms Lydia Lynch and Mr Toby Crockford, 'He is doing an outstanding job': Queensland Premier heaps praise on PM', Brisbane Times, 14 April 2020, www.brisbanetimes.com.au/politics/queensland/he-is-doing-an-outstanding-job-queensland- premier-heaps-praise-on-pm-20200414-p54jle.html.

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1.248 Coalition Senators note this parliamentary oversight is the strongest form of accountability, and we welcome the NCCAB's proactive engagement with this important process.

Senator James Paterson Deputy Chair

Senator Perin Davey

Australian Greens Senators' additional comments

1.1 The Australian Greens support the recommendations and the interim findings of the majority report but make the following additional comments and findings.

Time to get over neoliberalism 1.2 Many of the shortcomings in the Australian Government’s (government) response to COVID-19 can be traced back to neoliberalism, which has been the dominant ideology in Australian politics for the last forty years. The purported aim has been to free up the potential for markets to generate growth and distribute the benefits. In reality, it has been a cover story for the rise of crony capitalism and the hollowing of the state in favour of corporate interests. Neoliberalism is a great, big con that has been used to justify privatisation and deregulation, the winding back of the social security, and the concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people. 1.3 COVID-19 has exposed the void created by neoliberalism and the damage that it has done to the capacity of our nation to govern in the collective interest. The government was slow to respond to the health crisis and slow to respond to the economic crisis. This inertia was because a 180 degree turn was required by the government if it was to listen to the scientists rather than the vested interests, and if it was to put the wellbeing of the Australian people ahead of a budget surplus. Neoliberalism is the doctrine by which this government has lived, and scientists and the public interest are the very things that neoliberalism has systematically and relentlessly attacked for the last forty years. 1.4 Neoliberalism explains why the government wasn't adequately prepared for a global pandemic despite repeated warning of the growing potential for one to occur. Neoliberalism explains why casual workers were excluded from a wage's subsidy, why companies receiving government support were allowed to pay dividends, why aged care where there are so many big for-profit providers continues to be poorly regulated, and why the childcare sector remains undervalued and underfunded. And while the government had a moment of clarity in abandoning its fear of borrowing money, it has very quickly snapped back, exalting a 'business led recovery' designed to enrich its corporate mates, and reducing and withdrawing income support while nearly a million people remained unemployed. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) figures for

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1.11 According to data released by the Australian Border Force, as at October 31 they had received 155 402 travel exemption applications from temporary visa holders wanting to enter Australia, with only 25 394 approved. Anecdotally through media and community support groups we know that there are many more temporary visa holders who have been stranded abroad due to Australia's travel bans that haven't made applications for travel exemption for fear of rejection and how this might affect their ongoing visa status and migration plans.3 1.12 Many of these temporary visa holders have been stranded overseas, separated from the homes, jobs, and families. 1.13 The government and the Department of Home Affairs (including the Australian Border Force) have suggested that if a temporary visa holder has been stranded abroad and separated from their family, their family should leave Australia to join them overseas – to 'go home'. Because according to the government, these people don't actually live here: they are merely visitors.4 1.14 But many of these temporary visa holders have lived here for many years, working their way through various student and skilled visas on a pathway to permanent residency. Once a temporary resident is eligible for permanent residency, an application for a permanent resident visa can take well over a year to process. 1.15 This means that many of the temporary visa holders the government has chosen to consider as foreigners have in fact lived in Australia for over a decade; built homes, careers, families, and communities here. These are people who have built lives here, strengthened our economy, paid their taxes, contributed to our rich cultural diversity, and made huge commitments to Australia. They are, for all intents and purposes, Australian.

3 Kate Ashton, 'Australia's coronavirus travel restrictions leave temporary residents stranded overseas', ABC News, 5 November 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-05/coronavirus-temporary- australian-residents-stranded-overseas/12843482 (accessed 8 December 2020).

4 See for example the Hon David Coleman MP, Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, 'Coronavirus and Temporary Visa Holders', Media Release, 4 April 2020.

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what the sector says is required, there was no additional commitment in the Budget to augment the initial investment.

Recommendation 8 1.54 That the Australian Government immediately increase funding to frontline domestic and family violence support services to fully meet demand, and to increase investment in primary prevention strategies.

Arts and entertainment 1.55 The arts and entertainment industry was effectively shut down overnight when social distancing restrictions were implemented in March and has been one of the hardest hit by COVID-19 restrictions. ABS statistics released in June showed that 23.9 per cent of arts and recreation payroll jobs had been lost in comparison to just 5 per cent over the same period in the construction sector. Despite the $112 billion contribution that the sector makes to the economy, the government was slow to announce a support package for arts and entertainment businesses and workers, and even slower getting the money out the door. 1.56 Government support offered to the sector under to JobMaker banner is insufficient and has only just started to reach those who need it. The Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) heard in June that it would take several months for the $75 million Restart Investment to Sustain and Expand Fund (RISE Fund) to be set up and in a position to be able to provide funding to organisations. In October Estimates hearings it was revealed that no money from the RISE Fund had been spent yet. Funding for RISE is capped at $75 million which is expected to fall short of the need for support in the arts and entertainment sector. To provide adequate support to the arts and entertainment industry, funding for the RISE program should be uncapped and demand driven. 1.57 Many arts and entertainment workers are on short term contracts, in casual roles or work gig to gig. The nature of employment in this sector meant that many workers were not eligible for JobKeeper payments and as a result either lost their job or were stood down without pay. While many arts workers and organisations were unable to claim JobKeeper, the committee heard that for organisations that were able to claim it, Jobkeeper was important to keeping organisations afloat and the sector has called for it to be extended as the arts and entertainment sector will still be heavily affected by COVID-19 well beyond the current end date for JobKeeper in March. 1.58 The arts and entertainment sector continues to be severely impacted by COVID- 19 shut downs and social distancing requirements. It will take the sector a long time to recover and rebuild from the losses of 2020. The sector will continue to be heavily impacted until a vaccine is able to be rolled out across Australia and social distancing requirements are able to be relaxed. The committee has heard

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from the sector that they are looking for ongoing government support that will allow organisations to be able to take the risk of planning events such as theatre and festivals and have government support if they are required to cancel performances or events due to COVID-19 outbreaks or shutdowns. Such support could be provided by the government through the introduction of an industry interruption fund to provide arts and entertainment organisations with the certainty to plan live events without major financial risk during these uncertain times.

Media 1.59 COVID-19 has had a significant impact on the Australian media industry. Media organisations have played an important role in keeping the public informed of important public health information. 1.60 During this time the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) has been especially important in providing information to the Australian public. The committee heard that the 7.30 program has experienced a 20 per cent growth in audience since last year. News Breakfast is up 34 per cent from last year. The ABC 24 channel reached 2.8 million people a week, which is up 33 per cent from last year. Despite the significant increase in users across all of their platforms, the ABC has not received any additional financial support from the government. 1.61 Although the public broadcasters were given an increase in funding to support their work during the COVID-19 pandemic, the committee heard that Foxtel was given an extra $10 million as part of the COVID-19 recovery package to fund the broadcast of underrepresented sport. It was later revealed in October Estimates the ABC also pays Foxtel to broadcast some women's sporting events on the public broadcaster, meaning taxpayers pay Foxtel twice. 1.62 The government did provide some support to public interest journalism through the Public Interest News Gathering Fund. This fund has provided support to commercial television, newspaper, and radio businesses in regional Australia and notably was used to provide $5 million in funding to secure the financial viability of the AAP newswire service.

The National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board 1.63 The National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board (NCCAB) is a publicly funded, hand-picked body that has been responsible for coordinating advice to the government on non-health aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It's no wonder the NCCAB has recommended a gas-led recovery given it and its advisory bodies (including the Industrial Relations Working Group; Manufacturing Taskforce; and Charity, Philanthropy and Fundraising Advisory Group) has been stacked with representatives from the gas sector. 1.64 The Australian Greens continue to hold serious concerns about the NCCAB's governance and structures. The NCCAB lacks transparency and accountability.

Appendix 2 Public hearings and witnesses

Thursday, 23 April 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer  Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary

Tuesday, 28 April 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of the Treasury  Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, Secretary  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Ms Meghan Quinn, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group  Ms Roxanne Kelley, Deputy Secretary, Corporate and Foreign Investment Group  Mr James Kelly, Acting Deputy Secretary, Markets Group  Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division  Mr Roger Brake, Division Head, Foreign Investment Division  Mr Hector Thompson, Acting Division Head, Individuals and Indirect Tax Division

Thursday, 30 April 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Social Services  Ms Kathryn Campbell AO CSC, Secretary  Mr Shane Bennett, Deputy Secretary  Ms Liz Hefren-Webb, Deputy Secretary  Ms Catherine Rule, Deputy Secretary

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Services Australia  Ms Rebecca Skinner, Chief Executive Officer  Ms Annette Musolino, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Payments and Integrity Group  Ms Michelle Lees, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Customer Service Delivery Group  Mr Russell Egan, Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Customer Service Design Group

National Disability Insurance Agency  Mr Martin Hoffman, Chief Executive Officer

NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission  Mr Graeme Head AO, Commissioner

Tuesday, 5 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Australian Border Force  Mr Michael Outram APM, Commissioner

Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment  Mr Andrew Metcalfe AO, Seretary  Ms Lyn O'Connell PSM, Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity and Compliance Group

Department of Home Affairs  Mr Michael Pezzullo AO, Secretary

Wednesday, 6 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Attorney-General's Department  Ms Sarah Chidgey, Deputy Secretary, Integrity and International Group

Digital Transformation Agency  Mr Randall Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer

Department of Health  Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary  Mr Paul McBride, First Assistant Secretary, Health Economics and Research Division

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Thursday, 7 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Australian Federal Police  Mr Reece Kershaw APM, Commissioner  Mr Brett Pointing, Deputy Commissioner, Operations

Australian Taxation Office  Mr Chris Jordan AO, Commissioner of Taxation  Ms Kirsten Fish, Acting Second Commissioner, Law Design and Practice  Mr Jeremy Hirschhorn, Second Commissioner, Client Engagement Group  Mr Ramez Katf, Chief Information Officer  Mr Jeremy Geale, Chair, COVID Taskforce

Department of the Treasury  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division  Mr Trevor Power, Division Head, Macroeconomic Conditions Division

Wednesday, 13 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer  Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary  Mr Gavin Matthews, First Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Health Division  Dr Lucas de Toca, Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Primary Care Response

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  Mr Philip Gaetjens, Secretary  Ms Stephanie Foster PSM, Associate Secretary  Mr Simon Duggan, Deputy Secretary, Economy, Industry and G20 Sherpa  Ms Cath Patterson, Acting Deputy Secretary, Social Policy  Ms Caroline Millar, Deputy Secretary, National Security

National COVID-19 Coordination Commission  Mr Peter Harris AO, Chief Executive Officer

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National Indigenous Australians Agency  Mr Ray Griggs AO CSC, Chief Executive Officer  Ms Letitia Hope, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Operations and Delivery  Mr Blair Exell, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Policy and Programs

Tuesday, 19 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Education, Skills and Employment  Dr Michele Bruniges AM, Secretary  Dr Ros Baxter, Deputy Secretary, Early Childhood and Child Care  Ms Alex Gordon, Deputy Secretary, Schools  Mr Rob Heferen, Deputy Secretary, Higher Education, Research and International  Mr Marcus Markovic, Deputy Secretary, Corporate and Enabling Services  Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment  Ms Nadine Williams, Deputy Secretary, Skills and Training  Mr Simon Gotzinger, Acting General Counsel  Ms Kylie Crane, First Assistant Secretary, Payment and Engagement Division, Early Childhood and Child Care  Mr Dom English, First Assist Secretary, Higher Education Group  Ms Janine Pitt, First Assistant Secretary, Employment Programs and Activation  Ms Karen Sandercock, First Assistant Secretary, International  Mr Mark Sawade, First Assistant Secretary, Funding and Data Collection Division  Mr George Thiveos, First Assist Secrtary, Appprenticeship and Workforce Skills Division  Mr Ivan Neville, Assistant Secretary, Labour Market Research and Analysis  Ms Linda White, Assistant Secretary, Workforce and Apprenticeships Industry

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Thursday, 21 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Attorney-General's Department  Mr Martin Hehir, Deputy Secretary, Industrial Relations Group  Ms Alison Durbin, First Assistant Secretary, Employment Conditions  Mr Greg Manning, First Assistant Secretary, Employee Entitlement Safeguards and Policy  Ms Janey Kuzma, First Assistant Secretary, Industrial Relations Legal  Ms Rachel Volzke, Assistant Secretary, Employment Standards and Organisations  Ms Sharon Huender, Assistant Secretary, Industrial Relations Strategy

Fair Work Commission  Ms Bernadette O'Neill, General Manager  Mr Murray Furlong, Executive Director, Tribunal Services Branch  Ms Ailsa Carruthers, Executive Director, Client Services Delivery Branch

Fair Work Ombudsman  Ms Sandra Parker PSM, Fair Work Ombudsman  Mr Michael Campbell, Deputy Fair Work Ombudsman, Corporate  Ms Kristen Hannah, Deputy Fair Work Ombudsman, Strategy, Engagement and Communications  Mr Mark Scully, Deputy Fair Work Ombudsman, Operations  Mr Jeremy O'Sullivan, Chief Counsel  Ms Nicky Chaffer, Executive Director, Communications  Ms Lynda McAlary-Smith, Executive Director, Compliance and Enforcement  Ms Antonia Parkes, Executive Director, Advice, Support and Assistance  Mr Russell Thackeray, Chief Financial Officer

Department of the Treasury  Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, Secretary  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Ms Meghan Quinn, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group  Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division  Ms Katrina Di Marco, Division Head, Tax Analysis Division  Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division  Mr Trevor Power, Division Head, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Mr Chris Leggett, Assistant Secretary, Law Design Office

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Tuesday, 26 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission  Ms Janet Anderson PSM, Commissioner  Mrs Christina Bolger, Executive Director, Regulatory Policy and Performance  Ms Ann Wunsch, Executive Director, COVID-19 Taskforce

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Chief Medical Officer  Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary  Mr Michael Lye, Deputy Secretary, Ageing and Aged Care  Ms Tania Rishniw, Acting Deputy Secretary, Health Systems Policy and Primary Care  Ms Amy Laffan, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Aged Care Reform and Compliance  Mr Mark Roddam, First Assistant Secretary, Mental Health

Thursday, 28 May 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Reserve Bank of Australia  Mr Philip Lowe, Governor

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  Mr Wayne Byres, Chair  Mrs Helen Rowell, Deputy Chair  Mr John Lonsdale, Deputy Chair  Mr Geoff Summerhayes, Executive Board Member

Australian Securities and Investments Commission  Mr James Shipton, Chair  Ms Karen Chester, Deputy Chair  Mr Daniel Crennan QC, Deputy Chair  Ms Cathie Armour, Commissioner  Mr Sean Hughes, Commissioner  Ms Danielle Press, Commissioner  Mr John Price, Commissioner

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Tuesday, 2 June 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Health  Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary  Dr Lucas de Toca, Acting First Assistant Secretary, COVID‐19 Primary Care Response Team  Mr Gavin Matthews, First Assistant Secretary, Indigenous Health

Department of Social Services  Ms Kathryn Campbell AO CSC, Secretary  Mr Shane Bennett, Acting Deputy Secretary, Social Security  Ms Liz Hefren-Webb, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities  Mr Adrian Hudson, Acting Chief Operating Officer  Ms Catherine Rule, Deputy Secretary, Disability and Carers  Mr Nathan Williamson, Deputy Secretary, COVID-19 Taskforce

National Indigenous Australians Agency  Mr Ray Griggs AO CSC, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Kevin Brahim, Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Operations and Delivery  Mr Blair Exell, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Policy and Programs  Mr Ryan Bulman, Group Manager, Economic Policy and Programs  Mr Sam Jeffries, Group Manager, Central Region

Outback Stores  Mr Michael Borg, Chief Executive Officer

Thursday, 4 June 2020 Committee Room 2S3 Parliament House Canberra

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  Mr Phil Gaetjens, Secretary  Mr Simon Duggan, Deputy Secretary Economic, Industry and G20 Sherpa  Ms Stephanie Foster PSM, Deputy Secretary, Governance Group  Ms Caroline Millar, Deputy Secretary, National Security  Mr Lachlan Colquhoun, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division  Mr Matthew Roper, Acting First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Social Policy and Implementation

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National COVID-19 Coordination Commission  Mr Neville Power, Chair  Mr Malcolm Thompson, Deputy Chief Executive Officer

Tuesday, 9 June 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Minister for Finance

Australian Taxation Office  Mr Chris Jordan AO, Commissioner of Taxation  Ms Kirsten Fish, Acting Second Commissioner, Law Design and Practice  Mr Jeremy Geale, Chair, COVID-19 Response Committee  Mr Jeremy Hirschhorn, Second Commissioner, Client Engagement Group  Mr James O'Halloran, Deputy Commissioner, JobKeeper Payment Program

Department of the Treasury  Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, Secretary  Ms Meghan Quinn, Deputy Secretary, Markets Group  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division  Ms Katrina Di Marco, Division Head, Tax Analysis Division  Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division  Mr Trevor Power, Division Head, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Ms Vicki Wilkinson, Division Head, Social Policy Division  Ms Laura Berger-Thompson, Principal Advisor, Macroeconomic Conditions Division

Tuesday, 23 June 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance  Mr Paul Murphy, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Matthew Chesher, Director of Legal and Policy  Ms Helen Dallimore, Member  Ms Fiona Donovan, Member  Ms Nadine Garner, Member  Ms Ruth Hazelton, Member

Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association  Mr Gerard Dwyer, National Secretary

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United Workers Union  Mr Tim Kennedy, National Secretary  Ms Jessica Liersch, Member

Australian Council of Trade Unions  Ms Michele O'Neil, President  Mr Chris Watts, Senior Policy Advisor

Wednesday, 24 June 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  Mr James Pearson, Chief Executive Officer

Australian Industry Group  Mr Innes Willox, Chief Executive Officer

Business Council of Australia  Mr Tim Reed, President

Council of Small Business Organisations Australia  Mr Peter Strong, Chief Executive Officer

Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman  Ms Kate Carnell AO, Ombudsman  Dr Craig Latham, Deputy  Ms Alexandra Hordern, Director

Thursday, 25 June 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Dr Peter Collignon AM, Private capacity

Dr Raina MacIntyre, Private capacity

Mr William Bowtell AO, Private capacity

Dr Norman Swan, Private capacity

Australian Medical Association  Dr Tony Bartone, President  Dr Martin Laverty, Secretary General

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Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation  Ms Annie Butler, Federal Secretary  Ms Lori-Anne Sharp, Assistant Federal Secretary

Tuesday, 30 June 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

A New Approach, Australian Academy of the Humanities  Ms Kate Fielding, Program Director

National Association for the Visual Arts  Ms Esther Anatolitis, Executive Director

Regional Arts Australia  Ms Ros Abercrombie, Executive Director

Regional Arts NSW  Ms Elizabeth Rogers, Chief Executive Officer

Australian Major Performing Arts Group  Ms Bethwyn Serow, Executive Officer  Ms Mary Jo Capps AM, Chair  Mr Patrick McIntyre, Chief Executive Officer, Sydney Theatre Company  Ms Libby Christie AM, Chief Executive Officer, The Australian Ballet

BlakDance  Ms Merindah Donnelly, Executive Producer

Screen Producers Australia  Mr Mathew Deaner, Chief Executive Officer  Ms Holly Brimble, Director of Policy

Australian Festivals Association  Ms Julia Robinson, General Manager

Australian Recording Industry Association  Mr Dan Rosen, Chief Executive Officer

Live Performance Australia  Ms Evelyn Richardson, Chief Executive

Australia Council for the Arts  Mr Adrian Collette AM, Chief Executive Officer  Dr Wendy Were, Executive Director Advocacy and Development

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Office for the Arts, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications  Dr Stephen Arnott PSM, First Assistant Secretary  Ms Caroline Fulton, Assistant Secretary, Creative Industries  Ms Justine Curnow, Assistant Secretary, Arts COVID Recovery and Response

Wednesday, 1 July 2020 Committee Room 2S3 Parliament House Canberra

Foodbank Australia  Ms Brianna Casey, Chief Executive Officer

Red Cross  Mr Noel Clement, Director, Australian Programs

St Vincent de Paul Society  Mr Toby oConnor, Chief Executive Officer

UnitingCare Australia  Ms Claerwen Little, National Director  Ms Corinne Dobson, Senior Analyst  the Hon. Bronwyn Pike, Chief Executive Officer, Uniting Vic.Tas

Australian Federation of Disability Organisations  Mr Ross Joyce, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Trevor Carroll, Vice President  Mr Patrick McGee, National Manager, Policy, Advocacy and Research  Mr Bryn Overend, Principal Lawyer, Social Security Rights Victoria  Dr Karen Soldatic, Associate Professor, Western Sydney University

Carers Australia  Ms Liz Callaghan, Chief Executive Officer  Ms Sue Elderton, National Policy Manager  Ms Lisa Kelly, Chief Executive Officer, Carers ACT

Children and Young People with Disability Australia  Ms Mary Sayers, Chief Executive Officer

People with Disability Australia  Mr Jeff Smith, Chief Executive Officer  Ms El Gibbs, Director, Media and Communications  Ms Romola Hollywood, Director, Policy and Advocacy

200

First Peoples Disability Network Australia  Mr Damian Griffs, Chief Executive Officer

Thursday, 2 July 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Market Economics  Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director

Mr Saul Eslake , Private capacity

The Australia Institute  Dr Richard Denniss, Chief Economist  Mr David Richardson, Senior Research Fellow

Grattan Institute  Dr John Daley, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Brendan Coates, Household Finances Program Director  Dr Stephen Duckett, Health Program Director  Ms Danielle Wood, Budget Policy and Institutional Reform Program Director

Institute of Public Affairs  Mr Daniel Wild, Director of Research  Mr Morgan Begg, Research Fellow

Australian Council of Social Service  Dr Cassandra Goldie, Chief Executive Officer  Dr Peter Davidson, Principal Advisor  Ms Charmaine Crowe, Senior Advisor Social Security

Tuesday, 21 July 2020 Committee Room 2S3 Parliament House Canberra

Transport Workers' Union of Australia  Mr Nick McIntosh, Assistant National Secretary  Ms Darlene Bailey, Member

Australian Services Union  Ms Linda White, Assistant National Secretary  Ms Maree Keygan, Australian Airports Regional Manager, Air Niugini

201

Flight Attendants' Association of Australia  Ms Teri O'Toole, Secretary, International Division  Mr Gareth Uren, Secretary, National Division

Qantas Airways Limited  Mr Andrew Parker, Group Executive, Government, Industry, International, Sustainability  Mr Andrew Finch, General Counsel and Group Executive, Office of the Chief Executive Offiecr  Dr Ian Hosegood, Director, Medical Services

Department of the Treasury  Ms Meghan Quinn PSM, Deputy Secretary, Markets Group  Ms Kate O'Rourke, Head, Markets Taskforce

Mr Nicholas Moore , Private capacity

Tuesday, 28 July 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Australian Council of Social Service  Dr Cassandra Goldie, Chief Executive Officer  Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Director of Policy and Deputy Chief Executive Officer  Ms Charmaine Crowe, Senior Advisor Social Security

National Tertiary Education Union  Dr Alison Barnes, National President  Dr Terri MacDonald, National Research Officer

Australian Services Union, NSW and ACT Branch  Ms Natalie Lang, Branch Secretary  Ms Emeline Gaske, National Campaign and Communications Coordinator

National Union of Students  Ms Molly Willmott, National President  Mr Ali Mohammad Amin, Welfare Officer

Universities Australia  Ms Catriona Jackson, Chief Executive  Ms Anne-Marie Lansdown, Deputy Chief Executive

Group of Eight  Professor Margaret Gardner AC, Chair

202

Regional Universities Network  Professor Helen Bartlett, Chair

Charles Sturt University  Professor Heather Cavanagh, Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research and Engagement

TAFE Directors Australia  Mr Craig Robertson, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Ronald Jackson, Director, Strategy and Tertiary Education

Department of Education, Skills and Employment  Mr Rob Heferen, Deputy Secretary, Higher Education, Research and International  Ms Nadine Williams, Deputy Secretary, Skills and Training  Mr Dom English, First Assistant Secretary, Higher Education  Mr Tim Ffrench, General Counsel  Ms Mary McDonald, First Assistant Secretary, VET Quality and Policy  Ms Karen Sandercock, First Assistant Secretary, International  Mr George Thiveos, First Assistant Secretary, Apprenticeships and Workforce Skills  Ms Belinda Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Workforce and Apprenticeships Services  Ms Clare Sharp, Assistant Secretary, National Skills Reform Taskforce  Mr Adam Weideman, Acting Assistant Secretary, Economic Response, Taskforce

203

Thursday, 30 July 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of the Treasury  Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, Secretary  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Mr Luke Yeaman, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group  Mr Ian Beckett, Division Head, Macroeconomic Modelling and Policy Division  Mr Matt Brine, Division Head, Environment, Industry and Infrastructure Division  Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division  Ms Katrina Di Marco, Division Head, Tax Analysis Division  Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division  Mr Trevor Power, Division Head, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Mr Jonathan Rollings, Division Head, Budget Policy Division  Ms Vicki Wilkinson, Division Head, Social Policy Division  Mrs Laura Berger-Thomson, Principal Adviser, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Mr Merrick Peisley, Principal Adviser, Environment, Industry and Infrastructure Division

Australian Taxation Office  Mr Jeremy Geale, Chair, COVID-19 Response Committee  Mr Jeremy Hirschhorn, Second Commissioner, Client Engagement  Ms Deborah Jenkins, Acting Second Commissioner, Law Design and Practice

204

Services Australia  Ms Rebecca Skinner, Chief Executive Officer  Ms Amanda Cattermole, Chief Operating Officer  Mr Paul Creech, Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Payments and Integrity Group  Mr Russell Egan, Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Customer Service Design Group  Ms Michelle Lees, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Customer Service Delivery Group  Ms Annette Musolino, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Income Compliance Taskforce.  Mr Jason McNamara, General Manager, Debts and Appeals Division  Ms Debbie Mitchell, General Manager, COVID-19 Closure Taskforce

Tuesday, 4 August 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Secretary  Mr Michael Lye, Deputy Secretary, Ageing and Aged Care  Ms Amy Laffan, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Aged Care Reform and Compliance

Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission  Ms Janet Anderson PSM, Commissioner

205

Thursday, 6 August 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Education, Skills and Employment  Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment  Ms Nadine Williams, Deputy Secretary, Skills and Training  Ms Renae Houston, First Assistant Secretary, VET Quality and Policy  Ms Benedikte Jensen, First Assistant Secretary, Labour Market Strategy  Ms Margaret Kidd, First Assistant Secretary, Delivery and Employer Engagement  Ms Mary McDonald, First Assistant Secretary, Skills Reform Taskforce  Mr Ty Emerson, Assistant Secretary, Job Seeker Participation and Compliance Branch  Ms Melissa Ryan, First Assistant Secretary, New Employment Services Model  Ms Robyn Shannon, First Assistant Secretary, Quality, Integrity and Evidence  Mr George Thiveos, First Assistant Secretary, Apprenticeship and Workforce Skills  Ms Belinda Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Workforce and Apprenticeships Services  Mr Ivan Neville, Assistant Secretary, Labour Market Research and Analysis  Ms Clare Sharp, Assistant Secretary, National Skills Reform Taskforce  Mr Adam Weiderman, Assistant Secretary, Economic Response Taskforce  Mr Tim Ffrench, General Counsel

206

Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications  Mr Simon Atkinson, Secretary  Dr Rachel Bacon, Deputy Secretary  Mr David Hallinan, Deputy Secretary  Mr Brendan McRandle PSM, Deputy Secretary  Ms Pip Spence PSM, Chief Operating Officer and Deputy Secretary  Mr Richard Windeyer, Deputy Secretary  Mr Richard Wood, Acting Deputy Secretary  Mr Stephen Arnott PSM, First Assistant Secretary, Office for the Arts  Ms Jessica Hall, First Assistant Secretary, COVID Surface Transport Division  Ms Gayle Milnes, First Assistant Secretary, Data, Analytics and Policy Division  Mr Simon Moore, Acting First Assistant Secretary, COVID Aviation Response Programs Division  Ms Marisa Purvis-Smith, First Assistant Secretary, Regional Development, Local Government and COVID Regional Recovery Division  Ms Janet Quigley, First Assistant Secretary, COVID Aviation Issues Management Division  Mr Phil Smith, First Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Investment Division  Ms Natalie Broughton, Acting Assistant Secretary, COVID Regional Policy and Programs, COVID Aviation Issues Management Division  Mr Daniel Caruso, Assistant Secretary, COVID Recovery Infrastructure Investment Stimulus, Infrastructure Investment Division  Mr Jason Dymowski, Acting Assistant Secretary, COVID Domestic Policy and Programs, COVID Aviation Issues Management Division  Mr Phil McClure, Assistant Secretary, COVID Financial Assistance, COVID Aviation Response Programs Division  Ms Cindy McTaggart, Acting Assistant Secretary, Airports, COVID Aviation Issues Management Division  Mr Jim Wolfe, Assistant Secretary, COVID International, COVID Aviation Response Programs Division

207

Tuesday, 11 August 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  Mr Phil Gaetjens, Secretary  Ms Deb Anton, Acting Deputy Secretary Social Policy  Mr Simon Duggan, Deputy Secretary Economy, Infrastructure and G20 Sherpa  Ms Stephanie Foster PSM, Deputy Secretary Governance and APS Reform  Ms Caroline Millar, Deputy Secretary National Security and International Policy  Mr Lachlan Colquhoun, First Assistant Secretary National Security Division  Mr Trevor Jones, Assistant Secretary Disaster Preparedness and Response Branch

National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board  Mr Neville Power, Chair  Mr Malcom Thompson, Deputy Chief Executive Officer

Department of Education, Skills and Employment  Dr Michele Bruniges AM, Secretary  Mr Tim Ffrench, General Council  Dr Ros Baxter, Deputy Secretary, Early Childhood and Child Care  Ms Alex Gordon, Deputy Secretary, Schools  Mr Rob Heferen, Deputy Secretary, Higher Education, Research and International  Mr John Baker, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Funding and Data Collection Division  Mr Dom English, First Assistant Secretary, Higher Education  Dr James Hart, First Assistant Secretary, Payment Policy and Engagement Group  Mr David Pattie, First Assistant Secretary, Improving Student Outcomes Division  Ms Karen Sandercock, First Assistant Secretary, International  Mr Jeff Willing, Assistant Secretary, Coordination and Engagement Branch

208

Friday, 14 August 2020 Committee Room 2R1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Secretary  Professor Paul Kelly, Acting Chief Medical Officer  Ms Caroline Edwards, Associate Secretary  Mr Paul McBride, First Assistant Secretary, Medical Benefits  Mr Daniel Keys, Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer

Digital Transformation Agency  Mr Randall Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Peter Alexander, Chief Digital Officer  Mr Anthony Warnock, Head of Government Technology, Digital Delivery and Corporate Division

Department of the Treasury  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Mr Luke Yeaman, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group  Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division  Ms Katrina Di Marco, Division Head, Tax Analysis Division  Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division  Mr Trevor Power, Division Head, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Mr Hector Thompson, Acting Division Head, Individuals and Indirect Tax Division  Ms Vicki Wilkinson, Division Head, Social Policy Division  Mrs Laura Berger-Thomson, Principal Adviser, Macroeconomic Conditions Division

Australian Taxation Office  Mr Chris Jordan AO, Commissioner of Taxation  Mr Jeremy Hirschhhom, Second Commissioner, Client Engagement Group  Ms Deborah Jenkins, Acting Second Commissioner, Law Design and Practice  Mr Jeremy Geale, Deputy Commissioner, Review and Dispute Resolution

209

Tuesday, 18 August 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment  Mr Andrew Metcalfe AO, Secretary  Ms Rosemary Deininger, Deputy Secretary  Ms Emily Canning, First Assistant Secretary, Biosecurity Operations Division  Ms Nicola Hinder, Assistant Secretary, Meat Exports

Australian Border Force  Mr Michael Outram APM, Commissioner  Ms Cheryl-anne Moy, Chief Operating Officer  Ms Erin Dale, Acting Deputy Commissioner Operations  Ms Kaylene Zakharoff, Acting Deputy Commissioner Support  Ms Pip de Veau, General Counsel  Ms Kylie Rendina, Assistant Commissioner Border Patrol and Coordination Command  Ms Claire Rees, Acting Group Manager, Immigration Detention Group

Australian Defence Force  Lieutenant General John Frewen DSC AM, Commander Defence COVID-19 Task Force  Rear Admiral Sarah Sharkey, Surgeon General  Mr Tony Fraser, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition

Senator the Hon Anne Ruston, Minister for Families and Social Services

Department of Social Services  Ms Kathryn Campbell AO CSC, Secretary  Mr Shane Bennett, Acting Deputy Secretary  Ms Liz Hefren-Webb, Deputy Secretary  Ms Catherine Rule, Deputy Secretary  Mr Nathan Williamson, Deputy Secretary  Mr Andrew Harvey, Chief Finance Officer  Mr Adrian Hudson, Acting Chief Operating Officer  Ms Mary McLarty, Acting Group Manager, Participation Payments Group

Services Australia  Ms Rebecca Skinner, Chief Executive Officer  Mr Paul Creech, Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Payments & Integrity Group

210

 Mr Russell Egan, Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Customer Service Design Group  Ms Michelle Lees, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Customer Service Delivery Group  Ms Annette Musolino, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Income Compliance Taskforce  Ms Amanda Cattermole, Chief Operating Officer  Ms Kirsty Faichney, General Manager, Families, Children and Target Services Division  Ms Laura Gannon, Acting General Manager, COVID-19 Closure Taskforce  Mr Jason McNamara, General Manager, Debts and Appeals Division

Thursday, 20 August 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Australian Tourism Industry Council  Mr Simon Westaway, Executive Director

Tourism Accommodation Australia  Mr Martin Ferguson, Chairman  Mr Michael Johnson, Chief Executive Officer

Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  Mr John Hart, Executive Chair, Australian Chamber Tourism Committee  Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment and Skills, and Director, Tourism

Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia  Mr Peter Strong, Chief Execuive Officer

Australian Airports Association  Mr James Goodwin, Chief Executive Officer

Australian Regional Tourism  Ms Coralie Bell, Chairperson

Tourism and Transport Forum  Ms Margy Osmond, Chief Executive Officer

United Workers Union  Ms Jo Briskey, National Political Coordinator, Parliamentary Affairs  Ms Josephine Annink, Industrial Member, Casinos  Mr Chris Ball, Industrial Member, Casinos  Mr Adam Quill, Industrial Member, Pubs and Clubs

211

Australian Federation of Travel Agents  Mr Tom Manwaring, Chairman  Mr Darren Rudd, Chief Executive Officer

Business Events Council of Australia  Dr Vanessa Findlay, Chair  Mr Andrew Hiebl, Chief Executive Officer of the Association of Australian Convention Bureaux

Australian Trade and Investment Commission  Mr Tim Beresford, Acting Chief Executive Officer  Mr Robert Donelly, Chief Operating Officer  Mr Dom Bilbie, Head of Client Programs

212

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary  Ms Mary Balzary, First Assistant Secretary, Soft Power, Communications and Scholarships Division  Mr James Baxter, First Assistant Secretary, Office of Trade Negotiations  Mr Craig Chittick, First Assistant Secretary, United States and Indo-Pacific Strategy Division  Mr Tom Connor, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Division  Dr Jenny Gordon, Chief Economist  Ms Amanda Gorely, Ambassador for Arms Control and Counter- Proliferation, and First Assistant Secretary, International Security Division  Ms Danielle Heinecke, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Operations and Development  Mr Jamie Isbister, Ambassador for the Environment & First Assistant Secretary, Economic Growth and Sustainability Division  Ms Elly Lawson, First Assistant Secretary, North Asia Division  Ms Kate Logan, Chief of Protocol  Mr Simon Newnham, Chief Legal Officer  Mrs Elizabeth Peak, First Assistant Secretary, Human Development and Governance Division  Ms Cathy Raper, First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Coordination Unit  Mr Daniel Sloper, Chief People Officer  Mr Gerald Thomson, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Bilateral  Mr Murali Venugopal, Chief Finance Officer  Ms Elizabeth Ward, First Assistant Secretary, Trade, Investment and Business Engagement Division  Dr Fiona Webster, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division  Dr Stephanie Williams, Ambassador for Regional Health Security  Ms Suzanne McCourt, Assistant Secretary, Sanctions Crime and Sea Law Branch  Mr Ben Milton, Assistant Secretary, Corporate Law Branch  Ms Ruth Stone, Assistant Secretary, Human Rights Policy and Social Inclusion Branch

Tourism Australia  Ms Phillipa Harrison, Managing Director  Mr Mark Craig, Executive General Manager, Corporate Services  Mr Bede Fennell, Executive General Manager, Corporate Affairs

213

Friday, 21 August 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck, Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Secretary  Mr Michael Lye, Deputy Secretary, Ageing and Aged Care  Ms Amy Laffan, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Aged Care Reform and Compliance

Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission  Ms Janet Anderson PSM, Commissioner

214

Thursday, 10 September 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Finance  Ms Rosemary Huxtable PSM, Secretary  Dr Stein Helgeby, Deputy Secretary, Governance and Resource Management  Mr Andrew Jaggers, Deputy Secretary, Commercial and Government Services  Ms Clare Walsh, Deputy Secretary, Business Enabling Services  Mr Matt Yannopoulos, Deputy Secretary, Budget and Financial Reporting  Ms Tracey Carroll, First Assistant Secretary, Financial Analysis, Reporting and Management Division, Governance and Resource Management  Mr Andrew Danks, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Procurement and Insurance Division, Commercial and Government Services  Mr David De Silva, First Assistant Secretary, Ministerial and Parliamentary Services, Business Enabling Services  Mr Scott Dilley, First Assistant Secretary, Governance Division, Governance and Resource Management  Mr Martin Graham, First Assistant Secretary, Social Policy Division, Budget and Financial Reporting  Ms Stacie Hall, First Assistant Secretary, Commercial Investments Division, Commercial and Government Services  Mr Nick Hunt, First Assistant Secretary, Property and Construction Division, Commercial and Government Services  Ms Amanda Lee, First Assistant Secretary, Budget Policy and Coordination Division, Budget and Financial Reporting  Mr Libor Pelecky, First Assistant Secretary, Industry, Education and Infrastructure Division, Budget and Financial Reporting  Mr Iain Scott, First Assistant Secretary, Corporate Services Division, Business Enabling Services

Productivity Commission  Mr Michael Brennan, Chair  Ms Nina Davidson, Head of Office

215

Tuesday, 15 September 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Mental Health Australia  Dr Leanne Beagley, Chief Executive Officer

Community Mental Health Australia  Mr Bill Gye OAM, Chief Executive Officer

headspace National Youth Mental Health Foundation  Mr Jason Trethowan, Chief Executive Officer

Lifeline Australia  Mr John Brogden AM, Chairman  Dr Anna Brooks, National Manager Lifeline Research Foundation

Mental Health Victoria  Mr Angus Clelland, Chief Executive Officer

Beyond Blue  Mr Alastair Stott, Chief Services Officer

Black Dog Institute  Professor Helen Christensen AO, Director and Chief Scientist

National Mental Health Commission  Ms Christine Morgan, Chief Executive Officer  Dr Alison Morehead, Deputy, Strategy

216

Thursday, 17 September 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of the Treasury  Ms Jenny Wilkinson, Deputy Secretary, Fiscal Group  Mr Luke Yeaman, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group  Ms Philippa Brown, Acting Division Head, JobKeeper Division  Ms Katrina Di Marco, Division Head, Tax Analysis Division  Mr Robert Jeremenko, Division Head, Retirement Income Policy Division  Mr Trevor Power, Division Head, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Mr Hector Thompson, Acting Division Head, Individuals and Indirect Tax Division  Ms Vicki Wilkinson, Division Head, Social Policy Division  Ms Laura Berger-Thomson, Principal Adviser, Macroeconomic Conditions Division  Ms Michelle Dowdell, Principal Adviser, Strategic Policy Coordination Division  Mr Merrick Peisley, Principal Adviser, Centre for Population

Australian Taxation Office  Mr Chris Jordan AO, Commissioner of Taxation  Mr Jeremy Hirschhorn, Second Commissioner, Client Engagement Group  Ms Deborah Jenkins, Acting Second Commissioner, Law Design and Practice  Mr James O’Halloran, Deputy Commissioner, JobKeeper Payment Program

Department of Social Services  Ms Catherine Rule, Deputy Secretary, COVID-19 Response for Disability

National Disability Insurance Agency  Mr Martin Hoffman, Chief Executive Officer  Dr Lisa Studdert, Deputy Chief Executive Officer

NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission  Mr Graeme Head AO, Commissioner  Ms Samantha Taylor PSM, Registrar

217

Tuesday, 22 September 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Women’s Legal Services Australia  Ms Angela Lynch AM, Chief Executive Officer, Women's Legal Service Qld  Ms Helen Matthews, Spokesperson

Monash Gender and Family Violence Prevention Centre  Associate Professor Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Director  Dr Silke Meyer, Deputy Director  Dr Marie Segrave, Associate Professor  Dr Naomi Pfitzner, Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Australian Women Against Violence Alliance  Ms Tina Dixson, Acting Program Manager

Family Day Care Australia  Mr Andrew Paterson, Chief Executive Officer

National Foundation for Australian Women  Professor Helen Hodgson, Chair, Social Policy Committee  Associate Professor Sally Moyle, Member, Social Policy Committee  Dr Kathleen MacDermott, Member, Social Policy Committee

Women in Super  Ms Catherine Wood, National Chair

Economic Security4Women  Mrs Roselynne Anderson, Chair  Mrs Sharen Page, Finance and Project Officer

Australian Human Rights Commission  Ms Kate Jenkins, Sex Discrimination Commissioner

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  Ms Catherine Hawkins, First Assistant Secretary, Office for Women  Ms Elizabeth Brayshaw, Assistant Secretary, Women’s Safety and International Engagement  Ms Margaret Thomas, Acting Assistant Secretary, Women’s Economic Security, Programs and Leadership

Workplace Gender Equality Agency  Ms Libby Lyons, Director  Dr Janin Bredehoeft, Research and Analytics Executive Manager

218

Thursday, 24 September 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Individuals Impacted by Repatriation and Travel Issues  Peta, private capacity  Mrs Deanne Vowels, private capacity  Mrs Claire Burles, private capacity  Margaret, private capacity  Ms Sarah Eifermann, private capacity  Ms Fiona Wright, private capacity  Mr Pieter Den Heten, private capacity  Gina, private capacity

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  Mr Simon Duggan, Deputy Secretary Economy, Industry and G20 Sherpa  Ms Stephanie Foster PSM, Deputy Secretary Governance and APS Reform  Ms Alison Frame, Deputy Secretary Social Policy  Ms Caroline Millar, Deputy Secretary National Security and International Policy  Mr Lachlan Colquhoun, First Assistant Secretary National Security Division  Ms Nicole Spencer, Assistant Secretary Infrastructure, Population, Agriculture and Regional Development

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary  Ms Mary Balzary, First Assistant Secretary, Executive Division  Ms Cathy Raper, First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Coordination Unit  Dr Fiona Webster, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division  Mr Daniel Sloper, Chief People Officer  Ms Kate Logan, Assistant Secretary, Protocol Branch  Mr Murali Venugopal, Chief Finance Officer, Finance Division

Australian Border Force  Mr Michael Outram APM, Commissioner  Mr Tim Fitzgerald, Acting Assistant Commissioner Border Patrol and Coordination Command

Department of Home Affairs  Mr Michael Pezzullo AO, Secretary

219

Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications  Mr Simon Atkinson, Secretary  Ms Christine Dacey, Deputy Secretary  Ms Janet Quigley, First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Aviation Issues Management Division  Mr Richard Wood, First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Aviation Response Programs

Tuesday, 29 September 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Department of Health  Dr Brendan Murphy, Secretary  Mr Michael Lye, Deputy Secretary, Ageing and Aged Care  Dr Nick Hartland, First Assistant Secretary, In-home Aged Care  Ms Amy Laffan, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Aged Care Reform and Compliance

Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission  Ms Janet Anderson PSM, Commissioner

Thursday, 26 November 2020 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Individuals Impacted by Repatriation and Travel Issues  Carly, private capacity  Mr David Jeffries, private capacity  Mrs Kate Jeffries, private capacity  Ms Fiona Wright, private capacity

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  Ms Stephanie Foster PSM, Deputy Secretary Governance and APS Reform  Mr Simon Duggan, Deputy Secretary, Economy, Industry and G20 Sherpa  Ms Alison Frame, Deputy Secretary, Social Policy  Ms Nicole Spencer, Head COVID-19 Response Taskforce  Mr Lachlan Colquhoun, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division

220

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary of the International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group  Mr Murali Venugopal, Chief Financial Officer  Ms Frances Lisson, First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Coordination Unit  Ms Kate Logan, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division

Department of Home Affairs  Mr Andrew Kefford PSM, Deputy Secretary  Ms Peta Dunn, First Assistant Secretary  Mr Michael Willard, First Assistant Secretary  Ms Kylie Rendina, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Operational Strategy and Coordination, Australian Border Force  Mr Tim Fitzgerald, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Operational Coordination and Planning Command, Australian Border Force

Department of Health  Professor Paul Kelly, Acting Chief Medical Officer  Ms Caroline Edwards, Associate Secretary

Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications  Ms Christine Dacey, Deputy Secretary  Mr Richard Wood, First Assistant Secretary, COVID-19 Aviation Response Programs