An Incident of “Pilegesh B’Givah” in 19th Century Germany

AN INCIDENT OF “PILEGESH B’GIVAH” IN 19TH CENTURY GERMANY by Eli Genauer I recently purchased an antique Hebrew book for less than the price of a dinner at a moderately priced restaurant. This particular edition is what some would call a “common” — meaning it is the 36th edition (the fourth edition of a revised version) of this book and it was printed in the mid-19th century. Generally, the market does not assign a high price for books like these, but they can be a treasure trove of knowledge and information. The work is Tikkun Shlomo and is primarily focused on the Shabbos liturgy. I reproduced the title page: Many will no doubt recognize the name of the compiler, Shlomo and”קהלת שלמה“ Zalman London (1661-1748) who wrote the book that it was reprinted thirty times in the next 200 years. Tikkun Shlomo was first published in Amsterdam by Dr. Naftali Hertz HaLevi in 1733. Dr. Levi published many a storied book, including the first edition of Mesilat Yesharim and the edition of the Shu”t HaTashbetz that is alleged (erroneously) to have been cosigned to flames. According to Friedberg, when Dr. Levi published the Tikun Shlomo, not much else was being published in Amsterdam due to the effect of the Thirty-Year War.[1] The Tikkun Shlomo was very popular, going through almost 40 editions by the late 19th century. Heidenheim expanded this work in 1835, and the edition I purchased was the fourth Heidenheim edition (two of the three were published in Roedelheim and the other in Lemberg). Things get off to a wonderful start in this book with the Hakdamah which is indicated to come from the third edition. In it, the unnamed editor pays tribute to his mentor Wolf Heidenheim Z”L and maintains that he has followed in his footsteps in all matters because “anyone who follows him will not err”. The editor only refers to himself at the end of the Hakdamah as “HaTzair”, but he leaves us an unmistakable hint as to his identity. Before we get to that, let us see what else he includes in this “Hakdamah” ויהי מימים,ויקם עוד בּישׂראל פּורץ גדר,וישׁחת דברים נעימים, ויוסף עוד להרוס חומת שׂפת עבר ולדבּר תועה אשר לא כּדת. כּי פּרץ מצפון בא בא, ותפתח הרעה, וידפיס אישׁ אחד את המחזורים ב׳האננאפער׳, ויעבור חק, ויהפוך וישׁנה מדעתו את דברי התפילות ופיוטים, ויעקש ויעקל מאוד כמעט בכל דף ודף, ותהי זמירת ישׂראל בידו מעין משחת ומקור נרפשׁ, אשה יפה וסרת טעם, כּי שנה את טעמה ויתעמר בה וימכרה בּכּסף, .וכן לא יעשׂה He takes great offense to a certain Machzor printed by “one man”. The Machzor to which he referring to is known as “Ordnung der Oeffentlichen Andacht für die Sabbath und Festtage des Ganzen Jahres, nach dem Gebrauche des Neuen Tempel-Vereins”, otherwise known as “Seder ha-‘Abodah, Minhag Ḳehal Bayit Ḥadash” printed in Hamburg (not Hanover) in 1819. Two editors are listed: Seckel Isaac Fraenkel and Meyer Israel Bresslau. It was the new prayer book of the Hamburg Reform Temple dedicated in 1818. To paraphrase what he writes about this effort: “ a great evil has descended from the north, one that has been perpetrated by a man who published Machzorim in the city of Hanover ( Hamburg ). In his hands, the prayers, which are like a beautiful woman , are now left with no personality. His purpose was to destroy the Hebrew language, the prayers as we know them, and Judaism itself.”

He continues by writing that he has authored a work Zichron Livnei Yisroel ( Altona 1819) in which he lays out his war against these Machzorim.[2] The title incorporates this explanation: זה ימים יצא בדפוס קונטרס מיוחד לתפילת ערבית ושחרית לשבת, ומעתיקי תפלה הזאת עברו גבול אשר גבלו הראשונים, גרעו והוסיפו כחפץ לבבם … חלילה … לשנות מסדר תפלתינו / … דברי … עקיבא בר”א ברעסלויא, ראב”ד פה ק”ק אלטונא This was Rabbi Akiva Wertheimer (1778-1835), the Rav of Altona, Germany, today part of the city of Hamburg. He wrote “Zichron Livnei Yisroel” and was the editor of our edition of “Tikun Shlomo”. His opposition to the new Reform prayer service is noted in a book called “Shnos Dor V’Dor” printed in Jerusalem by Artscroll/Mesorah in 2004. It records the following that occurred in 1819 which coincides with the printing of his book “Zichron Livnei Yisroel”: בשנת תקע״ט, עוד קודם להתמנורנו, בקום המחדשים ״אנשי ההיכל״ הרפורמי דהמבורג לשנות את סדרי התפילה היה הוא הראשון אשר יצא .כנגדם והזהיר את כל הקהילות סביבות אלטונא מפניהם Continuing in the Hakdamah to Tikun Shlomo, we find that Rav Wertheimer has launched a campaign against the reformers by adding that he has sent this out broadside everywhere to warn others of this assault on tradition. He does this brilliantly by paraphrasing a Pasuk in Tanach ( Shoftim 20:6) which deals with the tragic story of “Pilegesh B’Givah” an incident which almost tore the Jewish people apart. וָאֹחֵז בְּפִילַגְשִׁי, וָאֲנַתְּחֶהָ, :The Pasuk reads וָאֲשַׁלְּחֶהָ, בְּכָל-שְׂדֵה נַחֲלַת יִשְׂרָאֵל: כִּי עָשׂוּ .זִמָּה וּנְבָלָה, בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל His paraphrase reads: ואוחז בפּילגשׁו ואנתחה ואשׁלחה בכל גבול ישׂראל, למען יראו זקני עם וקציניו, והסירו גם את המכשלה הזאת מקרבּם The full text of the broadside was published in Dukes, AW”H leMoshav, Cracow: 1903, 104-05. Additionally, the National Library of Israel has a copy (perhaps that of Israel Mehlman, see his catalog Ginzei Yisrael, no. 1743). The broadside is signed, Akiva br”a Bresslau without additional identifiers, i.e. the son of Avigdor Wertheimer. As Dukes notes, Graetz mistakenly attributed this work to a different Akiva, Akiva Eiger. But he was not the only one to publish against the Hamburg Temple and its prayer book in Altona that year. The work, Eleh Divrei ha-Brit, was also published in Altona in 1819 and it contains, among others, the position of the Hatam Sofer. The battle was waged by both sides, and Meyer Israel Bresslau, one of the editors of the Hamburg prayer book, that same year responded with Herev Nokmat (available onlinehere ). The other editor, Fraenkel, in the prayerbook includes a defense of the changes[3]. As with many editors of Siddurim, Rav Wertheimer extols the exactness of his edition, claiming that he has fixed many of the errors that have crept into previous Siddurim. Specifically, he addresses the text of Mishnayos Shabbos which appeared in many Siddurim and which he has carefully edited especially when it comes to the “Nekudos”.

He continues and states that when it comes to words of foreign origin, such as in Greek, Latin or Arabic, he has also made sure that the “Nekudos” are correct reflecting the proper pronunciation in those languages. Unfortunately this is not a simple task and this example will illustrate the difficulty in doing so. The laws of what a woman may or may not carry outside on Shabbos are discussed in Shabbos 6:3. Among the items prohibited is something called a “Tzlochis Shel Palyiton”, a flask of “Palyiton.” Jastrow defines this word as “an ointment or oil prepared from the leaves of spikenard”. He adds that its origin is the Latin word “foliatum”. The Latin Lexicon website spells this word foliātum and gives the exact same definition. So how should this Latin word be spelled in Hebrew? Rav Wertheimer indicates that it should be pronounced something like “Folia’tone”which is pretty close to the Latin word except for there being an “n” sound at the end of the word instead of the “m” sound. I have a Mishnayos printed in Pisa during the same time period (1797) which makes it look more like “Pal’yi’tone”:

Two very old manuscripts of the Mishneh shed some light on how the word was originally spelled. One of the most famous is known as Codex Kaufmann ( MS Kaufmann A 50) which was written in 10th or 11th century Palestine. There we find the word looking more like “Pil’Ya’Tome”, with an “m” sound at the end: The Parma manuscript referred to as MS Parma, De Rossi 138 written in 1073 has it the same as Kaufmann. In recently printed Mishnayos such as from Feldheim, Artscroll, Steinsaltz, and Blackman, the word is spelled with either a Patach ,Chirik, or “Shva” under the ”פלייטון“ which looks more like Rav Wertheiner’s ,”פולייטון“ Peh”, or“ rendering. One thing is clear- it is sometimes very difficult to write a foreign word with Hebrew letters and vowels, and it is also difficult to ascertain which version is “correct”. Another wonderful aspect to the book that I bought was learning about the man whose name is embossed on the front יוסף אשר בן כ״ה (כבוד הרב) משה פאלאק cover. He is listed as We know a bit about Yosef Asher Pollock from some of the other books and manuscripts he owned. The following two citations are from the online catalogue of the Israel National Library: 1. A manuscript written in the 19th century by Chaim ben Yaakov Abolofia. .תקנות קהלת איזמיר Los Angeles – University of California 960 bx. 1.9 ותו הספר: “מספרי יוסף אשר פאלאק ז”ל” משנת תרפ”ה. From this record we know that he had passed away before 1925 and that the manuscript is now in Los Angeles.

2. A manuscript written in the 18th century .ספר הכונות (חלק שבת ומועדים) Amsterdam – Universiteitsbibliotheek MS Rosenthal 567 בראשו תו ספר של הבעלים “יוסף אשר פאלאק This rare manuscript has been scanned and is available online. The first page looks like this:

From this one we also learn quite a bit more about Yosef Asher Pollock because it contains this bookplate on the inside front cover We surmise from here that this was not the only book he had that was donated, as someone went to a lot of trouble composing and printing such a heartfelt donation plate. (“ Yosef is not here, nor is Shimon”) The year the bookplate was printed was 5693(1933). There is also a stern warning that since this is a gift, it may never be sold by the recipient.

The history of the Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana in Amsterdam is also interesting, especially how the collection of Judaica survived the Nazi occupation. The library’s website notes the following: “The Germans closed the Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana in the summer of 1941 and transported part of the collection to Germany, where it was earmarked for Rosenberg’s ‘Institut zur Erforschung der Judenfrage’. Happily, these plans were thwarted with the German capitulation. Most of the boxes of books were in storage in Hungen, near Frankfurt am Main, where they were found and shipped back to Amsterdam. But the curator and his assistant together with their families had also been deported-for them there was no return” Finally, it seems clear to me that my book was also a gift never to be sold. I surmise this from the fact that the name of Yosef Asher Pollack is beautifully embossed on the front cover of the Siddur, making it unnecessary to have an ownership bookplate inside the Siddur.

Nevertheless, on the inside front cover there is a rectangular remnant of a bookplate which has been torn off. Coincidentally, its size exactly matches the bookplate of the manuscript donated to the Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana, which contained the admonition of not selling the book. Tearing off this “warning label” enabled the book to be sold, something that most likely happened over time to many books that were donated to libraries. ______[1] Friedberg, History of Hebrew Typography, Antwerp: 1937, 49. Although Dr. Levi’s production may have slowed, the bases for Freidberg’s assertion that Amsterdam publishing was affected by the Thrity-Year War is uncertain. During the 18th century, production of Hebrew books in Amsterdam ranges from 82 to a high of 246 per decade. The 1730s, the period that Tikkun Shlomo was published, is in the mid-range of those two extremes, with 145 books published between 1730-39. [2] This work is a single sheet broadside and begins with Moda’ah raba . . . Zikhron Le-veni Yisrael. [3] For a summary of his arguments, see Petuchowski, Prayerbook Reform in Europe, New York, NY: 1968, 53-54.

The Pew Report and the Orthodox Community (and Other Assorted Comments), part 2

The Pew Report and the Orthodox Community (and Other Assorted Comments), part 2 by Marc B. Shapiro Continued from here. Returning to the matter of Jewish men and non-Jewish women, it is noteworthy that the Spanish scholar R. Solomon Alami (14th-15th centuries), in his ethical will to his son, specifically warns him to abstain from sexual relations with non-Jewish women.[1] Note how in the following passage he also assumes that Reuben actually had sexual relations with his father’s concubine (an opinion also shared by talmudic sages, though in my experience the alternative view, that he didn’t actually do this, appears to be the standard approach among contemporary darshanim). בבת אל נכר אל תחלל בריתך. היה גבור כארי למשול בתאוותך, תהי צדיק מושל יראת א-להים להטיבך באחריתך. השמר ממר ממות ופרוש מן הזימה. טמאת השם רבת המהומה. וזכור דבר זמרי ורעתו. וחרפת שבטו ברדוף נשיאם תאוותו. הלא אל אלה חטא שלמה מלך ישראל ונחלקה מלכותו. וזכור צדקת יוסף אשר גבר על יצרו ולא נתן מאוויי גבירתו. ותשב באיתן קשתו. עם גודל יופיו ועדונו והוא בבחרותו. והיה זה סיבה לשום במרום מדרגתו. וכל בית אביו חיו בזכותו. ונתנה לו הבכורה ונדחה ראובן בחללו יצועי אביו מבכורתו. כי לא יאות הכבוד לנקשר בזימה בכחשו. An Italian list of takkanot from 1418 also speaks about this problem, that Jewish men thought that there was nothing wrong הנשים הנכריות מותרות :[with having sex with non-Jewish women[2 The fact that the various moralists speak about this .בעיניהם issue shows that it was a real problem. While suggestions were offered to help men overcome sexual temptations, there was a recognition that, as the Talmud, Hullin 11b, states, “There is This .אין אפוטרופוס לעריות ”,no guardian against unchastity principle is quoted by R. Joseph Karo in Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 22:15.[3] Yet interestingly enough, in R. Karo’s Magid Meisharim[4] he is told that since he is entirely involved with service of God he cannot be seduced even by a naked woman. מאחר שלבך תמיד אינו מהרהר אלא בעבודתי אפילו תפגע באשה ערומה לא תבוא לידי חטא We know that there were some who argued that it was better for men to use Jewish (single) prostitutes so that they not come to having sex with married women or engage in homosexual acts.[5] (I am referring to places where Jews could not avail themselves of non-Jewish prostitutes, as the punishment for this was often execution.) R. Moses Hagiz[6] argues against this position, stating that we do not permit a lesser offense to prevent one from violating a more severe offense. He even calls this approach hukot ha-goyim. והלכו בחוקת הגיום שזו היא טענת פטור אצלם אכן אנו בני ישראל הקדושים כשהשני איסורים הם מדאורייתא או תרי דרבנן אין לנו להתיר הא’ מחשש שלא יבא לעשות האחר This passage is quoted by R. Isaac Lampronte, Pahad Yitzhak, s.v. boel aramit. He then adds that he heard from a hakham that sex with a Jewish prostitute is worse than sex with a non-Jew because of the possibility that that one will violate the niddah prohibition. דיכול לבוא לאיסור נדה שהיא בכרת Notice how he doesn’t say that one will certainly violate the niddah prohibition, only that it is a possibility. What this means is that even the Jewish prostitutes were expected to go to the mikveh, but that one can’t assume that they would indeed do so, and this explains why sex with a non-Jewish woman is preferable.[7] But he adds that this should not be said publicly or to an ignorant person as this knowledge could lead men to have sex with non-Jews since they will mistakenly conclude that the prohibition is not so serious. אין אומרים דבר זה בפרהסיא או בפני עם הארץ, כדי שלא ינהגו פריצות בביאות גויות. What we are discussing was not simply theoretical since R. Isaac Arama, writing in fifteenth-century Spain, tells us that not (שופטי ישראל) not only did the Jewish community leaders communities [קצת)[take prostitution seriously, but in a few (8 Jewish prostitutes were welcomed and even supported with Jewish communal funds (!).[9] This was done as the prostitutes were thought to be performing a public service, since without them it was thought that men would be led to have sex with married women or non-Jewish women (which as mentioned already could lead to execution). From a responsum of R. Judah ben Asher,[10] we see that even in an earlier era this point had been made with regard to “loose women” (and was rejected by R. Judah who thought it was better to have sex with a non-Jewish woman for whom the niddah prohibition did not apply): ומוטב שיסתכנו הגופים מן הנפשות Arama tells us that on different occasions he argued with the which I assume means גדוליהם communal leaders, and also before their rabbis, that it is one thing if someone commits a sin in private. In such a case, Arama would probably agree that it would be better for a man to have sex with a Jewish prostitute than with a with a non-Jew. (It must be that these prostitutes went to the mikveh, as Arama doesn’t mention anything about the niddah prohibition.) But Arama is firm that it is absolutely forbidden for the community – and he includes in showing that the rabbis were complicit – to בתי דיניהם this countenance any sin whatsoever, in this case welcoming in Jewish prostitutes, even if this strict stance leads to people committing greater sins or being executed by the non-Jews.[11] R. Isaac Bar Sheshet (Rivash) had earlier also testified to the fact that the “gedolei ha-dor” had acquiesced to the existence of Jewish prostitutes in order to prevent men from visiting non-Jewish women, with all the dangers this entailed.[12] Contrary to Avraham Grossman,[13] the Rivash is not saying that this is what the gedolei“ ha-dor” should do when faced with such a circumstance. Rather, he is decrying what they did. I am curious to hear if readers agree with me. Here are the words of the Rivash: והרמב”ן ז”ל כתב בפ’ התורה שהיא אזהרה לב”ד שלא יניחו בנות ישראל להפקיר עצמן לישב בעינים על הדרך או בקובה של זונות לזנות לכל יבא. בואו ונצווח על דורנו שאין דומה יפה, וגדולי הדור העלם יעלימו את עינים פן יכשלו בני פריצי עמנו בנכריות ותצא אש ומצאה קוצים ונאכל גדיש Returning to intermarriage, we see something very interesting in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 39. According to this text (which is paralleled by other midrashim[14]), Jacob’s sons married their sisters. The explanation given is that they did so in order not to marry the local inhabitants: כדי שלא יתחתנו בעמי הארצות This is quite an incredible assertion, since incest is forbidden under the Noahide code. If there were no eligible marriage partners, one would have expected Jacob’s sons not to marry at all rather than marrying their sisters. R. David Luria, in his commentary on the passage, does not even deal with this problem, instead noting that elsewhere in rabbinic literature one finds that Jacob’s sons did marry the local women. (For some reason, R. Luria’s edition does not include which comes right after ,כדי שלא יתחנתו בעמי הארצות the words the text stating that Jacob’s sons married their sisters. This does not appear to be an act of censorship, since the real issue is not the explanation for their marriages, but the incestuous marriages themselves, and this is still found in R. Luria’s edition.) The Tosafists have a simple response to this problem: Since the Torah had not yet been given Jacob’s sons only observed what they wanted.[15] מאחר שלא נצטוו על התורה אע”פ שידעוה ברוה”ק מה שהיו רוצין היו מקיימין ומה שלא היו רוצין היו מניחין. Nahmanides, Commentary to Gen. 38:2, assumes that each of the brothers married one of the twins of the other brothers, but not their own twins. Furthermore, no one actually married a complete sister, i.e., sons of Leah did not marry daughters of Leah. Thus, they did not violate Noahide Law. (I think this is probably also what the Tosafists assumed in the passage mentioned above.) While Nahmanides’ understanding works with some of the midrashim, it cannot be fit into the language of Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 36, which states explicitly that each son was born together with his future wife: וכולן נולדו זווגן עמם חוץ מיוסף שלא נולדה זווגה עמו Furthermore, Bereshit Rabbah 80 states that Simeon married Dinah, and she was his sister from the same mother. It is precisely in order to answer this problem that a Tosafist cites the Aggadah[16] that Dinah was actually first impregnated in Rachel, and God later transferred her to Leah, meaning that Simeon and Dinah were really not from the same mother.[17] (Many have pointed out that this has implications to the debate about the status of children born from surrogate mothers.[18]) The Maharal explains that the situation of the brothers marrying their sisters was an exceptional case, since if they did not marry them the only available marriage partners would have been pagan women.[19] As the Maharal notes, the parallel is to the sons of Adam who were permitted to marry their sisters since there was no one else for them to marry. This permission to marry their sisters was known to Jacob through ruah ha-kodesh, and the Maharal adds that one should not think that this contradicts the Torah, “for the one who gave the Torah forbade [it] and the one who gave the Torah [also] permitted [it].” In other words, God is the source of the law so he can choose to alter it if he chooses. This approach can also explain the story of the akedah which troubles so many. If the reason not to murder is because God says so, then God can, if He wishes, permit murder in certain cases. I don’t want to get into the issue of Natural Law and the Euthyphro problem. Suffice it to say that most people would assume that the prohibition against incest is indeed part of Natural Law and not simply because God forbids it. Yet it must be noted that Sanhedrin 58b records a view that the Noahide code does not forbid marriage between brothers and sisters. According to Sanhedrin 58b, and this is followed by pretty much all commentators and halakhists, a non-Jew is permitted to marry his daughter. See alsoMishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:5.[20] That at least some of the prohibitions on incest are not part of Natural Law would also seem to be a necessary conclusion of the Sifrei,[21] which states that the Children of Israel were driven to tears when Moses told them that they could no longer marry their sisters (from their fathers).[22] וישמע משה את העם בוכה למשפחותיו . . . שהיו ישראל מצטערים בשעה שאמר להם משה לפרוש מן העריות מלמד שהיה אדם נושא את אחותו ואחות אביו ואחות אמו ובשעה שאמר להם משה לפרוש מן העריות היו מצטערים. R. Ari Chwat has made the following interesting point.[23] The fact that the Sages state that the sons of Jacob married their sisters, something forbidden under Noahide law, illustrates how important it was for them to show that the brothers did not marry Canaanite women. In order to free them from the stain of intermarriage, the Sages were even prepared to claim that they had incestuous marriages. This shows how bad intermarriage was regarded by them. נראה שכך יש להבין גם את המדרש (פרקי דר’ אליעזר פל”ה [צ”ל ל”ו] וב”ר פ, יא) שבני יעקב נשאו את אחיותיהם, למרות שיש בכך משום האשמתם בגילוי עריות, דבר שאסור אפילו לבני נח מלפני מתן תורה. אלא שרצו חז”ל ללמד זכות על אבותינו עצמם, ולנקותם מעבירת נשואי תערובת, עבירה בעייתית בדורם של חז”ל. כלומר: היות ועבירת נשואי אחיות לא עמדה על סדר יומם של חז”ל, ממילא האשמה זו תפגע בכבודן של אבותינו פחות מאשר להאשימם בנשואי תערובת, מעשה המתאים רק לשפלים ביותר בעם. Regarding intermarriage, take a look at the following fascinating responsum from R. Meir of Rothenburg that appears in Teshuvot Ba’alei ha-Tosafot, ed. Agus, no. 72 (pp. 152-153).

It begins by referring to the widow of a man “who was not pure”. What does this mean? From the responsum it would appear that this woman was “married” to a non-Jew. Based on the answer, it seems that she was claiming that she had done nothing wrong with this “marriage”, as she had received rabbinic permission, and therefore she should not suffer any stigma.[24] R. Meir tells us that he knew a woman of whom it was said that the rabbis permitted her to have sexual relations with a non-Jew. He also states that he heard that in France the rabbis permitted this for several women. What this appears to mean is that the rabbis permitted the Jewish women to live with non-Jewish men (since the rabbis were certainly not permitting promiscuous sexual relations). Irving Agus reasonably suggests that the reason these “intermarriages” were permitted is that refusal to allow them would have endangered Jewish lives.[25] R. Meir does not accept this permission at all, and points out that the talmudic examples of Jewish women having sexual relations with non-Jews were when they were forced. Yael’s sexual encounter with Sisera was intended to weaken him out so she could then kill him. Following R. Meir’s responsum, there is an additional note, apparently from R. Mordechai ben Hillel, stating that it is not certain that had Esther and Yael consulted with halakhic authorities that they would have been given permission for their actions. The copyist rejects this point, noting that since the actions of Esther and Yael were done in order to save the Jewish people, what they did was certainly permitted. Howewver, one cannot use these cases to also permit other women to have sexual relations with non- Jews. On the general matter of sex, I would like to call readers’ attention to a book that recently appeared. It is called Devar Seter and no author is given. You can see the book here. This book is, as far I know, the most liberal work on the halakhot of sex ever to appear. I am worried that if I get too explicit and explain what I mean by “liberal” that some readers’ internet protection will prevent them from accessing this post. Therefore, I won’t say any more about the book except than I find it interesting that a number of rabbis who praise it only feel comfortable doing so anonymously. Another book on sex recently appeared, this time in English, which also has a very liberal perspective, although it is not focused on halakhah but is a self-help book. It is authored by Rabbi David Ribner and Jennie Rosenfeld and is titledThe Newlywed’s Guide to Physical Intimacy.[26] A reader alerted me to an article on the book available here, and asked if I could comment on the following excerpt. It is widely believed that ultra-Orthodox Jews are so concerned about modesty that they have sex through a hole in a sheet. But this is a total myth, says Ribner: “There has never been a group of Jews anywhere in the world that has advocated having sex through a hole in a sheet. That has never happened. It doesn’t happen today, it never happened in history. It’s not advocated in any text within the Jewish community.” I have no idea if there is anyone today who uses a sheet for sexual intercourse. There is certainly no community that insists on this (not even the Gur Hasidim, whose sexual behavior is extremely ascetic). However, it is simply incorrect to say that this action is not advocated in any text. Usually, when you have a widespread rumor like this, there is some basis for it, even if the original source has been distorted. What is the origin of the idea of sex through a sheet? The Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 1:1, states that R. Yose ben Halafta, who performed the levirate marriage with his sister- In case the .דרך סדין בעל :in-law, had sex in this fashion were not clear to readers, R. Baruch ben Isaac דרך סדין words explains in Sefer ha-Terumah, Hilkhot Halitzah (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 46a, that it means that R. Yose ben Halafta made a hole in the sheet[27]: נקב עשה בסדין דרך מקום ביאה This was done so that his personal pleasure be reduced and the focus be on the mitzvah.[28] The Talmud records that he had five children with this woman, and it is not clear if he used the sheet throughout their marriage or only in conceiving the first child (see Korban ha-Edah, ad loc., and also R. Hayyim Kanievsky’s commentary).[29] If this was all we had, it would not be of great significance. All it would show was that one talmudic sage used the “hole in the sheet” method. There is no implication from the passage that anyone else adopted this approach. Yet based on this text, R. Meir of Rothenburg indeed assumed that when it came to levirate marriage this was the general practice among the pious during tannaitic times.[30] ואפי’ חסידים הראשונים דור התנאים כשהיו מיבמין היו בועלין דרך סדין כדמשמע בירושלמי (פ”ק דיבמות ה”א) ר’ יוסי בר’ חלפתא הי’ בועל יבמתו דרך סדין R. Jacob Emden, whose writings include a good deal about sexual matters, assumes that this type ofhasidut is only applicable with levirate marriage, but not with one’s wife.[31] דווקא ביבמה יש מקום לחסידות כזה לא זולת There is also another significant passage, and it comes from the Vilna Gaon. He comments on the following text from the Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 240:8: וי”מ מגלה טפח ומכסה טפח שלא היה ממרק האבר בשעת תשמיש כדי למעט הנאתו The point of this text is that even during sex one should attempt to lessen the pleasure. In his note on this passage, the Gaon ties R. Joseph Karo’s words to what we have just seen in the Jerusalem Talmud. He then states that although one can say that R. Jose ben Halafta acted this way only because he was performing a religious ritual (levirate marriage), nevertheless, “it is also proper to act this way with one’s wife.” In other words, in contrast to what R. Jacob Emden wrote, the Gaon tells us that the practice of sex through a sheet is according to one opinion a valid and even recommended method of lessening sexual pleasure. A well-known talmid hakham who examined this text at my request wrote to me that since the Gaon does not object it implies acceptance, meaning that the Gaon would have approved of the proverbial hole in the sheet. Use of a sheet would appear to be contradicted by the following passage in Ketubot 48a: implies close bodily [שארה] R. Joseph learnt: Her flesh contact, viz., that he must not treat her in the manner of the Persians who perform their conjugal duties in their clothes. This provides support for [a ruling of] R. Huna who laid down that a husband who said, ‘I will not [perform conjugal duties] unless she wears her clothes and I mine’, must divorce her and give her also her ketubah. Yet this text, which rejects the approach of the Persians, is itself opposed by R. Gamaliel who stated: “For three things do I like the Persians: They are temperate in their eating, modest in the privy, and chaste in another matter [i.e., sexual behavior]” (Berakhot 8b).[32] Another interesting point related to sex and seforim is the following. Megillah 13b states: “R. Johanan said: Bigthan and Teresh were two Tarseans and conversed in the Tarsean language. They said: From the day this woman came we have been able to get no sleep. Come, let us put poison in the dish so that he [Ahasuerus] will die.” Bigthan and Teresh couldn’t get any sleep since they could not go to sleep as long as the king was awake. But why was the king not going to sleep? Rashi explains that he found Esther so attractive that he had lots of sex with her, and this was keeping him up at night. מתוך שהיתה חביבה עליו היה מרבה בתשמיש R. Baruch Epstein, Torah Temimah, Esther 2:23, offers a different explanation of the Talmud. He claims that Ahasuerus was up at night because he so enjoyed taking walks with and talking to Esther. כי היה מטייל ומשוחח עמה הרבה What I can’t figure out is why R. Epstein expects us to prefer his understanding, which turns Ahasuerus into a perfect gentlemen, over that of Rashi.[33] Finally, let me offer an example of distortion when it comes to sex. R. Israel Yanovski, Taharat Yisrael, vol. 2, p. 100b, no. 33, states: מי ששם אצבעו בתורף אשה פריצות גדולה היא ויש בו איסור The source offered for this surprising invasion of the marital bedroom is R. Yerucham,Toledot Adam ve-Havah, vol. 1, netiv 23 (p. 192d in the standard edition). Yet R. Yerucham says something very different.[34] מי ששם אצבעו בתורף אשת אישפריצות גדולה היא ויש בו איסור ואפילו המסתכל אבל אינו חייב מלקות The only question is if R. Yanovski’s quotation was a careless error (copied perhaps from R. Dovber Karasik,Pithei Olam, Orah Hayyim 240:16, who uses the same mistaken wording) or an intentional distortion due to puritanical feelings.[35] R. Moshe Stern, Be’er Moshe, vol. 3 p. 204, assumes the former while I think the latter is also possible. I say this because Taharat Yisrael is quite an extreme work when it comes to sexual matters, which R. Yanovski wants to limit as much as possible. Thus, he praises those tzadikim whose children, we are told, equal exactly the number of times these tzadikim had sexual relations. In other words, if a certain tzaddik only had three children, then in his entire life he only had sex three times.[36] As for other pious people, R. Yanovski, based on kabbalistic sources, tells them to avoid sexual relations on Rosh Ha- Shanah (and tavo alav berakhah if one can abstain for the entire Ten Days of Penitence), Hoshana Rabbah, the three days preceding Shavuot and also on Shavuot, from Rosh Hodesh Av until the 11th of Av, the first and second night of Passover, the nights of Shemini Atzeret and Simhat Torah, and hol ha- moed Pesah (unless it falls on Shabbat). If this wasn’t enough, he also assumes that sex is forbidden on Hanukkah and Purim and any day that you don’t recite tahanun (!).[37] בחנוכה ופורים נראה דאסור וכ”ש שאר ימים שאין נופלין על פניהם בהם דאסור בלי ספק

Finally, let me call attention to Berakhot 57b which states that three things resemble the World to Come, “the Sabbath, sunshine, and tashmish.” What does tashmish mean? Normally you would assume it to meantashmish ha-mitah, i.e., sexual relations. However, the Talmud explains that it doesn’t mean this but refers to tashmish“ of the orifices.”R. Samuel Alexandrov claims that the original rabbinic saying indeed meant what it said, i.e., that sex resembles the pleasure of the World to Come. However, the later sages didn’t want people to focus on sexual matters so they explained the passage in a different way.[38] Regarding the connection between sex and the World to Come, R. Solomon Alkabetz quotes “the kedoshim” that sexual pleasure is one sixtieth of “the true pleasure”, i.e., the World to Come.[39]

To be continued

* * * * * * Most of R. Yanovski’s Taharat Yisrael (mentioned in this post) focuses on the laws of niddah and mikveh. It was printed twice in Europe and then was reprinted in the United States in 1952. This latter publication was dedicated to the memory of R. Judah Leib Forer, the rabbi of Holyoke, Massachusetts. This page appears at the beginning of the book.

Here is the page of American haskamot added for this edition. This is one of a handful of haskamot from R. Soloveitchik, and I think is the first to appear in print. Regarding R. Forer, who was an outstanding student of R. Hayyim Soloveitchik, there is a good deal of information from family members available on a website here. Among the points noted was that R. Shach was a student of his. Here is the title page of Milei de-Igrot, consisting of Torah letters between R. Forer and R. Mordechai Gifter. There is also one letter from R. Shach to R. Forer. On p. 181 we also see that R. Forer delivered a shiur at RIETS. (There is another volume of Milei de-Igrot and this contains letters between R. Gifter and his teacher R. Moses Aaron Poleyeff. There is a good deal of biographical information about R. Gifter in this latter volume, including his difficult relationship with R. Bernard Revel.)

The one point I would like to add to all the recollections that appear on the website I have referred to is that R. Forer was unique in that he was the spiritual leader of both the Orthodox and Conservative communities. That is, the membership of the Conservative synagogue liked R. Forer so much that while they wanted a mixed pew congregation, they also wanted him as their rabbi. This information was confirmed to me by elderly members of the Orthodox and Conservative synagogues. What is not known is if R. Forer ever actually attended the Conservative synagogue or if he was ever officially recognized as their rabbi. He was, however, the only spiritual leader in the town, recognized by all, and I don’t know of another example in history where there was one rabbi for both the Orthodox and Conservative congregations. [1] Iggeret Musar, ed. Haberman (Jerusalem, 1946), p. 33. It is interesting that later in this work, in giving an example of an anti-Semitic decree in Spain, Alami mentions that Jews were forced to grow their beards. See p. 40. This shows that going clean-shaven was common in medieval Spain. Alami sees this as an example of midah ke-neged midah, i.e., since the Jews were improperly cutting off their beards, it was the non- Jewish authorities who forced them to grow the beards. [2] Jubelschrift zum siebzigen Geburtstag des Prof. Dr. H. Graetz (Breslau, 1887), p. 60 (Hebrew section). Both this source and Alami are cited in Israel Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages (New York, 1975), p. 94 (he mistakenly dates the Italian document as 1413). Louis Finkelstein,Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages (New York, 1964), ch. 10, reprints the Italian document (mistakenly dating it as 1416). The passage I have referred to appears in Hebrew on p. 286, but is missing, together with much else, in what is supposed to be the translation on p. 294. Among the other Italian takkanot is one stating that a man can only wear one gold ring. See Jubelschrift, p. 59. I mention this only because some have the mistaken perception that Jewish men never wore rings. See also S’s post here which has a painting of R. Bernard Illowy wearing a ring. [3] In the days of the Talmud we find that plenty of betrothed, but not yet married, couples were having sex, or at least suspected of it. See Ketubot 9b, 12a. [4] Parashat Miketz, mahadura kama. [5] R. Moses Sofer, She’elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Even ha- Ezer no. 133, writes: ועוד דזנות דפנויה קיל לאינשי ולא משמע להו איסורא כל כך אע”ג שהם נדות, ועינינו רואות דרובן פרוצות בפנוייתן ונעשות צנועות אחר נישואי[הן]י Understood as written, the second part of this sentence is quite incredible, as the Hatam Sofer is stating that most unmarried Jewish women are sexually active. Yet there is no question in my mind that what he is really means is that most of those who are sexually active before marriage, behave properly after marriage. See here.

[6] Leket ha-Kemah (Amsterdam, 1707), p. 29a. [7] R. Jacob Kamenetsky was adamant that it is worse for a man to marry a non-Jew than to marry a Jew who won’t observe taharat ha-mishpahah. See Emet le-Yaakov, parashat Ve- Yehi, p. 237, translated here. [8] Perhaps this should be better translated as “some communities”, but I am dan le-kaf zekhut. See also Abraham Neuman, The Jews in Spain (Philadelphia, 1944), vol. 2, p. 279 n. 42. [9] Jewish prostitutes definitely felt that they were part of the community. See R. Raphael Ankawa, Karnei Re’em (Jerusalem, 1910), no. 225, for a responsum sent to Brazil, regarding whether it was permissible for the synagogue to accept charity from the prostitutes, as well as a parochet they made for the synagogue. See also R. Moses Isserles, Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 153:21. R. Raphael Aaron ben Shimon,Nehar Mitzrayim (Alexandria, 1908), vol. 1, p. 12a, discusses a case where not only did the prostitute donate a parochet, but she also inscribed her name into it in golden letters. As R. Raphael notes, this is especially problematic since if allowed then people praying in synagogue would see her name staring down upon them and this would invariably lead to improper thoughts. (He adds that this particular prostitute had been with a lot of the young Jewish men.) Therefore, he ruled that the parochet could not be used and any gifts from prostitutes to the synagogue could not have their names on it. He also mentions a prostitute who donated a sefer Torah to the synagogue (!), and this was accepted on the condition that her name not appear on it.. Regarding Jewish prostitutes, see also the documents from the Russian archives recently published in ChaeRan Y. Freeze and Jay M. Harris,Everyday Jewish Life in Imperial Russia (Waltham, 2013), pp. 337ff., and see also Dan’s earlier post here. In 1611 the Prague Jewish community ordered the Jewish prostitutes to leave. See Simhah Assaf,Ha-Onshin Aharei Hatimat ha-Talmud (Jerusalem, 1922) p. 114. Any prostitute found plying her trade after this time would have a mark of shame branded onto her skin! וזו שתזנה ח”ו מהיום והלאה יתוו עליה תו-קלון על ידי ברזל לוהט See also Takanot Kandia, eds. Cassuto and Artom (Jerusalem, 1942), no. 31. Pimps also felt that they were part of the community. See R. Joseph Hayyim, Rav Pealim, vol. 2, Orah Hayyim, no. 18, who rules that it is forbidden to give a pimp an aliyah, even if he only deals with non-Jewish prostitutes and non-Jewish clients. R. Hayyim Palache ruled that pimps must be expelled from the Jewish community. See Masa Hayyim, p. 14a. R. Solomon Kluger discusses Jewish pimps in Ha-Elef Lekha Shlomo, Yoreh Deah, no. 192, and see also R. Hayyim Palache, Hayyim be-Yad, no. 19, and R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini, Sedei Hemed, Pe’at ha- Sadeh, ma’arekhet alef, no. 152 (s.v. apotropos le-arayot) . [10] Zikhron Yehudah, no. 17. [11] Akedat Yitzhak, Bereshit, sha’ar 20. [12] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rivash, no. 425. [13] Hasidot u-Mordot, p. 240 n. 96: הוא סבר שעל “גדולי הדור” להעלים עיניהם מקיומן של זונות יהודיות מחשש לתגובה קשה של הסביבה הנוכרית, אם יהודים יקיימו יחסי מין עם נשים נוכריות [14] See Torah Shelemah, Gen. 37, note 200, and see also Rashi, Gen. 37:35. [15] See Da’at Zekenim mi-Ba’alei ha-Tosafot, Gen. 37:35 [16] See Berakhot 60a. [17] Tosafot ha-Shalom, ed. Gellis, to Gen. 46:8. [18] See R. Avraham S. Avraham, Nishmat Avraham (Jerusalem, 2007), vol. 3, p. 32. [19] See Gur Aryeh, Gen. 46:10. [20] The one exception I know of is Meiri, Sanhedrin 58b, who states that a non-Jew cannot marry his daughter. Even though the Talmud rejects this opinion, Meiri does not see this אפשר שדרך .rejection as the Talmud’s final word on the subject However, just a few lines below this .דחיה הוא וסוגיא בעלמא Meiri writes that if a Jew’s daughter (through a non-Jewish woman) converts to Judaism, he can marry her! While R. Abraham Sofer doesn’t comment on this seeming inconsistency, in R. Yitzhak Ralbag’s edition of Meiri on Sanhedrin, published in Sanhedrei Gedolah, vol. 4, he writes: ק”ק לשיטת רבינו שב”נ אסור בבתו איך מותרת לו אחר הגירות. Before you reply that the convert is like a “new person” and thus has no connection to her father, recall that in Yevamot 22a it explains that the incest prohibitions that are applicable for a non-Jew remain forbidden (rabbinically) even after conversion. So how then, according to Meiri, can a father marry his converted daughter? [21] Ba-Midbar 90. See also Shabbat 130a. [22] See also Maimonides. Hilkhot Melakhim 9:5, that this is permitted for non-Jews. I will return to the matter of incest in a future post. [23] See his article “Ha-Zakaim be-Mikra ve-Hayavim be-Hazal,” available here. [24] See Irving Agus, Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg (New York, 1970), vol., 1, p. 279. [25] Teshuvot Ba’alei ha-Tosafot, p. 33. See also Agus in Jewish Quarterly Review 49 (1959), pp. 217-218. [26] A number of years ago two of my friends got married. One of them met with his rabbi for “the talk”, and was told that when it comes to sex, pretty much everything is permitted. The other friend attended a “hatan class” in New York City. He called me one night, surprised at being told that in sexual relations only one position is permitted. This was stated as a matter of halakhah and the directly opposing statement of R. Moses Isserles, Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 25:2, was never even mentioned. R. Isserles writes: ויכול לעשות עם אשתו מה שירצה . . . ובא עליה בין כדרכה בין שלא כדרכה או דרך איברים ובלבד שלא יוציא זרע לבטלה. ויש מקילין ואומרים שמותר שלא כדרכה אפילו אם מוציא זרע אם עושה באקראי ואינו רגיל בכך. ואף על פי שמותר בכל אלה כל המקדש עצמו במותר לו קדוש יאמרו לו Note R. Isserles’ last sentence. In other words, my friend’s hatan teacher decided (without asking his students) that all the future grooms sitting before him were going to be .קדוש called [27] See also R. Moses of Coucy, Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, pos. no. 52. R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski, She’elot u-Teshuvot Ahiezer, vol 3, no. 24:4-5, has a different understanding. [28] R. Nahman of Bratslav stated that not only does the tzaddik not experience any sexual pleasure, but he suffers during sex, even more than a boy suffers during circumcision. See Arthur Green, Tormented Master (Woodstock, VT, 1992), p. 39. Regarding sexual pleasure, there is an old question as to why one does not recite a blessing over it. R. Zvi Elimelech Shapira of Dinov stated that before sex one should make a shehakol on food or drink and include in thisalso the anticipated sexual pleasure. See his Magid Ta’alumah (Bnei Brak, 2006), to Berakhot 40a, 43a. Recognizing that people will find this suggestion quite strange, especially as no one before him ever had this idea, R. Zvi Elimelech adds: כתבתי זה מסברתי והמשכיל לא ישליך דברי אחרי גיוו כי דברי טעם הם Elsewhere, R. Zvi Elimelech writes that optimally one should not have any pleasure from sex. See Igra de-Firka (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 28b (no. 197): ובאמת עפ”י התורה יותר טוב שלא ליהנות [29] See also Tosafot, Shabbat 118b, s.v. eima, that R. Yose ben Halafta performed yibbum with five different women. [30] She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharam be-R. Barukh, ed. Bloch (Budapest, 1895), no. 866. [31] Mor u-Ketziah 240. [32] It is also worth noting that R. Isaac Luria held that one’s tallit katan should remain on during marital relations. See R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai,Birkei Yosef, Orah Hayyim 8:7. See also Magen Avraham, Orah Hayyim 240:22, and R. Avner Afgin, Divrei Shalom, vol. 5, pp. 417ff. R. Mordechai Eliyahu, Darkhei Taharah ha-Shalem, p. 278, writes: והמקפידים ללבש טלית טקן כל הזמן חוץ משעת רחצה, יניחו בשעת התשמיש את הטלית על צוארם שלא יחצץ ביניהם

[33] A friend pointed out to me that R. Ovadiah Yosef adopted R. Epstein’s explanation. See Hazon Ovadiah: Purim, p. 279. [34] R. Yerucham’s formulation is also quoted by R. Moses Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 21:2. [35] R. Yanovski’s “revision” of R. Yerucham relates to the matter of female sexual pleasure. There is a good deal to say about this, especially with regard to the approach of the Gur hasidim which forbids any foreplay from the husband. However, for now, let me just note that R. Joseph Hayyim says the exact same thing, and unlike the Gur hasidim who see this as an added stringency, he sees it as an actual prohibition (which for many women would mean that in their entire lives they ומפני הצניעות would never experience any sexual pleasure :See Ben Yehoyada, Niddah 13a (.אקצר גם הנשים אסורות להשחית הזרע שלהן, כמ”ש רבינו האר”י ז”ל. מיהו נראה גם באשה אם בעלה עושה משמוש ידים באותו מקום דרך שחוק והתעוררות תאוה ודאי גורם לה בזה הזרעה לבטלה, ואיכא איסור של השחתת זרע (See, however, Torah li-Shmah, no. 504, where he does not regard this as an actual prohibition.)TheLehem Mishneh, Hilkhot Ishut 15:18, says the exact same thing as appears in Ben Yehoyada without using any kabbalistic sources: כשהבעל ממשמש באותו מקום דודאי מן הדין אסור לעשות כך דאסור למשמש שם Lehem Mishneh’s view is accepted by R. Isaac Palache. Yafeh la-Lev, Even ha-Ezer 25:8. R. Yitzhak Abadi, Or Yitzhak, vol. 2, p. 65, is very disturbed by the Lehem Mishneh and states: הוא תמוה לחדש כן בדברי הרמב”ם מכח קושיא בדבריו . . . ובכלל עצם הענין הזה לחדש דברים כאלה בלי שום ראיה הוא דבר תמוה, ובפרט שרש”י אומר בפירוש שמותר, ועוד שמצוותו בכך נשים לאו בנות ,Regarding the talmudic statement,Niddah 13a ,R. Moshe Malka,Mikveh ha-Mayim, vol. 6, p. 57 ,הרגשה נינהו writes as follows, in surprisingly strong language: כמה קשה עלי שמועה זו שהיא נגד הטבע, וכי נשים לאו בני הרגשה נינהו? וכי אינן נהנות גם הן מתשמיש כמו הגברים? I was surprised to see that R. Shlomo Aviner does not regard female sexual pleasure as having any real significance. Here are passages from two separate letters (quoted in Yakir Englander and Avi Sagi, Guf u-Miniyut be-Siah ha-Tziyoni-Dati he-Hadash [Jerusalem, 2013], p. 108). מה שאין אשתך נהנית בשעת החיבור אין זה אסון, זה קורה לנשים רבות, והעיקר שהיא אינה סובלת מזה. היא נהנית הנאה רגשית פנימית מעצם הקרבה, מעצם האהבה האחווה השלום והרעות, ואינה זקוקה להנאה גופנית בעניין ההנאה – מה שאינך נהנית, אינו קריטי, ישנן נשים שלא נהנו כל ימי חייהן אפילו פעם אחת ולא הפריע להן, אלא הכול היה באהבה גדול I hope to return to this very interesting book. But for now I can’t resist citing a passage from R. Eliezer Melamed (quoted ibid., p. 128). Not only could an American Modern Orthodox rabbi never express such sentiments (if he wants to keep his job), but I am convinced that even if such a passage appeared in an American haredi publication, the women would be quite offended. איזו אישה כשירה? העושה רצון בעלה, זה הסדר. כאשר יש החלטה כזו או אחרת, בנהוג שבעולם שהאיש הוא הקובע, כך מקובל. כאשר זה לך כך, בדרך כלל שני בני הזוג לא מרוצים. אפילו אם האישה שמחה שהיא מחליטה בלבד ומשפיעה על מהלך העניינים, בסוף היא מתמרמרת שהיא לא נשואה לבעל, לא לגבר, אלא לסמרטוט. כמובן שיכולים להיות דברים מסוימים שבהם האישה קובעת, “נו, תחליטי את איזה צבע נבחר לספה”. הבעל ג’נטלמן, בבקשה, תחליטי את. אבל הוא נותן לה את המנדט להחליט, כך מקובל R. Aryeh Leib Steinman, Ayelet ha-Shahar, Kiddushin 30b, also states that a wife is obligated to obey her husband. It is easy to find plenty of earlier sources that say this, but I wonder how many haredi women today have such an understanding of their position in a marriage.

Regarding R. Melamed’s point that a man has to be a “man”, it reminded me of an interesting Meiri toKiddushin 82b. The Talmud, ibid., states: “Happy is he whose children are males, and woe to him whose children are females.” Meiri suggests the following explanation: “Woe to him whose sonsare like females,” with all the negative implications this implies:

שבניו נקבות שהזכרים פחותים וחסירים, ואשרי מי שבניו זכרים שנמצא בהם השלמות המכוון בהם R. Yoel Schwartz, Ben Torah vi-Yeshivah (Jerusalem, 1978), p. 143, mentions this Meiri in the course of his discussion of male and female roles in Judaism. Schwartz makes the following very enlightened comment about how men should relate to “women’s work”, i.e., housework.

טיפוח הבית, הוא חלק האשה כמו שביארנו לעיל, מאחר שכאמור שטח זה הוא בתחום האשה, מי שמתעסק בטיפוח הבית מפסיד את כל ערך התועלת של קנין תורה I shouldn’t mock it, however. If these guys can get their women to go along, who am I to protest? It wasn’t that long ago that pretty much all men had this Archie Bunker-like attitude. [36] Taharat Yisrael, vol. 2, p. 97b. [37] Taharat Yisrael, vol. 2, p. 97a. [38] Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (Vilna, 1907), vol. 1, p. 51. See also David Biale, Eros and the Jews (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 42-43, who sees here a conflict between the Sages and popular belief, with the latter assuming that there is a place for sexuality in messianic days. (When the Talmud refers to the World to Come it means the messianic era.) [39] Shoresh Yishai (Sziget, 1891), to Ruth 3:7 (p. 56a).

She’ot Hityahadut – Review Essay

She’ot Hityahadut – Review Essay פאני נוידא, שעות התייחדות – ספר תפילה ומוסר לנשות ישראל ולבנותיה לתפילה בציבור וביחידוּת ולכל הזדמנות בחיי אישה, מבוא: עליזה לביא, תרגום מגרמנית: קטיה מנור, הוצאת ידיעות אחרונות תשע”ד, 259 עמודים. Fanny Neuda, She’ot ,Hebrew edition ,(שעות התייחדות) Hityahadut introduction by Aliza Lavie; translation of prayers by Katja Manor, Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2014, 259 pages By: Yael Levine The author holds a Ph.D. from the Talmud department at Bar Ilan University. She is the author of numerous articles related to women in Judaism. She recently published “Tefillot Li-Tevilla”. The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in Europe, the United States, and Israel, in the compilation of prayers Stunden der Andacht, composed by Fanny Neuda (1819–1894). Highlights of this renaissance will be currently mentioned. Bettina Kratz-Ritter published several scholarly studies relating to Neuda and her works. Some prayers from Stunden der Andacht were published in Hebrew translation in Tefillat Nashim (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2005), edited by Aliza Lavie. An English edition, Hours of Devotion, was published by Dinah Berland (New York: Schocken Books, 2007). An abridged edition in Czechoslovakian was published in 2008. TheOpen Siddur Project transcribed one of the German editions. Recently, a Hebrew translation of the work, the subject of this review, was published. The introduction was written by Dr. Aliza Lavie, and the translation of the prayers was carried out by Katja Manor. However, despite the fact that Lavie states in the introduction that the work offers a translation of the first edition published in 1855, a scrutiny of the translation reveals that, in actuality, this is a translation of the second edition published in 1858. The latter edition was re-edited by Neuda herself and contains many additions and changes. Additionally, the introductory material to the Hebrew edition contains factual errors, and consequently the present edition can’t be relied upon. Lavie provides laconic biographical information concerning Neuda and her religious stance. However, it’s possible to show that her husband had Reform leanings. While we aren’t in possession of any direct evidence concerning her own religious practices, her milieu of acquaintances was progressive and Reform. This religious environment is not conveyed in the Hebrew edition, though it is entirely essential for the reader to be familiar with. Aliza Lavie is presently a MK in the Israeli parliament. However, the volume under discussion was, for the most part, prepared prior to the elections in January 2013. The current review doesn’t relate to political issues. פאני נוידא, שעות התייחדות – סקירה* יעל לוין מבוא בשנת 1855 יצאה לאור המהדורה הראשונה של קובץ התפילות שכתבה פאני נוידא (1819–1894) Stunden der Andacht, שהתפרסם כשנה לאחר התאלמנותה. הקובץ כולל קרוב למאה תפילות רשות בגרמנית לנשים, תפילות האמורות ללוות את האישה היהודייה בשעת התפילה בבית-הכנסת, וכן לאורך מעגל השנה היהודי ומעגל החיים. חיבור זה הפך פופולרי, התפרסם במהדורות אחדות, ובתקופת הכיבוש הנאצי יצאה מהדורה חדשה שלו. הספר תורגם ליידיש ולאנגלית, ונדפס על מהדורותיו השונות כשלושים פעמים עד לשואה. “שטונדען דער אנדאכט” יצא לאור לאחרונה בתרגום עברי הנושא את הכותר “שעות התייחדות”. את המבוא לספר כתבה ח”כ ד”ר עליזה לביא, ואת התפילות תרגמה קטיה מנור. כפי שמוזכר מפורשות בספר, דבר קיומו הראשוני של ספרה של נוידא הגיע לידיעתה של לביא באמצעות כותבת שורות אלה במסגרת תפקידי כיועצת אקדמית ל”תפילת נשים”. אפשר לציין באורח מעניין כי שנות חייה של פאני נוידא חופפות ברובן לאלה של חנה רחל ורברמאכר (1806?–1888), מי שנודעה בכינוי “הבתולה מלודמיר”, שימשה כאדמו”רית ובאה להתגורר בירושלים. דמות נוספת ששנותיה מקבילות במידה רבה לאלה של נוידא היא רבקה ליפא אניקשטער (נפטרה בשנת תרנ”ג; 1893), בת היישוב הישן שעלתה ארצה בשנות השישים של המאה התשע-עשרה. אישה זו פרסמה בשנת תרמ”ב (1882) את הקונטרס “זכר עולם”, שעתיד היה לראות אור במהדורות אחדות. היא שימשה מורת דרך לשתי נשים נוספות ביישוב הישן, רייצע בת מרדכי וטויבע פעסיל פיינשטיין, שהילכו בדרכה והוציאו לאור אף הן קונטרסים בשלהי המאה התשע- עשרה.1 כפי שנוידא מגוללת במבוא לספרה, הוא לא נכתב על ידה בבת אחת, אלא לפנינו יצירה שהתהוותה על פני זמן, אשר את משכו המדויק איננו יודעים. התפילות חוברו לצורך שימושה האישי, אולם היא נענתה כעבור זמן לעתירותיהם של רבים וטובים להדפיסן. מבחינה מסוימת קיים כאן תהליך דומה לזה שהתרחש עם “ליקוטי תפילות” לרבי נתן, תלמידו המובהק של רבי נחמן מברסלב, עשורים אחדים מוקדם יותר. רבי נתן החל לחבר בשנת תקע”ה (1815) תפילות רשות המיוסדות על תורותיו של רבי נחמן ב”ליקוטי מוהר”ן” וב”ליקוטי מוהר”ן תנינא”, בהתאם לדברי רבי נחמן עצמו לפיהם ראוי לעשות מהתורות תפילות. בראשונה חיבר רבי נתן תפילות אישיות שהיו מיועדות לשימושו הפרטי, וכיוון שנכח שתפילותיו מכילות בקשות לעניינים הנצרכים לכל אדם החליט להעתיקן ולהופכן לתפילות בעלות אופי כללי שיהיו ראויות להיאמר בידי כל אדם. בשנת תקע”ז (1817) החל להעתיק את התפילות ולהפיצן בקרב אנשי שלומו. הן התקבלו באהדה רבה עד שהפצירו בו להעתיק את כלל התפילות שחיבר ולהדפיסן. מלאכת ההדפסה של הדפוס הראשון של “ליקוטי תפילות” החלה בברסלב בראשית שנת תקפ”ב (1821), נמשכה על פני למעלה מחמש שנים, והגיעה לסיום בשנת תקפ”ז (1827).2 המהדורה העברית במסה “דברים לאמהות האצילות ולנשים בישראל” פרי עטה של נוידא, הכלולה ב”שטונדען דער אנדאכט” והמופנית לנשי ישראל, מביעה היא את מורת רוחה מכך שנשים אינן בקיאות בלשון הקודש ואינן מבינות את נוסחי התפילות בבית-הכנסת ואת ספר הספרים בשפתם המקורית. הן מקדישות זמן ללימוד נגינה בפסנתר, אך אינן מייחדות זמן ללימוד עברית, והיא מעלה את ההצעה שיקדישו שעה אחת מדי יום למטרה נעלה זו. על פניו פרסום המהדורה העברית של “שטונדען דער אנדאכט” היה אמור להיות מאורע משמח. אלא שאין אלה פני הדברים. כפי שנפרט, המהדורה בעברית רצופה טעויות לאורך חומר המבוא, אמירות שלמות וקטעים שלמים אינם מוסרים מידע נכון, ואף נוסחי התפילות דורשים הגהה. למעשה, לא שפר גורלם של תרגומי ספרה של נוידא בדורנו, שכּן גם המהדורה באנגלית שראתה אור בשנת 2007 אינה נטולת בעייתיות מהותית. כך אפשר לציין בין היתר שחלק מהתפילות עובד מחדש על בסיס התרגום האנגלי הישן, ולא תורגם מהמקור; התפילות מוצגות בתור שירה ולא פרוזה, והמחברת מגישה מהדורה חלקית בלבד. אני מוצאת לנכון להעיר בשלב הזה את ההערה הבאה: “שעות התייחדות” היה מוכן ברובו המכריע קודם שהמחברת ד”ר עליזה לביא נבחרה לכהן כח”כית, ופרסום הספר נדחה בשל כניסתה לתחום הפוליטיקה, דבר שעיכב את השלמתו הסופית. לפיכך, הסקירה הנוכחית מתייחסת לתקופה קודם היבחרותה. “שעות התייחדות” מתיימר לתרגם את המהדורה הראשונה של קובץ תפילותיה של נוידא, כהודעתה של לביא לכל אורך המבוא. כך, בין היתר, לביא מודיעה מפורשות שהיא מגישה לקוראים את המהדורה הראשונה: “בספר זה, אשר הסתמך – כאמור – על המהדורה הראשונה, משנת 1855”. אולם בפועל הנוסח המוגש הוא של המהדורה השנייה משנת 1858, מהדורה שאינה מוזכרת כלל במהלך החיבור. מהדורה זו כוללת הגהות ושינויי נוסח רבים מעשה ידי נוידא עצמה, ובכלל זה המסה המופנית לנשי ישראל זכתה להרחבה ניכרת ומוקמה בסוף הקובץ. ח”כ ד”ר עליזה לביא כותבת במהלך חומר המבוא: “ספר התפילות, שעות התייחדות (הדגש במקור – י”ל)… פורסם לראשונה בפראג בשנת 1855… ואף שאיני שולטת בשפה כלל, הבנתי מיד את תוכן העניינים: הספר מכיל דברי מבוא של המוציא לאור, פתח דבר של המְחברת, ואת התפילות עצמן… בסוף הספר בחרה המחברת, פאני נוידא, לפנות בקריאה על-זמנית לאימהות, לחנך את בנותיהן להיות בנות נאמנות וגאות לעם ישראל”. תיאור זה אינו מתאים למהדורה הראשונה. מתברר שלביא לא הייתה מודעת להימצאותם של שינויים בין שתי המהדורות הראשונות, ואפשר לקבוע שהיא לא עיינה במהדורה הראשונה, ולא העלתה על דעתה את האפשרות שייתכנו הבדלים בין המהדורות. ההחלפה בין המהדורות היא עניין עקרוני, וזהו מעשה שאינו ליגיטימי גם בפרסום שאינו מתיימר להיות אקדמי במובהק. כאמור, נוידא עצמה ערכה הגהות למהדורה הראשונה ששולבו במהדורה השנייה. לעתים נוסחיהן של המהדורות הראשונות של חיבורים משופרים יותר, אולם במקרה הנוכחי קיימת אמנם האפשרות לעשות שימוש במהדורה השנייה כבסיס למהדורה העברית, אולם חובה להודיע על כך. יחד עם זאת, דרושה הגהה נוספת של נוסחי התפילות עצמם שכּן ניתן להצביע בין היתר על תרגום בלתי מהימן ב”תפילת הנערה הצעירה”. המילים במקור הגרמני “בריאים בנפשם ובגופם” תורגמו כ”בריאים בגופם ובנפשם”. אולם הנוסח בתפילות “מי שברך” לחולים הנו “רפואת הנפש ורפואת הגוף”, וכן הוא בתפילות נוספות לחולים. אין ספק שנוידא כיוונה את דבריה לתפילות מעין אלה, ולא הייתה הצדקה לשנות. חילוף זה עשוי לכאורה להצביע על ריחוקו של המתרגם מעולם הליטורגיה, או שמא על אי-הכרות עם תפילות אותנטיות. משום כך, יש צורך לעבור ולבדוק את נוסחי התפילות על ידי אדם הבקי במקורות שיוכל לעמוד על הרמזות למקורות. חשוב לציין כי בשנת 1855 יצאה לאור מהדורה נוספת של “שעות התייחדות”, מהדורה מקוצרת בת שלושים-וחמש תפילות, הנושאת את הכותר Andachtsbuch für israelitische Frauenzimmer. 3 דבר זה לא מאוזכר אצל לביא כלל. לביא מזכירה במבוא שבשנת 1859 יצאה לאור מהדורה מתורגמת ליידיש, ובה נכללו שלושים-וחמש תפילות בלבד. לאמיתו של דבר, זהו תרגום של המהדורה המקוצרת מ1855-, ובשנת 1859 יצאה לאור מהדורה נוספת עם תרגום שלם של מהדורת 1858. קיימים שני תרגומים לאנגלית של “שטונדען דער אנדאכט”, האחד יצא באירופה (שנת הפרסום המדויקת אינה ידועה) והאחר בארה”ב בשנת 1866. לביא מזכירה את אחת המהדורות בלבד. בשנת 1870 יצאה לאור בברסלאו מהדורה נוספת של “שטונדען דער אנדאכט”. מהדורה זו מצומצמת יותר בהיקפה, וכוללת כשמונים תפילות. יש בה תפילות חדשות לנושאים קיימים וכן תפילות אחדות בנושאים חדשים, כגון תפילה ליום הולדת ותפילה בשעת מגיפה. לעומת זאת, הוצאו ממנה תפילות שונות, כגון התפילות לכל אחד מימי השבוע, התפילה להפרשת חלה וחלק מהתפילות המרובות בענייני חולי. לביא כותבת שנוספו במהדורה זו תפילות חדשות, אולם לא ציינה שאף הוצאו תפילות. מהדורה זו ממתינה להיחקר. יצוין עוד כי מהדורת 1870 נדפסה פעמיים נוספות, ומהדורה שלישית מוגהת על ידי נוידא פורסמה בשנת 1890. עם זאת, המהדורה הקלאסית משנת 1858 היא זו שקנתה לה שביתה והמשיכה להידפס לאחר מכן. בנובמבר 2008 פורסמה בשפה הצ’כית מהדורה חלקית של ספרה של פאני נוידא, הכוללת למעלה משלושים תפילות. מסִּיבה בלתי ברורה לביא לא מזכירה מהדורה זו, למרות שהיא עצמה מודעת לה ומוזכרת בה. רנסנס מזה כעשור בהקשר זה יש להזכיר כי בפתח “שעות התייחדות” נאמר שעליזה לביא החזירה את החיבור לארון הספרים היהודי. אולם יש לפקפק בקביעה זו ואין לקבלה, משום שקיים רנסנס של ממש בחיבורה של נוידא מזה למעלה מעשור בארה”ב ובאירופה. כך בטינה קראץ-ריטר פרסמה, החל משנת 1985, מחקרים אחדים על נוידא. תפילות נבחרות משולבות באנתולוגיה הידועה של כתבי נשים יהודיות, Four ,Centuries of Jewish Women’s Spirituality שיצאה לאור בארה”ב במהדורתו הראשונה בשנת 1992, ומשם בין היתר נודע שמה. תפילות אחדות פורסמו בתרגום עברי ב”תפילת נשים”, שיצא לאור לראשונה בשנת ,2005 בעריכתה של לביא. בשנת 2007 יצא לאור חיבורה של דינה ברלנד, ובשנת 2008 יצאה לאור המהדורה החלקית בשפה הצ’כית. כן יצאו בשנים האחרונות מהדורות פקסימיליה של הדפסות שונות של החיבור בגרמנית ושל התרגום האנגלי משנת 1866, והפרויקט המקוון The Open Siddur Project שיכתב לאחרונה את מהדורת .1858 אם כן, ללביא שמור חלק כלשהו ברנסנס של ההתעניינות בכתביה של נוידא, אולם במפורש לא בלעדיות. כאמור, תפילות נבחרות אחדות התפרסמו ב”תפילת נשים”, ובערב יום הכיפורים תשס”ח (2007) קיבלה לביא, כדבריה במבוא ל”שעות התייחדות”, החלטה לפעול לתרגום הספר במלואו, למרות שהעניין עלה במפורש לדיון קודם למועד זה. אגב, גם הנסיבות שהביאו את לביא לערוך את “תפילת נשים” מעוגנות במועד של ערב יום הכיפורים, לפי מה שכתבה במבוא לקובץ זה. לביא מציינת כי בשעה שהחלה להתחקות אחר עקבותיה של פאני נוידא, והקישה את שמה במנועי החיפוש בעברית, לא עלה בידה למצוא מידע או אזכורים על אודותיה. וכאן עולה השאלה, מאימתי הימצאות מידע בגוגל היא אמת מידה עבור חוקר? חוקר אמור להתמקד בעיקר בחומר ממקורות כתובים. ואמנם, חיוני לומר שלביא אינה מסתייעת במכלול הספרות הקיימת בנושא, אלא בחלקו בלבד. לפאני נוידא כאלמנה לא היו האמצעים לפרסם את ספרה, ולואיזה פון רוטשילד (1894–1820) סייעה בידה. נוידא הקדישה לה עמוד הוקרה בפתיחת הספר. לואיזה פון רוטשילד הייתה אשת מאיר קרל פון רוטשילד (1820–1886), בתו הצעירה של נתן מאיר פון רוטשילד מאנגליה, ואף הוא מוזכר בעמוד ההוקרה. היא נישאה למאיר קרל פון רוטשילד מפרנקפורט, מקום אליו עברה עם נישואיה בשנת 1842. עליזה לביא לא זיהתה את העניין, וסברה שמדובר בעמוד הנצחה לדמות אחרת ממשפחת רוטשילד. משום כך גם תהתה לגבי אזכור העיר פרנקפורט בעמוד זה. “הערת המערכת” ב”שעות התייחדות” מוסרת ש”סדר התפילות מובא כפי שקבעה פאני נוידא”. אולם דבר זה אינו מדויק, ומיקומן של שתי תפילות המופיעות לקראת סוף הקובץ שוּנה למיקומים הנראים כמתאימים יותר. הכוונה ל”תפילה לראש השנה וליום הכיפורים לפני תפילת ‘עלֵינו'” ו”תפילה לחג הסוכות, בהקפות עם הלולב והאתרוג”. חובה היה לסייג את האמירה הכללית, ולהודיע לקוראים על השינויים. אפשר להצביע על שגיאות אחרות בחומר המבוא. ברשימה הביבליוגרפית לביא כוללת רישום של המהדורה הראשונה ושל המהדורה שיצאה לאור בידי ד”ר מרתה ורטהיימר בשלטון הנאצי. בכל אחד מהפריטים הללו מצויה שגיאה בהעתקה. בהערת שוליים לביא מציינת את המהדורה הראשונה, בהזכירה את הוצאת ברנדייס, ולא פאשלס. זאת בשעה שהמהדורה הראשונה של הוצאת ברנדייס הייתה בשנת 1868. לביא הכניסה שינוי טכני למבואהּ של נוידא. במהדורה הראשונה והשנייה תאריך כתיבת המבוא מופיע בסוף, דבר שמבטא את הנוהג בספרים בעבר. אולם לביא העבירה זאת לראש המבוא, למרות שלא היה אמור לחול כאן שינוי כלשהו. בסוף המבוא הגרמני כתוב “הסופרת”, אולם לביא שינתה וחתמה את המבוא בשם “פאני נוידא לבית שמידל”. שמה זה של נוידא מופיע מעל גבי שער החיבור, אולם גם שינוי כזה מזקיק הערה. אחת העדויות המעשיות שלביא מביאה לגבי אמירת תפילות מתוך “שטונדען דער אנדאכט” היא עדותה של גב’ יהודית וירצבורגר מתל-אביב בשם בעלה, שלא נזכר בשמו. לדבריה, סבתו נהגה לומר במהלך שנות מלחמת העולם הראשונה את “תפילת אם שבנהּ משרת בצבא” בשפה הגרמנית, וכן נהגה אמו בשעה שבניה שירתו בצה”ל. למעשה, שמעון וירצבורגר עצמו התייחס לעניין זה קודם לכן בדברים שכתב בעיתון “הצופה” בשנת 2003. 4 הוא מציין שם שהתחינה הנזכרת נאמרה בידי סבתו במלחמת העולם הראשונה בשעה שארבעת בניה היו בצבא הגרמני, וכן אמו אמרה אותה במהלך מלחמת השחרור בכל עת שאחיו או הוא היו מגוייסים. מקורות השראה ספר התפילות של נוידא לא נוצר יש מאין, ואפשר לעמוד על מקור השראה מובהק ששימש לו בסיס. הכוונה לקובץ התפילות לנשים יהודיות בצרפתית “אמרי לב”, שיצא לאור לראשונה בשנת 1848. חיבור זה היה פופולרי מאוד בקרב יהודי צרפת, ויצא לאור בשנת 1856 בתרגום אנגלי מעשה ידיה של הסטר (אסתר) רוטשילד. נודעת השפעה ברורה של “אמרי לב” על “שטונדען דער אנדאכט”. ב”אמרי לב” מובאת קשת תפילות רחבת-היקף, ולמרבית מנושאי תפילותיה של נוידא מצויות הקבלות בחיבור הזה, והתפילות מובאות בעיקרן בסדר זהה ל”אמרי לב”. ניכרים גם דמיונות תוכניים שונים בין התפילות בשני הקבצים. כמו כן, בראש כל תפילה ב”אמרי לב” מובא כתוב מקראי, ונוידא אימצה תבנית כללית זו. לביא מאריכה את הדיבור על הייחודיות כביכול של תפילתה של נוידא לחג השבועות, תפילה המוסבת על קריאת עשרת הדיברות והמתייחסת באופן פרטני לכל אחת מהדיברות, ואולם הקבלה מובהקת אליה מצויה ב”אמרי לב”. לביא מציינת כי פאני לא הייתה הראשונה שחיברה קובץ תפילות בגרמנית, והיא מונה שלושה קבצים כאלה שחוברו בידי גברים. השני מביניהם הוא “תחנוני בת יהודה”, שיצא לאור בשנת 1846, ולגביו לביא לא מציינת מי היה מחברו. והנה, זהו לא אחר ממאיר הלוי לעטעריס (1800?–1871). לביא מזכירה דמות זו במקום אחר ב”שעות התייחדות” בהקשר לחמש תפילות שבחרה שלא לתרגם. לדבריה, שתיים מהן ניטלו מתוך מחזור התפילה ליום כיפורים של לעטעריס, ושלוש האחרות נתחברו בידי מחברים שונים.5 אולם לביא לא זיהתה ששלושת הטקסטים האלה מופיעים ב”תחנוני בת יהודה” וכן בחיבור קודם של לעטעריס משנת 1845. 6 אחת התפילות ב”תחנוני בת יהודה” מובאת ב”תפילת נשים”, ושם ההתייחסות למחבר היא כ-ד”ר מקס לטריס. בנוסף, כותר המהדורה המקוצרת של ספרה של נוידא משנת 1855 איננו זהה למהדורה הראשונה השלימה,7 אך זהה לתחילתו של כותר המשנה של ספרו של לעטעריס.8 לביא כתבה ב”תפילת נשים” כי נוידא בספר תפילותיה בחרה לעצמה את פסוקי הפתיח. אולם אין הדברים האלה מדויקים. היא חרגה אמנם מהכתובים המובאים ב”אמרי לב”, אולם מכל מקום ניכרת השפעה. וכך אפשר לציין ביחס ל”תפילת הנערה הצעירה” כי “אמרי לב”, “תחנוני בת יהודה” ו”שטונדען דער אנדאכט” עושים שלושתם שימוש באותו הפסוק עצמו, “שקר החן והבל היופי”. תפילה להפרשת חלה מצויה אצל נוידא ואצל לעטעריס, אך לא ב”אמרי לב”, ובשניהם אין כתוב פותח. התפילה על עשרת הדיברות אינה מצויה בשלושת החיבורים בגרמנית שמנתה לביא, אלא ב”אמרי לב” בלבד. ב”שטונדען דער אנדאכט” אין תפילה לטבילה, זאת בדומה לקבצי התפילות לנשים בשפות לעז שלא כללו תפילות לעניין זה. לעומתם, מרבית קבצי התחינות ביידיש כללו תפילות בנושא זה. אם כן, פאני נוידא החרתה-החזיקה אחרי קבצי התפילות בלעז בבחירתה שלא לכלול תפילה בנושא טבילה. העמידה על מקורות השראתה של פאני נוידא אף מבטלת את האפשרות להחשיבה כ”פורצת דרך”, כפי שלביא מבקשת לטעון. נוידא צעדה בעקבות קודמיה, שאבה במידה מרובה מ”אמרי לב” את הדגם הכללי כמו גם תכנים מסוימים, ובמידה מינורית הושפעה מ”תחנוני בת יהודה”. תפילותיה של נוידא משקפות אמנם נקודת מבט נשית, אולם גם בקבצים שעליהם הסתמכה מובאים רעיונות דומים לאלה שהזכירה, כגון לדוגמה לגבי “תפילת הרעיה האומללה”, באופן שאין ניכרת בספרה בשׂורה חדשה או מהפכה של ממש. כאן המקום לציין כי נודעת בעייתיות בכל הקשור לתכנים המובעים אצל נוידא ב”תפילת הרעיה האומללה”, וכן בתפילה המקבילה ב”אמרי לב”. לקראת סוף התפילה נאמר בתפילתה של נוידא: “‘אני מוכנה ומזמנה להעלות לקרבן את הנאותי; לשקד על מלאכות הבית בשקט, ובארך רוח למלא את החובות המטלות עלי. ברך ובעדנה לקבל את התוכחה המרה, את המלים המרות והפוגעות, ולכבש את לב בעלי”. כלומר אישה זו מוכנה להיות אישה כנועה ובמקרה של בעל מתעלל מוכנה להבליג ולספוג התנהגות מתעללת. אין זה מוטיב שפמיניסטיות בזמננו, לרבות לביא עצמה, סומכות את ידיהן עליו. בהקשר לדיוננו בדבר מקורות השראתה של נוידא, חיוני להידרש לכותר Stunden. der Andacht הכותרת אינה מקורית לה; זהו כותר חיבורו הפופולרי של Heinrich Zschokke המביא את עיקרי האמונה הנוצרית בדרך מוסרית ופילוסופית והמחזיק כרכים אחדים, חיבור שיצא לאור בשנים 1809–1816. כותרתו של התרגום האנגלי Hours of Devotion זהה לכותר שניתן לשתי המהדורות באנגלית של ספרה של נוידא. יש לציין עוד כי בשנת 1834 הוציא לאור הרב המשכיל והמתקדם שמשון וולף רוזנפלד (1780–1862) חיבור בן כרכים אחדים, הנושא את הכותר Stunden der Andacht für Israeliten, והוא מעין חיבור יהודי המקביל לחיבור הנוצרי הנזכר. סביבתה האידיאולוגית-דתית של נוידא לביא מייחדת מקום כלשהו בדברי המבוא להזכרת הוריה של פאני, אחיה ובעלה. אביה, הרב יהודה שמידל, שימש כרב, ואימהּ, נחמה קרפלס, באה ממשפחת רבנים. אחיה של פאני, הרב אברהם-אדולף נוידא, אף הוא שימש כרב וכן בעלה, הרב אברהם נוידא. לביא מתייחסת לפולמוס שהתעורר סביב היבחרותו של בעלה לכהן כרב בלושיץ, ובהקשר זה מציינת את ההתנגדות שנבעה גם מתוקף העובדה שהיה אחד משלושה רבנים במורביה שדרשו בשפה הגרמנית. אולם אין הדברים הלאקוניים הללו משקפים את מלוא העניין. בשנת 1841, לאחר מאבק ממושך עלה בידו לכהן כרבה של לושיץ (ב”תפילת נשים” כתוב במִשְׁגֶּה שהיה רבה של ניקולסבורג), מקום אשר מנה בראשית המאבק לכהונתו בשנת 1835 כארבע-מאות יהודים. אולם גם אם בעלה החזיק בסופו של דבר בתפקיד זה, היה הוא בעל דעות מתקדמות, ותמך בהכנסת תיקונים מסוימים בדת. כך בתשובה שכתב צידד בשימוש בעוגב בבית הכנסת בשבת ובהעמדת הבימה בקדמת בית הכנסת, כמנהג המתקנים. תשובה זו יצאה לאור בשנת 1845 בקובץ שנערך מטעם התנועה הרפורמית בעיר פאפא (Pápa) שבהונגריה.9 כמו כן, אחיה של פאני היה רב בעל דעות ליברליות. שיקוף זה אינו עולה מתיאורה של לביא, למרות שהקוראים רשאים ואף מחויבים להכיר את האוריינטציה הדתית של הדמויות הפועלות הקשורות לחיבור. יתירה מכך, אין בידינו אמנם לדעת בבירור מה הייתה השקפת עולמה הדתי של פאני נוידא, אולם אפשר לקבוע שמחברי הכתבים שאותם היא מצטטת היו מחוגים משכיליים ומתקדמים. כאמור, פאני נוידא מביאה לרוב כתוב מקראי כפתיח לתפילות, אולם בתפילות אחדות חרגה מנוהגה זה, והביאה תוכן בעל אופי הגותי. פתיח אחד נטול מתוך כתביו של שלמה מימון. פתיח אחר מביא קטע מכִּתבי גבריאל רייסר ,(1863–1806) מראשי האמנציפציה. כפי שהזכרנו, נוידא שאבה טקסטים אחדים מ”תחנוני בת יהודה”, ואחד מהם אף הוא נטול מחיבור של רייסר. טקסט אחר לקוח מהקובץ “שירי ישורון”, שיצא לאור בשנת 1829, וחובר בידי הרב המתקדם יוסף יאהלזאן. לעטעריס עצמו, שממנו שאבה נוידא, נמנה על ראשי המשכילים בגליציה. מתרגם המהדורה האנגלית של ספרה של נוידא שראתה אור בארה”ב, מוריץ מאייר, היה רב רפורמי. אם כן, הסביבה האינטלקטואלית שאפפה את נוידא הייתה סביבה של יהודים ליברליים ומתקדמים. על רקע תיאורנו זה עולה גם השאלה באיזו מידה אמנם רלוונטי ונחוץ לנשים דתיות בזמננו, בדור אתחלתא דגאולה, לאמץ תפילות מעין אלה כמושאי הזדהות. יש באמתחתנו אוצר תפילות נאות לנשים בשפה העברית המפוזרות בקבצים שונים. חלקן בלבד נקבצו בזמננו לאסופות תפילה. אלה הן תפילות שצמחו באופן אורגני מתוך הוויה יהודית אותנטית. מבחינה זו, התחינות ביידיש מבטאות השקפה יהודית מקורית הרבה יותר מאשר קבצי התפילות בלעז. כאן המקום להעיר כי גם אם לעתים מובאים בתחינות ביידיש מוטיבים שאיננו יכולים להזדהות עמם לגמרי בזמננו, כגון נוסחים שיש בהם בקשה מפורשת לבנים זכרים, בהיותן תפילות רשות רשאים אנו לשנות ולומר נוסח אישי יותר. מלבד שימושה בכתובים מקראיים מקדימים לתפילות, נוידא מסתייעת לעתים במהלך התפילות במקורות מובהקים מאוצרותינו, וכן ישנם לפרקים הרמזות ושיבוצי מקורות. עם זאת, הסתמכותה על מקורות ספציפיים אינה כה רבה, וחלקים גדולים מקובץ התפילות כוללים רעיונות כלליים שאינם מעוגנים במקורותינו. אין בידינו ידיעות חיצוניות לגבי שיעור למדנותה של נוידא. על בסיס תוכני הקובץ אפשר לומר שהייתה לה ידיעה נאה בתנ”ך, אך אין בכוחם של המקורות הבאים לידי ביטוי בספר להצביע על בקיאות וידענות מופלגות במקורות היהדות. סיכום בבואו של מחבר להוציא לאור ספר מוטלת עליו האחריות לוודא שחיבורו יהיה נקי מטעויות. הספר הנדון בסקירה זו לא היה ראוי להתפרסם במצבו הנוכחי, ויש לצפות לפרסום מהדורה מתוקנת. המצב שבו נתון הקובץ מלמד גם על אוזלת ידה של התפיסה לפיה אין חובה לדקדק כשמדובר בחיבור פופולרי. הספר לא עבר לקטורה של מומחים, דבר שיכול היה למנוע את הטעויות. זו מהדורה שאין אפשרות להסתמך עליה ועל מהימנותה. אני תקווה שהסקירה הנוכחית, הפורטת את הבעייתיות בספר, תלווה את מי שתחת ידיהם מצויה המהדורה הראשונה. הערות 1. ראו לאחרונה יעל לוין, ‘”דיינו שה’ מחדש את כוחותיי תמיד”‘, מקור ראשון, יום שישי, 11 באפריל 2014, י”א בניסן תשע”ד, מוסף פסח, 870, עמ’ 8, 10. 2. ראו בהרחבה יעל לוין, שים שלום: תפילות לשלום העולם, אסופה מתוך “ליקוטי תפילות”, הוצאת קורן: ירושלים 2009, מבוא, עמ’ 2–4. 3. זה כותר המהדורה השלימה: Fanny Neuda, geb. Schmiedl,Stunden der Andacht: ein Gebet- und Erbauungsbuch für Israels Frauen und Jungfrauen, zur öffentlichen und häuslichen Andacht, so wie für alle Verhältnisse des weiblichen Lebens, Prag 1855. וזו כותרת המהדורה המקוצרת: Andachtsbuch für israelitische Frauenzimmer zur öffentlichen und häuslichen Erbauung in allen Verhältnissen des weiblichen Lebens, Prag .1855 4. שמעון וירצבורגר, “התחינה החסרה”, הצופה, א’ בטבת תשס”ד, סופרים וספרים, עמ’ 15. וראו את מאמר תגובתה של כותבת שורות אלה: יעל לוין, “תפילה לשלום המתגייסים לצה”ל והמשרתים בו”, הצופה, ח’ בטבת תשס”ד, עמ’ 12. 5. שלושת הטקסטים הללו מובאים במהדורת 1855 ובמהדורת 1858 בעמ’ 137–142. M. Letteris, Erbauliche Betrachtungen, hebräische .6 Sagen und Dichtungen, Prag 1845, pp. 29–30, 34–37 7. ראו לעיל, הערה 3 והטקסט לידה. 8. הכותר הלועזי של המהדורה הראשונה של “תחנוני בת יהודה” (מילים אלה מופיעות תחילה בראש העמוד) הוא: Andachtsbuch für israelitische Frauenzimmer zur öffentlichen und häuslichen Andacht in allen Verhältnissen des Lebens, als Jungfrau, Braut, Gattin und Mutter, Prag 1848. אולם המילה Andacht הוחלפה בהמשך עם המילה Erbauung. מבין מהדורת החיבור מצויות בספרייה הלאומית בירושלים המהדורה הראשונה ולאחר מכן המהדורה החמישית משנת 1852, ובה מופיע השינוי בכותר. הן חיבורו של לטריס והן ספרה של נוידא נדפסו בבית הדפוס של וולף פאשלס (Wolf Pascheles) בפראג. .9 Zulässigkeit und Dringlichkeit der Synagogen-Reformen, Wien 1845, pp. 85–89 — © כל הזכויות שמורות ליעל לוין What is Bothering the Aruch Hashulchan? Women Wearing Tefillin

What is Bothering the Aruch Hashulchan? Women Wearing Tefillin Michael J. Broyde [email protected] Please note that this piece isn’t meant to be construed one way or another as the view of the Seforim Blog. Introduction In our previous article,[1] we focused on the view of the Mishnah Berurah concerning women wearing tefillin. In this article, we focus on the Aruch Hashulchan, whose approach is also complex, reflecting the complexity of the area. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 38:6) states: נשים ועבדים פטורים מתפילין מפני שהיא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא דשבת ויו”ט פטור מתפילין ואם רוצין להחמיר על עצמן מוחין בידן ולא דמי לסוכה ולולב שפטורות ועכ”ז מברכות עליהן דכיון דתפילין צריך זהירות יתירה מגוף נקי כדאמרינן בשבת [מ”ט.] תפילין צריכין גוף נקי כאלישע בעל כנפים ובירושלמי ברכות שם אמרו תמן אמרין כל שאינו כאלישע בעל כנפים אל יניח תפילין אך אנשים שמחויבים בהכרח שיזהרו בהם בשעת ק”ש ותפלה ולכן אין מניחין כל היום כמ”ש בסי’ הקודם וא”כ נשים שפטורות למה יכניסו עצמן בחשש גדול כזה ואצלן בשעת ק”ש ותפלה כלאנשים כל היום לפיכך אין מניחין אותן להניח תפילין ואף על גב דתניא בעירובין [צ”ו.] דמיכל בת שאול היתה מנחת תפילין ולא מיחו בה חכמים אין למידין מזה דמסתמא ידעו שהיא צדקת גמורה וידעה להזהר וכן עבדים כה”ג [עמג”א סק”ג וב”י ולפמ”ש א”ש[: Women and slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of tefillin since it is a positive commandment that is time bound since tefillin are not worn on Shabbat and Yom Tov. If they wish to adopt this as a stringency, we should protest. This is not comparable to sukkah and lulav from which they are exempt, but nonetheless recite a blessing. This is because tefillin require extra diligence regarding cleanliness, as it states in Shabbat (49a) that tefillin need a clean body like Elisha .In the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachot) it says that anyone who is not clean like Elisha should not wear tefillin. Even men must be careful [with cleanliness] when reciting the Shema and Amida which is why they do not wear them all day, as I noted in the previous paragraph. If this is so, then why should women — who are exempt [from the mitzva of tefillin] — place themselves under this great risk, since for them, [wearing tefillin] when the Shema and the Amida are recited is comparable to men [wearing tefillin] the entire day. Therefore, we do not permit them to put on tefillin. Even though it recounts in Eruvin (96a) that Michal bat Shaul did don tefillin, and the rabbis did not rebuke her, we should not extrapolate from this, since they knew that she was very righteous and could be careful. Slaves are in the same situation. [See the Magen Avraham 38:3 and the Bet Yosef; according to what I have written all makes sense.] There are a few problems with the Aruch Hashulchan that are immediately clear. Four come to mind as requiring resolution in order to understand the Aruch HaShulchan: · Why does he not cite the primary source for the halacha of rebuking women, which is the Pesikta? · What are the characteristics of women who can put ontefillin according to the Aruch Hashulchan or does he mean that Michal bat Shaul is unique? · Can all slaves put on tefillin? Can any? · What is the problem with the Magen Avraham and the Bet Yosef that he is seeking to answer? In short to understand the Aruch Hashulchan’s approach, one must first comprehend what is bothering him about other approaches. In this case, he tells the reader what is bother him when he notes in his final עמג”א סק”ג]] parenthetical note וב”י ולפמ”ש א”ש in which each word is abbreviate, but crucial to understanding, so we spell it out: [עיין מגן אברהם סעיף קטן ג ובית יוסף ולפי מה שכתב אתיא שפיר[: [See the Magen Avraham call note 3, and the Bet Yoesef, and according to what I have written all is logical.] In this note, Aruch Hashulchan is claiming that neither the Magen Avraham nor the Bet Yosef have properly solved the problem, and he thus doing so. This paper is an explanation of that. The Approach of the Bet Yosef:

Bet Yosef (OC 38) quotes Tosafot, as well as the Pesikta to explain the reasoning behind Chazal’s recorded disapproval of Michal bat Shaul wearing tefillin. Bet Yosef states and elaborates: כתב הכל בו (סי’ כא) בשם הר”ם שאם רצו הנשים להניח תפילין אין שומעין להן מפני שאינן יודעות לשמור עצמן בנקיות עכ”ל ובספר ארחות חיים (הל’ תפילין סי’ ג) הקשה עליו מדאמרינן בריש פרק המוצא תפילין (שם) דמיכל בת כושי (פירוש בת שאול) היתה מנחת תפילין ולא מיחו בה חכמים. ולי נראה שטעם הר”ם כמו שכתבו התוספות (ד”ה מיכל) דאיתא בפסיקתא (רבתי פרק כב) שמיחו בה חכמים ופירשו הם דטעמא משום דתפילין צריכין גוף נקי ונשים אינן זריזות ליזהר והר”מ רצה לחוש לדברי הפסיקתא: The Kol Bo (21) writes in the name of the Maharam that if women wish to wear tefillin, we do not listen to them, since they do not know how to keep themselves clean. The Orchot Chaim (Tefillin 3) questioned this based on the Talmud in Eruvin 96a that Michal bat Kushi (daughter of Saul) did don tefillin and the rabbis did not rebuke her. To me, it appears that the view of the Maharam is like that quoted by Tosafot (sv michal) as it appears in the Pesikta that the Sages did rebuke her. They explained the reason to be that tefillin need a clean body and women are not careful about such matters. Maharam was concerned for the view of the Pesikta. The Bet Yosef is clear and simple. He thinks that there is a dispute between rabbinic sources about whether any women can ever wear tefillin. The Babylonian Talmud rules that Michal bat Shaul can wear tefillin, and she is a model for all other women; the Pesikta states that such is prohibited to all women, even to women like Michal bat Shaul. Some, the Bet Yosef claims, are concerned with the view of the Pesikta, which they think is normative. Following his rules to resolve disputes, Rabbi Karo in the Shulchan Aruch rules against the Peskita and like the Bavli, as such is the resolution favored by Rambam, Rif and Rosh. Rabbi Karo states simply: נשים ועבדים פטורים מתפילין, מפני שהוא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא. Women and slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of tefillin since it is a positive time bound commandment. Nothing is codified to discourage this conduct; only an exemption is noted. The view of our Talmud is codified and nothing else is cited. According to Rabbi Karo, tefillin are like lulav, sukkah and shofar, which women need not, but may do, and is a mitzvah for them to do. The Peskta is rejected. The Approach of the Magen Avraham The Rema, however, adds the alternative: הגה: ואם הנשים רוצין להחמיר על עצמן, מוחין בידם. If the women wish to be strict for themselves, we protest. The Rema seems to be adopting the view of the Pesikta that we ought to protest such conduct, essentially prohibiting it. Much is unclear about the Rama, including why and does he mean all women (although logic inclines one to think that he means all women.) To explain the position of the Rama, Magen Avraham (38:3) write: מוחין כו’ – מפני שצריכין גוף נקי ונשים אינם זריזות להזהר אבל אם היו חייבים לא היו פטורין מה”ט דהוי רמי אנפשייהו ומזדהרי כנ”ל דלא כע”ת: We protest: Since they need a clean body and women are not particularly careful with cleanliness; but if they were obligated, they would not be exempt for that reason since they would accept the mitzvah upon themselves and they would thus be conscientious. Such appears to me to be the rule, and not like the Olat Tamid. The whole thrust of the Magen Avraham is to explain the view of the Pesikta in contrast to the Bavli. The Magen Avraham explains that the Pesikta rules once one is not obligated in donning tefillin, one is not careful to be clean and only those obligated are considered careful enough to wear tefillin. The Magen Avraham’s view is simple and central. The halacha follows the Pesikta’s view which is that the Rabbis made a decree that no one may don tefillin other than those who are obligated. Even Michal bat Shaul may not. The Magan Avraham explains the Rama as clearly residing in the camp which rules that the halacha follows the Pesikta against the Bavli. The whole thrust of the reasoning of the Magen Avraham is to reject the view of the Olat Tamid who argues that Rama is codifying only the rule that women who are not clean should be rebuked.[2] Understanding the Aruch Hashulchan The Aruch Hashulchan does not adopt either of these views. He thinks that the halacha is balanced between two textual imperatives, and he thinks that neither the Magen Avraham nor the Bet Yosef has balanced them correctly, since one accepts that the Bavli is completely correct and one that the Pesikta is the rule. Not so the Aruch Hashulchan: he accepts the ruling of the Pesikta as codified by the Rama that one needs to rebuke women who don tefillin, but he has to harmonize that ruling with the binding holding of the Babylonia Talmud, which is the center of his (and our) halachic universe that Michal Bat Shaul was not rebuked. How does he do that? The answer is clear. He quotes the Rama’s ruling (twice!) that one rebukes women and then he explains the rule of the Rama consistent with the Talmud. He never quotes the view of the Pesikta and explains the halacha exclusively on the basis of the Bavli. His logic is simple and it can be laid out in almost mathematical form. 1. We are very concerned about physical cleanliness and thus no men wear tefillin other than during morning prayer time when they are obligated to. 2. Men are obligated and women are not. 3. Thus, just like we discourage men from wearing tefillin all day long, we discourage women from wearing tefillin even during prayer, since they are not obligated. 4. But (just like it is not prohibited for a man who is careful to wear his tefillin all day long[3]), it is not prohibited for a woman to wear tefillin if she is careful. Only exceptional and rare women are careful in that way. 5. The Babylonian Talmudic discussion about Michal bat Shaul is not – as the Bet Yosef claims – about all women, but only about special and unique women. The Pesikta claim that the Bavli is wrong even about these special and unique women has to be rejected as the Bavli is controlling when directly on point. But, in all other cases, we follow the Pesikta, since the Bavli can be read as only speaking about special cases. Thus, while he quotes the Rama’s view that we must object to women donning tefillin, he modifies it in his last sentence of analysis — exactly because it goes quite clearly and directly against our Talmud (the touchstone of Jewish law). Aruch Hashulchan wants to make it clear that we do rule exactly like the Bavli, but as understood though the lenses of the Pesikta. When the Peskita and the Bavli directly conflict or seem to conflict, then we have to adopt the rule of Bavli: when they do not, we adopt an explanation of the Bavli consistent with that of the Pesikta. That explanation focuses on the rule of cleanliness, and rules that people who might be unclean and who are not obligated ought to be rebuked when they don tefillin. In short, the Aruch Hashulchan rules that as a general rule women are rebuked (as the Pesikta states) but exceptional women are not, as the Bavli rules, but even the Bavli agrees that women generally should not don tefillin.[4] The following things are then apparent from the Aruch Hashulchan. · He rejects the view of the Magen Avraham that all women and slaves are categorically prohibited from donning tefillin. · The Aruch Hashulchan does not cite the Pesikta because he thinks that the ultimate holding of the Pesikta is wrong, in that Michal bat Shaul is allowed to wear tefillin without rebuke. But, he does not reject the rule of rebuke generally, as he is concerned that women will cavalierly don tefillin when they are not clean, and that should be discouraged and rebuked. · The Aruch Hashulchan thinks that, as a matter of theory, a slave and a cheresh (who are also not obligated in tefillin) are also allowed to wear tefillin when concerns of cleanliness are not present. It is unclear from his formulation if he adopts the view of the Olat Tamid that all slaves can wear tefillin, or he adopts the view of the Tosaphot Yerushalayim that only slaves who are rare and special like Tevi are allowed to wear tefillin. But, it is clear from the Aruch Hashulchan’s formulation with regard to a cheresh that one who is not obligated but clean may wear tefillin.[5] (For reasons explained in the previous article on the Mishnah Berurah, in terms of tefillin law, both slaves and chereshim are harder cases than women.[6]) In Sum: The Aruch HaShulchan preserves the Talmudic rule of non-rebuke in a subset of case, as that is the rule codified in the Talmud. This is consistent with a proper methodological understanding of the Aruch Hashulchan, who would be very hesitant to rule like a Pesikta against a clear Bavli. He argues with the Magen Avraham and those many others who codify the rule that rebukes even Michal bat Shaul. So too, he argues with the Bet Yosef who simply ignores the Pesikta completely. The Aruch Hashulchan codifies both rules while giving priority to the Bavli when the two sources conflict. This approach of the Aruch Hashulchan explains why he is also comfortable arguing with the inclination of the Magen Avraham that even men should not wear tefillin other than during the times of prayer.[7] Magen Araham is inclined to rule that once a man has fulfilled the tefillin obligation, he should not put them on again, since a man who has already donned tefillin is like a woman who has not, and neither may don again, (based on the rules of the Pesikta). Aruch Hashulchab rejects the rule of the Pesikta as applicable to all women, treating it only as good advice and permits both very pious and unique men and women to violate it when it is clear that fears about cleanliness do not apply to them. צדקת and such women he calls יחידי סגולה Such men he calls .גמורה There is one important thing still unclear in the Aruch Hashulchan. We do not know who else fits into the Michal bat Shaul rule besides her? He classifies women who should not be which צדקת גמורה וידעה להזהר rebuked under the heading of literally means that “she was a completely righteous woman who knew to be careful [about cleanliness]”[8] What is clear, however, is a few things. 1. The Aruch HaShulchan rejects without citing[9] the view of the Olat Tamid 38:3 that the proper classification of women who may put on tefillin is as elderly, since the Aruch Hashulchan does not connect cleanliness to menstruation (other than in some factual way, as he does in OC 88:4). 2. Furthermore, the Aruch Hashulchan does not limit to the rule of Michal bat Shaul to a functional null set, like other authorities, who nominally rule like the Bavli in the case of Michal bat Shaul and the Pesikta in all other cases, but insist that the Michal bat Shaul case is limited to daughters of kings who are also wives of kings, as the Levush does (OC 17:2) or various kabbalists (cited by the Klaf Hachaim 38:9) who limit it to women who cannot have children and do not menstruate. These halachic authorities are trying to solve the problem of the Bavli being in conflict with the Pesikta as limiting the Bavli to a functional null set and the Aruch Hashulchan will have none of that. To the Aruch Hashulchan, Michal bat Shaul is a functional case, as if he just sought nominal fidelity to the rule of the Bavli, he would have adopted some other rule that totally minimizes the Bavli. 3. The Aruch HaShulchan, like the Mishnah Berurah before him, rejects without citing the view of the Gra (38:3) who rules that the Bavli and the Pesikta both agree that women ought to be rebuked for donning tefillin. 4. The Aruch Hashulchan, like the Mishnah Berurah before him, rejects the rule of the Magen Avraham that all those who are not obligated in tefillin may not wear them. Rather, the Aruch Hashulchan codifies two simple rules: (1) Women generally should not wear tefillin out of concerns of cleanliness; (2) special women who are righteous and clean may do so. Of course, to what extent this has practical halakhic application is for a different discussion. For example, there might be other rationales outside oftefillin law prohibiting such conduct,[10] or one could look to the view of the Magen Avraham and Pri Megadim and object to women wearing tefilin due simply to their lack of obligation. But, the Aruch Hahsulchan standing alone as a matter of tefillin law does not flatly prohibit clean righteous women from wearing tefillin.

[1] http://seforim.blogspot.com/2014/05/fixing-typesetting-error-i n-order-to.html [2] As the Pre Megadim notes in his explanation of the Magen Avraham, the Ashel Avraham 3, Magen Avraham rules that all those exempt may not put on tefillin. This is in direct contrast with the Olat מהא דאמרנן דלא מיחו בה חכמים משמע:Tamid (38:4) who writes דאם האשה זקנה וידעינן בה שיודעת לשמור את עצמה דאין למחות בה ובה”ג מיירי :התם Nevertheless, the source that says the Rabbis did not rebuke Michal does imply that if a woman is elderly [i.e., post-menopausal] and we know that she is capable of watching herself [to stay clean], one should not rebuke her. And it is such a case that the Talmud has in mind there [i.e. in me shemeto, where women are said to be exempt from wearingtefilin , not categorically forbidden from doing so]. [3] As Aruch Hashulchan OC יחידי“) explicitly notes that uniquely rare men 37:3 wear tefillin (“סגולה all day even nowadays. [4] Much more can be said about how the Aruch HaShulchan address tensions between the Bavli and other Talmudic sources, which needs a much longer essay. See generally http://www.torahmusings.com/2011/05/the-yerushalmi-as-a-source -of-halacha/. [5]Aruch Hashulchan 37:12 states simply: וחרש ושוטה ודאי דאין ליתן להם תפילין דבודאי לא יזהרו בקדושתם: A cheresh and an insane person should not be given tefillin since certainly they will not be careful with their holiness. Implying that such a person who can be careful is not prohibited. [6] See the Mishnah Berurah article cited in note 1. [7] See Aruch Hashulchan OC 37:3: ויש שמשמע מדבריהם שמי שירצה עתה להניחם כל היום בבטחו שלא יפיח ולא יסיח דעת ומ”מ לא יניחם כל היום [עמג”א סק”ב] ולענ”ד לא נראה כן וכן שמענו שיש יחידי סגולה ומה גם בדורות שלפנינו שהיו נושאים כל היום ועכשיו נהגו ג”כ היחידים השרידים ללמוד מעט בהם אחר התפלה There are those who wish to derive from their words that one who wishes to don tefillin all day, certain that he will neither pass gas nor lose focus, still should not do so [Magen Avraham 37:2] and inmy opinion this does not appear correct, and we have heard that there are unique special people even in the generations before us who donned tefillin all day, and even now it is the custom of a few to keep them on a bit after morning prayers. [8] As I explain above, I think it roughly correspondent to the way he understands men who can wear tefillin unique and) יחידי סגולה all day, who he calls special people) — special cases which actually do exist, but were not common. [9] Unlike many of his contemporaries – including the Mishnah Berurah who cites the Olat Tamid more than 400 times — the Aruch Hashulchan did not cite the Olat Tamid more than 15 times and even then only when he is cited by others (most commonly, the Aliyah Rabba). I suspect that the Aruch Hashulchan did not actually have the Olat Tamid in his library as it was already a rare work. [10] See for example, Piskai Teshuva 38:3 who provide one such reason or the recent teshuva of Rabbi Hershel Schachter who provides another.

The Pew Report and the Orthodox Community (and Other Assorted Comments), part 1

The Pew Report and the Orthodox Community (and Other Assorted Comments), part 1 Marc B. Shapiro 1. Here is a short piece I wrote a right after the appearance of the Pew Report. (The endnote is not part of the original article.) There has been a great deal of discussion in the wake of the recent release of the Pew Research Center’s “Portrait of Jewish Americans.” Some have focused on the report’s evidence of increasing intermarriage and lack of any Jewish connection of many in the younger generation. Others have zeroed in on some of the survey’s anomalies and results that are simply not correct. For example, the survey informs us that 1% of Ultra- Orthodox Jews had a Christmas tree last year. I would be willing to bet that in the entire world there isn’t even one Ultra-Orthodox Jew with a Christmas tree, and 1% means at least a few thousand Ultra Orthodox households have Christmas trees. After adding in the Modern Orthodox, we are told that 4% of Orthodox Jews have Christmas trees. Being that the survey places the Orthodox at 10% of the Jewish population, and also tells us that there are 5.3 million adult Jews (another one the survey’s surprises), this leads to the result that more than 21,000 adult Orthodox Jews have Christmas trees in their homes. Since these results are not just improbable, but impossible, it raises the general question of how reliable the survey is when it comes to the Orthodox. Can anyone believe the survey when it tells us that in the 18-29 age bracket the Modern Orthodox only account for 1% of the country’s Jews while the Ultra-Orthodox account for 9%, or that in the 30-49 age bracket, the Modern Orthodox are 3% and the Ultra Orthodox 10%. We are also are told that 24% of Ultra-Orthodox Jews handle money on Shabbat but only 19 percent of Modern Orthodox Jews do so. (Who was it that said the Ultra-Orthodox are frummer than the Modern Orthodox?!)

When you read results like these you can only wonder what went wrong, and I hope we get some explanation as to how such results were generated. (Professor Jonathan Sarna has written to me that all surveys have absurd results for various reasons, and “one is to look at broad trends and ignore absurdities.”) Perhaps there was confusion about the way the questions were asked. Such confusion is the only way I can explain that only 64% of the Ultra-Orthodox agree that a person can be Jewish if he works on the Sabbath. The truth is that every Ultra-Orthodox Jew knows that a person who works on the Sabbath is still Jewish (albeit a sinning Jew). I presume that those who answered “no” to the question understood it to be asking if one can be a “good Jew” and work on the Sabbath. (In case anyone has been wondering, I use the term “Ultra- Orthodox” since that is what the survey uses. I don’t know why no one told the survey directors that this term is no longer regarded as appropriate.)

The sort of anomalies I have mentioned appear to be confined to matters of religious life, and other areas seem more believable. For example, we are told that 37% of Modern Orthodox households have incomes in excess of $150,000, which places them in the top ten percent of Americans. This strikes me as on the mark and illustrates one of the great problems with Modern Orthodoxy in the United States. Anyone who has been to Israel knows that there are non-haredi Orthodox Jews in all areas of life. You see men with kippot who are bus drivers, security guards, and doing every other job imaginable. Yet in the United States, Modern Orthodoxy has become largely an upper middle class phenomenon. The cost of a Modern Orthodox lifestyle, which includes expensive schools and camps, is simply beyond most people’s reach. I believe that this cost is a major reason why the Modern Orthodox camp has not picked up much in the way of ba’alei teshuvah.[1]

I have no doubt that many of the non-Orthodox admire the Modern Orthodox lifestyle, and would be willing to try it out, before learning the cost. Many non-Orthodox would also be happy to send their kids to Modern Orthodox schools, but they are not going to sacrifice a middle class lifestyle for this. Those who grow up Modern Orthodox and remain in the community are prepared to make the financial sacrifices (as well as limiting how many children they have). But for those who are not part of the community, the entry fee is simply too high. Needless to say, there are also those among the Modern Orthodox who drift away because of the financial cost, and this drifting often begin when the first child is enrolled in public school. As I see it, the financial burden is the great Achilles’ heel of Modern Orthodoxy, and what prevents it from any real growth. By the same token, those of us in the Modern Orthodox world must recognize that one of the great strengths of the haredi community is that there is room in it for everyone, from the wealthy real estate developer to the blue- collar worker. If, as so many predict, the future of American Orthodoxy is with the haredim, money (or lack of it) will play an important role in this story.

* * * * * *

The Pew Report reported very high levels of intermarriage in the Jewish community.[2] Yet even among those who would never dream of intermarrying, we know that some engage in sexual relations with non-Jews. There is an interesting responsum in this regard by the late R. Moshe Stern, the Debrecener Rav, Be’er Moshe, vol. 4 no. 141.

R. Stern testifies to receiving numerous questions regarding this matter by the very people engaged in such behavior. For those who don’t know anything about R. Stern and who asked him questions, I can tell you that these were definitely not Modern Orthodox people or members of the Lithuanian yeshiva world.[3] This volume of Be’er Moshe was reprinted in 1984 without any changes. However, sometime after that the volume was reprinted again. There is no indication of when this took place, as the title page is the same as the 1984 edition. (Presumably, the reprint was after R. Stern’s passing in the summer of 1997.) Someone called my attention to how the responsum appears in this most recent reprint.

The censorship of this responsum can only have one purpose, namely, so that people don’t learn about how some members of R. Stern’s community (the Hungarian hasidic world) are having sexual relations with non-Jewish women. What is the remedy for these men who are intimate with non- Jewish women? Repentance, of course. Yet there is a very strange opinion as to how to go about this repentance. R. Solomon Ephraim Luntshitz, in his Keli Yekar[4] to Numbers 19:21, says something which is so “out of the box” that I am shocked that it has not yet been censored from the Mikraot Gedolot. (Yes, I realize that it is just a matter of time.) R. Luntshitz is discussing the statement in Yoma 86b: “How is one proved a repentant sinner? Rav Judah said: If the object which caused his original transgression comes before him on two occasions, and he keeps away from it. Rav Judah indicated: With the same woman, at the same time, in the same place.” In context, this means only what it says, but not that someone should actually put himself in this situation. Yet this is exactly the lesson R. Luntshitz derives. He refers to Berakhot 34b, “In the place where penitents stand even the wholly righteous cannot stand.” R. Luntschitz cites an opinion that the ba’al teshuvah (penitent) of a sexual sin has to put himself in the exact same situation as he was before, that is, to be alone with the very same woman and overcome his inclination. This is not permitted to one who is “wholly righteous” since he is forbidden to put himself in this situation. But the penitent needs to do this in order for his repentance to be complete, and this explains how a wholly righteous one cannot stand where the penitent stands, since the penitent has to put himself in a situation that would be forbidden for the righteous one. R. Luntshitz explains that the very act of repentance, i.e., being alone with the woman, “makes the pure [the tzaddik] impure and the impure [the sinner] pure.” This is a strange passage for any number of reasons, not least of which that the action of being alone with the woman is itself sinful, even if it never leads to any sexual activity. Yet R. Luntshitz tells us that in this case we have an exception, and true repentance requires intentionally putting oneself in the exact same situation one was beforehand and this time overcoming one’s inclination. Of course, there is no guarantee that the person will emerge successfully from this self-imposed test. R. Israel Isserlein reports such an occurrence, where an individual put himself in this situation in order to achieve proper repentance, but ended up sinning again![5] Sefer Hasidim earlier warned against falling into precisely this trap.[6] R. Luntschitz’s point is also found in his Olelot Ephraim, vol. 2, no. 228, showing that he was entirely convinced of his position. R. Luntschitz was the rabbi of Prague, yet a later incumbent of this position, R. Ezekiel Landau, strongly rejects R. Luntschitz’s point. He acknowledges that many shared R. Luntschitz’s error, which I think is interesting since I can’t imagine anyone having such an opinion today.[7] R. Landau doesn’t tell us who else advocated R. Luntschitz’s view, but R. Mordechai Harris,[8] R. Dovid Yoel Weiss,[9] R. Yaakov Levi,[10] and Nahum Rakover[11] provide sources. Among these sources are R. Joseph ben Judah Loeb Jacob, Rav Yevi (Netanya, 2012), to Psalms 36:3, who quotes the Baal Shem Tov as offering the same approach as R. Luntschitz. Jewish men getting together with non-Jewish women is, of course, not a new thing. The Talmud, Sanhedrin 82a, already refers to this possibility with regard to Torah scholars (!), concluding: “If he is a scholar, he shall have no awakening [i.e., teaching] among the sages and none responding among the disciples.”[12] Avodah Zarah 69b-70a deals with the status of kosher wine on the table when Jewish men are sitting together with a non-Jewish prostitute. Yom Tov Assis, in his article “Sexual Behaviour in Mediaeval Hispano-Jewish Society,”[13] discusses the situation in Spain where it was not uncommon for Jews to have non-Jewish mistresses.[14] Avraham Grossman also deals with this matter and his discussion includes other parts of medieval Europe as well.[15] In R. Judah ben Asher’s responsa (Zikhron Yehudah, no. 91), we are told about the problem of Jews having sex with their non- Jewish slave girls (and also having impregnating them). A few centuries later, R. David Ibn Zimra testifies that there were men, learned in Torah, who even thought it was permissible for them to have sex with their slaves.[16] The fact that the prohibition on occasional sexual relations with non-Jewish women is only rabbinic[17] no doubt (דרך זנות) contributed to many not taking it very seriously.[18] Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:2, writes: אבל הבא על הגויה דרך זנות מכין אותו מכת מרדות מדברי סופרים גזירה שמא יבוא להתחתן. ואם ייחדה לו בזנות חייב עליה משום נידה, ומשום שפחה, ומשום גויה, ומשום זונה. ואם לא ייחדה לו אלא נקרית מקרה אינו חייב אלא משום גויה. וכל חיובין אלו מדבריהן. R. Moses Isserles [19] even mentions the view of the Tur that is only a rabbinic (דרך אישות )intermarriage itself prohibition.[20] The Bah explains the Tur’s view, Even ha- Ezer 16, as follows, leaving no doubt as to the matter: אבל בשאר אומות . . . אין בהן איסור כלל מן התורה ואפילו בא עליהן דרך אישות אלא גזירה דרבנן. This approach, incidentally, could explain how Esther married Ahasuerus, as the prohibition on intermarriage was not yet established. Maimonides disagrees with the Tur and assumes that there is a not ,(דרך חתנות) biblical prohibition to marry any non-Jew simply the seven Canaanite nations. Therefore, he claims that Solomon converted all the women he married.[21] However, R. Raphael Berdugo disagrees, and states that there was no halakhic problem with Solomon marrying these women without converting them.[22] This leads him to discuss the story of Pinhas killing Zimri and the whole concept of kana’in pog’in bo. R. Berdugo explains that kana’in pog’in bo only applies when dealing with sexual relations that are public, promiscuous, and the woman is an idolator.[23] ולא אמרו קנאין פוגעין בו אלא דרך הפקר ועובדת ע”ז ובפרהסיא. According to R. Berdugo, following the Tur, Jews who are married to non-Jews are only violating a rabbinic prohibition. I mention this since I recently met someone who thought that in messianic days intermarried Jews will be subject to kana’in pog’in bo. I originally thought that this was a clear error. If you look at Maimonides’ formulation,Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:4, you find that contrary to R. Berdugo he indeed includes all non-Jews, not just idolators, as subject to kana’in pog’in bo. (And see his very strong words against Jewish-Gentile sexual relations inHilkhot Issure Biah 12:6-7.) Yet he is just as explicit that the sexual intercourse has to be public, just like with Zimri. כל הבועל גויה בין דרך חתנות בין דרך זנות אם בעלה בפרהסיא, והוא שיבעול לעיני עשרה מישראל. Based on this, it was clear to me that according that according to Maimonides (following Avodah Zarah 36b) an intermarried Jew is not subject tokana’in pog’in שיבעול לעיני bo, as living together is not the same thing as Even if one were to reject this point, in the very next .עשרה halakhah Maimonides states: ואין הקנאי רשאי לפגוע בהם אלא בשעת מעשה כזמרי . . . אבל אם פירש אין הורגין אותו. This means that the act of zealotry must take place during the actual sexual act, or at least this is what I thought. But when I investigated a bit I learnt that while my understanding is shared by many, there are also many who assume otherwise. For example, the always interesting R. Shemariah Menasheh Adler states that an intermarried man is indeed subject to kana’in pog’in bo.[24] He claims that Maimonides’ statement just quoted only refers to one who is engaged in an act of promiscuous sex in public. With such a man he can only be killed in the act, but Maimonides is not referring here to a man who is publicly living with a non-Jew. In such a case, R. בשעת Adler claims, there is no need for the zealotry to be כל הבועל גויה בין דרך As for Maimonides’ explicit words .מעשה R. Adler claims that this only refers to the first act , חתנות of marital sexual intercourse, and that it needs to be in public for kana’in pog’in bo to be applicable, but not once they have already established a home and are living together. R. Adler also quotes R. Solomon Kluger[25] as agreeing with his basic point, and I have found others as well.[26] We have seen lots of strange stuff in recent years. Is it only a matter of time before someone disgusted with the high rate of intermarriage decides to act the part of kana’in pog’in bo? It is also worth noting that most commentators and halakhists assume that kana’in pog’in bo only applies when there is a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman, not the reverse. Despite this, we indeed have some examples in Jewish history of “honor killings”. For example, in 1311 a Jewish woman who married a Christian and became pregnant was killed by her brothers.[27] In 1557 an Italian Jew killed his sister because her alleged sexual activity embarrassed the family. Elliot Horowitz, who mentions this case, adds: “Azariah Finzi, the girl’s father, saw fit to defend this action by his only son, asserting that it was ‘inappropriate for one calling himself a Jew, especially a member of one of the best families, to suffer a veil of shame upon his face, being mocked by all who see him for the blemish attached to his family’s reputation.’”[28] In Teshuvot Hagahot Maimoniyot to Sefer Nashim, no. 25 (found in the standard printings of the Mishneh Torah), there is a responsum which describes how a woman cheated on her husband, apparently with a local non-Jew, and became pregnant. According to her father, she also killed her baby (“the mamzer”[29]) after it was born. Her father, worried that she would apostatize, asked, indeed pleaded with, the local rabbis to permit him to kill his daughter by drowning her in the river. The rabbis turned the request down. בא אביה של שרה לפני שנים ממנו החתומים למטה ובא לימלך בנו להורות לו אם מותר להרוג בתו לטובעה בנהר ולאבדה מן העולם . . . [אמר אביה] אני מבקשכם בכל מיני תחינה שתתירו לי להורגה. The case is actually quite sad since she was probably a teenager in over her head. The responsum describes how she would run away from home but her mother would convince her to come back. When her father rebuked her for her behavior, her reply was, “I am not the first woman who did something bad.” R. Asher Ben Jehiel, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rosh 18:13, deals with a case of a woman who was intimate with a non-Jew and became pregnant from him. R. Asher affirms the local rabbi’s decision to cut off her nose. (See also R. Matityahu Strashun, Mivhar Ketavim [Jerusalem, 1969], p. 158 n. 3.)

Also relevant is a very strange story recorded in Ta’anit 24a. It begins by telling us that R. Yose ben Abin left his teacher, R. Yose of Yokeret. His reason was, “How could the man who showed no mercy to his son and daughter show mercy to me?” Let’s leave aside the story of R. Yose of Yokeret and his son. Here is what the Talmud records about him and his daughter. He had a beautiful daughter. One day he saw a man boring a hole in the fence so that he might catch a glimpse of her. He said to the man, “What is [the meaning of] this?” The man answered: “Master, if I am not worthy enough to marry her, may I not at least be worthy to catch a glimpse of her?” Thereupon he exclaimed: “My daughter, you are a source of trouble to mankind, return to the dust so that men may not sin because of you.” Although he did not physically kill his daughter, he did express the wish that she die (according to some it was an actual curse), and in the opinion of many commentators this is exactly what happened (see Hagahot ha-Bah, ad loc.). What makes this text so shocking is that the daughter was entirely innocent of any improper behavior. In other words, it was her very existence as a beautiful woman that created the problem, and as such it was better that she simply exit this world before any more men were led into sinful thoughts. I see no way that this story can be brought into line with mainstream rabbinic thought, despite many attempts to do so.[30] (At a future time I can present some lessons that contemporary moralists have derived from this story, which also are quite shocking.) Returning to the matter of Jewish-Gentile sexual relations, while the Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 16:1, following Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:2, tells us that occasional sexual relations (i.e., no marital relationship) with a non-Jewish woman is only rabbinically prohibited,[31] R. Nissim of Gerona disagrees. Yet if we are indeed dealing with a Torah prohibition then what does the Talmud[32] mean when it states that the Hasmonean Beit Din decreed against sex with a non-Jewish woman? If it was already forbidden according to the Torah, there would be no need for such a decree. R. Nissim suggests that the Hasmonean Beit Din’s decree was designed to add an additional penalty onto an already existing prohibition. It is not that occasional sex with a non-Jewish woman was banned by the Hasmonean Beit Din, but they merely added the penalty of lashes. The reason for this, R. Nissim points out, is that sometimes people are not concerned about heavenly punishments like karet, but they are concerned with an earthly punishment.[33] Yet this is a minority view, and the standard approach is that there is no biblical prohibition on occasional private sex with a non-Jewish woman. Here is how theEncylopedia Talmudit sums up the matter[34]: הבא על הגויה דרך זנות, איסורו מדברי סופרים, גזרה שמא יבוא להתחתן. (In case people are wondering, I don’t think that this is the sort of information that should be spread among the masses, precisely because that some people might decide that violating a rabbinic prohibition is not such a big deal.) I keep stressing Jewish men and non-Jewish women, since the situation of Jewish women and non-Jewish men has its own issues that should be postponed to another post. But with regard to Jewish women who are intermarried, let me note that according to R. Ovadiah Yosef, such a woman should be told to go to the mikveh. He also adds that she should not tell the mikveh lady about her situation (I assume because she might then be refused entry).[35] To be continued.

* * * * * *

In an earlier post here I mentioned some of the shocking things said by R. Chaim Kanievsky about R. Shmuel Auerbach. Someone asked me if I could put together a list of the harshest things said by Torah scholars about their contemporaries. This would be an interesting project, and we can also find some very harsh things in this regard in talmudic and midrashic literature. I must stress, however, that often these shocking (to our ears) statements are not as harsh as they sound, since they were not meant to be taken literally. Some rabbis use figures of speech that everyone understands are simply part of a literary genre. Here is one such example. R. Abba Mari of Lunel, in his attack against the Jewish rationalists, tells us that if he had the power he would do as follows to his opponent[36]: אקרע סגור לבו להיות בדמו ממרס. This means “I will cut open his heart so as to stir his blood.” I am sure people in medieval times would also be offended by such a statement. Yet its meaning then was far removed from what it would mean today, and if any of our contemporaries spoke like this we would assume he needed to be institutionalized. After reading the post, some also wrote to me to express dissatisfaction with the rabbinic leadership in the haredi world. Contrary to what some think, this sort of feeling is not new, and in every generation people have been disappointed with the rabbinic greats. Here, for example, is what appears in the anonymous letter printed at the beginning of R. Mordechai Benet’s Parashat Mordechai. ואף הגדולים וחכימי דרא לא משגיחים רק לעצמם בלחודוהי לזכות עצמם בלחוד אבל לא לזכות דרא לעורר תשובה בעלמא. Finally, a couple of people corresponded with me regarding the stories of great rabbis who had totally sublimated their emotions. There are other stories that could be told of rabbis who were not even (at least outwardly) emotionally affected by the death of a child. This is sometimes held up as an example of piety and acceptance of God’s decree. Yet R. David Ibn Zimra (Radbaz) had an entirely different perspective.[37] Regarding one of the gedolei“ ha-dor” who when his son died did not shed a tear, Radbaz was asked if this is a good characteristic or not. In his reply, Radbaz does not mince words about how wrong this is, seeing such “piety” as cruel, un-Jewish, and evidence of a psychological problem (to use a modern formulation): זו מדה רעה מורה על קושי הלב ועל רוע תכונת הנפש והיא מדת אכזריות והוא דרך הפילוסופים האומרים כי זה העולם הכל הוא מעשה תעתועים [1] Alan Brill has recently written as follows: Centrism requires its members to live in the top six percent of U.S. income. The community is known for kitsch engagements and weddings, and other signs of conspicuous consumption in the name of religion. In the face of the recent economic downturn many will remain in the community and follow whatever guarantees survival in suburbia. “The Emerging Popular Culture and the Centrist Community,” in Yehuda Sarna, ed., Developing a Jewish Perspective on Culture (New York, 2014), p. 30. As with everything else Brill writes, this essay is well worth reading. On this same page he refers to the fact, noted by others, that for most Centrist Orthodox Jews, their Orthodoxy has nothing to do with doctrine but is about lifestyle and family values. Being Orthodox is about family on Shabbat, shiva calls, hospital visits, sharing simchas, and helping others. They consider the warmth of the community as their Orthodox Judaism, yet are oblivious to doctrine and practice demarcations. . . . Many define faith as “everyday morality” rather than institutional commitment or theological Orthodoxy. I would add that not only is this not new, I believe it is how traditional Judaism has always functioned and is applicable to much of the haredi world as well. In other words, many in the Orthodox world would agree with the Reconstructionist saying, “Belonging is more important than believing.” See Mel Scult, The Radical American Judaism of Mordecai M. Kaplan (Bloomington, 2014), p. xiii. From Brill’s article I learnt that Aish Hatorah put on a recent Purim megilah reading “that featured as emcee and guests of honor the non-Jewish Chris Noth, who played Mr. Big on Sex and the City, and Snooki, of the MTV show Jersey Shore.” See also here. Brill uses this example, and others, to show the influence of contemporary culture. I am fascinated by how the haredi world tolerates this sort of thing in the name of kiruv. I personally am very turned off by this, but am apparently in the minority. When I told a couple of twenty-somethings that I think that the following Aish video, with almost three millions hits, makes a mockery of what Yom ha-Din is all about, they thought I was simply out of touch. Yet as I noted to them, contrary to the implication of the video, Rosh ha-Shanah is indeed about spending the day in synagogue in prayer, not about having fun and breakdancing to non-Jewish music. [2] See my earlier discussions of intermarriage here and here. Regarding another type of “intermarriage”, see Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers (New Haven, 2009), p. 94, that Sephardim in seventeenth-century Amsterdam were forbidden by their community to marry Ashkenazim. (Poor Sephardim were also given a higher charity subsidy than Ashkenazim.) [3] See Be’er Moshe, vol. 4, no. 146:26-27, where R. Stern speaks very strongly against the practice in Boro Park and Willamsburg of men and women going for walks on Shabbat on Yom Tov, as this leads to a mingling of the sexes. [4] For some reason the title of this commentary is almost always written as Keli Yakar, yet the second word should be Yekar, as appears in Prov. 20:15. [5] Leket Yosher, ed. Kinarti (Jerusalem, 2010), Hilkhot Yom ha-Kippurim, p. 304. [6] Sefer Hasidim, ed. Margaliyot, no. 167. While preparing my Torah in Motion classes on R. Joseph Hayyim I found a strange passage in his Ben Yehoyada, Sotah 36b. Although the Talmud, ibid., records the view that Joseph intended to sin with Potiphar’s wife, R. Joseph Hayyim says that this is not to be taken literally. Rather, Joseph’s intention was to inflame his lust for her so that would then be able to overcome it which would be a great spiritual victory. He says the same thing about King David and Abigail. Although the simple meaning of the Talmud, Megillah 14b, is that David wished to have sex with her, R. Joseph Hayyim states that here, too, all David wished was to arouse his lust in order to then overcome it. וכן היה הענין אצל דוד הע”ה, בענין אביגיל כשתבע אותה דודאי חלילה לנו לחשוב על אותו צדיק אשר לבו חלל בקרבו, שביקש לחטוא בא”א, אלא כוונתו היתה לעורר התאוה בקרבו, ולהעביר אש החשק בלבבו, כדי שבעת שיגיע לנקודת המעשה ינתק עבותות התאוה, ויכבה אש החשק כרגע, ויחדל ויפרוש מעשות רע (R. Luntshitz, in the passage fromKeli Yekar I cited, specifically states that only one who has already sinned in such a fashion and is engaged in repentance can put himself in this situation, but a tzaddik is absolutely forbidden to do so). R. Joseph Hayyim’s comment reminds me of the notion that one who has not sinned, and thus has nothing to repent for, should purposely commit a sin. This will then allow him to fulfill the mitzvah of teshuvah, which he would otherwise not be able to do. In a future post I will discuss this. Regarding King David, I found something quite strange in Etan Levine, Marital Relations in Ancient Judaism (Wiesbaden, 2009), p. 129. Levine writes: “And though the sages hardly regarded extramarital affairs as meritorious, their antipathy to divorce led some of them to opine that extra-marital relations with an unattached, sexually-permitted female was preferable to terminating a marriage.” This might be true, but no valid source is cited to support this idea.. In his note to the quoted passage, Levine writes: “King David’s case was interpreted as proof: it was to prevent his divorcing any of the 18 wives permitted to a king that he was allowed to .with Abishag without marrying her (I Ki (יחוד) sexually tryst 1:1f.). See the Babylonian-born Simeon bar Abba (d. ca. 310CE), a disciple of Rabbi Johanan whose homily he cites in bar Abba is (שמן) Tb Sanhedrin 22a.” To begin with, R. Shaman not quoting R. Johanan in Sanhedrin 22a. What he says is that the fact that David was permitted yihud with Abishag shows how much divorce was disapproved of, for otherwise he would have divorced one of his wives and married Abishag. But where does Levine get the notion that yihud means “sexually tryst.” The Bible itself (!) is explicit that David “knew her not.” [7] Derushei ha-Tzelah (Warsaw, 1886), derush 1, no. 11. [8] Yad Mordechai (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 43-44. [9] Megadim Hadashim: Berakhot (Jerusalem, 2008), pp. 360-361. [10] Gan Naul (n.p., 2009), pp. 108ff. [11] Takanat ha-Shavim (Jerusalem, 2007), pp. 588ff., 595ff. [12] The Talmud’s teaching (quoted by Shulhan Arukh, Even ha- Ezer 16:2) is very clear, and events of recent years have shown us that even Torah scholars are not immune to such behavior. Yet I can’t say I was surprised to find that even these clear words are distorted. R. Gedalyah Axelrod, Migdal Tzofim, p. 148 (parashat Pinhas), states that the Talmud and Shulhan Arukh couldn’t really mean that a Torah scholar might have sexual relations with a non-Jew. Therefore, he explains that they really mean that the Torah scholar causes others to do so, by performing fraudulent conversions, and these “converted” women (who are still halakhically non- Jewish) then marry Jews. This is very nice darshanut, but how can anyone take this seriously as an actual explanation of the Talmud and Shulhan Arukh? The Maharal knew better, and in Derekh Hayyim 4:4 he gives the following example: עשרה תלמידי חכמים יושבים ואחד נכנס לבית זונות ולא נודע איזה שזה מחלל שם שמים בסתר. See also R. Hayyim Vital, Sefer ha-Hezyonot, ed. Eshkoli (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 33:

ליל שבת שעברה שכב תלמיד חכם הנקרא בעדת הספרדים “חכם” עם גויה אחת [13] In Ada Rapoport-Albert and Steven J. Zipperstein, ed., Jewish History: Essays in Honour of Chimen Abramsky (London, 1988), pp. 25-59.

[14] See Sefer Hasidim, ed. Margaliyot, no. 701, that the level of Jewish sexual morality will mirror what appears in society at large. כמו שמנהג הנכרים כן מנהגי היהודים ברוב מקומות כגון אם הנכרים גדורים בעריות כך יהיו בני היהודים הנולדים באותה עיר. See also R. Solomon Ben Adret, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba, vol. 1, no. 1209:

ובנות ישראל צנועות הן אלא שהדור מנוולתן. I was surprised to see Michael Satlow write: “There is no rabbinic law against intercourse with a prostitute.” Tasting the Dish: Rabbinic Rhetorics of Sexuality (Atlanta 1995), p. 166. This is incorrect, as Sanhedrin 82a explicitly states: בית דינו של חשמונאי גזרו הבא על הכותית [ס”א הגויה] חייב עליה משום נדה שפחה וכו’ See also Geoffrey Alderman’s article, “It is Not a Sin to Visit a Prostitute,” in his The Communal Gadfly (Brighton, 2009), pp. 267-268. I don’t know how he can write such nonsense as the following: As far as I am aware, there is no general halachic prohibition on Jewish men sleeping with prostitutes, unless the whore is herself Jewish. If not, then, according to the Talmud, a Jewish man who feels the need to visit a prostitute must simply take care to do so in a town in which he is not known – which strikes me as very sound advice. If the whore is Jewish, however, we are faced with the certainty of multiple acts of adultery [!], all of which are prohibited. This is because intercourse is itself a form of marriage. So the first Jewish man a prostitute consorts with becomes her husband [!]; if she wishes to consort with anyone else, this first Jewish customer will have to give her a get [!]. So will the second, and so on. [!] (I am ignoring for my present purposes, considerations of mikveh, since I have yet to learn of any brothel that has one.)

It is actually a common kabbalistic view that one who has sex with a non-Jewish woman will be reincarnated as a Jewish prostitute. See e.g., R. David Ibn Zimra, Metzudat David, no. 612. [15] Hasidot u-Mordot (Jerusalem, 2001), pp. 229ff. [16] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, vol. 1, no. 48. [17] See Sanhedrin, 82a, Avodah Zarah 36b, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:1-2; Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 16:1, and the commentaries ad loc. R. Moses Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 34:4, writes: בא על הגויה לא מיפסל רק מדרבנן דהא אינו אלא מגזירת בית דין של חשמונאי. R. Shlomo Goren, Mishnat ha-Medinah (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 142, points out that sex with a non-Jewish woman does not fall under the category of arayot, even rabbinically. ועל אף חומר האיסור אין זה מגדרי איסור עריות אפי’ מדרבנן. R. Joseph Kafih, commentary toMishneh Torah, Issurei Biah 12:2, raises a problem with the standard understanding of Maimonides that occasional sex with a non-Jewish woman is only a rabbinic prohibition. Even though Maimonides,Issurei what is one to ,ולא אסרה תורה אלא דרך חתנות Biah 12:2, writes do with halakhah 9 [no. 8 in R. Kafih’s edition] which implies the opposite? R. Kafih writes ומה יעשה בדברי רבנו לקמן הל’ ח שגויה הנבעלת לישראל תיהרג מפני שבאה תקלה לישראל על ידה, ולדבריו [דברי המעשה רקח] שאין אסור דאוריתא איזה תקלה באה על ידה? Presumably, Maimonides in halakhah 9 is only referring to a public sexual act, which would be regarded as a biblical violation. [18] After writing this sentence I found that R. Solomon Ibn Verga said the same thing. SeeShevet Yehudah (Jerusalem, 1955), p. 134:

כבר התחילו בספרד לתת עיניהם בבנות הארץ מרוב ההרגל וקצתם לקחו היתר לאמר כי אין בו אלא מלקות I don’t mean to imply that there wasn’t sexual immorality involving Jewish men and Jewish women, as there was plenty of this as well. R. Asher ben Jehiel,Teshuvot ha-Rosh, nol. 37:1, even speaks about the practice of engaged couples living before marriage. He tells us that the (לדור ביחד) together women did not go to the mikveh since they were embarrassed to do so before marriage. But they weren’t embarrassed to live together before marriage.

[19] Even ha-Ezer 16:1. [20] Since the consequences of intermarriage are so devastating, one must wonder why there is no explicit biblical prohibition. Be that as it may, in coming years watch for the Conservative movement to halakhically legitimize intermarriage by relying on the view that it is only rabbinically prohibited. As with other rabbinic prohibitions previously abolished by the Conservatives, they will argue that this too can be set aside for important societal concerns. Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot Ishut 1:4, recognizes that one cannot logically explain why certain sexual acts are biblically prohibited and others had to wait for the Sages to prohibit them. ואל תתמה היאך תהיה הישראלית ביאתה בזנות בלאו והגויה מדברי סופרים לפי שאיסור העריות הוא בגזירה ודבר שאין לו טעם בכל פרטיו. והנה תראה שאם חמותו היא בסקילה [צ”ל בשריפה] ואם אמו מדברי סופרים בלבד ונדות בישראלית הוא מן התורה בכרת ובגויה אין נדות כלל אלא מדברי סופרים. Regarding the Tur’s assertion that there is no biblical prohibition to marry women who are not of the Canaanite nations, this has been hard for many to accept. The Arukh ha- Shulhan, Even ha-Ezer 16:2, states that “it appears to me” that even according to this opinion, if the Jewish man and non-Jewish woman actually live together there is a Torah prohibition. How could the Arukh ha-Shulhan say this when the Tur, Even ha-Ezer 16, states explicitly that contrary to -with contemporary non דרך אישות Maimonides, sexual relations Jewish women does not incur a biblical penalty? Is there a and living דרך אישות real distinction between sexual relations together as husband and wife?. Here are theArukh ha- Shulhan’s words (following which he cites a talmudic proof for his understanding): ומ”מ יראה לי דאפילו להחולקים על הרמב”ם מ”מ אם היא בביתו ובועל אותה תמיד כדרך איש ואשתו חייב עלה מדאורייתא For others who argue that despite the simple sense of his words, the Tur must hold that there is still a biblical prohibition for a Jew to marry a non-Jew, see Otzar ha-Poskim, Even ha-Ezer 16:1. See also R. J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 2, p. 273. Nevertheless, the severity of the stricture against intermarriage tends to indicate that, even according to the Tur, some form of biblical prohibition against intermarriage with non-Jews who are not members of the Seven Nations must exist. The question to be resolved is the nature of the biblical prohibition. With reference to those who have argued that intermarriage (and even non-marital Jewish-Gentile sexual relations) violates Torah law, Shaye J. D. Cohen writes: “This may be good halakhah and good preventative medicine, but it is bad history and bad exegesis.” “From the Bible to the Talmud: The Prohibition of Intermarriage,” Hebrew Annual Review 7 (1983), p. 30. [21] Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:2, 13:14. [22] Mesamhei Lev (Jerusalem, 1990), commentary to ch. 1 (p. 229). [23] See Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:5 that there is no kana’in pog’in bo when it comes to a ger toshav. [24] See Geulat Yisrael (London, 1950), pp. 95ff. [25] Commentary to Even ha-Ezer 16:2, in the standard eds. [26] See also R. J. David Bleich,Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 2, pp. 275ff., who argues that intermarriage is the equivalent of a public act of sexual intercourse, and thus biblically forbidden according to all. [27] See Renée Levine Melammed, “The Jewish Woman in Medieval Iberia,” in Jonathan Ray, ed., The Jew in Medieval Iberia 1100-1500 (Boston, 2012), p. 272. [28] “Jewish Confraternal Piety in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara: Continuity and Change,” in Nicholas Terpstra, ed.,The Politics of Ritual Kinship (Cambridge, 2000), p. 159. the ,ממזר מן הגוי Although her father called the baby [29] term was only being used colloquially, since a child of a non- Jew is not halakhically a mamzer. [30] R. Samuel Edels, Maharsha, ad loc., states explicitly that R. Yose of Yokeret was wrong in cursing her so that she die. )How many other examples do we have of commentators criticizing talmudic sages?) However, I don’t think Maharsha’s approach will make matters much easier for many readers, because he suggests that instead R. Yose should have cursed her that she become ugly! ולא יפה עשה לקללה שתשוב לעפרה בשביל כך אלא כי אם לקללה שתשוב לשחרוריתה. R. Mordechai Karvalho of Tunis, Meira Dakhya (Livorno, 1792), ad loc., also wonders why the daughter had to die. After all, “are we commanded to kill everyone who is beautiful?” He suggests that R. Yose should have kept her inside the house so no man would ever see her.

ובתו ג”כ היא לא עשתה שום עבירה וא”כ היל”ל להחביאה בחדרי חדרים שלא יראה אותה שום אדם ולא ימיתינה וכי מי שהוא יפה תאר מצווין אנו להמיתו This idea, of keeping unmarried women off the street, is found in various Jewish sources. In his recently published Asaf ha- Mazkir, p. 61, R. Meir Mazuz refers to R. David Kimhi’s commentary to 2 Sam. 13:2:

ודרך הבתולות בישראל להיות צנועות בבית ולא תצאנה החוצה R. Mazuz also refers to R. Asher ben Jehiel, Piskei ha-Rosh, which I assume ,בנות Ketubot 7:15, who says that in Spain the also means unmarried women, would only go to the bathhouse in the middle of the night, since they were accustomed not be seen outside. In order to show that this was the practice of the pious women of medieval Spain, R. Mazuz cites another source, Tikunei Zohar, no. 58: צריכא ברתא דאיהי בתולה למהוי סגורה ומסוגרת בבית אביה With reference to my question at the beginning of this note, R. Mazuz, Asaf ha-Mazkir, p. 128, cites the great R. Raphael Joseph Hazan, Hikrei Lev, vol. 1, Yoreh Deah, no. 26 (p. 29b), that R. Simeon ben Yohai was mistaken in thinking that animals are subject to individual providence:

דרשב”י לא ידע . . . אבל האמת אינו כן R Mazuz cannot accept this sort of language when dealing with R. Simeon ben Yohai: דמה כוחנו לחלוק על רשב”י בסברא בעלמא, ומה ידענו ולא ידע Not noted by R. Mazuz is that R. Hayyim Palache cites R. Hazan without objection. See Amudei Hayyim (Izmir, 1875), p. 101a. [31] In Hilkhot Issurei Biah, 12:6 (followed by Shulhan Arukh 16:2), Maimonides writes that if one who had sex with a non-Jewish woman is not killed by kana’im or given lashes by The context of this .עונשו מפורש בדברי קבלה שהוא בכרת beit din halakhah, and the previous ones, is an act of public sexual relations, the sort that is a Torah violation and subject to kana’in pog’im bo. Yet some understand Maimonides to be See Beit .דרך זנות also referring to private sexual relations Shmuel, Even ha-Ezer 16:4. This position is hard to understand, since as has been pointed out by others, how can there be karet on a rabbinic prohibition? A punishment of karet would seem to imply that we are dealing with a Torah violation, yet Maimonides is explicit that this is not the case with non-public and non-marital sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman. This problem leads R Yosef Rein,Penei Yosef: Sanhedrin (Bnei Brak, 2009), p. 648, to offer the כרת original suggestion that Maimonides is talking about -To complicate the matter even more, Seferin ha .מדרבנן Mitzvot, neg. com. no. 52, Maimonides indeed states that there is karet for non-public sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman, which contradicts his position in the Mishneh Torah. R. Kafih, in his commentary on Sefer ha-Mitzvot, explains:

כלומר שעונשו חמור כחייבי כרתות Needless to say, this is a very unlikely explanation, and if Maimonides wanted to say what R. Kafih writes, he could have easily done so instead of speaking of actual karet. [32] Sanhedrin 82a, Avodah Zarah 36b. [33] See Hiddushei ha-Ran, Sanhedrin 82a, and also R. Aryeh Leib Heller, Avnei Miluim, Even ha-Ezer 16:1:3. R. Simhah Lieberman, Bi-Shevilei ha-Amim, no. 14, has a very good discussion of the matter. See also the sources showing the seriousness of the offense in R. Michael Bacharach, Arugat ha- Bosem, Even ha-Ezer 16:2. R. Aviad Sar Shalom Basilea also argues against those who claim that occasional sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman is only rabbinically prohibited. See Emunat Hakhamim (Mantua, 1730), ch. 29. Among the points he makes is if occasional sex with a non-Jewish woman is only rabbinically forbidden, then what is the point of the yefat toar law? This is a special law that permitted what otherwise was already forbidden. He also quotes R. Judah Briel that sex with a non-Jewish woman is included as part the prohibition of wasting one’s seed. (It is not clear if R. Briel is speaking homiletically or halakhically. See also Torah Shelemah, Ex. 20, no. 334, for the midrashic statement that one who has sex with a non-Jewish woman violates fourteen [!] separate Torah prohibitions. Regarding this statement, see also Louis Epstein, Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism [New York, 1967], p. 176.) R. Basilea’s point about yefat toar can easily be refuted. See e.g., Mizrachi to Deut. 21:11 who suggests that the entire point of the law is to permit sex with a married non-Jewish woman, something that otherwise would be forbidden. It implies nothing about occasional private sex with an unmarried non- Jewish woman, which was permitted in the days of the Torah. כיון שבבית שהוא בצינעה בא עליה הביאה ראשונה למה לי קרא להתירה הא לא אסרה תורה אלא דרך חתנות אבל דרך זנות בביאה ראשונה שאינה אלא מפני יצרו הרע אין איסורה אלא מדברי סופריםולמה לי קרא למשרייה ושמא יש לומר דמשום אשת איש איצטריך קרא להתירה וצ”ע . . .כל הפרשה הזאת לא נכתבה אלא באשת איש. . . מדאצטריך קרא להתירה בשעת שביה מכלל שבאשת איש דאסירא בעלמא קמיירי, דאי בפנויה [שריא] אפילו בעלמא, כ”ש בשעת שביה, וזהו הנכון אצלי According to some, another novelty of the yefat toar law is that it also permits rape, which otherwise is forbidden. See also James Diamond, “The Deuteronomic ‘Pretty Woman’ Law: Prefiguring Feminism and Freud in Nahmanides,” Jewish Social Studies 14 (Winter 2008), pp. 61-85.

I previously discussed yefat toar here and here. To the sources I cited, add R. Eliezer of Metz, Sefer Yereim, ed. Schiff, no. 20, who specifically states that ayefat toar cannot be raped ([called to my attention by R. Chaim Rapoport], and see Toafot Re’em, ad. loc., note 13, that this is already a talmudic dispute). On the other hand, Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot Ishut 14:17, states: וענין יפת תואר חדוש הוא ולא התירה אותה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע . . . ובעלה בעל כרחה R. Pinhas Horowitz, Ha-Makneh, Kiddushin 22a, understands Rashi to permit rape of a yefat toar (I haven’t seen others who agree with this). מה שפירש”י ז”ל דקידושין תופסין בה אין לפרש שיכול לקדש אותה בע”כ דלא מצינו קידושין בע”כ כי אם ביבמה אלא דע”כ הכי קאמר קרא דלאח’ הגירות בת ליקוחין היא אם מתרצית להתקדש לו ואם לא מתרצת יבא עלי’ בע”כ דהיינו שהתירה התורה נגד היצה”ר It is precisely with these sorts of passages in mind that, as I have quoted on a number of occasions, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg states that when there is a dispute among the early authorities, we should decide the halakhah in accord with contemporary sensibilities. ואגלה להדר”ג [הגרא”י אונטרמן] מה שבלבי: שמקום שיש מחלוקת הראשונים צריכים הרבנים להכריע נגד אותה הדעה, שהיא רחוקה מדעת הבריות וגורמת לזלזול וללעג נגד תוה”ק (כתבי הגאון רבי יחיאל יעקב וויינברג, חלק א סי’ לב). See also my post here. There are a number of laws in the Torah that are not in line with modern conceptions of morality (the one most in the news these days deals with homosexuality). But I thinkyefat toar is unique in that I have never seen an English language discussion of the law in an Orthodox publication that actually deals with its parameters in any detail, and cites what the rishonim say about the law. (Searching on the internet I found Jacob Bernstein, “Eshet Yefat To’ar: A New Look” here, but this too does not elaborate in sufficient detail on the morally difficult aspects of the matter.) Could it be that this law is more morally problematic for moderns than the laws dealing with homosexuality and slavery of which we have seen endless discussions? And if so, why?

Here is one final source regarding yefat toar. R. Reuven Katz, Duda’ei Reuven, vol. 2, p. 217, states explicitly that the heter of yefat toar is not proper or ethical, but nevertheless in necessary. While this is a quite provocative formulation, it really reflects the outlook of the Sages. Nevertheless, I don’t know if any contemporary halakhic authorities would write this way (emphasis added). אמנם קיים בנסיבות מיוחדות היתר לדבר שאינו הגון ומוסרי, כיון שהתנאים אינם יכולים להתעלם מתופעה זה Regarding rape, there is one other strange thing I would like to share. Maimonides, Hilkhot Ishut 15:17, forbids marital rape. In a case where a woman is in a situation of yibum, and she does not want the Levirate marriage, she is not forced and instead the man must take part in thehalitzah ceremony (although according to Maimonides she is regarded as a moredet). See Hilkhot Yibum ve-Halitzah 1:2, 2:10. However, there is a special halakhah when it comes to yibum that even if the man forces her to have sex, it is still a valid yibum and she becomes his wife. (Hilkhot Ishut 2:3). R. Isaiah of Trani (the Elder),Teshuvot ha-Rid, ed. Wertheimer (Jerusalem, 1987), no. 59, responds to an unnamed questioner who thought that it was permissible for a levir to force his sister-in-law to have sex with him (i.e., to rape her). R. Isaiah expresses his surprise that anyone could make such a mistake (although he acknowledges having heard of others who also erred in this way): מה שכתבתה [!] למה אין כופין את היבמה להתייבם לא נכונו הדברים האלה לומר לאיש חכם, שלא עלתה על לב אדם שנכפה את היבמה להתייבם . . . אם היבמה אינה רוצה להתייבם והיבם רוצה שנכוף אותה לפניו לא היה ולא נברא R. Isaiah then states that if the levir was chasing after the woman to rape her (in order to fulfill the mitzvah of yibum), we are commanded to save her from him, even if we have to kill him. (See R. Avraham Shapiro, Shiurei Maran Ha-Gaon Rabbi Avraham Shapiro: Yevamot, Gittin [Jerusalem, 1995] p. 170.)

So far we haven’t seen anything surprising. But in his note to R. Isaiah’s responsum, the editor, R. Avraham Yosef Wertheimer, writes as follows: ומש”כ רבינו דמצוה להצילה מידו זה חידוש גדול דהא עכ”פ הוא מקיים מצות יבום ולמה עלינו למנוע ממנו אותה מצוה Wertheimer doesn’t understand why R. Isaiah thinks it is necessary to stop the levir from raping the woman, since after all, he is intending to perform a mitzvah. How Wertheimer could write this after seeing what R. Isaiah explains in his responsum is beyond me. In a future post I will discuss how the commentators deal with Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 4:4, which appears to be saying that the king may take women as his wives and concubines even against their will. [34] Vol. 5, s.v. goy, col. 297. See also vol. 3, s.v. boel aramit. [35] Ma’yan Omer, vol. 7, p. 26. See, however, ibid., p. 294, that on another occasion R. Ovadiah saw no need to instruct intermarried women to go to the mivkeh (and see ibid. for the editor’s explanation of the different answers). See also R. Rafael Evers, Va-Shav va-Rafa, vol. 3, no. 147, for R. Yitzhak Shmuel Schechter’s responsum stating that an intermarried woman should go to the mikveh. This is a very practical question today. Pretty much every outreach minyan has attendees who are intermarried or living with non-Jews. I have also come across people in such circumstances in regular Modern Orthodox synagogues. When it comes to sexually active single women, both R. Ovadiah and R. Moshe Sternbuch believe that they should be allowed to use the mikveh if they so desire. See Ma’yan Omer, vol. 7, pp. 234, Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 1, no. 484. See also Ma’yan Omer, vol. 7, p. 261, that we should not advise women to do this (i.e., it is only if they come on their own that they should be allowed to use the mikveh). [36] Teshuvot ha-Rashba, ed. Dimitrovsky, vol. 1, p. 639. See Neuman, The Jews in Spain (Philadelphia, 1944), vol. 2, p. 125. [37] She’elot u-Teshuvot Ha-Radbaz, no. 985. See also R. Solomon Schueck, Torah Shelemah (Satmar, 1909), vol. 2, p. 114b-115a. Fixing a Typesetting Error in Order to Understand The View of the Mishnah Berurah on Women Wearing Tefillin

Fixing a Typesetting Error in Order to Understand The View of the Mishnah Berurah on Women Wearing Tefillin by Michael J. Broyde [email protected] Please note that this piece isn’t meant to be construed one way or another as the view of the Seforim Blog. While there has been considerable recent discussion regarding women wearing tefillin, I will not review here the general topic but rather focus specifically only the view of the Mishnah Berurah. I believe the view of the Mishnah Berurah has been widely misunderstood due to two identical typesetting errors in the text, one in the Mishnah Berurah itself and one in the Biur Halacha. It is not my intent to address the normative halacha in this article. Background Sources

Rabbi Karo (OC 38:3) states simply: נשים ועבדים פטורים מתפילין, מפני שהוא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא. Women and slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of tefillin since it is a positive time bound commandment. Rema adds to his exemption, noting: הגה: ואם הנשים רוצין להחמיר על עצמן, מוחין בידם. If women wish to be strict for themselves, we protest. is adopting the view of Tosafot and the Pesikta Rabati that we ought to protest such conduct, essentially prohibiting it. But this blanket statement of the Rema does not sit well with some commentators. The Olat Tamid[1] (38:4) writes: ואם הנשים רוצין וכו׳: הטעם כתב בכלבו משום שאינו יודעת לשמור את עצמן בנקיות עכ”ל ואני תמה אם כן למאי הצריכו בגמרא פרק מי שמיתו לפרש מפני שהוא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא הנשים פוטרות מן התפילין ת”ל דאפילו אס רוצים להחמיר אסורין להניח תפילין, שהרי אינן ידעת לשמרם בטהרה! אלא ודאי דליתא להאי טעמא לפי סוגיות הגמרא וכן אמרינן בר”פ המוצא תפילין דמיכל בת כושי היתה מנחת תפילין ולא מיחו בה חכמים אע”ג דבפסיקתא א’ להיפך דמיחו בה חכמים מ”מ אנן אגמרא דידן סמכינן. מיהו יש לדחות, הא דלא מפרש גמרא הטעם זה משום שרוצה ליתן טעם גם לעבדים דפטורות ואי משום טעם זה לבד היה נראה דעבדים חייבים שהרי בודאי הם יודעים לשמרם בטהרה ולפיכך מפרש מפני שהוא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא • דמש”ה גם עבדים פטורים מיהא מהא דאמרנן דלא מיחו בה חכמים משמע דאם האשה זקנה וידעינן בה שיודעת לשמור את עצמה דאין למחות בה ובה”ג מיירי התם: The Kolbo writes that the reason is because women do not know how to guard themselves with cleanliness. I was amazed at this, as if that is the case, why does the Talmud in chapter me shemeto need to explain that women are exempt from tefillin because it is a time bound positive commandment? Wouldn’t it be true [according to Kolbo] that [whether they are exempt or not and] even if they wish to be strict on themselves, it is prohibited from them to don tefillin since they do not know how to watch themselves with purity! Rather, it must be that this reason [i.e., that women may not wear tefillin due to cleanliness issues] is not correct according to the Talmudic text. So too, it says in the beginning of the chapter Hamotzee tefillin that Michal Bat Shaul donned tefillin and the Rabbis did not rebuke her; even though one Pesikta says the opposite, that they did rebuke her, nonetheless, we follow our Talmudic source. However, one could rebut the [previous] proof, [because perhaps] our Talmud [in me shemeto] does not give this explanation [cleanliness] since it wants to offer a reason why slaves are also exempt. And if it were for this reason [cleanliness] alone, it would appear that slaves are obligated in donning tefillin, since they certainly know to keep themselves clean. Therefore the Talmud explains [that women are exempt from tefillin] because of the principle of time bound positive commandments, since it is for this reason that slaves are also exempt. Nevertheless, the source that says the Rabbis did not rebuke Michal does imply that if a woman is elderly [i.e., post-menopausal] and we know that she is capable of watching herself [to stay clean], one should not rebuke her. And it is such a case that the Talmud has in mind there [i.e. in me shemeto, where women are said to be exempt from wearing tefillin, not categorically forbidden from doing so]. The Magen Avraham does not agree with this Olat Tamid. Magen Avraham (38:3) states: מוחין כו’ – מפני שצריכין גוף נקי ונשים אינם זריזות להזהר אבל אם היו חייבים לא היו פטורין מה”ט דהוי רמי אנפשייהו ומזדהרי כנ”ל דלא כע”ת: We protest: Since they need a clean body and women are not particularly careful with cleanliness; but if they were obligated, they would not be exempt for this reason since they would accept the mitzvah upon themselves and they would thus be conscientious. Such appears to me to be the rule, and not like the Olat Tamid. The whole thrust of the Magen Avraham is to reject the approach of the Olat Tamid) who permits women to wear tefillin when they are clean). Magen Avraham accepts that once one is not obligated to wear tefillin, one is not careful to be clean and only those obligated are careful, whereas Olat Tamid thinks cleanliness is unrelated to obligation. [2] Now consider whether one ought to rebuke a [male] slave who wishes to wear tefillin. Like a woman, he is not obligated in the mitzvah of tefillin, but yet he seems to have no practical issue with guf naki factually. If he were to don tefillin (which he is not obligated to at all) should we rebuke him? One could claim that the Rama (and the Taz for that matter) both implicitly agrees that a slave is not rebuked since only women (and not slaves) are mentioned as subject to rebuke. Pre Megadim (Mishbatzot 38:2) [3] disagrees and states: מוחין. עיין ט”ז. ומ”א [ס”ק] ג’. ומשמע עבדים אין מוחין שיכולין להזהר. וזה אינו, דגם כן אין זהירים דפטורים, וגם גריעי תו מנשים דעד א’ נאמן באיסורים וספרה לה [ויקרא טו, כח]. ועבדים בסתמן לא [נאמנים] עיין ש”ך יו”ד סימן א’ [ס”ק ב]. גם על כרחך פשיטא אין מניחין שלא יעלו אותו ליוחסין וכדומה:

We Object: See Taz. See Magen Avraham 3. And this implies that when a slave dons tefillin one does not object, since they can be careful [about cleanliness]. This is wrong, because they are not careful since they are exempt. Furthermore, slaves are worse than women [in this mitzvah] since “one witness is believed regarding ritual matters” (as it says in Lev 15:28) “she counts” but slaves are not believed; see Shach YD 1:2. One must also adopt the obvious position that slaves do not wear tefillin [even though they can keep clean] so that we should not mistake them as full Jews. Pre Megadim makes a few claims here. While inferring that Rama and Taz hold slaves are not rebuked and may wear tefillin if they wish, Pre Megadim himself holds this is incorrect for several reasons: (1) all those exempt are rebuked according to the Pesikta, since one who is exempt is not as careful to be clean; (2) slaves are deemed less reliable than women in many Jewish law matters; (3) permitting a slave to wear tefillin might mistakenly lead people to believe he is fully Jewish. Thus, whether we should deem all exempt individuals as being always insufficiently careful about cleanliness, and therefore object to them wearing tefillin, is a dispute between Magen Avraham and Pre Megadim versus Olat Tamid. The Typographical Error in Mishnah Berurah 38:12 Now, to the heart of this short note: Mishnah Berurah is uncertain about how to resolve the question of whether a slave who dons tefillin ought to be rebuked. Since this matter is not one that normative halacha needs to resolve (as slaves no longer existed within Jewish life in the time of the Mishnah Berurah) he simply states (38:12): הנשים – עיין בפמ”ג שה”ה לענין עבדים ועיין בספר תוספות שבת שכתב בהדיא להיפך ועיין בספר תוספות ירושלים: Women: See Pre Megadim who states the same rule for slaves. See also Tosafot Shabbat who writes explicitly the opposite and see the work Tosafot Yerushalayim.[4] Several difficulties present themselves in this simple Mishnah Berurah, but I want to focus on only one: Who is this Tosafot Shabbat that the Mishnah Berurah is quoting and what does he say? Hebrewbooks.org and Otzar HaChachma data bases list a few books with that title, but none of them seem to deal at all with tefillin. While the Mishnah Berurah does in several other places quote a work by this title, the work that he quotes is always the famous work “Tosafot Shabbat” which deals with Hilchot Shabbat only or (less frequently) the similarly named work which discusses when does Shabbat begin or end? Furthermore, no discussion of tefillin or slaves is found in those works at all, as far as I can tell. None of the other works with this title are relevant either, as far as I could tell: none of them had a section dealing tefillin law. Luckily, someone pointed out to me that his version of the Mishnah Berurah has a footnote by the editors noting that the is a mistake in the typesetting of the Mishnah תוספות word Berurah. A similar correction is also noted by other new editions of the Mishnah Berurah as well — I found it in Hotzah Chadashah uMetukenet Benai Brak (5767). These editions argue that this note (12) in the Mishnah Berurah is supposed to read: הנשים – עיין בפמ”ג שה”ה לענין עבדים ועיין בספר עולת שבת שכתב בהדיא להיפך ועיין בספר תוספות ירושלים:

Women: See Pre Megadim who states the same rule for slaves. See also Olat Shabbat who writes explicitly the opposite and see the work Tosafot Yerushalayim. This makes perfect sense and completely solves the mystery. The typesetter made a mistake that is easy to understand. Since on the same line of text already contained the words “tosafot” and the work Tosafot Shabbat was widely cited in the previous volume which was printed (volume 3) whoever was typesetting the work made an error and typeset the wrong word. Olat Shabbat is another name for the work Olat Tamid (quoted above), who quite clearly, as the Mishnah Berurah notes, permits slaves to wear tefillin, since they are observant of the rules of guf naki. Olat Tamid was the name used for those sections of the book addressing daily halacha (up to chapter 240 in the Shulchan Aruch) and Olat Shabbat is the name of the same work for those remaining sections that deal with Shabbat and Festival law. Furthermore, the Mishnah Berurah uses both names at various times without following the exact correspondence to whether he is quoting from the part of the work named Olat Tamid or Olat Shabbat. For example, in Shar Hatziyun 42:23 he quotes the Olat Tamid on a matter related to tefillin law and he calls him the Olat Shabbat. The work went by two names. To summarize: While the Mishnah Berurah in 38:12 quotes a work call Tosafot Shabbat as discussing whether a slave may don tefillin, as far as can be told, no such work exits. A work named Olat Shabbat does exist which comments on Siman 38 of the Shulchan Aruch and permits a slave to don tefillin. All of this makes a case so compelling that several new and critical editions of the Mishnah Berurah have noted this must be a typesetting error in the Mishnah Berurah and so have corrected the text accordingly.[5] What the Mishnah Berurah does not note at all, but is completely clear once you look at the Olat Tamid inside – by now an obscure book that is hard to find, but which is on Hebrewbooks.org and is quoted above – is that for the same reasons that Olat Tamid contends we do not object to a slave wearing tefillin, Olat Tamid also permits a woman who is careful with guf naki (because she is post-menopausal) to wear tefillin. Furthermore, Mishnah Berurah is fully consistent with the reading of the halacha found in the Olat Tamid when he explains the Rema’s objection to women donning tefillin in his next note, stating simply and directly (38:13) that: מוחים בידן – מפני שצריכין גוף נקי ונשים אין זריזות להזהר: We protest: since they need a clean body and women are not particular to be conscientious about being careful [to be clean]. The Mishnah Berurah thus explains why women do not don tefillin by quoting only the rationale that is consistent with the Olat Tamid’s understanding of the Rama, namely: this halacha is fundamentally about cleanliness, and not necessarily obligation (which categorically excludes all women and all slaves, no matter how clean). Thus, in contrast to Pre Megadim and Magen Avraham, the Mishnah Berurah leaves out אבל אם היו חייבים לא היו פטורין מה”ט דהוי רמי“ the idea that but if they were obligated, they would not“) ”אנפשייהו ומזדהרי be exempt for reasons of cleanliness”) since that is not consistent with the Olat Tamid, and the Mishnah Berurah holds the Olat Tamid is correct about even a slave.[6] In other words, slaves should be rebuked because they are not meticulously careful to be clean independent of their lack of obligation to put on tefillin. The Typographical Error in Biur Halacha 39:3

Chapter Thirty Nine of the Shulchan Aruch addresses who can write tefillin, which is a different question than who can don them, although somewhat related. This is made clear by the comments of the Mishnah Berurah writing in the Biur Halacha in 39:3 which even more forcefully adopts the view of the Olat Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch notes that a convert may write tefillin and the Mishnah Berurah continues in the Biur Halacha 39:3 by stating directly: כשר לכתוב תפילין – כ”ז איירי בגר צדק. ולענין גר תושב הסכימו הפמ”ג ול”ש ומחה”ש [ועוד הרבה] דפסול מטעם דהא אינו בקשירה והשע”ת[7] המציא דבר חדש דאיירי הד”מ דמכשיר בגר תושב דקיבל עליו כל המצות חוץ מאיסור נבילה וא”כ הלא ישנו בקשירה ובאמת נלענ”ד שגם זה אינו דהלא עכ”פ אינו מוזהר על הקשירה ותדע דאטו אם אשה ועבד יקבלו עליהן מצות תפילין יהיו כשרים לכתיבת תפילין ואם תדחה משום דמוחין לנשים על הנחת תפילין וכדלעיל בסימן ל”ח ז”א דכל זה רק מחמת חומרא בעלמא שחוששין להפסיקתא אבל ש”ס דילן סובר דאין מוחין ע”ז וכדאיתא שם בב”י ועוד עבדים יוכיחו דאין מוחין בהן וכמו שכתבתי לעיל במ”ב בשם התו”ש: A convert may write tefillin: All this is discussing a proper convert, but as to a ger toshav, the Pre Megadim Levushai Serad, and Machatzit Hashekel [as well as many others] all agree may not write tefillin since they are not obligated to don tefillin. Sharai Teshuva finds another novel matter here when he notes that the Darchai Moshe permits a ger toshav [to write tefillin] since he accepted all the mitzvot other than eating not kosher meat, since he is permitted to don tefillin. In truth in my opinion even this is not correct, since such a person is also not obligated in donning tefillin. And you should know that concerning even a woman and a slave who accept upon themselves to the mitzvah to don tefillin could they write tefillin?[8] And if you push this off, since we rebuke women on donning tefillin as noted in chapter 38, that is wrong, since this pushing off is only a mere stricture grounded in being fearful of the Pesikta, but our Talmud rules that one does not rebuke on this as is noted by the Bet Yosef, and even further, we do not rebuke slaves as I noted in the Mishnah Berurah there in the name of the Tosafot Shabbat. And of course, as the standard new editions of the Mishnah Berurah now note, there is a typographical error — the last words in the Mishnah Berurah should read Olat Shabbat here making it clear that the Mishnah ,ע to an ת also, changing the Berurah has a consistent preference for the approach of the Olat Shabbat-Olat Tamid over the approach of the Magen Avraham and the Pre Megadim, as a better explanation of the Rama. (The Mishnah Berurah then continues to explain why women and slaves – who can put on tefillin as a matter of tefillin law – still cannot write them.[9]) According to the Mishnah Berurah, the Rama directs rebuke of women in 38:3 for donning tefillin not as a matter of the minimal technical halacha, but only as a chumra bealma since he is of the view that the Pesikta’s formulation is inconsistent with the Bavli and thus not the formal mandatory rule of halacha ever (just like the Olat Tamid notes).[10] Furthermore, the Mishnah Berurah makes it clear here that he is ruling against the Pre Megadim on the matter of rebuking slaves who don tefillin which he left as an open dispute in 38:12. A Test Case: The Cheresh

Consider a test case: Should we rebuke acheresh (fully mentally incapacitated man) who wishes to wear tefillin, if he is competent to maintain cleanliness? This is an excellent test case. He is Jewish (like a women is), but exempt from all mitzvot, including tefillin, and he lacks the basic credibility that even a Jewish woman has to label food items as prohibited or permissible, so two of the three reasons of the Pre Megadim apply to him, mandating rebuke. For our present purposes, his “risk profile” vis-à-vis wearing tefillin thus falls in between a slave and a woman: he is riskier than a (post-menopausal) clean woman and less risky than a slave. Olat Tamid states (37:1) that since a cheresh can maintain cleanliness, he should not be rebuked for donning tefillin. The Mishnah Berurah (37:12) rules that way and he cites as precedent for this the classical work Baer Hatev, who in turn cites the classical work Olat Tamid![11] חרש המדבר ואינו שומע או שומע ואינו מדבר חייב להניח תפילין אבל אין שומע ואין מדבר אין מוחין בידו מלהניחם אם רוצה [בה”ט]: A cheresh who speak but cannot hear, or hear but cannot speak is obligated in tefillin, but one who can neither listen nor speak one does not rebuke them when they don tefillin if they wish. [Baer Hatev] Thus, from the Mishnah Berurah’s ruling regarding a cheresh, we see that he clearly rejects the view that “one is not obligated may not don tefillin since such a person will not be particularly careful to be clean.” Rather, Mishnah Berurah only cites the Pre Megadim’s view about slaves apparently in deference to the Pre Megadim’s other concern: since slaves are not full Jews, permitting them to wear tefillin might confuse others about their personal status as full-fledged Jews.[12] Otherwise, Mishnah Berurah adopts the Olat Tamid’s explanation of the Rama in this halachic area – i.e. focusing on cleanliness, and not automatically deeming exempt individuals as incapable of maintaining proper cleanliness. Conclusion

The Mishnah Berurah does not address the question of whether a carefully clean woman who wants to don tefillin may do so. Such a radical break with tradition would never be raised or considered in a completely hypothetical vacuum by the Mishnah Berurah. The Mishnah Berurah simply never discusses the matter and he is silent. How should we understand his silence? Did he think we ought to rebuke such a woman as a matter of tefillin law[13]? With all of this data in hand – most importantly, the proper text of the Mishnah Berurah – it is reasonable to conclude that the best way of interpreting the Mishnah Berurah is that he does not think that a woman who is sufficiently careful about guf naki[14] needs be rebuked – as a matter of tefillin law – if she does don tefillin. Proof to this can be found from: (1) his citation of the Olat Tamid in the case of a cheresh and a slave and (2) the Mishnah Berurah’s a mere ,חומרא בעלמא referral to the view of the Pesikta as a stricture, [15] and (3) his focus on cleanliness as the reason for rebuke of women, like the Taz and the Olat Tamid. Further proof of this is the unstated view of the Mishnah Berurah can be found from: (4) the Mishnah Berurah’s rejection of the formulation of the Magen Avraham that all those who are exempt are prohibited as a matter of tefillin law and (5) the Mishnah Berurah’s sub-silento rejection of the Gra’s view that the Pesikta and the normative Bavli both agree that women ought to be rebuked and (6) the Mishnah Berurah’s implicit rejection of the view of the Levush (and others) that while Michal bat Shaul could put on tefillin because she was unique, no one else can.[16] There is no other viable theory left other than to accept that — to the Mishnah Berurah — the proper way to understand the Rama’s rule that one should rebuke a tefillin donning woman is limited to one who either is not clean, which is the base line view of the Talmud Bavli or, as chumra be’alma, to rebuke any woman who is “not particular to be conscientious about being careful [to be clean]” as he states in 38:13. Thus, the purpose of this article is to make an intellectually honest point which hopes to contributes to reasoned discussion: those who have acknowledged the view of the Olat Tamid as permitting slaves, clean women andchereshim to don tefillin, and yet dismiss that view as supposedly rejected by all normative poskim, are mistaken, once the correct text of the Mishnah Berurah is established. To what extent this has any practical halachic application is for a different discussion. For example, there might very well be other excellent rationales outside of technical tefillin law prohibiting such conduct,[17] or one could look to the view of the Magen Avraham and Pre Megadim and object to women wearing tefillin due simply to their lack of obligation or one could note that even without the rebuke obligation, tefillin are still no better than tzitzit and our rule is that women do not wear them either as a matter of very old custom. None of this practical halacha is the focus of this paper. [18] The attached six pages are copies of the front matter and relevant pages from two modern editions of the Mishnah Berurah which note the typographical errors mentioned and correct them.

[1] There are a number of works entitled Olat Tamid in the rabbinic library and this Olat Tamid is the one that the Magen Avraham had which is by Rabbi Shmuel ben Yosef Orgler found at http://hebrewbooks.org/21386 at page 28. [2] Pre Megadim reinforces this as the correct read of the Magen Avraham in Ashel Avraham 3 where he emphasizes that one who is exempt is not careful. [3] The Pre Megadim is commenting on the Taz – as he understands the Taz to agree with the Olat Tamid here and to focus only on cleanliness and not level of exemption – and/or is inferring from Rema’s note that we object to women who wish to wear tefillin that Rema would not object to a male slave wearing tefillin. [4] Tosafot Yerushalayim cited by the Mishnah Berurah is not in chapter 38 of his work (where you would expect it) but in OC Chapter 17. Tosafot Yerushalayim adopts the reasonable view that only slaves like Tevi of Rabbi Gamliel can don tefillin, as a correspondence to the exceptional case of Michal bat Shaul. His view is that among people who are not obligated in tefillin, only exceptional individuals are sufficiently careful about cleanliness ought to don. Tosafot Yerushalyim is itself a fascinating work which attempted to incorporate the view of the Jerusalem Talmud into the normative halacha. [5] A copy of the page from the Mishnah Berurah Hotzah Chadasha uMetukenet Benai Brak 5767 can be found at the end of this paper with the correction noted on the Hagaot veTekunim 5 [6] See the next section for an explanation, [7] The corrected text of the Mishnah Berurah notes that this is the Yad Efraim. [8] Although one could read this as a statement and not a rhetorical question, that would be a mistake as it could create a dispute between this statement and the text of the Shulchan Aruch in OC 39:1. It would also be inconsistent with other parts of the same Biur Halacha not quoted here. [9] Who can write tefillin (as opposed to who can don them) is not a topic we focus on now. [10] This Biur Halacha was pointed out to me by Rabbi Shlomo Brody while he was reviewing a prior draft of this article. [11] A reader suggested to me that maybe the Mishnah Berurah ruled one should not rebuke a cheresh only because he was aware of the fact that some of his contemporaries considered an intelligent cheresh to be fully obligated in the mitzvah. I think that is mistaken as the Mishnah Berurah is directly quoting the Baer Hatev who is directly citing the Olat Tamid, who was from the 1600’s and was not speaking about the modern “smart” cheresh. The Mishnah Berurah and Baer Hatev’s source – the Olat Tamid – clearly based this ruling on his view that one who is exempt but clean can wear tefillin. Moreover, if the Mishnah Berurah were merely showing deference here to the view that a (modern) cheresh is obligated to wear tefillin, then surely he would have strongly urged thecheresh to don tefilin – and not just written that we acquiesce to one who chooses to do so. (Note that Aruch Hashulchan argues in OC 37:4 and objects to a cheresh wearing tefillin, but only because he cannot image such a person being meticulously clean.) [12] And even that fear is ultimately rejected by the Mishnah Berurah in the Biur Halacha 39:3, as noted above. [13] What I mean by “tefillin law” is just the halacha of mochen and the like, and not the more general halachic conversation concerning change or minhag or authority, all of which are important, but not part of this article and could form independent grounds for prohibiting (or permitting) this conduct. [14] Because she is post-menopausal according to the Olat Tamid. [15] I am uncertain how exactly to translate the term chumra bealma. In their recent article, Rabbis Dov and Aryeh Frimer translate it as “mere, often unbased, stringency (humra be- alma)” which they note is one of the cases where nachat ruach lenashim does allow such sometimes to be ignored. See Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot,” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 46:4 (Winter 2013), 67-238 at pages 115 to 117 and particularly note 358. [16] Reasons five and six are important to digest, in that who the Mishnah Berurah quotes or does not quote is a very telling mark of what he thinks is reasonable. Here he does not quote Gra’s approach in 38:3 precisely because he has rejected Gra’s approach of harmonizing the Pesikta and the Bavli in 39:3 by calling the Peseikta a chumra be’alma. So too, he rejects the approach of the Levush and Aruch HaShulchan of limiting the Bavli to the rare and special Michal bat Shaul since the Mishnah Berurah adopts the view of the Olat Tamid and resolves the conflict by insisting that the Pesikta is not the normative halacha. The view of the Aruch Hashulchan needs its own analysis, which I hope is forthcoming. For a more general understanding of the Mishnah Berurah, see my forthcoming work (with Rabbi Ira Bedzow) “The Codification of Jewish Law and an Introduction to the Jurisprudence of the Mishna Berura” (Academic Studies Press, 2014). [17] See for example the modern work Piskai Teshuva 38:3 who gives one such reason and the recent teshuva by Rabbi Hershel Schachter on this matter who gives many such reasons. [18] Besides these rationales which explain why the Mishnah Berurah simply does not discuss this issue, allow me to speculate in a footnote that perhaps the Mishnah Berurah does not cite the Olat Tamid on the topic of women donning tefillin at all because he rejects in the view of the Olat Tamid that menstruation is a valid concern for guf naki matters and that was the central to the holding of the Olat Tamid.