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What's So Special About Patent Law?
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Fordham University School of Law Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 26 Volume XXVI Number 4 Volume XXVI Book 4 Article 1 2016 What’s So Special About Patent Law? Michael Goodman George Washington University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?, 26 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 797 (2016). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol26/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. What’s So Special About Patent Law? Cover Page Footnote Frank H. Marks Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law. University of Mary Washington, B.S.; Duke Law School, J.D.; Emory University, M.A./Ph.D. I am grateful to Gregory Dolin, William Hubbard, and Kristina Caggiano Kelly for their thoughtful comments on early drafts and to Melody for the time to write. This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol26/iss4/1 What’s So Special About Patent Law? Michael Goodman* The widespread belief that patent law is special has shaped the de- velopment of patent law into one of the most specialized areas of the law today. -
Inhibiting Patent Trolling: a New Approach for Applying Rule 11 Eric Rogers Molecular Templates, Inc
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 2 2014 Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 Eric Rogers Molecular Templates, Inc. Young Jeon e-Litecom Co., Ltd. Recommended Citation Eric Rogers and Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 291 (2014). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol12/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 Eric Rogers & Young Jeon November 2014 VOL. 12, NO. 4 © 2014 by Northwestern University School of Law Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Copyright 2014 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 12, Number 4 (November 2014) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 By Eric Rogers & Young Jeon* There has been an alarming rise in the number of litigious entities—commonly referred to as patent trolls or non-practicing entities—that make no products but file dubious patent infringement lawsuits merely to extract money from commercially productive companies. High litigation costs provide a fertile environment for an exploitive business model that uses shotgun tactics to threaten patent infringement claims against numerous companies, many of which will make a purely financial decision to pay patent trolls rather than expend even more money in litigation. -
Predictably Expensive:Ac Ritical Look at Patent
PREDICTABLY EXPENSIVE: A CRITICAL LOOK AT PATENT LITIGATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Brian J. Love* James Yoon† CITE AS 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) ABSTRACT In this Article, we compare U.S. patent litigation across districts and consider possible explanations for the Eastern District of Texas’ popularity with patent plaintiffs. Rather than any one explanation, we conclude that what makes the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs is the accumulated effect of several marginal advantages—particularly with respect to the relative timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction—that make it predictably expensive for accused infringers to defend patent suits filed in East Texas. These findings tend to support ongoing efforts to pass patent reform legislation that would presumptively stay discovery in patent suits pending claim construction and motions to transfer or dismiss. However, we also observe that courts in the Eastern District of Texas have exercised their discretion in ways that dampen the effect of prior legislative and judicial reforms that were aimed (at least in part) at deterring abusive patent suits. Given courts’ broad discretion to control how cases proceed, this additional finding suggests that restricting venue in patent cases may well be the single most effective reform available to Congress or the courts to limit patentees’ ability to impose unnecessary and unwarranted costs on companies accused of patent infringement. * Assistant Professor and Co-Director of the High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of Law. My work on this Article was supported in part by the INPRECOMP Project of the Center for Law, Science & Innovation (LSI) at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. -
Artikelen PRIVATEERS and TROLLS JOIN the GLOBAL PATENT WARS; CAN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES DISARM THEM?
Mr. M. Dolmans1 Artikelen Privateers and trolls join the global patent wars; can competition authorities disarm them? Computerrecht 2014/37 a component that is subject to network effects, and you can threaten producers with catastrophic loss. On Halloween of 2013, patent assertion company – Patents proliferate in the ICT sector. This is partially Rockstar, owner of one of the largest patent portfo- due to patent mining and strategic patenting – firms lios in the world, 2 filed patent law suits against seven creating dense thickets of overlapping patent claims mobile phone makers and Google in the Texas ‘rocket covering and surrounding a product to block rivals. As docket’. 3 This heralded an escalation in the mobile patent offices are overwhelmed by applications in new, patent world war raging since 2010. fast-moving and complex technology areas, some think they grant patents without adequate review, leading to This ‘Halloween Attack’ is symptomatic of an in- lower patent quality. 4 Yet, in a portfolio, volume makes creasing problem: opportunistic exploitation of up for weakness. Patents are presumed valid, and chal- patents by Patent Assertion Entities (‘PAEs’, or less lenging patents is costly and time-consuming. More politely, ‘trolls’), and the strategic use of such PAEs important, if one patent is annulled or found not in- by firms to hamper their rivals. The war stories from fringed, patentees will have others. Litigation becomes the mobile phone sector are interesting as examples like a fight against the Hydra: chop off one head and of a competitive game, but even more as a harbin- two more grow. -
Some Observations on the Patent Troll Litigation Problem
Intellectual Property& Technology Law Journal Edited by the Technology and Proprietary Rights Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP VOLUME 26 • NUMBER 8 • AUGUST 2014 Some Observations on the Patent Troll Litigation Problem By Christopher Hu atent infringement cases brought by so-called problem can be addressed. In brief, the problems P patent trolls have received considerable atten- stem from the way nonpracticing entities (NPEs) tion in recent years, enough so that both Congress use or misuse the judicial system, not the US Patent and the White House have chimed in on the sub- Office. Accordingly, the solution primarily involves ject.1 The number of cases filed by patent trolls, the applying existing judicial procedures more vigorously cost of defending or settling these cases, the size with minimal changes to existing substantive law. of some judgments, the perceived frivolousness of some cases, and the use or abuse of litigation as a The Patent Troll “Problem” tool to “extort” settlements have all drawn atten- tion to this issue. Adding to the controversy is the Some Statistics on Patent Troll Litigation sentiment among some that it is inherently unfair NPEs, also known as patent trolls or patent asser- or economically wrong for an entity that does not tion entities (PAEs), are a fact of business life in the practice a patent to profit by asserting it. United States. Definitions of a patent troll vary but Although there is some statistical data concerning the common element of every definition is that a the assertion of patents by trolls, and a considerable patent troll is an entity that does not itself practice a amount of anecdotal evidence, there appear to be patent but instead asserts the patent against entities no rigorous studies on the economic effect of trolls. -
Patent Trolls' Hefty Tolls
0125.012456.84151 3PAT0125.PAT-012456.8 28 | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Patent18254520.321.654921 Trolls’ Hefty Tolls Lawmakers target shell companies that threaten small businesses with bogus25167282012456012456 claims of patent violations. BY012456012456012456 JONATHAN GRIFFIN ampires, zombies, werewolves (especially the teen variety) and aliens have captured people’s inter- est once again. On TV, at the movies and in books, these fantastical beasts entertain and thrill those brave enough to watch or read about them. But there is one creature that entertains no one and Vevokes only groans3PAT0125.012456.86465 and sighs when its name is uttered, and that’s the “patent troll.” These real-life ogres are largely to blame for more than doubling the number of patent lawsuits in the last 10 years, and in 2011 alone cost U.S. businesses $29 billion in legal fees. Beyond the Tolkien-inspired name, what is a patent troll? And more important, what, if anything, should state lawmakers do to curb the harm many claim they do to small businesses? Patent trolls,67641353PAT0125.012456.8 formally known as patent assertion entities (PAEs), generally are holding or “shell” companies that don’t manufacture anything but hold a number of patents, typically purchased legally from bankrupt firms. They make their money by sending threatening letters to companies claiming they have been violating one or more of their (often vaguely defined) pat- ents. The letters say that if the companies pay the license fees to use their patents,0125.012456.84151 they won’t be sued. PAEs usually request unreasonable fees in light of the alleged infractions and often fail to give companies any details about under fire. -
Patent Assertion Entity Activity: an Ftc Study
Patent Assertion Entity Activity AN FTC STUDY Federal Trade Commission October 2016 PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY A REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION EDITH RAMIREZ Chairwoman MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN Commissioner TERRELL MCSWEENY Commissioner Heather Hippsley Chief of Staff David B. Robbins Executive Director Deborah L. Feinstein Director, Bureau of Competition Jessica L. Rich Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection Ginger Zhe Jin Director, Bureau of Economics David Shonka Acting General Counsel Randolph W. Tritell Director, Office of International Affairs Jeanne Bumpus Director, Office of Congressional Relations Tara Isa Koslov Acting Director, Office of Policy Planning Justin Cole Director, Office of Public Affairs Donald S. Clark Secretary of the Commission Andrew I. Gavil Former Director, Office of Policy Planning* Martin S. Gaynor Former Director, Bureau of Economics Francine Lafontaine Former Director, Bureau of Economics Marina Lao Former Director, Office of Policy Planning Report Drafters and Contributors Suzanne Munck, Deputy Director, Office of Policy Planning & Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property Daniel S. Hosken, Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Economics John E. Dubiansky, Office of Policy Planning J. Elizabeth Callison, Bureau of Economics Julie A. Carlson, Bureau of Economics Jason O’Connor, Bureau of Economics Elizabeth A. Gillen, Office of Policy Planning Benjamin Chartock, Bureau of Economics Christopher Bryan, Office of Policy Planning Henry C. Su, Office of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez Inquiries -
Patent Court Decision Clarifies Mental Act Patentability Exclusion
Patent Court Decision Clarifies Mental Act Patentability Exclusion We talk a lot about software and business method patents, but one of the subject-matter exclusions which attracts less attention is that of methods of performing a mental act. The exclusion has been touched upon in past UK decisions and two possible interpretations have been considered, the wide interpretation and the narrow interpretation. The question of which interpretation is correct has not been tackled head-on, until now. The scope of the mental act exclusion was addressed in full by HHJ Birss QC in his recent Patents Court judgement on Halliburton's application. This case is an appeal from a refusal by the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) of four UK patent applications relating to methods of designing a drill bit by simulation. Schemes, rules and methods for performing a mental act as such are excluded from patentability by the same legislative clauses that exclude software and business methods. This is true both in the UK and in the European Patent Office (EPO). As with the other exclusions, the "as such" rider has created confusion and debate as to where exactly to draw the line between patentable and non-patentable. This decision provides important clarifications in this regard. The bulk of the decision concerns the choice between the wide interpretation of mental acts, in which any method capable of being carried out mentally is excluded, and the narrow interpretation, in which only methods actually carried out mentally are excluded. This potential difference in interpretation makes a huge difference in the case of complex numerical processes such as simulations - in theory, the processing involved in the simulation could be carried out mentally, without the aid of a computer. -
The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents
College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2002 The esF to Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents John F. Duffy Repository Citation Duffy, John F., "The eF sto Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents" (2002). Faculty Publications. 850. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/850 Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs JOHN F. DUFFY THE FESTO DECISION AND THE RETURN OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THE BAR OF PATENTS On January 8, 2002, a crowded courtroom in the Supreme Court witnessed a famous legal and political figure rise from his chair to begin arguments on a case about monopolies. The individual was well qualified for the task. He had written one of the most impor tant books on monopolies in the last half-century, 1 taught antitrust law at the Yale Law School, represented the United States as Solic itor General, and served for six years as a judge on one of the most important federal courts in the nation.2 In many ways, there was nothing unusual about this scene. Since the dawn of the republic, federal policy toward business monopolies has excited passions both inside and outside of courtrooms. In every period of its his tory, the Supreme Court has been intimately involved in crafting the federal law of monopolies, and the cases at the Court have frequently attracted some of the most preeminent members of the bar. -
This Opinion Is Subject to Motions for Rehearing Under Rule 22 As Well As Formal Revision Before Publication in the New Hampshire Reports
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by e-mail at the following address: [email protected]. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Sullivan No. 2018-0198 AUTOMATED TRANSACTIONS, LLC & a. v. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION & a. Argued: February 14, 2019 Opinion Issued: August 16, 2019 Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (Steven M. Gordon, Timothy J. McLaughlin, and Stephanie K. Annunziata on the brief, and Mr. Gordon orally), for the plaintiffs. Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester (Jonathan Shirley and Joshua M. Wyatt on the brief, and Mr. Wyatt orally), for defendant American Bankers Association. Litchfield Cavo, LLP, of Lynnfield, Massachusetts (Mark A. Darling and Bethany P. Minich on the brief, and Mr. Darling orally), for defendant Credit Union National Association. Desmarais Law Group, PLLC, of Manchester (Debra L. Mayotte on the brief and orally), for defendants Robert H. Stier and Pierce Atwood, LLP. Gilles R. Bissonnette, of Concord, on the brief, for American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire and Electronic Frontier Foundation, as amici curiae. -
BIG DATA Handbook | Chapter 1 — IP Rights
BIG DATA Handbook | A Guide for Lawyers 1 IP Rights IP Rights Introduction > Patent Law > Trade Secrets > Copyright > Open Source Software > Patent Defense Approaches > Standard Essential Patents > IP Policies > BIG DATA Handbook—A Guide for Lawyers | Chapter 1 — IP Rights PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL IP Rights Introduction Intellectual Property (IP) rights should be a top consideration when developing Big Data systems, particularly for drafting Data Usage Agreements and IP Policies. Collection, transmission, processing, storage, distribution, and other related uses of data can all have important IP implications. What rights are in play? Who owns those rights? At what stage of the process? Can and should they be licensed? These and other question should be asked and answered at the outset of, and continually throughout, a Big Data project. Given the complexity of Big Data projects and transactions, one can easily imagine a scenario in which multiple parties claim an interest in the same data, further highlighting the importance of data ownership rights. For example, in the case of a smart kitchen appliance that collects data from users, a number of different parties might claim to own the data: the user, the manufacturer of the smart appliance, or an app or software developer who processes that data to gain insights. Given the intangible and non-exclusive nature of data, IP rights and data usage agreements can be the most effective tools for establishing and controlling the ownership of data in complex Big Data projects. In some instances, the dispute as to who owns the rights, or the value of the rights or subject data, may not even be readily apparent at the outset, when an agreement is consummated. -
Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court: State of Play
UNITARY PATENT AND UNIFIED PATENT COURT: STATE OF PLAY Stefan Luginbuehl Lawyer, International Legal Affairs, PCT European Patent Office, Munich REGULATIONS ON UNITARY PATENT PROTECTION 20 January 2013: Entry into force of two EU regulations . Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection . Regulation (EU) No. 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements For the 25 participating member states REGULATIONS ON UNITARY PATENT PROTECTION . Italy joined the enhanced co-operation scheme 2 October 2015. Regulations (EU) No. 1257/2012 and (EU) No. 1260/2012 are now in force for 26 of the 28 EU member states (exceptions: Croatia and Spain). They apply from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement). AGREEMENT ON A UNIFIED PATENT COURT (UPC AGREEMENT) . The UPC Agreement was signed on 19 February 2013 by 25 of the 28 EU member states (exceptions: Croatia, Poland and Spain). Austria 7 August 2013 . It will enter into force after the deposit France 14 March 2014 of the 13th instrument of ratification or Sweden 5 June 2014 accession (including France, Germany and the UK). Belgium 6 June 2014 Denmark 20 June 2014 . So far, nine states have deposited their Malta 9 December 2014 instruments of ratification. Luxembourg 22 May 2015 Portugal 28 August 2015 . Several states have indicated their intention to ratify in the next few months.