Navnita Chadha Behera Risk Profile India y Prospects for Conflict and Peace Country Risk Profile 2000 Countr 2000 Swiss Peace Foundation ⋅ Institute for Conflict Resolution and SDC ⋅ Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Swiss Peace Foundation Sonnenbergstrasse 17, Postfach, CH-3000 Bern 7 Telefon ++41 (0)31 330 12 12, Telefax ++41 (0)31 330 12 13 E-mail: [email protected] www.swisspeace.ch Prospects for Conflict and Peace Prospects for Conflict and Peace TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ................................................................................................................................. 2 1. Executive Summary........................................................................................................ 3 2. Policy Recommendations ............................................................................................ 4 2.1. The Domestic Arena ............................................................................................... 4 2.2. The External Realm.................................................................................................. 6 3. Background ...................................................................................................................10 3.1. Political Factors ...................................................................................................... 13 3.1.1. Creation and Demand for New States ..................................................... 13 3.1.2. Towards Multi-level Governance................................................................ 14 3.1.3 Regionalization of the Political Forces ........................................................ 15 3.1.4. The Kashmiri Secessionist Movement ......................................................... 17 3.1.5. North-East India: A Zone of Turmoil............................................................. 20 3.1.6. Caste/ Class/ Agrarian Violence ................................................................ 26 3.1.7 Growing Influence of Hindutva.................................................................... 28 3.1.7.1. Attacks on Christian Minorities.................................................................. 30 3.2 Environmental Factors ........................................................................................... 31 3.3. Foreign Affairs......................................................................................................... 34 3.3.1 Ties with Pakistan ............................................................................................. 34 3.3.2 India-Bangladesh Border Problems ............................................................. 37 3.4 Nuclearization of South Asia ................................................................................ 38 4. Internal Risk Assessment .............................................................................................. 44 5. International Risk Assessment..................................................................................... 49 End Notes ........................................................................................................................... 54 1 Prospects for Conflict and Peace Preface The present series of case studies on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan were presented and discussed at the “Second Workshop on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia: Early Warning in Practice” in September 2000 in Bern, Switzerland. The workshop was organized by the Swiss Peace Foundation's early warning unit FAST (Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding) and brought together scholars, local experts, and representatives of NGOs dealing with the South Asian region. FAST's main objective is the early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations for the purpose of early action towards the prevention of armed conflict and – if given – seizing opportunities for peace building. Combined with a collection of statistic evidence and systematic monitoring of conflictive and cooperative events, the present Country Risk Profile is part of FAST's early warning methodology linking early warning and early action by relevant decision makers. FAST is mandated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The case studies on Afghanistan (Rahimullah Yusufzai), India (Navnita Chadha Behera) and Pakistan (I.A. Rehman) shed light on the various political, socio-economic and demographic causes of specific ongoing conflicts in the South Asian region. 2 Prospects for Conflict and Peace 1. Executive Summary The nature and character of the Indian nation-state has rested on three key pillars of democracy, secularism and federalism. While Nehru secured constitutional subordination of sub-national identities, Mrs. Gandhi sought their submergence into a pan-Indian identity, resulting in several violent regional movements. The Congress strategy of politicizing religion to electoral ends was exploited by the BJP to articulate Indian nationalism driven by the ideology of Hindutva. The recent series of attacks on Christian minorities, against this backdrop, have been analyzed to show that religion is being used as a convenient tool to divert attention from deeper political and economic struggles. The key political features in the current evolution of Indian nation- state pertain to the growing demand and creation of new states, steps towards multi-level governance and regionalization of political forces. At the same time, India continues to be rocked by several secessionist movements along with caste, class and agrarian violence. The armed conflicts in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East region continue to simmer. A peace process is underway that may not be buried despite various difficult obstacles it faces. Development induced displacement of millions of people because of big dams and its implications for leading to new social conflicts have been addressed. In the external realm, the border tensions between India and Bangladesh resulting in skirmishes and killing of soldiers as well as civilians have been discussed. More importantly, the scenario of another “Kargil” or “mini-war”, arising out of miscalculation, between India and Pakistan cannot be completely ruled out. This logic extends to the nuclear realm, although there are several factors such as economic constraints, ambiguity about the current status of nuclear weaponization and growing international pressure especially from the USA, militate against such a possibility. The paper maps a vibrant nuclear debate regarding India’s proposed nuclear posture, doctrine and size and structure of its proposed nuclear arsenal. 3 Prospects for Conflict and Peace 2. Policy Recommendations The policy recommendations are addressed to three broad sets of actors: the Indian government, the civil society players and institutions within India and, the international community. 2.1. The Domestic Arena The policy recommendations in the domestic arena are primarily for the most critical set of players—the Indian government, that is, the central government in New Delhi as well as the relevant state governments and the key non-state actors such as militant groups. With regard to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government must clearly spell out the agenda and the mandate of the K.C. Pant mission in terms of its scope, substance and proposed strategy. The central government’s initiative to begin the dialogue process with different segments of the Kashmiri society is a welcome step in the right direction. This should be further broad-based to include political leaders and representatives of other communities such as Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, Paharis, Gujjars, Ladakhi Buddhists and Shia Muslims of Kargil region in J&K. The government should also facilitate a dialogue between the Kashmiri groups across the Line of Control. New Delhi should allow the Hurriyat leaders to visit Pakistan to pave the way for their inclusion into the dialogue process. The All-Party Hurriyat Conference, in return, should drop its pre-condition of being accepted as the sole spokesman of Kashmiris. They have yet to establish their credentials as the true representatives of Kashmiris and considering they are fighting for Kashmiris’ right of self-determination, they cannot in principle usurp the rights of other political groups (e.g Shabir Shah led Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party) and militant outfits’ direct participation in the dialogue process, leave alone the rights of Jammuites and Ladakhis whom they do not even claim to represent. Farooq Abdullah’s government needs to undertake serious measures to improve the quality of governance in the state. The restoration of a democratically elected government has done little to redress popular grievances and urgent steps are needed to rectify the situation. 4 Prospects for Conflict and Peace Both the central and state government need to revive the agenda of autonomy. The former needs to clarify and revise its stand on the recommendations of the State Autonomy Commission while the latter should initiate a state-wide debate on the recommendations of the Regional Autonomy Commission. A similar set of measures needs to be undertaken in the North-East region. These include improving the quality of governance and sanitizing the political processes to break the grid of links between the state governments and militant groups. The central and state governments need to seriously and squarely address the issue of influx of foreigners and outsiders that has