Books Call Sign Chaos

reviewed by Col Chris Woodbridge, USMC(Ret)

n his novel, El Club Dumas,1 Spanish author Arturo Perez-Re- >Col Woodbridge is the Publisher, verte observes, “There are no in- Editor, and Chairman of the Edito- nocent readers anymore ... To the rial Advisory Panel of the Marine Iinformation the author provides he’ll Corps Gazette. Unless otherwise always add his own.” To be honest, noted, all quotations are from Call I am not an innocent reader of Call Sign Chaos. Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead. During my 30 years in the Marine Corps, I CALL SIGN CHAOS: Learning to served directly under Gen James N. and entertaining leadership manual Lead. By and Bing Mattis’ command three times, always for executives, managers, and military West. New York, NY: Random two echelons down the chain of com- officers. Mattis is a gifted storyteller, House, 2019. mand: for example, me at , and his advice will be useful to any- ISBN: 978-0812996838, 320 pp. him at ; me at battalion, him one who runs anything. The book is not, however, an account of his time in at division; and so forth. This is also 2 the first time I reviewed a book that I service to the 45th president. appear in, however briefly. This is rel- So, if you expect a “tell-all ex- evant only in that I was close to some pose” about the Office of the Secre- uncovers the ’s “origin sto- of the events and many of the Marines tary of Defense in President Donald ry” from youth in State mentioned in the book, and I bring J. Trump’s administration, you will be through early ship-board deployments my own views to the reading. What disappointed. As the General explains to the Western Pacific and subsequent follows is not “the rest of the story,” in his introduction, his resignation “is recruiting duty. This part continues but my opinions of the book shaped how my public service ended; now I through his first combat experiences by my personal experiences. will tell you how it began.” as a lieutenant while com- I also need to add that writing this Furthermore, if you expect deeply manding a battalion in Operation review has been challenging since a touching insights into the character of DESERT STORM and concludes with minor print and television media fren- Jim Mattis the man, you will also be his command of Task Force 58, the zy has grown around the General’s disappointed by the book. Likewise, if first American and allied “brigade” first interviews since his resignation you expect a chest-thumping first-per- into after the terrorist as Secretary of Defense. The ques- son battle narrative from “Mad Dog attacks of 11 September 2001. This tions and discussion in these public Mattis,” you truly do not know who first part demonstrates the General’s interviews have all seemed to focus the General is. However, if you expect grounding in personal leadership on everything but the book. A situa- a collection of carefully curated bio- at the tactical level where personal tion perhaps best illustrated by Jeffrey graphical vignettes that carry funda- preparation—mental, physical, and Goldberg in his article for the October mental lessons on leadership, then you spiritual—and immediate presence edition of , wherein he de- will be pleased with this book. Above in the lives of the Marines you lead scribes the General’s departure from all, this work is worth every Marine’s are crucial to success. As a lieutenant the current administration: time to read. Call Sign Chaos will also serving as a platoon commander in Here is where I am compelled to note be of particular value to all who serve his battalion, we all learned from him that I did not learn any of these de- in the joint force, the Defense estab- the moral imperatives of leadership tails from Mattis himself. Nor did I lishment, as well as students of na- in war—lessons many of us took into learn them from his new book, Call tional defense, strategy, history, and our own commands in the sequels to Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, which he military affairs. the so-called First . wrote with the former Marine officer The book is organized into three The second part, “Executive Lead- . The book is an instructive parts. The first, “Direct Leadership,” ership,” begins by following General

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Mattis in combat again, covering his keep fighting for those who are still First, I reassured our traditional friends time in command of the First Marine with you. that we stood with them in defend- Division during the initial invasion of ing their security against the terrorist and early stability and counter- The third part, entitled “Strategic threat. Second, I made it clear that insurgency operations through his as- Leadership,” deals exclusively with we would not tolerate Iranian incur- signments at MCCDC, I MEF, U.S. the General’s time commanding U.S. sion violating their territorial integrity. Joint Forces Command, and NA- CENTCOM. Since the establishment Third, I reinforced our ambassadors’ TOs’ Supreme Allied Command for of CENTCOM in 1983, only four- efforts and encouraged regional leaders Transformation. Among this part’s teen men have served as the geograph- to be responsive to and inclusive of all vignettes are the details of an incident ic combatant commander for this their people. I saw this all as buying that has not appeared in the official complex, dynamic, and volatile area of time for them to make reforms aligned with their societies’ carrying capacity. histories of Operation IRAQI FREE- responsibility. This period of the Gen- DOM. Shocking and controversial at eral’s service is probably the least re- The book further illustrates this the time was the decision to relieve latable for even the most experienced, point regarding “carrying capacity” for Col Joe D. Dowdy from command mature, and well-read military reader. change by drawing the stark contrasts of RCT 1 during the “march up” to The book does a credible job of break- between and : Baghdad. The General’s decision is ing down this barrier to understand- described over three pages and it is ing by detailing the daily routine, or To see what might have happened had clear he neither took the action lightly personal battle rhythm, the General the Egyptian military not acquiesced to the will of millions of Egyptians in nor second-guessed his choice once demanded of himself and his staff. the streets, we need only look to Syria. made. Although General Mattis’ stat- The sheer intellectual stamina and ed intent “involved speed as the top personal discipline required to oper- Here again, the theme of strategic in- priority,” the commander of RCT 1 ate at this level is a testament to the coherence at the national level plays “expressed his heartfelt reluctance to exceptional character of such leaders. out through the period of “red lines” lose any of his men by pushing at what Sadly, much of this section describes and inaction. The horrific civil war in might seem to be a reckless pace.” Col the friction and frustration born from Syria continues to destabilize the re- Dowdy was relieved immediately and failures to frame and articulate a co- gion and “America lives today with the replaced by one of the General’s most herent national strategy for the region. consequences of emboldened adversar- trusted subordinate leaders, then-Col In addition to the precipitous with- ies and shaken allies.” John Toolan. As a lieutenant colonel, drawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and General Mattis took command Toolan had served as the Operations restrictions on “boots on the ground” of CENTCOM with two threats in Officer, 7th Marines, when then-Col- troop strength in Afghanistan, this mind: “stateless Sunni Islamist ter- onel Mattis commanded the 7th Ma- period was marked by the wave of rorists, and the revolutionary Shiite rine Regiment and was responsible for popular uprisings across North Africa regime in . By the end of Strategic the “Chaos” call sign. and the Middle East that came to be Leadership, it was the situation with A second vignette continues a known as the “Arab Spring.” Although Iran that eroded the General’s trust theme that resonates throughout the heralded by some as the ushering in and “traction” within the Obama ad- book: the frustration and squandered liberal democracy in the Arab world, ministration. In December 2012, the lives, resources, and opportunities for the General and others such as Secre- General departed CENTCOM “a re- victory that attend upon political and tary of Defense were gion aflame and in disarray. The lack strategic incoherence at the national of integrated regional strategy had left level. Not unlike the missed opportu- wary about the consequences of the us adrift and our friends confused. We nity to trap Osama Bin Laden and his uprising … Democracy was not pre- were offering no leadership or direc- ordained to emerge from what was Al Qaeda forces at Tora Bora in 2002, unfolding, I didn’t have a crystal ball tion.” described at the end of “Direct Lead- but a quick glance at history reminded The book closes with a section ership,” what the General refers to as me that every society has its own car- titled, “Reflections.” This section is his worst day in the Marine Corps rying capacity for making change. I close to a tutorial on national defense came in 2004 during the abortive first was concerned that if traditional Arab and military science. The first part, battle of : societies proved unable to assimilate “Lethality as a Metric,” is based on a I believed I had let my men down, sudden political change, something deep understanding of the unchang- having failed to prevent the attack in worse would erupt. ing nature of war and the General’s the first place and subsequently failing years of experience leading forces in to prevent a stop once we were deep Throughout this dynamic time, the combat: inside the city. It was a tough time General travelled constantly through- The need for lethality must be the for me, because higher-level decisions out the region employing three lines measuring stick against which we had cost us lives, but now was not the of effort: evaluate the efficacy of our military. By time to go inward. You must always aligning the entire military enterprise

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… to the goal of compounding lethal- The second theme is, of course, the ership and years of service. In this ity, we best deter adversaries, or … win importance of reading history and manner, the book is crafted to add at the lowest cost to our troops’ lives. “studying one’s craft.” His advice here as much value for sergeants and cap- is clear, if aspirational, for many: “If tains and it does for colonels, senior S‑ Reflections’ second part is “The Art you haven’t read hundreds of books, NCOs, and generals as well as elected of Leading,” which, as the title sug- learning from others who went before and appointed policy makers. Credit gests, provides a first person descrip- you, you are functionally illiterate— must also go to co-author “Bing” West tion of the General’s personal leader- you can’t coach, and you can’t lead.” and editor Will Murphy. This writ- ship and how he drew upon the Ma- The final part of “Reflections” and ing team has produced a thoroughly rine Corps way of war in his own au- the last paragraphs of the book is “The useful handbook for leaders housed thentic warfighting style. This section Need for Allies.” Perhaps added here, inside an engaging and uniquely au- expands upon two recurring themes for those readers who “skip to the thentic memoir. from throughout the book. First, is the end,” these paragraphs are the closest gratitude for the Vietnam veteran Ma- to discussing the General’s service as rines who trained and mentored the the Secretary of Defense. The advice Notes General in his formative years in the here is broad and addressed to those 1. Arturo Perez-Riverte, El Club Dumas, trans- Service. This debt is expressed repeat- who make national policy: “History is lated by Sonia Soto, (New York, NY: Houghton edly in the book and is best stated here: compelling. Nations with allies thrive Mifflin Harcourt, 1996). and those without wither.” I had been shaped and sharpened by Call Sign Chaos is an important 2. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Man Who Couldn’t the rough whetstone of those veterans, addition to any professional military Take It Anymore,” The Atlantic, (Online: Octo- mentored by sergeants and captains reading list. Each section of the book ber 2019), available at https://www.theatlantic. who had slogged through rice paddies com. and jungles fighting a tough enemy will resonate more with different read- every foot of the way. ers based on their own level of lead-

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