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FINDING THE ENEMY: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, 1861-1865

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

William B. Feis, M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University 1997

Dissertation Committee. Approved by Professor Allan R. Millett, Adviser

Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr. Adviser Professor Mansel G. Blackford Department of History UMI Number: 9721093

Copyright 1997 by Feis, William Burhans

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9721093 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by William B. Feis /997 ABSTRACT

"The art of war is simple enough," Ulysses S. Grant observed. "Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on. " This statement captures the essence of Grant's generalship during the Civil War. In the past, however, historians have focused primarily upon the "striking" and the "moving on" aspects of his generalship but have paid little attention to the most crucial ingredient in his recipe for success-finding the enemy. This dissertation addresses that shortcoming by examining how Grant obtained and used military intelligence during the Civil War.

In the Western theater. Grant enjoyed enormous success despite lacking intelligence on several occasions. His victories resulted in part from his ability to "read" his opponents and anticipate their behavior. In the absence of intelligence, the initiative, determination, and "pressing on" worked well in Mississippi and Tennessee. However, in order to neutralize Robert E. Lee's key weapon—strategic and operational mobility-Grant had to adapt, becoming more reliant upon intelligence and on the Army of the Potomac's

"Bureau of Military Information" to track the Confederate army. In 1864-65, Grant had at his disposal the most sophisticated military intelligence system of the war, and one that played a significant role in Lee's defeat.

Grant’s experience with intelligence revealed that he understood uncertainty to be a constant in warfare. More importantly, he realized that managing uncertainty was far more productive and more realistic than waiting for "perfect" intelligence to eliminate it.

ii During times when uncertainty prevailed. Grant turned to the initiative as a substitute for

intelligence and as a means of piercing the fog of war. Although he remained an avid

consumer of information and appreciated its intrinsic value, he refused to view

intelligence as a panacea. By war’s end. Grant had become convinced that the combination of the initiative and intelligence could prove decisive, even against Robert

E. Lee.

Ill ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people played an indispensable role in helping to complete this dissertation.

I give full credit to the people I am about to mention for the merits of this work, but I

willingly shoulder the blame for all errors. First, I would like to express my deepest

gratitude to my advisor. Professor Allan R. Millett. He taught me a tremendous amount

about the Civil War, military history, and the historical profession, but I am most thankful for the great friendship we developed while "campaigning" at Gettysburg,

Camifex Ferry, Franklin and Nashville, and the Wilderness. A finer scholar and "pard" would be hard to find.

Professor Peter Maslowski was the model of scholarship and professionalism that inspired me during my undergraduate and graduate days at the University of Nebraska-

Lincoln. Together we discovered the world of Civil War military intelligence and came up with the idea to study Grant's use of intelligence. I believe the findings in this study have justified our early enthusiasm. I am also thankful for his friendship and advice. His faith in me helped transform my love of history from a hobby to a profession. To him I owe a considerable debt.

Edwin C. Fishel, the dean of Civil War military intelligence, has been with me since the begirming of this project. His encyclopedic knowledge of intelligence matters during the war, and his mastery of the resources available at the National Archives made my research much easier. Moreover, his willingness to share ideas, research notes, and insights gained from decades of research is a model scholarly cooperation and

iv selflessness. Most of all, the long research trips to Washington were always brightened

by the many dinners shared with Ed and his wife Gladys at the Cosmos Club.

Also deserving of high praise is Michael Musick and Micheal Meier of the

Military Reference Branch of the National Archives. Their knowledge of the collections and their thoughts on where I might find intelligence-related material paid off

handsomely. Their devotion to public service and to preserving American history is

inspirational. E. Cheryl Schnirring of the Illinois State Historical Library also pointed me

in many profitable directions.

I would also like to thank the U. S. Army Center of Military History for a

Dissertation Year Fellowship, the Ohio State Department of History for the Ruth Higgins

Summer Fellowship, the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University for providing graduate assistantships at critical times, and Mrs. Cecile Guthrie for honoring me with the Gerry D. Guthrie Fellowship. The funds provided by these institutions and by Mrs.

Guthrie allowed me to complete my research and pay the bills.

I could never repay the enormous debt of gratitude I owe my parents, Gil and

Polly Feis, my sister, Mary Christy, and my grandparents. Bill and Anne Doering and

LaVeta Feis, for their steadfast support and endless faith . I would also like to thank my mother- and father-in-law, Sharon and Dick Bartholomew, for not only sharing their daughter, but also for making West Virginia my second home. My dear friends John

Stull, Greg Keller, Steven Helm, Beth Russell, Joyce Grimes, and Suzanne Studer were always there for me. Their ability to brighten the endless days at the computer meant more to me than they could ever know.

Finally, to my wife, best friend, and soulmate, Dixee Bartholomew-Feis, I owe everything. Her love, patience, and understanding, not to mention her exceptional editing skills, made this dissertation possible. VITA

August 31, 1963 ...... Bom - Franklin, Nebraska

1989...... M.A. History, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

1996 - present...... Assistant Professor of History, Buena Vista University, Storm Lake, Iowa

PUBLICATIONS

1. William B. Feis, "Intelligence Activities," in Steven E. Woodworth, ed.. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Research and Literature (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996).

2. William B. Feis, "Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865." Civil War History 39 (September 1993): 199-215.

3. William B. Feis, "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12-July 14, 1864." Civil War History (September 1990): 209-225.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Abstract ...... ii

Acknowledgments ...... iv

Vita ...... vi

List of M aps...... ix

Chapters;

Introduction...... 1

1. Early Intelligence Education: From West Point to M exico ...... 5

2. The First Test: Missouri, 1861 ...... 30

3. Intelligence and Command at B elm ont...... 63

4. On the Twin Rivers: Forts Henry and Donelson...... 103

5. Surprise at Shiloh...... 146

6. A Frustrating Interlude: Northern Mississippi, 1862 ...... 192

7. On to Vicksburg ...... 238

8. The Fruits of Intelligence and Luck: The Chattanooga Campaign...... 274

9. Into the Darkness: The Overland Campaign, 1864...... 301

10. Neutralizing the V alley...... 328

11. The Last Campaigns: Petersburg and Appomattox...... 365

vn Conclusion...... 380

Bibliography ...... 385

VIII LIST OF MAPS

Map Page

1. The Western Theater of War, 1861-1862 ...... 31

2. Western Kentucky ...... 64

3. Fort Henry and Fort Donelson ...... 104

4. Western Tennessee ...... 147

5. Northern Mississippi and Western Tennessee, Late Fall, 1862 ...... 193

6. Grant's Route to Vicksburg ...... 239

7. Chattanooga Battlefield and the "Cracker Line," 1863 ...... 275

8. The Advance to the James R iv er...... 302

9. Early’s Raid on Washington, 1864 ...... 329

10. Theater of Pursuit From Petersburg to Appomattox...... 366

IX INTRODUCTION

"The art of war is simple enough," Ulysses S. Grant observed. "Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on."* More than any other description, this statement captures the essence of Grant's generalship during the Civil War. For example, we know that he found the enemy and from the length of the casualty lists, it is evident that he struck the Confederates hard and often. Moreover, we also see that he rarely sat idle, preferring to press the enemy relentlessly rather than surrender to inertia. Historians have analyzed, eulogized, and criticized Grant's military career from many angles. But they have focused primarily upon the "striking" and the "moving on" aspects of his generalship. However, the first ingredient of Grant's formula for success—utilizing information to "find the enemy"—has yet to receive adequate attention.

The collection, analysis, and use of intelligence (a term synonymous with information in nineteenth century military lexicon) is an important command function that can produce insights into enemy movements, deployments, strength and capabilities, and even intentions. In essence, intelligence forms the foundation upon which generals formulate their own plans and campaigns. "Secret operations are essential in war," wrote Sun Tzu, for "upon them the army relies to make its every move." Antoine Henri

Jomini asked: "How can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant [of] what his adversary is about?"- Given the centrality of intelligence to decisionmaking, determining what Grant knew, when he knew it, where he acquired it, and how he used intelligence to formulate plans and make decisions will shed new light upon his

1 generalship. Moreover, this approach produces a more balanced assessment since

Grant’s decisions are judged from the viewpoint ofwhat he knew at the time, not what

historians know from hindsight. Viewing generals from this "intelligence perspective"

can produce significant results, as demonstrated by Edward Drea's excellent study on the

role of ULTRA in General Douglas Mac Arthur's World War II campaigns.^

Assessing the impact of the human element in intelligence further illuminates the

subject. Commanders make decisions, not intelligence. Thus, the outcome depends upon

the whims of individuals. To the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, this fact

escalated the level of "friction" in war, which made even the simplest activity more difficult. Personality and character, preconceptions, attitude toward risk, tendency

toward wishful thinking or worse-case scenarios, excitability, and military education, to

name a few, constitute important intangibles that influence commanders and their decisions. This study will illuminate the impact these intangibles had upon Grant's judgments, as well as highlight the characteristics that made him a successful commander. He possessed a healthy respect for the potential of intelligence but, unlike some contemporaries, he recognized that even the best information would never eliminate uncertainty. As a result, he compensated for intelligence shortcomings with an

unwavering trust in his own intuition and judgment, and a deep faith in the initiative as a handy substitute for intelligence. How well this arrangement worked comprises the essence of the following chapters.

Even though historians have scrutinized Grant's role in the war from many angles, we can still achieve a better understanding of his generalship by examining him through different lenses. "Here is a man," wrote historian E. B. Long, who "deserves some new investigation, some new thought."'^ Without understanding the role of military intelligence in his decisionmaking calculus, an assessment of Grant's generalship remains incomplete. Spanning his military career from West Point to Appomattox, this dissertation addresses that need through a systematic examination of how Grant obtained and used military intelligence during his Civil War campaigns. NOTES

‘Quoted in J. F. C. Fuller, Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship. 2nd ed. (1957; Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982), 78.

- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York; Oxford University Press, 1963), 149; Antoine Henri Jomini. The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (1862; Westport, Conn.; Greenwood Press, 1971), 268

^See Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan. 1942-1945 (Lawrence. Kan.: University Press o f Kansas, 1992).

'‘E. B. Long, "Ulysses S. Grant for Today," in David L. Wilson and John Y. Simon, eds., Ulysses S. Grant: Essays and Documents (Carbondale. III.; Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 25. CHAPTER 1

EARLY INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION; FROM WEST POINT TO MEXICO

Ulysses S. Grant knew what he had to do. On April 12, 1861, Confederate forces had fired upon Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, shattering his beloved

Union and plunging the nation into war. With the patriotic speeches delivered at a pro-

Union rally still echoing in his ears. Grant walked the dark streets of Galena, Illinois with his younger brother Orvil. In this moment of crisis, the former soldier realized that the Federal government would need experienced Army officers to raise, train, and lead volunteers. A West Point graduate with fifteen years of active duty including service in the Mexican War, Grant had become a valuable man. The silence hung heavy as the brothers distanced themselves from the courthouse and the raucous crowd spilling into the street. Before they had gone too far. Grant turned to his brother and said simply: "I think I ought to go into the service."' Within two months of this decision Grant would command a regiment. By the end of the war he would be the genuine hero of a nation, second only to George Washington in prestige and equal in military rank.

Some contemporaries and later historians described Grant, the son of a tarmer, as a man destined for greatness. However, these revelations usually emerged late in the war or after Appomattox had sealed his reputation in American military history. Politicians, acquaintances, and others scrambled to grab a share of the spotlight by claiming credit for aiding him in his success, sometimes revealing that they had known all along that fame awaited Sam Grant. But during the dark days of April, 1861, no one had any idea what lay ahead in the coming tempest, let alone that someone as unimpressive as

"Useless" Grant would play an important role in helping the Union survive the maelstrom. Initially, few predicted accurately the length of the conflict and even fewer understood the enormous effort and skill required to raise, train and equip massive armies and lead them into battle, especially for a civilian population possessing a fundamental historical aversion to soldiers and armies. According to one observer, both the Fédérais and Confederates, in the beginning, "were babes in military practice.

Grant was no exception. Although he had military training and had served in combat, by 1861 Grant was a civilian and his West Point days and Army career only distant memories. Much like his contemporaries, he entered the war with a lot to leam about commanding large armies. Many historians have argued, however, that his ability to leam as he went along, to adapt to changing circumstances, to deal with a situation on its own terms, and to benefit from mistakes separated him from other military leaders the war produced. As one biographer recalled. Grant achieved success because he "had fine soldierly qualities and an open mind, and who in his quickness to leam was ahead of his compeers."^ In his study of Grant’s generalship, J. F. C. Fuller maintained that the clerk from Galena "was forever leaming," achieving his objectives "through sheer industry, perseverance, and self-education." More recently. Archer Jones described one of his most important attributes: "Grant also possessed much of that ability for seeing interrelationships, making valid inductions, and identifying critical variables, so essential to managers and to those who administer, maneuver, and fight armies amidst the fog and friction of war.'"^

Jones's depiction illuminates a characteristic that aided in Grant’s success during the Civil War: his ability to collect and analyze military information, and use it in formulating plans and making decisions. Since intelligence operations were left to the discretion of individual commanders during the Civil War, officers had few places to tum

6 for guidance in this important command function. Although this limitation applied to

Grant as well, he was no stranger to intelligence work. His West Point education had exposed him, albeit in a very limited sense, to the theoretical elements of intelligence.

More importantly, his service in the Mexican War had brought the classroom lessons to the battlefield. Before attaining a command in 1861, Grant had some practical experience with the organization of an intelligence system and with using information as a basis for future operations. That education continued throughout the Civil War.

Grant's cadetship at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point ( 1839-1843) represents a logical starting point for discovering formative influences on his view of command and intelligence, keeping in mind, as one noted historian of West Point has warned, that linking an officer’s performance during the Civil War with what he may or may not have learned at the academy remains a highly speculative venture.^ Yet, examining the theoretical or practical instruction Grant received on the subject of intelligence while a cadet provides a backdrop against which to view the way he handled these matters during the Civil War.

Nearly a decade after his graduation Lieutenant Grant returned to West Point for a brief visit. "My trip has been a very pleasant one," he wrote, "and 1 really felt very glad to get back to the old place where 1 spent, what then seemed to me, an interminable four years. The homecoming reminded him of the bittersweet nature o f his time there.

After he arrived at the academy in 1839 Cadet Grant wrote, putting on a brave face, that the academy suited him so well that he "would not go away on any account whatever."

Not long after, however, he followed with great interest the Congressional debates over the proposed abolition of the institution, hoping the measure would pass and provide him with an honorable way out. He recalled later that, by the commencement of classes his first year, barely three months after arriving, "I felt as though I had been at West Point always."^

7 Academically, Grant’s mediocre performance placed him twenty-first in a class of

thirty-nine at graduation. His best subjects were math and engineering, his worst French,

ethics, and infantry tactics.* Former classmates and biographers have described Cadet

Grant as quiet, unassuming, honest and, aside from being a great equestrian, wholly

undistinguished among a talented stable of future officers. His fellow cadets described

him as "lazy and careless," possessing a memory "not at all good " for remembering his

lessons accurately. Inattentive and disinterested. Grant himself admitted that he "did not

take hold of my studies with avidity," rarely perusing his lessons more than once before class.^ Overall, he was a quick study, but was easily bored with the mind-numbing

lessons in the classroom. However, some of his comrades also noticed that Grant often displayed good judgment and possessed an unshakeable common sense.

West Point posed a scholastic challenge for Grant and many of his fellow students but also the sheer drudgery of the curriculum, the stifling rules and regulations, and the sparse living conditions made the experience that much more difficult. Cadets spent their time attending lectures and recitations, studying in their rooms, or drilling on the parade ground. The only appreciable break from this pattern during their four years was the summer furlough granted after the second year. The annual summer encampment, where cadets learned infantry, artillery and (after 1853) cavalry drill plus other facets of soldiering, provided some relief from the books. * * Overall, however, the classroom experience comprised the essence of West Point life during this period.

While in the classroom, cadets learned quickly that the Academy's curriculum was neither easy nor overly exciting in its composition. Sylvanus Thayer, the third superintendent and an 1808 graduate, designed and implemented much of the academy's course of study during his superintendancy from 1817 to 1833, forming the cornerstone of the West Point educational experience before the Civil War. Thayer had spent two years in Europe studying military education systems and his observations left an indelible

8 imprint on his thinking. Impressed by the French institutions, he returned to America and

modeled West Point on the French school for military engineers, the L 'Ecole

Polytechnique. Like the French counterpart, Thayer’s curriculum stressed mathematics,

engineering and French, since most of the advanced military texts of the time were only

in that language. For the young man from rural Ohio, ill-prepared for this academic

rigor, "the time hung drearily."

The emphasis on mathematics and engineering not only paid homage to France's

perceived preeminence in military affairs of the time, but also reflected 19th century

American social and political realities and tilted the academy’s focus more toward

utilitarian educational pursuits than toward military training. Traditionally, nineteenth-

century Americans loathed professional soldiers and standing armies, preferring the

decidedly unmilitary militiaman and wartime volunteers to the professional soldier. A

key reason for the military academy’s survival amidst such hostility was its emphasis

upon producing engineers for work on civilian projects. During the 1820s and 1830s

West Point-trained engineers were in great demand to oversee massive internal

improvement programs as well as to survey and explore the western frontier. Congress codified the use of army engineers in these non-military activities in 1824 with the

General Survey Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act. Thus, through his curriculum

Thayer sought primarily to legitimize the army in American society, not to shape it for war.

In time, Thayer had molded the academy into the finest engineering college in the

United States, and cadets realized quickly that their performance in the technical disciplines, particularly mathematics, determined everything from class rank to their post-graduation duty assignment. Usually the top students in a class landed assignments with the Corps of Engineers, the Topographical Engineers, or the Ordnance Department, while the basement-dwellers of a class went to the infantry, cavalry, or artillery. As one

9 historian noted, "success at the military academy depended primarily on the exactitude with which a student met requirements imposed by an instructor, a textbook, or a set of regulations; initiative and imagination, if not actively penalized, were not rewarded."

The basic rationale behind the technical curriculum was to produce engineers first and soldiers second.

Not everyone agreed with the technical focus o f future officers. In 1819 the Army inspector general urged the Academy to expose cadets to more history, geography, and languages, reminding the faculty that "the great victories which had called forth the admiration o f every age were not achieved by the 'rule and compass' or the measurement of angles '" These protests barely caused a ripple, however, and Thayer's curriculum endured virtually unchanged (including the faculty who taught the courses) through the

Civil War. By 1839, the "Thayer System" was firmly entrenched and cadets like Grant found themselves facing four years of instruction that would contribute more toward transforming them into proficient engineers, or "technicists," than into competent professional officers.'^

Although the curriculum subordinated instruction in purely military affairs to more technical instruction, the engineering training itself was geared toward sharpening intellectual acuity and producing "tough-minded officers, capable of cutting through ambiguity and making coldly logical decisions under pressure.In addition, many educators believed that mathematics was an excellent method to "sharpen the intellect, to strengthen the faculty of reason, and to induce a habit of mind favorable to the discovery of truth and the detection of error." Moreover, the hours spent collecting and interpreting data and pursuing logical conclusions were all applicable to intelligence work and the above qualities were necessary characteristics of a good intelligence officer. Grant performed well in mathematics and perhaps honed his already keen intellect for future calculations on the battlefield.

10 The precision and cold logic instilled in cadets by the rigid curriculum dovetailed nicely with another important West Point staple—Drawing. Under the guidance of Robert

K. Weir, a member of the American Academy of Design, cadets learned how to sketch human figures, landscapes, and other subjects. Taken during the second and third years, the drawing class was essential for understanding and visualizing topography and terrain, as well as for mapmaking, a skill officers would need in the field. Most of all, Weir's course instilled a respect for careful and precise observation in his students. Rendering objects on a sketchpad gave cadets practice at estimating distances, assessing size and proportionality, discerning subtleties of terrain, and paying attention to detail. Even though the course conformed to the technical emphasis of the curriculum, particularly for drafting engineering plans, these skills were necessary tools not only for an officer in charge of building a canal, but also for one leading a reconnaissance patrol. An officer tasked with reconnoitering enemy positions and assessing the terrain had to be, according to one contemporary military theorist, "one who sees things as they are, and tells clearly and precisely what he has seen," carefully distinguishing between "what he knows from his own observation" and "that which he has learned from others." In the final analysis, the skills developed in engineering, mathematics, and drawing classes were transferable to intelligence operations, where precision, accuracy, and keen powers of observation had no substitutes.

With the introduction of the mandatory course entitled "Military and Civil

Engineering and the Science (later Art) of War" in 1832, cadets finally learned about various military topics like strategy, tactics, and military history. The brainchild of

Professor Dennis Hart Mahan, a Thayer protege, the course, which met daily, became the capstone of a cadet's military education, a standard element of his final year, and apparently one of the more enjoyable classes offered. Mahan's course comprised the only formal theoretical military and professional instruction at West Point in an age where it

11 was believed that great generals were bom, not made in the classroom. Graduating from West Point in 1824 Mahan spent four years studying the French army and the

School of Application for Engineers and Artillery at Metz and gathering instructional materials. When he returned, he incorporated his observations and ideas into the lesson plans for the "Science of War" course. Mahan remained at the Academy from 1833 until

1871, becoming the main prophet of the military art in America. Most West Point educated officers who served in the Civil War, including Grant, cut their professional theoretical teeth on Mahan's interpretation of warfare.-®

Despite attention to more military topics, Mahan's instruction remained consistent with the engineering emphasis of the academy curriculum. Under his tutelage, cadets spent the fall term of their fourth year concentrating on civil engineering and drawing while the study of military fortifications occupied most of the spring. However, during this final term Mahan squeezed in his "Science of War" class, essentially a six-lesson, nine hour mini-course covering topics such as the composition and organization of armies, offensive and defensive principles, and tactics and strategy.-* One cadet remembered that Mahan's lectures "were restricted almost entirely to short descriptions of campaigns and battles, with criticisms upon the tactical positions involved."--

Teaching largely by historical example, Mahan portrayed Napoleon as the ideal general and utilized his military chronicler Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini's treatise Summary of the Art of War ( 1838) as the primary theoretical foundation. Since Jomini’s opus remained untranslated until 1859, Mahan used as standard texts his own lithographed notes and later his book An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard. Outpost, and

Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling_Them Jo

Presence of an Enemy ( 1847). Eventually, Mahan's system was adopted into army

12 regulations. At best, "The Science o f War" only scratched the surface of the study of

warfare. As a result, what the cadets did not learn in class was left to the most demanding

and unforgiving teacher of all; experience.-^

According to students and judging from his own writings, however, Mahan was

not an orthodox Jominian. In fact, his lessons warned against blind adherence to

textbook principles and rules and advised a reasoned, common sense approach to military

affairs. This approach fit with Mahan’s attempt to infuse American social and political

realities into a systematic theory of war. To comprehend the military art, he believed,

required flexibility and reason. Cadet John C. Tidball noted that the professor, with a

voice affected by seemingly constant nasal congestion, implored his students to use their

heads so often that they dubbed him "Old Cobben Sense." Mahan believed that the

mastery of basic military principles supplemented with critical thinking skills and

common sense were essential for the success of future officers.-’^

Since time restrictions limited Mahan's discussions, he probably spent little time

discussing military intelligence operations in any detail. But both his idol Napoleon and

Jomini recognized the fundamental importance of intelligence in warfare. For example,

the great French general utilized a sophisticated blend of spies, diplomats, intercepted

mail, and other sources with success in the Jena Campaign of 1805.^^ Jomini also

discussed the importance of information and took a pragmatic approach toward

intelligence in his writings. In his sub-chapter entitled "Of Reconnoissances [sic] and

other Means of gaining Correct Information of the Movements of the Enemy," Jomini’s

summary provided a balanced and realistic assessment of intelligence and command,

furnishing a brief, common sense intelligence primer for commanders. On a tactical

level, for example, he advocated utilizing multiple collection means and sources and compiling bits of information which, although seemingly meaningless when taken alone, could form an accurate picture of the enemy when pieced together.-^

13 Echoing Clausewitz's famous dictum that "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult," Jomini recognized that "As it is unquestionably o f the highest importance to gain... .information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility."-^ The French thinker believed that the talent and genius o f a commander also constituted an essential element in intelligence work. Given a choice of officers, Jomini wrote, "I should have a much higher regard for the man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy than for him who could make a grand display of theories."-*

Although Mahan apparently agreed with Jomini on the importance of military intelligence, he devoted little space in Out-Post to information-gathering or what he termed "reconnaissance," which was defined as simply the "examination and collection of facts. However, the Academy professor made clear the crucial nature of intelligence in war. "There are no more important duties which an officer may be called upon to perform," he asserted, "than those of collecting and arranging information upon which either the general or daily operations of a campaign must be based." According to

Mahan, possessing "clear and specific information" reduced a general's problems by half and fortified him with confidence and strengthened his resolve. "[T]his feeling of certainty constitutes all the difference," wrote Mahan. Without it a general hesitates to make decisions and infects others with the "want of confidence in his own mind."^®

Aside from his emphasis upon intelligence in Out-Post. further evidence suggests that Mahan felt strongly on the subject and that he probably passed that appreciation on to his students. In a letter to Secretary of War Joel Poinsett in 1840 (Grant's second year) protesting the low standards set for non-West Point educated applicants for commissions in the Army, Mahan revealed what he believed was most important for officers to know.

"[T]here are certain attainments which every officer should possess," he advised Poinsett,

"amongst these.... are the Means of Military Reconnaissance." During Mahan's class,

14 Cadet Henry du Pont (Class of 1861) wrote down the principles espoused by the

professor in his lectures. Among the "General subjects of which a reconnaissance

should give information," du Pont noted, Mahan stressed, among others, "Military

topography" and the "Position o f the enemy. Although his "Science of War " class provided only a thumbnail sketch of a whole range of military matters, Mahan's observations on intelligence in Outpost and his letter to Poinsett suggests that the professor introduced his students to the necessity and importance of military information on the battlefield. Even so, what they received in the classroom only scratched the surface. Overall, the Army depended upon experience and common sense to further the education of new officers when it came to intelligence.

Since West Point prepared officers for the world of the slide rule and the compass, those who went to the infantry after graduation soon found that their academy education left much to be desired. Adept at reading maps, drill, and small unit tactics, new graduates knew little about administration, logistics, and staff functions and organization. In 1848 Lieutenant John C. Tidball discovered the hard way that West Point reality differed markedly with that of the Army. He arrived at his first duty station in

Texas only to find, much to his embarrassment, that the academy had neglected to familiarize cadets with basic army regulations or military routine.^-

Unfortunately for these graduates, no systematic post-graduate educational program existed within the Army akin to the War College or the Command and General

Staff College. Apparently, few graduates pursued military study while on active duty.

When Jacob D. Cox asked why this was so, a fellow officer retorted; "What would you expect of men who have to spend their lives at a two-company post, where there was nothing to do when off-duty but play draw-poker and drink whiskey at a sutler's shop?"

Although an unflattering depiction of the intellectual stasis of West Point-educated officers, Cox admitted that he had "hit the nail on the head." Those who attempted to

15 supplement their knowledge relied upon their West Point experience and various books, particularly Mahan's Outpost and the work of one of his students, Henry Wager Halleck, entitled Elements of the Military Art and Science ( 1846). Largely derived from Jomini, the latter treatise was one of the most widely read among contemporary officers and contained a valuable bibliography of the latest works on military subjects, many still in

French, for an officer’s professional enhancement.^^

Some historians argue that West Point-educated officers who went on to command in the Civil War carried with them a Jominian approach to warfare instilled in them by Mahan. Scholars have maintained that the academy produced officers wedded to such outdated notions as the primacy of the offensive, even though advancements in small arms technology had made assault tactics obsolete and deadly. However, attributing the behavior of Civil War generals solely to what they were exposed to at

West Point ignores the more pervasive influence of experiences encountered between graduation and 1861, especially for those, like Grant, who graduated before 1846. While some future Civil War officers fought Seminole Indians in Florida, others languished on numerous isolated frontier posts, and still others left the service for more lucrative civilian pursuits. More importantly, many gained valuable, practical military experience during the Mexican War. To disregard these factors places undue emphasis on the influence of the West Point classroom and parade ground.^^

Although West Point cadets may have read and reflected upon intelligence in warfare from Jomini or Napoleon, the key question is what Grant learned about the subject at the Academy. But determining this is problematic. To assign major influence to either Mahan or Jomini is to assume that Grant immersed himself in his studies, that he read more military literature on his own outside of class (he preferred novels), or that he mastered French well enough to translate and comprehend Jomini’s writings. By his own admission Grant was a mediocre student, possessing little interest in most classes,

16 particularly French and tactics. He never mentioned Jomini, Mahan, or their teachings in his correspondence or later in his Memoirs. This is not to say that Grant failed to learn important lessons at West Point, only that the academy did not solidify his thoughts on the conduct of war. That would come later.^^

Regarding Grant’s exposure to principles o f military intelligence, the same caveat applies. Mahan emphasized the importance of military reconnaissance within his historical approach to studying military affairs, but attributing Grant's success or failures with intelligence during the Civil War solely to a six-hour sub-course during his final term exaggerates its impact. On the other hand. Professor Mahan's statements regarding military reconnaissance and particularly his emphasis on common sense only reinforced a commander's natural desire to find out, as Wellington observed, "what is on the other side o f the hill" and to discern "what we don't know by the study of what we do."^^ The professor’s stress upon applying gray matter to the enigmatic nature of military problems, including intelligence work, avoiding blind adherence to textbook rules, and accepting and dealing with a situation on its own terms most likely buttressed Grant's developing thoughts on war and life in general. "An active intelligent officer, with an imagination fertile in the expedients of his profession, will seldom be at a loss as to his best course when the occasion offers," Mahan concluded, but "to one without these qualities, opportunities present themselves in vain."^^

Little evidence suggests that Grant continued his formal military study after graduation. While posted with the Fourth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks and Camp

Salubrity prior to the outbreak of war with Mexico, he kept busy with routine duties and prepared himself for a possible mathematics professorship at West Point.^* Grant never mentioned reading Mahan's or Hal leek's work while on active duty and when he did crack a book, it was usually a math text or a novel, a heritage from his cadet days.^^

Given his lackadaisical attitude toward his studies at the academy. Grant certainly lacked

17 any interest in further military study. On the other hand, however, he hoped to someday return to West Point to teach mathematics. But the war clouds looming south of the Rio

Grande foretold a different future for the young lieutenant who once admitted that

"circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans.The coming conflict with Mexico was Grant’s graduate seminar on war and more beneficial than any

West Point lesson, particularly on the subject of military intelligence.

Since his final class standing in 1843 kept him from the ranks of the Corps of

Engineers, Grant accepted a commission as a Brevet Second Lieutenant in the Fourth

Infantry stationed at Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis, Missouri. In June 1844 the regiment transferred to Camp Salubrity, near Natchitoches, Louisiana, and remained there for nearly a year. The growing threat of war with Mexico brought the Fourth to Corpus

Christi, Texas in August, 1845 as part of General Zachary Taylor’s Army o f Observation monitoring the disputed territory along the Mexican-American frontier.'** During this period. Grant’s highly descriptive and detailed correspondence underline his innate intellectual curiosity and his knack for observation and reporting.'*^

A small village situated near where the Nueces River emptied into the Gulf of

Mexico, Corpus Christi had prospered since 1839 due to the efforts of Henry Lawrence

Kinney, a Pennsylvanian who owned the major trading post in the town. Since the duties on goods traded between Texas and Mexico were high, Kinney and his partner William

Aubrey had transformed Corpus Christi, also known as "Kinney’s Ranch," into a haven for Mexican smugglers to obtain American goods without paying the expensive duties.

Due to the nature of his business, Kinney developed extensive connections in northern

Mexico and in the Mexican government. As a result, he possessed a ready-made network of spies and informants to monitor Mexican activity across the Rio Grande. After his arrival in Corpus Christi in August 1845, Taylor, now leading the Army of Occupation, tapped into Kinney’s network and received information from numerous indigenous

18 operatives, including his primary agent, ChapitaSandovalUsing Mexicans as spies

proved a prudent—and unavoidable—policy since they knew the area of operations,

particularly the road system, and fit in with the predominantly non-white population and

spoke that native language. Since few officers or soldiers understood Spanish and white

Americans roaming about the countryside would likely attract attention, Taylor had little choice but to rely on natives for information and on Texans fluent in the language—

usually less than savory characters who smuggled for a living—as interpreters. Several officers found this practice distasteful and dangerous and referred to both the Mexican operatives and their white interpreters as "worthless characters." Grant noticed the "bands of Mexican smugglers coming to this place to trade," but remained unaware o f their clandestine activities.'^

In addition to Kinney's spies, Taylor utilized the topographical engineers on his staff, including Lieutenant George G. Meade, for their reconnaissance and mapmaking skills prior to his advance toward the Rio Grande in the spring of 1846. During the Battle of Palo Alto (May 8, 1846) one of his "topogs," Lieutenant Jacob E. Blake, rode in front of the Mexican lines within musket range, stopping periodically to count the number of enemy soldiers in formation. Prior to the Battle of Monterey (September 19-20, 1846)

Taylor used information provided by his topographers to devise his attack plan. But "Old

Rough and Ready's" martial reputation rested upon his penchant for fighting, not on his ability to collect and use information on campaign. Meade criticized Taylor for his

"perfect inability to make any use of the information" he received. Even after success at

Monterey, Taylor made minimal efforts to collect and analyze the information streaming into his headquarters.'^^ Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who would serve as Winfield

Scott's inspector general, alluded to Taylor's lack of appreciation for intelligence during a visit to his camps early in the war. Even after hearing a report from Chapita Sandoval

19 regarding a Mexican move upon Matamoros, Hitchcock complained that Taylor was still

"quite in the dark " "The General may have information which he keeps to himself," he noted, "but I know him too well to believe he has any.'"*^

Despite Taylor’s shortcomings with intelligence. Grant still admired his commander. Historians have observed that his description of Taylor’s leadership and command characteristics in his memoirs seemed almost a mirror image of his own style during the Civil War, especially the ability to convey intentions clearly and succinctly in written orders. Historian Grady McWhiney claimed that "No other man so profoundly influenced Grant's pre-Civil War military education" than Zachary Taylor.'’*^ On the other hand. Grant did not emulate Taylor’s ambivalence toward collecting, interpreting, and using military information as an integral part of command. Although not a role model in this respect, perhaps Grant learned one important lesson related to intelligence from his commander. While comparing Taylor and General Winfield Scott, the two commanders he served under in Mexico, Grant criticized the latter for seeing "more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own" while Taylor, on the other hand, "saw for himself.'"** As his later experiences with military intelligence will show.

Grant preferred to make decisions based upon his own observations and interpretation of the evidence. Nevertheless, the true beginnings of his intelligence education came under the tutelage of Winfield Scott in central Mexico. After joining "Old Fuss and Feather’s" overland campaign to Mexico City in the spring of 1847, Grant, now the quartermaster of the Fourth Infantry, participated in military intelligence operations and also witnessed how the effective use of reconnaissances could help secure victory at low cost.

As Scott’s Army moved inland from its base at Veracruz, Grant observed two battles in particular which revealed the value of reconnaissances, especially if performed by skilled and knowledgeable officers. Scott had a penchant for detailed planning and, as a result, routinely dispatched patrols to gain information on enemy dispositions and

20 terrain before committing to a movement or battle. At Cerro Gordo, the Mexican

military leader General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna planned to blunt the American

inland advance in a mountain defile along the National Road leading from Vera Cruz to

Perote, Puebla, and finally Mexico City. Halting Scott's forces there would trap the

Americans in the coastal lowlands during the deadly yellow fever season, a disease more

dreaded than Mexican bullets. Santa Anna believed he held an impregnable position. But

Lieutenant P. G. T. Beauregard and Captain Robert E. Lee, both West Point graduates in

the Corps of Engineers, proved him wrong when they discovered a way to turn the left

flank of the Mexican line. On April 17, Scott's forces, led by the engineers, did just that

and sent Santa Anna and his troops fleeing toward Mexico City."^^ Engineer officers also

played a pivotal role in the opening phase of the campaign against Mexico City in early

August. Lee and Beauregard traversed a seeming impassable lava field and brought U. S.

forces crashing down on the unsuspecting Mexican garrison at Contreras on August 20.

"This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo," Grant wrote in his memoirs, "was an engagement

in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction."^® In these two battles in particular, the investment in West Point paid substantial dividends for the Army

in war as well as in peace.

Grant received his first hands-on experience with intelligence education before

American forces marched into the Valley of Mexico. After Cerro Gordo, Scott concentrated his forces at the town of Puebla, about seventy miles east of Mexico City.

The division under General William J. Worth, which included the Fourth Infantry and

Quartermaster Grant, entered the town first on May 15, followed by Scott and the rest of the army. The Americans remained in Puebla until early August while Scott, anxious to move on Mexico City, awaited replacements for the volunteer regiments whose enlistments had expired and searched the countryside for supplies to support his troops now isolated from their base at Vera Cruz. In addition, "Old Fuss and Feathers" seized

21 the opportunity to gather information on Santa Anna's forces, the defenses of Mexico

City, and the condition of the roads and terrain approaching the capital. Moreover, stalled in the middle of enemy territory and separated from his base by miles o f rugged country controlled by unfriendly Mexican guerrilla units, Scott needed reliable information and security now more than ever.^*

Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, recently transferred from Taylor’s army and in charge of Scott's "secret service" and security apparatus, wasted little time in addressing the situation. In June, he hired Manuel Dominguez, an established highwayman and robber and resident of Puebla, as a courier. Incarcerated in the Puebla jail when

Hitchcock found him, Dominguez accepted the colonel's offer and before long, had brought his entire band of 200 men on board as spies, guides, couriers, and guerrilla fighters for the U. S. Army. Known as the "Mexican Spy Company," Dominguez's men scouted the roads to Vera Cruz and Mexico City, collected information from contacts in the population, harassed guerrillas, and penetrated the Mexican capital in disguise to learn more about its defenses and to monitory military activity.^-

While Scott's forces prepared for the coming offensive, the Mexican Spy

Company and reconnaissance patrols, headed by the indefatigable engineers, searched for the best avenue of approach to the capital city. Scott saw several possible routes to

Mexico City, including a northern route around Lake Texcoco aimed at the Santa Anna's northwest defenses and another avenue along the southern shore of Lake Chaleo toward

St. Augustin and the fortifications south and west of the city. The swampy nature of the terrain around the fortified city, accessed primarily by elevated roads and causeways, limited American options. The army engineers on Scott's staff, along with topographers under the direction of Major William Turnbull, pored over the available maps of the area.

22 penciling in additional information learned from reconnaissances and from spies and local inhabitants. After learning about the impracticability of the northern route, Scott opted for the advance along the southern shore o f Lake Chaleo.

Lieutenant Grant played a minor role in these intelligence operations at Puebla.

Probably because of his contacts among the population gained while procuring supplies for the regiment. Grant received authorization, probably from Worth, to question local citizens about the roads and countryside between Puebla and Mexico City, and about the defenses of Mexico City. He also examined the "Mexican scouts in our camp," undoubtedly a reference to Dominguez’s operatives, and kept track of the intelligence gained on an "information map."^'^ Hitchcock had provided Worth with secret service funds and the general may have employed the young lieutenant, a competent quartermaster, as his intelligence officer.In addition. Worth's well-earned reputation for believing every rumor and report he received of overwhelming Mexican forces descending upon him at Puebla had drawn sharp criticism and ridicule, possibly prompting him to seek more reliable methods of gaining formation. Since Worth's attempt at improving his intelligence system in Puebla roughly coincided with the larger effort initiated by Hitchcock, Grant may have had some connection with the secret service apparatus operating out of Scott's headquarters.-^

Not only was Grant involved with collecting information, he also analyzed and used what he learned to formulate his own plan to assail the Mexican capital. Scott's decision in early September to attack the city from the west and southwest had resulted in the battles of Contreras, Churubusco, and Molino del Rey. By September 12 the stout fortress of Chapultapec still blocked the way to Mexico City. Reacting to the situation facing American troops. Grant issued his first "intelligence report" (although the addressee remains unknown) complete with a recommended course of action based upon his analysis of information;

23 My observations convince me that we have other strong works to reduce before we can enter the city... .From my map and all the information I acquired while the army was halted at Puebla, I was then, and am now more than ever, convinced that the army could have approached the city by passing around north of it, and reached the northwest side, and avoided all the fortified positions, until we reached the gates of the city at their weakest and most indefensible, as well as most approachable points.

Although he had communicated the above information to his superiors earlier. Grant did not know if his assessment had reached Scott’s headquarters. Regardless, he assumed

"that the commanding General had possessed himself of all the facts" [emphasis supplied] before making his decision.^* Nearly four decades later Grant remained faithful to his intelligence assessment. "It has always seemed to me," he wrote, "that this northern route... would have been the better one to have taken."^^ Overall, Grant's

Mexican War experience, especially his on-the-job intelligence training at Puebla, demonstrated his early recognition that a successful commander always "possessed himself of all the facts" before sending men into battle. Whether he would remember this lesson during his Civil War commands remained to be seen.

After the war. Grant remained in the Army for six more years, resigning his commission in 1854 under a cloud of alcohol abuse and careless accounting. He then devoted his life to scratching out a living for his family, first as a farmer in Missouri and then, in the spring of 1860, as a clerk in his father’s leather goods store in Galena. When the Civil War erupted, he realized that his military skills, no matter how atrophied, would be in high demand, and he declared his intention to return to his old profession.

After that moment, he never returned to his father's store "to put up a package or do other business." As he walked with his brother Orvil, perhaps Grant recalled a promise he had made to himself in Mexico. "I think if 1 ever get to a good cold [c]lim[ate] once more," he wrote, "I will not want to come South again."^®

24 NOTES

* * Lloyd Lewis. Captain Sam Grant (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 400.

^James M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1982), 163-173; Henry Coppee. Grant and His Campaigns: A Military Biography (New York: Charles B. Richardson, 1866), 16.

^A. L. Conger, The Rise of U. S. Grant (New York: The Century Co., 1931), 377.

F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (1929; New York: DeCapo Press, 1991), 8; Archer Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 229.

^For antebellum West Point, see James L. Morrison, Jr., "Educating Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833-1861," Military Affairs 38 (October 1974): 108, 110; Morrison, "The Best School in the World:" West Point. The Pre-Civil War Years. 1833-1866 (Kent, Oh.: The Kent State University Press, 1986), 153; George S. Pappas, To the Point: The United States Military Academy. 1802-1902 (Westport Conn.: Praeger, 1993).

^USG to Julia Grant, July 13, 1851, John Y. Simon, ed.. The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant (henceforth cited as GP') 20 vols, to date (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-), 1:219.

^ Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Sons, 1885), 1: 39.

^U.S. Military Academy, Official Register of the Officers and Cadets o f the United States Military Academy (West Point, N.Y.: U. S. Military Academy, 1843), 13. See also Ibid. for the years 1840, 1841, and 1842.

^ Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant, ed. Wayne C. Temple (1897; New York: Bonanza Books, 1961) 342; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 38; Grady McWhiney, "Ulysses S. Grant's Pre-Civil War Education," in Southerners and Other Americans (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973), 62.

“^Coppee, Grant and His Campaigns. 22.

' ' Morrison, "Best School in the World." 69-70.

*^For Thayer's curriculum, see Ibid., 23-26,37-60, 87-101, Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty. Honor. Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins

25 Press, 1966), 62-105, and William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps. 1784-1861 (Lawrence, Kan.; University Press of Kansas, 1992), 167-72; see also U. S. Military Academy, Regulations Established for the Organization and Government o f the Military Academy at West Point. New York (New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1839).

•^Edward M. Coffhran, The Old Army: A Portrait o f the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1986), 49; Skelton, Profession of Arms. 228-30.

^"’Morrison, "Educating Civil War Generals," 110; Morrison, "Best School in the World." 87-88, 101.

‘^Skelton, Profession of Arms. 169; Morrison, "Best School in the World." 24; Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 195-203,246-53.

^^Skelton. Profession of Arms. 170: Ambrose. Dutv. Honor. Country. 169.

’^Ibid., 89.

‘^Morrison, "Best School in the World." 34-56, 93; Skelton, Profession o f Arms. 168; Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard. Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in Presence of an Enemy (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1847), 74.

^ ^Morrison, "Educating Civil War Generals," 109; Morrison, "Best School in the World." 94-98; Skelton, Profession of Arms. 172.

“®The best treatment of Mahan remains Thomas E. Griess, "Dennis Hart Mahan: West Point Professor and Advocate of Military Professionalism, 1830-1871" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1968); Morrison, "Best School in the World." 47-49.

21 Ibid., 94-96.

^^Quoted in McWhiney, "Grant's Pre-Civil War Education," 64.

Prior to Out-Post. the primary text was S. F. Gay de Vernon's two-volume Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification, trans. John Michael O'Conner (New York: J. Seymour, 1817); Ambrose, Duty. Honor. Country. 98; Morrison, "Best School in the World." 47-49.94-95;

26 96; Skelton, Profession of Arms. 247; John C. Tidball, "Getting Through West Point: The Cadet Memoirs of John C. Tidball, Class of 1848," ed. James L. Morrison, Jr., Civil War History 26 (December 1980): 322.

-^Jay Luvaas, "Napoleon's Use of Intelligence: The Jena Campaign of 1805," in Michael I. Handel, ed.. Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1989), 40-54.

Jomini, Art of War. 268-77; see also Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence in Historical Perspective," in Keith Neilson and B. J. C. McKercher, eds.. Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), 185 and Handel. Masters of War: Sun Tzu.Clausewitz and Jomini (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1992), 126- 132; Victor Rosello commented that, unlike Clausewitz, Jomini emphasized the "need to develop a workable intelligence apparatus to better serve the commander, thereby elevating the overall importance of intelligence;" see Rosello, "Clausewitz's Contempt for Intelligence. Parameters 21 (Spring 1991): 110.

^^Karl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119; Jomini, Art of War. 268-69.

28lbid., 269.

-^Mahan, Out-Post, 73.

^Ofoid., 73-74

^‘Morrison. "Best School in the World." 64-71: Stephen E. Ambrose, "Dennis Hart Mahan." Civil War Times Illustrated 3 (November 1963): 35; Mahan quote in Morrison, "Best School in the World," 16.

^^Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana. 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 11; Coffman, Old Army. 65- 66 .

^^Skelton, Profession of Arms. 248-52; Ambrose, Duty. Honor, Country. 210: Jacob D. Cox, Military Reminscences of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1900), vol. 1: 30,175; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 11; Henry W. Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1846); Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modem Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1988), 14.

^"^Hattaway and Jomes, How the North Won. 14; Morrison, "The Best School in the World," 96-97; Skelton, Profession of Arms. 172; The debate over the impact of Jominian theory on Civil War officers has resulted in a wide array of arguments, including Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military

27 Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Universi^. Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1982), 41-47, McWhiney, "Grant’s Pre-Civil War Education," 61-71, Joseph L. Harsh, "Battlesword and Rapier Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War," Military Affairs 38 (December 1974): 133-38, T. Harry Williams, "The Return o f Jomini—Some Thoughts on Recent Civil War Writing," Military Affairs 39 (December 1975): 204- 206.

^^On several occasions. Grant mentioned Napoleon but overall, he had little admiration for the Corsican; see Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 547.

^^Wellington's quote found in David Chandler's commentary in Lt. Gen. Sir George C. D'Aguilar, trans. The Military Maxims of Napoleon f 1901: New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 111.

^^Mahan, Out-Post. 143.

^^Lewis. Captain Sam Grant. 100-102.118-19: Grant Personal Memoirs. 1: 51 -52.

^^USG to Julia Grant, May 6, 1845, QP 1: 44; USG to Julia, October, 1845, Ibid., 60.

"^^GranL Personal Memoirs. 1: 40.

Lewis. Captain Sam Grant. 100-102, 114-15.

‘^^USG to Julia Grant, June 4, 1844, GE 1: 23-25; USG to Julia Grant, September 14, 1845, Ibid., 53-55.

"^^A. Brooke Caruso, The Mexican Spy Company: United States Covert Operations in Mexico. 1845-1848 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1991), 80-83.

Jack Bauer, Zachary Taylor: JSoldier. Planter. Statesman of the Old Southwest (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 117; K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War. 1846-1848 (1974; Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 34-37; George G. Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 1: 31; USG to Julia Grant, October, 1845, QP I: 58-59.

Adrian Traas, From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U. S. Army Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War. 1846-1848 (Washington, D C.: Center of Military History, 1993), 124-25, 132-36; Bauer, Mexican War, 34; To compensate for his deficiencies, Scott assigned veteran officer Maj. William W. S. "Perfect" Bliss to Taylor's staff as his adjutant general. Ibid., 6-7; Caruso, Mexican Spy Company, 89; Meade, Life and Letters. 1: 101.

2 8 '^^Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field: The Diary of M^or General Ethan Allen Hitchcock. U. S. A., ed. W. A. Croffut (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909), 199.

^^Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 138-39; McWhiney, "Grant's Pre-Civil War Education," 69.

"^^GranL Personal Memoirs. 1: 139.

"^^Caruso, Mexican Spy Company. 152; Bauer, Mexican War. 261 -68;GE 1 ‘ 131-37; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 131 -34.

^°Bauer, Mexican War. 290-95, 308-311.

^^Ibid., 270-72, 274; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 136-37; Caruso, Mexican Spy Company. 152.

^^For Dominguez and the Mexican Spy Company, see Bounty-Land Application File for Manuel Dominguez, Record Group 15 [hencforth RG], Records of the Veterans Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D C. [henceforth NAj; RG 107, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Letters Received. See also Caruso. Mexican Spy Company. 152-158; Hitchcock. Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 263; and Bauer, Mexican War. 274.

^^Ibid., 288,290-91; Traas, Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War. 193.

^"^USG to [unknown], September 12,1847, Q E 1: 145; Lewis, Captain Sam Grant. 217, 223. Grant also began censoring his typically descriptive correspondence. Informed that Mexican guerrillas between Puebla and Vera Cruz often intercepted the mails. Grant told Julia that "I cannot venture to write you as I otherwise would lest some day my letter might be in the hands of the enemy." USG to Julia Grant, May 26,1847, QE 1: 141.

^^Lewis, Captain Sam Grant, 216-217; Caruso, Mexican Spy Company. 150.

^^Lewis, Captain Sam Grant. 216-17; Caruso, Mexican Spy Company. 154.

^^USG to [unknown], September 12, 1847, G E 1: 145.

^^USG to [unknown], September 12, 1847, Ibid.

^^Grant. Personal Memoirs, 1: 165.

60lbid., 231 ; USG to Julia Grant, May 24,1846, G E L 89.

29 CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST TEST: MISSOURI, 1861

"You have probably seen that I have been appointed to a Colonelcy" Grant wrote

Julia after taking command of the 7th Congressional District Regiment of Illinois

Volunteer Militia. Stationed at Camp Yates outside Springfield, Grant assumed command on Jime 18, just ten days before the regiment was mustered into Federal service as the 2 1 st Illinois Volunteer Infantry. ' Understanding that his men were volunteers with little military training. Grant began instructing his officers and recruits in the rudiments of basic drill and soldierly conduct. He also realized that these militarily inexperienced and stubbornly individualistic Illinois farmboys would require plenty of time on the parade ground and at least some minimal discipline to enable them to perform successfully on the battlefield. But his six year absence from the Army had eroded his military command skills. Grant’s hardscrabble existence in Missouri and

Illinois after 1854 had not dulled his mind, but with the welfare of his family the highest priority, military concerns such as battalion drill or Army regulations faded into insignificance. Like officers entering military service for the first time and other veterans returning to their former occupation in the spring of 1861, Grant had little time to re- familiarize himself with drill commands, leadership. Army paperwork, and regulations.

Until seasoned by hard campaigning and hardened by combat, the new Colonel had to rely upon his West Point education, his Mexican War experience, and common sense in preparing his regiment and himself for war.

30 KANSAS KanMsOt;

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Map 1 From the beginning, Grant faced the problems of organizing, equipping, and training his men. Like much of the effort on both sides during the early part of the war, improvisation was commonplace in the camps of Illinois volunteers. Even after the 21st

Illinois entered the war zone in Missouri, Grant was still learning. When he reached

Mexico, Missouri in late July, Grant, knowing that his men had not been instructed in tactical evolutions beyond the company level, began to teach them battalion drill. But his own tactical instuction at West Point had come an outdated manual and his experience in

Mexico had been as a regimental quartermaster, which required knowledge of supply and logistics, not battalion maneuvers. To help. Grant obtained a copy of William J.

Hardee's popular tactical manual, perused one lesson, and quickly concluded that teaching tactics "was nothing more than common sense." Before long. Grant had his men doing what he wanted without anyone knowing that he "had never studied the tactics that

I used."-

Grant’s army experience did prove invaluable in other instances during those tumultuous days after he took command, especially with regard to army administration.

His experience as regimental quartermaster, for example, had not only taught him how to complete the required paperwork, but had provided him with first-hand knowledge of supply and logistics.^ Although his quartermaster experience would prove valuable.

Grant faced other duties as a regimental commander for which he had little prior experience. With a small, inexperienced staff. Grant handled most of the routine duties personally, which placed a severe strain on his time and energy. Although he handled many of the mundane staff functions, one element that Grant would become involved with on a daily basis was the collection and analysis of intelligence. This function remained of lesser importance to him while at Camp Yates where training and supplying his men took precedence. But as his regiment marched into Missouri in mid-July the importance of learning about the enemy would grow with each mile. Unlike many

32 officers, however, he knew the responsibility for this rested upon his shoulders. He would have to improvise and rely on his own judgment and organizational skill to develop an information-gathering system capable of fulfilling his needs.

On July 3 the Twenty-first Illinois received orders to proceed to Quincy, Illinois on the Mississippi River to help quell increased guerrilla activity on the railroads in northern Missouri. Divided loyalties rent Missouri, as pro- and anti-secession forces, as well as mere criminals and opportunistic marauders, preyed upon Missourians. Union troops also found themselves in a hostile environment menaced by prowling guerrillas and bushwhackers. Railroads, supply columns, and isolated outposts were favorite targets of pro-Confederate groups who descended without warning and then quickly melted into the countiyside. It was into this seething cauldron that Grant marched his troops that summer. On July 11 the Twenty-first Illinois arrived in northeastern Missouri and camped at West Quincy, Missouri. Shortly thereafter. Brigadier General John Pope, in charge of Union-held territory north of the Missouri River, sent Grant to Monroe,

Missouri to rescue a Federal regiment besieged by forces commanded by Brigadier

General Thomas Harris of the pro-Confederate Missouri State Guard. Harris retreated before Grant's troops arrived, and the Twenty-first and two other Illinois regiments were then placed along the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad, which bisected the northern part of the state, to protect it from further Confederate raids. Grant set up camp on the Salt

River west of Monroe and set about protecting the workers repairing a damaged railroad bridge."^

With Harris still causing trouble for Union forces. Brigadier General Stephen A.

Hurlbut, commanding troops at Quincy and responsible for protecting the Hannibal & St.

Joseph Railroad, ordered Grant to disperse Harris' State guardsmen from their encampment near Florida, Missouri, twenty miles to the south.^ Although insignificant in military terms, the results of this expedition have become legendary through the

33 revealing description provided in Grant's post-war reminiscences. According to his account, as the Twenty-first approached Harris' supposed bivouac. Grant felt the weight of command on his shoulders. All the sweat, the drilling, the discipline, and all the headaches and anticipation had come down to this first encounter with the enemy. The

loneliness and fear, he recalled, nearly overwhelmed him. All o f his prior combat experience in Mexico involved risking only his own life whereas this time, he was responsible for the lives of many others. His anxiety grew with each forward stride.

"As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we would see Harris' camp, and possibly his men already formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on."^

As they crested the hill and the valley came into view, it became apparent that the

Confederates had decamped to points unknown. From this experience. Grant claimed that he learned an important lesson, and one he never forgot: "From that event to the close o f the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy," he wrote, because "I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his." He later discovered that Harris, hearing of the Federal's intended march on Florida, had abandoned his camp even before Grant had departed from the Salt River. ^

In Grant’s memory this experience marked a turning point in his thinking on war.

Upon closer examination this event also reveals a side of the story left out of his later account. The failed pursuit of Harris comprised an early instance where Grant collected military information on his adversary and made an assessment based on that evidence.

However, on the surface, the apprehension he felt as he topped the hill not knowing what to expect in the valley below suggests that he possessed little up-to-date information on

Harris' position and that he had failed to scout the area for topographical data or for intelligence on Harris' movements. But Grant's failure to conduct an adequate

34 reconnaissance and keep himself informed in the presence of the enemy appears odd for an old soldier who knew first-hand the importance of reconnaissances from his Mexican

War service. Moreover, even his minimal intelligence experience in Mexico, not to mention his common sense, would warn against taking the field without securing some knowledge of the enemy.

Although Grant's version implied that he had no knowledge of Harris beyond the location of his camp near Florida and that he failed to acquire a more recent sounding of his whereabouts, correspondence written prior to the expedition suggests that he knew more about Harris than he indicated later. The day before leaving on the expedition.

Grant expressed doubts concerning the chances of finding the Confederates. "From the best evidence that can be obtained here," he wrote, "Harris' command is not likely to be found at Florida nor any other point where a regiment of Federal troops are together."*

Regardless of his recollections of what he feared he would encounter on the other side of that hill, when Grant departed for Florida he did not expect to find Harris waiting for him. This is not to say that he did not have the epiphany about fear that he wrote about years later. Even the best intelligence does not eliminate all the doubt and anxiety attendant with leading men in combat. Contrary to his recollections, however. Grant did not pursue Harris blindly. He possessed information about his adversary and from it determined that the Fédérais would not find the enemy at Florida. As he reached the brow o f the hill, that assessment proved correct.

Perhaps Grant learned another important, if unspoken, lesson in northern

Missouri that day. If the enemy feared him as much as he feared the enemy, then accurate intelligence used correctly might reduce anxiety, countering tendencies toward excessive caution that plagued other commanders who too often stopped in the face of risk-filled opportunity. Grant had little patience for wasting time. "Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him hard as you can, and keep moving

35 on," became his mantra. This outlook and the realization that the enemy also feared him

became key elements of his command and leadership style. However, if taken to

extreme, these convictions could also lead to disaster, as Grant would discover at Shiloh

the following spring.

After "troting [sic] around" northern Missouri, Grant received orders to report to

Mexico, Missouri to command the troops near that town. On August 5 Colonel Grant

became Brigadier General Grant and with his new star came a change of location to the

command of the Military District of Ironton, Western Department. As a district

commander his responsibilities multiplied since he now oversaw a post garrisoned by

three regiments, including the 21st Illinois. Moreover, Grant also faced his first

experience with establishing an intelligence apparatus to provide information on enemy

activity. In the orders assigning him to command. Major General John C. Fremont, head

of the Western Department, advised Grant to "scour the country" and to keep informed of

the enemy's intended movements "by employing reliable spies.Fremont's order to

gather information, aside from being sound advice to a commander in hostile country,

reflected his own appreciation of intelligence. Taking note of the terrain, inhabitants,

roads and natural obstacles in an area, as well as enemy dispositions, came naturally to

the former topographical engineer. In fact, for his numerous information-gathering

expeditions to the West and for his role in conquering California during the Mexican War

Fremont had become known as the "The Pathfinder." Although not West Point educated,

he had received a collateral appointment as a second lieutenant in the elite U.S. Army

Corps of Topographical Engineers, serving from 1838 to 1848 and led several westward expeditions that garnered valuable scientific, topographic, and cartographic information

for government use when "Manifest Destiny" and westward expansion had captured the

American imagination. He learned mapping and surveying in the field under expert

36 tutelage and, through experience, gained a great respect for critical observation and accuracy in information. He brought that appreciation and his experience to St. Louis when he assumed command of the Western Department on July 25, 1861.

After his arrival in St. Louis, Fremont established his own scouting unit within the army, named the "Jessie Scouts" after his wife, Jessie Benton Fremont. The Jessie

Scouts, commanded by Captain Charles C. Carpenter, were used primarily in western

Missouri and became Fremont's eyes and ears in that region. After his departure in

November, 1861, some of the Jessie Scouts accompanied him to his new command in the

Shenandoah Valley. A few remained behind and continued to serve other commanders, including Grant. * *

The department commander also used a number of spies to penetrate the

Confederate lines and find information on the activity, dispositions, and movements of

Southern forces in Kentucky, Tennessee and along the Mississippi River. He named

Edward M. Kern as his chief intelligence officer in charge of deploying the operatives and reporting the information they gathered. Kern had served as the "Pathfinder’s" topographical assistant on his third expedition to California in 1845 and, in addition to having a river named for him in that state, Kern also earned Fremont's respect as a surveyor and mapmaker. However, the feelings were hardly mutual. Kern first applied to General George B. McClellan as a "chief of scouts" in July, 1861 because, as one of his supporters wrote, "He is not on terms of friendship with Fremont and won't apply to him. " His aversion to the esteemed explorer grew after his brother was killed by Indians on Fremont's Fourth Expedition. Kern blamed the "Pathfinder" for his death, but the two eventually reconciled and Kem came to Missouri to run Fremont's intelligence service. '-

The most famous personality in Fremont's stable of operatives was Russian-born

Charles A. De Arnaud. A former Russian officer. De Arnaud gained the elite status of

"military expert"*^ on Fremont's staff and spent a great deal of time traveling in Kentucky

37 and Tennessee observing enemy activity, particularly along the Tennessee and

Cumberland Rivers. His post-war battle with the government over compensation for his

services dragged on for years after the war and would provide some interesting insights

into the workings o f Fremont's intelligence service.’^

As the Harris episode demonstrated. Grant required little incentive to seek

information on the enemy, especially since his responsibilities had increased with his

assignment to a regional command. Fortunately, Army regulations allowed brigadier

generals to possess a larger staff to help with the day-to-day command functions.

Officially, a brigadier general's headquarters staff consisted of two aides-de-camp, one assistant adjutant general, one surgeon, one assistant quartermaster, and one officer in charge of supply. In addition, a brigadier could also appoint one personal aide with the

rank of captain. However, many officers ignored these limitations and employed as many aides as they needed. Commanders assigned various duties to their staff officers,

including the collection and analysis of military intelligence. Oftentimes this duty fell among the miscellaneous tasks assigned to the general's chief-of-staff, an assistant adjutant general, or the provost marshal. While his neophyte staff officers learned the ropes. Grant retained personal control over many routine ftinctions, including the collection and analysis of intelligence.

When Grant arrived in Ironton, however, he had not had time to assemble a permanent staff. He had offered an aide-de-camp slot to John A. Rawlins, but was still awaiting his fellow Galenan's reply to his request for assistance. Facing a mountain of paperwork and countless demands on his time. Grant formed a temporary staff to fill the gap, but on August 11 he made his first permanent staff appointment, accepting

Lieutenant Clark B. Lagow of the 21st Illinois as an aide-de-camp. As usual, however.

Grant still kept his hand in routine staff duties and continued handling intelligence on his own.

38 Before Fremont's order to "scour" the countryside for information reached him.

Grant had already begun collecting intelligence at his Ironton headquarters. Undertaking what is now called "net assessment," he analyzed his own situation and that of the enemy and immediately sent operatives into enemy territory to gather information on the enemy. On August 9 he surveyed the ground "it may be necessary for me to defend" and assessed the condition of his troops. In addition, he cast about for news regarding the enemy's "position," meaning in the lexicon of the day the determination of the location, strength and intentions of his forces. From "spies, and loyally disposed citizens" Grant ascertained that there was "no force within thirty miles of us that entertain the least idea of attacking this position." Nevertheless, countless rumors reached his headquarters purporting that the enemy planned to march on Ironton with 8000 men. Despite the persistence of rumors. Grant relied upon his intelligence sources and remained unwilling to give these rumors much credence.

The situation near Ironton in late August demanded up-to-date intelligence.

Rumors persisted indicating that Confederate Brigadier General William J. Hardee had gathered a large force thirty-seven miles south of Ironton at Greenville, Missouri.

According to these sketchy reports, Hardee planned to attack the Union post soon and

Grant prepared to defend his command and the crucial Iron Mountain Railroad that ran from Ironton to St. Louis. But he harbored serious doubts about the accuracy of these incoming reports. To get at the truth. Grant dispatched scouts and cavalry reconnaissances to patrol toward Greenville and watch for Hardee. He had at least three to four scouts operating behind enemy lines. One of these scouts. Lieutenant Henry

Houts of the 6th Missouri Infantry, stole into Hardee's camps at Greenville and sent back reports via messenger.^®

Employing civilian scouts in Missouri, however, was not an easy task. Colonel C.

Carroll Marsh, in command at Cape Girardeau while Grant was at Ironton, encountered

39 serious difficulties using loyal Missourians. "The Home Guard cannot be relied upon," he claimed. Part of the problem, complained Marsh, was that some of his scouts were too well known by the enemy to be of use. In fact, he had already lost one operative because enemy soldiers recognized him and blew his cover. This problem forced Marsh into recruiting scouts in southern Illinois because they were unknown in the Cape Girardeau area. Variations on this problem also surfaced at other Union posts in the state. Hurlbut wrote from Kirksville that "A great difficulty besets us here in obtaining timely information" because "Union men are slow to come in and inform us." As a result, he lamented, "we rarely know the movements o f the enemy until too late."^’ Although Grant offered no comment on these or related issues while at Ironton, he may have encountered similar problems.

In addition to civilian scouts. Grant also dispatched mounted patrols to check the roads and towns in the vicinity for signs o f a enemy activity, and sent troopers south to watch the approaches from Greenville and northern Arkansas. During the war, a sizable portion of information came from visual observations and interrogations of enemy deserters and prisoners as well as news provided by runaway slaves, refugees, and local citizens. However, operating in hostile country like southeastern Missouri, Grant realized that the local population might not feel obligated to furnish the truth, especially if their sentiments leaned toward the Confederacy. In fact, they might become a source of information for the enemy if not watched carefully. Moreover, southeastern Missouri

Unionists, a likely source of news for the Fédérais, could be intimidated into lying or into remaining silent by their pro-secession neighbors. For these reasons Grant remained wary of reports from civilians and advised subordinates to exercise caution when procuring information from the local populace, whether loyal or disloyal.^-

Intelligence reports filtered regularly into Grant's headquarters and much of the news centered upon Hardee's troops, who had indeed entered southern Missouri and by

40 August 4 had occupied Greenville. "Old Reliable" Hardee hoped to capture Ironton in preparation for a major offensive against St. Louis and, in fact, had already ordered his cavalry to cut the Iron Mountain railroad between Ironton and St. Louis in preparation for that move.-^ But the success of the campaign hinged upon the lull cooperation among

Hardee, Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow's forces stationed at New Madrid, Missouri and Missouri State Guard troops under M. Jeff Thompson roaming about southeast

Missouri. Although the Confederates did have an offensive on their minds. Grant quickly determined that their movements did not match their intentions, maintaining instead that, based upon recent intelligence, the enemy was actually further away and smaller than the current rumors depicted. He reasoned that Hardee had only 3000 men at Greenville (in reality he had 4000) and that "no information has been received to lead to the supposition that this place is in danger of an immediate attack."-"^ By August 12 he felt secure in his assessment and refuted the claims of many people who, upon his arrival, brought him tales of a Confederate juggernaut descending upon Ironton. "Now," he wrote, "Hardee's force seems to have been reduced and his distance from here to have increased." He might have added that his efforts to find information on the true situation had led to the revisions.-^

In fact, on August 8, Hardee had reluctantly delayed the offensive as a result of

Pillow's refusal to cooperate. The Tennesseean had shunned the Ironton offensive in favor of his own plan to capture Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi River. Disgusted at

Pillow’s betrayal and angry that Pillow had also persuaded pro-Confederate Missouri

Governor Claiborne Jackson to divert Thompson's State Guards to participate in his Cape

Girardeau operation. Unable to muster adequate support for the Ironton venture, Hardee retreated on August 9. Charging that "Pillow and Jackson destroyed all my plans," his

41 troops made their way back toward their base at Pitman’s Ferry south of the Arkansas border. Although Grant did not know the reasons for the withdrawal, he had nevertheless correctly ascertained that the enemy's operations in Missouri had collapsed.-^

Despite Grant's success at pinning down the Confederate position and intentions, the situation changed rapidly when Major General Leonidas Polk, commander of the

Confederate Department No. 2 P revived Hardee's plan and ordered Pillow to cooperate in a new offensive against Ironton. On August 12, an elated Hardee retraced his steps toward Greenville with 4000 men and, brimming with confidence, wrote Polk that "Our united forces offer hopes of accomplishing results of which you may be proud."

Although he did not indicate his source, though probably an operative traveling with

Hardee's army. Grant caught wind of this move on August 13 stating that "it is very reliable that 5000 well armed men, under Gen. Hardee, are advancing upon this place."

He interpreted "from the facts" that he expected an attack as early as the following day and girded his forces for the blow. The Confederate's plans unraveled when command and coordination problems among Polk, Pillow and Hardee once again hamstrung the combined offensive before it began. By August 20 Hardee remained at Greenville, convinced that, even with Pillow's aid, the opportunity to seize southeastern Missouri had passed.-*

Grant's efforts to obtain intelligence in a systematic and timely manner at Ironton paid off not only at the time, but also during his next assignment. On August 21 Fremont transferred the Illinois general to Jefferson City, part of Major General John Pope's

District of North Missouri.-^ By this time, however, the Federal's hold on Missouri had weakened considerably. On August 10 Sterling Price's army of pro-Confederate state guardsmen and Arkansas troops under Brigadier General Ben McCulloch defeated Union forces under General Nathaniel Lyon at Wilson's Creek. The Fédérais retreated north in disarray, thereby opening southwestern Missouri to further Confederate incursion. The

42 victorious Southerners soon occupied Springfield and on August 25 Price headed west

toward the Kansas border to seize and destroy Fort Scott, and to clear western Missouri

of Union influence. He then planned to seize Lexington, a Federal post on the Missouri

River, and establish control over the northern reaches of the state. For a variety of

reasons, none of them satisfactory to Price, McCulloch's Arkansans refused to

accompany the Missouri troops on their northward advance and remained in Springfield

preparing to retreat back to their home state.^®

When Grant arrived in Jefferson City, it was not yet threatened by any substantial

Confederate forces. Price and McCulloch remained at Springfield, over one hundred

miles to the southwest, and only occasional guerrilla raids and uncooperative civilians occupied Grant's time. Besides organizing and training his troops, which he claimed were

"very raw and about one half of them Missouri Home Guards without discipline," he also

immediately sent out scouts and some cavalry patrols (although he had few mounted units for this task) toward enemy lines. Being shuffled from post to post, he probably started from scratch or inherited a base of friendly civilians or soldiers with scouting experience to use when he arrived at a new command.^* At Jefferson City, these scouts ventured west and south, some roaming as far as Lebanon and Confederate-held

Springfield. The lack o f good maps, a constant problem, also hampered Grant's assessment process but he vigilantly cast about for accurate "sectional" maps that indicated major roads and other routes through that unfamiliar region. Despite this handicap, the always resourceful general concluded that he could make do by gleaning

"from persons conversant with all the roads, their relative practicability."^-

Conducting intelligence operations on top of organizing, training, and supplying a garrison of raw troops was difficult enough with a large and experienced staff. Grant had neither when he arrived at Jefferson City. In fact, only one aide-de-camp, Lagow, was on hand to ease Grant's workload. His most Important staff officer. Captain John A.

43 Rawlins, had yet to take the field. A Galena politician and able administrator, Rawlins

had accepted the position on August 12 but had delayed his departure for the field to

remain with his ailing wife in New York. Lieutenant William S. Hillyer, an aide, was

also expected soon. "They are all able men," he remarked. Although neither had any

military experience, they were "very capable of learning." With green troops and

insufficient staff help, however. Grant remained extremely busy "from the time I get up

in the morning until 12 to 2 O’Clock at night.Similar to his Ironton experience, he

had to personally attend to mundane duties usually delegated to staff officers as well as serve as his own intelligence officer. Yet this was an experience that immersed him in the daily activities associated with collecting, analyzing, and disseminating military

information.

After his arrival in Jefferson City Grant received frequent intelligence reports on the whereabouts and movements of Price's and McCulloch's forces. For example, on

August 26 Grant received news that the "Springfield army" (McCulloch's forces), numbering around 3000 men, had not moved from that location. In reality, at the time

McCulloch still occupied Springfield with 3000 men claiming his command was "in no condition to advance." But by late August Grant also began hearing rumors akin to those he had encountered at Ironton. According to the latest gossip, a Confederate army was apparently ready to pounce on Jefferson City at any moment.^'* However, Grant noted that although the citizens of the town feared an attack as a result of the rumors, he remained unconvinced. "There is considerable apprehension o f an attack soon," he remarked, "but my means o f information are certainly better than can be had by most others and my impression is that there is no force sufficiently strong enough to attempt anything of the kind." In this instance, as in others. Grant's trademark confidence and certainty of success can be traced to his faith in his intelligence.

44 Even with this confidence. Grant left little to chance and whipped his command

into fighting shape. He had determined that Lexington, Jefferson City and other counties

along the Missouri River offered logical targets for a renewed Confederate advance. As

early as August 23 he had forwarded ominous information to Pope from a "Mr. Silver,"

who told of the "precarious" condition o f Lexington, ninety-five miles northwest of

Jefferson City. Grant dispatched reinforcements to that command and on August 27

requested "that a large force be concentrated here" and that "protection be given all the

counties bordering on the Missouri [River]." But by the time Price's Confederates

advanced toward northern Missouri in mid-September and captured Lexington, Grant had

once again moved on to a new command. Relieved by General Jefferson C. Davis, Grant

left Lagow behind to attend to remaining details and departed for St. Louis on August

28, uncertain of his next assignment.^^

When he arrived in the city the next day Grant scribbled a note to his wife

informing her of the change. "I wish I could be kept with one Brigade steadily," he wrote,

"But I suppose it is a compliment to be selected so often for what is supposed to be

important service.Finally, Fremont assigned Grant to Cape Girardeau with

instructions to crush Thompson's Missouri state guards and stop them from causing

further problems for Union forces in the southeast. In addition, Fremont charged him with reconnoitering the Missouri shore o f the Mississippi River toward Belmont, a river landing directly opposite Columbus in still-neutral Kentucky. Aside from expelling

Thompson, Fremont revealed that his ultimate goal was the occupation of Columbus and the high bluffs dominating the river to the north of the town, only eighteen miles south of where the Ohio flowed into the Mississippi at Cairo, Illinois.^*

The first objective, however, remained the capture of Thompson's forces.^^ With only around 1500 men, self-styled the "Swamp Rats" due to their penchant for hiding out in the swamps east of the Mississippi, Thompson had proven to be a constant source of

45 annoyance to Fédérais in the region. Although his command inflicted little substantial

damage, commanders consistently overestimated the size of his columns and, therefore,

exaggerated the threat he posed. "Everyone gives me credit of having at least 7,000

men," Thompson once boasted, "and I have them frightened nearly to death.H is

statement contained much truth as Fremont devoted substantial resources to exterminate

the "Swamp Rats" and clear southeastern Missouri of his pro-secession influence.

However, his latest plan to trap Thompson, who was last reported to be near Benton with

nearly 4000 men, collapsed when a dispute over rank between Brigadier General

Benjamin F. Prentiss, in command at Ironton, and Grant hamstrung the mission.^’ "I am

under the painful necessity of reporting, " Grant informed Fremont on September 2, "that

Gen. Prentiss positively refused to obey orders from me and has therefore defeated the

prompt execution of your instructions." Without the troops from Ironton, a key

component of the plan, the mission could not proceed. Although Prentiss'

insubordination rankled him. Grant was not totally unhappy with the delay. New to

command at Cape Girardeau and unwilling to blindly lead troops into an unknown

situation. Grant needed time to "learn the position of the enemy." As the command

situation was being sorted out. Grant took the time to familiaze himself with southeast

Missouri and to form a picture in his own mind of the overall military situation.'^-

In the midst of the Prentiss imbroglio, however, on September 1 Fremont assigned

Grant to command the newly formed District of Southeast Missouri, comprising the strategic area bordering neutral Kentucky along the Mississippi River on the east and abutting Confederate Arkansas to the south. All of Missouri south and east of Ironton, although not including that post, and southern Illinois fell within the district's boundaries.

Grant now commanded more men, outposts, and territory than in any of his previous postings. The district contained several major garrisons, including Bird's Point and Cape

Girardeau in Missouri, and Mound City in Illinois, and numbered over 13,000 men.'*^

46 Moreover, Grant's scattered command guarded eastern Missouri and the mouth of the

Ohio River and occupied an important strategic position from which to observe neutral

Kentucky and, if necessary, confront Confederate forces along the Mississippi should that

neutrality end. On September 4, Cairo, Illinois became part of the district and, because

of its strategic location at the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, Grant

established his headquarters there as a future staging point for operations down the

Mississippi.^

Cairo offered few charms for those stationed there, and many soldiers looked

forward to moving on to duty elsewhere. Dirty, disease-ridden, and rat infested, Fremont

called it "the most unhealthy post in my command." The stench of rotting mules and

horses discarded carelessly along the riverbank filled the air, adding to the already

pungent aroma emanating from town. Mosquitoes and mud seemed in endless supply

and whole regiments became sick with some malady, including malaria. Grant noted that

Cairo had a reputation as an unhealthy place and, upon his arrival, observed that it "looks

as if it must be so." Its notoriety also reached other garrisons. A soldier stationed at

Bird's Point directly across the river in Missouri probably expressed the general opinion;

"Nobody ever heard me grumble about soldiering and never will if they don't station me at Cairo.'"^^

Grant reached Cairo on September 4 and reported to the commanding officer of the post. Colonel Richard J. Oglesby, to relieve him of command. But the post commander initially paid little attention to his superior as he stood before him in his crowded and noisy headquarters. Grant had yet to receive his brigadier general's uniform and thus looked to Oglesby like every other civilian crammed into his office at that moment. Through the noise, he failed to hear Grant introduce himself and thus ignored the man standing in front of him. He soon stared in disbelief as this "civilian" produced

47 an order claiming command of the District of Southeast Missouri. Although not an auspicious entrance, it was befitting o f the business-like and unpretentious nature of the new commander."*^

Grant faced the daunting situation at Cairo with only a skeleton staff to help him.

He had survived at Cape Girardeau with only two overworked aides, Hillyer and Lagow, but as of late they had spent much of their time dealing with the transition between commands. Even though his responsibilities had increased, his staff had not and Grant served as his own adjutant, commissary, quartermaster, ordnance, and intelligence officer and worked long hours processing newly arrived regiments, overseeing the condition of his other posts, sending out scouts and reconnaissances, and dealing with the mountain of reports, returns, requests, correspondence, orders, and other headquarters paperwork that multiplied daily. Grant worked long hours and anxiously awaited the arrival of Rawlins, whose reputation for being an able adminstrator would hopefully bring more order to headquarters. But his foremost staff appointee would not arrive in Cairo until September

Grant regretted that Rawlins had missed the experiences of the preceding months:

"The past would have been a good school of instruction for him in his new duties."

Rawlins would be a quick study, however, and would help his commander handle the daunting task of organizing, training, and supplying his troops, and establishing an intelligence system. Until his arrival. Grant faced these challenges with little help and, as it turned out, even less time.

"There is a greatdee! [sic] of marching and counter-marching in this part of our troubled country without coming to blows," Grant observed prior to his departure for

Cairo, but he fully anticipated that "They must follow.. . . soon." Just how soon remained unknown. After Prentiss had sealed the fate of the combined offensive against

Jeff Thompson, Grant sent Prentiss packing to St. Louis and, while Fremont settled the rank question, tried to salvage the operation. Current information on the Confederates

48 remained a primary concern, and Grant dutifully set about constructing an intelligence

system. Concerned more with the timely transmission of information than strict

adherence to the chain of command, Grant ordered his post commanders to report

directly to St. Louis any information they felt Fremont should know immediately, and

then to send a copy to Cairo headquarters. Fremont had urged Grant to keep him

"minutely and frequently advised," and this system allowed information to reach St.

Louis quickly, without having to pass through Cairo.^* At the same time. Grant was also concentrating on discovering the immediate and long-term threats to his command. By

September 4 he knew that Thompson’s men, the target of the Grant-Prentiss offensive, had retreated toward New Madrid. He also learned that Hardee, who had remained at

Greenville since giving up on Pillow, had retreated into Arkansas."*^

How he acquired this information illuminates interesting characteristics about

Grant's emerging intelligence methodology. From several sources he ascertained numerous tidbits of information, including detailed and fairly accurate information about

Thompson's forces from a black man from Sikeston. Later in the war Union commanders regularly questioned runaway slaves, known as "contrabands," for information, particularly on the terrain, roads, and current enemy positions. However, this occurrence comprised one of the first instances where Grant used blacks for information, and his skepticism showed. Relating the information to Fremont, Grant wrote; "Information is just in from Sikeston which I am disposed to credit although the authority is a negro man." Despite his less than enthusiastic endorsement, in the end Grant accepted his testimony because he told "a very strait stoiy" and also because it corroborated earlier reports. As the war continued. Grant learned to utilize "contrabands" as information sources and on occasion sent them as operatives into Confederate lines. Moreover,

Grant's reports suggest that he personally interviewed his informants and arrived at his own conclusions as to the veracity of their stories. Although he had not yet reached the

49 point where he systematically interrogated everyone who came into his lines from enemy

territory for combat intelligence, at this stage of his Missouri command. Grant had

reserved for himself responsibility over the collection, collation, and analysis of the

intelligence coming into his headquarters.^®

By the beginning of September the Confederates had forfeited their dreams of

capturing St. Louis for the time being and turned their gaze toward neutral Kentucky.

Gideon Pillow believed fervently that seizing and fortifying Columbus was the key to

protecting the "gateway into Tennessee" as well as safeguarding passage on the

Mississippi River to Memphis and beyond. "Kentucky is now a boiling caldron," he

observed on August 28, and predicted that whomever occupied the town first gained the

upper hand. He also judged correctly that Fremont had cast a covetous eye upon

Columbus, warning that "If he gets possession of it once, you can never dislodge him."

Better to act now, regardless of the neutrality issue, and capture Columbus while it was

unoccupied, he argued, than to expend blood and treasure taking it away from the

Fédérais. Polk considered his options while mounting evidence suggested that the

Fédérais intended to violate Kentucky's neutrality and seize Columbus. An ominous development occurred on September 2 that convinced Polk the Fédérais were in earnest.

In what looked like a preparatory step for a possible invasion. Union forces occupied the town of Belmont across the river from Columbus. A day later, deciding that hesitation might lose Kentucky and with Pillow chomping at the bit, Polk made the fateful decision to enter the state and claim Hickman, Columbus, and Paducah for the Confederacy.^’

As Polk positioned his forces to invade Kentucky, Grant, aware that Confederate forces in Missouri had retreated toward New Madrid and Pitman’s Ferry, continued searching for more indications of the enemy’s next move. An expedition sent toward

Belmont on August 28, which triggered Polk’s decision to advance, had occupied

Belmont on September 2 and, with the help of Federal gunboats, had monitored activity

50 in Columbus on the opposite shore. The following day the leader of the expedition.

Colonel Gustav Waagner, notified Grant of "an important movement of cavalry and infantry on the Heights in and near Columbus." More ominously, he also observed a

Confederate flag flying above the town. Unsure of how to respond to the events unfolding before his eyes, Waagner implored: "What shall I do with Kentucky?" The same day Commander John Rodgers, in charge of the Union gunboats Tyler and

Lexington operating with Waagner, warned that "The [Confederate] army at Hickman is considerable." Combined with news of the precipitate withdrawal of Southern forces in

Missouri, by September 4 Grant had determined that the enemy had indeed invaded the

Bluegrass State. "I regret to inform you," he wrote in a letter to the Kentucky state government, "that Confederate forces in Considerable numbers have invaded the territory of Kentucky and are occupying & fortifying strong positions at Hickman & Chalk Bluffs

[Columbus]." Viewing the people of that state as accomplices and "guilty o f an offence which must be resisted and punished," Grant ordered his post commanders to disrupt communications and halt all trade across the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. In the midst of this activity. Grant wanted to resist the invasion and fight the Confederates for possession of Columbus. Since Polk had already settled the neutrality issue, he urged Fremont to let him cross the Mississippi and seize Columbus, a movement the department commander had envisioned as early as August 28. Preparations for that offensive were barely underway when an exhausted, dust-covered figure appeared at Grant’s headquarters and changed everything.

Charles A. de Arnaud, Fremont's so-called "military expert" and prized spy, arrived in Cairo on September 5 bearing news gleaned while on a mission that took him as far south as Memphis. Confirming that the invasion was a reality, he also told Grant that enemy forces were also enroute to Paducah, located on the Kentucky shore overlooking the confluence of the Ohio and the Tennessee Rivers, intent upon capturing

51 the town and invading southern Illinois. After conferring with Grant, de Arnaud telegraphed the same message to Fremont, advising him that the Union occupation of

Paducah would "frustrate the enemy’s plans and secure for us the Tennessee River." He ended his report with the plea "No time to lose."^^

Grant did not know the man who had just brought him this news and, according to

De Arnaud, telegraphed department headquarters to verify the spy's identity. After receiving confirmation of his credentials. De Arnaud claimed that Grant listened attentively to his report. Realizing its importance. Grant immediately wired Fremont:

"On information telegraphed you, brought by Charles de Arnaud I am getting ready to go to Paducah."^'* Although he received no authorization for the movement, he forged ahead on the conviction that further delay would cost the Union an important foothold in

Kentucky. On the morning of September 6 Grant's troops landed at Paducah and, without firing a shot, claimed the town for the Union. His quick and unsanctioned seizure was seemingly justified since Grant found "numerous secession flags flying over the city" and heard rumors that Confederate troops were only sixteen miles away. Leaving Brigadier

General Eleazer Paine in command of Paducah, Grant returned to Cairo and found a message from Fremont belatedly authorizing his movements.

The occupation of Paducah remains one of Grant's more monumental decisions during the Civil War. If the Confederates had captured the town, they could have denied

Union forces access to the Tennessee River and an avenue into western Kentucky and

Tennessee. In addition. Southern forces perched on the Ohio River threatened Grant's left flank, Illinois, and the Ohio Valley. In Federal hands, however, Paducah protected these areas and furnished a convenient staging area for operations up the Tennessee River into the Deep South. From an intelligence perspective, however. Grant apparently made this momentous decision based upon the word of a spy whom he had never met and without any corroborative evidence. He confirmed this point later when he stated that his

52 movement on Paducah hinged "solely" on the information provided by De Arnaud. A

closer look at the evidence indicates, however, that other considerations shaped this

important decision.

When de Arnaud arrived with his news on September 5, Grant had officially been

in command of the District of Southeast Missouri for only one day. He had arrived in

Cairo barely three days earlier from Cape Girardeau and was deluged with the

responsibilities of his new, much larger command. Although in the past he had a

rudimentary intelligence network up and running fairly quickly, the rapid pace of his

transfers between Jefferson City and Cairo, not to mention his still-inadequate staff,

worked against him. Thus when de Arnaud presented his information. Grant probably

had neither the means nor the time to second-guess him.

Despite Grant's contention that the Confederate flags he saw upon his landing in

Paducah proved that he had barely beaten his foe to the punch, available evidence fails to

support either de Amaud's supposition or Grant’s belief that Confederate troops were approaching the town. Polk had targeted Paducah for occupation, but after capturing

Hickman and Columbus, the Confederate advance sputtered. After learning o f Grant's

move and the Union buildup in the town, he dispatched Brigadier General Benjamin F.

Cheatham with two brigades to Mayfield, twenty-three miles south of Paducah, to protect the Confederate right flank, not to launch an offensive. Thus, the Confederates had no

forces heading toward Paducah at the time when Grant made his fateful advance on the town.^^

Regardless of reality, however, de Amaud's erroneous report led Grant to seize

Paducah. With inadequate means of corroboration and little time. Grant had no way of knowing that de Arnaud brought flawed information. He knew from his own sources that

Southern forces had already occupied Hickman and Columbus, but had heard nothing about possible movements toward Paducah. However, since Paducah was strategically

53 situated on the Ohio River at the mouth of the Tennessee River, and directly across from

Illinois, the town was a logical Confederate objective. With the town under their control.

Southerners could block the Ohio River and guard the mouth of the Tennessee. Thus, when de Arnaud appeared with his information, the scenario he depicted fit within the realm of probability and Grant, aware of the importance of Paducah, reacted accordingly.

Perhaps he realized that trusting de Arnaud posed fewer risks than dismissing his report or awaiting corroboration. Sometimes a commander must make a decision based on very little information because the benefits of acting, even on bad intelligence, far outweigh the potential hazards of inaction. This was one of those times. Since the South had already violated Kentucky's neutrality, if Grant seized the town before the enemy, whether or not de Arnaud spoke the truth would be irrelevant; Paducah would be in

Union hands. Conversely, if the spy’s story proved correct, disbelief or delay might forfeit the town to the enemy. This would be a heavy price to pay for absolute certainty. In the final analysis. Grant's perception of reality on that day was far more significant than reality itself.

The capture of Paducah had shown Grant the benefits and necessity of seizing the initiative. This was a lesson he would not soon forget. But this incident, as well as his command experience in Missouri, had also reinforced the importance of accurate and timely intelligence. When he returned in triumph from Paducah, he realized the need for constant vigilance. "The troops under me and the rebel forces are getting so close together," he wrote, "that I have to watch all points. In the coming months he maintained that alertness not only to protect his command, but to unearth new opportunities as well. Overall, his command experience in Missouri constituted the opening phase of his intelligence education; it had already revealed certain leadership characteristics that Clausewitz had deemed essential for traversing the minefield of

54 wartime intelligence operations: "What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense.

55 NOTES

•USG to Julia Grant, June 17, 1861,(^2:42-43; Orders No. 7, June 18, 1861, Ibid., 45- 46; see also Bruce Catton Grant Moves South. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 3-6.

^Grant Personal Memoirs. 1: 129.

3 Ibid, 118.

^USG to Julia Grant, July 19,1861, Ibid., 72.

^Hurlbut was assigned to protect the railroad on July 4. See orders for Grant, July 13, 1861, Ibid., 68-69.

^Grant, Personal Memoirs 1:249-50.

^Ibid., 250.

*USG to Hurlbut, July 16, 1861, G£ 2: 71. In a letter to his father several days earlier USG also indicated that even if they found Harris, his men were mounted and the Federal infantry stood little chance of catching them. See USG to Jesse Grant, July 13,1861, Ibid, 66-67.

^Capt John C. Kelton to USG, Ibid., 86-87; U.S. War Department, The War o f the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies [henceforth QR] ( 128 vols., Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 3; 430-31; Frank J. Welcher, The Union Army. 1861-1865, (Bloomington: Indiana State University Press, 1993), 2:154-55.

Andrew Rolle, John Charles Fremont: Character as Destiny (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 15-17. For an examination of the duties, training and contributions of the Topographical Corps during the Mexican War, see Traas, Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War. For Fremont's expeditions and wartime service, see pages 7-8 and 25-49.

• • Rolle, John Charles Fremont. 13-15; For Carpenter’s service as chief of the Jessie Scouts, see RG 110, Records of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau, entry 36, Correspondence, Reports, Appointments, and Other Records Relating to Individual Scouts, Spies, and Detectives, boxes 1, 2, and 3, NA. See also John Bakeless, Spies of the Confederacy. (Philadelphia; J.B. Lippincott Company, 1970), 314-16

56 *^George Gibbs to Gen. George B. McClellan, 4 July [1861], RG 110, entry 36, box 3, NA; Rolle, John Charles Fremont. 121-22, 197-98; Robert V. Mine, In.the Shadow flf Fremont: Edward Kern and the Art of Exploration. 1845-1860. CNorman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), 149; RG 393, Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, Part I, entry 5500, Western Department, Letters Sent, vol. 7, NA. For Kern’s intelligence reports, see RG 393, entry 5502, Western Department, Letters Received, box 14, NA; RG 110, Entry 36, Box 3, NA.

After the war, de Arnaud maintained that since he served as a "military expert" and not a mere spy, he was entitled to more compensation for his services. Both he and Fremont argued that there was a marked difference between the two occupations because de Anaud had military experience and most civilian spies did not. This argument over titles highlighted a common view of civilian spies; they were not seen as professionals nor particularly skilled. In fact, many saw spying as a vocation that attracted people with serious character flaws and low moral standards. One official involved with de Amaud's post-war pension case cut to the heart of the matter when he observed that, had the Confederates captured de Arnaud behind the lines, his claims of being a "military expert" would not have saved him from the gallows. See Charles de Arnaud Pension File, NA.

•'^Rolle, John Charles Fremont. 197; Charles de Arnaud Pension File, NA; John C. Fremont, "In Command in Missouri," in Clarence C. Buel and Robert U. Johnson, eds.. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, [henceforth B & L] 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1881), 1; 281,283, 285; RG 110, entry 95, Accounts o f Secret Service Agents, box 1, NA. Other Fremont operatives identified in the records include Dr. Oscar Habbig and Charles Noyes, who had also worked in the War Department earlier as a secret service messenger. See Habbig voucher in Ibid., b o x . For Noyes, see Ibid., Box 4 and RG 393, entry 5502, box 14, NA.

•^J.D. Kittle, The Military Staff: Its Historv and Develoment. (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1944), 161-65. See also Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: _A Military Historv of the Civil War. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 102-107.

^ ^During the Civil War, it was not uncommon for a commander to act as his own intelligence officer. See Edwin C. Fishel, "The Mythology of Civil War Intelligence," Civil War History [henceforth CWH] 36 (Dec. 1964): 344-367 and A. L. Conger, The Rise of U.S. Grant. (New York: The Century Company, 1931), 14-15. During World War I, Conger served as General John J. Pershing's chief of the Military Information Division,G-2 Section, AEF. Due to his expertise, he deals specifically with intelligence matters when analyzing Grant's campaigns. See also Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division. Department of the Army General Staff. 1775-J941 (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1986).

57 ^^USG to Julia, August 10, 1861, 2: 96; James Harrison Wilson, The Life of John A. Rawlins. (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1916), 53-55, 58. Chosen in part because Grant felt obligated to have at least one of his aides come from his old regiment, Lagow remained on Grant's staff through the Chattanooga campaign in 1863. USG to Kelton, August 11, 1861, G E2: 98.

**The ancient Chinese military philospher Sun Tzu provided the most concise definition of net assessment: "Know your enemy and know yourself." Net assessment consists o f the comparative evaluation on the strengths and weaknesses of your forces as well as those of your adversary. The present definition usually applies to the analysis of military forces in the international arena, but the concept remains applicable to the Civil War. See Michael I. Handel. Masters of War Sun Tzu. Clausewitz and Jomini (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1992), 118-19. For a useful conceptual discussion of net assessment, see also Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds. Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 1-18.

^^ S G to Kelton, August 9, 1861, GE 2: 89-90; USG to Julia, August 10, 1861, Ibid., 96.

-®For Houts’ activities, see "Special Orders," August 13, 1861, Ibid., Ill; USG to Kelton, August 15, 1861, Ibid., 114. Apparently, Houts' spying days were short-lived. He was reported killed a few days later while spying on Hardee's camps. See Illinois State iûumâL August 24, 1861.

-*See Marsh to Fremont, August 12, 1861, RG 393, Entry 5502, Box 14, NA; Hurlbut to Pope, August 21, 1861, ÛR3: 133-34.

^U SG to Kelton, August 9, 1861, GE2: 89-90. On one occasion he sent out a mix of infantry, cavalry "and two spies to ascertain the position, &c, of the Confederate troops." USG to Kelton, August 11,1861, Ibid., 98. For an excellent discussion of the nature of intelligence sources during the war, see Peter Maslowski, "Military Intelligence Sources during the American Civil War: A Case Study," in Walter T. Hitchcock, ed. The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1991): 39-70; USG to Major W. E. McMackin, August 12,1861, GE2: 104.

^^USG to Kelton, August 9,1861, GE2: 89-90; USG to Kelton, August 10,1861, Ibid., 94; USG to Kelton, August 12, 1861, Ibid., 102. Hardee had expressed the desire to attack Ironton as early as July 29, see Hardee to Major General Leonidas Polk, July 29, 1861, OR 3: 619.

^'^USG to Kelton, August 10, 1861, GE 2: 94. For the size of Hardee's forces, see Hardee to Polk, August 2,1861, OR vol. 3,626-27; Hardee to Polk, August 4,1861, Ibid., 629.

2^USG to Mary Grant, August 12, 1861, GE2: 105.

58 “^Pillow to Folk, July 30, 1861, OR 3:621; Hardee to Polk, August 4, 1861, Ibid., 629; Pillow to Polk, August 7, 1861, Ibid., 634; Hardee to H. M. Rector, August 8, 1861, Ibid., 636-37; Hardee to Polk, August 11, 1861, Ibid., 641-42. See also Nathaniel Hughes Cheairs, Jr. and Roy P. Stonesifer, Jr., The Life and Wars o f Gideon J. Pillow (Chapel Hill; The University o f North Carolina Press, 1993), 180-82; Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., General William J. Hardee. Old Reliable. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 78-79.

-^The Confederacy formed military-geographical divisions at the war's outset and the Confederate Department No. 2 consisted of portions of northern Alabama, eastern Arkansas, western Tennessee, northeastern Louisiana, and western Mississippi and eventually included all o f Missouri. On July 4 Polk was named commander of the department with headquarters at Memphis. See Joseph H. Parks, General Leonidas Polk. C.S.A.: The Fighting Bishop IBaton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 170-71.

-^Hardee to Polk, August 20, 1861, QB. 3: 664; USG to Kelton, August 13, 1861, GE 2: 106-7. Pillow failed to cooperate in part because he did not want to serve under Hardee. "You can judge with what reluctance 1 yield the command," he wrote Secretary of War Leroy P. Walker, "to an officer who was a captain under me in the Mexican war-while 1 was a Major General." Quoted in Hughes and Stonesifer, Pillow. 187. See also Ibid., 183-88;

^^Pope had specifically requested that Grant be moved to the District of North Missouri because he was "a Soldier by education & experience & a discreet prudent man who is eminently needed now for immediate supervision of the disaffected counties north of Hannibal & St. Joseph road." Pope to Kelton, August 10, 1861, QE 2; 123-124.

^°Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West. (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 25-50.

^^USG to Capt. Speed Butler, August 22,1861, GE 2: 128; USG to Jesse Grant, August 27,1861, Ibid., 145-46. Documentation is scarce on the people who worked for him early in the war primarily because he moved so frequently and because, like other aspects of the early war period. Grant's intelligence operations were undertaken on an ad hoc basis with no systematic recordkeeping.

^^Catton, Grant Moves South. 28-36; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:258-59; USG to Butler, August 27, 1861, GE2; 142; USG to Butler, August 23,1861, Ibid., 131-32.

^^USG to Jesse Grant, August 27, 1861, Ibid., 145; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1; 260-61.

^^USG to Butler, August 26,1861, GE2: 138-39. McCulloch to Jefferson Davis, August 24, 1861, QB 3; 671. On August 26, a report indicated that 1500 men from Price's

59 command were "aiming at Jeff City." By this time, however. Price was still in western Missouri and had not yet turned north. See USG to Pope, August 26,1861, GE 2; 139; Castel, Sterling Price. 49.

^^To his father he wrote "My means of information are certainly as good as anyone els [sic] has and I cannot learn that there is an organized body of men North of the Osage river or any moving." See USG to Jesse Grant, August 27,1861, QE 2; 146; USG to Julia, August 26, 1861, Ibid., 141 .

^^USG to Julia, August 29, 1861, Ibid., 149; Fremont to USG, August 27, 1861, Ibid., 149, 151.

^^USG to Julia, August 29, 1861, Ibid., 149.

^^Fremont to USG, August 28, 1861, Ibid., 151.

^^Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 261.

"*®Thompson to Pillow, August 16, 1861, Œ 3 ; 657. See also Catton, Grant Moves South. 41; Conger, Rise of U.S. Grant. 37-38. Although Thompson had only about 2000 men in his command, by late August his numbers had doubled by reinforcements from Pillow and Hardee. Thompson to Pillow, August 17, 1861, QR. vol. 3; 658; Thompson to Colonel Aden Lowe, August 25, 1861, Ibid., 680.

Fremont placed Grant in overall control of the movement composed of converging columns from various commands, including Prentiss' forces at Ironton. Although Grant and Prentiss were both confirmed as brigadier generals in August, Prentiss had been awarded this rank in May, 1861 before Grant was even named a colonel. However, Grant believed correctly that, despite the discrepancies in the dates, he still outranked his fellow officer because of his Mexican War service with the regular Army. Prentiss believed otherwise and, until the dispute was settled, refused to obey Grant's orders. Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1 ; 257.

^*^USG to Fremont, September 2,1861, QE2: 174.

"^^USG to Julia, August 29, 1861, Ibid., 149;, 151-53; Conger, Rise of U.S. Grant. 67; Ibid., 167; Welcher, The Union Army. 2: 155.

"^General Orders No. 3, September 4, 1861, QE2: 183-84.

"'^Fremont in E ^ L I : 281; Catton, Grant Moves South. 44; Charles W. Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier (Washington. DC.: Globe Printing Company, 1906), 35; Grant to Julia 3 September 1861, GE 2: 181.

60 "^Catton, Grant Moves South. 47.

51-56. When Grant became a brigadier general he was allowed by law to have an adjutant, a quartermaster general and a commissary generals all with the rank of captain, and two aides-de-camp (lieutenants) on his staff. The assistant adjutant was often the chief of staff and the locus of all communications to and from the commanding general. See Ibid., 67; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 106-107; Hittle, The Military Staff. 163-65; and Wilson, Rawlins. 54. For Hillyefs appointment, see Hillyer to Annie Hillyer, August 12,1861, William S. Hillyer Papers, University of Virginia Library Charlottesville, Virginia, [hencforth UVaL]

^^Fremont to USG, September 1,1861, Π.2 : 165.

'♦^SG to Brigadier General John A. McClemand, September 1, 1861, Ibid., 166; USG to Fremont, September 4, 1861, Ibid., 186. For Pillow's abandonment of the Cape Girardeau operation and Thompson's move to New Madrid, see Hughes and Stonesifer, Pillow. 184- 190; Thompson to Hardee, August 25, 1861, QE. vol. 3: 680-81; Pillow to Polk, August 28, 1861, Ibid., 685.

^°Conger, Rise of U.S. Grant. 234-35; USG to Fremont, September 4, 1861, GE 2: 186.

Pillow to Polk, August 28, 1861, QR 3: 686; Polk to Jefferson Davis, September 4, 1861, Ibid., 4; 181; Polk to Governor Beriah Magoffin, September 8, 1861, Ibid., 185. See also Steven E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Lawrence, Kan.; University Press of Kansas, 1990), 34-39; and Hughes and Stonesifer, Pillow. 194.

^^On September 5 Brigadier General John A. McClemand reported that Union engineers and troops had crossed to the Kentucky shore opposite Cairo to survey the area and conduct reconnaissances "with a view to occupation preparatory to more decisive movements south." By the time they returned, the operation toward Paducah was already underway. See McClemand to Fremont, September 5, 1861, QR 4: 196.

^^For de Amaud's report and related material, see de Arnaud to Fremont, September 5, 1861, Q£2: 193 and de Amaud Pension File, NA.

^'^USG to Fremont, September 5,1861, QE 2:190; USG to Fremont, September 5,1861, Ibid., 193.

^^USG to Fremont, September 6, 1861, Ibid., 196-97.

^^USG to de Amaud, November 30, 1861, Ibid., 3:243.

^^Polk to Jefferson Davis, September 14, OR vol. 4: 191.

61 ^*USG to Mary Grant, September 11, 1861, GE 2: 237.

^^Clausewitz. On War, 117.

62 CHAPTERS

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMAND AT BELMONT

"Things down here begin to look like work," Grant wrote upon his return from

Paducah, but "What future operations will be... I don't know."' He still believed that

Columbus, Kentucky should be the primary objective of forthcoming Union movements, especially now that the Confederates had gained possession of that town, which had a commanding view of the Mississippi. Until Federal forces captured Columbus and its environs the South controlled a major roadblock to Union offensive thrusts against

Memphis and New Orleans. Moreover, a Confederate Columbus also complicated

Northern efforts to dominate the upper Mississippi River valley, southeastern Missouri, and western Kentucky. Believing that no time should be wasted getting underway. Grant expected that the drive on Columbus would not be long in coming. "Evrything [sic] looks quiet here now," he told Julia, "but it may be simply a quiet before a storm."-

The importance of Columbus was not lost on the Southern high command. Polk, now commander of the Confederate Department No. 2 headquartered in Columbus, and officials in Richmond recognized the town's strategic value and incorporated it into the overall Confederate strategy in the Western theater. "Its possession," Pillow asserted, "is a military necessity involving the ultimate safety of Tennessee." With no less than the security of key regions in the west at stake, the Confederates invested a great deal to defend it. After seizing the town, Polk began transforming Columbus, nestled among high bluffs that overlooked a large stretch of the river and surrounded by rugged and

63 INDIANA >A^tern Kentucky 0 to iO 30 40 ^ Evansville ^

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TENffJESSEE 'fashvllle ftoMmphtt fp Omttanooga

Map 1 naturally defensible terrain, into a key bastion anchoring the left flank of the Confederate defensive line in the West. Stout fortifications on the heights, appropriately named the

Iron Banks, bristled with a vast array of artillery that stood like silent sentinels commanding the river. Not only was Columbus significant because of its topographical features, it was also connected with the interior of the Confederacy by the logistically important Mobile & Ohio Railroad.^

On the Missouri bank and in the shadow of the Columbus guns lay Camp

Johnston, a small Confederate post situated near the hamlet of Belmont to protect the ferry landing and the line of communication with Kentucky. More importantly, however, this Southern toehold on the western bank offered a convenient portal into southeast

Missouri and a staging area for offensive operations against Cairo, Cape Girardeau, or even St. Louis. In Confederate hands Columbus and Belmont not only posed a formidable impediment to a Federal advance downriver, they also threatened the tenuous

Union presence in southeast Missouri, a region already menaced by guerrillas and bushwhackers, pro-Confederate Missouri state troops under Brigadier General M. Jeff

Thompson, and Major General William J. Hardee’s troops posted south of the Arkansas border at Pitman's Ferry."*

Both Grant and Fremont respected Columbus' defensive strength and its potential to impede Union operations along the Mississippi. Moreover, they also realized that the

Belmont camp represented a dangerous breach in their Missouri defenses. Nevertheless, the Confederates reached Columbus first and made clear their intention to stay, prompting Grant to press for an immediate advance before the position became impregnable. Confident that Fremont shared his concerns, the Cairo commander eagerly informed department headquarters of his willingness to organize and lead an expedition against the Confederate position.^

65 Fremont at first concurred with his subordinate’s appraisal of the situation and on

September 8 presented a plan that called for Union forces to expel the enemy from

southeast Missouri and then move to capture Columbus. He proposed dispatching troops

from Paducah, now a separate command under Brigadier General Charles F. Smith,

toward "the rear and flank of Columbus" while Grant drove Thompson and any other

Confederate forces out of Missouri. Once this phase was complete, Fremont envisioned a

combined assault by Smith and Grant on Columbus. After capturing the Confederate

stronghold, the department commander hoped to seize Hickman and eventually move on

to Memphis, predicting that the result of his grand offensive "would be a glorious one to the country."^

Unfortunately for Fremont, General Sterling Price, who led an army of pro-

Confederate Missouri state troops, forced the "Pathfinder" down a more conservative trail. Price’s August 10 victory at Wilson’s Creek in southwest Missouri and the subsequent Union withdrawal toward the Missouri River had opened half of the state to

invasion. In September Price moved to capitalize on this situation. Wary of the deteriorating situation in the western counties and unwilling to risk a reverse on the

Mississippi until he had subdued Price, Fremont quickly shelved his grand offensive indefinitely. On September 10 he ordered Grant to remain on the defensive in Kentucky and limit his activities in Missouri to chasing guerrillas.^ At least for the present, the advance on Columbus would have to wait.

While awaiting further orders. Grant and his small staff, including his newly arrived adjutant Captain Rawlins, organized and prepared the Cairo troops for action.

Part of the duties at Cairo included the construction of an intelligence apparatus to insure a constant flow of information to headquarters. When Grant assumed command in

Cairo on September 4, his predecessor. Colonel Oglesby, had already laid the groundwork for an information service. Including a stable of civilian informants roaming

66 the countryside south of Cairo and other "secret service" employees.^ Upon this

foundation Grant assembled his own intelligence system with access to both active and

passive sources o f information.^ Active sources tapped by Grant included spies operating

in Columbus, scouts roaming near enemy lines, and, most important of all,

reconnaissance patrols. These scouts and spies were recruited from the local population

because of their familiarity with the "movements, feelings, [and] habits" of the people.

"We must use men who have been in rebeldom to do our work effectively," noted one

Federal officer. Grant usually dispatched reconnaissance expeditions, composed

primarily of infantry units due to a shortage of cavalry, from outposts closest to enemy

territory. Patrols from Bird's Point in Missouri, led by such able officers as Oglesby and

Colonel W. H. L. Wallace, monitored the no man's land in the Charleston - Belmont

vicinity and, among other duties, attempted to verify or dispel rumors concerning

Confederate troop movements from Columbus. Along the Kentucky shore, patrols sent

from the Union outposts at Fort Holt and Fort Jefferson watched for enemy activity in the

rugged wilderness north of Columbus. ’ *

The land-based reconnaissances received assistance from the Union navy plying

the Mississippi above Columbus. The gunboats Tyler. Lexington and Conestoga, under

the overall direction of Captain Andrew Hull Foote, performed many duties for the

Army.’^ They supported amphibious landings and protected reconnaissance parties on

land by distracting the Columbus river batteries. The brown-water navy also

reconnoitered above Columbus and Belmont, at times supplying information on the

number and types of guns in Columbus and on the size of the military encampments surrounding the city. Foote's gunboats also performed "reconnaissance-by-fîre" missions to determine the location of Confederate forces in the deep woods along the river. The explosion of an 8-inch shell in the middle of camp "was not a very pleasant introduction

67 to the Gun Boats," remarked one Confederate whose bivouac the navy discovered in this manner. Besides causing Polk's men on the western bank some anxious moments, the

Federal navy played an important role in Grant's intelligence scheme.

Although much less dramatic. Grant also obtained intelligence from passive sources, which included prisoners of war, deserters, civilians, refugees, escaped black slaves, intercepted correspondence (both civilian and military), and newspapers.

Experience dictated, however, that the information derived from these sources be evaluated with care. Colonel Lew Wallace, stationed at Paducah, provided an enlightening commentary on the dangers associated with relying too heavily upon these sources. "Now I may be listening to a story of the advance o f the enemy," he complained,

"an hour hence I shall be as reliably told that Columbus is evacuated and the

Confederates gone to New Orleans." "The truth is," he continued, "those who tell us know nothing; those who do know will not tell."*'^ On the other hand, civilians, refugees and runaway slaves could provide accurate appraisals of recent enemy activity in the area, furnish information on the location and condition of roads, and report on the nature of the terrain. Prisoners of war and enemy deserters, if questioned properly, could also supply insights into the enemy's order of battle, an important facet of combat intelligence.

Additionally, since the practice of exchanging prisoners of war remained in vogue, returning Union prisoners sometimes furnished news and observations from behind

Confederate lines. At Cairo, however. Grant was not yet in the habit of questioning everyone who entered Union lines from enemy territory regardless of age, gender, or laceJS

Over the next two months Grant relied heavily upon his emerging intelligence system to keep abreast of Confederate activities on three different fronts. First, through reconnaissances and scouts he watched for troop movements between Columbus and

Belmont that might presage a Confederate invasion of southeast Missouri. Second, his

68 scouts and spies monitored military activity in Columbus, noting any threatening movements toward Paducah. Deserters from Polk's army also provided insights on these matters. Third, his operatives kept a close eye on Thompson's forces in southeast

Missouri and on Hardee's troops stationed south of the Missouri - Arkansas border.

Aside from Polk in Columbus, Thompson and Hardee were the only immediate threats in

Grant's district. With an efficient intelligence system. Grant wanted to prevent the

Confederates from surprising him, particularly from Belmont, but also hoped to uncover an opportunity to strike Columbus.

On September 10, Grant's embryonic information service faced its first test when a gunboat commander reported that transports laden with Southern troops had crossed to

Belmont and estimated that at least three thousand troops, mostly cavalry, now occupied

Camp Johnston. Although concerned, Grant doubted that Polk would embark on an offensive in Missouri so soon after invading Kentucky. "[M]y impression is that they want time to prepare for defense," he reasoned. Even if the Confederates advanced, he believed the most likely target would be Paducah since that position, in Union hands, posed the most substantial threat to Columbus and to Confederate control of western

Kentucky. Moreover, many Southerners believed that the recent invasion of Kentucky remained incomplete until the Confederacy's sphere of influence reached to Paducah and the Ohio River. After determining that neither Cairo nor Paducah were in danger at that moment, however. Grant advocated taking the initiative instead of waiting on Polk to make up his mind. "If it was discretionary with me," he told Fremont, "I would take

Columbus."’^

Later that day a Union spy spirited out o f Columbus a copy of Polk's General

Order No. 19, dated September 7. This important document confirmed Grant's assessment that Polk was too preoccupied with regrouping, organizing, supplying, and resting his command to execute a major offensive. As Grant knew well from his

69 experiences with recently-acquired Paducah, transitioning from invasion to occupation was no easy task and Polk, attempting to defend both Columbus and Hickman, had his hands full. Grant also divined from this document that the Southern commander had recalled the troops he had posted toward Paducah. To Grant, the Confederates in

Columbus, overwhelmed with preparations to receive an attack, had little time or energy to initiate one. This interpretation became a common and dominant thread woven throughout Grant's later assessments of enemy movements and intentions.

The knowledge that Polk and Pillow were the principal officers in Columbus also contributed to Grant's pacific picture of the enemy. Polk's military reputation had suffered as a result of his hasty and, to many, ill-conceived invasion of Kentucky that automatically placed the onus of violating that state's neutrality squarely on the South.

Some complained of his failure to capture Paducah and cement Confederate control of western Kentucky. Characterized as a "vain cadet," the Episcopal Bishop had few admirers in blue or gray, with the notable exception of his most powerful supporter,

Jefferson Davis. His lackluster subordinate, Gideon Pillow, aroused even more visceral reactions from those who knew him. Like many officers familiar with Pillow's background. Grant openly despised the haughty Tennessean. His incompetence in military affairs, revealed during the Mexican War when he placed a ditch on the wrong side of his fortifications, earned him the derision of West Pointers, while his unwarranted arrogance merited the contempt of most everyone else. One officer claimed that Pillow was "as consum[m]ate an ass, as any army, modem or ancient, has ever been inflicted with." When he heard that Pillow had earned a command in southeast Missouri early in the war. Grant predicted he "would not be a formidable enemy." This rather unflattering view of his opponents would have an impact on Grant's future behavior. "Knowing Polk's caution and believing Pillow to be a fool, " argued one historian, led Grant to take risks he might not have if faced with a more competent adversary.

70 Despite Grant's negative opinion of Polk and Pillow and his growing conviction that they presently pursued a defensive strategy, September 11 brought news that contradicted this image. A Confederate deserter stated that five thousand troops had crossed to Belmont recently and that some officers in Columbus talked about attacking

Bird's Point and Cairo soon. In response. Grant dispatched infantry patrols and a gunboat toward Belmont for verification. Colonel Oglesby, in charge of the column sent from

Norfolk, returned on September 16 and reported that the size of the Camp Johnston garrison, around three thousand men, remained unchanged. More importantly, he neither heard of nor observed any activity in the camp that foretold of a major advance.^'

In fact. Grant believed so fervently that his adversary thought only in terms of defense that before these reconnaissance patrols could even report, his thoughts had already turned toward plans for a Union offensive. On September 12, Grant offered headquarters a two-pronged plan aimed at clearing the Confederates out of Missouri and ultimately turning Columbus. First, he proposed that Smith's Paducah forces turn the

Confederate left flank by attacking Union City, Tennessee, a key supply depot twenty miles south of Columbus, and sever Polk's communications. Second, Grant planned for another flanking force on the Missouri shore, presumably under his command, to march on Belmont under the protection of the gunboats. With their supply lines cut and threatened on both flanks. Grant believed Polk "would be forced to leave Columbus."^-

Although reminiscent of his own earlier plan to capture the Confederate stronghold,

Fremont did not comment on his subordinate's proposition.

After hearing more news of Confederate activity on September 15, Grant's attention shifted from grand offensive schemes to defending his command. Recent rumors claimed that Polk had evacuated Columbus, but from the sketchy information

Grant had no idea whether the Southern forces were "marching upon Paducah or leaving

Kentucky altogether.Although doubtful that his adversary had any offensive

71 inclinations. Grant needed the services of his scouts and spies now more than ever.

Unfortunately, he faced a crisis on that front. Earlier in the month. Grant had requested

more money for secret service operations and had also asked permission to maintain and control his own secret service budget. However, department headquarters issued no reply. When the latest rumors surfaced on September 15, Grant again contacted St. Louis, this time using the seriousness of the present crisis as a pretext. "It is highly necessary to get information which cannot be obtained from our own reconnoitering parties," he complained, "[but] without money to pay, the services of citizens cannot much longer be obtained." He feared that, without proper compensation for the risks they incurred, particularly those who resided behind enemy lines, his sources would likely return home in silence. Fremont finally granted his request, but three days—and the crisis—had passed before Grant received the needed funds for intelligence operations.-'^

Despite his monetary troubles. Grant searched diligently for any information that might shed light on the supposed evacuation of the Columbus garrison and their possible destination. Finally, he learned from both a deserter and from one of his spies, known only as "Mr. L.," that on September 14, ten thousand troops under General Albert Sidney

Johnston, the new commander of the Confederacy's Department No. 2, had left

Columbus, now headquarters of the "First Division" commanded by Polk, and marched toward Mayfield, Kentucky. According to both sources, his ultimate objective was the capture of Faducah.^^ Combined with the unconfirmed reports o f the evacuation of

Columbus, Grant should have been duly alarmed at these ominous developments.

Initially, however, he remained suspicious of the news brought by the agent and deserter, stating that "I do not think this movement [on Paducah] has been made."^^ Nevertheless,

Grant remained cautious, and over the next several days, both he and Smith accelerated

72 defensive preparations. On September 20 Grant’s intelligence finally brought welcome news that the Confederates at Mayfield had returned to Columbus. Although this crisis had seemingly passed, more loomed ahead.

In reality. Southern forces had indeed occupied Mayfield just as Grant's sources had claimed, but in nowhere near the strength reported. The force depicted as an army led by Johnston was actually only two regiments under Brigadier General Benjamin F.

Cheatham on a defensive mission to secure Polk's right flank. Similarly, what Grant saw as the termination of the "offensive" against Paducah was in reality the retreat of

Cheatham's column toward Columbus, a move prompted by the lack of fresh water and supplies in Mayfield.^* The supposed large-scale offensive push reported by Grant's intelligence had never entered Polk's thoughts. In fact, at that moment the Bishop

General feared that Union forces in Paducah were poised to attack him, not the reverse, which led to Cheatham's foray to Mayfield. The Confederate withdrawal only strengthened Grant's perception that the enemy remained in a defensive mode.^^

Before long, however, another challenge to that belief emerged. On September 23 a spy in Columbus warned that Polk had dispatched more troops to Belmont, prompting

Grant once again to send the reliable Colonel Oglesby with a patrol toward the

Confederate camp.^® But the patrol found that now only 2500 of Thompson's guardsmen occupied Belmont, meaning that no infusion of troops from Columbus had occurred In addition, Oglesby downplayed the threat posed by these current occupants of Camp

Johnston, observing that Thompson's bivouac appeared quiet with no sign of any preparations commensurate with a pending offensive. The results of the reconnaissance once again confirmed Grant's suspicions that the enemy remained "confined to their encampments at Columbus and Belmont."^*

Despite the district commander's assessment and the confidence he placed in

Oglesby's judgment, the latest rumor of Confederate forces crossing into Missouri had

73 caused great trepidation in St. Louis, especially in light of events in western Missouri. In late September Sterling Price's state troops had ventured as far north as the Missouri

River and had captured the Union garrison at Lexington, a loss that reverberated throughout the Western Department.^^ With the fate of his command as well as that of the Union cause in Missouri at stake, John C. Fremont was undoubtedly the most apprehensive of all. In response to the crisis, he left for western Missouri on September

24 to direct operations against Price personally, leaving his adjutant. Captain Chauncey

McKeever, in charge of departmental affairs in St. Louis.^^ Fearful that recent events might encourage Polk either to reinforce Price or to attempt to expel Union forces from southeastern Missouri or Paducah, Fremont directed Grant and Smith to remain on the defensive and work together to "control" any Confederate incursions against their positions. Although he gave them some latitude to attack if the chance arose, Fremont was quick to clarify that "at present I am not in favor of incurring any hazard of defeat."

Suspending all offensive operations along the Mississippi River, the "Pathfinder" embarked on a mission to salvage western Missouri and his own increasingly battered reputation.

At the time. Grant concurred with his superior’s decision to delay an assault on

Columbus, but for different reasons. While the department commander feared a simultaneous advance against Cairo and Paducah in support of Price's operations, or vice versa. Grant believed that Polk favored strengthening, not abandoning, his works, thereby surrendering the initiative to the Fédérais. But Grant faced acute manpower and supply shortages that delayed an advance on the stronghold. He possessed sufficient forces to defend Cairo, he complained, but not enough for "an aggressive movement against the large force now occupying Columbus." Moreover, the possibility that Fremont might appoint a more senior officer to lead the campaign in the interim also weighed heavy on

Grant's mind and only added to his anxiety and restlessness. Grant summed up his

74 fhistration in a letter to his wife. "Ail is quiet here now," he remarked, but just "How long it will remain so is impossible to tell." One thing was certain, he added, "If I had troops enough[,j not long."^^

The prospects for an advance in the near future, however, depended upon

Fremont's success against Price. Until these two forces had locked horns in southwestern

Missouri, Columbus would have to wait. Frustrated by the inertia gripping the District of

Southeast Missouri, Grant fixed his gaze upon Columbus, confident that only the want of men and supplies and Fremont's obsession with Price prevented him from reducing the

"Gibraltar of the West" to rubble.

Even though Fremont's priorities had shifted westward, the possibility that Polk might reinforce Price kept the department commander glancing nervously toward

Columbus. Before long he saw something that concerned him and on September 28 he sent Grant an urgent warning that, based upon his sources, the Confederates had evacuated Columbus, crossed to Belmont, and planned to assail Ironton or Cape

Girardeau. More in touch with the true situation, however, the Cairo commander replied confidently that, on the contrary, "Evrything [sic] here is quiet [with] no rumors to disturb it." A few days later he completely dismissed Fremont's report as idle gossip.

"There is no enemy on the Missouri side of the river.. except Jeff Thompsons [sic] force at Belmont." As for this latter contingent. Grant believed that even a small Union force could "easily drive them from [the] vicinity."^^

The district commander had barely quashed this latest rumor when news about increased Confederate activity in Kentucky grabbed his attention. On September 30 a wounded Confederate prisoner let slip that a large column under Pillow had departed

Columbus for Paducah. Lacking any contradictory evidence. Grant remained somewhat cautious and traveled up the Ohio River to assist Smith with defensive preparations.

Once again, the Confederate attack failed to materialize. However, when Grant returned

75 to Cairo he received a report of Southern troops crossing to Belmont intent upon capturing Cape Girardeau. But Grant's operatives and Smith's scouts soon unearthed no corroborative evidence showing any Confederate movements toward either Paducah or

Belmont. Once again. Grant's intelligence had again supported his belief that Polk remained on the defensive. As a result, on October 4 he wrote that the enemy had "no concerted plan to attack [Cairo], Cape Girardeau or Paducah.

Despite Grant's recent assurances, the tide of rumors refused to ebb. On October

6, he again received news from department headquarters that Johnston was at Belmont with a large force preparing to attack Cape Girardeau. Unfortunately, Grant confessed that this latest report baffled him. He had received no "reliable" intelligence for the past two days that shed light on this alleged movement, primarily because the gunboats were all out of service, his scouts had returned empty-handed, and one o f his spies, from whom he expected a "full & accurate report," had yet to return. "I always try to keep myself posted as to [the enemy's] movements but I am at a loss for the last few days," he complained.^^ Facing a critical information shortage. Grant dispatched an infantry patrol toward Belmont and sent Johnston Brown, a trusted Union scout, to "ascertain the position .. of the enemy." But until more evidence arrived. Grant held to his original view that "the enemy have no present intention of moving on Cape Girardeau" and that if the Confederates planned to attack anywhere (which he doubted), Paducah would likely top their list.'^®

The next day Grant finally received reliable intelligence that supported his basic assessment, although it also contained indications of a possible advance against Paducah.

The intelligence originated with Smith who reported that a priest, whose flock included officers and men in Columbus, had learned that Polk planned to attack Paducah in the next few days. But when he relayed this information to Grant, Smith appeared reluctant to place much credence in it, stating that he forwarded the report "for what it is worth," a

76 common phrase used to express doubt about the reliability o f a report. In fact. Smith was not alone in his skepticism. Some of his subordinates also played down the possibility of an attack on Paducah. Colonel Lew Wallace may have summed up the prevalent feeling among the Paducah garrison at the time. "[W]hile we don't remit our vigilance," he observed, "we are not greatly concerned."'^* Although certainly not ignoring the possibility of a Confederate advance to the Ohio River, Grant held fast to his original assessment, proclaiming that the Southerners were still "fortifying strongly and preparing to resist a formidable attack and have but little idea of risking anything upon a forward movement.

In the meantime. Grant also monitored the movements of Thompson and Hardee.

Throughout September Grant had watched Thompson, not a difficult task considering his force of around 2600 men had not, for the most part, ventured far from Belmont. But on

October 1 Thompson's brigade departed for New Madrid to resupply and prepare for an advance on Cape Girardeau."^^ Jeff Thompson had earned a ghost-like reputation in the region, especially among the footsore Union infantrymen sent after him and who, more often than not, came away empty-handed. After just such a mission, one tired soldier complained that "there seems to be nothing reliable about any of the reports we have of him. " Unfortunately for Thompson, this time he fooled no one. The same day that he departed Belmont, a deserter told Grant of the move and subsequent information, gleaned from prisoners and civilians in the area, corroborated the stoiy.'*^

Unaware that Grant was on his trail, Thompson departed New Madrid for Cape

Girardeau, reaching Sikeston on October 4. Although only thirty miles shy of his objective, Thompson canceled the assault due to inadequate manpower, and headed west toward the safety of the swamps. Grant learned o f the Confederates' arrival in the

77 Sikeston area and then confirmed their hasty retreat to the west. As a result of

Thompson's precipitate withdrawal, the Cairo commander concluded once and for all that "There is [now] no force... threatening Cape Girardeau.'"*^

Finding retreat distasteful, however, Thompson attempted to salvage something from his aborted mission and turned north toward Fredericktown, sending his infantry toward that town while he led his cavalry on a bridge burning expedition. After skirmishing with Union forces on October 17, Thompson, with his infantry and cavalry back together, occupied Fredericktown, about 25 miles east of Ironton. But with fewer than 2000 men and new recruits scarce, he proposed to hold the town only "until the enemy discovers my w eakness.H ow ever, Grant knew all along that Thompson's depleted brigade numbered less than three thousand men and, armed with this information, ordered Colonel Joseph Plummer and 4500 men to find and destroy the

"Swamp Fox." Taking his task seriously, Plummer's men routed Thompson's forces on

October 21 and sent them retreating southward toward Greenville and Bloomfield.

Claiming that Plummer's Fredericktown victory had "crushed out the Rebellion in South

East Missouri," from late October on Grant saw Thompson as little more than a minor nuisance.'^^

During September and October Grant also observed Hardee's activities in northeast Arkansas. Busy recruiting, training and supplying his brigade, Hardee had not ventured far from Pitman's Ferry since late August. That changed on September 17 after

Polk, fearing a Union attack from Paducah and searching for reinforcements, requested

Hardee's presence in Columbus. After several delays, "Old Reliable" Hardee and his

4000-man brigade finally trudged out of their camps, crossed the Mississippi, and on

October 6 reached Columbus. Unfortunately for Polk, Johnston had decided that central

Kentucky needed Hardee's troops more than Columbus and ordered the brigade to join

78 Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner’s army at Bowling Green. With little rest in- between, Hardee’s footsore column finally reached central Kentucky around October

13.4*

Grant first learned of Hardee’s departure from Pitman's Ferry on September 28, although initially he seemed skeptical of the report, probably doubting that the

Confederates would leave northern Arkansas so exposed.4^ However, on October 16

Brigadier General William T. Sherman, the Union commander facing Buckner in central

Kentucky, confirmed that Hardee had reached Bowling Green. Two days later, a "secret agent" corroborated this news. Although Hardee’s transfer relieved pressure on Grant, it caused new headaches for his fellow Ohioan. Sherman already believed that Buckner possessed superior numbers and intended to attack Louisville; the news of Hardee's arrival further convinced him of impending disaster. From his perspective the

Confederate legions gathering to the south appeared formidable, although Buckner’s forces, even with the addition of Hardee, numbered far fewer than the Union commander believed. Moreover, the Confederates, just as fearful of Sherman as he was of them, entertained few thoughts of an advance on Louisville. Nevertheless, Sherman's paranoia was at fever pitch and, feeling cut off and doomed, he implored Grant to rattle the gates of Columbus and relieve the pressure on central Kentucky.

The Cairo commander offered to cooperate with Smith in an effort to aid

Sherman, even though his forces were already dangerously dispersed, his manpower resources low, and his men ill-armed. "If you have any plan to propose I am ready to cooperate to the extent of my limited means," Grant informed the Paducah commander, adding that he could provide up to 5000 troops for the campaign. As usual, however, department headquarters refused to endorse the proposal.^’ But by this time. Grant had already forfeited nearly all hope of leading an advance on Columbus anytime soon, bemoaning that "the fates seem to be against any such thing." In his own defense,

79 however, he offered the weakened condition of his command as the primary reason "for my not being in Columbus to-day instead of where I am." Excuses aside, with Hardee gone, Thompson on the ropes, and Polk idle. Grant's desire to seize the initiative still burned. "What I want," he proclaimed, "is to advance.

In spite of the dismal outlook for a Union advance down the Mississippi, after learning on October 25 that Johnston had gone east to inspect the defenses at

Cumberland Gap, Grant's offensive zeal flared again. Combined with intelligence showing that only ten to fifteen thousand troops remained in Columbus, Grant discerned an emerging pattern in Confederate behavior, specifically, the tendency to weaken the left flank on the Mississippi to shore up the center and the right at Bowling Green and

Cumberland Gap.^^ Convinced now more than ever that the Confederates in Columbus had neither the will nor the manpower for an offensive campaign. Grant once again lobbied headquarters for permission to advance. "Such [drafts] have been made upon the force at Columbus for the Green River country [central Kentucky] and possibly other parts of Kentucky," Grant told Fremont, "that if Genl Smith and my command were prepared [Columbus] might now be taken." Although Grant then promptly retreated from his proposal, citing inadequate supplies, arms, and transportation as the chief impediments to success, he had put Fremont on notice that an opportunity was at hand, and only headquarters could provide the logistical support required to capitalize on it.

Had Fremont authorized an advance that day, the Cairo commander would undoubtedly have overlooked these complaints and forged ahead. But this request, like those before it, elicited no response from Western Department headquarters.^'^

By the end of October, a certain view of the military situation in southeast

Missouri and Kentucky had taken shape in Grant's mind. First, Grant believed that

Thompson represented only a minimal threat after his thrashing at Fredericktown and that the Swamp Fox had put considerable distance between himself and Union forces in

80 the region. The Cairo commander also knew that Hardee's forces had been transferred from northern Arkansas to central Kentucky. Only Belmont and New Madrid remained as symbols of Confederate authority in southeast Missouri.

As for western Kentucky, Grant's assessment centered on his fundamental belief that Columbus had suffered serious manpower losses to Buckner’s command that, in turn, had sapped what little enthusiasm the Bishop General had for any offensive ventures. In essence, the ever-cautious Polk waited for the Fédérais to dash themselves against the rocks of his Gibraltar and spent his time and resources preparing for that event. The first evidence that Grant leaned toward this perception came on September 9 when he interpreted Polk's General Order No. 19 as a defensive manifesto. Whether prescience or wishful thinking on Grant’s part, the resulting picture of a defensive-minded foe persisted and became a common denominator in later intelligence analyses. Thus, the more Grant assumed that Polk had eschewed the offensive option, the more this judgment shaped his on-going assessment of the overall situation. Using an earlier example, when he learned on October 6 of the supposed Confederate advance on Paducah, Grant held firm to his impression that the enemy had no such designs. Despite having information that contradicted this view, he maintained that "My beleif [sic] is that the attack will not be made for the present," an opinion based on little more than his own intuition.^^ When he heard on another occasion that Johnston had occupied Belmont with a large force, he again deferred to this perception, despite possessing "no reliable intelligence" to support it.^^ Napoleon once commented that "In war everything is perception" but warned against "making pictures," or fixating upon a certain view of the enemy. In this case, however. Grant's perception o f the enemy's intentions, originating in September and buttressed by the bulk of his intelligence, proved correct. By early November, detaching troops from Columbus had become anathema to Polk, who warned of "the serious consequences" resulting from such a policy. More importantly, the Bishop General was

8 1 thinking only in terms of defense, just as Grant had predicted. Until Fremont authorized an attack on Columbus, however. Grant’s optimistic assessments mattered little.^^

On November 1 Fremont surprised the Cairo commander with orders to make demonstrations toward Charleston and Norfolk, Missouri and Blandville, Kentucky, although the instructions were silent on the purpose behind the operation. Urging him to keep in constant motion before these towns, Fremont wanted Grant to occupy the enemy's attention but specifically forbade him from attacking any point. In conjunction with these demonstrations. Smith received instructions to move columns toward Columbus in a menacing fashion but was also prohibited from seriously engaging the enemy "without special orders." Unlike Grant's directive, however. Smith's orders explained the rationale behind the saber-rattling on both sides of the river. Reflecting Fremont's fixation on western Missouri, the combined movement was designed to "occupy the enemy in the

Mississippi Valley" in case Polk attempted to reinforce Price.

The next day, however, Fremont assigned Grant with an additional task.

Thompson had supposedly resurfaced near the St. Francis River, sixty-two miles southwest of Cairo, and Fremont instructed the Cairo commander to drive him into

Arkansas. Even though Grant viewed the "Swamp Fox," still stinging from the beating he took on October 21, as a minor threat, he nevertheless dispatched Oglesby with 4000 men and Plummer with another 3000 in pursuit. Instead of merely pushing these forces out of the state, as per Fremont's orders, he instructed Oglesby to locate and "destroy"

Thompson’s command.With these columns underway. Grant returned to his preparations for the upcoming demonstration.

On November 5, however. Grant indicated that he had more in mind than a mere demonstration. On that day he informed Smith of his intention to "menace Belmont," a position well south of the objectives stipulated in Fremont's November 1 directive. The

82 next evening two Union brigades, nearly 3000 men, boarded transports at Cairo, steamed downriver, dropped anchor along the Kentucky shore a few miles above Columbus and, under the watchful eyes of the gunboats, waited silently for the dawn.^®

Early on November 7, Grant's men disembarked three miles above Belmont and began their march toward the Confederate camp. Occupied by one infantry regiment, a battalion of cavalry and an artillery battery and commanded by Colonel James C.

Tappan, Camp Johnston came alive at the news of the Fédérais' approach. When word of the attack reached Polk's headquarters, however, the Confederate commander convinced himself that the ruckus on the opposite shore was merely a diversion masking an assault upon Columbus. Until he determined otherwise, Polk decided to keep his troops concentrated on the Kentucky side. He did send four of Pillow's Tennessee regiments, about 2500 men, across to support Tappan. These troops had received the order to reinforce Camp Johnston just as they were departing Columbus for Clarksville,

Tennessee. In a move to strengthen the defenses further east, Johnston had ordered

Pillow's entire division (5000 men) to northern Tennessee, causing a further drain on the ranks in Columbus. The gunfire across the river interrupted their journey and four regiments disembarked to meet the Unionists. The newly reinforced Belmont garrison, now totaling around 3000 men under Pillow's direct command, formed in time to meet the initial Federal assault at mid-morning.^’

After savage fighting between equally green volunteer armies, the Fédérais flanked the Southerners, forced them back through Camp Johnston, and threatened to drive them into the river. With victory in their grasp and exhilarated by their first combat, many of the pursuing Union soldiers ignored their officers' pleas and commenced looting the Southern encampment. In the interim. Pillow's men huddled along the river bank or fled upriver. Meanwhile, Smith's demonstration against Columbus had fallen far short of

Grant's expectations. The Fédérais prowling in the vicinity stymied Polk for awhile, but

83 when they failed to close on Columbus, he determined that Smith’s forces had aborted their attack on the fortress city and finally dispatched reinforcements to Pillow’s beleaguered command. Once on the west bank, the fresh troops under General Frank

Cheatham chased the Fédérais back to their transports waiting upriver. As the Fédérais cut their way out. Grant himself barely escaped capture. Under fire from the shoreline, the transports managed to slip away from shore and return to Cairo. The retreat from

Belmont resulted in the withdrawal of all Federal columns operating in southeast

Missouri and western Kentucky and ended the first major Union action in the region since the capture of Paducah.^-

After the battle Grant crowed about his "complete" victory and claimed that he had "accomplished all that we went for, and even more," somehow forgetting about his panic-stricken retreat that had left the enemy in possession of the field. His triumphant rhetoric failed to quell a storm of criticism that met him the moment he stepped off the

Belle Memphis in Cairo. ”[W]e have met the enemy and they are not ours," trumpeted one newspaper correspondent, echoing the sentiments of many in the North. Others berated the general for fighring a battle that had "cost many good lives and resulted in very little, or nothing." A soldier in Oglesby's command spoke for many when he stated simply that "Grant got whipped at Belmont.

Over time, historians joined this debate and raised serious questions concerning

Grant's actions that day. Ranging from commendatory to condemnatory, scholars have attempted to unravel the mysteries of Belmont and extract something meaningful from the sacrifice. While one author viewed the battle as a "folly" defying military logic because "It was so ludicrous and its outcome so disastrous," another declared that

Belmont illustrated "a few of the qualities which carried Grant to eventual victory" (i.e. initiative, aggressiveness, determination) and established him as a fighting general. One historian claimed that Grant's day at Belmont "was rounded out in such a way that gives it

84 a good place in military history." The author of the only monographic treatment of the battle asserted that Grant learned valuable lessons about command and leadership that day, noting that "He had done well; he would do better."^

At some point in their treatises these historians grappled with Grant's after-action reports containing the justifications and objectives behind the attack. On November 10

Grant sent Fremont the first brief account of the battle. Overall, he claimed that he attacked Belmont for two basic reasons. First, he wanted to prevent Polk from sending troops into Missouri to reinforce Price's army in the southwest. Second, he hoped to intercept an enemy force supposedly sent from Columbus to strike the columns under

Oglesby and Plummer hunting Thompson west of Belmont.For some unknown reason, however. Grant deemed this report unsatisfactory and later submitted a more detailed sketch, complete with official correspondence and certain insights absent from the original summary. The revised report, dated November 17, 1861 supplanted the earlier version and became the general's official rendition of the campaign. Consistent with the first report, he again stressed that preventing troops in Columbus from reinforcing Price and protecting his columns were the key motivations behind the attack. But unlike his earlier report, this time he explained how he arrived at these objectives and, ultimately, why he attacked Bel mont.

Regarding the reinforcements heading for Price, a movement that in reality never occurred. Grant stated that he first learned of it from a November 5 telegram from

Fremont, which he also claimed authorized him to proceed with the demonstration ordered on November 1. But Grant failed to provide a verbatim copy of this telegram, an unusual oversight considering its importance to his case. Not only has the telegram itself failed to materialize, neither Grant's headquarters correspondence nor Fremont's letterbooks contain any record of it. The absence of this key document and the lack of corroborating testimony affirming that Fremont's staff even sent the message or that

85 Grant received it leaves little doubt that the telegram never existed. On the other hand, even if the mysterious telegram had reached Grant, it is doubtful that he would have accepted it without question given his strong belief that Polk had neither the desire nor the manpower to support Price's operations.

In addition. Grant's pre-battle correspondence, particularly that in which he discussed his plans, contains no mention of this movement or that interrupting the western flow of reinforcements was a main reason for his attack. Not until the day after the battle—and in his second telegram to Fremont—did Grant refer to Price or to any efforts to reinforce him. In this dispatch. Grant provided an estimate of Federal casualties and the number of Confederate prisoners in his possession. He then told of how both he and McClemand had lost their horses to enemy fire. After this piece of trivia Grant noted, as an afterthought, that "Prisoners taken report that a large force [was] prepared to

. . . join Price." The attack on Belmont, he claimed, "will no doubt defeat this move."

Curiously, Grant did not seem to be in any hurry to relay the above news to Fremont who, given his fixation upon Price's army and the thrust of his alleged November 5 directive, would have wanted to know immediately about this ominous development. More importantly, however, is that nowhere in his correspondence—either before or immediately after the battle-did Grant indicate that the prevention o f this supposed movement had been the primary motivation behind his actions all along.

By nightfall of November 8, however, this post-battle discovery had somehow become a pre-engagement objective in Grant's account. In a letter to his father he stated for the first time that a primary goal behind the Belmont expedition was to prevent reinforcements from joining Price, but made no mention of any orders directing him to do so.^* But even though Grant had apparently stumbled upon this informationafter the battle, the news that he had indeed thwarted Price's reinforcement gave his attack, so far

8 6 devoid of any other tangible results, a much nobler purpose as well as the appearance of success. From then on. Grant let his post-Belmont revelation stand as an essential element in his decision to assail the outpost.

The origin of Grant's second stated objective, the protection of Oglesby's and

Plummer’s columns sent in pursuit of Thompson, appears dubious as well. On November

6 troops from Cairo boarded the transports and steamed downriver, stopping for the night along the Kentucky shore. According to Grant, at 2:00 a.m. the next morning a messenger from Colonel W. H. L. Wallace arrived in the general's cabin aboard the Belle

Memphis and relayed news from a "reliable Union man" in Charleston that Confederate troops had crossed to Belmont recently to hunt down the Union columns chasing

Thompson. "This move," wrote Grant in his official report, "seemed to me more than probable" and ultimately drove him "to attack vigorously at Belmont.Unfortunately, like the November 5 telegram, no other corroborative evidence has surfaced to verify the contents of the 2:00 a m. message or prove its existence.

Wallace's role as the purveyor of the information also casts doubt upon the validity of the Cairo commander's story on this point. Although Wallace and his troops were in Charleston that night, enroute to join Oglesby's column, his post-Belmont correspondence discredits his superior's version of his involvement in sending the message. On November 14 Wallace blasted Grant for engaging in such a foolish and costly engagement and rendered perhaps the most stinging indictment of his conduct. He maintained that Grant "had not the courage to refuse to fight" even though the

"advantages were all against him & any permanent or substantial good [was] an utter impossibility." "True [Belmont] demonstrated the courage and fighting qualities of our men," he continued, "but it cost too much." These statements appear odd coming from the officer who supposedly provided the information that initiated the very attack he now condemned. Moreover, Wallace gave no indication that he knew o f the alleged

87 Confederate move to Belmont or that he had transmitted this important news to his superior that night. In fact, had he known that Confederate troops were moving west from

Belmont, he neglected to impart this news even to Oglesby, the one officer who truly needed to know. Nevertheless, even if Wallace had supplied the information, the news would have had little impact. Grant had already determined to attack Belmont before the transports departed Cairo.

Finally, the fact that the November 5 telegram and the 2:00 a m. intelligence report first appeared in Grant's official report, which was not composed until May, 1864, and backdated to correspond with the battle, also makes them suspect. Written primarily by Rawlins and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Bowers, these staff officers relied upon memory and an assortment of documents to reconstruct what had transpired nearly three years earlier, thereby subjecting the report to the whims of clouded recollections, the absence of key actors (W.H.L. Wallace died in April, 1862), and interpretations tainted by hindsight. Judging from the harsh treatment Grant received for Belmont, the report was possibly an attempt by Grant's staff to settle the controversy and deflect any further criticism from their boss, now head of all Union armies, by offering a more detailed explanation. Unfortunately, in their attempt to set the record straight, his subordinates only confused the issue more by offering unsubstantiated evidence to demonstrate that their commander had exhibited wisdom and prudence, not insubordination. Perhaps

Grant scholar John Y. Simon offered the best advice on how to deal with the November 5 telegram and the 2:00 a m. intelligence report, as well as the justifications that supposedly emerged from them. "Recognizing their questionable origins," he cautioned,

"we can better understand the battle by ignoring both."^*

Following that advice remains unsatisfying, however, unless another explanation for his decision can be found. Put another way, if Grant's post-battle rationale for assaulting Belmont is discarded, why did he risk lives and his career on a venture that

8 8 had no perceivable purpose? Surely his desire to "bloody" his men cannot by itself account for his decision. Why, then, did U. S. Grant fight at Belmont? Consulting

Professor Simon on this question, he once again offers wise counsel: "The answer must be found in [Grant] himself, and no simple answer will do."^^

Factoring Grant's pre-battle perceptions into his decisionmaking calculus produces a compelling alternative to the general's explanation for the attack. As examined earlier, his interpretation of Confederate intentions, based upon a mixture of intelligence, assumptions, and intuition, had remained fundamentally unchanged since

September. Combined with other factors, this mental image probably influenced Grant's final decision and propelled him toward Belmont. On November 5 the Cairo commander outlined his plans for the upcoming operation and, in the process, revealed that he intended to do more than merely amuse the Columbus garrison with a pointless demonstration. Unaware that Smith was already under orders to demonstrate against

Columbus, Grant asked the Paducah commander to support his operations in Missouri by sending a reconnaissance-in-force toward the Confederate stronghold. Grant hoped

Smith's move would divert Polk's attention and prevent him from "throwing over the river much more force than they now have" at Belmont, thereby allowing the troops from

Cairo time "to drive those [forces] they now have [there] out of Missouri." To accomplish this part of the plan. Grant was assembling an expeditionary force to "menace

Belmont." Saying nothing about reinforcements heading for Price but recognizing the vulnerability of the contingent pursuing Thompson, Grant informed Smith that the primary objective of this dual movement was to "to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear o f those now out from this command.

The next day, however. Grant had changed his mind. Instead of protecting

Oglesby and Plummer, he moved toward diverting these troops for use in his operations against Belmont. Later that day, he went even further. The latest intelligence showing a

8 9 depletion of the Columbus garrison by transfers to central Kentucky combined with two

months of false alarms had vindicated Grant's long-held view that Polk had neither the

forces nor the desire to venture into Missouri. Seeing an opportunity to seize the

initiative along the Mississippi, Grant ordered W. H. L. Wallace to intercept Oglesby and

instruct him to break off his pursuit of Thompson (Plummer would continue the chase)

and turn southeast toward Confederate-held New Madrid, roughly 25 miles southwest of

Belmont. His instructions suggest that he expected the combined Oglesby-Wallace

column to be in the field for several days, perhaps anticipating extended operations

beyond the Belmont engagement. Once underway toward New Madrid, Grant told

Oglesby to contact him at Belmont, indicating that he intended to be in control of the

town by that time.

Thus, instead of mindlessly chasing Thompson, whom he saw as a minor threat

anyway, or exhausting his men marching about the countryside in harmless

demonstrations. Grant saw an opportunity to drive the enemy from southeast Missouri,

which both he and Fremont believed was a necessary prelude to a campaign against

Columbus. When Oglesby, after receiving his new orders from Wallace, boasted that his

command "could march to Memphis," he undoubtedly understood that Grant had in mind

more than mere saber-rattling.^^ Restless from months o f inactivity and perhaps fearing

that another chance might not come along. Grant forged ahead, believing the results

would justify the risks. Charles W. Wills, a soldier in Oglesby’s brigade, came close to

deciphering Grant's intentions:

"I think the Paducah forces were to take Columbus, Grant was going to swallow Belmont, we were to drive all the guerrillas before us to New Madrid, and then with Paducah forces and Grant's we were to take Madrid and probably go to Memphis or maybe join Fremont...

Grant's drive to seize or to make opportunities and, as one historian noted, his willingness to "try conclusions" would become hallmarks of his generalship.^^

90 Grant's attack on Belmont, therefore, constituted one phase of a larger plan to reclaim the western bank of the Mississippi River from Belmont to New Madrid for the

Union. Although Columbus had been his preferred goal all along, clearing the Missouri shore from Belmont to New Madrid also promised significant rewards without the attendant risks of an assault on Polk's fortifications. If successful, the movement might aid in turning the Columbus position, thus avoiding a costly attack into the teeth of its defenses. While pursuing this mission, however. Grant stretched Fremont's original directive and disobeyed the order prohibiting an attack. But this sort of behavior was nothing new for the district commander. Two months earlier Grant had seized Paducah without authorization, a move fraught with far more political and military risks than the assault on Camp Johnston.

The plan to capture Belmont and New Madrid and to drive the Southerners out of southeast Missouri had not originated with Grant. As early as September 5 Fremont had indicated his desire to expel Southern forces from southeastern Missouri, ordering Grant to capture Charleston, Sikeston, and Belmont and "follow the retreating Rebels to New

Madrid." In his grand offensive scheme announced three days later, Fremont declared that Grant's primary objectives were to control the west bank opposite Columbus and to capture New Madrid, thereby dislodging the enemy from the region, while forces from

Paducah flanked Columbus. Once this phase of the operation was complete, the department commander hoped to launch a combined attack on Columbus and Hickman as part of a drive down the Mississippi Valley toward Memphis. Although his fixation on southwestern Missouri checked the plan in mid-September, Fremont fully intended to

"move on Memphis" after defeatingPrice.Grant's actions on November 6-7 must be viewed within this context. He was not blindly moving downriver "looking for a fight" anywhere he could find it, but was essentially following a general course plotted by the

"Pathfinder" in early September. With Thompson on the run, Polk on the defensive, and

91 the Confederate leadership fixated on central Kentucky, Grant saw an opportunity. Thus, when Fremont ordered demonstrations on November I, the district commander set in motion the plan hatched in September in hopes of regaining the initiative in the

Mississippi Valley. Although these same orders forbade an attack, his desire to advance outweighed his fear of insubordination.

Grant's hunger for the initiative also factored in to events on November 7. He believed that when two opponents fielded armies of inexperienced volunteers, to delay an offensive for the sake of more drill and discipline gained nothing since the enemy would utilize the time for similar purposes. As a result, whichever side seized the initiative first ultimately gained the upper hand. And since the Union carried the burden of forcing open the Mississippi while the Confederates had only to hold their ground, an offensive, in Grant's mind, became a question of when, not if?^ From the day he assumed command at Cairo, the district commander waited anxiously for Fremont to unleash him.

Moreover, his intelligence-driven perception that the Confederates in Columbus posed only a minimal offensive threat heightened his awareness of the opportunity presented to him in early November. Regardless of whether this "picture" of the enemy situation drove his intense longing to advance or vice-versa, the decision to attack Belmont was undoubtedly bom of this relationship.^®

The assault on Belmont also made sense for other reasons. First, to Union officials, this enemy outpost represented a dangerous chink in the Federal armor in southeastern Missouri and eliminating it offered the surest way to neutralize a potential problem. Second, the Confederate troops occupying the camp also presented an inviting target for Grant, especially since a sizable expanse of water stood between the garrison and support from Columbus. Union intelligence had also shown that only a small force, typically no more than 3000 troops, occupied Belmont at any one time. By November 7, the odds were even better as Grant knew that Thompson, the last known occupant at

92 Camp Johnston, had evacuated the area. Third, in order for the New Madrid phase of the plan to succeed. Grant had to protect Oglesby's flank as he moved south toward his objective and assailing the Belmont garrison would attain that end. And, fourth, from the earlier Union occupation of Belmont and numerous reconnaissances in that direction, essentially dress-rehearsals for the real event, the district commander gained knowledge of the roads and terrain in the area. Although in the shadow of the Columbus guns,

Belmont remained a vulnerable and inviting target.*’

More importantly. Grant had also gleaned from his intelligence that the

Confederate high command had thinned the ranks in Columbus, leading him to conclude that Polk's main worry was ensuring the safety of Columbus. If threatened on both sides of the river, his ever-cautious adversary would probably remain behind his defenses, conserve his manpower, and leave Camp Johnston to its own fate, especially if the scuffle across the river only masked a main thrust against Columbus. In the final analysis, the odds were good that Polk would not risk the "Gibraltar of the West" to save a minor outpost, thereby allowing Grant's forces to seize the western bank with little interference from Kentucky. Although Polk did send troops to rescue Belmont, his initial hesitation showed that Grant's assumptions had merit.Finally, with Belmont and New Madrid in

Union hands, and with Smith threatening Polk on his Kentucky flank, the possibility remained that this combined offensive might turn Columbus and force its abandonment, a scenario that Grant had envisioned as early as September 12.

Contrary to the arguments that bad intelligence precipitated the Battle of

Belmont, Grant actually based his decision to assault the outpost on good intelligence tempered by a perceptive reading of the enemy's condition and intentions, as well as the likely behavior of Polk and Pillow. At Belmont, Grant was initiating the long-awaited campaign to open the Mississippi Valley in the hopes of winning the war before it became too costly. Thus, instead of a fruitless battle brought about by flawed

93 information, as some have argued, Belmont was actually a potentially profitable engagement bom of two months of intelligence work. Grant’s remarkable prescience, and his unflagging belief in the initiative as a decisive element in war.

94 NOTES

^USG to Mary Grant, September 11,1861, QE2: 237.

^Pillow to Polk, August 28,1861, QB.3; 686; USG to Julia, September 20,1861. GP 2: 289.

^Woodworth, Davis and His Generals. 52-53, 57-58; Jay Carlton Mullen, "The Turning of Columbus," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 64 (July 1966): 217-18; Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., The Battle of Belmont: Grant Strikes South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 36-38. Thomas L. Connelly claimed that Columbus was not as forbidding as others have argued, calling it a more of a trap than a bastion and asserting that the town provided "no additional security against a Union advance." What mattered, however, was that the Union high command, including Grant, believed the fortress was a substantial impediment to an advance downriver. See Thomas Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee. 1861 -1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 54-55; Hughes, Belmont. 37.

^Ibid., 82-83; Mullen, "Turning of Columbus," 218. On Thompson and Hardee, see Jay Monaghan, Swamp Fox of the Confederacy: The Life and Military Services of M. Jeff Thompson (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1957).

^Fremont to USG, August 28, 1861, OR 3: 141 -42; Fremont to Prentiss, August 28, 1861, GP 2: 151-52; Fremont to USG, September 5, 1861 Ibid., 191; USG to Fremont, September 4, 1861, Ibid., 186; USG to Fremont, September 10, 1861, QE 2: 224-25. See also Mullen, "Turning of Columbus," 218; Catton, Grant Moves South. 60; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 269.

^Catton, Grant Moves South. 39-40; Fremont to Abraham Lincoln, September 8, 1861, OR 3: 478.

^Castel, Sterling Price. 48-50; Catton, Grant Moves South. 59; Fremont to USG, September 10, 1861, GR 2: 224.

*For Oglesby's intelligence-gathering operations, see RG 393, entry 5502, boxes 13 and 14, NA.

%laslowski, "Military Intelligence Sources," 39-70; Fishel, "Myths," 27-58.

95 ’®For examples, see USG to Fremont, September 8, 1861, G£2; 209; USG to Fremont, September 10, 1861, Ibid., 224. See also Maslowski, "Military Intelligence Sources," 41-47; J. P. Sanderson to C apt J. B. Devoe, [n.d], RG 393, entry 2778, Letters Sent Relating to the Secret Service, NA.

( ^USG to Col. Richard J. Oglesby, September 13, 1861, GE 2; 252; USG to Col. Jacob G. Lauraan, September 21,1861, Ibid., 292; USG to Oglesby, September 21,1861, Ibid., 294.

'^Foote assumed command of the western flotilla on September 6, 1861. U.S. War Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, [henceforth ORN] 30 vols. (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1894-1922), 22: 307.

•^Hughes, Belmont 5; USG to Fremont September 21, 1861, GE 2:292; Donal J. Stanton, Goodwin F. Berquist and Paul C. Bowers, eds.. The Civil War Reminiscences of General M. Jeff Thompson (Dayton. Oh.: Momingside Press, 1988), 89.

•"^Maslowski, "Military Intelligence Sources," 49-50; Brig. Gen. Lew Wallace to Susan Wallace, October 13, 1861, Lew Wallace Collection, box 1, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Ind. [henceforth Lew Wallace Collection, IndHS].

*^For order of battle intelligence, see Lt. Col. Irving Heymont Combat Intelligence in Modem Warfare (Harrisburg, Pa., 1960), 111-116. For Grant's early use of interrogations and order of battle intelligence, see Conger, Rise of U.S. Grant 234-35.

^^Lt. S. Ledyard Phelps to Capt. Andrew H. Foote, September 10,1861, ORN 22: 324- 25; USG to Fremont, September 10, 1861, GE2: 225. l?For a Confederate view of the importance of Paducah, see Gen. Simon B. Buckner to Gen. Samuel Cooper, September 13,1861. OR 4: 189; USG to Fremont, September 10, 1861, GE 2:225.

^^General Orders No. 19, September 7, 1861. OR 3:699; USG to Fremont, September 8, 1861, GE 2: 210; USG to Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith, September 10, 1861, Ibid., 227-28.

^ ^Woodworth, Davis and His Generals, p. 30; Steven E. Woodworth, "The Indeterminate Quantities’: Jefferson Davis, Leonidas Polk, and the End of Kentucky Neutrality, September 1861." Civil War History 38 (December 1992): 289-97; Parks, Uonidas Polk, 181-85; Buckner to Cooper, September 13, I86I, ÛR3: 189; Col. W. H. L. Wallace to Anne Wallace, Wallace-Dickey Papers, box 2, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, 111. [henceforth ISHL].

96 ^^Quoted in George Winston Smith and Charles Judah, Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the Mexican War. 1846-1848 (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 440; USG to Jesse Grant, May 6,1861, QE 2:22; USG to Capt. Speed Butler, August 23, 1861, Ibid., 131; USG to Julia Grant, October 1, 1861, Ibid., 3: 10. Catton, Grant Moves South. 34; John Y. Simon, "Grant at Belmont," Military Affairs 45 (Dec. 1981): 164.

“*USG to Fremont, September 11, 1861, GE 2: 231-32; USG to Oglesby, September 13, 1861, Ibid., 235-36; USG to W. H. L. Wallace, September 13,1861, Ibid., 252-53: USG to Fremont, September 14,1861, Ibid., 258; Oglesby to USG, September 16,1861, Ibid., 252.

^“USG to Fremont, September 12, 1861, Ibid., 242. For strategic turning movements in the Civil War, see Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 14-17, passim, Fremont to Lincoln, September 8,1861, QK 3: 478.

^^USG to Fremont, September 15,1861, GE2: 262.

^'^USG to Fremont, September 9, 1861, Ibid., 216; USG to Fremont, September 15, 1861, Ibid., 262-63; USG to Capt, Parmenas T. Tumley, September 18, 1861, Ibid., 282-83.

-^USG to Fremont, September 16, 1861, Ibid., 269-70. "Mr. L." probably refered to John Lellyett, a resident of Nashville and political crony of Andrew Johnson who spied for the Union army in Kentucky from 1861 to 1862. Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins, eds. The Papers of Andrew Johnson 11 vols, to date (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976- ), 4:63. [henceforth Johnson Papers] See also USG to John Lellyet, January 11, 1862, GE 4: 34-35; Special Orders No. 149, September 10, 1861, Π4:405.

^^USG to Fremont, September 16, 1861, GE 2:269-70.

-^USG to Fremont, September 17, 1861, Ibid., 273-74; USG to Fremont, September 20, 1861, Ibid., 286-87.

^^Polk to Davis, September 14, 1861, QR4; 191; Hughes and Stonesifer, Pillow. 95; Christopher Losson, Tennessee’s Forgotten Warriors: Frank Cheatham and His Confederate Division (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 33; Lt. F. R. R. Smith to Col. Adolphus Heiman, September 25, 1861, QR4: 428; Polk to Cooper, September 14, 1861, Ibid., 191.

^^Woodworth, Davis and His Generals. 52-53; Parks, Leonidas Polk. 187-88; Gen. Albert S. Johnston, September 16,1861, QE. 4:194; Connelly, Army of the Heartland. 64-68.

^ ^ S G to Fremont, September 23, 1861, GE 2: 300-301; USG to Oglesby, September 23, 1861, Ibid., 304.

97 Oglesby to USG, September 24, 1861, Ibid., 304; USG to Fremont, September 26, 1861, Ibid., 314; Oglesby to USG, September 26, 1861, Ibid., 315-16.

^^Castel, Sterling Price. 48-56.

^^Catton, Grant Moves South, p. 70; Fremont, "Command in Missouri," B & L 1; 286-87; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:269-70; Rolle, John Charles Fremont. 201-203. See also Col. Joseph H. Eaton to unknown, October 8,1861, RG 393, entry 5500, vol. 7, NA.

^^Capt. Chauncey McKeever to USG, September 26, 1816, QR3; 507; Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 162-63. Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik offers a more sympathetic rendering of the "Pathfinder’s" tenure in Missouri. See "Fremont and the Western Department," Missouri Historical Review 82 (July 1988): 359-67.

^^USG to Julia Grant, September 25, 1861, QE. 2:311.

^^USG to Julia Grant, September 22, Ibid., 300; Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 162-63.

^^Fremont to USG, September 28, 1861, QR 2: 507-508; USG to McKeever, September 29, 1861, GE 2: 321; USG to McKeever, October 1, 1861, Ibid., 3: 4; USG to Col. Joseph B. Plummer, October 3, 1861, Ibid., 14.

•’^USG to Plummer, September 30, 1861, Ibid., 2: 329-30; Smith to McKeever, October 1, 1861, OR 3: 510; USG to McKeever, October 1, 1861, QE 3:4; USG to McKeever, October 4,1861, Ibid., 17.

^%fcKeever to USG, October 6, 1861, Ibid., 18; USG to McKeever, October 6, 1861, Ibid., 19; USG to Julia Grant, October 6, 1861, Ibid., 23.

"^®Brown passed through W. H. L. Wallace's command at Bird's Point. See Hi 1 Iyer to Wallace [Pass from Grant for Johnston Brown], October 6, 1861, Wallace-Dickey Papers, box 2, ISHL. See also Fremont to Col. B. Gratz Brown, July 31,1861 and Pass for "J. E. Brown," July 31, 1861, RG 393, entry 5500, vol. 7, NA: USG to McKeever, October 6, 1861, GE 3: 19.

Smith to USG, October 6, 1861, Ibid., 25; Lew Wallace to Susan Wallace, October 27, 1861, Lew Wallace Collection, box 1, IndHS.

"^^USG to McKeever, October 7,1861, GE 3:24. The same dispatch contained a rumor that the Columbus garrison had been reinforced to 45,000 (a serious overestimate) that may have convinced Grant even more that Polk was preparing an impregnable defense.

98 '^^Conger, Rise of U.S. Grant 79; Thompson to Col. Aden Lowe, September 30, 1861, OK 3:712.

"*^Wills, Army Life. 36; Oglesby to USG, October 2,1861,0E 3: 12; USG to McKeever, October 4, 1861, Ibid., 16.

^^Thompson to Lowe, October 3, 1861, QR3; 713; Thompson to Col. James A. Walker, October 7, 1861, Ibid., 714; Thompson to Johnston, October 8, 1861, Ibid., 53: 748; USG to McKeever, October 11,1861, QE. 3: 33.

"^^Thompson to Johnston, October 11,1861, QK 3; 224; Thompston to Johnston, October 18, 1861, Ibid., 225-26.

'^^USG to McKeever, October 18, 1861, GE 3: 54; USG to Plummer, October 18, 1861. Ibid., 56-57. For Thompson's version of Fredericktown, see Stanton et al., eds., ReminscencesofM. Jeff Thompson. 106-117; USG to C. Carroll Marsh, November 5, 1861, GE3: 116.

"*®Hardee to Johnston, September 18, 1861, QR 3: 703; Buckner to Col. W. W. Mackall, October 11,1861, Ibid., 4:444; Johnston to Cooper, October 13, 1861, Ibid., 3: 445; Hughes, Hatdeg. 81-82.

"^^cKeever to USG, September 28, 1861, QR 3: 508; Marsh to Rawlins, September 29, 1861, GE 2:322.

^%rig. Gen. William T. Sherman to USG, October 16, 1861, Ibid., 3:43; USG to McKeever, October 17, 1861, Ibid., 47; USG to McKeever, October 18, 1861, Ibid., 54- 55; USG to Plummer, October 18, 1861, Ibid., 56-57. See also John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order INew York: The Free Press, 1993), 157-63.

^^USG to McKeever, October 16,1861, G E 3:42; USG to Smith, October 16,1861, Ibid., 43.

52uSG to Julia Grant, October 20, 1861, Ibid., 63-64. At about this time Grant dismissed another report of Confederates crossing to Belmont, claiming that they were only harvesting com for Polk's commissary. See USG to McKeever, October 17,1861, Ibid., 47; Report of Commander William D. Porter, November 15, 1861, ORN 22:430.

^^Smith to USG, October 25, 1861, GE 3: 72. Smith also reported that several thousand troops had been transferred to Union City, Tennessee and Feliciana, the location of Camp Beauregard. Smith to McKeever, October 1,1861, QR3: 510. Polk had 17,230 men at Columbus. See Returns for First Division, Western Department for October, 1861, Ibid., 730.

99 to McKeever, October 27, 1861, QE. 3; 78; Catton, Grant Moves South. 60.

^^USG to McKeever, October 7, 1861, GE 3; 25; USG to McKeever, October 9, 1861, Ibid., 30.

^^USG to McKeever, October 6, 1861, Ibid., 18; USG to McKeever, October 6, 1861, Ibid., 19.

^^Jay Luvaas, "Napoleon and the Art of Command," Parameters 15 ( 1985): 35. Polk was responding to Johnston’s order sending Pillow’s five thousand man division to Clarksville. See Polk to Johnston, November 4,1861, QR.4: 513.

^^McKeever to USG, November 1,1861, GE 3 : 143-44; McKeever to Smith, November 1, 1861,ÛR3: 300-301.

^^cK eever to USG, November 2, 1861, GE 3: 144; USG to Oglesby, November 3, 1861, Ibid., 108-109; USG to Plummer, November 4,1861, Ibid., 111-12.

^^SG to Smith, November 5,1861, Ibid., 114. For a description of Grant's preparations and his descent toward Belmont, see Hughes, Belmont. 48-55, 78-84.

Catton, Grant Moves South. 75; Polk to Mackall, November 10, 1861, ÛR3: 306-308; Hughes, Belmont. 67-68, 71, 74-77, 184; Hughes and Stonesifer, Pillow. 196-99.

^-Hughes, Belmont 91-188; Hughes and Stonesifer, Pillow. 199-205; Polk to Mackall, November 10, 1861, QR 3: 306-308. Other treatments of the battle include James E. McGhee, "The Neophyte General: U.S. Grant and the Belmont Campaign," Missouri Historical Review 47 (July 1973): 465-83; and Henry I. Kurtz, "The Battle of Belmont," Civil War Times Illustrated 3 (June 1963): 18-24.

^^The Union suffered 120 killed, 383 wounded, and 104 missing of approximately 2500 engaged, while the Confederate casualties were 105 killed, 419 wounded, and 117 missing out of nearly 5000 engaged. Hughes, Belmont 184-85; J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), 119; Hughes, Belmont 207; Wills, Army Life. 43.

^Augustus W. Alexander. Grant as a Soldier (St. Louis, 1887), 41; Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 165-66; Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War 5 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1949-58), 3: 86; Hughes, Belmont. 207.

^^USG to Brig. Gen. Seth Williams, November 10,1861, GE3: 141.

6^USG to Williams, November 17,1861, Ibid., 143-49.

100 ^^USG to McKeever, November 8, 1861, Ibid., 133.

^*USG to Jesse Grant, November 8, 1861, Ibid., 136-38.

^ ^ S G to Williams, November 17, 1861, Ibid., 146; Hughes, Belmont 51; Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 165.

^^Wallace to Anne Wallace, November 14, 1861, Wallace-Dickey Papers, box 2, ISHL; Franklin D. Nickell made this point in "Grant's Lieutenants in the West, 1861-1863," (Ph.D. diss.. University of New Mexico, 1972), 293-94; Isabel Wallace, Life and Letters o f General W. H. L. Wallace (Chicago; R. R. Donnelly, 1909), 141. William S. McFeely argued that Grant "had already made the decision to attack when he left Cairo" and that he had "set out to fight... not to demonstrate." McFeely. Grant: A Biography HSIew York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1981), 92.

April 27,1864, Rawlins wrote that "Colonel Bowers and myself finished yesterday General Grant's report of the battle of Belmont" and commented that "it places that engagement in its true light for transmittal to posterity, so far as could be known on our side." Wilson, Rawlins. 425. See also, Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 165; Hughes, Belmont. 46-47, 51-52.

^“Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 165. See also Simon’s analysis o f Grant's official report in ÛE3: 152.

^^USG to Smith, November 5, 1861, Ibid., 114.

^"^USG to Oglesby, November 6, 1861, Ibid., 123; Oglesby to USG, November 7, 1861, Ibid., 124; Wallace to Arme Wallace, November 6, 1861, Wallace-Dickey Papers, box 2, ISHL.

^^Oglesby to USG, November 7, 1861, G£ 3: 124. Other historians have supported this interpretation. See, in particular, Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 163-64; Conger, Rise of U.S. Grant. 372.

76wills. Army Life. 42-43.

^^This observation by G. F. R. Henderson is quoted in Williams, Lincoln Finds a General. 3: 74.

^^Fremont to USG, September 5, 1861, GE 2: 191; Fremont to Lincoln, September 8, 1861, QB.3:478-79; Fremont to USG, September 9,1861, G E 2: 216. See also, Fremont to USG, September 10,1861, OR 3 : 484; Catton, Grant Moves South, 39-40; Fremont, "Command in Missouri," 287.

101 ^^Wilson, Rawlins. 439.

*®Several Navy officers, including Foote and Porter, also pressured Grant to advance on Columbus. See Report of Porter, November 15, 1861. ORN 22:430; Foote to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, November 7,1861, Ibid., 396-97.

Catton, Grant Moves South, 70-71; Simon, "Grant at Belmont," 165; Hughes, Belmont. 53, 83; Conger, Rise of U. S. Grant 372. Union troops occupied Belmont in early September. See USG to Col. Gustav Waagner, September 3, 1861, GE 2: 178.

^^McGhee, "Neophyte General," 471; Catton, Grant Moves South. 74.

102 CHAPTER 4

ON THE TWIN RIVERS: FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON

Reflecting upon the Belmont battle several days later. Grant noted optimistically that "The lesson, though severe, will be of great advantage to the entire command." ' His untried forces had met the enemy on his own ground and had, he believed, won a substantial victory. His troops had "seen the elephant" and would be better for it. In addition. Grant had learned to trust his intuition and gained experience at turning information into action. Moreover, the Belmont expedition had whetted his appetite to attack Columbus and to begin wresting the Mississippi River from the Confederacy's grasp. To prepare for this task. Grant focused his intelligence resources to monitor Polk's activities in Columbus and northwestern Kentucky. But his fixation on capturing the fortress, a key element in his thinking since the day he arrived at Cairo, would not last.

In a few months his attention would shift toward the forts under construction on the

Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, but not until intelligence and the strategic advantages of such a move pointed him in that direction. During the interim. Grant welcomed a new department commander, watched his command responsibilities expand, and continued the construction of an intelligence system at his Cairo headquarters aimed squarely at the Confederate "Gibraltar."

The more time elapsed after Belmont the more magnified the supposed victory became in Grant's mind. The battle, he wrote, "proves to have been a greater success than... first thought." The fight had emboldened Union forces while the Confederates

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Map 3 downriver worked tirelessly to strengthen their works because, according to Grant, "the greatest consternation has prevailed... lest Columbus should be attacked." Even though Polk had sallied forth from his bastion and driven Union forces from Belmont, that experience failed to dampen the Grant's enthusiasm for an advance on Columbus.

Hinting at the need to assume the offensive before the fruits of his recent "victory" spoiled. Grant argued that, if left alone, the Confederates, "may be induced to act on the offensive if more troops are not sent here soon." Reminiscent of his pre-Belmont calls for more manpower to initiate offensive operations. Grant clearly had no intention of leaving Polk alone. For now, Columbus still held the key to unlocking the Mississippi.^

To realize his goal. Grant doubled his efforts to gather intelligence on the

Columbus garrison. Moreover, a dramatic change in the military situation in southeastern Missouri also helped focus his attention upon the fortress. Prior to the battle, and usually in response to reports of enemy activity aimed at Missouri, Grant had ordered numerous infantry and cavalry reconnaissance patrols down both sides of the river. He also sent Foote's gunboats within range of the Confederate river batteries. During the remainder of 1861, however, the Cairo commander's concerns over the security of southeast Missouri had all but dissipated. The decreased interest was due in large part to the dwindling military threat posed by Jeff Thompson's forces. Although the Swamp Fox remained as elusive as ever, toward the end of 1861 desertions and men refusing to re- enlist had so eroded the strength of his command (a fact duly noted by Grant) that by

December he possessed but a handful of loyal followers described as "a wretched, ragged, dispirited looking set of men."^ Moreover, between mid-November and January,

1862 only a single rumor of an impending attack upon Bird's Point reached Cairo. Grant responded with the typical reconnaissance to the Belmont area and, as usual, it found nothing. Thus, land-based reconnaissances along the western bank decreased considerably, although the gunboats continued plying the waters flowing past the

105 Southern stronghold. These factors, along with Polk’s perceived unwillingness to venture

far from his works, allowed Grant to turn his attention almost exclusively toward

Columbus.’^

No one staff officer bore the responsibility for assigning scouring missions,

questioning refugees and deserters, completing maps, or dispatching spies into enemy

territory at Grant’s behest. Nor are there any orders spelling out these duties or who

would oversee them. Although Grant retained his own counsel when it came to analyzing and using intelligence. Colonel Joseph D. Webster and Captain William S. Hillyer

probably shared the duty of coordinating secret service operations, specifically the

collection process. A member of the Topographical Corps with service during the

Mexican War, Webster acted as Grant’s chief engineer and chief of staff. With his

knowledge of terrain, mapmaking and experience with distilling raw data into useable

form, Webster accompanied reconnaissance patrols and actively pursued information on

Confederate positions. Hillyer, Grant's aide and later provost marshal for the District of

West Tennessee, apparently had responsibility for sending operatives behind enemy

lines.^ Admiral Foote also had his headquarters at Cairo and shared with Grant the results of water-borne reconnaissance activity down the Mississippi, Cumberland, and

Tennessee rivers.

With additional information transmitted by his subordinate commanders at places like Bird’s Point and Fort Holt, Grant, by years’ end, had established a workable system of information that allowed him to penetrate the veil surrounding Columbus and its environs. Within one three week period, for example. Grant heard from a range of sources, including a "Mrs. Johnson," a refugee from Memphis, two Confederate deserters, and four spies on duty in Columbus, all of whom provided insights into conditions in Columbus. One man in Grant’s employ even spent a week within Polk’s fortifications covertly completing a map of the fortress, which Grant claimed "to be as

106 accurate as it is possible to get it before it falls into our possession."^ The Cairo commander revealed the confidence he had in his intelligence ability when he boasted to

Hal leek in early December that he now possessed "full means of keeping posted as to what is going on South of this point" and promised to keep his department commander

"fully informed."^ With information from various sources coming in on a regular basis, the faith he had in that system was well placed.

While Grant strained to learn more about Columbus, he also faced a drastically altered command system in the Western theater that would eventually create problems for the coordination of future Union movements, as well as for intelligence operations.

On November 19, Major General Henry Wager Halleck officially assumed command of the Department of the Missouri, a new administrative entity supplanting Fremont's defunct Western Department. An 1846 graduate of West Point, favorite student of

Mahan, and author of several books. Including an important textbook on military affairs,

Halleck brought to his St. Louis headquarters a lofty intellectual and military reputation that had earned him the sobriquet "Old Brains."® That he might be a skilled and dangerous adversary was not lost upon the Confederate high command. When word of

Hal leek's appointment reached Richmond, Confederate President Jefferson Davis warned that "the Federal forces [in the West] are not hereafter, as heretofore, to be commanded by Pathfinders and holiday soldiers, but by men of military education and experience in war." With a command stretching across six states (Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota,

Wisconsin, Illinois, and Arkansas) and that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland

River, and enduring pressure from Washington to launch an offensive, Halleck had to surmount numerous financial, political, and logistical problems, many due to Fremont's inept management, in addition to dealing with the various threats posed by Confederate forces in Missouri and western Kentucky. By January, 1862 Halleck still suffered under

107 the weight o f the responsibility, complaining to President Abraham Lincoln that he felt like a carpenter forced to build a bridge using a "dull axe, a broken saw, and rotten timber."^

As the new department commander struggled to prepare his troops for active service, he also made arrangements to collect intelligence. Halleck retained the services of some o f Fremont's "Jessie Scouts" who had remained behind after the Pathfinder's departure. Foremost among these was the detachment's self-styled leader. Captain

Charles C. Carpenter. Neither a commissioned captain nor a permanent employee of the army. Carpenter was hired by Halleck on an ad hoc basis to scout for department headquarters. He also worked on occasion for Grant's subordinate. Brigadier General

John McClemand. In December and January, Carpenter made two trips to southeast

Missouri and western Kentucky, accompanied at times with another Jessie Scout, L. F.

Scott, to monitor road conditions and spy on the garrisons at New Madrid and Columbus

According to one of Halleck’s staff members. Carpenter was "admirably adapted for the dangerous services in which he engages," and possessed both "great shrewdness" and

"reckless courage."*®

Halleck undoubtedly employed other intelligence operatives at department headquarters (possibly former Fremont employees) for scouting and spying details, but unlike his predecessor, he relied upon his commanders in the field to collect their own information without burdening them with unconfirmed rumors circulating in far-off St.

Louis. Given the unreliability and slow pace of communications, however, especially in areas beyond the reach of telegraph wires, and the distances involved in the Western theater, operational intelligence-gathering was best left to individual commanders who could at least approximate real-time communication. * *

After assuming command, Halleck reorganized the districts within the department. To accommodate the extension of his command into western Kentucky, in

108 late December, Halleck extended Grant's district to include that part of the Bluegrass

State west of the Cumberland River, renaming it the District of Cairo. Added to his

enlarged command was the important Union outpost at Paducah. Fortunately, the Cairo

commander had already established a working relationship with Smith, the post

commander, that included the sharing of information. Between Belmont and Forts Heniy

and Donelson, Grant concentrated upon Columbus while Smith sent gunboats up the

Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to spy on the progress of the forts under construction

astride those crucial arteries. The intelligence relationship forged before Belmont

between these two officers would play a key role in fostering the shift of Union

operations from the Mississippi to the Tennessee.

Unfortunately, the divided—and divisive— nature of the Union command system

in the West would prove detrimental to Grant's access to intelligence, especially during

the Henry-Donelson campaign. Halleck's department stretched into Kentucky as far as

the Cumberland River (Grant's district). East of the Cumberland was the province of

Major General Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Department of the Ohio, which

encompassed Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee (although still in Confederate hands

and as yet undivided), and the rest of Kentucky not in Halleck's domain. Headquartered

at Louisville, Buell's forces faced Confederate opposition in eastern Tennessee and a

large army under Albert Sidney Johnston at Bowling Green, Kentucky. As for Forts

Henry and Donelson, both in northwestern Tennessee, neither Halleck nor Buell knew

under whose authority these positions fell. The boundary between the Missouri and

Ohio departments, running along the Cumberland River, would also create problems.

Both Halleck and Buell jealously eyed each other across the river and lobbied

Washington for resources and for overall command of the Western theater. Buell had the ear of the commander of all Union armies. Major General George B. McClellan, and

109 their friendship further stirred already troubled waters. These conditions effectively

hamstrung the coordination of offensive maneuvers and hampered the timely

transmission of strategic intelligence between the two departments.

Confederate intelligence operations also posed a serious threat to the Union cause

in the West. While Grant could feel confident that he possessed the means to gain

accurate information on his adversary, he could not feel as assured about his own

security. Believing that Cairo was "one of the most exposed Posts, in the Army," Grant

attempted to limit the number of people passing through his lines to the south. On

November 20, he issued an order prohibiting citizens coming from Missouri or Kentucky

from passing through Cairo without written authorization. The only exceptions were

people "of known loyalty" and those who "do not expect to return South again." Any other suspicious characters found roaming Union camps would be arrested as spies.

Aware of the potential for serious information hemorrhages in his extended and exposed command, the district commander initiated more preemptive measures.

Exchanged Confederate prisoners posed a possible security problem as they passed through Grant's lines, unescorted, heading south. These men. Grant complained, kept the enemy "well informed of all [Union] movements." Other possible leaks were fugitive slaves entering Union lines. Halleck believed this class of people conveyed information to the enemy and therefore prohibited the admittance of any fugitive slaves within

Federal camps. He also enjoined his commanders to remember the "importance of preventing unauthorized persons of every description from entering and leaving our lines." Heeding this warning. Grant barred any persons not in Federal service from crossing his lines without a pass. In some instances, however, the nature of this civil war forced him to make allowances for "Northern men," including former Confederate soldiers, attempting to escape Southern control, even though he stood the chance of allowing an enemy agent into his midst. Thus, Grant had to strike a balance between

110 military security and aiding Unionists trying to escape Confederate persecution.

Believing that "it is better that ninety-nine guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer," Grant admitted that "we may be deceived at times."

These counterintelligence measures, including a ban on transmitting sensitive

intelligence over the telegraph, most likely had some impact on plugging information leaks. Regardless of the best efforts, however. Southern operatives still passed information out of Union lines. For example. Confederate General Daniel M. Frost, captured at Camp Jackson in May, 1861 and detained in St. Louis until his exchange, somehow managed to transmit intelligence to Pillow in Columbus regarding the strength and intentions of Union forces. In addition, although everyone coming through Federal lines needed a pass, these were apparently not hard to find. In the case of John D. Weld, arrested as a Confederate spy, a Union officer noted that Mr. Weld had a provost marshals pass, but then quipped "who has not?" Leaks in security troubled other Union commanders as well. Johnston somehow procured a copy of Buell's order of battle from the Union general's own books! As for Grant, he could take comfort that his counterintelligence efforts were reaping results; yet, he could only guess at how much he missed.

Despite the wrangling between Halleck and Buell and concerns about security.

Grant forged ahead in his efforts to gather information. On November 21, he learned from numerous "Northern men" who had entered Federal lines from Columbus since the battle the strength of Polk's forces. From these sources, he concluded that forty-seven regiments of infantry and cavalry, ten light artillery companies, and over one hundred heavy guns defended the town, while another eight thousand men occupied Camp

Beauregard, a Confederate outpost about twenty miles southeast of Columbus. Later in the month. Grant learned from reading the Memphis Appeal that the governor of

Mississippi had called for ten thousand volunteers to defend Columbus. These reports

111 showed Grant that the Confederates were expending great energy "to make Columbus

impregnable" and that reinforcements were flooding into the area. On December 8, he

heard from a man recently in Columbus who corroborated the earlier estimate of

regiments in Columbus and further supported Grant's belief that the Confederates had

"not the slightest intention of attacking Cairo" but, conversely, feared an impending

Federal attack. Altogether, his information indicated that Belmont had heightened Polk's

insecurity and added to Grant's belief that the battle had sown fear and doubt within

Southern civilian and military ranks.

Just as he had engendered fear in his adversary. Grant experienced some anxious

moments himself. Even though he had suffered no official rebukes for Belmont, the emptiness of that engagement (in the eyes of the public) and other concerns kept alive his

fear of losing command. "This is the most important command within the department," he wrote, "and will probably be given to the senior officer next to General Halleck himself." Although Grant soon felt more at ease, his anxiety was not misplaced, given

Halleck's attempts (unknown to Grant) to replace the Cairo commander with Major

General Ethan Allen Hitchcock. Regardless, Grant never felt entirely secure in his command and therefore believed it imperative to move on Columbus as soon as possible.

With every day o f inaction he risked forfeiting that opportunity.-®

In spite o f (or perhaps because of) this anxiety. Grant pursued information on

Columbus in hopes of uncovering an opportunity to either strike or turn the Confederates out of their stronghold. On December 11 he dispatched a cavalry patrol from Fort Holt to scout the Mayfield Creek area north of Columbus. The expedition's leader provided important topographical information as well as the observation that Polk's scouts had not ventured north o f the creek for over a month. Five days later "A Gentleman of

Charleston Mo ," brought startling news that four infantry regiments and three gunboats had departed to aid in the defense of New Orleans. On December 18 one of Grant's spies

112 and a Confederate naval deserter told of an even larger diminution of the Columbus garrison. Both testified that "a great many of the troops are gone," although six regiments remained in the vicinity, including three sent to reinforce Camp Beauregard, twenty miles to the southeast. "Something has taken place to call off so many of their troops," he concluded. Once again Grant saw welcome indications that Southern officials were continuing to drain Polk's strength.^ ^

Reports also arrived describing the conditions of the Columbus garrison. By mid-

December rumors circulated that the Confederates could only muster "boys, badly disciplined and drilled." Clothing, shoes, provisions, salt and other necessities were also reportedly lacking in Columbus. Shortages of all kinds posed serious problems for morale. According to one deserter, even though militia units from Tennessee,

Mississippi and Louisiana had come to buttress the defenses, want among the garrison and the new arrivals had sown discontent. "If salt can be kept out," Grant reasoned, perhaps with a double meaning, "they will have some difficulty saving theirb a co n .

With flagging morale and manpower reductions in Columbus, the district commander's enthusiasm for offensive operations soared.

On Christmas Eve Polk ordered 5000 troops stationed at Camp Beauregard to march for Bowling Green. By December 29 Grant knew of the evacuation and estimated that at least 7000 Confederates were enroute to central Kentucky. Moreover, one of his

Columbus spies (the same one who provided a detailed map of the fortifications) had learned that Polk was now sending away many of his best troops, and that only untrained

Southern militia units were on hand to replace them.-^ Polk had parted with these regiments very reluctantly, and only after Johnston had repeatedly demanded their transfer to Bowling Green. Unwilling to detach a single soldier, Polk claimed that to reduce his strength any more "would be to sacrifice this command and to throw open the

13 valley of the Mississippi." After Bowen's departure, the Bishop replaced his veterans with four regiments o f unruly and untested Mississippi militiamen that he claimed

"cannot be expected to be very effective.

As 1862 dawned, information continued to flow into Cairo headquarters as a result of Grant's intelligence system and his relationship with Smith. On January 3 the

Paducah commander sent Grant a detailed report from a spy who had taken extensive notes on the fortifications and armaments in Columbus and had even produced a rough sketch of the fortress. Moreover, the spy reported that on December 29 two more regiments had departed for Bowling Green and that Pillow had resigned. Three days after Smith's correspondence. Grant learned that the Columbus garrison was "now reduced from what it was a few weeks ago," due to the dispatch of the Mississippi militia regiments to Camp Beauregard, leaving a force of "probably thirty regiments" in the town. In addition, he confirmed the report that Pillow had indeed resigned and returned home. Accordingly, if only thirty regiments remained in Columbus out of forty-seven previously reported, then seventeen regiments had departed the fortress since mid-

November.*^

Although the Cairo commander provided no estimate of Polk's remaining force size, both Halleck and Buell had estimated his strength at between twenty and twenty- two thousand and Grant probably had a similar appraisal.Regardless, the departure of so many regiments represented a substantial weakening of Polk's position. Again, Grant found himself, just as he had before Belmont, facing an enemy weakened by detachments and reluctant to go on the offensive, and nagging fears of losing his command.

Moreover, his troops were anxious to test Polk. "We really want a turn with them at

Columbus," remarked on Wisconsin soldier. With these factors in mind, the district commander requested permission to meet with Halleck and discuss "business connected with this command."-^ That Grant was going to department headquarters to ask

114 permission to move against Forts Henry and Donelson, as he claimed in his memoirs, remains highly doubtful since his total focus since November had been on Columbus, not on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. In fact, before January, Grant paid little attention to the forts, concentrating instead upon his own district and the Confederate

Gibraltar. Regardless of his motivation, however, the answer came in the form of orders from Halleck calling for a demonstration in western Kentucky led by the forces from

Cairo. Grant willingly postponed his trip to St. Louis for a welcome jaunt into the

Bluegrass State.^*

On January 3, 1862 General-in-Chief McClellan ordered Halleck to send forces into western Kentucky to distract the Confederates at Columbus, Camp Beauregard and those along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers and prevent them from "moving to the support of the force in front of General Buell." Essentially a diversion in Buell’s favor,

Halleck chafed at playing second fiddle. McClellan instructed Halleck to send an expedition up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to freeze troops at Dover (Fort

Donelson), Fort Henry, and Clarksville. Meanwhile, another force would demonstrate against Columbus to prevent the dispatch of troops from that place to aid Johnston. If a large number had already departed the fortress, advised McClellan, "the place should be taken.

Although reluctant to execute this order, complaining that those in Washington were ignorant of the difficulties he faced and that it would be "madness" to make a serious advance on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, Halleck issued orders for Grant to initiate the demonstration. However, the instructions the Cairo commander received differed in important ways from McClellan's directive to Halleck. The Missouri department head ordered Grant to march in force against Mayfield and Murray east of

Columbus "letting it be understood that Dover [Fort Donelson] is the object of your attack. " Noting that the real intention was to prevent the dispatch o f troops to Bowling

115 Green, Halleck advised his subordinate purposefully to deceive his own men, as well as the enemy, as to his purpose. "Make a great fuss about moving all your forces toward

Nashville," he wrote, "and let it be so reported by the newspapers." Probably wary of

Grant's tendency to stretch orders, Halleck cautioned him against engaging the enemy in a serious right because "we are not ready." Moreover, nowhere did Halleck allude to

McClellan's comment on taking Columbus if the garrison had been sufficiently reduced.^*^

Grant immediately formulated plans for the advance. He first requested a sketch of the Columbus defenses, left recently at McClemand's headquarters, be sent to his headquarters for inclusion in an "information map" being prepared by Webster, his chief engineer and topographer. "I am anxious to have the map... completed as early as possible," he told McClemand. He then Issued the appropriate orders to his post commanders taking part in the expedition. He ordered Smith's Paducah forces to march on Mayfield, where they would be joined by cavalry from Cairo, then move to threaten

Camp Beauregard and Murray, all the while feigning that Dover (Fort Donelson) was their ultimate objective and that his troops comprised only the van of a larger force aimed at Nashville. Grant also advised Smith to dispatch a gunboat up the Tennessee river "to add to the deception." As for McClemand's Cairo troops, he had issued no instructions since, he explained to Halleck, "I will be along and may have to vary from any plan that could now be drawn up." Thus, in what was becoming his trademark. Grant hoped to adapt to the situation and respond to events—and opportunities—as they arose.

According to McClemand, however. Grant did provide some guidance regarding the purpose o f their mission, but it apparently had little to do with feigning an advance toward the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. In fact, McClemand believed his aim was to create doubt as to whether he planned to attack Columbus, move on Camp Beauregard, or cut the Mobile & Ohio Railroad line south of town. Overall, wrote McClemand, his

116 basic mission was to "awaken apprehension for the safety o f each."^^ A demonstration

such as this would not only prevent reinforcements from leaving Columbus for the east,

but would also allow Grant an opportunity to enhance Polk's insecurity. Moreover, the

movement would provide an opportunity to observe Polk's reaction to these threats and

possibly force him to venture out of his works to challenge the Union advance on ground

chosen by Grant.

The demonstration began on January 10 and ended eleven days later. Grant

discovered important information during this operation that he utilized in planning his

next move. On January 12 he learned from two different sources that seven more

regiments had recently departed for Bowling Green. As a result. Grant believed that "the

Garrison of Columbus is now weaker than it has been for several months" and that some

of Polk's best troops were among those sent away. The same day a cavalry patrol

dispatched by McClemand toward Columbus also confirmed that Confederate

reinforcements had gone to Bowling Green from the Mississippi position. Given Grant's

fixation upon Columbus and his distaste for empty demonstrations, his dispatch to

Halleck, which contained the above information, was perhaps intended to nudge the

department commander into seizing this opportunity. In his official report McClemand

noted that, at the time, few obstacles impeded an advance upon the stronghold from

several directions, while Mayfield Creek offered a fine defensive position for Union

forces in case of repulse. In fact while his men camped within only a few miles of Polk's

defenses, McClemand claimed that "a favorable time was thus afforded for successful

attack and the capture of Columbus.

The January demonstration benefited Grant in other ways that would prove

advantageous for an advance on Columbus. The district commander personally

reconnoitered Mayfield Creek and the roads to the south toward the Mississippi River. In all. Grant rode over thirty miles familiarizing himself with the terrain and road system

117 and, including the operations of McClemand's troops, surveyed the countryside from

Puntney's Bend, north of Columbus, to the Memphis & Ohio Railroad south of the town.

From his journeys. Grant commented on the poor road conditions in the vicinity and, more importantly, noted the curious lack of opposition to his probes. In fact, even though

McClemand's column had edged to within a mile and a half of Columbus, the

Confederates remained idle. Describing the demonstration as a "splendid reconnaissance of the country over which my army may have to move," the Cairo commander had not only gained first-hand knowledge of the probable area of operations, he also confirmed his earlier estimation of Leonidas Polk, who stayed behind his works even though Union forces came within sight of his defenses.

Prior to January 20, Grant had proclaimed the January excursion a success even before Smith's eastem column had reported in with the results of the demonstration along the Tennessee river. This oversight indicates once again his fixation upon Columbus— not Forts Henry and Donelson—as the probable target of future operations. In fact Grant's mere presence with McClemand's column instead o f with the Paducah forces, which had advanced to within three miles of Fort Henry on the Kentucky side, and the personal effort he expended to survey the terrain around Columbus also points to that conclusion.

Smith even advised his commander on the benefits of occupying Union City, a vital logistical hub southeast of Columbus, for future operations against the fortress. Yet by the end of January Grant's focus would change drastically, due in part to the intelligence he received upon his retum to Cairo.^^

On January 20 the district commander received the startling news that

Confederates had mshed reinforcements (no estimate of strength provided) to Columbus from Union City and Camp Beauregard, a report confirmed by McClemand four days later. Armed with this information, the news that Smith’s forces had operated so close to

Fort Henry unopposed, and reports of refugees who told of waning confidence among

118 Southerners in the ultimate success of their arms. Grant again requested an audience with

Halleck to suggest, or so he claimed in his memoirs, an advance up the Cumberland.

However, it is also possible he had another option in mind and one that involved a major effort against Columbus, long the focus of his efforts at Cairo. But by the time the department commander granted an interview. Grant had received intelligence from Smith on January 22 that moved the Cumberland advance to center stage.^^

The Paducah commander provided four salient pieces of information that, on top o f the recent increase in Columbus’ strength and Grant's never-flagging confidence in

Polk's reticence to leave his works, convinced him of the feasibility of shifting the line of operations to the east. First, Smith complained that the roads south of Paducah were

"something horrible" and that he consumed an entire day moving a single brigade three miles. Coupled with McClemand's unfavorable report of the road conditions around

Columbus, Grant knew that forces sent east from Columbus to reinforce Fort Henry would experience great difficulty in negotiating these avenues with any speed.^^ Second, he noted that the river had risen fourteen feet in one week, thus providing enough clearance for both gunboats and transports to navigate the waters above the fort. Third,

Smith argued that "two iron-clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry," a belief predicated upon the lack of Confederate naval forces and his own observations from the deck of a Union gunboat during a personal reconnaissance to within two and a half miles above the fort. A naval officer echoed this assessment, claiming that the fort was "apparently ill-calculated [in its construction] for defense against bombshells" launched from the gunboats. Finally, but most important. Smith estimated that only two to three thousand troops occupied the fort.^*

To Grant, the ultimate decision to shift his focus to the Tennessee river fort came down to simple mathematics. He could either attack a well-fortified bastion defended by over twenty thousand soldiers with a slightly smaller force and, because of the Columbus

119 batteries, without substantial aid from the gunboats, or he could descend upon an ill- constructed fort manned by only three thousand men with an overwhelming force and with the support of Foote's flotilla. Both choices posed serious risks, but the latter option, if pursued with vigor, promised nearly the same results, and perhaps even more, at less cost. The twin rivers offered a convenient invasion avenue into the heart of the

Confederacy and ran through an area rich with natural resources. Fertile farmland and iron ore deposits, which spawned numerous furnaces and forges, increased the importance of the region for the resource-poor Southerners.^^

Armed with this information, in combination with seeing the strategic sense underlying such a move. Grant prepared to meet Halleck and lay out his plan to capture

Fort H enry.H ow ever, on January 23, a day before his departure, he expressed anxiety in a letter to his sister about the future of his career. "I do hope," he wrote, "it will be my good fortune to retain so important a command for at least one battle." That battle would be at Fort Henry, the plan for which he hoped Halleck would approve the following day.

"[TJhere is no portion of our whole army better prepared to contest a battle than there is within my district," he argued.'^*

Grant's meeting with the department commander did not go as planned, however, probably because he failed to state his case clearly and concisely to his busy superior.

Regardless, Grant returned to Cairo on January 28 "very much crestfallen," but determined to prevail. The same day he wired Halleck for permission to "take Fort

McHenry [sic] on the Tennessee." Perhaps recalling the malaise that gripped the Federal high command after the seizure of Paducah and allowed the Confederates time to transform Columbus into a formidable position, a day later he again asked for clearance to move up the Cumberland and urged immediate action.

At first Halleck demurred, never replying directly to Grant, but a telegram from

McClellan in Washington forced his hand. On January 29 the general-in-chief informed

120 the Missouri commander that a Confederate deserter in Virginia had stated that

Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard and fifteen regiments from the Southern army in the Old Dominion had orders to join Albert Sidney Johnston in Kentucky. The prospect of Beauregard, who had already gained a solid military reputation, and such a sizable escort jolted the department commander. Fearful that these reinforcements would tip the balance in Johnston's favor, Halleck wired Grant to "take and hold" Fort Henry. In his written instructions sent later, the department commander offered not only direction, but also relayed some outdated intelligence that Grant likely ignored. He warned his subordinate that Polk would probably attempt to reinforce Henry and added the news of

Beauregard's impending arrival on the Columbus-Bowling Green line, urging Grant to take Henry before he arrived.'^^

McClellan's information, however, was only partially correct. Beauregard had indeed received orders to head west, but the report of fifteen regiments supposedly accompanying him was nothing more than a camp rumor. In a preview of his abysmal intelligence-gathering and analysis during the upcoming Peninsula Campaign, especially his habit of accepting at face value reports from highly suspect sources, McClellan believed the story of a single deserter without bothering to corroborate it. Worse yet, he had passed this unverified information on as fact to Halleck, who in turn swallowed it whole."^ Grant, however, was not stampeded by the report and continued his preparations, observing only that "More troops should be here [Cairo] soon if a change of commander is expected in Columbus." As for the possibility of colliding with

Beauregard's force somewhere on the Tennessee or Cumberland rivers. Grant appeared unconcerned and made no arrangements to discover the veracity o f McClellan's intelligence.'*^

When the Army of the District of Cairo embarked for the Tennessee river on

February 2, Grant knew the approximate size of the Fort Henry garrison, which had

121 increased to six thousand, and something about the guns commanding the river/*^

However, he knew little else about the area in which he was about to commit his army

since neither his scouts nor spies had ventured east of the Tennessee. He possessed scant

knowledge of the surrounding terrain and knew almost nothing about Fort Heiman, the

Confederate outpost opposite Henry in Kentucky. What little he knew came from Smith's

reconnaissances and those of the gunboats. In fact Grant increased his own blindness by

sending McClemand's First Division upriver in the vanguard, leaving Smith, who knew

more about the general area and that stretch of river than any other Union officer, and his

Second Division to bring up the rear.^^

More importantly. Grant's unfamiliarity with the terrain along the river made it

difficult to locate a disembarkation point for his army on the Tennessee shore. To find a

landing that would permit his forces to advance toward the fort without having to cross

flooded Panther Creek in the face of the enemy. Grant led a personal reconnaissance

aboard the gunboat Essex to gauge the range and accuracy of the Confederate river

batteries, information that would prove essential in ascertaining where it was safest to

unload the troops. Smith, who had taken the Lexington to within two and a half miles of

the fort in January, reported that the only Confederate shell fired at them fell short by

half a mile. Perhaps hopeful that this was still the case. Grant had the Essex brought to

that distance. Two Confederate shells, one that sailed over the boat and another that

smashed into the deck and nearly killed Grant, made it clear that the Fédérais had to land

at least three miles downriver from the fort. Thus, on February 4 McClemand’s men

disembarked at Bailey's Ferry three miles below the fort but still north of swollen Panther Creek.^*

After his risky reconnaissance. Grant retumed to Paducah, along with a bulk of

the empty transports, to oversee the transfer of Smith's division to Tennessee. Leaving

McClemand with no escape route. Grant spent an anxious night worrying about his

122 troops lying under the enemy's guns. McClemand spent that night, as well as the next two days, preparing a defensive position and probing the Confederate position. Although he lacked the services of a large cavalry force, he dispatched what he had toward the fort and also personally surveyed the terrain.M cC lem and also enlisted the services of the itinerant scout Carpenter who, according to the Illinois general, "closely approached [the] defenses and reported to me correctly with regard to them, and the preparations of the enemy." On February 4 McClemand concluded that Fort Henry had received reinforcements from the south via steamboat, although his resulting estimate of the garrison's strength—somewhere between six and twenty thousand—proved less than helpful. Further reconnaissance by his "independent scouts" (probably including

Carpenter) corroborated the reports of reinforcements streaming into the fort.^®

Grant had also heard about the new troops filling the ranks of the Henry garrison, but disagreed with McClemand's wide-ranging estimate. "What the strength of Fort

Henry Is I do not know accurately," he wrote, but predicted that probably 10,000 men manned the works. Although that many armed men poised behind strong fortifications might give reason for pause. Grant still retained "confidence in the success of our enterprise" and moved ahead with the operation.^*

Back in St. Louis, however, Halleck experienced enough anxiety for both of them.

On February 3 (although Halleck apparently did not receive the message until February 5)

Buell casually mentioned that, on top of Beauregard's troops, at least another ten thousand Confederates marched for the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. These forces, supposedly commanded by Generals John Bell Floyd and Simon Bolivar Buckner, had departed Bowling Green on January 22 destined for Paris, Tennessee, south of Fort

Heiman and, at last report, had stopped in Russellville, Kentucky on the Memphis,

Louisville & Clarksville railroad. In an example of the breakdown of intelligence cooperation between the two departments, Buell had leamed of this movement on

123 January 23, but had either forgotten or deemed the news not important enough to relay to

St. Louis until nearly two weeks later. Even then he included the information almost as an afterthought. Realizing that Grant's fifteen thousand men, cut off from reliable communication and quick reinforcement, might soon face the combined forces of

Beauregard, Buckner and Floyd, "Old Brains" urged McClellan to send more troops.^-

Halleck also telegraphed the officers left in command at Cairo and Paducah to forward all available troops to the Tennessee expedition. On February 6 he was nearly despondent, claiming that, in addition to reinforcements from Bowling Green, Fort Henry had also absorbed troops from Columbus. In fact, he wired the Ohio department commander later the same day that Beauregard had already reached the fort, but without his troops. "They intend to make a stand [at Fort Henry]," he wrote McClellan, adding that "Unless I get more forces, I may fail to take it." Halleck then made a clever attempt to deflect blame onto the general-in-chief in case his forces met disaster along the

Tennessee. Referring to the information supplied by McClellan that precipitated the whole movement, he claimed: "I was not ready to move, but deemed best to anticipate the arrival o f Beauregard’s forces.” [emphasis supplied]^^ Interestingly enough, for all of Halleck's concerns about the Cairo forces deep in enemy territory, he apparently never directly informed the one officer who truly needed to know about reinforcements destined for Fort Henry. Grant had heard reports of the arrival of fresh troops from his own sources, but only after the post commanders at Cairo and Paducah had forwarded

Halleck's urgent dispatches (addressed to them) did he learn indirectly of his superior's concerns. These reports prompted Grant to attack Henry without delay.^'*

Not only did Halleck fail to convey important information to his subordinate in the field, the movement up the Tennessee severed Grant from his traditional intelligence sources at Cairo. He possessed the essential means of procuring tactical intelligence while in the field through cavalry patrols, scouts, and his engineers, including Webster

124 and Lieutenant Colonel James B. McPherson, but he remained blind to matters outside his operational area.^^ Moreover, this type of strategic level intelligence was relatively new to Grant. During his tenure in Missouri he had concentrated primarily upon familiarizing himself with immediate threats, a rational course of action given his position and resources. This assumed, however, that someone had the responsibility for collecting and disseminating strategic intelligence to subordinate commands, a task made more difficult by the divided nature of the Western command structure. The general-in- chief in Washington was too far removed to be effective on this count, which meant that strategic intelligence collection and dissemintation devolved upon department headquarters. Halleck, however, neglected this role due in part to his ongoing feud with

Buell.

Grant partially addressed this deficiency when he ordered the temporary commander at Cairo to keep him posted on enemy activities in the Columbus area, presumably to warn him o f troop detachments heading toward the Cairo army's rear.

However, when Halleck sent his chief of staff there to oversee operations during the advance on Fort Donelson, he discovered that Grant had taken "everybody and thing with him," probably including records of secret service activity in the district. Moreover, unreliable and slow communications further hampered Grant's access to information.

Since telegraph wires as yet extended no further than Paducah and Smithland, Grant had to rely upon steamboats plying the waters between Fort Henry and those posts for transmitting and receiving correspondence from St. Louis. This situation made the transmission of intelligence in real time extremely difficult. As a result. Grant depended a great deal upon luck and the rapidity of his movements to prevent disaster.

As evidenced by his decision to uncover Cairo and Paducah in the face of some twenty-thousand Confederates in Columbus and turn his back to them on the Tennessee river, however. Grant felt confident that he had little to fear from that quarter. Judging

125 from the course he chose, he had no respect for Polk's generalship or his intestinal

fortitude. In fact, the shift to the Tennessee line operations demonstrated the depth of

Grant's conviction that the Bishop-General, wedded to a cordon-defense mentality, would

not budge from behind his works nor part with many of the reinforcements sent him,

even if Fort Heniy, part of his so-called Fourth Division, came under attack. He could

not say the same about Johnston or Beauregard, however, but he put forth even less effort

to gain information on their activities than he had with Polk. Perhaps relying upon

Halleck to keep him posted on that count, or possibly even ambivalent toward the lack of

strategic intelligence. Grant entered the wilderness above Fort Henry trusting in

providence to help him pierce the veil beyond the Tennessee river.

Before Grant could test Fort Henry's landward defenses, Foote's gunboats battered

the bastion into submission from the river. Unfortunately, McClemand's troops were not

in a position to prevent most of the garrison from evacuating to Fort Donelson, some

twelve miles east on the Cumberland. Tilghman surrendered the fort and nearly 80

officers and men. Although Grant did not know it, the force at Henry had numbered only

around three thousand men, far below his earlier estimate, and had received little

reinforcement prior to the attack. But the ease of the victory emboldened Grant. "I

intend to keep the ball moving as lively as possible," he wrote, adding that his recent

victory had rattled his opponent. "The scare and fright of the rebels up here is beyond conception.

After the surrender of Fort Henry to the Federal navy. Grant focused on his next objective and one he knew even less about. Situated on the Cumberland river eleven

miles east of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson remained somewhat of an enigma. Although

Grant knew the Confederates had constructed the fort on the Cumberland to prevent

Union encroachment into the heart o f Tennessee and safeguard Nashville, after Henry's

fall he still lacked substantial information on his next objective. Such ignorance might

126 have caused another commander to pause and await a more complete picture of the situation. But now that his forces were in motion for the first time since Belmont, there would be no more waiting. Grant intended to move ahead regardless of his imperfect knowledge of the enemy. "I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson," he wrote in his memoirs, "because I knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly." Fifteen thousand Federal soldiers assailing Fort Donelson immediately, thereby maintaining the initiative gained at Fort Henry, even against unknown numbers "would be more effective," he reasoned, "than 50,000 a month later.

Grant knew little about the fort's layout and construction, including the strength of its river batteries and landward defenses. Information on these aspects of Fort Donelson remained sketchy throughout the fall and early winter, even though Foote's gunboats had ascended the Cumberland several times to survey it. Lieutenant S. Ledyard Phelps, commanding the gunboat Conestoga, made two sojourns near Fort Donelson in early

December and retumed with only scant information. Because of the bend in the river where the fort was situated, the outer works could only be observed by water from a mile away, well within the range of the big guns bristling from behind them. In late January

Phelps complained of the dearth of intelligence on Donelson. "I wholly rely upon others for information," he complained, because the river batteries precluded him from getting very close. "I have been to the bend where a boat's length would have placed us in sight

[of Fort Donelson]," Phelps intoned, but he had to withdraw because "their [target] practice has all been precisely at that point. But Grant left this problem for the Navy to handle. He had his own knowledge gap to contend with on land.

After Fort Henry surrendered Grant eyed Fort Donelson and, although he had received no explicit authorization to proceed, he informed Halleck of his plan to "take and destroy" the bastion on February 8. Even though he possessed only scant information

127 on Donelson's strength, the Cairo commander believed he could capture it and retum to

Fort Henry on the same day. Fortunately from an intelligence standpoint, muddy roads and high water had Grant's forces "perfectly locked in" along the Tennessee on that day, delaying the advance east until February 12. The postponement allowed Grant an opportunity to learn more about the terrain and road system in the area of which they had no accurate maps, as well as on the defensive arrangements and strength of the garrison.^*

Between February 7-12, Grant's cavalry, scouts and engineers surveyed the routes and ground to Fort Donelson, at times to within a mile of the works. From these reconnaissances. Grant leamed that two serviceable avenues, the Telegraph and Ridge roads, connected the Tennessee with the fort on the Cumberland. The Telegraph road ran directly toward the fort while the Ridge road dipped to the southeast toward the town of Dover. He also gained information on the rugged nature of the terrain in-between.

However, these scouting details uncovered little about the ground directly in front of the fort or on the nature of the fortifications. According to Engineer Webster, "Our army approached the place [Fort Donelson] with very little knowledge of its topography." The extent and strength of the enemy defenses remained a mystery until the troops were in sight of them Then "[tjhese were reconnoitered as thoroughly as possible under the circumstance." Nevertheless, Union cavalry (of which Grant had little), scouts, and the tireless efforts of engineers Webster and McPherson yielded invaluable topographical information essential for an advance on Fort Donelson.

When Grant departed Cairo for Fort Henry he believed that he knew the size of the garrison. Before the move on Fort Donelson, however, he possessed no such information. This state of affairs was not lost upon some junior officers. Before the

Cairo forces departed Fort Henry, Colonel Lew Wallace marveled at "how little we know in advance of the condition of the enemy." His remark accurately reflected the fog that

128 enshrouded Grant's headquarters with regard to this important detail.^ On February 8 the Cairo commander admitted that he had nothing definite on the size of the enemy’s forces in the fort but warned that "if any reinforcements were on the way for this place

[Fort Henry] no doubt they have, or will, go [to Fort Donelson]." Three days later on the eve of the advance Grant was no closer to an estimate. In his orders for the movement the next day, he could offer his subordinates nothing definite on Confederate strength and deferred giving them explicit directions because "The force of the enemy being so variously reported it is impossible to give exact details of attack." Despite the information deficiency, he remained confident in success. According to one story, a correspondent asked the general if he knew the size of the Confederate garrison at Fort

Donelson. "Grant replied that he did not but thought he could take the fort; in any event he would try." Although his sense of security and wariness of reporters renders this story apocryphal, it accurately mirrors Grant's thinking on the eve of battle. He was prepared to fight regardless of how many Confederates confronted him.^^

The first news regarding the strength of the Cumberland bastion came from prisoners captured during the advance on February 12. According to these men, between twenty to twenty-five thousand troops occupied Fort Donelson under the combined command of Generals Pillow, Buckner, Floyd, and Bushrod Rust Johnson. Despite this ominous news. Grant continued on, even though he had but fifteen thousand men.^^

Cavalry under Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest blocked his path in places, but his efforts only slightly delayed the advance. By the evening of February 12 the

Army of the District of Cairo had settled in before Fort Donelson. Traveling the

Telegraph road. Smith's division deployed on the left directly in front of the fort and cut off any escape route to the north. McClemand's First Division followed the Ridge road and sidled to the right toward the Cumberland below Dover to block any proposed retreat route to Nashville along the southem bank of the Cumberland. As his troops encircled the

129 fort and tightened the noose. Grant settled into his field headquarters at the Crisp House and assessed his situation. Neither the unknown strength of the garrison and the ease with which they could be reinforced from Clarksville or Nashville, nor the tenuous position of his forces deep in enemy territory with danger lurking on his all fronts dampened his enthusiasm. In fact. Grant predicted that he would telegraph victorious news from within the captured prize the following day.^^

Grant claimed later that the boldness with which he executed his march on

Donelson resulted primarily from the knowledge that Gideon Pillow was in the fort. To

Grant, his presence there gave the Fédérais an advantage. Familiar with Pillow’s history of incompetence. Grant decided that "I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchmenfs he was given to hold."^® Eventually John Bell Floyd, a former secretary of war, arrived as senior commander in the fort, but Grant dismissed him as a mere pawn to "Pillow’s pretensions." Also according to Grant’s reminiscences, Buckner, the

Confederate officer given the unenviable task of relinquishing the fort, told Grant after the surrender that if he (Buckner) had commanded the fort. Federal troops would have encountered stiffer opposition during their advance. Grant replied that had his old friend

Buckner been in charge he would have changed his plans. "I had relied very much,"

Grant claimed, " upon their commander [i.e. Pillow] to allow me to come safely up the outside of their works." On February 9, the very day Pillow took command at Donelson,

Grant leamed of his arrival in the fort. Keeping in mind Grant’s opinion of the

Tennessean prior to Belmont and, more importantly, his recent dangerous gamble in leaving Cairo and Paducah vulnerable based upon a similar assessment of Polk, his post­ war account of the impetus behind his bold approach gains added weight.

On February 13, the day Smith and McClemand initiated unsuccessful assaults upon the Confederate works. Grant still knew little about Confederate strength.

However, he had discovered that Floyd had arrived at Donelson with four thousand men.

130 The next day Grant provided his first official estimate of Confederate strength, placing

their number at around thirty thousand, although noting that "All statements places [sic]

their numbers much higher." Even though supposedly outnumbered by an enemy

hunkered down behind strong earthworks with access to more reinforcements. Grant

observed that, despite their strength, "they [i.e. Pillow] do not seem inclined to come

out," a factor he viewed as being decidedly in his advantage. With the Pillow "factor"

keeping the Confederate garrison at home, the Cairo army apparently faced a protracted

siege. Nonetheless, Grant fully expected to "accomplish their subjugation."^®

At department headquarters, however, the mood was far less sanguine. The ever-

cautious Halleck remained pensive about what the Confederates had in store for his

forces and hoped that Grant would solidify his base on the Tennessee before marching

east, to provide his forces with a safe haven in case Fort Donelson proved too formidable.

In a not-so-subtle gesture he even advised his subordinate that picks and shovels were on

the way. But by the time the department commander’s advice reached the front. Grant had already invested Donelson. He had little stomach for Halleck's ponderous style of

warfare. As one historian has pointed out, the department chief proved to be ill-prepared

"to handle Grant's obviousness to danger and disdain for caution.

As his subordinate neared the Cumberland river position, Halleck continued

monitoring Confederate activity in central Kentucky and with each day became more convinced that Grant's army faced great peril from that quarter. In fact, he had provided

Buell with his estimate of Confederate troop strength in the area (40,000) before Grant

himself had even settled on a figure. By February 15, "Old Brains" had wired McClellan that Johnston had evacuated Bowling Green to fall upon Grant's rear. Moreover, Halleck believed Beauregard had arrived in Columbus with plans to attack Cairo. "It is the crisis of the war in the West," he warned the general-in-chief and announced that he could

131 send no more troops to the Cairo army. "I can do no more for Grant at present." He then

ordered his chief of staff in Cairo to halt all reinforcements slated for Tennessee in order

to check Beauregard.

Halleck failed to apprise Grant of his fears. Perhaps the tenuous lines of

communication with Grant's army hindered the transmission of such information, or

perhaps Halleck placed little stock in these reports and used them only to bludgeon

McClellan and Buell into sending reinforcements to his department. Regardless, not

until Brigadier General William T. Sherman at Paducah wrote Grant on February 15 did

he learn of the reported evacuation of Bowling Green and Johnston's rumored

concentration on the Cumberland. However, Sherman's letter reached Grant long after

events at Fort Donelson had rendered its contents moot.^^

Others besides the Missouri department commander expressed concern for

Grant's troops. After the fall of Fort Henry, Buell felt that the Confederates would soon

retake the bastion, if not capture the Cairo army altogether. Assistant Secretary of War

Thomas A. Scott wondered if Grant's forces were strong enough or adequately prepared

for the Donelson expedition. More importantly, he feared that Grant was in "extreme danger of being cut off by Beauregard." Even McClellan remained uncertain of the possible outcome. Like Halleck, however, these concerned parties never bothered to share their anxieties with Grant directly, nor did the department commander pass them on.^'^

Blissfully unaware of these matters. Grant continued pressing Fort Donelson. On

February 14, however, the army remained idle as Foote's gunboats attempted to repeat their Fort Henry performance. Unfortunately for the Western Flotilla, the day belonged to the gunners manning the fort's river batteries as they blasted the gunboats into retreat.

132 disabling or damaging several in the process. Before the engagement Foote's intelligence

on the river batteries had been scarce; that day, however, he leamed far more than he had

wanted to know.^^

Early the next morning Confederate troops marched silently through the darkness

toward their left near Dover in preparation for an attack aimed at punching a hole in the

Union right to accommodate the garrison's retreat to Nashville. Leaving their trenches on

the left manned with only a skeleton force, the Confederates were gambling everything on this roll of the dice. Fortunately for them. Union pickets never discovered the movement, probably due to the stormy weather that kept many o f them near their fires.

Even if they had detected it, however, given Grant's confidence in Pillow's poor generalship, he might not have believed such reports anyway. He absented himself from his headquarters prior to the attack to confer with Foote, fully expecting no action that day "unless 1 brought it on m yself since the conditions for battle "were much more favorable to us" than for the enemy. Demonstrating a dangerous tendency that would haunt him on other battlefields. Grant failed to appreciate that his enemy might attempt the unexpected. As Helmuth von Moltke once observed, just when a commander believed his adversary had but three remaining options, he inevitably chose a fourth.

Just before dawn Pillow, the chief author and planner of the forthcoming attack, chose this unforeseen alternative and shattered Grant's complacency. Southem forces sallied forth and smashed the Union right flank. Despite a determined resistance by the

Fédérais along Wynn's Ferry Road that prevented the Union right from crumbling and a counterattack by Smith's troops on the Confederate right, both of which helped stabilize the Federal line, the Southerners had pried opened an escape route. As both exhausted armies settled in for the night. Grant remained ignorant of the gap in his lines and the open road to Nashville. Fortunately for the Union commander, the breach also remained unknown to the Confederate high command. The presence of numerous campfires in the

133 area (later determined to have been started by the wounded, not Federal troops)

convinced Floyd, who was supported by Buckner and Bushrod Johnson, that Grant had

closed the gap, making an escape impossible without serious loss. Surrender, they

believed, remained the only viable alternative. In a move that would have surprised

Grant, Pillow argued against capitulation, proposing instead to continue the fight and

save the garrison. But the serious meeting turned comic opera when Pillow caved in and,

along with Floyd, passed the command-and responsibility for surrendering the garrison—

to Buckner. The next day, the campaign for Fort Donelson ended when Buckner

accepted the terms of unconditional surrender from his old friend Grant.

The loss of the twin river forts completely shattered Johnston's defensive

perimeter in the west, a line already badly fractured by the loss of Fort Henry and the

Confederate defeat at Mills Springs in eastem Tennessee the previous month, and led to

the evacuation of Bowling Green and Nashville. The victory eventually caused the

abandonment of Columbus, Grant’s primary objective since his arrival in Cairo, on

March 2. But Johnston soon formed a new line further south and again dared the Fédérais

to come test it. Sporting another star for his role in the recent victories and given

command of the newly-formed District of West Tennessee, Grant felt equal to the

challenge.

Prior to the Henry - Donelson campaign Grant had concentrated his efforts and

his intelligence resources on hastening the capture of Columbus and winning control of

the Mississippi River above Memphis. By early January he believed that Confederate authorities had substantially weakened Polk's force, making an attack on the fortress

plausible. The January demonstration in western Kentucky, in which Grant and

McClemand carefully reconnoitered possible approaches to the city without encountering any resistance, further convinced him that Polk's cautious restraint would allow Federal

forces to tum the position with little opposition. However, the expedition netted even

134 more crucial information. Smith found that only six thousand troops occupied Fort

Henry and that the roads in the area would slow any overland support coming from

Columbus. Moreover, he believed the gunboats could pound the fort into submission due to its poor construction and location. Simple mathematics helped tum Grant toward Fort

Henry where he could concentrate overwhelming numbers against a weak, but strategically important, position. Thus, the move on Fort Henry represented a calculated risk on Grant’s part, but one he felt outweighed the risks of doing nothing.

The advance on Fort Donelson, however, was a different matter. Grant knew little about the fort’s construction, the strength or layout of its defenses, the terrain between the

Tennessee and the Cumberland, or the size of the garrison. He did learn that his old nemesis Gideon Pillow was inside the works, which further emboldened him to take risks. That his forces marched to within range of the fort virtually unmolested seemed to validate his assumptions. Grant also had inadequate knowledge of the battlefield, which became brutally evident after the February 15 counteroffensive crumpled his right flank and, unknown to the Federal commander, opened an escape route for the Confederate garrison. Overall, Grant’s belief that he was the attacker and that he alone would decide when and where a battle would occur, a view fostered in part by his contempt for Pillow, led to a relaxation of his vigilance. But the blunders committed by the Confederate high command prevented the garrison from capitalizing on Grant’s mistake.

Intelligence and good strategic sense led Grant to shift his operations from the

Columbus front to the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Although others had also recognized the wisdom of the twin rivers approach, the Cairo commander was the only one who had the information necessary to achieve success, at least at Fort Henry. But even without adequate intelligence at Fort Donelson, Grant's perceptions of Polk and, to a lesser extent. Pillow proved correct. G. F. R. Henderson commented that the great

135 general looked beyond numbers and positions and concentrated upon the enemy's leader and "with that officer’s eyes and mind looks at the situation On this occasion. Grant had mastered his opponent

To overlook numbers and position is to court disaster and the Cairo commander certainly did that, especially during the Donelson phase of the campaign. Grant's unbending faith in the primacy of the initiative, echoing somewhat Clausewitz's dictum that "the offensive offers much more scope for positive action," also affected the intelligence balance between the Fédérais and Confederates.^® Before his advance on

Donelson, Grant lacked adequate intelligence on the enemy. But he also assumed that his opponents probably faced a similar shortage. In his estimation, therefore, forging ahead would not only preserve the initiative gained at Fort Henry but would also widen the enemy's information gap. In other words, "a bold commander tended to create timid enemies—his own confidence thrusting the burden of uncertainty onto the foe."*' Grant's movement up the Tennessee and then toward Fort Donelson had precisely this effect.

Polk paced nervously behind his Columbus earthworks, Johnston vacillated in Bowling

Green, and Tilghman, Pillow and Floyd scrambled to strengthen their fort's defenses, thereby relinquishing the initiative. All the while Grant moved steadily and surely against their positions, relying upon his boldness to compensate for his lack o f intelligence.

Grant had achieved remarkable success at Forts Henry and Donelson, helped in no small measure by Confederate miscues, but the campaigns left indelible impressions on him. The victories convinced him further that the initiative and dogged persistence could be decisive. Even stout fortifications like those at Donelson (which he claimed were so formidable that the Confederates "had nothing to do but stand in their places to hold them") were no match for a relentless army willing to take risks.*- Moreover, the campaign demonstrated to Grant that these factors reduced his own uncertainty by

136 forcing his opponent to react tohis movements, not the reverse. Not even the massive

Confederate counterattack at Donelson failed to disabuse him of the notion that he alone controlled the tenor of events.

Perhaps this campaign's most important influence upon Grant was that, once again, he demonstrated remarkable prescience when it came to assessing enemy intentions in the absence of intelligence. He had come to realize that uncertainty does not automatically lead to disaster.and, conversely, it might even provide opportunities for an able officer unafraid of rolling the dice. During times where information eluded him.

Grant did not let uncertainty paralyze him. Instead, he filled the information void—as a good commander should—with his own perceptions of the situation based upon experience and common sense. But a fine line separatesprescience from wishfiil thinking. For Grant, the next campaign would reveal the disastrous consequences of confusing the two, and of taking the lessons of Forts Henry and Donelson too far.

137 NOTES

*USG to Brig. Gen. Seth Williams, November 20,1861, GE. 3: 192.

^USG to Elihu B. Washburae, November 20, 1861, Ibid., 205; USG to Capt. John C. BCelton, November 21,1861, Ibid., 208

^USG to Kelton, December 29, 1861, Ibid., 353; Col. Leonard Ross to USG, December 11 and 27, 1861, Ibid., 280-81,353; Col. E. W. Gantt to Polk, December 21, 1861, QK 8: 717.

"*USG to Oglesby, December 13, 1861, GE 3; 283-84; Oglesby to Rawlins, December 15,1861, Ibid., 290.

^For Webster, see Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 546-47; Traas, Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War. 215,225; General Order No. 22, December 23,1861, GE3: 331. Albert D. Richardson, A Personal History of Ulysses S. Grant (Hartford. Conn.: Winter & Hatch, 1885) 189-90; Military Papers, box 1, Hillyer Papers, UVaL.

^USG to Maj. Gen. Henry Wager Hal leek, December 12, 1861, GE 3: 278. For reports received from these various sources, see dispatches from USG to Kelton of December 8, 16, 18,22, and 29, 1861, Ibid., 263, 293-94,304-305,324,353.

^USG to Kelton, December 8,1861, Ibid., 263.

^General Orders No. 1. November 19.1861. OR 7: 439. For Halleck's pre-war career, see Stephen Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 3-10. See also Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 50-77.

^ a v is to W. P. Harris, December 3, 1861, QR 8: 701; Halleck to Abraham Lincoln, January 6, 1862, Ibid., 7: 532.

^^Charles C. Carpenter to Halleck, December 24, 1861, RG 110, entry 36, box 3, NA; Carpenter to Halleck, ca. January, 1862, Ibid., box 1. See also USG to Col. Leonard Ross, January 8,1862 and Capt. William McMichael to USG, January 10, 1862, GE 4: 16.

* * *Halleck probably included "secret service" oversight among the other duties of his chief of staff. Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum. See Cullum to Halleck, February 19, 1862, GE. 7: 943-44. Transmitting intelligence in "real time" means that information is delivered to a decision-maker while it is still useful.

138 ^^General Orders No. 22, December 23, 1861, GE 3; 330; Special Orders No. 90, December 24,1861, in U.S. General Service Schools, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Campaigns. February 1862: Source Book (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: The General Service Schools Press, 1923), 46.

^^For examples of their earlier cooperation, see Chapter 3, passim.

'“^Welcher, The Union Army. 2: 127-28. For Buell, see Warner, Generals in Blue. 51-52.

^^Stephen Ambrose, "The Union Command System and the Donelson Campaign," Military Affairs 24 (Summer 1960): 78-79; Ambrose, Halleck. 18; Warner, Generals in Blue. 51; Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson: The Key to the Confederate Heartland (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 63,65,67. Buell employed his own scouts and spies, including John Lellyett, who spent January, 1862 in Paducah collecting information. Although he was probably there solely to keep Buell apprised of activities at the outskirts of his deparment, Lellyett shared information with Grant. See Grant's endorsement o f Lellyett, January 11, 1862, GE 4: 34 and Lellyett's reports to Grant, January 7 and 11,1862, Ibid., 34-35. See also Lellyett to Andrew Johnson, January 14,1862, Johnson Papers. 5:97-98 [henceforth Johnson Papers]: Lellyett Correspondence in the Don Carlos Buell Papers, Rice University, Houston, Texas.

*^USG to Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, November 16, 1861, GE 3; 177; Special Orders, November 20, 1861, Ibid., 285.

’^USG to McMichael, November 25, 1861, Ibid., 220; General Orders No. 3, November 20, 1861, OR 7: 370; General Orders No. 20, December 6, 1861, GE 3: 285; Grant to Col. John Cook, December 23, 1861, Ibid., 334.

'^Pillow to Johnston, November 28, 1861, Q R 7: 708; Maj. Mason Brayman to Rawlins, December 11,1861, GE3: 414-15. Johnston to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin, December 30,1861,G R 7: 809-81 i.

^^USG to Kelton, November 21, 1861, GE3: 208; USG to Kelton, November 29, 1861, Ibid., 234-35; USG to Williams, November 20,1861, Ibid., 192; Grant to Kelton, December 8,1861, Ibid., 263.

^ ^ S G to Jesse Grant, November 28, 1861, Ibid., 227-28.

^•Capt. Sterling P. Delano to USG, December 11,1861, Ibid., 415; USG to Kelton, December 16, 1861, Ibid., 293-94; USG to Kelton, December 18, 1861, Ibid., 304-305; USG to Mary Grant, December 18, 1861, Ibid., 308.

139 ^^USG to Kelton, December 18, 1861, Ibid., 304-305; USG to Kelton, December 22, 1861, Ibid., 324.

^^Polk to Johnston, December 24, 1861, QR. 7: 790; Grant to Kelton, December 29, 1861, GP 3:353. Smith discovered the movement two days earlier, but apparently neglected to inform Grant immediately. See Smith to Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum and Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, December 27, 1861, QR.7: 517.

Johnston to Polk, December 18,1861, OR 7; 773; Polk to Johnston, December 18, 1861, Ibid., 223-74; Johnston to Benjamin, December 30,1861, Ibid., 809-810; Polk to Johnston, January 11, 1862, Ibid., 826. See also. Parks, Polk. 203 and Connelly, Autumn o f Glory. 105-106.

^^Smith to USG, January 3, 1862, GE 3: 429-30; Grant to Kelton, January 6, 1862, Ibid., 375.

^^Halleck to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, OR 7; 532; Halleck to Buell, January 6, 1862, Ibid., 533; Buell to Halleck, January 3, 1862, Ibid., 528-29. Halleck's estimate came from Carpenter. See Carpenter to Halleck, December 24,1861, RG 110, entry 36, box 3, NA. Based upon his own strength at the time, not including artillery ( 13,746 in approximately nineteen infantry and cavalry regiments). Grant had around 723 men per regiment (minus artillerymen). Assuming that he might apply the same number to his opponent's regiments. Grant would then have arrived at a figure of around 21,704 infantry and cavalry in the fortress. See strength figures for Grant's command in QE. 7; 525, 853-54. About the same time, however, Polk estimated his forces at around 12,000 men. Polk to Johnston, January 11,1862, Ibid., 826.

^^USG to Kelton, January 6,1862, GE 3: 376; Cooling, Henry and Doneslon. 91 ; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 286-87.

^*For a brief description of the January expedition, see C. Peter Ripley, "Prelude to Donelson: Grant's January, 1862, March into Kentucky," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society. (October 1970): 311-18.

^^cClellan to Halleck, January 3,1862, QE7: 527-28.

^ ^ a lleck to Buell, January 6, 1862, Ibid., 533; Halleck to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, Ibid., 532; Halleck to USG, January 6, 1862, Ibid., 533-34.

^*USG to McClemand, January 8, 1862, GE4: 6; USG to Smith, January 8, 1862, Ibid., 11-12; USG to Halleck, January 8, 1862, Ibid., 3-4.

^^McClemand to Halleck, January 24,1862, Q R 7:70.

140 ^^USG to Halleck, January 12, 1862, QE.4: 37; McClemand to Halleck, January 24, 1862,Q& 7; 69,71.

^^USG to Kelton, January 17, 1862, GE 4: 62-63; USG to McClemand, January 18, 1862, Ibid.,67-68; USG to Julia Grant, January 23, 1862, Ibid., 96.

^^USG to Kelton, January 20, 1862, Ibid., 74; Smith to USG, January 27, 1862, Ibid., lOO-lOl.

^^USG to Kelton, January 20, 1862, Ibid., 74; McClemand to Halleck, January 24, 1862, OR 7: 69.

^^Smith to USG, January 21, 1862, GE 4: 90; McClemand to Halleck, January 24, 1862, GR 7: 69. Smith also discovered a serviceable road running from Paducah to Callaway that was not indicated on any maps. See Smith to Rawlins, January 2 7 ,1862, Ibid., 561. These reports on road conditions made Grant's observation prior to the demonstration that the poor state of these avenues would "operate worse upon the enemy.. than upon us," seem prophetic. See USG to Halleck January 8, 1862, GE 4; 3.

^^Smith to Rawlins, January 22, 1862, QR 7: 561; Phelps to Foote, January 21, 1862, QRN 22; 512-13. Smith also noted the absence of Confederate ironclads. In fact, the Southern brown-water navy was still virtually non-existent, save for the converted steamer Eastport, which was captured after Donelson fell. See William N. Still Jr., Iron Afloat: The Story of Confederate Armorclads (Columbia. S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 41-42.

^^Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 44-46.

"'^Historians have argued over who first suggested that Forts Henry and Donelson represented the true line of operations. However, several people recognized the strategic benefits of this move, but only Grant, with his intelligence on Tennessee River position and disdain for Polk, possessed the essential ingredients to pursue the course.

""USG to Mary Grant, January 23, 1862, GE4; 96.

‘'^USG to Halleck, January 28, 1862, Ibid., 99; USG to Halleck, January 29, 1862, Ibid., 103-104.

"'^McClellan to Halleck, January 29, 1862, GR 7: 571 ; Halleck to USG, January 30, 1862, Ibid., 121-22.

"'"'Amazingly, McClellan inquired later about Beauregard's whereabouts and what forces he had with him. This was basic information that the general-in-chief was far better suited to find in Virginia since the forces in question had departed fromhis front. See

141 McClellan to Halleck, February 14,1862, Ibid., 614. As later events would show, McClellan's handling of order of battle intelligence, compounded by the collection and calculation methods of his secret service chief Allan Pinkerton, led to seriously inflated estimates o f Confederate numbers on the Peninsula. See Edwin C. Fishel, "Pinkerton and McClellan: Who Deceived Whom?" Civil War History 34 (June 1988): 115-142 and Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), 107-110.

^^USG to Halleck, February 2, 1862, GE 4: 141.

‘^^Smith to Rawlins, January 30, 1862, Ibid., 123; USG to Halleck, February 1, 1862, lbid.,131.

'^^General Orders No. 5, February 1, 1862, Ibid., 129; Field Orders No. 1, February 5, 1862, Ibid., 151.

“^*USG to Halleck, February 4, 1862, Ibid., 147; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 92; Smith to Rawlins, January 22,1862, OR 7: 561. McClemand's command had already disembarked once, at Itra Landing, and then had to reload the boats after Grant returned with his intelligence. See Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 92.

'^^Only two regiments and four independent companies of cavalry accompanied Grant's expedition, all of which were in Smith's division. But one of the regiments, the Fourth Illinois, was absent until February 5 scouring the area between the Tennessee and Cumberland further north. See Ibid., 92,281 ; McClemand to USG, February 10, 1862, QR 7: 126-27; Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War (3 vols.. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985) 3:41.

^®For Carpenter, see McClemand's endorsement of his services, February 9, 1862, RG 110, entry 36, box 1, NA; McClemand to USG, February 4, 1862, QE4: 148-49; McClemand to USG, February 5, 1862, Ibid., 152.

^*USG to Julia Grant, February 5,1862, QE.4: 153. The actual Confederate strength in Fort Henry was only around 3033 men present for duty. See Abstract Report of the Fourth Division, January 31, 1862, QR 7: 855.

^^Buell to Halleck, February 5, 1862, Ibid., 580; Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook to Buell, January 23,1862, Ibid., 563; Halleck to McClellan, February 5,1862, Ibid., 583- 84.

^^Halleck to Commanding Officer, Cairo, February 5, 1862, Ibid., 52, pt. 1:206; Halleck to Commanding Officer, Paducah, February 5, 1862, Ibid., 7: 584-85; Halleck to McClellan, February 6,1862, Ibid., 586-87.

142 54uSG to Kelton, February 6, 1862, QE.4: 155.

^^McPherson was on detached service from Halleck's staff to act as Grant's chief engineer. See Halleck to USG, January 30,1862, QR 7: 121-22 and Cooling, Henry and Donelson,79.

^^USG to Brig. Gen. Eleazer Paine, February I, 1862, QE4: 134-35; Cullum to USG, February 7, 1862, QR 7: 594; Cullum to Halleck, February 19,1862, Ibid., 944. Grant had no telegraphic communication until after the fall of Fort Donelson, when a wire finally reached Fort Henry. See Halleck to McClellan, February 16, 1862, Ibid., 624-25; Halleck to Telegraph Operator at Smithland, February 18, 1862, QE 4; 261; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 161; and William R. Plum, The Military Telegraph during the Civil War in the United States (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Company, Publishers, 1882), 174-75.

^^Williams. Lincoln Finds a General. 3: 197; Connelly, Autumn of Glory. 84-85, 106- 107; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 68.

^*For a description of this battle, see Cooling, Henry and Donelson. Chapter 7. Abstract Report of Fourth Division, January 31,1862, QR 7: 855; USG to Mary Grant, February 9, 1862,024: 179.

^^Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, vol. 3: 228; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 116; Grant, Memoirs. 1: 291, 297-98.

^^Phelps to Foote, December 10 and 13, 1861. QRN 22:457-58,461; Phelps to Foote, January 7, 1862, Ibid., 485-86; Phelps to Foote, January 21,1862, Ibid., 512-13.

^*USG to Kelton, February 6, 1862, GP 4: 155; USG to Cullum, February 8, 1862, Ibid., 171-72; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 140

^^McPherson to USG, February 22, 1862, QR 7: 161-62.

Webster to USG, February 22, 1862, Ibid., 165; McPherson to USG, February 22, 1862, Ibid., 162.

^W allace to Susan Wallace, February 11, 1862, Lew Wallace Collection, box 1, folder 6, IndHS. See also Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, vol. 3:228; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 116.

^^USG to Cullum, February 8, 1862, QR 4: 171-72; General Field Orders No. 12, February 11, 1862, Ibid., 191-92; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 115.

143 ^^McPherson to USG, February 22, 1862, QR 7: 162; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 139. Before long Grant would receive an additional twelve regiments, boosting his force between twenty-three and twenty-five thousand men. See Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 71; Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 148..

^^On Grant's approach and deployments, see Ibid., Chapter 8; USG to Halleck, February 12, 1862, QP 4: 195.

^^Grant Personal Memoirs. 1; 294-95. However, Grant said he learned of Pillow's presence during a February 7 reconnaissance but the patrol he accompanied was not until two days later, at which time he learned o f Pillow's whereabouts. See USG to Mary Grant, February 9, 1862, QR4: 179-80; and A. L. C. [Arthur L. Conger], "Fort Donelson, " Military Historian and Economist 1 (January 1916); 43.

*^^Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:294-95,313; USG to Mary Grant, February 9, 1862, QP 4: 179-80. After Donelson fell. Grant claimed that both Pillow and Floyd were "as dead as if they were in their graves for any harm they can do." USG to Julia Grant, February 22, 1862, Ibid., 271. See also Cooling, Henry and Donelson. 137.

^ ^ o r the engagements fought on this day, see Ibid., Chapter 8. USG to Halleck, February 13, 1862, QE 4: 200; USG to Cullum, February 14,1862, Ibid., 209; USG to Julia Grant, February 13,1862, Ibid., 203-204.

Hal leek to USG, February 8, 1862, Ibid., 193-94; Halleck to USG, February 10, 1862, OR 7:600; Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Union Command System and the Donelson Campaign." Military Affairs 24 (Summer I960): 78, 84-85.

^“Halleck to Buell, February 12, 1862. OR 7: 607; Halleck to McClellan, February 15, 1862, Ibid., 616; Halleck to McClellan, February 17,1862, Ibid., 627-28; Halleck to Cullum, February 17, 1862, Ibid., 628; Ambrose, "Union Command System," 82.

Sherman to USG, February 15, 1862, Q £4: 215.

Ambrose, "Union Command System," 84; Scott to Halleck, February 11, 1862, QR 7: 604; McClellan to Buell, February 13, 1862, Ibid., 609.

^^For the gunboats day in front of the fort, see Cooling, Henry and Donelson. Chapter 9.

^^Ibid., 163-68; Grant, Memoirs. 1:305; Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 8.

^^For the last day at Donelson and the surrender, see Cooling, Henry and Donelson. Chapters 10 and 11.

144 ^^IbicL, 231-44. Grant became a major general on February 19 and prepared to lead the Army of the District o f West Tennessee further south. See miscellaneous correspondence, GE4: 230,271-73.

^^Quoted in J. F. C. Fuller. The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant( 1929: reprint. New York: De Capo Press, n.d.), 4.

*®CIausewitz, On War. 201.

**John Ferris and Michael I. Handel, "Clausewitz. Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations," Intelligence and National Security 10 (January 1995), 6.

«2u SG to Julia, February 22, 1862, GE 4: 271.

145 CHAPTER 5

SURPRISE AT SHILOH

"These terrible battles are very good things to read about for persons who loose

[sic] no friends," remarked Grant after his Fort Donelson triumph, "but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of it as possible." To forestall further bloodletting and hasten the end of the Confederacy in the West, he reiterated what had become a constant theme of his generalship: preserve the initiative and "push forward as vigorously as possible." All around him the new commander of the District of West Tennessee saw the far-reaching impact of such a vigorous policy. After the loss of the twin river forts the Confederates had evacuated Nashville and by early March had also abandoned Columbus. Johnston's vaunted defensive line had crumbled and, in Grant's estimation, so had Southern morale.

With the rebellion "on its last legs in Tennessee," now was the time to shatter the western

Confederacy before Johnston or Beauregard could pick up the pieces. *

The recent Union victories had also revealed Grant's insightfulness in understanding the enemy and the behavior of Confederate commanders. Forts Henry and

Donelson had seemingly confirmed his belief that possessing the initiative afforded a decided advantage and that, in the absence of reliable intelligence, pressing the enemy thrust the burden of uncertainty upon his foe. Despite imperfect information or, as at

Donelson, almost a complete lack of foreknowledge of the enemy. Grant had prevailed.

Looking back over the past campaign, the district commander saw few things he would change, boasting that "I have done a good job at Forts Henry and Donelson." Looking

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Map 4 ahead. Grant expected his army to succeed regardless of where they moved next. "I shall have one hard battle more to fight," he predicted, "and will find smooth sailing after that." Moreover, in what would become a constant theme, he believed that while

Northern morale soared. Confederate spirits had reached low ebb. "Defeat, disastrous defeat, is admitted," he crowed.- This complacent attitude regarding his past performance, his growing belief in the inevitable Union success and in the erosion of

Southern resolve, and an increased reliance upon his own intuition would have a marked influence upon his upcoming campaign on the Tennessee River.

But after Fort Donelson Grant's next assignment remained a mystery. Columbus,

New Madrid, Island No. 10 and Memphis were all possible objectives. For a time. Grant thought he might return to face the Confederate Gibraltar again or move to aid Buell against Johnston, who had abandoned Nashville on February 17 and retreated into middle

Tennessee. Regardless of his next destination, he hoped to continue the relentless pounding of Southern forces and morale begun at Fort Henry. Until Halleck authorized an advance, however, the district commander found himself in the same situation he had faced under Fremont, tugging at his tether while headquarters vacillated. Flushed with success. Grant's men also hungered for action. "The boys are getting tired of this kind of lazy idle life and want to be moving," observed one Federal officer.^

Grant's characteristic impatience conflicted with the views of his more studious superior in St. Louis. Whereas the district commander had shown during the Donelson campaign that advancing without adequate information did not disturb him, the ever- cautious Halleck required a more complete picture and demanded certainty where sometimes none existed. "We must strike no blow till we are strong enough to admit no doubt of the result," fairly summed up his outlook. But Grant's experience had revealed that hesitation also favored the enemy. He had sat idly by as the Confederates strengthened Columbus and had later surveyed the formidable earthworks at Fort

148 Donelson. Delaying gave the Southern armies more time to dig and increased the difficulty, not to mention the likely casualties, of successfully storming their works. But

Halleck's approach prevailed, frustrating his subordinate's longing to pressure the enemy and deny him the opportunity to fortify. Undoubtedly, Grant would have agreed with

Clausewitz, who wrote that "time allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender. He reaps where he did not sow.'"^

While awaiting orders from St. Louis, Grant spent the remainder of February at

Fort Donelson resupplying the Army of the District o f West Tennessee^ and organizing the new regiments streaming in from downriver. He also kept abreast of the latest news regarding the enemy. Unfortunately, several possible objectives ran through his mind after the victory on the Cumberland, but as of yet he had no orders to help focus his planning and illuminate his intelligence needs. Although Columbus beckoned, after the evacuation of Nashville on February 17 Grant concentrated upon the movements of

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the overall Confederate commander in the West, currently leading a collection of troops from Bowling Green, Nashville, eastern

Kentucky, and central Tennessee. On February 23, Grant learned that Johnston's army had retreated to Murffeesborough, some thirty-five miles southeast of Nashville. Two days later, however, new information placed him at Chattanooga, far away in southeast

Tennessee near the Georgia state line.^

Hoping to "learn what I can of the movements of the enemy," Grant ventured to

Nashville, now under Federal occupation, to confer with Buell. But their meeting had an inauspicious beginning as Buell, perhaps a bit jealous of the victor of Forts Henry and

Donelson, kept an increasingly irate Grant waiting for some time. Once Buell appeared, the meeting was less than friendly, and the two Union generals failed to reach a consensus on the location of Johnston's forces. The Ohio army commander insisted that the enemy was retreating south toward Decatur, Alabama, a major depot along the

149 Memphis & Charleston Railroad (M & C) on the south bank of the Tennessee River, not

to Chattanooga. As a result. Grant returned to his headquarters on February 28 no more

certain of Johnston's whereabouts than he had been before the meeting.^ Nearly two

weeks would pass before Grant again heard about Sidney Johnston.

Grant’s uncertainty resulted, in part, from Confederate deception. Initially

Johnston had marched toward Murfreesboro, on the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad,

instead of moving directly south. To befuddle the Fédérais, he forwarded ordnance and

quartermaster stores, as well as mail for his troops, to Chattanooga and spread rumors to

support the ruse. But Johnston had decided to abandon Middle Tennessee. Instead, he

sent his troops south toward Decatur and then west to Corinth, Mississippi where they

would unite with troops under Beauregard, Polk, Braxton Bragg, and John C.

Breckinridge to defend the Mississippi Valley*

In addition to being fooled by Johnston's deception. Grant experienced difficulties

in accessing strategic intelligence due primarily to the lack of personnel and resources

suited to that task. After his departure from Cairo in early February, reports from spies

sent operating behind enemy lines dwindled markedly. One possible explanation for the dearth of information was that, in his haste to get to Fort Henry, Grant left behind what

few spies he at Cairo or in Columbus. Moreover, the lack of secret service funds and other, more pressing duties (he still had only a small staff) may have prevented him from actively recruiting new operatives, a difficult task anyway given the sparse population in the twin rivers area and the skittishness of local Unionists. On February 25 two of Smith's spies, returning from a mission to Nashville, Decatur and Memphis, did visit Grant's headquarters. But their report, which contained little news of importance, would be the last coming from covert operatives—Grant's or anyone else's—for some time. Besides the lack of available personnel, perhaps Grant perceived that his momentum had tipped the balance of uncertainty in his favor, thereby decreasing his own need for more complete

150 intelligence. Similar to the situation he faced during the approach to Fort Donelson,

Grant remained ignorant of Confederate troop movements outside his operational area,

forcing him to rely upon Halleck and Buell to be his strategic eyes and ears. For some

reason, however, Buell neglected, as he had done during the Henry-Donelson campaign,

to share with Grant information that had relevance to operations on the Tennessee.^

Unfortunately, information denial was becoming a normal function of generals' relations

in the West.

On March 1 Grant finally received welcome news from St. Louis. Halleck had

decided on a campaign up the Tennessee and the first objective was to demolish the M &

C railroad bridge near Eastport, Mississippi on the Alabama state line. Another objective of the planned raid was the destruction of the rail junction at Corinth, Mississippi, a vital

strategic point for the Confederates where the M & C and the Mobile & Ohio Railroads

(M & O) intersected twenty miles from the Tennessee River. Union troops would also target the M & O stations at Jackson and Humboldt in Tennessee. Finally, Grant's troops

were to then leave their calling card at Paris, Tennessee, a major stop along the

Memphis, Clarksville & Louisville Railroad (MC & L) twenty-five miles southwest of

Fort Henry. Halleck expected the district commander to remain behind while Smith or

"some very discreet officer" led the two-phased operation. Finally, with words reminiscent of Fremont, his successor impressed upon Grant the need to "avoid any general engagement," advising that retreat remained preferable to battle.

Not one to be left out o f the action. Grant ordered Smith to march on Paris while he commanded the columns headed toward the objectives on the upper Tennessee river.

While preparing for the expedition. Grant received a startling message from St. Louis.

On March 4 Halleck ordered Grant to relinquish control of the upcoming movement to

Smith and confine himself to Fort Henry. The orders left Grant dumbfounded and in

"very poor humor."* * Halleck seemed to be punishing him. In fact, the department

151 commander was upset with his subordinate. St. Louis headquarters had not received regular reports from the West Tennessee army for some time, and an irate Halleck accused the district commander of disobeying orders with regard to such standard army communications. Believing that there was "a screw loose" in Grant’s command, Halleck fumed over his subordinate's apparent neglect and inefficiency and had even acquired permission from McClellan to arrest him. By March 13, however, Halleck had restored the victor o f Forts Henry and Donelson to command after learning that tardy reporting by regimental officers and communication problems accounted for the silence at Grant’s headquarters.*^

In the meantime. President Lincoln had issued his War Order No. 3, which placed Halleck in charge of the newly created Department of the Mississippi, an entity encompassing the Department of the Missouri and a portion of the Department of the

Ohio. Halleck had at long last achieved unity o f command in the West, the lack of which had hampered coordination of operations from the outset. Just as pleasing was that, in addition to Buell coming under his control, the March 11 order also removed McClellan,

Buell's close friend, from overall command o f the Union armies. Unfortunately for Grant, however, this new command structure did little to improve the transmission of strategic intelligence to his headquarters.

Before Halleck restored Grant to command, however. Smith had already sent the expeditions up the Tennessee River toward their objectives. By March 15 lead elements of the Army of the District of West Tennessee occupied positions on the west bank north of the Mississippi state line. After damaging the M & O tracks west of the river.

Brigadier General Lew Wallace's veteran Third Division bivouacked at Crump's Landing.

Due to inclement weather Brigadier General William T. Sherman's Fifth Division, formed at Paducah in late February, halted its mission on the upper Tennessee and occupied Pittsburg Landing. These two divisions represented the vanguard of a what

152 would become a major Federal thrust against the new Confederate defensive line that, after Columbus' evacuation on March 3, stretched along the railroads from Island No. 10 on the Mississippi along the railroads to Decatur, Alabama. Viewing the Tennessee river as "the great strategic line of the Western campaign," Halleck planned to puncture the

Confederate center at Corinth or Jackson.

With his command troubles seemingly behind him. Grant left Fort Henry to lead this offensive, confident that he had "such an inside track of the enemy that by following up our success we can go anywhere." On March 17 he arrived at Savannah, Tennessee, his new field headquarters on the east bank nine miles downstream from the Union juggernaut forming near a small country church named Shiloh.

When he arrived at his new headquarters Grant possessed only sketchy information on the enemy. On March 5, he heard that 20,000 Southerners were fortifying

Eastport and Corinth. The same day Lieutenant William G win, a gunboat commander, claimed that Confederate forces were dispersed along the railroads with sizeable garrisons posted at Henderson Station, Corinth, and Eastport, with troops arriving daily from Columbus and from the Deep South. Moreover, he reported that the latest rumor had Johnston’s army moving toward Decatur. But G win reported this information to

Foote in Cairo, who then transmitted it to Halleck. Grant, however, gave no indication that he ever received this updated information or that Halleck had informed him that the latest rumors placed Beauregard in command of the troops at Corinth.

Not until March 14 did Grant receive another estimate of Confederate forces gathering in northern Mississippi. After Wallace and Sherman had settled in their new camps. Smith reported that the enemy had posted as many as 60,000 troops along the railroads from Jackson to Eastport, with the bulk at Corinth, only twenty-two miles southwest of Sherman's Pittsburg Landing camps. Although the veteran commander complained that he had yet to find "any thing like the desired information, as to the

153 strength of the enemy," Grant nonetheless embraced his assessment, repeating the figure

(a three-fold increase over his previous estimate) to Halleck the next day. Meanwhile,

Sherman had also searched for news of Confederate numbers. Although fiustrated by

"indistinct" information extracted from Confederate prisoners, he estimated that only

30,000 Southerners occupied Corinth and other points while five regiments were at

Purdy, a small village west of Crump's Landing. More importantly, Sherman also observed that "Every road and path is occupied by the Enemy’s cavalry" and that two

Southern regiments were reported at Pea Ridge, near Monterey, approximately thirteen miles southwest of Pittsburg Landing*®. In less than a month, the presence of the forces at Pea Ridge/Monterey would have a profound impact upon Sherman's interpretations of enemy intentions. At this juncture, however. Grant only knew that the enemy appeared to be concentrating in northern Mississippi.

On March 17 Grant visited the Union camps at Pittsburg Landing to review the deployments made by Sherman, who had assumed the responsibility of senior officer at the landing due to an accident that incapacitated C. F. Smith. The Federal encampment stretched from Sherman's outermost position near Shiloh Meeting House toward the landing, nearly three miles to the northeast. The front stretched for three and half miles

(although not in an unbroken line) between two rain-swollen creeks, which refused both flanks, and the rear rested on the Tennessee River. Due to this narrow avenue of approach, the camp appeared secure especially since the enemy could advance only from the southwest, easing the burden of reconnaissance patrols. The ground along this front was cut by numerous ravines and covered with dense forests and tangled underbrush, broken in places by an open field. Sherman, although instructed by Smith to construct any fortifications necessary for "temporary defense," claimed the terrain alone "admits of easy defense by a small command." Besides, he admitted later, "I always acted on the

154 supposition that we were the invading army" and, therefore, erecting earthworks "would have made our raw men timid." Grant agreed with this assessment and sustained

Sherman's deployments and his decision to forego fortifications.-®

By the end of March five divisions, nearly 30,000 men, occupied these woods and meadows while Wallace's men guarded the Union supply depot several miles downriver at Crump's Landing. Two of Grant's divisions, Sherman's and another organized on

March 26 under Brigadier General Benjamin M. Prentiss, were new to the field and lacked adequate arms, training, and discipline. Unfortunately, these neophyte commands also occupied the most advanced positions between Owl and Lick Creeks. Moreover, gaps between regiments and brigades further compromised the defensibility of their camps in case of attack. Thus raw troops with little field experience or protection comprised the first line of defense for the entire Union encampment. Both Grant and

Sherman, however, felt certain that the Confederates would not strike them at their base on the river.^’

On March 17 one of Smith's scouts reported that Confederate numbers had apparently swelled. He claimed that nearly 150,000 enemy troops had arrived in northern

Mississippi with 50,000 of those in Corinth alone. The arrival of Johnston's army, he intimated, accounted for the increase. But Grant promptly discounted the scout's estimate as "very much exaggerated [sic]" and commented that Johnston's presence in Corinth

"was very much against my expectation," indicating a continued reliance upon two week old information that placed the Southern general and his army either at Decatur or

Chattanooga.^^ The following day he provided his own thoughts on the enemy's disposition and numbers. He acknowledged that they were indeed gathering a sizable force at Corinth and along the railroads but remained uncertain as to their strength. "1 have not been here long enough to form much of an idea of the actual strength of the rebels," he confessed, "but [I] feel satisfied that they do not number 40,000 armed

155 effective men at this time." The next day, one o f Sherman's informants verified the earlier report that only 20,000 Confederates garrisoned Corinth with more posted at other strategic points. In addition, the informant noted that the Confederates had yet to fortify their positions. This last news was an encouraging sign, especially since many assumed that Federal inactivity had given the South "abundant time to build up new Donelsons and Columbuses."*^

Grant also learned from Sherman's source that "Buell seems to be the party most expected" by the enemy, who estimated his strength as high as 150,000 men. The Army o f the Ohio, only 35,000 men strong, was indeed enroute to Pittsburgh Landing from

Nashville, although still over 100 miles away and moving at glacial speed due to muddy roads and rain-swollen rivers. Buell's column represented the final ingredient in

Halleck's plan, and he periodically reminded Grant that earlier orders against engaging the enemy remained in effect until the Ohio army reached the Tennessee. Hearing nothing from Buell, by now a well-established trend. Grant grew increasingly anxious to learn about his progress and dispatched two scouts to find him. As he waited for their return. Grant never gave the enemy's awareness of Buell's impending arrival a second thought. Apparently, he failed to consider that thwarting the junction of these two Union armies might present an irresistible opportunity for the supposedly desperate

Southerners.*'^

As an endless parade of new troops swelled the population of the Shiloh camps.

Grant's confidence in the inevitability of Confederate defeat grew apace. In fact, on

March 20 an opportunity for victory appeared close at hand. That day Halleck heard that enemy troops had departed Corinth to attack Federal transports below Savannah and disrupt Union communications. "If so," he told Grant, "General Smith should immediately destroy [the] railroad connection at Corinth." With Smith still bedridden from an earlier accident. Grant decided to direct the operation in person. Bad roads and

156 late winter storms delayed the advance, but the report of thirteen trainloads of armed

Confederates arriving in Corinth two days earlier led to its cancellation. This sizable influx of troops. Grant informed Halleck, "would indicate that Corinth cannot be taken without a general engagement, which from your instructions is to be avoided." Faced with the contradiction within his own orders, the department commander officially scrubbed the advance on Corinth and ordered Grant to stand down, continue fortifying, and wait for Buell.

During this exchange. Grant provided his interpretation of the latest intelligence.

Despite the recent infusion of troops, he maintained that Confederate morale had virtually disintegrated and, as a result, Corinth would fall "much more easily than

Donelson did." Deserters asserted that a general feeling of "panic" had spread throughout the army and that many soldiers were reluctant to fight. "All accounts agree," Grant surmised, "that the great mass of the Rank and file are heartily tired. Other Union officers also queried deserters about the spirits in Southern camps with similar results.

According to some deserters questioned by Lew Wallace, their comrades in Corinth were

"demoralized to the last degree" and would not put up much o f a fight.^^

Although kept in check by Halleck, Grant nevertheless permitted Sherman to advance toward the Pea Ridge/Monterey area to corroborate rumors that the Confederates were constructing fortifications. Sherman had heard about Southern troops lurking in that vicinity, about 10 miles southwest of his camps, ever since his arrival at Shiloh. An encounter with Confederate cavalry near Pea Ridge/Monterey on March 20 and reports of enemy scouts prowling outside his lines finally convinced him that the enemy was making "desperate efforts to penetrate our lines to ascertain our approximate force." He had already tightened security in his camps by prohibiting both soldiers and civilians residing behind his lines from passing his picket posts, a measure he claimed had left the enemy "utterly at a loss" as to the Federal condition. Despite Grant's instructions to

157 occupy and "partially" fortify Pea Ridge, Sherman had in mind only a "strong reconnaissance" to gather information and disperse Confederate scouts and patrols. On

March 24 Sherman led two brigades toward the area but returned to camp when no enemy troops appeared. Although Confederate units would later reoccupy the Pea

Ridge/Monterey area, Sherman continued to view them as merely reconnaissance forces sent to spy on his position.-^

The day before Sherman moved. Grant learned from Smith that, according to a

Memphis newspaper. Confederate General Braxton Bragg was currently in Memphis and that General Daniel Ruggles commanded the forces gathering at Corinth. Implying that an opportunity was at hand. Smith confided that the latter officer was "a weak vessel."

Confronted with this information. Grant replied in typical style: "[T]he enemy are gathering strength at Corinth quite as rapidly as we are here, and the sooner we attack, the easier will be the task of taking the place." Then, in words reminiscent of his appraisals of Polk and Pillow, he added: "If Ruggles is in command it would assuredly be a good time to attack. Despite what he saw as a chance to strike another weak

Southern commander. Grant had to restrain himself again, having no choice but to wait either for Halleck to change his mind about avoiding an engagement, or for Buell to appear at Savannah. Unfortunately, neither of these alternatives appeared likely to happen soon.

The Army of the Ohio departed Nashville on March 16 but high water on the

Duck River near Columbia delayed Buell's progress while his engineers constructed a bridge. Not until March 29 did the army begin crossing and continue towards the rendezvous on the Tennessee, nearly seventy-five miles to the southwest. During the interim, Buell kept an eye on Johnston who was last reported heading toward either

Decatur or Chattanooga. On March 23 Buell had a fix on his adversary and wrote

Halleck that Johnston's army marched for Tuscumbia, Alabama, a stop along the M & C

158 fifty miles southeast of Corinth.^® Scouts Carson and Breckinridge arrived at Buell’s headquarters the same day with Grant's message of the March 19 and he promptly sent them back to Savannah, which they reached on March 26, with the news of Johnston’s withdrawal to Tuscumbia. For some reason, however. Grant failed to mention Buell’s intelligence in his report to Halleck, noting only that he had received "no news from

Corinth ” Since Grant had earlier believed that Johnston had marched toward

Chattanooga, he may have discounted Buell’s intelligence as inaccurate. And since his ability to gather strategic intelligence remained minimal, he had no way of verifying it.

Apparently, Buell’s report had little impact on Grant’s assessment and he continued believing that a weak commander (Ruggles) was in charge at Corinth, not Johnston.^ *

Unknown to Grant, however, Sidney Johnston, a soldier of great renown in the pre-war U. S. Army, had already arrived with his troops in Corinth and assumed overall command. After the loss of the twin river forts, the Southern high command had determined to concentrate all available forces in the West and defend the Mississippi

Valley. The key rail junction at Corinth became the focal point and regiments from all over the Deep South flocked to northern Mississippi, including Bragg’s 10,000 comparatively well-disciplined troops from the Department of Alabama and West

Florida, a brigade of Louisiana infantry from the Gulf coast led by Ruggles, and the bulk of Polk’s former Columbus garrison. Finally, with the addition of Johnston’s 13,000 men, the armed multitude hovering about the town and along the railroads soon numbered over

40,000 men. Johnston divided the so-called Army of the Mississippi into three corps commanded by Polk, Bragg, and Hardee and a reserve under John C. Breckinridge.

With this force, much of it as raw and untrained as Grant’s, he planned to launch a bold counterstroke to turn the tide in the West before Buell could join with Grant and plunge deeper into the heart of the Confederacy. With Kentucky and most of Tennessee already

159 in enemy hands, Johnston and Davis saw few alternatives. As one western Confederate

concluded; "We have retreated as far South as we can go and if we don't fight now we

might as well give up."^^

Meanwhile, Grant knew the Confederates were concentrating in Corinth but

reports of low Southern morale led him to the opposite conclusion. He believed that the

recent defeats had sent the enemy reeling, leaving it little choice but to dig in and parry

Federal thrusts. And thus far Grant’s intelligence had supported this view of Confederate

intentions. The information acquired by Buell and Halleck pointed to a similar

conclusion. On March 24 the Ohio department commander reported that intercepted

correspondence indicated that 40,000 troops had already gathered at the rail junction and

that the Southerners "Expect a battle at Corinth." Two days later Halleck told Buell that

he believed "the enemy will make his stand at or near Corinth." Grant never received

Buell's assessment, but Halleck's intelligence, which arrived in Savannah on March 31,

only verified what he already knew.^^

Other information arriving near months' end also supported Grant's appraisal of

the Confederate situation. On March 28 the post commander at Fort Henry notified

Savannah that a refugee from Memphis claimed that the Confederates were girding

themselves for a last "desperate stand" at Corinth. Moreover, he added that Richmond

had even dispatched troops from the Virginia theater to defend northern Mississippi and

that the hero of Manassas, General P. G. T. Beauregard, had replaced Ruggles at

Corinth. Although Grant made no comment on these latest developments. Captain

William Rowley of his staff indicated that the report had impressed his commander and that he now believed between 50,000 and 75,000 men defended Corinth. Grant was not alone in this assessment. Halleck also believed that Beauregard led the Western forces and that "a large part of the Manassas army" confronted the Union troops on the

Tennessee. Despite the serious implications of facing a competent Southern commander

160 and his Bull Run veterans, Halleck and Grant remained unmoved by this development

and saw only Buell's absence standing in the way of the inevitable Union victory at

Corinth.^^

By late March Grant's intelligence depicted a disheartened enemy bracing for a

final showdown in northern Mississippi. In fact, the last information received for the

month supported that assessment. From a group of deserters Grant learned that, although

nearly 80,000 Southerners shouldered muskets at Corinth, their withering morale had

reached critical mass. As a result, proclaimed Grant, "Many men will desert if an opportunity occurs." Back in St. Louis, however, Halleck was less convinced by Grant's

intelligence, probably because its content had remained virtually unchanged since early

March. Grant wrote on March 5 that the enemy was fortifying Eastport and Corinth with an army of 20,000 men. By months' end the estimated size of Confederate forces was the only significant alteration in that assessment, and even that figure was constantly in flux.

Uncomfortable with these nagging uncertainties, the methodical Halleck complained to

Stanton about the need for "better information as to the enemy's strength in the vicinity of

Corinth" because "General Grant's dispatches [do not] give me any satisfactory information." On March 31 he urged Grant to provide a more concrete picture of the enemy situation in northern Mississippi and, in a condescending tone, reminded his subordinate that "Your scouts and spies ought by this time to have given you something approximating to the facts of the case."^^

Grant, however, had not yet made any concerted efforts to penetrate enemy lines and gain "the facts of the case." The observations of Confederate deserters comprised the bulk o f Grant's intelligence on the enemy and, aside from a few isolated reports, he received very little information—confirmatory or otherwise—from more objective sources

(i.e. cavalry patrols, scouts, spies), especially when compared with the harvest he reaped from these wellsprings while in Cairo. The West Tennessee army had ample cavalry for

161 reconnaissance but neither Grant nor his subordinates employed them as actively and aggressively as they had in earlier days. Moreover, the rugged terrain surrounding

Pittsburg Landing inhibited mounted operations and reconnaissance patrols. More importantly. Grant reorganized his cavalry on April 2, transferring various regiments to new divisions and placed many unitshors de combat as they moved to their new assignments and familiarized themselves with their new surroundings. When portions of the veteran 5th Ohio Cavalry under Sherman moved to Hurlbut's division, for example, the transfer left the Fifth Division without horsemen during the daylight hours of April 5.

Historian Stephen Z. Starr commented that the preoccupation of the cavalry with the reorganization, combined with Grant's desire "to leave well enough alone" and not dispatch patrols toward Corinth, meant that Union troopers had "no time for what they should have been doing in the near proximity of a large enemy force." This redistribution of horseflesh, as later events would reveal, could not have happened at a worse time.^^

Reports from scouts and spies employed at Grant's headquarters were also noticeably absent during this period. Although scouts Carson and Breckenridge were available. Grant apparently utilized their services primarily to track Buell's progress, not to watch the enemy. Before April 9, moreover, not a single spy from Corinth or elsewhere reported to S av an n ah .T h e rapid pace of events and the heavy workload since February left Grant with little time to devote to secret service recruitment. An acute shortage of money also contributed to the atrophy of his intelligence arm.

Wrestling with the financial debacle as a result of Fremont's extravagent spending,

Halleck tried to rein in department outlays, including expenditures for secret service. In

December, 1861, the commander of the District of Rolla received word from headquarters that his spies would be paid for past services, but that "The number and

162 expense o f such persons should be diminished as much as possible " Although no record exists showing that Grant received similar advice, money was in short supply throughout the department and secret service operations undoubtedly suffered as a result.^^

Scouts and spies employed by the six division commanders also maintained a low profile, if they existed at all. For example. Captain Charles C. Carpenter, head o f the so- called Jessie Scouts, and his partner L. F. Scott had provided valuable service for both

Hal leek and McClemand during the Henry-Donelson campaign. McClemand retained their services throughout February and March but their penchant for "stealing and plundering" ended their service with the army. Calling them an "intolerable nuisance,"

Grant had both men arrested on March 25 and shipped under guard to St. Louis. Their departure left McClemand without their services at a critical juncture.

As for other divisions, Sherman, whose command occupied the outermost perimeter astride the road to Corinth, failed to dispatch operatives, relying instead upon pickets and an occasional cavalry patrol for information and warning. He had utilized scouts and spies before, but apparently saw little need for their services at Pittsburg

Landing. The divisions of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace, who replaced the ailing Smith, camped behind the main Union line but their commanders, both new to the myriad responsibilities of such large commands, relied upon Sherman to gather the pertinent intelligence. Moreover, Grant apparently did not order them to collect their own.

Prentiss, whose brigades occupied the Union left, deployed his pickets only three hundred yards from his camps and left the task of detecting an enemy buildup to

Sherman. Even when deployed, however, the raw troops of these divisions had received little training or instruction in the finer points of picketing and reconnaissance. Only Lew

Wallace had dispatched scouts into enemy territory, but these were sent primarily to uncover any Confederate overtures toward his isolated position at Crump’s Landing.'**

163 Why Grant refrained from recruiting a corps o f scouts and spies at Savannah

remains unknown. One historian has argued that the Federal command experienced an

information drought at Pittsburg Landing due in part to demographics. Few civilians

resided in the area between the landing and Corinth and those who did were reticent,

either from fear of retribution or out of pro-secession sympathies, to impart news to

Federal officers. Moreover, most Unionists in the region, and natural candidates for

espionage behind enemy lines, lived on the east bank. This state of affairs seriously

limited the number of non-military sources in the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing.'^-

Nevertheless, Grant claimed that "union sentiment seems to be strong in the south part of

the state" and later counted over five hundred new enlistees in his army from southern

Tennessee and dozens more who came in to escape Confederate conscription. On the

west bank, an area supposedly devoid of loyalists. Lew Wallace "colonized" around one

hundred refugees in his camps, leading him to believe that "there is Unionism still left in

Tennessee." In fact, the division commander did receive topographical intelligence from

loyalists in the Crump's Landing area. For some reason, however. Grant harbored the

Unionists who reached his lines but left untapped this potential pool of informants."*^

Perhaps one explanation for the deficiencies within Grant's secret service was that, by April 1, he was satisfied with his intelligence and with the assessments he derived from it. He knew from information collected over the past month that a large

Confederate army concentrated at Corinth to repel the inevitable Union attack. Since Fort

Donelson, however. Union intelligence had also revealed a Southern army hamstrung by low morale and on the verge of disintegration. This circumstance offset their supposed numerical superiority with the potential for mass desertion and all but eliminated a counteroffensive from the list of Confederate options. And, since the Fédérais possessed

164 the initiative since Fort Henry, the burden of uncertainty rested squarely on the Southern

high command; they must anticipate Grant's next move, not the reverse. By April 1,

therefore, the only unknown for the West Tennessee army was Buell's itinerary.

A major influence upon the above assessment was Grant's rendering of past

Confederate conduct. On the strategic level. Southern commanders had remained

consistent in their actions, opting to concentrate and await the Fédérais from behind

entrenchments rather than seek the offensive. Only in the tactical realm had they

exhibited boldness. The Confederates thus far had followed this "defensive-offensive"

script closely and, from all indications, they were preparing an encore at Corinth. In fact,

Beauregard had advocated a similar strategy. Viewing the terrain as unsuitable for

"purely offensive" operations, he proposed to wait for the Fédérais to advance from the

river and then strike them away from their base. Sidney Johnston, however, had no

intention o f conforming to Grant's timetable.'^

Unlike Johnston, Sherman waited anxiously for the upcoming Union advance.

But during the first days of April his command spent more time observing and, at times,

tangling with Confederate units lurking about his front than preparing for offensive

operations. Still concerned about Southern attempts to discover his strength and

deployments, Sherman dispatched a mixed force o f infantry and cavalry on April 3 to

clear his front of Confederate videttes and cavalry and to capture prisoners for

interrogation. He ordered Colonel W. H. H. Taylor of the 5th Ohio Cavalry to "Bring in

every suspicious person" but avoid molesting civilians engaged in "legitimate" pursuits.

This restriction resulted from Grant's disgust over a rash of recent arbitrary arrests of citizens by overzealous Federal officers. Aside from the embarrassment caused by detaining innocent civilians. Grant understood that they also posed a potential

information hemorrhage. Since these uncharged prisoners had to be released, he observed. Union officers were essentially "admitting spiees [sic] within our lines."

165 Taylor observed these restrictions, bagging a private in the First Alabama Cavalry, whom

Sherman believed was "pretty intelligent" and sent to Savannah for questioning, and "Dr.

Parker," a civilian arrested for alerting enemy pickets of the Union approach.

During the operation, Taylor learned, possibly from the lone prisoner or the

woman "living near the [Confederate] picket post" who exposed Parker’s treason, that

the Southerners had at Pea Ridge/Monterey three regiments of infantry, one o f cavalry,

and an artillery battery. The presence of these units at Monterey, however, probably

came as no surprise to Sherman. Earlier in March he knew that Confederate troops had

occupied that area and were sending out patrols toward the Union camps. Since Sherman

chose not to seize the ridge in March and Grant had failed to press the issue, nothing

prevented the enemy from using Pea Ridge/Monterey as a forward observation post—and

a tripwire—along the road to Corinth. More importantly, since the Fifth Division camps

were only ten miles from that forward position, the appearance of Confederate pickets

and roving cavalrymen near his front would not be all that unusual, especially since the

Ohioan fully expected the enemy to actively scout his position. For these reasons, despite

the constant presence of enemy pickets and patrols, Sherman remained sanguine that the

Confederates would "await our coming at Corinth" and that the Pea Ridge/Monterey

outpost posed little threat to the Union camps.^^

Grant received Sherman's and Taylor's reports on April 3 and possibly even

interrogated the Alabama cavalryman, although no record of the session has been found.

If Grant questioned the prisoner, apparently nothing he imparted persuaded the general to

alter his perspective.'^^ Despite complaining about the questionable nature of the news

coming from Corinth, that same day Grant revealed in his report to Halleck that his view

o f the situation had not changed. "Deserters occationally [sic] come in," he wrote, "but all that can be learned from them that is reliable is that the force there [Corinth] is large

and increasing." Moreover, they also described the hopelessness that permeated the

166 enemy's ranks, leading him to believe that "many would desert if they could." Even in the face of Halleck's demand for better intelligence, the district commander held fast to his earlier assessment. To Grant, his intelligence had already told him all that he needed to know.^*

Unknown to Grant, however, by late March Johnston had already decided upon a far more aggressive course. On the evening of April 2, he ordered an advance on

Pittsburg Landing, twenty-two miles away, to drive the invaders into the Tennessee before Buell could render assistance. For the Confederates to abandon their fortifications and march an army—supposedly composed of undisciplined and demoralized troops—to assail a victorious Federal force at their base was but a remote possibility to Grant and his subordinates. But that option was precisely what Johnston had in mind. He hoped to catch the enemy napping by doing something that, on the surface, made little sense.

After considerable delays and miscues on the march, an inevitability given the imperfect knowledge of the road system, misinterpreted or missed orders, and the inexperience of both soldiers and officers, Johnston's army was finally in position to attack on the evening of April 5, two days behind schedule. The green Confederates had all but announced their arrival with beating drums, intermittent shouts, and scattered gunfire as troops tested their weapons for damp powder. Despite the opposition of the esteemed

Beauregard, who argued that the racket had surely tipped their hand, Johnston did not flinch. "I would fight them if they were a million," he proclaimed and slated the attack for daybreak of April 6. That night nearly 40,000 Southern troops bedded down near

Union lines, some within earshot of Sherman's and Prentiss's camps, and awaited the dawn. They would find out soon enough if the Union army had discovered their approach."*^

As Johnston's columns snaked their way toward the Tennessee, Grant and his army remained blissfully unaware of approaching danger. During the first days of April,

167 however, enemy activity west of the Federal supply depot at Crump's Landing concerned

him. On April 2 Confederates under Benjamin Cheatham established an outpost at Purdy to monitor Union activity. Lew Wallace, whose division guarded the depot and points along the road toward Purdy, interpreted Cheatham's advance as an attack on Crump's

Landing and formed his division to meet it. Although Grant instructed Sherman to watch

for enemy troops moving across his front and placed W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut on alert, he downplayed the possibility of an assault on the Third Division position.

Ironically, Cheatham thought the sudden appearance of Wallace's brigades meant an attack on Purdy and his urgent dispatches to that effect prompted Johnston, who viewed the Union activity as an indication of Buell's impending arrival, to hasten the planned movement toward Pittsburg Landing. Grant knew nothing of what transpired in Corinth but he now entertained the possibility that the Confederates might make small scale attacks on vulnerable points along the Union line, in particular Wallace's isolated position. "I feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores... before Wallace could be reinforced."^® This prospect never left Grant's thinking prior to April 6.

Wallace also took the threat seriously. The Confederates could easily transport troops by rail from Corinth to Bethel Station, a stop along the M & O Railroad only a few miles west of Crump's Landing. Shortly after his arrival at the landing, Wallace, aware of the isolated nature of his position, took measures to protect his command from surprise, including assembling a scouting corps composed of Horace Bell, John C. Carpenter, and

W. C. Sanders.^’ Carpenter and Bell traveled the roads toward Corinth, though they rarely ventured any farther than Monterey, while Sanders, masquerading as a loyal secessionist, made regular visits to Purdy. Once these scouts were in action, Wallace crowed that "not even a squad of bush-rangers" could elude his surveillance net.^-

168 On the evening of April 4, as Wallace fretted about Cheatham, Bell returned bearing ominous news. He had traveled several miles south of Monterey on the main

Corinth road and found the Confederate army, commanded by Johnston, advancing toward Pittsburg Landing, not Wallace's position. Estimating their force at 50,000 men.

Bell predicted they would arrive opposite the Federal encampment by nightfall of April

5. According to Wallace, just as Bell finished his report Carpenter returned with similar information. Wallace claimed he immediately forwarded a dispatch to Grant and instructed the courier to deliver it in person at Pittsburg Landing. If the general had retired to Savannah, the messenger was to order the postmaster to deliver it without delay. But Grant never acknowledged receiving such information nor has a copy of the alleged correspondence surfaced.

In a letter to Wallace written over forty years later, however, Horace Bell corroborated the general's basic story, though his version differed on a few points.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Wallace did receive information on April 4 of a large-scale

Confederate advance upon Pittsburg Landing. Yet, despite professing his belief in the accuracy of Bell's information, Wallace relayed the news in a manner inconsistent with its supposed importance and failed to even insure its receipt. This apparent neglect, he later claimed, resulted from his fear of appearing too overbearing and pretentious in the eyes of his superior. He also assumed, moreover, that the commanding general's intelligence sources had probably already alerted him to this development. "[WJhat right," he asked, "had 1 to suppose General Grant was not on the watch, with more facilities at his command than belonged to me?" He never dreamed, he admitted, "that a force from Corinth meaning battle... could close in upon our divisions. . . without full knowledge of it at headquarters.

But Wallace's excuses seem rather lame and unconvincing when compared to the potentially disastrous consequences for the army if Grant was somehow unaware of the

169 movement. Perhaps the true reason why Wallace failed to forward Bell's intelligence with more alacrity was that the division commander placed little stock in it. On April 5, the day Bell predicted the Confederate army would appear on the Union front, Wallace seemed almost indifferent to that prospect as he fretted about the safety of Crump's

Landing. In a letter to W. H. L Wallace, the commander o f the nearest support division at Pittsburg Landing, he suggested that mounted elements from the Second Division familiarize themselves with the road between their respective commands in case the

Confederates threatened the depot. But he apparently saw little need for haste, however, as he slated this reconnaissance for April 6, the day after Bell expected the Confederates to reach the vicinity of Grant's army. Obviously his scout's report failed to impress

Wallace as much as he later claimed.

In addition, Wallace's skepticism seemingly prevented him from forwarding this important information to other division commanders, particularly Sherman and Prentiss.

Nor did he mention the episode in his official report. Not even his brigade commanders, whom he supposedly informed immediately, viewed the news as significant enough to merit inclusion in their own official renditions. In fact, the first printed reference to this incident emerged in his autobiography written over forty years later and in the shadow of the bitter feud between Grant and Wallace over the latter*s supposed tardiness on the second day at Shiloh. The controversy did serious damage to Wallace's reputation and spilled over into the post-war era as he endeavored, somewhat unsuccessfully, to vindicate himself. This is not to imply that Wallace imagined the whole event, especially since Bell verified it in 1901, but that he harbored doubts about the accuracy of the intelligence he received that evening. Overall, Bell's report apparently had little impact upon Wallace's assessment of the situation, which mirrored Grant's belief that the enemy was at Corinth awaiting an attack, although both allowed for the possibility of a raid on

170 the Union supply depot. Thus, if Wallace questioned the accuracy of information from his own sources, why would Grant, if indeed he received the report, feel inclined to trust it?57

In the meantime, increased Confederate activity on Sherman's front caused concern at Savannah. Early on April 4 a picket near Seay Field, along the main Corinth road less than a mile south of Sherman's foremost brigade, reported seeing enemy soldiers eating breakfast in the woods at the southern edge of the expanse. The observers determined from this sighting that the Confederates occupied the front "in full force."

Later that day the First Alabama Cavalry bagged one of Sherman's picket outposts. The

72nd Ohio, an inexperienced regiment drilling nearby, and a battalion of the 5th Ohio

Cavalry, under Major Elbridge G. Ricker, gave chase and engaged the enemy horseman in a sharp skirmish. Ricker’s men eventually scattered the Alabamians and pursued them for nearly a quarter-mile. But as the Union troopers crested a hill, they ran headlong into two Confederate infantry regiments and artillery arrayed in battle line. Ricker finally extracted his men, bringing away ten prisoners, all of whom came from the First

Alabama Cavalry.^*

At Fifth Division headquarters, however, Sherman attached no special significance to the skirmish, even though Ricker emphasized that two enemy infantry regiments and a large cavalry force lurked nearby. Sherman has received ample criticism for apparently ignoring these ominous signs that pointed to an attack on his Shiloh camps, a mistake that one historian believed "cannot be explained or excused." But

Sherman had a rational explanation for why the Confederates were lurking about his front. Rebel cavalry stalking the roads between Corinth and Shiloh and the presence of infantry and artillery supports at Pea Ridge/Monterey was simply old news. Although he acknowledged that the enemy had a "considerable force" south of his camps, none of this worried him. As evidenced by a letter written to Thomas Ewing on April 4, Sherman

171 believed the contingent down the road was merely an outpost for the main Confederate army in northern Mississippi. "When we move forward," he predicted,"the first collision will occur at Monterey or Pea Ridge [emphasis supplied] and from there all the way to

Corinth." Sherman was not alone in his prediction of a running fight across the

Tennessee countryside. "It is thought the Rebels will not make much of a stand at Purdy," wrote a soldier in Wallace's command, "but will fall back to Corinth as we advance."

More importantly, however, the troops stationed at Pea Ridge/Monterey would naturally reconnoiter the Federal position, which would explain their continued presence outside his lines. Little did Sherman realize, however, that on April 4 his troops had bumped into the advance units of the entire Confederate army creeping north from Corinth.-^

Reveling in his minor victory of the previous day, Sherman reported on April 5 that quiet prevailed near Shiloh and that while enemy cavalry remained on his front, the infantry and artillery had retreated nearly six miles. But the division commander had few means of verifying this information because his cavalry units were in the midst of the reorganization ordered by Grant. Nevertheless, he felt comfortable with his interpretation that the Confederates at Pea Ridge/Monterey posed no substantial threat and that they, along with the main body at Corinth, were content to let the Union army make the first move. So confident was he that the Confederates on his front were but a token force, that on the evening of April 5 he planned to send his cavalry to "drive away or capture" these troublesome Confederates. Due to the strength of his view, Sherman therefore had little patience with several brigade and regimental commanders who chattered nervously about increased Confederate activity in the woods and fields south of

Shiloh Church. The rumors of large enemy forces lurking nearby persisted, but they caused little excitement at division headquarters.^®

In the meantime. Grant displayed less concern for the possible intent behind recent Confederate activity than he did for Sherman's reactions. Perhaps fearing that his

172 subordinate might accidentally drag the army into an engagement in violation of

Halleck’s orders, a circumstance he wished to avoid given his recent troubles with the

department commander, on April 4 Grant rushed to see his subordinate and survey the

situation in person. Enroute he met McPherson and W. H. L. Wallace who informed him

that the skirmish that day had amounted to little and that Sherman expected no more

trouble. Caught in a rainstorm and trusting in Sherman's judgment. Grant decided to

cancel his rendezvous and return to Pittsburg Landing.

The next day he asked Sherman for his appraisal, to which the division

commander replied; "The enemy... got the worst of it yesterday and will not press our

pickets far" for fear of receiving another pounding. He conceded the possibility of more

Confederate probes, but believed they posed no larger threat. Sherman reiterated this

belief in his report: "On Saturday [April 4] the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, yet I did not believe that he designed anything but a demonstration." Thus, confident in the accuracy of his information and assessments, he told Grant on April 5: "I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position." His superior concurred, later admitting that, the enemy sortie on April 4 was viewed as a mere reconnaissance-in-force and did not portend a major Confederate offensive. Thus, Grant's army readied themselves for a fight, but one most everyone in blue believed would happen at

Corinth.®^

Along with his report of the recent skirmish Sherman also sent Grant the ten prisoners captured from the First Alabama, who had bragged unabashedly when captured that their brethren were poised to crush the Union army on the banks of the Tennessee.

Although the prisoners were taken aboard Grant’s personal steamer and transported to

Savannah late on April 5, the district commander either neglected to interrogate them or what they told him failed to shake his established view. Even assuming these captives boasted about the thousands of rebels bearing down upon the Shiloh camps, why would

173 Grant believe their stories when the preponderance of the evidence since mid-March

directly contradicted this view? Other Union officers, perhaps even Sherman, had

dismissed the chattering rebels' stories as "a hoax." More importantly. Grant had ruled

out a large-scale Confederate counteroffensive based not only on intelligence, but upon

his own intuition. And thus far his prescience had not let him down. In a subsequent

telegram to department headquarters, therefore, Grant echoed Sherman's appraisal,

stating that he had "scarsely [sic] the faintest idea of an attack, (general one,) being made

upon us." He anticipated that the Confederates might attempt more small-scale attacks

similar to the one on Sherman's outposts, but that was all they had in store. "There will be

no fight at Pittsburg Landing," he predicted on April 5, "we will have to go to Corinth,

where the rebels are fortified.

As Confederate troops filed into position opposite Union lines on April 5, Grant

wired Halleck with the latest on the enemy's numbers and dispositions. He still claimed

that the enemy's main body remained at Corinth with small contingents along the railroad

to the east and also at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt along the M & O (possibly

intimating a build-up for an attack on Wallace). However, he had yet to fix the strength

o f these positions because "the numbers at these places seem to constantly change." His

estimate of Corinth's strength, including those units within supporting distance, remained

static at 80,000 men, even though this information was nearly six days old. In addition,

the district commander still believed that Beauregard, not Johnston, commanded the

Confederate arm y.^ Though he complained about the unreliability of his information on

the evening of April 5, Grant remained steadfast in his belief that the enemy remained in

Corinth and patiently waited for the Fédérais to pay a visit. The thousands of

Confederates lurking in the dark woods just beyond the Union camps would soon prove

him dreadfully wrong.

174 Early the next morning, Johnston's Army of the Mississippi crashed through the

woods and pounced upon the unsuspecting Fédérais, many of whom formed for battle on their color lines or among their company streets as long lines of Southern infantry emerged from the woods. Elements of the 25th Missouri patrolling near Fraley Field had provided some warning after they collided with the Confederate advance at around 3 a.m.^^ But not until Sherman saw the glistening bayonets of Bragg's infantry bearing down on his camps at about 8 a. m. did he realize that this was not, as he first believed, another demonstration but a "determined attack on our whole camp." "I confess," he acknowledged later, "I did not think Beauregard would abandon his railroads to attack us on our base." Though proven wrong by the sudden onslaught, Sherman quickly found his footing and during the remainder of the day showed why he excelled as a combat leader.

Grant first heard the heavy firing as he sat down to breakfast at his Savannah headquarters around 7 a m. Leaving his food untouched, he boarded a steamer and headed upriver. Before departing he notified Buell of the latest development, claiming rather curiously that he had been "looking for this" but not before "Monday or Teusday

[sic]."^* Although somewhat misleading, the last statement reflected his expectation that the enemy might raid Crump's Landing or, similar to April 4, demonstrate against his perimeter south of Shiloh Church, not that he foresaw a determined attack along his whole front. Buell confirmed Grant's initial response when he noted that the West

Tennessee commander first viewed the firing upriver as merely "an affair of outposts" since "the same thing.. .[had] occurred for the two or three previous days." When he penned the note to Buell, moreover. Grant was still unable to discern the exact origin of the gunfire. Not until he neared Crump's Landing did he realize that the battle sounds

175 emanated from the main Federal encampment further upstream. Clearly Grant did not

foresee a large-scale Confederate assault upon Pittsburg Landing on that peaceful Sunday morning.

Though shocked by the onslaught, some Union brigades fought tenaciously while others disintegrated under the weight of the Confederate assault By noon Sherman and

Prentiss's camps lay behind enemy lines and the Ohio commander, along with

McClemand's command, fought to save the Federal right Meanwhile, scattered remnants of Prentiss's, W. H. L. Wallace's, and Hurlbut's divisions formed for a desperate stand along a sunken road soon to be christened the "Hornet's Nest." By 5:30 p.m. the

Federal right and the Hornet's Nest position had collapsed under the weight of

Confederate numbers, but they had bought Grant enough time to rally his troops and establish a new defensive line near the landing. As night and a torrential downpour settled in, Buell's troops arrived at Pittsburg Landing and, with the addition of Lew

Wallace's division, gave Grant an additional 24,000 men. Realizing that the Confederates were probably as disorganized as his own troops. Grant believed the Union army would prevail "if we could only take the initiative."^*^

Without reconnoitering the Confederate position, the next morning Grant and

Buell struck the Confederates all along the front and eventually drove them back through the shattered Union camps. Astonished that the Union army even remained at the landing after the beating they took on Sunday, the Southerners were unprepared for this grand assault but nevertheless fought ferociously to retain the previous days' hard-earned victory. But the massive Federal counterattack proved too much for their tired and depleted ranks. Beauregard, now in command after Johnston's death on Sunday, ordered a general retreat back to Corinth. Over the next few days his weary army limped into town, thus ending the South's major bid to reclaim the initiative in the Mississippi

Valley.^’ The remarkable turnabout from defeat to victory on April 7 had truly revealed

176 the iron will and steady nerve of U. S. Grant Even though his army was surprised and nearly destroyed, he demonstrated an uncanny "tolerance for disaster"and somehow managed the swirling chaos while maintaining his composure or his unbending faith in ultimate victory. Unfortunately, the shoestring save of the West Tennessee army came at a cost of 13,047 Federal casualties, including over seventeen hundred deadJ^

Despite Grant's triumph, there remains little doubt that the April 6 attack came as a complete surprise. Some of his own men certainly thought so. "I think Gen. Grant fell short in his duty," claimed one soldier, while another complained that, despite omens like the boasts o f the Confederate prisoners captured on April 4, the Union high command expected "as much to see the devil himself as to see the rebels come and attack us in our own camp." Rawlins conceded this point after the war, admitting that "we did not expect to be attacked in force that morning, and were surprised that we w ere... Although

Grant certainly bears the responsibility for being caught off-guard that April Sunday, the pre-battle assessment of enemy intentions that led to the surprise was, given the circumstances, a logical conclusion. As the Confederates gathered at Corinth, he confronted two major explanations for the concentration. First, Southern forces might be converging upon Corinth to establish another defensive barrier, this time to protect

Memphis, the Mississippi Valley, and the important rail connections with the rest of the

Confederacy. On the other hand, they might be assembling a strike force at the rail junction in preparation for a major counteroffensive to expel the invading Federal army and regain the initiative. Both competing interpretations were equally credible, but the defensive-oriented picture of enemy intentions seemed more plausible to Grant based upon his intelligence analysis and insights into past enemy behavior. As one historian noted, "To turn a retreat into a counteroffensive is considered one of the most difficult feats in warfare; neither Grant nor Sherman dreamed that Johnston could do it."^^

177 Although deserters and other passive sources comprised the primary foundation of this view, their reports corroborated each other in two important respects. First, they agreed that the Confederates intended to make a stand at Corinth and, secondly, that sinking morale and growing despondency permeated the gray ranks so deeply that, when the Fédérais finally moved, many a Southern soldier would desert Grant’s correspondence, moreover, provides no indication that he received any reports contradicting this picture, much less news predicting a massive Confederate counterstroke. If his division commanders feared such a possibility, not one expressed their concerns directly to Grant except Lew Wallace, but even he apparently doubted the likelihood of such an occurrence. At the point of the encampment, Sherman perhaps stood the best chance of divining enemy intentions since he had more opportunities to capture prisoners and scout the roads to the south. Contraiy to a popular argument, however, Sherman did not reject information that contradicted his views out of fear that crying wolf a practice that eventually cost him his command in Kentucky in 1861, might once again raise questions about his mental stability. Far from dismissing information on the basis of this selfish motive, Sherman had a rational explanation for the enemy's presence on his front and for their "saucy" behavior.

Finally, neither Halleck nor Buell intimated that an attack on Pittsburg Landing worried them at all. Thus, the evidence, both spoken and unspoken, sustained the hypothesis that the Confederates would make their stand at Corinth. In his biography of

Sherman, John Marszalek maintained that the Union leadership at Shiloh, having dismissed the possibility of attack, "simply ignored all information to the contrary."

Michael Fellman echoed this sentiment recently, arguing that Sherman "ignored the evidence brought to him."^^ On the contrary. Grant and Sherman, did not purposely disregard contradictory intelligence; they simply misinterpreted it.

178 In her classic study o f U. S. intelligence and Japan's surprise attack on Pearl

Harbor in 1941, Roberta Wohlstetter introduced the concepts o f "signals" and "noise" in

intelligence analysis. A signal is a "piece of evidence that tells about a particular...

enemy move or intention" whereas noise is comprised of "competing or contradictory

signals which are useless for anticipating enemy action (in hindsight)." Before Pearl

Harbor "there was a good deal of evidence available to support all the wrong

interpretations." However, these various renderings "appeared wrong onlyafter the event. Prior to the Shiloh surprise. Grant also received "signals" that, after the fact,

seemed obvious indicators of an attack. But at the time, the "noise" generated by an equally plausible—yet completely erroneous— interpretation, namely that the

Confederates waited at Corinth, muffled other, more accurate signals. This occurrence is natural and perhaps unavoidable as long as the timeless element o f human nature, which

injects wishful thinking, subjectivity, and self-confirming beliefs into the process, remains a crucial factor in intelligence analysis. Once this noise-mistaken-as-truth became imbedded in Grant's mind, and that of others, any fears o f an attack-and thus the need for heightened security or entrenchments—declined precipitously. "If no one is listening for signals of an attack against a highly improbably target," argued Wohlstetter,

"then it is veiy difficult for the signals to be heard.

In addition to the noise generated by a competing interpretation, a "local background of noise" created by his past military successes also deafened Grant to the approach of the enemy. The perceived Union victory at Belmont, the inglorious

Confederate surrender of Fort Donelson, despite the formidable nature of the fortress, and the subsequent abandonment of Kentucky and most of Tennessee merely solidified

Grant's growing sense that the South lacked the moral courage and the will needed to prevail. In his view, the enemy was far too demoralized and fearful to attempt a strategic counteroffensive and therefore would retreat, entrench, and react to Union movements.

179 Confirmed by intelligence reports, this view became dogma at Savannah and eventually

throughout the army at Pittsburg Landing. But these past victories and the perceived

advantages offered by the initiative only concealed the inadequacies of Grant's

intelligence. As a result, both veteran and green Union officers inclined toward

explanations of Confederate behavior that conformed to the popular hypothesis.

Wohlstetter ascribed this phenomenon to "the very human tendency to pay attention to

the signals that support current interpretations." As a result, the Fédérais at Pittsburg

Landing became, as one officer described it, "too easy going and less careful."*®

In the final analysis. Grant violated a central tenet of intelligence by basing his

overall assessment on assumptions about the enemy's intentions instead of on knowledge

o f his capabilities.** Instead of a large army preparing to defend its homeland. Grant saw

only a beaten army teetering on the brink of disintegration. As a result, this perception,

supported by intelligence, sapped his vigilance at Shiloh. He failed to realize that

desperation can breed boldness as well as hopelessness. On the other hand, his rendering

of Confederate intentions, based upon their past behavior and the results of his

intelligence analysis, was a rational and logical choice at that time. Although guilty of

letting down his guard in close proximity to the enemy and perhaps allowing wishful thinking and self-confirming beliefs to shape his views. Grant cannot be faulted for his shortcomings as a clairvoyant. Not even the finest intelligence can predict with absolute certainty what the enemy will do; it can only supply indications of what hecan and might do. "At its best, intelligence can provide the bounds for strategic calculation," argued one scholar, "but it is asking too much to expect it to look into the future."*- Grant had his

perceptions, intuition, experience, and imperfect military intelligence to guide him before

Shiloh, not a crystal ball.

Thus, the surprise at Shiloh was due not to a lack of intelligence, although Grant could have exhibited more vigor in pursuing it, but to a fundamental misreading of that

180 intelligence. In December, 1944 the Allied forces in the Ardennes suffered the same fate.

Like Grant, the Allied commanders assumed the enemy "could no longer win the war"

and that any offensive action the Germans took "could only delay the inevitable." But

they all failed to allow for enemy opportunism and that, out of desperation, a foe might

still "envisage the possibility, no matter how remote, for a substantial, though not

decisive... victory." It took the Germans and Albert Sidney Johnston to reveal the

enormous chasm between truth and fiction in their opponent's optimistic assessments.

Both Grant and the Allied high command discovered too late why Napoleon warned that

maintaining a fixed image of the enemy was "the worst thing of all."®^

Despite a near-disaster, the Shiloh experience revisted some old lessons that

Grant believed he had already absorbed. Besides rediscovering the importance of

maintaining a continual flow of intelligence into his headquarters, he also suffered the

harsh consequences of ignoring previous experience. In August, 1861, Grant led troops

into hostile territory for the first time. As he approached the site of a reported enemy

encampment, he found himself overcome with great fear and trepidation. Much to his

relief, however, the foe had fled upon hearing of his approach. Looking over the deserted

camp. Grant experienced what was for him a great martial epiphany. At that moment he

realized the enemy feared him as much as he feared the enemy. As a result o f his

recent successes, however, by April 1862 Grant's rendering of that lesson had undergone a subtle, yet dangerous evolution. He now believed that the Confederates had come to

fear him more. The long gray battle lines steamrolling through the Union camps in the early dawn of April 6 revealed the horrible depth of his self-deception.

******

181 For several weeks after the battle of Shiloh both sides tended their wounded,

buried the dead, and prepared for the next bout. Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing to

take charge of the upcoming offensive aimed at capturing Corinth, which began on April

29. Fearing another surprise attack and anxious to fight the war according to the book,

"Old Brains" advanced cautiously toward the rail junction, entrenching his army, which

included Grant's newly christened Army of the Tennessee, General John Pope's Army of

the Mississippi, and Buell's Army of the Ohio, at every stop along the route. At this

ponderous pace it took nearly a month to traverse the twenty miles to Corinth.

The Army of the Tennessee took an active part in the march and eventual siege of

the Confederate stronghold, but not under Grant's leadership. Halleck had placed

General George H. Thomas in command and moved Grant, perhaps as punishment for

Shiloh, to the nominal position of "second-in-command" of the entire expedition. His

command responsibilities included overseeing the right wing and the reserve. In reality,

however. Grant found himself virtually powerless since the department commander

routinely bypassed him when issuing orders. Angered, Grant asked to be relieved and

sent elsewhere. Halleck refused. Essentially placed on the shelf Grant quietly endured

the ordeal.

Finally, on May 30 Beauregard—unbeknownst to Halleck-evacuated Corinth and

retreated to Tupelo. The abandonment of the key rail junction to the Fédérais led to the evacuation of other Confederate positions, including Memphis. After the Confederates slipped away, Halleck chose to disperse his army to protect the railroads in western

Tennessee and northern Mississippi instead o f pursuing Beauregard. This decision effectively stalled the Union drive into Mississippi. Grant regained command of the

Army of the Tennessee headquartered at Memphis, and in July assumed command of

Halleck's old department when "Old Brains" departed for Washington to be the new general-in-chief. Grant now commanded his army as well as Pope's Army of the

182 Mississippi. As he assessed his new situation. Grant realized that opening the Mississippi

River was still the primary objective and knew that, despite their recent setbacks, the

Confederates still had an army to be reckoned with. They would "turn up somewhere,"

Grant warned, "and [they] have to be whipped yet."*^

183 NOTES

'USG to Julia, February 24,1862, Q E 4 :284.

-USG to Julia, March 1 ,1862, Ibid., 305; USG to Julia, February 16,1862, Ibid., 229-30; USG to Washbume, February 21, 1862, Ibid., 264; USG to Cullum, February 19, 1862, Ibid., 245.

^Charles P. Roland. Albert Sidney Johnston. Soldier of Three Republics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 300; Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 134-49; Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson, 252.

^Halleck to USG, March 16, 1862, QP 4; 367; Clausewitz, On War. 357.

^The proper designation was "Army of the District of West Tennessee," although Grant began calling it the "Army of the Tennessee" just prior to the battle of Shiloh. The latter name was not official, however, until April 21,1862. See Welcher, The Union Army. 2: 176

^Smith to Rawlins, February 23, 1862, Q E 4:280; USG to Cullum, February 24, 1862, Ibid., 279; USG to Julia, February 24, 1862, Ibid., 284; USG to Cullum, February 25, 1862, Ibid., 286-87.

^USG to Julia, February 26, 1862, Ibid., 292; USG to Buell, February 27, 1862, Ibid., 293-94; USG to Kelton, February 28, 1862, Ibid., 299; Buell to McClellan, February 28, 1862. OR 7: 671: Catton. Grant Moves South. 191-93.

^Connelly, Army of the Heartland. 138-39; Roland, Johnston. 301-305.

^USG to Cullum, February 25,1862, QP 4: 286-87; see also USG to Sherman, February 25, 1862, Ibid., 288-89.

•^Halleck to USG, March 1, 1862, QR 7: 674.

* * ^USG to Smith, March 2, 1862, GE4; 311; USG to McClemand, March 2, 1862, Ibid., 308; Halleck to USG, March 4, 1862, Ibid., 319; USG to Julia, March 5, 1862, Ibid., 327; USG to Smith, March 7,1862, OR 10. 2: 17.

'^Halleck to Cullum, February 24, 1862, Ibid. 7; 661; Halleck to USG, March 6,1862, Ibid. 10, 2: 15; Catton, Grant Moves South. 193-208; Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April (Dayton, Oh.: Momingside House, Inc., 1974), 16-17; Halleck to USG, March 13, 1862, GP 4: 354; Halleck to McClellan, March 15,1862. OR 7: 683-84.

184 War Order No. 3, March 11, 1862, Ibid, 10,2; 28-29.

’'^Sword, Shiloh, 6-11; William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (1875; New York: Da Capo Press, 1984), 228; Lew Wallace, Lew Wallace: An Autobiography. 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1906), 1:447; Halleck to McClellan, ^ ^ c h 10, 1862, Q R 10,2: 24-25; Halleck to Buell, March 14, 1862, Ibid., 38.

‘^Sword, Shiloh. 17; Catton, Grant Moves South. 211; USG to Julia, March 11, 1862, QE 4: 348-49.

^^USG to Halleck, March 5, 1862, Ibid, 317-18; USG to Smith, March 5, 1862, Ibid., 324; USG to Sherman, March 5, 1862, Ibid, 325; G win to Foote, March 5,1862, Q R 10, 2: 8. Sherman corroborated Grant's information the next day. Sherman to Halleck, March 6, 1862, Ibid., 12.

^^Smith to Rawlins, March 14, 1862, GE 4: 369-70; USG to Halleck, March 15, 1862, Ibid., 366; USG to Halleck, March 15,1862, Ibid, 367.

^^Sherman to Capt. William McMichael, March 16, 1862, RG 393, entry 2593, Department of the Missouri, Letters Received, box 5, NA.

^^Sword Shiloh. 30. Smith, who had seriously scraped his leg climbing into a rowboat, died from a tetanus infection on April 25. See Ibid., 7,441.

^°lbid., 24,27-30,35-37; Sherman to Rawlins, March 17, 1862, GE 4:379; Sherman, Memoirs. 229,247; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 332. According to Rawlins, however, even Smith believed fortifications were unnecessary and ultimatelly detrimental to morale. See Rawlins to Prof. Henry Coppee, November 25,1865, Hillyer Papers, box 2, UVaL. For an excellent discussion of Grant and Sherman's decision in light of contemporary regulations and military engineering theories, see Hagerman, Origins of Modem Warfare. 169.

Sword Shiloh. 35. For Halleck's views on a possible enemy attack, see Halleck to Buell, March 29, 1862, QR 10,2: 77.

22u SG to McLean, March 17,1862, GE.4: 378.

22u SG to Halleck, March 18,1862, Ibid., 386-87; USG to McLean, March 19,1862, Ibid., 393-93; Lew Wallace to Susan Wallace, March 15, 1862, Lew Wallace Collection, box 1, IndH.

185 -'^USG to McLean, March 19, 1862, ÜE4; 392-93; USG to Buell, March 19, 1862, Ibid., 393-94. One of these scouts, Irving W. Carson, was an engineer on the Illinois Central Railroad before the war and worked for Prentiss gathering intelligence in Missouri. The trip to find Buell would be his last mission; he was killed at the battle of Shiloh less than a month later. See Ibid.

2%aIIeck to USG, March 18, 1862, QR 10,2:46; USG to Halleck, March 19, 1862, Ibid., 49; USG to Halleck, March 20, QR 4: 396-97; USG to Halleck, March 21, 1862, Ibid., 400-401; Halleck to USG, March 20,1862, OR 10,2; 50-51. See also. Sword, Shiloh. 32-33.

-^USG to Halleck, March 21,1862, QE 4; 400-401 ; USG to Halleck, March 20, 1862, Ibid., 396-97.

^^Lew Wallace to Susan Wallace, March 21, 1862, Lew Wallace Collection, box 1, IndH.

^*USG to Halleck, March 23, 1862, QE 4; 410; Smith to USG, March 23, 1862, Ibid., 411; USG to Smith, March 23, 1862, Ibid.; Sherman to McMichael, March 20, 1862, QR 10,2: 52; Sherman to Colonel Jesse Hildebrand, March 23, 1862, Ibid., 61; Sherman to Colonel David Stuart, March 23, 1862, Ibid.; Sherman to General H. K. Strong, March 24, 1862, Ibid., 65. See also. Sword, Shiloh. 33.

-^Smith to USG, March 23, 1862, QE4; 411; USG to Smith, March 23, 1862, Ibid. Ruggles assumed command of the Corinth forces on February 17 and remained in charge until Bragg arrived in mid-March. Beauregard, in overall command of the new "Army of the Mississippi" gathering at Corinth and along the railroad, remained incapacitated due to illness in Jackson, Tennessee. Why Grant viewed Ruggles as such an incompetent officer remains unknown. See Ruggles to Johnston, February 18, 1862, QR 7:891; General Orders No. 11, March 19,1862, Ibid., 10,2; 342; Sword, Shiloh, 64-65,74, 82.

^®Ibis., 44-47. Although Buell sent the message on March 23, communication problems delayed its transmission to Halleck until April 2. See QR 10,2: 79-80.

Buell to Halleck, March 23, 1862, Ibid., 59; USG to Halleck, March 26,1862, GP 4: 424.

^^Johnston to Davis, March 25, 1862, Ibid., 303; Johnston to Davis, March 7, 1962, Ibid., 302; Sword, Shiloh. 63-68, 84-85.

^^Davis to Johnston, March 26, 1862, OR 10,2: 365; Johnston to Davis, April 3, 1862, Ibid., 387; Davis to Johnston, April 5, 1862, Ibid., 394. See also Sword, Shiloh, 91-92, 109; and James Lee McDonough, Shiloh-in Hell before Night (Knoxville. Tenn.: The Univeristy o f Termessee Press, 1977), 98.

186 to Halleck, March 24, 1862, QS. 10,2:64-65; Halleck to Buell, March 26, 1862, Ibid., 66; USG to McLean, March 31,1862, GP 4; 451-52.

^^Colonel William W. Lowe to Rawlins, March 28, 1862, Ibid., 435-36; Captain William Rowley to Washbume, March 29, 1862, Ibid., 446; Halleck to Buell, March 29, 1862, QR, 10,2:77.

■’^USG to McLean, March 30, 1862, QR4; 447-48; Halleck to Stanton, April 8, 1862, QR, 10, 2; 98; Halleck to USG, March 31,1862, Ibid., 82.

^^On the cavarly reorganization, see General Orders No. 33, April 2, 1862, Ibid., 87, Sword, Shiloh. 120,129 and Starr. Union Cavalry. 3: 46-47.

^^Spencer Kellogg Brown, a spy employed by Commodore William D. Porter, traveled from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing during the battle of Shiloh, but his information was moot by the time he reported to Grant. Brown's original mission, however, was not to aid Grant, but to gather intelligence on Confederate fortifications along the Mississippi River for the Navy. He was in Corinth only by happenstance and headed toward Shiloh not to report his findings, but to end his harrowing journey in the South in which he narrowly escaped the hangman's noose. Brown's father later claimed that his son told Grant on the morning of April 7 that the Confederates had exhausted their reinforcements, leading the general to counterattack that day with renewed vigor. GranL however, did not meet Brown until April 9. In addition, the intelligence Grant attributed to him does not corroborate the elder Brown's version. See George Gardner Smith, ed., Spencer Kellogg Brown: His Life in Kansas and his Death as a Spy, 1842-1863 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1903), 231-54; Porter to Foote, April 20,1862, OR 10,2: 121; "Report of Fourth Master [S.] Kellogg, regarding the Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi River, April 8, 1862," QRM 22: 767-68; USG to Halleck, April 9, 1862, QP 5: 31.

^^McMichael to Col. Grenville M. Dodge, December 16, 1861, Grenville Mellon Dodge Papers, box 2, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, [henceforth Dodge Papers, SHSI].

‘^^John J. Riggin, Jr. to McClemand, March 25, 1862, Ibid., 4:422; McClemand to USG, March 25, 1862, Ibid.; USG to McClemand, March 25, 1862, Ibid., 421-22; USG to McLean, March 29, 1862, Ibid., 440.

Sherman to Halleck, February 25, 1862, QR 7: 666; Sword, Shiloh. 136, I I 7-18; James Marshall-Comwall, Grant as Military Commander (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), 72.

'’^Sword, Shiloh. 116-17.

187 to McLean, March 15, 1862, ÛE4; 368; USG to Julia, March 18, 1862, Ibid., 389. The Confederates received more cooperation from the local citizenry in their intelligence collection efforts. See Sword. Shiloh. 116-17.

^Ibid., 81.

'^^Sherman to Taylor, April 2, 1862, ÛR 10,2; 87; Sherman to Col. David Stuart, April 2, 1862, Ibid.; USG to Smith, March 26, 1862, GE.4:425; Sherman to Rawlins, April 3, 1862, QE. 10,2: 90; Taylor to Sherman, April 3,1862, Ibid., 10, T. 86. See also. Sword, Shiloh. 119.

'^^aylor to Sherman, April 3, 1862, Π10, 1: 86; Sherman to Ellen Sherman, April 3, 1862, GE5: 5; Sherman to Thomas Ewing, April 4, 1862, Ibid.

^^Tbe First Alabama Cavalry had arrived at Pea Ridge on March 31 with orders to scout the Union position. Yet Johnston's marching orders were not disseminated until late on April 2. Thus, when captured the following day, Lammon might have known very little about the upcoming offensive anyway. See Bragg to Gen. James R. Chalmers, March 31, 1862, OR 10, 2: 375-76; Sword, ShOoh. 92.

'^SUSG to McLean, April 3,1862, GE 5: 3.

^^Sword, Shiloh. 97-114; Roland, Johnston. 317-25.

^®Sword, Shiloh. 94-97; Wallace, Autobiography. 1; 449-50; Grant, Personal Memoirs. I : 334.

^’Horace Bell enlisted in the 6th Indiana Volunteer Infantry for three months' service and later became a scout for Wallace. For some unknown reason. Grant had him arrested after Shiloh but he went on to scout for General James C. Veatch and ended the war working for General Edward R. S. Canby in the Military Division o f West Mississippi. See Horace Bell Pension File, NA; E. A. McLaflin to General James Bowen, February 3, 1863, RG 393, entry 2637, box 1, NARA. Bell also wrote a book after the war, but he remained silent on his services as a scout. See Horace Bell, On the Old West Coast. Being further Reminscences of a Ranger. Lanier Bartlett, ed. (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1930). John C. Carpenter enlisted in the 5th Ohio Cavalry in February, 1862, but was detailed on secret service at Crump's Landing on March 19, 1862. See Wallace to Rawlins, April 11, 1862, RG 393, entry 2593, box 5, NA; Wallace, Autobiography, 1: 450. Specific information on Sanders remains scarce, but he was detained by Confederate authorities on March 31 on the road to Purdy. Col. Preston Smith to Maj. C. G. Rogers, March 31,1862, QR. 10,2:374-75.

^^Wallace, Autobiography. 1:450-51.

188 53lbid, 454-58.

to Wallace, November 29, 1901, Lew Wallace Collection, IndH.

^^Wallace, Autobiography. 1:458; Sword, Shiloh. 118.

^^Lew Wallace to W. H. L. Wallace, April 5, 1862, Wallace-Dickey Papers, box 2, ISHL.

^^Wallace to Rawlins, April 12, 1862, QR 10, 1; 169-174; Wallace. Autobiography 1; 458. On the Grant-Wallace controversy, see reports of Wallace and Grant’s staff in Ibid., 174-90; Sword, Shiloh. 439-40; and Harold Lew Wallace, "Lew Wallace's March to Shiloh Revisited." Indiana Magazine of History 59 (March 1963): 19-30.

58Sword, Shiloh. 122-25.

^^Sherman to Thomas Ewing, April 4, 1862, GP 5:5; Joseph Allan Frank and George A. Reaves. Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989), 77.

^®0n Sherman's jubilant mood, see W. H. L. Wallace to Ann Wallace, April 5, 1862, Wallace-Dickey Papers, box 2, ISHL. Special Orders No. 18, April 4,1862, QR. 10, 2:92- 93; Sword, Shiloh. 125-30.

^%id., 125.

^^Sherman to USG, April 5, 1862, GE 5; 14, 16; Sherman to Rawlins, April 5, 1862, Ibid.; Sherman to USG, April 10, 1862, QR 10,1: 248; USG to Jesse Grant, April 26, 1862, GE 5: 78; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 332, 334;.

Sherman to Rawlins, April 5, 1862, GE. 5:16; Sword, Shiloh, 133; USG to Halleck, April 5, 1862, Ibid., 13; Diary of General Jacob Ammen, April 5, 1862, GR 10, 1:330- 331; Frank and Reaves, Seeing the Elephant 143.

^Halleck also believed Beauregard and "part of the Manassas army" confronted Grant. Halleck to Stanton, April 5, 1862, GR 10,2: 93.

^^USG to Halleck, April 5, 1862, 1862, GE 5: 13; USG to Julia, April 8, 1862, Ibid., 27; USG to Buell, April 5, 1862, Ibid., 16.

^Sword, Shiloh. 141-90.

*^^Sherman's Official Report, April 10, 1862, GR 10, 2:249; Sword, Shiloh. 189.

68lbid„ 213; USG to Buell, April 6, 1862, GE 5: 17.

189 ^^Grant, Personal Memoirs. I; 336; Sword, Shiloh. 215-16; Buell to McLean, April 15, 1862, OR 10,1:292.

^^Sword, Shiloh. 191-368; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 348.

Sword, Shiloh. 369-422.

^^This concept is described by Richard Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," in Douglas H. Dearth, ed. Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U. S. Army War College, 1991), 395.

^^The Confederates suffered over 23,000 casualties. See Sword, Shiloh. Appendix C, 460-61.

^"^Frank and Reaves, Seeing the Elephant 142-43; Wilson, Rawlins, 448.

^^Roland, Johnston. 329.

^^For recent manifestations of this interpretation, see Marszalek, Sherman. 176 and Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman (New York: Random House, 1995), 91-109, 114.

^^Marszalek, Sherman. 175; Fellman, Citizen Sherman, 114.

^^Roberta Wohlstetter. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 3,392.

^^Michael Handel agued that "In the final analysis, intelligence problems are human- problems of perception, subjectivity, and wishful thinking-and thus are not likely to disappear no matter how much the technological means of intelligence improve." Michael 1. Handel. War. Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 70; Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor. 392.

*®Ibid.; Frank and Reaves, Seeing the Elephant, 77.

Allied intelligence officers made the same mistake just prior to the surprise German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December, 1944. See Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bongard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge. December, 1944 - January. 1945 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1994), 40.

*^Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 42-43.

190 *^Dupuy, et al.. The Battle o f the Bulge. 40,44; Luvaas, "Napoleon," 31.

^"^Grant Personal Memoirs, 1; 249-50.

^^Although Grant commanded Halleck's Department o f the Mississippi, officially the spot remained vacant until October 25 when Grant was appointed the head of the newly named Department of the Tennessee. See General Orders No. 1, Department of the Tennessee, October 15, 1862, QR 17,2; 294. Catton, Grant Moves South. 263-77; USG to Julia, May 31, 1862, GE 5: 134.

191 CHAPTER 6

A FRUSTRATING INTERLUDE; NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI, 1862

After replacing Halleck in command of the Union forces in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi on July 17, Grant moved the headquarters of the District of

West Tennessee to Corinth and plunged into the task of protecting his scattered command, including over 360 miles of railroad track, and planning for a future campaign. * Besides securing a 115-mile front, chasing the ubiquitous guerrillas, rebuilding burned railroad bridges, replacing tom-up track, and managing an overtly hostile population. Grant also monitored the enemy's main army still recuperating at

Tupelo, only fifty miles further south. The loss of initiative after the Corinth campaign, which was sealed when Halleck dispersed the army to protect the newly-conquered territories, not only left Grant with the difficult task of defending his far-flung command, but also placed the burden of intelligence squarely upon his shoulders. Until Grant consolidated his armies for an offensive, the Confederates could strangle his logistical lines and perhaps swallow his isolated garrisons in detail. Moreover, as long as Union leaders in Washington remained tranfixed with events in Virginia, troops in the Western theater were likely to remain on the defensive, making the need for accurate and timely intelligence even more acute.^

From the outset. Grant faced difficulties in meeting this demand. First, communications between posts remained tenuous as guerrillas and Confederate cavalry severed telegraph wires-, interrupted rail traffic, and captured Union couriers. Moreover,

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193 Memphis and the stretch of river below Columbus, Kentucky could only be contacted by rail and steamboat, leaving them virtually isolated.^ Second, since the lack of a centralized army-wide intelligence service left this task up to individual commanders in the field, the effort and time invested in secret service activity depended heavily upon their experience with and opinions about this shadowy enterprise.^ Fortunately, Grant had several subordinates under his command who understood the importance of intelligence and worked tirelessly to keep themselves—and their commander—informed.

For example, Sherman, who became head of the District of Memphis, had obviously learned a lesson at Shiloh and, dispatched his own scouts and spies to watch the enemy.

In addition. Brigadier General William S. Rosecrans, Pope's successor in command of the

Army of the Mississippi, brought his keen organizational skill to bear upon intelligence operations and would have a profound influence upon his own successor. Brigadier

General Grenville M. Dodge. Before Halleck departed for Washington he gave

Rosecrans permission to "arrange his scouts and cavalry movements" completely independent of direction from headquarters. Apparently, Grant maintained this arrangement after Halleck's departure.^ But key questions remained. Did Grant learn any lessons about intelligence from the Shiloh debacle? Would he do what was necessary to better inform himself of the enemy situation?

After Halleck's departure. Grant made some changes in the conduct of intelligence operations. In General Order No. 65, he declared that only personnel

"employed on secret service" would be permitted to venture into enemy territory and these operatives could do so only on orders from division commanders. The directive also stipulated that Union pickets must send Confederate deserters and prisoners of war to the nearest officer for a "thorough examination." Although not a sweeping mandate for the use of scouts and spies, the measure indirectly consolidated authority-and responsibility—for secret operations at the division level and tightened up the procedures

194 for handling deserters and prisoners as information sources. This order constituted a first step, albeit not a strong one, in mandating responsibility for intelligence collection to commanders in the field. Before, commanders had carried out intelligence operations on an ad hoc basis. Under Grant's new orders these officers were given the power to broaden their operations and began shifting the intelligence burden from district headquarters to division commanders. Regardless of this shift, however. Grant remained the final arbiter on how that information was interpreted and used.^

Despite indications that Grant had indeed learned a valuable intelligence lesson at

Shiloh, not everyone was convinced. Several weeks before Halleck received his summons to Washington, Grant advised him that 30,000 Confederates were prepared to attack LaGrange, Tennessee. Perhaps afraid that Shiloh had spooked his subordinate into believing every rumor of an attack, Halleck chided Grant for confusing gossip with the truth and offered an unsolicited lesson in intelligence. "Why not sen[d] out [a] strong reconnaissance & ascertain factsT [emphasis in original] "It looks very much like a mere stampede," he continued, warning that "Floating rumors are never to be received as facts. Armoyed by Halleck's reprimand. Grant replied coolly that "I heed as little of the floating rumors about the City as any one" and flatly denied being fooled or panicked by hearsay. "Stampeding is not my weakness." He also noted that his cavalry regularly patrolled the countryside southeast of the city and only an acute shortage of troopers prevented him from sending out more. Grant appeared to be pursuing intelligence more aggressively, a trait he had not shown since Cairo.*

After assuming command of the troops in western Tennessee and northern

Mississippi, Grant had a good reason to be wary. Aware that the Fédérais had relinquished the initiative in Mississippi but apprehensive about Buell’s move toward

East Tennessee, on June 27 General Braxton Bragg, who had replaced Beauregard in command of the Confederate Army of Mississippi, sent Major General John P.

195 McCown’s division toward Chattanooga to help Major General Kirby Smith's troops

defend East Tennessee. Although Bragg flirted with the idea of marching from Tupelo

into Middle Tennessee, Smith's predicament scuttled his plans. On July 23 he sent the

remainder of his army—35,000 men—by rail to Chattanooga to join what would soon

evolve into a bid to reclaim Tennessee and Kentucky and redeem the disaster-plagued

western Confederacy. Bragg's troops went by way of Mobile and Montgomery in

Alabama, and then through Atlanta but still reached Chattanooga before Buell, whose

advance was slowed by railroad repairs and persistent attacks on his communications.

Left to stop Grant were 16,000 men under Major General Earl Van Dom, whose main

duty was the defense of Vicksburg, and Major General Sterling Price's 16,000 men

protecting northern Mississippi. Overall, Bragg hoped these forces would keep Grant

from reinforcing Buell and allow the rest of Bragg's troops to slip away to join the

Confederate offensive.^

As Bragg prepared to transfer his army to Tennessee, Grant's intelligence

indicated that the Confederates had a different objective. On July 19 a railroad employee

from Mobile asserted that Bragg aimed toward Corinth. The next day, however,

Rosecrans learned from an escapee from the Tupelo jail that Bragg's army had already

departed for Chattanooga. In addition, a Southern deserter overheard Price promise his

Missourians that they would soon return, after a short detour through Kentucky, to their

home state. This diverse information revealed only that a move from Tupelo was afoot

but shed little light on the enemy's true objective. Grant even suspected that the reports

concerning Bragg might have been planted "with the view of having the information

reach us" and throw the Fédérais off the trail. By month's end, the district commander still had only suspicious reports and rumors to go on, leaving him uncertain as to whether

Bragg intended to move on Chattanooga or retake Corinth. The day Bragg's army

196 entrained for Chattanooga, Grant admitted that "nothing absolutely certain of the movements of the enemy have been learned " Concerned for the safety o f Corinth and his left flank. Grant continued to monitor events to the south. Luckily, he had help.

Appointed to command the Army of the Mississippi after Pope's transfer to

Virginia, Brigadier General William Starke Rosecrans brought an engineer's fondness for organization to intelligence collection. Upon arriving at his Jacinto headquarters in late

June, Rosecrans organized a corps of scouts, under the immediate command of Brigadier

General Charles S. Hamilton, a division commander in the Army of the Mississippi, and spies who received direction mostly from army headquarters. * * Although adept at gathering information, the new commander would be much less proficient at utilizing what he had learned. Rosecrans did many things well as a commander, except fight battles.

Rosecrans also worked to enhance the topographical knowledge o f his area of operations. Drawing upon his experience in the U. S. Army Topographical Engineers, he instituted the use of so-called "information maps." These were detailed maps of the operational area that were contantly updated with the latest intelligence "from scouts, spies, citizens, and all other sources." The maps were then photographed and distributed to commanders in the field. These officers were then charged with sending revisions to headquarters to update the master map. To ensure accuracy, Rosecrans assigned each brigade commander a topographical engineer whose primary responsibility was to amend the maps and send changes to Jacinto. Grant was impressed by Rosecrans "most excellent map" that showed "all the roads and streams in the surrounding country" on the Union left. For that reason. Grant "deferred very much" to his subordinate's judgment on intelligence matters in that vicinity.

Rosecrans also commanded talented subordinates who aggressively pursued intelligence. One of his cavalry commanders. Colonel Philip H. Sheridan, possessed a

197 keen appreciation for intelligence, or what he called "that great essential of success."

Based at Booneville, Mississippi, about thiry miles north of Tupelo, Sheridan was

"expected to furnish, by scouting and all other means available, information as to what was going on within the Confederate lines."*^ On July 27, a patrol from his brigade drove Confederates out of Ripley and, in the process, gained important intelligence. A bundle of private correspondence fell into Sheridan's hands and its contents provided evidence of the "transfer from Mississippi of most of Bragg's army" to east Tennessee." A few days later Sherman corroborrated this news. By months' end, it appeared as if

Bragg was marching east while Price's army remained behind at Holly Springs and Grand

Junction to keep Grant's army in check.

After reviewing this and other evidence on August 1, Grant felt certain that "there is but a small force in front of us[,] most having gone Eastward." Characteristically, he saw in this situation an opportunity to destroy Price, or at least push him further south.

Halleck disagreed, preferring that Grant keep his troops on the defensive as a ready- reserve for Buell's army marching toward Chattanooga. But Grant downplayed the threat to Buell because he believed, based upon some recently intercepted letters from

Confederate soldiers, that Bragg was leading "the mass of [his] disciplined troops" to

Richmond, Virginia, not to East Tennessee, leaving mostly untrained and less disciplined regiments behind. "I have no positive evidence of this," Grant admitted, "but the conviction is strong with me." Buell's impassioned argument that the Confederates proposed to concentrate in east Tennessee and attempt to "regain what they have lost [i.e.

Middle Tennessee and Kentucky]" challenged, but did not change. Grant's assessment.

As late as August 25 the district commander still held that Virginia was Bragg's true destination.^^

Bragg's movements and intentions, however, were of less concern to Grant than those of the enemy forces directly on his front. On August 12, he had heard from a spy,

198 who had perused the railroad logbooks at Mobile, that not only had nearly 56,000 of

Bragg's men passed through there to Chattanooga, but Price planned a demonstration

from Tupelo to "cover a flank movement on the rail road and Tenne[sseeJ east from

here."*^ In other words. Grant feared that Price would somehow divert his attention and

send his Army of the West around the Union left flank into Tennessee. To make matters

worse, this news arrived at the same time that Buell’s manpower requests became urgent,

meaning that Grant's forces would suffer further reductions with which to hold his 115-

mile front.

But the threat to Buell was real. Bragg planned to launch a major Confederate

counteroffensive from East Tennessee to reclaim Southern losses in the West, including

Kentucky. To meet this threat, Halleck ordered Grant to reinforce the Army of the Ohio.

On August 14 two divisions of Rosecrans' army embarked to join Buell. With these

reductions and with the need to defend every point along his supply lines to the north.

Grant grew more anxious that the Confederates who remained behind might easily

concentrate for an attack against a weak point. Even more frustrating was that this state

of affairs effectively ruled out the offensive campaign he had longed to initiate. "1 am

now in a situation," he complained, "where it is impossible for me to do more than to

protect my long lines of defense." Grant found himself in a vulnerable position and one

he loathed; he had surrendered the initiative. ’ ^

During August and early September, Grant fretted about the depletion of his army and speculated on Price's likely objectives. For a time in August he believed that Price's

role was to freeze Union forces along the Tennessee-Mississippi border while Bragg

marched either to Chattanooga or to Richmond. After Halleck siphoned off more troops

from his command. Grant feared that Price and Van Dom would discover his vulnerabilty and assault his thinning lines. By month's end rumors indicating that Price was

199 advancing toward Corinth, that Confederate cavalry had disrupted Federal communications in West Tennessee, and a message from Halleck requesting another division for Buell intensified boded ill for the District of West Tennessee.^*

At the beginning of September Grant faced several problems. First, he needed either significant reinforcements or a reduction of his commitments in West Tennessee and northern Mississippi. Before releasing another division from Rosecrans' army for service with Buell, Grant, claiming to be "weak & threatened," urged Halleck to consider abandoning the Memphis & Charleston Railroad east of Corinth. When the general-in- chief agreed. Grant detached Brigadier General Gordon Granger's division, which included Sheridan’s cavalry, and ordered Rosecrans and his remaining two divisions to pull back to the Corinth area. Grant also shuffled other troops within his district to maximize his ability to concentrate forces quickly upon a threatened point. The district commander would soon have over half of his 45,000 troops clustered near the front to meet an enemy thrust. Although still facing acute manpower problems. Grant had at least increased his chances of parrying a Confederate thrust

The second issue centered upon his ability to locate Price and discern his intentions. Being on the defensive and tied to fixed positions, finding the enemy and anticipating likely objectives became paramount, especially since Grant could ill-afford to weaken his thin lines in one place to strengthen another until he knew for sure where the Confederates would strike.^® Thus, over the next several days Grant considered the possible avenues his adversaiy might take. For example. Price could pass around

Rosecrans' flank at Corinth, covering the move with a demonstration elsewhere, cross the

Tennessee, and descend upon Buell's rear. On the other hand, he might simply remain in the area to fix Grant's attention and thereby prevent further reinforcements from going to

Buell. Moreover, in his weakened condition and with little hope of aid. Grant also feared Price might seize this opportunity to retake Corinth and evict the Fédérais from

200 northern Mississippi. Price's cavalry and Mississippi Partisan Rangers under Colonel

William C. Falkner had already made resupply difficult A coordinated offensive might

loosen the already tenuous Union grip on the region. Watching and waiting for the

enemy to make their move. Grant remarked that this was, for him, the "most anxious

period o f the war. *

In early September Sterling Price knew what he wanted to do. Under orders from

Bragg to prevent Federal reinforcements, specifically Rosecrans' army, from going to

Buell, Price looked to General Earl Van Dom, commanding the District o f the

Mississippi at Jackson, for assistance. Although offering to participate in immobilizing

Grant along the Tennessee-Mississippi line. Van Dom, co-equal to Price in the confusing

world of Confederate organization in the West, proposed a different objective-

reclaiming West Tennessee—and delayed sending support. The situation changed when

Bragg, believing that Buell was pursuing him into Kentucky and that Rosecrans had also

been called to the Bluegrass State, ordered the Army of the West to march on Nashville,

supposedly abandoned by the Fédérais. Using these orders as an excuse to initiate

independent operations. Price left Tupelo on September 7 and reached G untown, thirty-

five miles south of Corinth on the M & O Railroad, the next day. While at G untown he

leamed that Rosecrans currently occupied luka, twenty miles southeast of Corinth on the

M & C Railroad. He interpreted this to mean that the Army of the Mississippi was

indeed enroute to join Buell and, given Bragg's earlier orders to prevent this, he decided

to pursue. Leaving the tardy Van Dom on his own. Price diverted his army toward luka.--

At that time, however, the Army of the Mississippi had already abandoned the

railroad toward luka, retreated west, and bivouacked near Clear Creek, only five miles

southeast of Corinth. Only a rearguard of 1500 men remained at luka to oversee the removal of army stores. On September 13 Price's cavalry appeared south o f luka. After the Fédérais tumed back the Confederate troopers, the luka commander leamed from

201 prisoners that Price's infantry was not far behind. Leaving behind a vast amount of supplies, the garrison evacuated the town. Price's army entered luka at sunrise on

September 14. Knowing now that Rosecrans had retreated to the west and was evidently not headed for Tennessee, Price wrote a quick note to Van Dom pledging his support in a combined effort to reclaim the prize of northern Mississippi: Corinth.-"*

Meanwhile, sketchy reports of Price's movements and intentions trickled in to

Grant's Corinth headquarters. On September 7, Hamilton reported that, according to his

"citizen scouts," Price's army o f36,000 men had reached Twenty Mile Creek, directly south of his lines, and were moving north for an attack. Later the same day he revised this assessment, claiming that Price and Van Dom had united but, contrary to his earlier report, had yet to formulate offensive plans. Even testimony the next day from a

Southem deserter, who claimed his comrades marched for Kentucky, failed to dissuade

Hamilton that Price and Van Dom lurked in the vicinity with their eyes on Corinth.^^

Rosecrans disagreed with his subordinate, although he affirmed that the enemy had two possible options: they could either slip past the Union left into Termessee or stay and fight But the reports of a large Confederate encampment at Twenty Mile

Creek, east of the M & O toward the Alabama line, indicated an eastward march into northem Alabama past Florence where the Muscle Shoals prevented the passage of

Union gunboats up the Tennessee. Moreover, a reconnaissance had revealed that only a few enemy regiments camped near Baldwyn, about thirty miles south of Corinth on the

M & O, "with no particular signs of movement," which contradicted the notion of a large force descending upon the town along the railroad axis. "[T]he rebels are playing a game of bluff," concluded Rosecrans. Not only were they weaker (only 12,000 men) than earlier reported, the Confederates hoped their recent activity would "cover up a

202 movement on Buells [sic] right and rear" through northem Alabama.^^ Unknown to

Rosecrans, however, his patrol to Baldwyn somehow missed seeing an entire division of

Price's army camped there and further south at Guntown.-^

Grant puzzled over the conflicting reports from his subordinates with little

success. "With all the vigilance I can bring to bear," he stated bluntly on September 9, "I

cannot determine the objects of the Enemy." Although most evidence pointed toward an

attack on Corinth, the district commander acknowledged the validity of Rosecrans'

interpretation. Due to the presence o f a large Confederate force at Twenty Mile Creeek,

he was concerned that the enemy's northward advance might be a feint to prevent Union

reinforcements from leaving the area or to conceal other major shifts of Confederate

personnel, including an advance against Buell. Although Grant downplayed the

possibility of an attack on Corinth or Bolivar and despite Halleck's reassurance that

"There can be no very large force to attack you," he continued concentrating his forces to

act as a ready-reserve for any threatened point along the left and center.^*

Amidst this confusion, and as Price's troops headed northeast from Guntown

toward luka on September 11, Rosecrans tried to persuade Grant that the enemy

movements, especially that in the direction of Corinth, was merely a ruse to cover a

larger advance across the Tennessee. As evidence, he submitted that the unusual amount

of noise generated by the enemy belied their true mission as a diversion. "[WJaming us

not usual," he noted. Moreover, the Confederates had intended upon sending Price to

Tennessee all along; "[T]his I am sure was a plan of Bragg & Beuregard [sic]." Finally,

he argued simply that "it is in their interest to do this."^^ Hamilton, on the other hand,

still viewed the situation differently, especially after a deserter claimed that Price and an army o f40,000 wanted to reclaim Corinth and that they had already passed Baldwyn on

203 the M & O, and were now less than thirty miles away. By September 11 Grant had accepted Hamilton's interpretation and informed Halleck that "Everything indicates that

we will be attacked here in the next 48 hours.

Within a few days, however. Grant began to view the situation differently. On

September 12 Sherman reported that another sizeable enemy force, including

Breckinridge's command, had occupied Holly Springs, about fifty miles southwest of

Corinth, with plans to either attack the Union center at Bolivar or "hold us in check while

Bragg pushes on to Kentucky." Two days later, while Price's Army of the West marched in to luka, Rosecrans leamed that only Confederate cavalry had taken that town since their infantry lagged two days behind. He maintained that Price was still heading away from Corinth toward Buell's rear, citing as evidence a scouting report that showed no enemy concentrations as far south as Guntown.^ * Ironically, Hamilton provided support for Rosecrans' assessment the next day when captured prisoners from Price's command confirmed that the Confederates-40,000 strong—were still about twenty miles south of luka at Peyton's Mills. "This shows a movement east of the Rebel Army," he surmised.

A scouting detail from Rienzi corroborated the above judgments stating that Confederate prisoners along with local citizens claimed that Price's objective was "some point on the

Tenn[essee] River." Unfortunately, what no one knew was that Price's entire army, consuming the abandoned Fédérais supplies at luka, was only a day's march from

Corinth.

After reviewing the evidence generated over the past few days. Grant concluded on September 15 that Van Dom and Breckinridge at Holly Springs planned to assault

Corinth and divert attention from Price's exodus across the Tennessee to join Bragg.

Unaware that Price had already occupied luka, however. Grant erroneously placed the enemy's main force at Bay Springs, at least a days march further south, heading northeast toward the Tennessee River. To prevent their escape. Grant proposed striking them

204 before they reached Bear Creek in northwestern Alabama. The plan rested upon his belief that Van Dom and Breckinridge could not possibly reach Corinth until September

19, four days hence. If he could smash Price before the other forces appeared before

Corinth, Grant reasoned, he would not only thwart the reinforcement of Bragg, but also prevent Price and Van Dom from uniting to attack Corinth. Little did he know that the two Confederate generals were already discussing a juncture for that very purpose.^^

A report from a Union patrol combined with statements of more prisoners had revealed by September 17, almost three days after the fact, that Price's army had captured luka. Confident that Price still planned to head into Tennessee, Rosecrans alerted Grant that fires visible in luka the previous evening led him to believe that the enemy had abandoned the town and "crossed the Defiles of Bear Creek & will pass the Tennessee before it rises." Later the same day, however, a Confederate deserter startled Rosecrans with news that not only was Price's entire army still at luka, but it was acting as bait to lure Grant out of Corinth. Once the Fédérais went after Price, he warned. Van Dom and

Breckenridge would "leap in on Corinth from the west." Nevertheless, Grant maintained that Van Dorn's column remained too far away to spring the trap and pushed forward with an attack on luka.^'^

September 18 brought more information that confirmed Grant's assessment. One of Rosecrans' spies reported that, since September 12, there had been "a continuous movement.. of forces Eastward" and that Van Dom, Breckenridge, and Price all had separate objectives, none of which included an attack on Corinth. Although another report wamed that 60,000 men under Price, Breckinridge and Magruder were between

Tupelo and luka. Grant dismissed it because reconnaissances had shown beyond a doubt that "there is but little force south of Corinth for a long distance." Leaving the important rail junction "well watched at a long distance out" and with troops within support range.

Grant moved to attack Price at luka and then retum before Van Dom could strike.

205 ”[U]nless the approach of a large force on [Corinth] should call us back," he informed the

War Department, the forthcoming attack on luka would render it "impossible for Price to get into Tennessee.

Urged by Halleck to prevent Price from crossing the Tennessee, on September 19,

Grant launched a simultaneous assault on luka with a column under Ord attacking from the northwest while Rosecrans advanced from the southwest. However, the pincer- movement went awry when Ord, whose cue to attack was the sound of Rosecrans’ guns further south, remained idle as a strong north wind carried the battle noise in the opposite direction. Despite fighting alone, Rosecrans finally forced Price to evacuate the town that night. Although a severe engagement. Price escaped the Federal trap via an unguarded road and retired southwest to Baldwyn for purposes of joining Van Dom, still in the vicinity of Holly Springs. Grant had successfully defended his vulnerable flank and prevented Price from entering Tennessee, but had failed to accomplish his primary goal: to destroy the Confederate Army o f the West.^®

The luka campaign revealed that Grant's intelligence, though certainly improved since Shiloh, still had gaps, one o f which Price nearly slipped through. For almost three days Grant remained unaware that Price's main body had reached luka. Had the

Confederate commander not delayed at luka and pressed onward toward Tennessee (at this point he was within easy reach of the Tennessee River crossings in northwest

Alabama) or moved to join Van Dom against Corinth, he may well have stolen a march on Grant.^^ But the Federal stroke ensured that Price would not slip around the Federal right into Tennessee, thereby isolating the Army of the West from its sister armies in the

Bluegrass State.

After the luka battle, the next intelligence problem for Grant centered on the likely junction of Price's and Van Dom's forces and the objective of their next campaign.

The appearance of a large force at Davis' Mill, Mississippi, south of Grand Junction,

206 raised concerns for the safety o f Bolivar, the key outpost at the center of Grant's defensive line. In fact. Van Dom had already made one foray to the outskirts of Bolivar and created quite a stir.^^ Not to be forgotten, Corinth also remained a tempting target for redemption-hungry Confederates lurking to the south. With the M & C railroad abandoned from Chewalla to Memphis and unguarded east of Corinth, Rosecrans guarded an exposed and vulnerable salient. If the Fédérais lost this key rail junction, it might very well cost them West Tennessee, as well. To protect the town. Grant would again rely heavily upon his subordinates in the field for intelligence.'*®

On September 22 Grant, who had moved his headquarters to Jackson, received the first hints of the enemy’s possible objectives. Rosecrans relayed information brought in by a trusted scout named Levi H. Naron, also know as "Chickasaw," who had infiltrated Price's camps the night o f the luka fight.'** According to Naron, the two

Southem armies in the region had not yet linked and, moreover, some Confederate officers claimed that if Van Dom and Breckinridge failed to move immediately upon

Memphis they would "throw up their commissions.'"*^ Despite Naron's report, by late

September Grant, utilizing "information brought in by scouts, who were constantly kept out by General Rosecrans,. . . and General Hurlbut," determined that the most threatened points were Bolivar and Corinth. Unable to shift reinforcements between the two posts for fear of inviting attack on the weakened one, however, the district commander could only wait until the Southerners tipped their hand.'*^

The Confederates did not keep him waiting for long. Van Dom, who had moved to Davis' Mill during the luka fight, decamped and joined Price at Ripley on September

28. Their combined forces, under Van Dom's overall command and renamed the Army of

West Tennessee, consisted of Price's two divisions, another under General Mansfield

Lovell from the District of Mississippi, and two cavalry brigades. He had lost

Breckinridge and his Kentucky brigade after luka when Bragg ordered them to

207 Chattanooga, but he still fielded a force of around 22,000 men."*^ With this army Van

Dom hoped to recapture Corinth because it offered the best chance of success at minimal risk. Once in Confederate hands. Van Dom would possess two important rail lines and a base from which to reclaim West Tennessee, not to mention turn Grant’s left flank. On

September 29 the Army of West Tennessee departed Ripley and, to preserve the mystery of their ultimate objective a bit longer, bivouacked at Pocahontas, a point equidistant between Bolivar and Corinth. Van Dom then marched to Chewalla and on October 3 appeared north of Corinth facing the old Confederate works constructed by Beauregard, now manned by Rosecrans' men.^^ That day and the next morning Van Dom hammered at the Union entrenchments but was unable to break the inner ring of fortifications around the town. The Confederates withdrew on the aftemoon of October 4 toward

Chewalla and the crossings on the Hatchie River.

As Van Dom and Price marched toward Pocahontas on September 30, Grant remained unaware of their current situation. His subordinates had informed him earlier that Price had reached Ripley and that a large force—presumed to be Van Dom's—lurked about in the vicinity of Davis' Mill. Unknown to Grant, however. Van Dom had been at

Davis' Mill during the recent battle, but had by now joined Price at Ripley, and marched north toward the M & C Railroad at Pocahontas. Neither of these events were detected by Union intelligence at the time, thereby skewing Grant's perception of Confederate dispositions along his front. Thus, the district commander believed that on September

30 Price was resting his men at Ripley and Van Dom's troops operated near Somerville,

Tennessee, almost twenty miles due east of Bolivar, "trying to effect a lodgement on the

Mississippiabove Memphis,” [emphasis supplied] when, in fact, the forces in question had already joined and were then twenty miles northwest of Corinth.'*^

Later that evening, however. Grant had a better grasp on the situation. From

Hamilton's "citizen scouts" he leamed that Price, Van Dom, and Breckinridge "had

208 effected a junction & [planned to] go to Tennessee." In addition, Rosecrans relayed a remarkably accurate report from a civilian that 20,000 Confederates were just then advancing on Pocahontas. The next day prisoners captured near Corinth claimed that

Price and other Confederate forces were on the Pocahontas-Corinth road, a report later confirmed by Hurlbut. From these. Grant concluded that Price and Van Dom had indeed united (although he wamed Hurlbut that the latter might still be west of Bolivar) and that they aimed for the Union left. "It is now clear that Corinth is the point," he wired to

Halleck on October 1.'*^ Despite the confident tone of his dispatch, doubts about Van

Dom's true whereabouts remained. A lingering concem that the Confederate general might reappear outside Bolivar likely contributed to Grant's delay in dispatching reinforcements to Rosecrans. With uncertainty tugging at his sleeve. Grant appeared less self-confident than usual. "My position is precarious," he wrote Halleck, "but [I] hope to get out of it all right.

Unlike Grant, Rosecrans entertained different ideas about the enemy's true objective, although he recalled his outposts and detachments just in case, testifying to the confusion generated by Van Dom's clever move to a point which threatened a number of

Union outposts. He knew from cavalry patrols that a large enemy force had reached

Pocahontas on October I, but persistent rumors purporting that the main blow would fall upon Jackson or Bolivar—by way of Bethel-colored his perceptions. Accordingly, when his troopers encountered Van Dom's column near Chewalla, Rosecrans concluded that they were merely a diversion to cover a move north on the M & O toward Bethel. On

October 3, an "unusually reliable" scout reported seeing 30,000 enemy troops near

Chewalla but assured Rosecrans that they resolved "to make their main move on

Bolivar." He claimed in his battle report that the lack of accurate maps detailing the territory northwest of town (a strange complaint considering his system of "information maps" then in operation) prevented him from determining "whether to expect a strong

209 demonstration here.. .while the blow was struck elsewhere or vice-versa." But to the

Joint Committee on the Conduct of War Rosecrans testified that he "thought it was in their interest to move at once on Bolivar and Jackson" and, therefore, "expected only a demonstration on Corinth."^® In an unintentional self-indictment of his intelligence,

Rosecrans later admitted that his troops waited in their works "wholly ignorant of what

Van Dom was doing at Chewalla.

Based on this assumption, on October 2, as Van Dom's column neared Chewalla to the northeast, Rosecrans suggested moving his entire command due west across the

Hatchie River, leaving Corinth virtually uncovered, and heading north to "push those fellows to the wall." Despite his near-certainty that Corinth comprised the main enemy objective. Grant still had doubts and gave Rosecrans permission to proceed with the plan

"if practicable," urging him to "inform yourself as well as possible of the strength and position of the enemy" before embarking. Clearly, Rosecrans believed until fairly late that the enemy determined to attack elsewhere. Not until Van Dom's infantry rolled over the outer defenses north of town a short while later did Rosecrans realize that Corinth was indeed the main event.

After severe fighting that lasted until around midday of October 4, Rosecrans repulsed Van Dom and inflicted heavy losses upon his command. The Army of West

Tennessee retreated toward the Hatchie River crossing at Davis' Bridge, but nearly met disaster when Union forces dispatched to relieve Corinth seized the span and blocked

Van Dom's retreat as Rosecrans closed on his rear. Finding another place to cross. Van

Dom and his army reached Holly Springs on October 13. Disgusted with Rosecrans' seemingly half-hearted pursuit. Grant recalled him to Corinth on October 7.^^

Van Dom's repulse at Corinth followed by Bragg's Perryville defeat on October 8 dashed Southem hopes of reclaiming their losses in the West and planting the

Confederate standard on the Ohio River. With the Southem armies in retreat—Van Dom

210 and Price to Holly Springs and Bragg to Murfreesboro, Tennessee— the initiative passed to the Union. Always cognizant of opportunities. Grant once again looked forward to carrying the war into the Deep South.^^

Grant later claimed that the Corinth battle alleviated "any further anxiety for the safety o f the territory within my jurisdiction," but the record tells a much different story.

Reports of massive reinforcements arriving in Mississippi and rumors of renewed

Confederate aggression continued to reach his headquarters. Unsubstantiated rumors that

General Joseph E. Johnston and 40,000 troops from Virginia had reached Mississippi and the possibility that Bragg's army might retum to northem Mississippi seemed to indicated that the enemy planned to hold on to Mississippi. In fact, the reported influx of new troops so worried Grant that he again feared for the safety of Corinth. He was anything but sanguine about his situation and the ability of his intelligence, less than efficient to this point, to track enemy forces accurately. Although luka and Corinth worked out well for the Fédérais, if the difficulties experienced in finding and tracking the enemy before they appeared out of thin air continued. Grant might eventually lose Corinth and possibly

West Tennessee. The rumors of large enemy reinforcements and renewed offensive activity only strengthened his resolve to seize the initiative and force the enemy to react to his movements. For the present, however, the static defensive posture of Union forces in the district and continuing manpower woes checked his ambitions; all he could do was respond to enemy thrusts and wait patiently until he could unleash one o f his own.^^

By the end of October, the situation began to change in several important ways.

On October 25 Grant assumed command of the newly formed Department of the

Tennessee, which encompassed all of Kentucky and Tennessee west o f the Tennessee

River and northem Mississippi. The troops within the department were officially redesignated the Thirteenth Army Corps, or Army of the Tennessee, including the Army of the Mississippi, which was discontinued and absorbed into the new organization.^^

211 Rosecrans, meanwhile, left Mississippi to head the newly organized Department of the

Cumberland and Army of the Cumberland (Fourteenth Army Corps), formerly Buell’s

Army of the Ohio, in Middle Tennessee. Hamilton assumed command of the new District of Corinth, one of four within the department, which included Rosecrans' former troops. Although it is unclear how many of Rosecrans' secret service personnel departed with him to Nashville, Hamilton’s scouting corps, as well as some spies for the

Army of the Mississippi, remained behind at Corinth. These agents formed the nucleus of what would become the first systematic intelligence organization utilized by Grant during the Civil War.

More importantly, the withdrawal of the Confederate armies from their counteroffensive also freed more reinforcements—both veteran units and new levies—for duty in Grant's department. The reports of increased Confederate strength in the region made the aid especially time-urgent and Halleck responded with promises of more men.

With the added troops. Grant could now begin to think seriously in terms of offensive operations against Vicksburg, the next obstacle to Union control of the Mississippi.

Although wary of Confederate Intentions, within twenty-four hours of his appointment to department chief. Grant offered Halleck a plan for a campaign against Vicksburg.

Realizing that his current strength limited him to defensive operations, especially since half of his force was engaged guarding rail connections and outposts. Grant suggested tearing up the railroads "to all points of the compass from Corinth" and concentrating his forces, now freed from guarding the railroads, for a drive down the Mississippi Central

Railroad toward Grenada. This turning movement would sever the Yazoo Delta areas from the remainder of the state, and "cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." Grant understood that pushing toward Vicksburg would put the enemy on the defensive and compel them to abandon any further attempts on Corinth in order to defend the fortress.

In addition, remaining on the static defensive had magnified his intelligence

212 shortcomings, similar to the pre-Shiloh period, and assuming the offensive stood to minimize them. Even as he anticipated his next campaign. Grant could not, however, afford to ignore an enemy who had a knack for appearing out o f nowhere.^*

After the Corinth fight. Grant learned that Price's and Van Dorn's troops had concentrated at Holly Springs under a new commander. Lieutenant General John C.

Pemberton, who now oversaw the new Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.

Several reports at months' end indicated that Pemberton's "Army of Mississippi," comprised of two corps under Van Dorn and Price, intended to resume offensive operations, possibly with help from Joe Johnston and a large force rumored to be at

Columbus, Mississippi.^^ "Everything now indicates an early attack on Bolivar or

Corinth," Grant warned Halleck. On November I, however, the rumors of Pemberton's impending attack dissipated and were replaced by those predicting the evacuation of

Holly Springs. Despite the caveat that he was "at a loss to divine their plans from any reliable facts in my possession," Sherman nevertheless noted that several sources witnessed Pemberton's artillery on railroad cars heading south, a sure sign of an impending evacuation. This bit of news also indicated something else to the Memphis commander. "They would hardly venture to attack you or Corinth," he wrote Rawlins, "if it be true they sent off their artillery." Hamilton added his theory: "[I]s it not likely the

Rebels are evacuating Holly Springs and covering it by a feint on Bolivar[?]" In spite of what the Confederates had planned, however, Grant concluded that, in the absence of concrete evidence, the best defense he could muster was to advance into Mississippi and drive the enemy from his front. "Corinth," he reasoned, "will then be covered."^®

Grant forged ahead with plans for an advance on Holly Spring and possibly

Grenada, another eighty-five miles further south. On November I, he ordered Hamilton, now the commander of the District of Corinth, which included the remnants of the old

Army of the Mississippi, to take three divisions to Grand Junction the next day.

213 Brigadier General James B. McPherson was to advance from Bolivar toward the same position with two divisions on November 3. Designated the Left (Hamilton) and Right

(McPherson) wings, these combined forces, numbering around 31,000 men, had concentrated at Grand Junction by November 4 and prepared to advance into Mississippi, using the Mississippi Central as an umbilical cord to his supply base further north.

In the meantime. Grant's assessment of the enemy's situation had changed. By

November 6, he maintained that, despite Sherman's and Hamilton's pronouncements,

Pemberton’s army remained at Holly Springs with around 30,000 men, althought these troops were reportedly "in rather a disorganized condition." Confident and eager to advance, especially now that Halleck had promised to send thousands of reinforcements to Memphis, Grant brimmed with enthusiasm. "I can now move from here with a force sufficient to handle that number without gloves."^*

Although several problems delayed his planned advance. Grant continued concentrating his army and shaping his campaign. On November 7, however, two deserters from a Kentucky regiment revealed to Hamilton that the Union buildup at

Grand Junction had caused the evacuation of Holly Springs. Attempting to verify this report the next day, McPherson interrogated Confederate prisoners but found their testimony less than helpful. "Some say the infantry has all gone," he reported, while

"others [say] that they are there in strong force." Moreover, he learned that an order to evacuate had been given, but that "some General came up and put a stop to it." [emphasis in original] This last information was subsequently confirmed by an escaped Union prisoner the next day.^^ Sherman added the following day that his information indicated that Holly Springs was either evacuated or so reduced as to no longer pose a threat to

West Tennessee. To find the truth. Grant dispatched McPherson on a reconnaissance in force toward Holly Springs. In fact, the department commander hoped that Pemberton would still be there. "If the enemy will remain at Holly Springs," he confided to

214 Hamilton, "it will satisfy me." To Grant, the sooner he engaged Pemberton, the better,

since " the opportunity of attacking there is better than it would be" further south toward

the Tallahatchie River.^

McPherson's reconnaissance reached the Cold Water River just north of Holly

Springs on November 9 and found the enemy in battle lines on the southern bank.

Heeding Grant's instructions to avoid a general engagement, McPherson retreated to

LaGrange. Based on the probe and "facts ascertained from observation, from citizens,

deserters and prisoners," Grant deduced that Pemberton had not abandoned the Cold

Water line and Holly Springs. Moreover, he also constructed his first true rendering of

the enemy's order of battle, which was accurate as to the number of divisions and their

commanders and also as far as the numbers in Pemberton's whole force.^^ However,

Grant's assessment was found wanting in other respects. McPherson's reconnaissance had

encountered Pemberton's rear guard above Holly Springs, not his main body. The

Confederate commander had evacuated the area on November 9 and within twenty-four

hours the Army of Mississippi had successfully retired to a second line south of the

Tallahatchie River at Abbeville, eighteen miles from Holly Springs. However, not until

November 13 did Grant learn of this development. By then, however, the opportunity to assail Pemberton before he attained more defensible ground further south had

vanished.

After Pemberton reached the southern bank of the Tallahatchie, Grant finally

received Halleck's blessing and on November 28 embarked upon his first offensive campaign since Shiloh. Besides McPherson's and Hamilton's wings, the department commander ordered Sherman to march from Memphis and join the advance at Holly

Springs. The Memphis troops would comprise the Right Wing of Grant's "Army in the

Field," while McPherson's men constituted the Center and Hamilton's divisions remained the Left Wing. In the midst of this grand thrust. Grant's enthusiasm was tempered

215 somewhat by alarming reports that Bragg's army, then facing Rosecrans outside

Nashville, had departed Middle Tennessee for Mississippi. Unwilling to abort his offensive, the department commander again relied upon the commander at Corinth to remain vigilant. But with Hamilton in the field, the job of securing the department’s left flank devolved upon a relative newcomer to Corinth, Brigadier General Grenville M.

Dodge.

Formerly colonel of the Fourth Iowa Infantry, Dodge became a division commander in Curtis’ Army o f the Southwest and participated in the battle of Pea Ridge in February before being transferred to Halleck’s department. Assigned various duties, including rebuilding the M & O Railroad between Columbus, Kentucky and Corinth,

Dodge earned a solid reputation as a competent officer and engineer. On October 30 he assumed command of a division in the Corinth garrison. When Hamilton left with three divisions for field service, command of the remaining garrison fell to Dodge. In charge of protecting the department’s left flank in northern Mississippi and western Tennessee, including monitoring the Tennessee River crossings for enemy activity. Dodge faced a daunting, yet important, task. Although he had some experience with intelligence operations from his previous commands, the situation he found himself in at Corinth would require all of it—and more.^*

On November 12, several of Rosecrans’ spies who had embarked on missions prior to their employer’s transfer to the Department of the Cumberland, reported to

Dodge with news that reinforcements were enroute to Pemberton from Tennessee,

Arkansas, and even Virginia. Understanding the import of this news. Dodge sent a summary to Grant. Aware o f the vulnerability of his left flank to an incursion from the east. Grant wired Corinth for help: "Can you get information from the East, say as far as

Florence? I want to hear from along the Tennessee from Tuscumbia eastward to know if any rebel troops are crossing there." When Rosecrans alerted Grant on November 21 to

216 the possibility of Bragg’s troops crossing the Tennessee, he once again turned to Dodge,

specifically ordering him to "send out spies and scouts [to the] east and obtain all the

information possible." Interpreting these instructions to mean that headquarters had

given him "carte blanche to take care of that front," Dodge endeavored to fulfill this

order and created a secret service organization probably more elaborate and extensive

than Grant expected or intended.A lthough he sent spies and scouts to destinations

outside the Department of the Tennessee, his primary intelligence responsibility was to

watch the eastern flank of the department, primarily along the Tennessee River in West

Tennessee and northern Alabama, for Confederate reinforcements coming from Middle

Tennessee. Although Grant neither authorized nor envisioned the organization Dodge eventually created, this simple order marked the genesis of a military intelligence network unparalled thus far in the war.

In late November, Dodge assumed command of the District of Corinth, part of the

Left Wing, Thirteenth Corps, a position he held—with some changes in corps affiliation— until after the Vicksburg campaign.^' Although Grant gave the initial order sanctioning intelligence operations and received news directly from Dodge, when the focus of Union strategy had shifted from the overland to the riverbome approach to Vicksburg in late

December, the Corinth commander reported directly to the commander of the Left Wing,

Sixteenth Corps, who then relayed information to corps headquarters in Memphis. The corps commander, at his discretion, then forwarded intelligence to Grant downriver. In the meantime. Dodge's duties included much more than just collecting and transmitting intelligence. His primary responsibility remained the security of his post and the left wing, meaning he was also busy with regular defensive operations as well as conducting expeditions against the enemy. As a result, although he had agents posted in far-away locales, much of Dodge's intelligence network focused mainly upon threats to Corinth and other outposts in northeastern Mississippi which, until Grant pushed Pemberton

217 further south, remained vulnerable to another Confederate incursion. Dodge's reports from November, 1862 to July, 1863 focused primarily upon activity on his immediate front. This arrangement makes sense considering Dodge had an entire district to defend.

Thus, pursuing strategic intelligence became a secondary, yet important, concern. But

Corinth's location was also well-suited to monitor larger threats emanating from

Tennessee, and thus Dodge became an asset to Grant.

Over the next few months. Dodge would create an intelligence organization that stretched from Corinth to Atlanta and into the interior of Mississippi, Alabama, and

Tennessee. From a nucleus of eleven operatives, most of whom had originally worked for

Rosecrans, Dodge's stable of scouts, spies, and guides burgeoned to over 130 by late

1863, although only a dozen or so were on his payroll during any one month. Dodge also selected a number of scouts, spies and guides from the 1st Alabama Cavalry (Union), formed in the fall of 1862 from Unionists in northern Alabama and commanded by his chief of staff. Colonel George E. Spencer. "These mountain men were fearless and would take all chances," claimed Dodge, thereby making them perfect candidates for espionage duty. In all, he utilized at least twenty-two men from the unit as scouts, spies and guides. During the heyday of Dodge's scouting operations (early November, 1862 through June, 1863), his operatives completed approximately 188 missions, mostly along the Tennessee River and in northeastern Mississippi.^-

During the early days at Corinth, however, his organization was still in its infancy and rendered only minimal assistance to Grant. In fact. Dodge's immediate intelligence problem focused upon the shortage of competent personnel with which to fulfill his assigned task. Rosecrans' former scouts and spies who remained behind to work for

Dodge apparently lacked adequate knowledge of the territory east of Corinth toward the

Tennessee River. During September and October, Rosecrans had utilized these men for long-range operations to Georgia and East Tennessee and for service on his immediate

218 front around Corinth. Hamilton's scouts, on the other hand, apparently knew that area well, but they had accompanied their commander into the field with the Left Wing.

Thus, when Grant ordered men sent to monitor the Tennessee River crossings. Dodge pointed out that "the best spies for that country are with General Hamilton," adding that he could sure use "one or 2 of them."^^

As Dodge watched the left flank. Grant looked toward the Tallahatchie and

Pemberton's newest line of defense. After remaining idle since mid-month awaiting the promised reinforcements from Halleck, on November 28 Grant finally advanced down the Mississippi Central with nearly 40,000 men, secure in the knowledge—provided earlier by Dodge-that Bragg remained stationary in Middle T e n n e sse e .A s for reliable information on Pemberton, however. Grant apparently had little. On November 29, an escaped slave claimed that Pemberton's men were cooking rations in preparation for an evacuation of the Tallahatchie line. Contradicting that testimony, however, was a captured Confederate spy who, after being "pumped by one of Hamilton's scouts" disguised in a Confederate uniform and placed in his jail cell, insisted that Pemberton fully intended to fight along the Tallahatchie. Hamilton found further evidence to support the spy's story. According to these sources, not only did the enemy plan to stay, they had also received reinforcements. The following day, however, a black manservant in Pemberton's army alleged that orders had been issued to strike tents and pack three- days' rations in preparation for a withdrawal. This conflicting evidence led Grant to report on November 29 that he possessed "no reliable information from the enemy.

On December I, however, a Union cavalry patrol verified the manservant's story.

"The Enemy deserted their fortifications yesterday," a jubilant Grant wired to Halleck.

Compelled to withdraw "for the defense of Vicksburg," Pemberton and his army of

21,000 had abandoned the Tallahatchie line on December I and reached the south bank of the Yalobusha River at Grenada, a distance of about fifty miles, by December 5.

219 Grant's advance down the Missisisppi Central had certainly played a role, but the

cooperation of another Union column from Helena, Arkansas proved decisive. The news

of this force streaking across the Yazoo Delta toward Grenada sealed Pemberton's

decision.^^

As Union cavalry pursued the enemy toward the Yalobusha, rumors that

Confederate authorities had dispatched reinforcements to aid Pemberton again reached

department headquarters. This time, however, with Pemberton in trouble and Vicksburg

at stake, the odds appeared better that these rumors might contain a shred of truth. One

of Dodge's scouts left Alabama with news that, although Bragg reportedly remained in

Middle Tennessee, a substantial portion of his cavalry and part of his infantry were expected any day in Huntsville and D ecatur.M oreover, the same day a spy—sent on an

extended mission by Rosecrans in October—finally returned and reported to Grant's

headquarters with news of the alleged evacuation of Arkansas so that the enemy could

"concentrate their whole force East of the Miss."^*

Grant turned to his man at Corinth for more details. "I get news from Bragg daily," replied Dodge, "but for the past week it has been very conflicting." He was certain, however, that no enemy troops had crossed the Tennessee east of Decatur and that the only troops Bragg had sent anywhere were the sick and wounded. By December

10, the department commander informed Halleck that the Confederates in Middle

Tennessee had not reinforced Pemberton; "Bragg intends to stay where he is." Unknown to Dodge or Grant, however, late in November Bragg had indeed detached an infantry brigade of new East Tennessee conscripts to Pemberton that reached Grenada-via

Mobile and Meridian—on December 17. Although Grant heard of infantry moving to

Pemberton through Meridian on December 14, he was skeptical because "it does not

220 agree with what [I] have heretofore heard." Unfortunately, as long as the Confederates sent troops by this circuitious route while Dodge looked for them to cross the Tennessee, it would not be the last time Bragg reinforced the Mississippi line under Grant's nose.^^

In the meantime. Grant had established his headquarters at Oxford and his principal supply depot at Holly Springs, where tons of supplies had already begun accumulating to support the ongoing offensive into Mississippi. Before resuming his advance, and as he waited for crews to repair the railroad reaching Oxford, the department commander’s plans took a new turn. Wary that his old division commander

McClemand had somehow won permission to lead an independent drive down the

Mississippi against Vicksburg, Grant—"desiring to have a competent commander in charge" of such an expedition—moved to preempt him.^° After receiving Halleck's reassurance that he remained in charge despite McClemand, on December 8 Grant ordered Sherman back to Memphis with one division and then, after augmenting his force with troops in the city and those stationed in Arkansas, instructed him to steam downriver and attack the Vicksburg fortifications along the Yazoo River, northeast of the city. Meanwhile, Grant would pin Pemberton at Grenada and wait for Sherman to dislodge the Vicksburg garrison. If Pemberton withdrew. Grant intended to "follow him even to the gates of Vicksburg."**

As Sherman marched for Memphis, the lead elements of Grant’s army crossed the

Yocona River and occupied Water Valley, about thirty miles northeast of Grenada, on

December 11. Inevitably, more rumors of troop transfers between Tennessee and

Mississippi surfaced the further the Fédérais penetrated. Despite the fact that earlier rumors of this sort had proven false. Grant advised Dodge to "Keep a sharp lookout for

Bragg's forces." ”[Y]ou have a much more important command than that of a division in the field," he emphasized, clearly revealing his appreciation for the intelligence role fulfilled by Dodge.Over the next few days conflicting reports swirled about Grant's

221 headquarters, some indicating that Bragg was enroute to Mississippi with a large force, while another purported that the Confederates in Middle Tennessee had concentrated at

LaVergne, fifteen miles southeast of Nashville, for a stand against Rosecrans. Grant inclined toward the former interpretation and on December 16 notified Halleck and

Rosecrans that Bragg's army headed southwest toward the Tennessee River via

Waynesborough, Tennessee and requested that the Army of the Cumberland pursue while

Union gunboats moved upriver to intercept them.*^

After receiving Grant's dispatch the following day, Rosecrans flatly denied his former commander's assessment, claiming that "Bragg was in Murfreesboro this morning." Not only had his scouts encountered no enemy troops heading toward

Waynesborough, he continued, but Jefferson Davis, on a visit to Bragg's Army of

Tennessee, reportedly proclaimed that "Middle Tenn. must, could & should be held."*'^

Rosecrans' appraisal of the situation was correct. In reality, by early December

Bragg felt that sending more troops to Mississippi jeopardized the security of Tennessee and therefore rebuffed Pemberton's requests for assistance. "Cannot move infantry across the Tennessee," he wrote, but promised to send cavalry under General Nathan Bedford

Forrest on a diversionary raid into West Tennessee to disrupt Grant's communications and temporarily relieve the pressure on the Confederate Army of Mississippi. By

December 15 Forrest's command had reached the Tennessee River at Clifton and prepared to stir up trouble in the Federal rear.*^

Rosecrans discovered Forrest's exodus from his base at Columbia, Tennessee on

December 11 and promptly warned Grant. Dodge picked up the trail the following day when a scout reported that Forrest's troopers were heading toward the river. Although estimated to have nearly ten thousand men, the department commander noted that

"Dodge... had a scout among [Forrest's command] before they commenced crossing" who reduced their size by half Arguably the most feared Confederate in the West,

222 Forrest crossed into West Tennessee and demonstrated just how vulnerable Grant's outposts were to mounted raids. His expedition absorbed the attention not only of the post commanders in the region, but also kept Dodge and Grant busy looking over their shoulders. In fact, the Corinth commander left on December 18 with a contingent of infantry, artillery and cavarly and headed north to defend Jackson, restricting, if not halting altogether, his intelligence operations until Christmas Eve. In the end, Forrest’s

West Tennessee raid, in conjuntion with other events, would be a mortal blow to the

Federal overland advance on Vicksburg and would have disastrous consequences for

Sherman's operations northeast of the city.*^

As Forrest galloped about deep in the Union rear, another Confederate cavalry column departed Grenada bound for Holly Springs, the key Federal's supply depot only about forty miles from Grant's headquarters at Oxford. Pemberton recognized that the plundering of Holly Springs along with the destruction of portions of the Mississippi

Central and Memphis & Charleston rail lines might compel Grant to abandon his offensive for want of secure logistical lines. To accomplish this mission, he sent Earl Van

Dorn, now in command of his cavalry, and a mounted force of 3500 men. They left

Grenada on December 17 and marched northeast to Pontotoc. Purposely avoiding any roads leading to Holly Springs, Van Dorn reached the Tallahatchie River at New Albany the following evening. By December 19 the Confederate column had reached Ripley and, after learning from a scout that the Federal garrison remained unaware of their approach, turned due west and raced toward the town. Early the next day Van Dorn's troopers descended upon Holly Springs, routed the unsuspecting garrison, and captured or destroyed vast amounts of material bound for Grant's army. The Confederate raiders then left the smoking ruins o f Holly Springs behind and headed north to dismantle the railroads.**

223 Not until December 19 did Grant learn about Van Dorn's column snaking its way

northward. On that day he received news that 3000 Confederate cavalrymen, whom he

mistakingly believed were under Colonel William H. Jackson, were galloping north to

strike the Mississippi Central and sever his communications. He warned Dodge to "look out for him," but the Corinth commander was still in the field pursuing Forrest in West

Tennessee and was therefore unable to aid his commander in tracking Van Dorn's advance. Grant also warned Colonel Robert C. Murphy, the commander at Holly Springs, and advised him to monitor the enemy's movements with his cavalry. Based upon his

intelligence. Grant believed the raiders would not reach the Tallahatchie crossing at

Rocky Ford—about thirty miles to the southeast o f Holly Springs—until the evening of

December 19. Perhaps confident that the Confederates would bivouac along the river and then resume their journey the next day. Grant told Murphy there was no need to dispatch cavalry patrols from the supply depot until the morning of December 20. Van Dorn's raiders, a full day's march ahead o f Grant's intelligence, descended upon Holly Springs before Murphy could dispatch his patrols or cobble together an adequate defense. Not until a Union officer, who had barely escaped Holly Springs before Van Dorn's attack, brought news o f the disaster did Grant know the full extent of his intelligence error.

At this point. Grant might have benefitted from information that, due to unfortunate circumstances, failed to reach him in time. Returning to Oxford from a raid on the M & O Railroad near Tupelo, a Federal cavalry expedition under Colonel T. Lyle

Dickey encountered Van Dorn's column as it moved north from Pontotoc in the early afternoon of December 18. This meant that the Confederates were farther north than

Grant had estimated and would likely reach the Tallahatchie that night, not the next day.

Had Grant known this, he may have placed Holly Springs on alert sooner and urged

Murphy to send out cavalry patrols immediately, perhaps increasing the chances Van

Dorn's approach would have been detected in time. In warfare, however, "friction " often

224 interferes to make even the best situations turn sour. Realizing that news of a large body of enemy cavalry advancing north toward the Union rear would be of interest to Grant,

Dickey sent several couriers to speed this important news to Oxford. That evening,

Dickey discovered to his horror that the messengers had misunderstood their orders and,

instead of rushing to Grant, had remained with the column. He dispatched new

messengers but, as luck would have it, they got lost and failed to reach Grant’s headquarters until the morning of Van Dorn's attack.^®

But even if these couriers had reached Grant in time, the result might have been the same. Dickey reached Oxford at 5:30 p.m. on December 19, ahead of his couriers who were still wandering about the countryside. The cavalry commander reported to

Grant what he had seen at Pontotoc the previous day. According to Dickey, "notice was at once telegraphed to every point on the railroad north." He even bragged that his timely news had "saved every station.. except Holly Springs" and that it should have spared that post as well, alluding to Murphy’s alleged incompetence.^* However, the only extant message that went over the lines that night said nothing of the enemy's last known location nor provided any estimates of his current position. Moreover, Grant's December

19 telegram to Murphy, which contained the news that the enemy would only be as far as

Rocky Ford that evening and that, as a result, he could delay sending his cavalry out until morning, was sent at / / p.m., long after Dickey had made his report. Thus, Grant had in his possession intelligence that placed the Confederates further north than previously believed. For some reason, however, this news failed to alter his estimation of the enemy's whereabouts. Perhaps Grant's earlier perception of Van Dorn's position and likely movements had become so fixed in his mind that new information could not change it; or, maybe he was so involved with his own plans and operations that he misjudged the whole situation. Either way. Grant's erroneous judgment cost him his main supply depot. Despite his own culpability in the disaster, the department commander

225 blamed Murphy for the loss of Holly Springs, claiming that he had failed to adequately

warn his men either out of "disloyalty .. or gross cowardice." However, it is clear that the lions' share of the guilt for this miscue belongs on Grant's shoulders.

The surprising success of Van Dorn's sweep through Holly Springs and Forrest's

West Tennessee raid convinced Grant that his logistical connections were far too vulnerable to sustain an overland campaign against Vicksburg. As long as he had ever-

lengthening supply lines, there would be more incidents like Holly Springs. As a result.

Grant withdrew slowly toward West Tennessee, having decided to shift the axis of advance on Vicksburg from the Mississippi Central Railroad to the Mississippi River.

The news of Holly Springs and Grant's subsequent retreat did not reach Sherman, who was then advancing for an amphibeous attack on Vicksburg from the northeast, until much later. The success of Sherman's assault on the Confederate fortifications along the banks of the Yazoo River depended upon Grant's ability to fix Pemberton at Grenada and prevent prevent him from shuttling reinforcements to meet it. But when Van Dorn disrupted Grant's plans and forced him to retreat, Pemberton utilized his interior lines and easily transfer troops from the Yalobusha line and elsewhere to aid the small garrison at

Vicksburg (only 5500 men) in fending off Sherman. When he learned that the Union expedition had landed on December 26, he rushed two brigades from Grenada toward the scene. After several unsuccessful and costly assaults against the strong Confederate defenses at the battle of Chickasaw Bayou (December 27-29), Sherman's men reboarded their transports and, having demonstrated the futility of approaching Vicksburg from the northeast, retreated upriver on January 2. As one noted historian observed: "It is doubtful whether the Vicksburg Confederates could have held off Sherman's legions without these troops [from Grenada].

Unknown to Grant at the time, other units besides the Grenada forces had been dispatched to defend Vicksburg. Feeling the pressure of Union forces upon his native

226 State, on December 14 Jefferson Davis authorized—over the protests of Bragg and the

new commander of the Department of the West, Joseph E. Johnston—the transfer of

Major General Carter L. Stevenson’s 9000-man division from Bragg's army to

Mississippi. After a long journey by way of Atlanta, Mobile, Meridian, and Jackson, two

of Stevenson's brigades filed into the works on December 29 in time to help parry

Sherman’s thrusts.

Not until January 1, 1863, did Grant discover the arrival of Stevenson’s division in

Vicksburg. Rosecrans must share part of the blame for Grant’s ignorance. The lack of

interdepartmental intelligence-sharing was still a problem, and Rosecrans behaved

similarly to Buell and Halleck with regard to the exchange of information with Grant.

He knew for certain that troops belonging to Kirby Smith’s corps had departed for

Mississippi as early as December 24, estimating the detachment to be at least 10,000

strong. But Rosecrans failed to share this knowledge with the one general who needed to

know.

Moreover, Grant relied upon Dodge to watch for enemy movements from Middle

Tennessee and to safeguard the left flank. But for several reasons, the Corinth

commander-and therefore Grant—remained unaware of Stevenson’s movements for a time.^^ Most of Dodge’s scouts were engaged in monitoring the crossings of the

Tennessee River in West Tennessee and northern Alabama, the shortest and seemingly

most logical routes between Bragg’s army and forces in Mississippi. However,

Stevenson’s column did not take this avenue and instead came by the southernmost route through Mobile

At one point. Dodge heard about a large force from Tennessee passing through

Mobile headed for Pemberton’s army. Perhaps because he believed Bragg would likely send reinforcements by the more direct route across the Tennessee, Dodge placed more stock in the views of his scouts watching the river fords and bridges. These men were

227 confident that none of Bragg's army had gone west and, in fact, observed signs that he might possibly withdraw to Chattanooga. On December 31 a refugee from Chattanooga reported witnessing "trains loaded with Kirby Smith[']s & Stephenson[']s troops going to

Jackson [,] Miss." Though the man told a "straight story," Dodge cautioned Grant against accepting it at face value. "I have heard such rumors as this before but placed no reliance in them."^* Despite his subordinate's skepticism, on New Years' Day Grant had apparently heard enough to convince him that a large force had come from Tennessee.

By that time, however, the revelation meant little to Sherman's men who had already experienced their arrival first-hand. This episode also had implications for the future.

The ease with which Bragg utilized interior lines to secretly shuttle a large force

(Stevenson's division alone represented nearly one-fourth of his infantry) to Mississippi, compounded by Rosecrans's reluctance to prevent Bragg from detaching reinforcements, presaged a problem that Grant would again face in his second campaign against

Vicksburg.

The events of the past few months had tested Grant's intelligence abilities like never before. Tasked with defending a large area dotted with strategically important positions, the department commander delegated intelligence collection to his division commanders with some success. On the downside, however, the dispersal of collection efforts sometimes led to the production of too much information, which can obscure the true picture as much as not possessing enough. The major problem, however, and one faced by generals throughout history, was with the quality of the information coming in.

All too often the information Grant received was so contradictory as to render it useless.

When conflicting reports concerning reinforcements coming from Bragg inundated department headquarters, for example. Grant remained as much in the dark as if he had received no reports at all.

228 During the interim between Grant's first and second Vicksburg campaigns. Price and Van Dorn had successfully outpaced Federal intelligence or eluded it altogether, luka and Corinth were instances where Grant, although a few days behind in his knowledge of the enemy’s whereabouts, rallied in time to blunt the offensives. Van

Dorn's lightning raid on Holly Springs, however, revealed that reliance upon stale intelligence or disregarding new information in deference to a fixed perception, even when one possessed the initiative, could be disastrous. Due to the inability to protect his logistical base and supply lines so starkly revealed by the Holly Springs debacle. Grant abandoned the overland approach to Vicksburg. Although primarily a problem with logistics, the intractable position he found himself in that December was compounded by his inability to accurately track enemy forces. His supply lines were secure only as long as he possessed adequate means to discover threatening movements in time to meet them. In the final analysis, therefore. Grant's logistical woes, which sunk his first drive on Vicksburg, stemmed in good measure from deficiencies in his intelligence.

229 NOTES

‘Grant now commanded the Army o f the Tennessee, the Army of the Mississippi, and the troops in the Districts of Cairo and Mississippi. General Field Order No. 62, July 17, 1862, ÜE. 5:210; Welcher, The Union Army. 2; 376-77.

^Grant, Personal Memoirs. I: 304-305; Catton, Grant Moves South. 289.

^Grant, Personal Memoirs. 395-96; Catton, Grant Moves South, 289-91.

'‘For a discussion of this ad hoc approach, see Fishel, "Mythology," 345.

^Halleck to Rosecrans, June 22, 1862, QR 17, pt. I ; 24.

^General Order No. 65, July 28, 1862, QE. 5: 247.

^USG to Halleck, June 29,1862, Ibid., 167; Halleck to USG, June 29, 1862, Ibid., 168.

*USG to Halleck, June 29,1862, Ibid., 168-69.

^Connelly, Army of the Heartland. 197-204,207; Price to Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dom, September 4, 1862, Q R 17, pt. 2; 692; Castel, Sterling Price. 93-94; Edwin C. Bearss, Decision in Mississippi: Mississippi’s Important Role in the War Between the States (Jackson, Miss.: Mississippi Commission on the War Between the States, 1962), 2-3; Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat (New York; Columbia University Press, 1969), 266-69.

‘^McClemand to USG, July 19, 1862, GP 5:228; Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans to USG, July 20, 1862, Ibid., 221-22; Rosecrans to USG, July 23, 1862, Ibid., 229; USG to Halleck, July 23, 1862, Ibid., 227-28.

‘ ‘Although no explicit orders define such a relationship, their correspondence points to this conclusion.

‘“"Rosecrans's Campaigns" in U. S. Congress, Report o f theJoint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 38th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1865), 3:17 [henceforth "Rosecrans's Campaigns"]. See also, Philip Lewis Shiman, "Engineering Sherman's March: Army Engineers and the Management of Modem War, 1862-1865," Ph D. diss., Duke University, 1991, 128-29; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:408.

230 *^Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan to Rawlins, July 16, 1865, QR46, pt. 1: 481; Philip Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888), I; 167-71.

l^USG to Halleck, July 29, 1862, GE 5:250; USG to Halleck, July 30, 1862, Ibid., 254; Roscrans to USG, July 30, 1862, Ibid., 255; Sherman to Rawlins, July 3 1, 1862, Ibid., 269.

^^USG to Halleck, August 1, 1862, Ibid., 257; USG to Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas, August 7, 1862, Ibid., 269; USG to Halleck, August 9, 1862, Ibid., 278; Buell to USG, August 13, 1862, Ibid., 291; USG to Halleck, August 25, 1862, Ibid., 329.

*®USG to Buell, August, 12,1862, Ibid., 289.

'^Special Orders No. 163, August 14, 1862, Ibid., 293; Grant, Personal Memoirs. I: 394- 98; USG to Mary Grant, August 19, 1862, GE 5: 310.

^*USG to Halleck, August, 14, 1862, Ibid., 292; Rosecrans to USG, August 19, 1862, Ibid., 304; Brigadier General Gordon Granger to USG, August 23, 1862, Ibid., 330; Halleck to USG, August 28,1862, Ibid., 334.

^ ^ S G to Halleck, September 1, 1862, GE 6: 5; Halleck to USG, September 2, Ibid., 7; Catton, Grant Moves South. 309. Sherman held the right flank at Memphis, Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord guarded the center, and Rosecrans protected the left at Corinth. See Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:404-405.

20lbid., 395.

“^Rosecrans to USG, September 9, 1862, GP 6: 27; USG to Halleck, September 9, 1862, Ibid., 26; USG to Halleck, September 9,1862, Ibid., 31; Catton, Grant Moves South. 306- 307. See also Rosecrans to USG, September 7,1862, GE6; 26-27; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 395.

^^ReportofMaj. Gen. Sterling Price, September 26, 1862, QR 17, pt 1: 119-124; Castel, Sterling Price. 95-98; Woodworth, Davis and His Generals. 152-53; Bearss, Decision in

23 Ibid., 9-15.

2"*Ibid., 17-18; Price's Report, September 26, 1862, QR 17, pt. 1: 121; Price to Van Dom, September 14, 1862, Ibid., pt. 2: 702.

231 Hamilton to USG, September 7, 1862, GE 6:26-27; Rosecrans to USG, September 8, 1862, Ibid., 27.

^^Rosecrans to USG, September 8, 1862, Ibid., 27; Hamilton to USG, September 7, 1862, Ibid., 26-27; Rosecrans to USG, September 9, Ibid., 27; Rosecrans to USG, September 9, 1862, Ibid., 28.

^^Bearss, Decision in Mississippi. 13.

^*USG to Halleck, September 9, 1862, GE 6:31; USG to Halleck, September 9, 1862, Ibid., 26; USG to Halleck, September 9, 1862, Ibid., 28; Halleck to USG, September 11, 1862, OR. 17, pt. 2; 214; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 404.

^^osecrans to USG, September 11,1862, G £6:34.

^(Hamilton to USG, September 1 1 ,1862, Ibid., 35-36; USG to Halleck, September 11, 1862, Ibid., 39.

^ ^Castel. Sterling Price. 97; Price's Report, September 26, 1862,GR 17, pt. 1; 121; Sherman to Rawlins, September 12, 1862, Ibid., pt. 2: 216; Rosecrans to USG, September 13, 1862, GE6; 39; Rosecrans to USG, September 13, 1862, Ibid., 42.

^^Hamilton to Grant and Rosecrans, September 14,1862, Ibid., 42; Col. John V. D. Du Bois to USG, September 15, 1862, Ibid., 47.

^^USG to Halleck, September 15, 1862, Ibid., 46; Price to Van Dom, September 14, 1862, GE. 17, pt. 2; 702; USG to Kelton, October 22,1862, Ibid., pt. 1; 65; Castel, Sterling Price. 100.

^^Rosecrans to USG, September 16, 1862, QR 17 pt. 2; 220; Rosecrans to USG, September 17, 1862, Ibid., 224; Rosecrans to USG, September 17, 1862, Ibid., 223; Rosecrans to USG, September 17,1862, GE6; 58.

^^Rosecrans to USG, September 18,1862, Ibid., 65; USG to Rosecrans, September 18, 1862, Ibid., 64; USG to Halleck, September 19, 1862, Ibid., 67.

^^Halleck to USG, September 17, 1862, QK 17, pt. 2; 222; USG to Kelton, October 22, 1862, Ibid., pt. 1:68. See also Castel, Sterling Price, 101-107; Bearss, Decision in Mississippi, 32-62.

^ ^Castel, Sterling Price. 99-100.

^^Catton, Grant Moves South. 312.

232 ^ ^o b ert J. Hartje, Van Dom: The Life and Times of a Confederate General (Nashville. Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), 212; Hurlbut to USG, September 22, 1862, QE6: 80; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:415.

40william M. Lamers, The Edge of Glorv: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans. U. S. A. rNew York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 131; Catton, Grant Moves South. 313.

'^^Naron began his scouting career with Pope and would continue serving in that capacity for Rosecrans. After Rosecrans' transfer to the Army of the Cumberland in October, 1862, Hamilton retained "Chickasaw," despite the scout's desire to remain with his old commander, and used him during the fall campaign in Mississippi. See Report of L. H. Naron, ca. July, 1862, RG 110, entry 36, box 4, NA; Levi H. Naron Pension File, NA.

''^Rosecrans to USG, September 22, 1862, G£ 6: 76-77.

"*^USG to Kelton, October 30,1862, QK 17, pt. 1: 157.

"^Van Dom to [unknown], October 20, 1862, Ibid., 377-78; Secretary of War George W. Randolph to Van Dom, September 29,1862, Ibid., pt. 2:715; Castel, Sterling Price. 104- 107; Van Dom to Price, September 18, 1862, Q R 17, pt. 2: 706.

''^Castel, Sterling Price. 108-111 ; Woodworth, Davis and His Generals, 154-55.

"'^Castel, Sterling Price. 11-127; Catton, Grant Moves South, 313-17.

'’^Hartje, Van Dom. 212; Castel, Sterling Price. 109; Van Dom to [unknown], October 20, 1862, QR 17, pt. 1: 377; USG to Halleck, September 25, 1862, QR6: 87; Maj. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut to USG, September 25, 1862, Ibid., 88; Rosecrans to USG, September 27, 1862, Ibid., 92; USG to Halleck, September 30, 1862, Ibid., 95.

^^Rosecrans to USG, September 30, 1862, Ibid., 96; Rosecrans to USG, October 1, 1862, Ibid., 97; Hurlbut to Rawlins, October 2, 1862, Ibid., 100; USG to Halleck, October 1, 1862, Ibid., 96-97.

^ ^ S G to Hurlbut, October 1, 1862, QR6: 98; USG to Halleck, October 1, 1862, Ibid., 96-97.

^®Ibid.; Rosecrans to USG, October 1, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2; 252; William S. Rosecrans, "The Battle of Corinth." B & L 2: 743; Rosecrans to USG, October 3, 1862, QP 6: 107; Rosecrans to Rawlins, October 25, 1862, QR 17, pt.l: 166; "Rosecrans' Campaigns," 20- 21.

233 ^•Rosecrans, "The Battle of Corinth, 745.

^^Rosecrans to USG, October 2, 1862, GE 6: 99-100; USG to Rosecrans, October 2, 1862, Ibid., 99; Castel, Sterling Price. 111.

^^Catton, Grant Moves South. 316-317; Lamers, Edge of Glory. 159-180.

^"^Catton, Grant Moves South. 320-21.

^^Grant. Personal Memoirs. 1; 420. For examples of these alarming intelligence reports, see, Rosecrans to USG, October 13, 1862, QE6: 150; Rosecrans to USG, October 22, 1862, Ibid., 179; USG to Halleck, October 23, 1862, Ibid., 178-79.

^^General Orders No. 1, October 25,1862, Ibid., 186; Welcher, The Union Army, 2: 143- 22,251.

^^Ibid., 268. The other districts in the department included the Districts of Memphis (Sherman), Columbus (Brig. Gen. T. A. Davies), and Jackson (Hurlbut). See General Orders No. 2, October 26, 1862, Ibid., 297; Welcher, The Union Army. 2; 144.

^^Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 300; Williams, Lincoln Finds a General. 4; 149; USG to Halleck, October 26, 1862, G E6: 199-200.

^ ^ ic h a e l B. Ballard, Pemberton: A Biography (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 114-15; Woodworth. Davis and His Generals. 169.

^®USG to Halleck, October 29, 1862, GE 6:210; Sherman to Rawlins, November 1, 1862, QR 17,2: 857; Hamilton to USG, November 1, 1862, GE 6: 238; USG to Hamilton, November 1, 1862, Ibid.

^*USG to Halleck, November 2, 1862, Ibid., 243; "Organization of Troops in the Department of the Tennessee," November 10, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2: 338-340; USG to Halleck, November 4,1862, GE6: 256.

^^USG to Sherman, November 6, 1862, GE 6:263; Edwin C. Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg. (3 vols., Dayton, Oh.: Momingside House, Inc., 1985) 1:36.

^^Hamilton to USG, November 7, 1862, GE 6: 270; McPherson to USG, November 8, 1862, Ibid., 277; McPherson to USG, November 9,1862, Ibid., 284; USG to Halleck, November 9,1862, Ibid., 278.

^Sherman to USG, November 8, 1862, QK 17, pt. 2: 861; USG to Hamilton, November 9, 1862, GE6: 285-86; USG to McPherson, November 8, 1862, Ibid., 276.

234 ^^McPherson to USG, November 9,1862, QK 17, pt. 2: 331; USG to Sherman, November 10, 1862, GE 6: 290-91.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 1; 50-51; Pemberton to Colonel P. B. Starke, November 9, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2: 745; USG to Halleck, November 13, 1862, GE 6:305.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. I; 70-72; Special Field Orders No. 7, November 27, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2:364; USG to Sherman, November 14, 1862, GE 6: 310-12.

*^*StanleyP. Hirshson. Grenville M. Dodge. Soldier. Politician. Railroad Pioneer (1893; Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1967), 37-61; USG to Dodge, November 14,1862, G E 6:288; J. R. Perkins, Trails. Rails and W ar The Life of General G. M. Dodge (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1929), 86-104;

^^o d g e to USG, November 12, 1862, RG 393, entry 4721, Department of the Teimessee, Telegrams Received, box 1, NA; USG to Sherman, November 14,1862, GE 6: 310-12. O f the three spies—John Coleman, James Leighton, and William A. Melvin- two continued to work for Dodge. See Secret Service Vouchers, boxes 148 and 149, and "List of Secret Service Men & Expenses," box 149, Dodge Papers, SHSI.

^®USG to Dodge, November 18, 1862, GE 6: 374; Rosecrans to USG, November 21, 1862, Ibid.; Rawlins to Dodge, November 22, 1862, Ibid.; Grenville M. Dodge, "The Secret Service of the Civil War," [henceforth "Secret Service"] Dodge Papers, SHSI.

After the new corps organization was instituted in December, which divided the troops in the Department of the Tennessee into the Thirteenth (McClemand), Fifteenth (Sherman), Sixteenth (Hurlbut), and Seventeenth (McPherson) Corps. The District of Corinth was temporily transferred to the Seventeenth Corps, but then later placed within the Left Wing, Sixteenth Corps. See Welcher, The Union Army. 2: 258,292-95.

^^Inventory of Dodge's Scouts, box 148, Secret Service Vouchers, boxes 148 and 149, and Dodge, "Secret Service," Dodge Papers, SHSI. See also William Stanley Hoole, Alabama Tories: The First Alabama Cavalry. U. S. A.. 1862-1865 (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Confederate Publishing Co., Inc., 1960).

Dodge to Rawlins, November 22, 1862, GE 6: 374.

^'^USG to Halleck, November 24, 1862, Ibid., 345-46; Bearss, Vicksburg. 1: 65; Catton, Grant Moves South. 331-32. Rumors that McClemand had received permission to command an expedition down the Mississippi against Vicksburg also spurred Grant to move. See Catton, Grant Moves South. 329-332.

235 ^^USG to Sherman, November 29, 1862, GE 6:361 ; Hamilton to USG, November 30, 1862, Ibid., 366.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 1: 75-76; USG to Halleck, December 2, 1862, QR6: 368; Special Order, November 30, 1862, QE. 17, pt. 2: 772; Pemberton to Bragg, December 4,1862, Ibid., 778. Grant had arranged earlier for Major General Samuel R. Curtis in Arkansas to send an expedition across the Yazoo Delta toward the Confederate rear. Bearss, Vicksburg, 1: 77-94.

^^USG to Halleck, December 3, 1862, QE 6:373. The scout, Joseph Palmer, was also a holdover from Rosecrans’ secret service. See Inventory of Dodge's Scouts, box 148, Dodge Collection, SHSI.

^^USG to Adm. David D. Porter, December 3, 1862, QE 6:385.

^^odge to Rawlins, December 7, 1862, Ibid., 7; 10-11; USG to Halleck, December 10, 1862, Ibid., 9-10; USG to Halleck, December 14,1862, Ibid., 26. For Bragg's detachment of a Brig. Gen. John C. Vaughn's brigade (about 1000 men) and its arrival in Grenada, see Bragg to Jefferson Davis, November 24, 1862, QR 20, pt. 2; 423; Special Orders No. 7 December 17, 1862, Ibid., 17, pt. 2; 799; Bearss, Vicksburg, 1; 143.

*^aw lins to Lt. Col. C. A. Reynolds, December 3, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2: 380; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:427-30; Catton, Grant Moves South. 334-340.

®*USG to Sherman, December 8, 1862, QE 6:406-407; Catton, Grant Moves South. 332; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:431.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 1:275-76; USG to Dodge, December 11, 1862, QE 7: 14-15.

*^USG to Halleck, December 16, 1862, Ibid., 46; USG to Rosecrans, December 16, 1862, Ibid.

^'^Rosecrans to USG, December 17, 1862, Ibid., 59.

^^Bragg to Cooper, November 21, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2: 755; Bragg to Pemberton, November 21,1862, Ibid. See also Brian Steel Wills, A Battle From the Start: The Life of Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 84-85.

®^Rosecrans to USG, December 10, 1862,QE7: 15; Dodge to USG, December 12, 1862, Ibid. Forrest's brigade numbered only 2100 men. Bearss, Vicksburg. 1: 232; Wills, Eonest 91.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 1:245-46.

236 **rbid, 275-318.

to Dodge, December 19, 1862, £LE 7: 71; USG to Murphy, December 19, 1862, Ibid., 76; USG to Murphy, December 19, 1862, Ibid.; Col. C. C. Marsh to USG, December 20,1862, OR 17, p t 2:443; Bearss, Vicksburg. I: 307,319.

^ ^ id ., 299; Dickey to Rawlins, December 20,1862, QR 17, pt. 1: 498-99; Williams, Lincoln Finds a General. 4; 190.

Dickey to Rawlins, December 20, 1862, QK 17, pt. 1; 499; Dickey to [his wife], December 28, 1862, QE 7: 75. Col. John K. Mizner at Water Valley had also informed Grant on December 19 that a sizeable enemy cavalry force lurked about Pontotoc a day earlier and that it may have even advanced further north. See Mizner to USG, December 19, 1862, QR. 17, pt. 2:437; Mizner to USG, December 19, 1862, Ibid., 439.

^^USG to Commanders at Holly Springs, Davis' Mill, Grand Junction, La Grange, and Bolivar, December 19,1862, Ibid., 71; USG to Murphy, December 19,1862, Ibid., 76; Murphy to Rawlins, December 20,1862, Ibid. For Grant's indictment of Murphy, see Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1: 433-34; USG to Kelton, December 25, 1862, QE 7: 105.

^^Ibid., 438; Bearss, Vicksburg. 1 ; 321 ; USG to Kelton, December 25, 1862, QE 7: 105.

^'^Ballard. Pemberton, 128-29; Bearss. Vicksburg, 1; 154.

^%earss, Vicksburg. 1; 113-224,347.

^^Special Orders No. 66, December 18, 1862, QR 17, pt. 2; 800; Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography fNew York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 194; Thomas L. Connolly, Autumn of Glory: The Army of the Tennessee. 1862- 1 M 5 . (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 40-41; Bearss, Vicksburg. 1:208-209, 346-47.

^^USG to Hamilton, January 1, 1863, QE 7: 156; Rosecrans to Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright, December 24, 1862, QR 20, pt. 2: 234; Col. Julius P. Garesche to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, December 28, 1862, Ibid., 258; Connelly, Autumn of Glory. 31-32.

^*The report about Confederate troops passing through Mobile came from an escaped Union prisoner named Loran W. Pierce, who later became one of Dodge's principal scouts. Dodge to USG, December 23, 1862, QE 7: 93; Dodge to USG, December 26, 1862, Ibid., 25; Dodge to USG, December 26, 1862, Ibid.; Dodge to USG, December 27, 1862, Ibid., 129; Dodge to USG, December 29, 1862, Ibid., 129-30; Dodge to USG, December 31, 1862, Ibid., 149.

^^Connolly, Autumn of Glory. 41.

237 CHAPTER?

ON TO VICKSBURG

"I will start for Memphis immediately," Grant informed Halleck on January 9,

"and P] will do everything for the capture of Vicksburg." * After the abortive overland campaign and Sherman's repulse at Chickasaw Bluffs, the department commander shifted his operations to the Mississippi River for a second try at capturing the Southern stronghold. To the Confederates, Vicksburg not only represented a formidable impediment to Union forces, it was also a key supply portal for goods shipped from the

Trans-Mississippi to the rest of the Confederacy. More importantly, as one historian has so aptly described, Vicksburg was the "psychological buckle" holding the Confederacy together at its seam along the Mississippi River. After the fall of New Orleans in the spring of 1862, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson, Louisiana, 150 miles downstream, remained the last obstacles to Union domination of the Mississippi Valley.

Undaunted by the recent failure o f the Mississippi overland campaign. Grant shifted his strategy to one that offered more options and fewer vulnerabilities to moimted raids. The possibilities offered by a river-oriented campaign, however, were counterbalanced by new challenges and unknowns, including how to supply his army with food and ammunition-and with information.^

Grant arrived in Memphis on January 10 to assume control over operations against Vicksburg. Believing he had independent authority over the upcoming river campaign. Major General John A. McClemand had already taken two corps downstream

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Map 6 and captured Arkansas Post, a Confederate stronghold about twenty-five miles upstream from the mouth of the Arkansas River. Asserting the authority recently given him by

Halleck, Grant rebuked McClemand for wasting men and resources on peripheral ventures and reduced him to command of the Thirteenth Corps. Finding it difficult to direct the campaign from Memphis, especially since communication with the troops below was at best uncertain, near month's end Grant moved his headquarters to Young's

Point, Louisiana, about eight miles upriver from Vicksburg.^

As Grant readied his forces for upcoming operations, he also studied how best to approach the city. The Chickasaw Bluffs disaster had revealed the difficulty of overcoming the Confederate Yazoo River defenses northeast of the city."^ With regard to the river defenses, Columbus paled in comparison to the natural and man-made strength of Vicksburg. The second "Gibralter of the West" boasted powerful river batteries emplaced along the steep hills from the strongpoint at Snyder's Bluff, (often erroneously called "Haynes' Bluff' by Fédérais)^ about twelve miles northeast on the Yazoo River, to

Warrenton, six miles south of the town. To sail down the Mississippi past the city Federal gunboats and transports first had to negotiate a hairpin curve, all the time under fire from the big guns perched on the shore. If they survived this, they then had to run a gauntlet of shot and shell for several miles. Vicksburg's guns also commanded the opposite bank and could challenge attempts to cross or harass movements down the Louisiana shore.

Fortifications thrown up on the landward side added to the foreboding nature of the position. Enhanced by the rugged terrain east of the city, one Federal described the

Vicksburg defenses as "frightful."^ With over 20,000 troops (a number that would grow with time) manning this seemingly impregnable fortress, Pemberton appeared determined to spoil any Union plan to gain control of the Mississippi River. Finding a way to thwart

Pemberton's defensive efforts and capture Vicksburg while avoiding heavy losses became

Grant's primary goal over the next few months.^

240 From January through March he pursued several different avenues to turn the

Confederate position and avoid the teeth of their defenses. "The problem was to secure a

foothold upon dry ground on the east side of the river," Grant wrote later. Since above average water levels had swallowed the roads on the west bank and precluded an overland march through the Louisiana bayou country to a position south of Vicksburg,

Grant experimented with several different water routes, including carving canals and using Lake Providence, Yazoo Pass, and Steele's Bayou to circumvent Pemberton’s defenses. None of these attempts bore fruit and by April I, with the roads on the

Louisiana side much improved, Grant scrapped these ventures in favor of marching the

Army of the Tennessee on the west bank to a point below Vicksburg and then ferrying his army across to a point midway between Warrenton and Grand Gulf. Once ashore, he could turn north toward Warrenton and Vicksburg or south to aid Major General

Nathaniel Banks' forces in capturing Port Hudson. Although frustrated by the obstacles impeding his progress. Grant believed that once his troops were across the river,

Vicksburg was doomed*

Procuring intelligence was also a source of frustration. By late February, some rumors predicted that Pemberton planned to defend Vicksburg at all costs. However, other reports claimed that the Confederates would evacuate the city without a right. To confuse matters even more, two different sources suggested that the Confederates hoped the Fédérais would land downriver because that move would leave West Tennessee open to invasion. One Federal commander even predicted that once the Army of the

Tennessee was south of the city, Pemberton would "sweep over [his] inland lines to attack Rosecrans."^ Once again, the contradictory nature of the reports and the difficulty in verifying them led to frustration. "It is impossible to get information from

[Vicksburg]," Grant complained. "Even deserters who come can tell nothing except of

241 their own regiments or Brigade at furthest" This problem apparently persisted as Grant observed again on March 17 that he had "no means of learning anything from below except what is occationally [sic] learned through Southern papers."

Several reasons account for Grant's procurement troubles during this period.

Grant had slashed his commitments in West Tennessee, stripped the region of available

Union troops, and left the defense of the department to Major General Stephen A.

Hurlbut's Sixteenth Corps, headquartered in Memphis. In the shuffle the Corinth district became part of the Left Wing, Sixteenth Corps under Hamilton. ’ * Thus, Dodge no longer reported directly to Grant but sent his summaries to Hamilton in LaGrange who then relayed them to Memphis. It was then Hurlbut's responsibility to forward important information for Grant's consideration, although at one point Hamilton expressed concern that this was not happening. Coupled with the lag in communications between the

"Army in the Field" and Memphis (no telegraph line yet connected the two), the new chain of command hindered the real-time transmission of information since it now took anywhere from a week to ten days for a dispatch to reach Grant's headquarters from

Corinth.*^

However, the fact that most of Dodge's scouts and spies operated in West

Tennessee and in the northern counties of Mississippi and Alabama had already reduced their usefulness to Grant. He needed intelligence about Vicksburg and its defenders, objectives that Dodge had yet to target. Although he did try to get a spy or two into

Vicksburg to report to Grant, the Corinth commander’s primary duty—to "cover [Grant's] left flank, and prevent any portion of Bragg's army from reaching the Mississippi,or... making a lodgment west of the Tennessee"—consumed his attention and the bulk of his resources. Because of this focus, the intelligence Dodge gathered was of more immediate use to Rosecrans than Grant, and thus the Corinth commander corresponded directly with Army of the Cumberland headquarters. Hurlbut also relied heavily upon

242 Dodge's operatives for information. As a result of these many factors, the Army of the

Tennessee commander could not—and did not-lean heavily upon Dodge for intelligence once he transferred his campaign to the Mississippi River.

In addition, determining the nature and strength of Vicksburg's defenses was altogether a different problem than tracking troop movements. This sort of information required the use of spies and a concerted effort to find black slaves in the area that had constructed Vicksburg's fortifications. Grant had even gained experience with gathering intelligence of this nature from his operations against Columbus in 1861. But early in his second Vicksburg campaign, he initiated no active intelligence-procurement operations, forcing him to rely upon passive sources like Southern newspapers and deserters for news.

Despite his early intelligence woes. Grant proceeded with the plan to get below

Vicksburg on the Louisana side and cross the river. In the first weeks of April

McClemand's corps was already enroute to New Carthage, Louisiana, a staging area midway between Warrenton and Grand Gulf. However, Charles A. Dana, a special commissioner from the War Department attached to Grant's staff, reported on April 10 the alarming news that several Northern newspapers had apparently revealed the Federal plan. Perhaps reflecting the prevailing view at headquarters, Dana claimed that the enemy would probably view the newspaper account as a deceptive ploy "to cover other designs." The prevailing opinion at headquarters was that Pemberton still expected the

Fédérais to launch another attack against the bluffs northeast o f the city. But

McClemand's movements toward New Carthage might just tip them off as to Grant's true purpose. Plagued by the inability to get reliable intelligence from Vicksburg, however.

Grant could only guess at what the enemy truly believed.

To divert attention from McClemand, Grant sent Major General Frederick Steele on an expedition toward Greenville, Mississippi, about 100 miles upriver from

243 Vicksburg, to help convince Pemberton that the Fédérais still planned a northern approach. However, the Greenville expedition (April 2 - 25), in conjunction with other events, succeeded in fooling the enemy in ways Grant never intended. Union activity as far north as Greenville, the withdrawal of the Yazoo Pass expedition, and reports that transports loaded with Union troops headed upriver led Pemberton to believe that Grant had abandoned his campaign and was withdrawing to Memphis, perhaps to reinforce

Rosecrans. The Confederate commander had heard rumors about McClemand's advance downriver on April 9 but, due to his belief that the Fédérais were retreating, discounted them. Usually opposed to sending troops away from his command, Pemberton, whose wishful thinking often plagued his decisions, felt so strongly about the accuracy of his assessment that on April 13 he detached two brigades (about 8000 men) from Stevenson's division to help Bragg defeat the forces concentrating against him in Middle

Tennessee.’^

The same day Pemberton issued this order, a spy from Vicksburg arrived in

Corinth and reported to Dodge that 8000 troops were enroute to Bragg. Apparently,

Grant had decided to rectify his information dearth on Vicksburg and had Dodge send a spy named W. I. Morris into the city on March 21. His decision paid off as Morris not only learned the enemy had detached troops, but also discovered that Pemberton's river defenses, stretching from Greenwood south to Grand Gulf were indeed strong, but that

"in the rear they do not fear [an] attack."** Although Pemberton recalled the detachment once he realized the Fédérais had not abandoned their campaign, the news that the

Confederates did not expect an assault from the rear—or the landward side—of the city offered more support for Grant's decision to approach from that direction.

Other than Morris' report. Grant possessed little intelligence on Pemberton's land defenses or the disposition of his army. According to Dana, however, the prevailing interpretation at headquarters by April 14 was that the enemy remained ignorant of

244 McClemand's movement and looked "for an assault on Hayne's [Snyder’s] Bluff or

Vicksburg direct."The Federal commander had faced other Confederate fortresses and he undoubtedly drew upon those experiences to guide him in the absence of information.

Perhaps he assumed that Pemberton, like his predecessors at Columbus and Fort

Donelson, would simply wait for the Fédérais to smash themselves against the northern­ most Vicksburg fortifications, just as they had done at Chickasaw Bluffs. Thus, Grant began concentrating his corps downriver in order to gain a beachhead on the east bank

"before the enemy could offer any great resistance."^®

During the night of April 16 seven Union gunboats and three transports loaded with supplies passed the Vicksburg batteries without serious damage. Six days later, another flotilla survived the gauntlet and anchored with the others near New Carthage to begin the amphibious assault on Grand Gulf. Grant probably understood that sending transports and gunboats downriver might reveal to Pemberton the true Federal objective.

If that failed to convince him, then the delay of his Louisiana columns caused by flooding near New Carthage ensured, in Grant's mind, "that the enemy cannot fail to discover my plans. To prevent this. Grant sent Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson and nearly 1500 cavalrymen on a sweep through central Mississippi to sever Pemberton’s communications, primarily the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, and divert his attention away from Grant's operations west of the river. Grierson's command departed LaGrange on April 17, the day after Porter’s first run past the batteries, and reached Baton Rouge,

Louisiana on May 2. The raiders not only tore up track, torched supplies and disrupted communications, but also distracted Pemberton's attention from Union activities to the west and exhausted his cavalry and a reserve infantry division in the chase. At roughly the same time a force under Dodge advanced from Corinth into northern Alabama and cavalry from Rosecrans' army slashed across that state toward western Georgia to sever

245 Bragg's major supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. As a result, from April 15 to

May 3 most of the Confederate cavalry between Middle Tennessee and the Mississippi

River were chasing Federal raiders instead of trying to divine Grant’s intentions.^-

As Grierson's troopers sent shock waves through Mississippi Grant prepared to make a lodgment on the east bank of the river. But he possessed no reliable means of determining whether the raid had any effect upon Confederate dispositions. Once underway, news concerning Grierson's position and his accomplishments were sporadic, coming mostly from second-hand sources such as newspapers and refugees. Also during this critical phase when news of activities in Vicksburg would be at a premium. Grant had not yet established a consistent and timely system of collecting information from within the city's defenses. According to provost marshal records, for some reason Grant sent no scouts or spies to monitor activity in the Vicksburg area after Morris' return on

April 13.^ He could have borrowed a few o f Dodge's men for service at his headquarters, but no such request has been found. Even if he had appropriated some operatives from Corinth, during most of April and early May Dodge's scouts were absent with their commander on Alabama raid.^'^ Despite lacking information on Pemberton's dispositions and reactions to Federal activity, and without adequate means o f gaining it.

Grant nevertheless pressed ahead with his plans.

By April 20 Grant had determined to "obtain a foothold on the east bank of the

Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads"

Moreover, the lead corps, McClemand's, was instructed to seize Grand Gulf "at the very earliest possible moment. To conceal the concentration at the staging area on the west bank. Grant planned another diversion. On April 27 he ordered Sherman to demonstrate against Snyder's Bluff northeast of the city. On April 29, while Porter's gunboats bombarded Grand Gulf in preparation for the assault, Sherman’s transports approached

Snyder's Bluff The following day his troops feigned an attack on the Confederate

246 fortifications along the Walnut Hills. As a result of Sherman’s effort, Pemberton balked

at sending reinforcements to Grand Gulf even though the commander there. Brigadier

General John S. Bowen, reported seeing an "immense force" across the river.

Again, Grant had no way o f monitoring these events, he could only assume that

the diversions would allow McClemand's men to reach the other shore before the enemy

discovered the truth. Porter, on the other hand, expressed grave doubts about the

enterprise. He believed the Confederates had already discovered their true intentions.

On April 23 a preacher had informed the naval officer that Pemberton knew the Union

plans and had sent guns and large reinforcements to defend Grand Gulf. "They have been

preparing this place [for] six weeks and have known all about this move," Porter warned

Grant.^^ Fearful that he had tipped his hand. Grant steamed downriver on April 24 to

survey the Grand Gulf position himself. The reconnaissance convinced the army

commander that Porter had overestimated the strength of the position and that, if attacked soon, "the place will fall easily.Grant proceeded with the assault and, although

Sherman's diversion stymied Pemberton for a time, the gunboats battled the Grand Gulf batteries for five hours to no avail. Undaunted by this temporary reverse. Grant simply

moved his amphibious landing further downriver.-^

Despite lacking intelligence on enemy defenses and troop dispositions below

Vicksburg and unaware of whether Pemberton was marching his army south to contest his crossing. Grant began transferring his troops to a position opposite Rodney,

Mississippi, and had Porter's gunboats and transports run past the Grand Gulf batteries.

The maps showed a good road stretching from Rodney to Port Gibson, a key position in the rear of Grand Gulf and where the roads to Vicksburg and Jackson converged.

Capturing Port Gibson would force the evacuation of Grand Gulf and offer serviceable roads to either the fortress city or the state capital. On the evening of April 29, however, a black man familiar with the opposite shore arrived at army headquarters and revealed

247 that a good road not found on Grant's maps connected Bruinsburg, ten miles above

Rodney, with Port Gibson. Without reconnoitering the area to corroborate the informant's news or ascertain if any Confederate troops had arrived to challenge the landing. Grant decided to cross to Bruinsburg.^®

Although Grant's decision proved correct, he did find a dry road leading to the interior, this episode underlines his lack o f foreknowledge of the topography and the enemy on the opposite shore. Apparently, no Union scouts, spies or patrols combed the east bank south of Vicksburg for possible landings or to determine whether the enemy might challenge the landing, although Grant later admitted that he fully expected the

Grand Gulf garrison to "come out to meet us."^ ' Regardless, due to the lack o f reconnaissance and scouts on the opposite bank, he found himself relying upon the word of a single man as a foundation for this important decision. As this episode shows, however. Grant was also not afraid to grasp opportunities and take risks even when faced with overwhelming uncertainty and ambiguity. Perhaps this attribute distinguished him the most from many o f his contemporaries on both sides.

On April 30 McClemand's corps rushed ashore at Bruinsburg unopposed, secured the bluffs above town, and moved east toward Port Gibson. As McPherson’s corps landed the next day, McClemand's troops marched on Port Gibson and engaged the enemy in a fierce fight amidst incredibly rugged terrain marked by heavily wooded ridges cut by ravines carpeted with impenetrable underbrush. Grant described this part of Mississippi as the "most broken and difficult to operate in I ever saw."^^ Like his superior,

McClemand possessed only fragmentary information as to the whereabouts of the enemy main force. In fact, after attaining the bluffs above Bruinsburg McClemand hoped to move out and "surprise the enemy //he should be found in the neighborhood of Port

Gibson." [emphasis supplied] Bowen did not disappoint his adversary and mounted a stubbom defense of Port Gibson. On May 2, however, the smaller Confederate force

248 relinquished the position and retreated north across Big Bayou Pierre. The capture of

Port Gibson neutralized Grand Gulf, leading to its abandonment a day later. Grant wired the happy news to Halleck, boasting that the Bruinsburg crossing "undoubtedly took them much by surprise.

Luckily for Grant, the deficiency of information on the enemy during the initial phases of the campaign was counterbalanced by his counterpart's mistakes and misjudgments. Pemberton's wishful thinking—that Grant would hammer away at the bluffs northeast of the city—tainted his perceptions and slowed his reaction to the Union navy's successful excursions through the Vicksburg gauntlet and to Bowen's ominous observations. Not until May 1 did the Vicksburg commander comprehend the magnitude of his miscalculations and frantically recalled troops from as far away as Grenada,

Meridian, and Port Hudson to stop Grant. "Enemy's success in passing our batteries has completely changed character of defense," he telegraphed Jefferson Davis on May 1. By this time, however, it was too late to plug the hemmorhage of Union troops pouring across the river.

After the battle at Port Gibson and before the Confederates could muster an organized defense. Grant had already begun his inland thrust, opting to march on

Vicksburg rather than assist Banks at Port Hudson. Rather than advancing directly toward the city from the south, however. Grant chose a more indirect approach. He understood that bagging the Confederate Mississippi army was more important than capturing an empty city and decided to first cut Pemberton's communications with Jackson, which connected Vicksburg with the rest o f the Confederacy, and then move toward the Big

Black River to prevent an escape. Cutting the Southern Railroad, destroying supplies at

Jackson, and dispersing any relief forces gathering to the east would isolate Pemberton and his army. To accomplish this, he sent McClemand's and Sherman's corps northeast hugging the south bank of the Big Black toward Edward's Station, a key stop on the

249 Southern Railroad, while McPherson marched toward Jackson to disrupt Confederate communications there before turning west to rejoin the main body. From the outset.

Grant designed his movements to sow uncertainty in Pemberton's mind as to the true

Federal objective. The key was to keep moving.^^

A sense of urgency also affected Grant's timetable. On May 6 rumors "from the other side" purported that Bragg had detached reinforcements from Tennessee to defend the river bastion. Interestingly, he did not request that Hurlbut or Dodge corroborate this news even though he wrote to Memphis the same day. Perhaps realizing that their information would be at least a week old by the time it reached his headquarters. Grant chose to rely upon his own intelligence for more timely information. To forestall any further detachments from Middle Tennessee, however, he asked Halleck to order

Rosecrans, whose army had remained idle since January, to occupy Bragg's attention.^^

In addition to difficulties with gaining timely intelligence about Confederate movements toward Mississippi, once the Fédérais moved inland many traditional sources of operational information also became limited in their usefulness. At the outset of the campaign. Grant had placed most of his small cavalry contingent with the most advanced elements.^^ But the swampy and water-logged nature of the terrain restricted the mobility and the reconnaissance capability of mounted units. Many troopers would spend the campaign delivering dispatches. Signal Corps personnel with the Army of the Tennessee also descovered that the region was unsuitable for visual communications. Robbed of their primary function, they became scouts. The men of the Signal Corps were divided into four detachments, one for each corps and Grant's headquarters, and sent on reconnaissances. Every day the Signal Corps scouts reported their observations to their respective corps commanders, who then relayed the information directly to army headquarters. Grant profited from this arrangement, but the idea did not originate with him. Captain J. W. DeFord of the Signal Corps designed and implemented the system.

250 As a result, boasted the chief signal officer, "each corps commander was kept well informed as to his own command and General Grant as to the whole army." However, both the cavalry and the Signal Corps scouts accounted for only a small portion of information received by Grant during the campaign. Judging from the journal kept by

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Wilson, Grant's inspector general and the staff officer tasked with recording all the news arriving at headquarters, the information gleaned from deserters, escaped slaves, civilians, newspapers, and intercepted mail accounted for most of the intelligence.^*

By May 12, Grant's army occupied a line from Fourteen Mile Creek eastward to

Raymond, south of and parallel to the railroad. That day McPherson’s troops defeated a

Confederate force at Raymond and sent it reeling toward Jackson. When he heard the news late that night. Grant decided upon a bold move. He knew from earlier reports that

Edward's Station had been reinforced and fortified by Pemberton and was "evidently the point on the railroad the enemy have most prepared for receiving us." A key position on the Southern Railroad blocking the approach to the all-important bridge over the Big

Black, Edward's Station was, according to one source, where "the rebels intend to make their big stand. Furthermore, a citizen reported that Jefferson Davis had instructed

Pemberton to await reinforcements from the east and "to hold the [Mississippi] river at all hazards." More ominously, rumors also surfaced purporting that Southern troops were pouring into Jackson.'^®

Based upon this information and demonstrating incredible flexibility under the circumstances. Grant turned his army toward Jackson to smash the garrison and ensure that no enemy forces lurked in his rear when he about-faced toward Vicksburg. Grant later claimed that rumors indicating that Gen. Joseph E. Johnston "was hourly expected to take command [at Jackson]" also influenced his May 12 decision. However, some evidence indicates that Johnston's presence in the town remained unknown to Grant until

251 after he captured the state capital two days later. However, the news of troops arriving in

Jackson, regardless of their leader, would have been enough to convince Grant to attack the town. Even though this maneuver would expose his communications and rear to

Pemberton's army. Grant had apparently concluded (correctly, as it turned out) that the safety o f Vicksburg would be paramount on the Confederate commander’s mind and would therefore be reluctant to leave his fortifications. Based upon previous evidence.

Grant may have assumed that Pemberton would be unwilling to risk losing Vicksburg by confronting the Army of the Tennessee in the open, and would instead make a stand behind the Edward's Depot fortifications.'^* Situated between two enemy armies and far from his supply base. Grant's inland thrust had placed him in a precarious position, yet one that promised profitable dividends should things go his way.

On May 14 Union troops captured Jackson after a brief engagement. Confederate

General Joseph E. Johnston, who had arrived a day earlier to assume overall control of the Mississippi theater at Davis' behest, evacuated the 6000-man garrison and retreated north along the Mississippi Central Railroad toward Canton.'^- The night before Jackson fell, however, Johnston wrote to Pemberton requesting that he move east from

Vicksburg, attack a Union force reportedly occupying Clinton, and then attempt to link with the forces defending the capital. To ensure its receipt, he sent three couriers with identical messages to find his subordinate. Fortune smiled upon Grant after he entered

Jackson on May 14. One of these dispatch bearers, in reality a Union spy in Hurlbut's employ, delivered Johnston's May 13 directive to McPherson, who promptly relayed it to army headquarters.'*^

The note revealed that Pemberton had been ordered to attack Grant's rear and then unite with the Jackson defenders. But the situation had changed dramatically since

Johnston penned these orders. The Jackson Confederates had abandoned the town and retreated north, leaving Grant free to face Pemberton with all his strength. Perhaps

252 disregarding the May 13 intercept as no longer relevant under the new circumstances, according to his subsequent correspondence Grant believed th a t Johnston was now attempting to link up with Pemberton, not vice versa. He concluded that the Jackson army planned to cross the Big Black River somewhere upstream, march southwest to join

Pemberton west of the Big Black, and "beat us into Vicksburg." A cavalry patrol sent to reconnoiter the roads west of Clinton was told that "The enemy retreated from this place

[Jackson] on roads leading north, probably to concentrate at some point west." In addition. Grant also heard reports that Pemberton had abandoned Edward's Station, the key Confederate position on the east bank, and retreated toward Vicksburg.'*^ Based upon this evidence, the Federal commander concluded that Pemberton's main force was retiring to the Vicksburg side of the river to await Johnston's arrival. With Richmond pressuring the Mississippi army to hold Vicksburg at all costs. Grant perhaps assumed that Pemberton and Johnston planned to withdraw within the city's defenses and let the

Fédérais smash themselves against the works, just as their predecessors had done at

Columbus and Fort Donelson. To thwart their designs. Grant ordered his army to concentrate at Bolton, about twenty miles west of Jackson, to "cut them off." In the end, he acted less upon the contents of the intercepted dispatch than on what the Confederate leadership had done in the past when faced with similar circumstances and, more importantly, on what he perceived Pemberton and Johnstonwould do under the present circumstances.

By nightfall of May 15 the Fédérais had seven divisions on three different roads converging on Edward's Station while Sherman's men remained behind in Jackson to destroy military stores and tear up the railroads. But that day new information forced

Grant to rethink his current assessment of enemy intentions. From Bolton, McClemand informed Grant that "reports were rife that the enemy were moving in strong force upon me" from the direction of Edward's Station. In addition, Wilson recorded that a Union

253 cavalry had reported that 20,000 Confederates had recrossed the Big Black River to

attack the Fédérais/^ But not until early the following morning when two Southern

Railroad employees, William Hennessey and Peter McCardle, appeared at headquarters

did Grant finally determine that these reports had merit. Both men left Vicksburg a few

days earlier and had just passed through Pemberton's army before entering Union lines.

They claimed that most of the Vicksburg garrison, estimated at between 20,000 and

25,000 men, were definitely advancing east from Edward's Station to give battle."*^

Instead of the two Confederate armies joining west of the Big Black to defend the city, it

now appeared that Pemberton planned to assail the Union forces east of the river. "I have just received information that the enemy has crossed Big Black with the entire Vicksburg

force," Grant wrote to McPherson. "He was at Edward's Depot [Station] last night and

still advancing." Armed with this information, which he acquired purely by luck. Grant

ordered his army toward Edward's Station."**

Meanwhile, Pemberton had decided upon a course contraiy to that envisioned by

Grant or even Johnston. Disregarding the May 13 order to attack the Federal rear and join him, Pemberton instead marched south from Edward's Station to attack Grant's line

of communication with Grand Gulf, a movement supported by Davis. He reasoned that,

if successful, the expedition against the Federal logistics might seriously disrupt or even

defeat the Union offensive without uncovering Vicksburg. However, Pemberton's

southward march, when combined with Johnston's simultaneous northward retreat from

Jackson, meant the two Confederate armies were moving in opposite directions. Furious

at his subordinate's obstinance, on May 15 Johnston ordered Pemberton to reverse course

and move to Clinton, where the Jackson army would be waiting. Unfortunately, Johnston

proceeded on the false belief that Grant's army remained in Jackson; in fact he worried that, if left alone, the Fédérais would erect fortifications. But Grant had already moved west from Jackson and, therefore, Johnston's order sent Pemberton directly into the

254 Union advance which by that time had already passed Bolton, almost ten miles west of

Clinton. Johnston's order reached the Vicksburg commander, who had marched only six miles south of Edward’s Station, at 6:30 a m. on May 16. Pemberton changed course and marched north toward Southern Railroad. Once there, he would turn east toward Clinton.49

Meanwhile, Grant proceeded toward Edward's Station along three roads, essentially ignoring the possibility that Johnston—whom Grant knew little about-might descend upon his flank from the north. Moreover, as a result of the railroad employees' reports, he believed Pemberton was advancing west from Edward's Station unaware that his force was actually below the railroad marching north. Thus, when Pemberton's advance units collided with the Union left wing near the Davis Plantation on the

Raymond road, the news was probably somewhat unexpected. Accepting these developments on their own terms, however. Grant pressed ahead with an attack. After fierce fighting at Champion Hill, Pemberton’s line finally collapsed and his army withdrew toward the Big Black River bridge, only to suffer another crushing defeat at the crossing the next day. After the debacles west of the river, Pemberton's army, minus

Brigadier General William W. Loring's division which had been cut off from the main body at Champion Hill and eventually joined Johnston, limped into the Vicksburg defenses with the Fédérais not far b e h i n d .

"The enemy have been so terribly beaten," Grant beamed on May 17 " that I cannot believe that a stand will be made unless the troops are relying on Johnstone [sic] arriving with large reinforcements." He dismissed this last possibility, however, believing instead that Johnston would not sacrifice his own command on such a venture, especially "if he was atal [sic] informed o f the present condition of things. Grant drove Pemberton into the defenses ringing Vicksburg and, brimming with confidence, determined to take the city by force. On May 19 and 22, claiming that his men "believed

255 they could carry the works in their front," Grant assaulted the Confederate fortifications.

Pemberton's men, proving that from behind stout fortifications even demoralized troops could mount a stubbom defense, repulsed both Union attacks and inflicted heavy casualties.^^

Failing to capture the city by storm. Grant opted to starve the Vicksburg garrison into submission. With siege operations underway, he then turned his attention to

Johnston's army still lurking somewhere east of the Big Black. This force could either come to Vicksburg's relief or possibly advance into West Tennessee and reclaim

Memphis, thereby isolating the Army of the Tennessee from its main base. Both dangers were real and although Grant had earlier scoffed at the notion of Johnston rescuing

Vicksburg, mmors to that effect soon reached his headquarters. Without timely intelligence from Dodge's operatives watching the Tennessee River crossings and the railroads between Chattanooga and Mississippi, Grant had to do it himself. By May 23 he knew that Johnston's demoralized force, about 8000 strong, occupied Calhoun, north of Jackson. He also understood that reinforcements from the East and elsewhere were on the way. But Grant was also confident that Pemberton would succumb within days and therefore worried less about an attempt to rescue the trapped garrison. Moreover, the

Fédérais had erected a logistical barrier that Johnston would have to overcome. With the

Southem Railroad out of commission for at least thirty days, and the countryside between the two cities denuded of forage and supplies, the Confederates would find the distance difficult to traverse without encumbering themselves with wagon-loads o f subsistence.

"They may attempt something of the kind," he wrote Halleck on May 24, "but I do not see how they can do it."^^

As Grant tightened his chokehold on Vicksburg, he became more sanguine about the chances of success. However, the possibility that Johnston might gallop in to save the day remained ever present on his mind. He did not fear Johnston with the force he

256 currently possessed, but if troops poured in from all over the South, the equation would change dramatically. On May 25, Grant heard rumors of a large force concentrating around Johnston and warned that an attempt to rescue the garrison was now "The greatest danger." Complaining o f the lack of cavalry to "guard properly against this," the Federal commander cast about for mounted units to perform this important duty, including a

fruitless plea for the return of Grierson's command retained by Banks at Port Hudson.

The campaign had worn down the small cavalry force at Grant's disposal, especially once siege operations commenced. Carrying messages the length of the siege lines exhausted horses and men. This function absorbed so much of their time that Sherman called his troopers "mounted orderlies" instead of cavalry. Grant's appeals for more horseflesh went unanswered until three regiments arrived in mid-June. Tofill the gap, he relied upon infantry patrols.

On May 26 Grant ordered Major General Francis P. Blair with six brigades to drive out enemy troops and strip bare the peninsula between the Yazoo and Big Black

Rivers, a natural avenue o f approach to Vicksburg from the northeast known as the

"Mechanicsburg Corridor". When Blair reached Mechanicsburg three days later he reported encountering no enemy troops west of the Big Black and noted that all his sources agreed that Johnston remained at Canton collecting and organizing a relieving force predicted to reach 45,000. Moreover, Blair felt confident that if Johnston attempted to descend the Mechanicsburg Corridor, he would find it difficult to supply his army because the Fédérais had destroyed or consumed most of the forage in the region. In addition to Blair’s operations. Grant also posted cavalry units and an infantry brigade at the Big Black River crossings to warn of any enemy approach.

On May 29 Hurlbut warned Grant that Bragg had detached three divisions for service with Johnston. Grant believed this intelligence for some time, even though he possessed evidence that the Confederates in Middle Tennessee had sent only one

257 division.^^ On May 30 Union pickets captured several people attempting to reach

Vicksburg with a large supply of rifle percussion caps. They also carried military correspondence, including a dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton. The message was in

"cipher," meaning the Confederates had encoded it to conceal the contents from prying eyes. After perusing the correspondence. Grant complained that he had "no one with me who has the ingenuity to translate it" and sent it to the War Department for decryption.^*

Not until mid-June did he receive the plaintext message, which stated that Bragg had sent only one division and that when it arrived Johnston planned to advance toward

Vicksburg. Thus, he had compelling information in his grasp but the lack of a cipher clerk kept it from him for several weeks.

May 30 also brought an important report from a cavalry officer who had led a small patrol toward Jackson disguised in Confederate garb. He informed the commanding general that Johnston had collected only about 18,000 men at Canton but that he was eagerly awaiting more. Moreover, his sources claimed that Johnston would not advance until his forces reached 40,000, a number which he hoped to attain in roughly ten days.^® By months' end. Grant had received enough information to determine that Johnston's army boasted at least 20,000 men, including Loring's division and a brigade from South Carolina. But he still worried that three divisions were on the way from Tennessee. To protect his operations Grant ordered Hurlbut to send everything he could from West Tennessee, and wrote Halleck that "If Banks does not come to my assistance I must be re-enforced from elsewhere." From Hurlbut and Halleck he received substantial reinforcements, including two divisions from Major General Ambrose

Burnside's Ninth Corps at Knoxville, which increased Grant's strength by mid-June to 77,000.61

In the meantime, Joe Johnston continued building an "Army of Relief to rescue

Pemberton's beleaguered garrison. Never overawed by the importance of fixed positions,

258 he had pressed hard for Pemberton to abandon the city and join him before it was too late, only to see Grant trap him in Vicksburg. Johnston hoped to muster enough force to save the Vicksburg army but he seriously doubted that his army could raise the siege. At the most, he hoped to distract Grant long enough for Pemberton to escape. By June 4 the

"Army o f Relief had grown to around 28,500 as troops from all over the South rushed to

Johnston’s aid, including three brigades from South Carolina, two from Bragg "s army

(part of Major General John P. McCown's division), another from Port Hudson, Loring's division formerly of the Vicksburg army, Breckinridge's infantry division, minus its

Tennessee brigade, and a cavalry division returned to Mississippi from Tennessee.

Although reports received during the first week of June maintained that Johnston had not moved from Canton, Grant dispatched another expedition, this time under

Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, up the peninsula to Mechanicsburg to acquire "all possible information" on the forces lurking east across the Big Black. When Kimball reached Satartia on June 4 Grant warned him that a large contingent from Johnston's army had reportedly occupied Yazoo City on the Yazoo River. The next day Kimball learned from local sources that about 13,000 Southem troops under Brigadier General W.

H. T. Walker held the town and that Johnston had mustered nearly 40,000 men at Canton.

Somewhat unnerved, the expedition's commander retreated back to Haynes' Bluff.

Frustrated by Kimball's retrograde movement and advised by an enemy deserter that

Johnston was "advancing from Canton to the Big Black with a large force," Grant dispatched a cavalry patrol toward Mechanicsburg to find the truth.^ Charles A. Dana,

Stanton's representative at Army of the Tennessee headquarters, accompanied the reconnaissance and on June 8 reported that they found "no signs of any considerable force of the enemy." "No doubt Johnston had moved some of his troops this side of the

259 Big Black," Dana concluded, "but his main force yet stays at Canton." Grant accepted

Dana's assessment, confident that regardless o f what happened, he could spare at least

30,000 troops to "repel anything from the rear."^^

In the period between the return of Kimball's expedition on June 6 and the arrival of the two Ninth Corps divisions nine days later. Grant had concluded that Bragg had indeed sent large reinforcements—at least two divisions-to help raise the siege. It also appeared that the Army of Relief might approach down the Mechanicsburg Corridor from

Yazoo City against the Union position at Haynes' Bluff possibly in conjunction with an advance across the Big Black from Jackson, where Breckinridge's division—from Bragg's army—was known to be stationed.^ In fact, on June 11 Major General Cadwallader C.

Washburn, in command of Union forces at Haynes' Bluff on the Yazoo River, claimed that most of Johnston's army had already crossed the Big Black into the Mechanicsburg-

Satartia area. Over the next few days other commanders from different sectors of the

Union lines corroborated Washburn's report. After receiving these reports, as well as others purporting that the Vicksburg garrison had pinned all their hopes on Johnston, on

June 13 Grant ordered Washburn to find out how many troops occupied Yazoo City and if the Army of Relief had indeed crossed the Big Black into the Mechanicsburg

Corridor.

On June 14 Washburn replied to his superior's request by first sending to Grant a spy named "Mr. McBimey" who had just returned from Yazoo City. The next morning

McBimey arrived at Grant's headquarters and reported that Johnston had only two out of his six infantry divisions at Yazoo City. After hearing the spy's news. Grant concluded that recent Confederate movements did not reveal "an intention to attack Haines [sic]

Bluff, immediately." Later in the day, however. Grant rushed Parke's troops to that very location after learning that Johnston had apparently ordered the Yazoo City force

(reported to be around 12,000 men) to advance while another division crossed to the west

260 bank of the Big Black from Jackson. By June 18 Grant still believed that the

Confederates were concentrating on the peninsula and pondered sending forth an

expedition "to drive the Rebels from between the two Rivers." This move proved

unnecessary, however, when Grant discovered two days later that Johnston had

withdrawn his forces back across the Big Black.

But Grant's information was over a week old. On June 11 Johnston had

withdrawn Walker’s infantry from the peninsula and was concentrating his army at

Vernon for an attack on Grant's lines via the lower crossings of the Big Black east of

Vicksburg. By the time Grant knew of this change (June 20), Johnston had already

abandoned his attack. News of large Federal reinforcements and of the strong Union

defenses along the river had influenced his decision. "I am too weak to save Vicksburg,"

Johnston sadly informed Pemberton. Save for patrols and reconnaissance activity,

Johnston's army remained idle for the next two weeks and effectively sealed the fate of

the fortress city and its garrison.

At Federal headquarters, however, no one knew of Johnston's pessimism. Grant

believed that the abandonment of the Mechanicsburg Corridor approach meant that

Johnston had determined to either bypass the Snyder's Bluff defenses and attack from the

east, or to march toward Port Hudson. Before long, Johnston appeared to tip his hand. On

June 22 a large Confederate cavalry force routed a Union patrol west of the Big Black

crossings at Bush’s and Birdsong's Ferries. This news, along with the report of an

"intelligent spy"^® who claimed that three divisions were moving south from Vernon, convinced Grant that within forty-eight hours the Army of Relief would assail the Union rear. "The attack will come from the Black river above Bridgeport," he warned.^' The

recent skirmish and other information indicated that the Confederates would cross at

Birdsong's Ferry and attack from the northeast. With a massive offensive in the offing.

Grant dispatched five brigades under Sherman's command to form a defensive line along

261 Bear Creek to deal with Johnston while the remainder of the Army of the Tennessee

carried on the siege. In all, he redeployed nearly 34,000 troops to confront the supposed

Confederate advance from the Big Black. Ultimately, he hoped to defeat the advancing

Confederates in the rugged country north of the creek before they reached more open and

maneuverable ground nearer the city. In the meantime, he promised Halleck that he

would "use every effort to learn any move Johnston may make."^-

To that end. Grant had Sherman scour the area near the Big Black River for the

next few days. By June 27 Sherman reported that "Not a sound, syllable, or sign indicate

a purpose of crossing Big Black River toward us." Although cognizant that the enemy

possessed "Every possible motive" to relieve Pemberton, the evidence—or lack thereof-

indicated to Sherman that, at least for now, Johnston had no plans to try it. Dana had

already reached the same conclusion based on evidence collected at Grant's headquarters.

"The report [of June 22] that Joe Johnston had crossed the Big Black,. . . was

erroneous," he wrote Stanton. "The siege goes on as usual.

The day Sherman reported his findings to Grant, however, a Union spy from

Canton claimed that Johnston had put 35,000 men under orders to advance as soon as

10,000 reinforcements arrived from Bragg's army. From this information Grant

concluded that the Army of Relief would attack his rear on July Unknown to the

Federal commander, however, Bragg had no troops to spare. Rosecrans had finally

lurched into action on June 23 and flanked Bragg's Tullahoma position, sending the

Army of Tennessee retreating toward Chattanooga.^^ Even without this knowledge, by

month's end Grant began to question Johnston's intentions. "Whether he will attack or not

I look upon now as doubtful," Grant concluded. Moreover, by July 2 Union scouts had

confirmed that the Army of Relief had not budged from its camps at Canton, Vernon,

Brownsville, and Bolton.

262 But these scouts had apparently missed something. On June 29 Johnston marched his army toward the Big Black River crossings in a last ditch effort to divert Grant's attention long enough to allow the Vicksburg garrison to escape. By July 5 he still lingered on the east bank pondering whether to cross north or south of the railroad.

Before he could make up his mind, however, Johnston received the unwelcome news that

Pemberton had surrendered. The Army o f Relief had no one left to save.^^

As Grant watched for Johnston's legions on the horizon, he also monitored the impact of the ever-tightening Union grip on conditions within Vicksburg. Deserters escaped on a regular basis and brought most of the information procured from inside the city. These men provided insights into the state of the garrison's morale and estimates of when its supplies would be exhausted. Those who reached Union lines between May 22 and July 4 told of decreasing rations and gruesome tales o f men reduced to earing pea flour bread, rats, and mules. A spy employed by Admiral Porter left Vicksburg in mid-

June and reported that insufficient food and hard labor had nearly exhausted the garrison. Others who escaped spoke of hospitals full o f sick and malnourished soldiers and of low morale and near mutiny in the ranks. As early as June 28 some deserters predicted that food shortages and crumbling spirits would force a capitulation by July 4.

Even as they ate rats and cursed the endless shells lobbed into the city by Grant’s guns, many soldiers and civilians still pinned their hopes on their comrades across the Big

Black. "Their principle faith," Grant observed in late June, "seems to be in Providence &

Jo Johnston [sic]."^^ Unfortunately for the Confederacy, neither one showed up to save the beleaguered city. On July 4 Pemberton surrendered the river bastion and with it his army. After the fall o f Port Hudson five days later, the Fédérais had at last conquered the

Mississippi River.

Despite winning the most important victory of his career thus far. Grant had little time to celebrate since Johnston's force still lurked across the Big Black. Immediately

263 following the surrender Sherman went after Johnston in the hopes of bagging yet another

trophy. Aware that Grant's entire army was now free to concentrate against him,

Johnston scurried back to Jackson with Sherman close behind. After a week of

inconclusive skirmishing, on July 16 Johnston evacuated Jackson for the second time and

retreated thirty-five miles east to Morton, Mississippi. Johnston's small army was now all

that stood between Union forces and the resource-rich Confederate states of Alabama and

Georgia. Also, with the Mississippi theater now a strategic backwater. Union forces in

the West could concentrate on securing Tennessee, particularly the gateway city of

Chattanooga, and then move on to bigger game. Sporting his new commission as major

general in the U.S. Army, Grant looked forward to the new campaigns sensing that he

would play a major role in them. As long as the war continued, he confided to Julia, "I do

not expect to be still.

******

When Grant crossed the Mississippi on April 30 he knew little about the terrain in the immediate operational area, let alone what Pemberton had in store for him on the opposite shore. Once again, however, he seized the initiative and transfered the burden of uncertainty to Pemberton and Johnston, thereby forcing them to commit errors and provide opportunities for the Fédérais to exploit. The character and personal judgment of his opponents were also influential; the Confederate commanders' views on how to stop

Grant were often diametrically opposed. The Federal commander’s boldness prospered in this target-rich environment. Although he was sometimes without any hard information on the enemy, he compensated by maintaining the initiative and by turning the tables on his foe. Using guile and deception, and making moves that would likely be unexpected by the Confederates, Grant paid less attention to his own inadequacies, and instead

264 concentrated upon exploiting the uncertainty enshrouding his adversary. Pemberton fell prey to this approach and it cost the Confederacy dearly. During the Vicksburg campaign. Grant had shown that instead of a liability, the lack of intelligence could be used to advantage and form the basis of a successful campaign.

265 NOTES

•USG to Halleck, January 9, 1863, GE 7; 204.

^Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston. 204; Ballard, Pemberton. 116-17; Cation, Grant Moves South, 346; Bearss, Vicksburg. 1:426-27.

% id., 349-315; USG to Halleck, January 11, 1863, QE 7: 209.

'^Halleckto Stanton, November 15, 1863, Π2 4 , pt. 1: 5; USG to Halleck, January 20, 1863,GE7: 233.

% id., 527.

^Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston, 204-205; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2: xiii-xiv, 60-64; Catton, Grant Moves South. 371-72,450-52.

^Return of the Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana, January 31,1863, ÛR 24, pt. 3:611.

^Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1:442, 431 -595; Ibid., 2: 19-51 ; Catton, Grant Moves South. 409-410; USG to Julia, March 27, 1863, GE 7; 479.

^Maj. Gen. John A. McClemand to USG, January 22, 1863, Ibid., 240; Brig. Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan to Rawlins, January 26, 1863, GR 24, pt. 3: 17; Hamilton to USG, February 2, 1863, GE 7: 292-93; Hamilton to Rawlins, February 25,1863, Ibid., 362.

*^S G to Hurlbut, February 27,1863, Ibid., 361; USG to Halleck, March 17, 1863, Ibid., 428.

’^Bearss, Vicksburg. 1: 428-29; Catton, Grant Moves South. 373; Welcher, The Union Army, 2: 293-94.

^ ^Hamilton wrote Grant that "I do not know whether Hurlbut has furnished you with the information received from time to time through Dodge's and my own spies from the south." Hamilton to USG, March 15, 1863, QR 24, pt. 3: 138. See also Dodge to USG, February 23, 1863, RG 393, entry 4719, Department of the Tennessee, Register of Letters Received, NA.

Dodge, "Secret Service," Dodge Papers, SHSI.

266 •"^Dodge to USG, February 27, 1863, GE 7; 363; Grenville M. Dodge, "Personal Recollections of General Grant, and His Campaigns in the West," in Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States (MOLLUS), New York Commandery, Personal Recollections of the War o f the Rebellion. 3d series (New York: [n.p.], 1907), 360-61; Hamilton to USG, February 9, 1863, QR 24, pL 3:41; Hamilton to Rawlins, February 26, 1863, GE 7: 363-64. For examples of Dodge-Rosecrans correspondence, see Dodge to Rosecrans, March 3,1863, Q R23, pt. 2; 100; Dodge to Rosecrans, April 1, 1863, Ibid., 200 .

^^Dana to Stanton, April 10, 1863, OR 24, pt. 1: 72-73; Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1898), 20-22. His reports to Stanton, which indicate that he was privy to intelligence arriving at Grant's headquarters as well as the commanding generals assessments of it, can be found in QE. 24, pt. 1:63-117.

^^Bearss. Vicksburg. 2: 107-126.

*^Ibid., 125-26; Pemberton to Cooper, August 2, 1863, QE 24, pt. 1: 251-52; Pemberton to General Joseph E. Johnston, April 12, 1863, Ibid., pt 3: 738; Pemberton to Cooper, April II, 1863, Ibid., 733; Pemberton to Cooper, Ibid., 751. See also Ballard, Pemberton. 134-37: Connelly. Autumn of Glory. 106.

’*Maj. Gen. Richard J. Oglesby to Lt. Col. Henry Binmore, April 13, 1863, QR 24, pt. 3: 191. On Morris' mission, see Dodge's entry for April 13, 1863 in his "Report of Spys [sic] 1863 to Feb. 1864," [henceforth Dodge Secret Service Diary] box 149, Dodge Papers, SHSI; "Final Report of Receipts and Expenditures of Col. Wm. S. Hillyer, Provost Marshal General, Department of the Tennessee, February - May, 1863" [henceforth Hillyer Report], Hillyer Papers, box 1, UVaL. See also Secret Service Vouchers, boxes 148 and 149, Dodge Papers, SHSI.

•^Dana to Stanton, April 14, 1863, QE24, pt. 1:75.

“®USG to Jesse Grant, April 21, 1863, GE 8: 109.

Bearss, Vicksburg. 2: 53-82; USG to Jesse Grant, April 21, 1863, GE 8: 109.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 2: 129-236; Starr, Union Cavalry. 3: 185-97; Catton, Grant Moves South, 422, Earl S. Miers. The Web of Victory: Grant at Vicksburg (Baton Rouge, La.. Louisiana State University Press, 1955), 148. See also USG to Kelton, July 6, 1863, QE 8: 506-507.

-^Two spies, Lorain Ruggles and Solomon Wool worth, were sent by Grant into enemy lines in late March, but neither were in his employ in late April. Ruggles, also known as "General Bunker," returned from scouting the region northeast of the city in early April with little substantive information and then rejoined his regiment (20th Ohio Infantry) for

267 the upcoming campaign. Brig. Gen. James W. Denver to McPherson, February 27, 1863, OR 24. pt. 3; 71-72; Hillyer Report, Hillyer Papers, UVaL. See also Lorain Ruggles Pension File, NA; [C. Lorain Ruggles], The Great American Scout and Spy. "General Bunker" 3d rev. ed. (New York: Olmsted & Co., 1870), 228-41; S. Wool worth. The Mississippi Scout ( Chicago: n.p., 1867), 5-9. As with all spy memoirs of this period, these works must be used with caution since authors typically exaggerated their exploits in order to sell book.

^^Maj. Gen. Richard J. Oglesby discovered that Dodge had taken his "staff of scouts" into the field and had stripped his district of cavalry for the expedition, leaving behind only a few small detachments. Oglesby to Binmore, April 21,1863, QR 24, pt. 3: 218; Oglesby to Hurlbut, April 18, 1863, Richard J. Oglesby Papers, box 2, ISHS. The absence of entries in Dodge's "information diary" between April 13 and May 8 confirms Oglesby's observations. See Dodge Secret Service Diary, box 149, Dodge Papers, SHSI.

^^Special Orders No. 110, April 20, 1862, QR.24, pt. 3:212-13; USG to McClemand, April 18, 1863, GE 8: 88.

-^USG to Sherman, April 27, 1863, Ibid., 130; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2:253-68; Bowen to Pemberton, April 28,1863, QR 24, pt. 3:797.

^^Porter to USG, April 23, 1863, GE 8: 114-15.

^®USG to Sherman, April 24,1863, Ibid., 117. Grant also sent Lt. Col. James H. Wilson, his chief topographical engineer, on a reconnaissance north of Grand Gulf to find a suitable landing and roads ascending the bluffs between Warrenton and the Big Black River. Wilson found the region and the roads under water. Wilson to Chief Engineer Capt. Frederick E. Prime, May 30, 1863, QR24, pt. 1: 127-28.

^ ^ S G to Halleck, April 29,1863, QE 8: 133; Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1:476-77; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2:317.

^°Ibid.; USG to Kelton, July 6, 1863, GE S: 491; Catton, Grant Moves South. 424-25; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1:477-78.

31 Ibid., 481.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg, 2: 317-46; USG to Halleck, May 3, 1863, GE 8: 143.

^^McCIemand to Rawlins, June 17, 1863, ÛR24, pt. 1: 143; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2; 347- 407; Catton, Grant Moves South. 428; USG to Halleck, May 3, 1863, GE 8: 147.

^"^Bearss, Vicksburg. 2: 351,417; Pemberton to Davis, May 1,1863, QR24, pt. 3; 807.

268 ^^USG to Kelton, July 6, 1863, GE 8; 494-95; Grant, Personal Memoirs. I ; 493-96; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2:431-57, 480.

3^USG to Hurlbut, May 6, 1863, GE 8: 170; USG to Halleck, May 6, 1863, Ibid., 169.

^^With Grierson's command retained by Banks, Grant began his campaign with only one complete cavalry regiment and a mix of companies from other regiments. Starr, Union Cavalry. 3: 182-83.

^^Report of Capt. Ocran H. Howard, Chief Signal Officer, June 6, 1863, QR 24, pt. 1. 130; James H. Wilson, "A Staff-Officer’s Journal of the Vicksburg Campaign, April 30 to July 4, 1863," Journal o f the Military Service Institution of the United States 43 (July 1908); 93-109,261-75.

^^SG to McClemand, May 13, 1863, GE 8; 208. See also McClemand to USG, May 7, 1863, Ibid., 173; McClemand to USG, May 8, 1863, Ibid., 177; Ballard, Pemberton. 147; Wilson, "Vicksburg Journal," 95,97-99. Pemberton had about 23,000 men in the field and another 8000 manning the Vicksburg defenses. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston. 207.

'^^Davis had indeed urged Pemberton to hold Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Davis to Pemberton, May 4,1863, QR 24, pt. 3: 842. On May 9 McPherson had reported that Confederate Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard and reinforcements gathered from all over the South had reached Jackson. McPherson to USG, May 9, 1863, GE 8: 183; USG to Kelton, July 6, 1863, Ibid., 494. Actually, Beauregard sent only two brigades (5000 men) from South Carolina, but he did not accompany them to Mississippi. Bearss, Vicksburg. 2:525.

"**USG to Kelton, July 6, 1863, GE 8:495-96; USG to Maj. Gen. Francis P. Blair, Jr., May 14, 1863, Ibid., 213; Wilson, "Vicksburg Joumal," 105; Grant. Personal Memoirs. 1: 499-500; Pemberton to Davis and Johnston, May 12, 1863, QR 24, pt. 3; 859; Ballard, Pemberton. 153-54; Woodworth, Davis and His Generals. 206-207.

'’^Bearss, Vicksburg. 2; 519-558; Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston. 208-209.

“^^Bearss, Vicksburg, 2: 530; Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston. 209; Catton, Grant Moves South. 441. Grant later recalled that the messenger was a man whom Hurlbut had banished from Memphis for disloyalty. But the man was really a Union spy and his expulsion merely a cover. Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1: 508. Hurlbut had used similar methods to secure the pro-Confederate credentials of his spies. In 1863 he incarcerated one of his operatives, Charles S. Bell, but allowed him to escape from jail in order to cement his reputation as a Southern sympathizer. Hurlbut to Provost Marshal, St. Louis, July 28, 1863, RG 110, entry 36, box 2, NA; Hurlbut to Rawlins, June 7, 1863, RG 393, entry 4720, Department o f the Tennessee, Letters Received, box 1, NA; Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith to Hurlbut, April 29, 1863, QR 24, pt. 1:521.

269 ^U SG to Blair, May 14, 1863, QE 8:213-14; USG to Halleck, May 15, 1863, Ibid, 220; USG to McClemand, May 14, 1863, Ibid, 215; Wilson, "Vicksburg Journal," 106.

^^USG to Halleck, May 15, QR 8:220. Edwin Bearss argued that, upon receipt of the captured dispatch. Grant "began to marshal his army to counter Pemberton's efforts to comply with Johnston's instructions." From the orders given after reading the intercept, however. Grant clearly hoped to prevent Johnston from reaching Pemberton on the west bank and to defeat their combined forces before they could slip into the Vicksburg works. See Bearss, Vicksburg. 2: 568.

"*^McClemand to USG, May 15, 1863, QR.24, pt. 3: 313; Report of Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus, May 26, 1863, Ibid., pt. 2: 13; Wilson, "Vicksburg Journal," 106.

"^^Ibid, 106-107; Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1; 511; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2; 579. Pemberton's army numbered around 23,000. See Ibid.

"^®USG to McPherson, May 16, 1863, QE. 8:226. After the war Dodge claimed that one of his scouts (known only as "Sanbum") had passed through Johnston's army and reported to Grant that same morning. According to Dodge, Sanbum told Grant that Johnston's force was too distant to aid Pemberton. No documentation in Dodge's records supports his claim or shows that Dodge had authorized such a mission. Dodge, "Secret Service," Dodge Papers, SHSI.

"^^Johnston to Davis, December 24, 1863, QR24, p t 1: 240; Pemberton to Cooper, August 25,1863, Ibid., 261-63; Johnston to Pemberton, May 15, 1863, Ibid., pt. 3: 882; Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston. 207-209; Ballard, Pemberton. 154-160.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 2; 559-651, 653-689.

51 USG to Sherman, May 17, 1863, QE 8: 233.

^^Bearss, Vicksburg. 3; 731-873.

5^USG to Porter, May 23, 1863, QE 8: 257; USG to Hallack, May 24, 1863, Ibid., 261 -62; Brigadier General Jacob G. Lauman, May 23,1863, Ibid., 259-60; Wilson, "Vicksburg Diary," 264; Porter to USG, May 23, 1863, QE 8:258.

^^Rawlins to Hurlbut, May 25, 1863, Ibid., 8:273; USG to Banks, May 25, 1863, Ibid., 268-69; USG to Prentiss, May 25, 1863, Ibid., 272.

^^Starr, Union Cavalry. 3; 180-85.

270 ^^Special Orders No. 141, May 26, 1863, GE 8:288; USG to Porter, May 29, 1863, Ibid., 285-86; Blair to USG, May 29, 1863, Ibid.; USG to Halleck, May 29, 1863, Ibid., 283; Blair to USG, May 31, 1863, Ibid., 290; Dana to Stanton, May 30,1863, QE. 24, pt. 1; 90; USG to Porter, June 2, 1863, QE 8: 299; Wilson, "Vicksburg Joumal," 270; Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg. 3: 995-1006.

^^Wilson, "Vicksburg Journal," 270; Dana to Stanton, May 31, 1863, QE 24, pt. 1; 90-91; Hurlbut to USG, May 30, 1863, QE 8:274.

^^Lauman to USG, May 30, 1863, Ibid., 294; USG to Kelton, May 31, 1863, Ibid., 293; Wilson, "Vicksburg Joumal," 270. This void remained until Samuel H. Beckwith joined Grant's staff as a "cipher operator" in September, 1863. See John Y. Simon and David L. Wilson, eds., "Samuel H. Beckwith: 'Grant's Shadow'," in Simon and Wilson, eds., Ulysses S. Grant: Essays and Documents tCarbondale. III.: Southem Illinois University Press, 1981), 84.

^^Col. George Thom to USG, June 16, 1863, Ibid., 294. For the enciphered message and two slightly different translations, see QE24, pt. 1: 39-40.

^®Col. Clark Wright to Rawlins, May 30,1863, QE 8:292.

^^USG to Banks, May 31, 1863, Ibid., 294-95; USG to Hurlbut, May 31,1862, Ibid., 297; USG to Halleck, May 29, 1863, Ibid., 283. By June I, Johnston's force had grown to around 23,000. See Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston. 211. Grant also estimated that Pemberton had 18,000 men present for duty in Vicksburg, only 644 over the actual number. See USG to Banks, May 31,1863, Ibid., 295; Ballard, Pemberton. 171; Inspection Report of Army at Vicksburg, May 26, 1863, QE24. pt. 3: 923.

Johnston to Davis, November 1, 1863, QE24, pt. 1:239; Johnston to Davis, May 31, 1863, 194; Retum of the Army in Mississippi, June 25,1863, Ibid., pt. 3: 978; Bearss, Vicksburg. 2:525-26.

^^USG to Kimball, June 3, 1863, QE 8:308-309; USG to Kimball, June 4, 1863, Ibid., 315; Kimball to USG, June 5, 1863, Ibid., 316-17; Kimball to Rawlins, June 6, 1863, Ibid., 317; Bearss, Vicksburg. 3: 1021-1030.

*^Dana to Stanton, June 7, 1863, QE24, pt. 1: 94; Bearss, Vicksburg. 3: 1027-28.

^^Dana to Stanton, June 8, 1863, QE 24, pt. 1:94; USG to Halleck, June 8, 1863. GP 8: 325.

*^^USG to Hurlbut, June 11, 1863, QE 8:348; USG to Halleck, June 11, 1863, Ibid., 345; Osterhaus to Rawlins, June 7,1863, ÛE24, pt. 2:215-16; McClemand to USG, June 12, 1863, QE 8: 358. In reality, Bragg had detached only parts of two divisions. Breckinridge

271 returned to Mississippi in June minus his Tennessee brigade and the division of John P. McCown arrived in mid-May, alos minus one brigade. In ail, their combined strength was around 8300 men. See Johnston to Davis, November I, 1863, QR.24, pt. 1: 239; Bearss, Vicksburg. 3:971-71, 1007.

^^Washbum to USG, June 11, 1863, QE 8:353; Osterhaus to Rawlins, June 12, 1863, Ibid., 339-40; Wright to Rawlins, June 12, 1863, Ibid., 340; McClemand to USG, June 12,1863, Ibid., 358; Captain J. B. Gorsuch to USG, June 13, 1863, QR 24, pt. 3; 407; USG to Washburn, June 13,1863, QE 8: 359-60.

68washbum to USG, June 14, 1863, RG 393, entry 4720, box 2; USG to Washburn, June 15, 1863, QE 8:373; Dana to Stanton, June 15, 1863, Q R 24, pt. I: 100; USG to McClemand, June 15,1863, QE 8; 368-69; Dana to Stanton, June 20, 1863, QR 24, pt. I . 104-105.

^%earss, Vicksburg. 3: 1083-1087; Johnston to Pemberton, June 16, 1863, QR 24, pt. 3. 965.

^®The spy was probably Charles S. Bell. On June 8 Hurlbut had sent Bell south to provide Grant with "all the information he can gather." See Hurlbut to USG, June 7, 1863, RG 393, entry 4720, box 1, NA. Later, Hurlbut sent Bell to Grant, who was then commanding general of all Union armies, and introduced him as the spy "who penetrated through Johnson's army in rear of Vicksburg and reported to you." Hurlbut to USG, October 4, 1864, QE 10: 387. See also Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith Smith to USG, January 17, 1864, RG 393, entry 2521, Military Division of the Mississippi, Records of the Provost Marshal, box 2, NA.

^'USG to Porter, June 22,1863, QE 8: 402; USG to McPherson, June 22, 1863, Ibid., 403-403; USG to Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, June 22, 1863, Ibid., 404; Dana to Stanton, June 22, 1863, QR 24, pt. 1 :106-107.

^^USG to Sherman, June 22, 1863, Ibid, 408; Bearss, Vicksburg. 3: 1089-1095; USG to Halleck, June 26, 1863, Q£ 8:432.

^^Sherman to Rawlins, June 27, 1863, QR 24, pt. 2:247; Dana to Stanton, June 24, 1863, Ibid., pt. 1: 107.

^^Dana to Stanton, June 27, 1863, Ibid., 110; USG to Hurlbut, June 27, 1863, QE 8: 435.

^^On Rosecrans' of intelligence during the Tullahoma campaign, see William B. Feis, "The Deception of Braxton Bragg: The Tullahoma Campaign, 1863," Blue & Gray Magazine 10 (October 1992): 10-21,46-53.

272 ^^USG to Banks, June 30, 1863, Ibid., 446; Dana to Stanton, July 2, 1863, QR 24, pt. 1; 113-14; Sherman to USG, July 1, 1863, QE 8: 453; USG to Ord, July 1, 1863, Ibid., 452.

^^Johnston to Davis, December 24, 1863, Q R 24, pt. 1:244-45; Bearss, Vicksburg. 3: 1131-1138.

^^For examples, see Dana to Stanton, June 11, 1863, OR 24, pt. 1:96; Dana to Stanton, June 14, 1863, Ibid., 98; USG to Julia, June 15, 1863, QE 8:376-77; Wilson, "Vicksburg Joumal," 266-67,271,273. Evidence indicates that Porter’s operative was probably named Trussel, the same man who had accompanied Spencer Kellogg Brown on his first spying mission in January, 1862. In a footnote. Brown's chronicler noted that during the Vicksburg campaign Trussel "reported to General Grant with very important information." See Smith, ed., Spencer Kellogg Brown. 239.

^^Wilson, "Vicksburg Joumal," 273; USG to Sherman, June 25,1863, QE 8; 423.

*°USG to Sherman, July 3, 1863, Ibid., 460; USG to Sherman, July 3, 1863, Ibid., 461; USG to Julia Grant, June 29, 1863, Ibid., 444.

273 CHAPTERS

THE FRUITS OF INTELLIGENCE AND LUCK; THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN

Just as he had after each of his previous victories, following the fall of Vicksburg,

Grant looked ahead to new challenges and toward ending the rebellion as quickly as possible. In early August, after he had solidified the Union hold on the Mississippi

Valley, Grant, rewarded with the rank of major general in the U. S. Army for his

Vicksburg feat, selected the seaport city of Mobile, Alabama as the next objective. His planning for that campaign ended abruptly, however, as events in Tennessee once again demanded his attention and the resources of his command, just as they had after the fall of Corinth over a year earlier.

In one of the most brilliant and bloodless campaigns of the war. Major General

William Starke Rosecrans, Grant's former subordinate and commander of the Army of the Cumberland, had maneuvered Braxton Bragg's army out of Middle Tennessee and sent it reeling toward Chattanooga in mid-July. Forced to evacuate the town, Bragg retreated into northern Georgia while Rosecrans claimed the "Gateway of the

Confederacy" for the Union. On September 19-20, however, the Confederate Army of

Tennessee, with help from Lieutenant General James Longstreet's corps on loan from the

Army o f Northern Virginia, exacted its revenge when it smashed Rosecrans' army at

Chickamauga, drove it back to Chattanooga, and laid siege to the city. Bragg's army occupied the heights dominating the city and nearly severed the Army of the Cumberland

274 TENNESSEE

Tunnel fOÏÎpSi

ÊKOWNS htckamiugB Station A lo LA r//\v-TiXWiîflia K

A L A B A M A \ J ^ J - CHATTANOOGA BATTLEFIELD AND THE “CRACKER LINE A Sherman. Nov. 24 and 25 B Thomas, Nov. 25 \ ^ , 1863 C Hooker, Nov. 24 D Hooker, Nov. 25 ' B to MILC* X Orchard Knob S a m 'K t w n f

Map 7 from its sources of supply. With food stockpiles dwindling and both men and animals on reduced rations, Rosecrans, still reeling from the Chickamauga disaster, pleaded for help. *

With the Army of the Cumberland in dire straits, Halleck ordered Grant to send reinforcements from Mississippi to aid their beleaguered comrades. Once again, the

Army of the Tennessee commander found himself supplying men and arms to Union forces in Tennessee just as he had done for Buell after the capture of Corinth in 1862. In both cases, the distraction in Tennessee forced Grant to shelve any offensive aspirations and assume a defensive posture. In what by now had become a familiar refrain. Grant revealed his frustration to Halleck. Instead of moving on Mobile, his army was relegated to a strategic reserve. Forced into idleness, he lamented the fact that "advantage cannot be taken o f so fine an opportunity of dealing the enemy a heavy blow."-

As the war entered its third October, the situation in Chattanooga had become critical. Cut off from all but a trickle of supplies, the Army of the Cumberland faced starvation unless someone lifted the siege. Described by Lincoln as acting "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head,"^ Rosecrans appeared incapable of solving the logistical problem or dealing with Bragg. The time had come to replace him with someone able to revive the Army of the Cumberland and break the Confederate hold on the city. On October 18, Grant met with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in Louisville and accepted command of the newly-created Military Division of the Mississippi, a vast geographic command comprised of the departments and armies of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee. Along with the reorganization came changes in personnel as well. Major

General George H. Thomas replaced Rosecrans as head of the Army of the Cumberland and Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Army of the Tennessee. Thus, instead

276 of merely sending men and arms. Grant would direct the relief of Chattanooga in person.

Not only did he hope to end the siege, but as usual he foresaw an opportunity for much larger possibilities. Atlanta beckoned in the distance."^

Before reaching Chattanooga, Grant met with Rosecrans at Stevenson, Alabama, for an update on the desperate situation he was about to inherit. Despite the animus between the two men dating back to the battle of Corinth, Grant remembered that

Rosecrans made "some excellent suggestions" as to the next course of action.^

Apparently, however, the former Army of the Cumberland commander failed to brief the new commander on the latest news concerning the enemy's situation. Several days after the meeting Grant complained to Halleck that he knew little about the forces ringing

Chattanooga. All he could get came from deserters, but "their information is limited to their own brigades or Divisions at furthest."^ His lack of intelligence seems strange given the emphasis Rosecrans' had always placed on intelligence-gathering throughout his Civil War career. He had created an intelligence system at Corinth that Dodge used as the foundation for his own network. While in Nashville, he established the "Army

Police" within the Department of the Cumberland, an interesting organization whose duties included information collection and counterintelligence.^ Moreover, using information gathered by his police and from other sources, Rosecrans artfully deceived

Bragg and maneuvered him out of Middle Tennessee the past summer. And just two weeks before briefing Grant, Rosecrans' provost marshal general had formulated an order of battle for the Confederate Army of Tennessee (fairly accurate) and provided an estimate (although highly inflated) of its strength. Regardless, Grant apparently never received such specific details from Rosecrans.* But as he had demonstrated before, he was not afraid to forge ahead without it.

In addition to Rosecrans' apparent reticence, the new commander at Chattanooga also complained that he possessed "no means of judging accurately" the size of the

277 enemy force opposing him.^ Apparently, at this early stage. Grant was unaware of the intelligence network operating out of Army of the Cumberland headquarters. Even as commander of the Fourteenth Corps before Rosecrans' relief, Thomas appreciated the important role of military information in warfare. Charles A. Dana, who visited Thomas' headquarters at Chattanooga in early October, revealed this when he noted that during his stay "Scouts were coming in constantly." Moreover, during the Tullahoma and

Chickamauga campaigns, Thomas pursued intelligence with systematic zeal. Thus Grant had at his disposal an intelligence system capable of fulfilling his needs, if he chose to utilize it.10

On October 23 Grant arrived in Chattanooga after a treacherous journey over

Walden's Ridge on the rugged mountain roads that currently served as the primary supply routes into the besieged city. The horrible condition of these roads left little doubt of the need for a more reliable means of feeding and equipping Thomas' army. After seeing the ragged and starving condition of the Army of the Cumberland, the new commander, aware that winter would soon come and make conditions worse, looked for a way to relieve Thomas' suffering soldiers so that he could begin offensive operations. As one officer noted at that time, only three options remained; "open the river, retreat, or starve." Unlike Rosecrans, Grant had no intention of abandoning the city in order to save the army. "Since Vicksburg fell this has become really the vital point of the rebellion," asserted Grant, "and requires all the care and watchfulness that can be bestowed upon it."i'

A plan to secure a better supply line by opening the Tennessee River had already been approved by Rosecrans when Grant arrived. Brigadier General William F. "Baldy"

Smith, Rosecrans' (and now Thomas') chief engineer, had devised a scheme for opening the so-called "cracker line" by seizing Brown's Ferry, a crossing on the Tennessee two miles west of Chattanooga, and gaining control of Raccoon Mountain west of the feny

278 and the valley west o f Lookout Mountain. Troops from Chattanooga would capture

Brown’s Ferry while the divisions under Major General Joseph H. Hooker, commander of the combined Eleventh and Twelfth Corps sent from the Army o f the Potomac after

Chickamauga, marched from Bridgeport, Alabama to secure Lookout Valley. Once these objectives were achieved, steamboats laden with supplies could reach Brown's Ferry, which was connected to Chattanooga by a short road and a pontoon bridge, both of which were out of range of the Confederate guns on Lookout Mountain. After minor skirmishing at the ferry and an intense night fight at Wauhatchie, by October 29 Union troops had achieved their objectives. The "cracker line" was open.

With his logistical problems easing. Grant turned his attention to resuming the offensive. In this he faced a formidable challenge. Not only did the weakened and demoralized condition of the Army of the Cumberland cause difficulties, but geography worked against the Fédérais as well. Situated on the south bank of the Tennessee where the river curves toward the south, Chattanooga was dominated by several significant terrain features. To the southwest. Lookout Mountain, rising eighteen hundred feet above a sharp bend in the river where it altered course from south to north, not only commanded the river at this point, but also the north bank, known as Moccasin Point, and

Lookout Valley to the west. In addition, its steep and craggy heights were within easy artillery range of Union lines. To the west of this eminence stood Raccoon Mountain, which guarded the far western approaches to the city. Four miles to the east o f Lookout

Mountain and across Chattanooga Valley lay another significant terrain feature called

Missionary Ridge. Extending southeast of South Chickamauga Creek, which emptied into the Tennessee roughly two and a half miles northeast of the city, this ridge, featuring deep wooded ravines, steep slopes, and rocky outcroppings, commanded Chattanooga from the east. The ridge ran unbroken to the southeast until punctured by a narrow gap at

Rossville. On the northern end of the Missionary Ridge, the key feature was Tunnel Hill,

279 one of the higher elevations in the area located just north of the Chattanooga &

Cleveland Railroad tunnel. Unfortunately for the Fédérais, the Confederates held all of

this high ground, thereby controlling all the major routes into Chattanooga.

Not only did the terrain and lack of knowledge about the enemy haunt Grant, he

had other concerns as well. Besides dealing with Bragg, the situation on his far left flank

in East Tennessee also demanded his attention. Before Grant's arrival at Chattanooga,

Major General Ambrose Burnside had fulfilled the wishes of the Lincoln administration by driving Confederate forces out of strongly pro-Union East Tennessee. By late

October, Burnside had cleared the region of enemy forces and occupied Knoxville.

Unfortunately, Burnside's East Tennessee campaign would be both a curse and a blessing for Grant. A blessing because his forces in Knoxville might distract Bragg. A curse because Burnside's presence might also hamper Grant's plans to resume the offensive by draining forces away from Chattanooga in order to secure the vulnerable left flank in

East Tennessee. Only time would tell whether the Knoxville forces would become an asset or a liability for Federal operations around Chattanooga.

On October 26, Grant received ominous news indicating that Burnside's presence in East Tennessee might become a burden. Reports indicated that Confederate troops from the Army of Northern Virginia were en route to Knoxville. The following day

Burnside discounted the reports o f troops coming from Virginia but warned that Bragg had apparently detached a sizable contingent to East Tennessee. When Burnside alerted him to this development. Grant as yet had no intelligence showing that any enemy forces had departed the Chattanooga front. By the time of Burnside's October 26 telegram, however, Bragg had already dispatched two divisions— Carter L. Stevenson's and Frank Cheatham's-toward Knoxville.

Burnside’s claim that enemy troops from Chattanooga were concentrating against him concerned the Chattanooga commander. Not only did it appear that Bragg could

280 send substantial forces to threaten Knoxville without detection, but Washington was also

pressuring Grant to relieve the pressure on Burnside and ensure that East Tennessee and

its Unionist population remained under Federal protection. However, the men and

animals of the Army of the Cumberland were still in wretched condition and as yet

unable to undertake rigorous operations, thereby limiting Grant's ability to meet these

requests. The whole situation, he later recalled, had caused him "much uneasiness."’^

Concerned that Bragg might advance on Knoxville from the southwest and drive a

wedge between the two Union armies before the Army of the Cumberland regained its strength. Grant turned his attention to heading off such a move. Due to the condition of

Thomas’ army and Hooker’s preoccupation with maintaining the "cracker line," only

Sherman's Army of the Tennessee, consisting of the Fifteenth Corps and division of the

Seventeenth (the rest remained behind in Mississippi and West Tennessee) was capable of parrying a potential move by Bragg against Burnside. But by early November nature and human error combined to slow Sherman's march from Mississippi to Chattanooga.

Until his trusted subordinate arrived. Grant believed he had few viable options and therefore delayed active operations.

Despite even more reports of large forces collecting northeast of Chattanooga to threaten Knoxville, Grant remained confident that if his old war horse Sherman arrived before Burnside was assailed, "I think I will be able to make [Bragg] take a respectful distance South of [Chattanooga]." In the meantime, however, he hoped to use

Thomas' army, though still incapable of undertaking large-scale operations, to demonstrate in Lookout Valley while simultaneously threatening the enemy lines along

Missionary Ridge. He hoped that this movement would pressure Bragg into recalling the troops sent to East Tennessee. But even if the Confederates succeeded in severing

Knoxville from Chattanooga and perhaps moved into Kentucky, Grant remained

281 sanguine about the final results. Although substantial territory and supplies would be

lost, he believed that "the rebel force making such a movement would be totally annihilated.

Believing that as many as 20,000 Confederates from Chattanooga were concentrating in East Tennessee, on November 5 Grant promised Burnside that he would soon force the recall of Bragg's detachments.^* Already "Baldy" Smith had formulated a plan to accomplish this end. He proposed that Thomas extend his picket lines on the left flank toward Citico Creek west of Missionary Ridge to provide more maneuver room and allow for more warning in case of a surprise attack. In conjunction with this operation,

Thomas would also advance his troops to "threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary Ridge." Rather than a full-scale attack. Smith saw the Citico Creek operation as merely a demonstration that might compel Bragg to countermand the orders of the units bound for East Tennessee. Grant, however, leaned more toward a cavalry raid on Bragg's communications with East Tennessee in conjunction with a demonstration up Lookout Valley. Aware of the limitations of Thomas' command. Grant believed Sherman and the Fifteenth Corps to be the key to the success of future operations and was willing to use Thomas' exhausted troops only if necessary. "Whether

Thomas makes any demonstration before [Sherman's] arrival," Grant advised Burnside on

November 5, "will depend on the advices of the enemys [sic] movements

That advice was not long in coming. The next evening Burnside notified Grant that the Confederates had attacked his eastern outposts. In addition, a lieutenant from a

Georgia regiment deserted to Union lines in Chattanooga that night bringing with him extremely valuable information. According to Dana, still acting as Stanton's eyes and ears at Grant's headquarters, the deserter disclosed that Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions were already in East Tennessee and, more importantly, that Longstreet's corps had departed Bragg's lines on November 4-5 to join the operations against Burnside.

282 Although unaware that the two aforementioned divisions had already been recalled, the

Confederate officer was precisely correct regarding Longstreet’s movements. Information from another unidentified deserter apparently corroborated the Georgia lieutenant's story and convinced the commanding general of the need to act^^

Grant responded in a characteristic fashion. Believing that enemy had "moved a great part of their force from this front" to assail Burnside, on November 7 the

Chattanooga commander resolved to "make an immediate move from here toward their lines o f communication to bring [their detachments] back."^^ Casting aside the cavalry raid and the Citico Creek operation. Grant ordered Thomas to attack the northern end of

Missionary Ridge "with all the force you can bring to bear against it." Fully expecting his subordinate to seize that position, he then instructed Thomas to threaten or, if an opportunity presented itself, attack Bragg’s communications between Dalton, Georgia and

Cleveland, Tennessee.

Thomas was shocked when he received the order. "You must get that order for an advance countermanded," he pleaded with Smith, or "1 shall lose my army.’’^^ Thomas and Smith then reconnoitered the Union left across from the northern tip of Missionary

Ridge to determine the feasibility of the intended operation. They returned later on the evening of November 7 and informed Grant that an attack at that time and against that place was unwise. They argued that Bragg’s lines extended further north than heretofore known, which would force Thomas to stretch his own lines far too much in order to outflank the Confederates. (Grant’s orders, however, said nothing about flanking movements; he had ordered an attack) Moreover, animals strong enough to transport artillery needed to support the attack were in short supply. Thomas also expressed his reservations about targeting northern Missionary Ridge, arguing instead that seizing

Lookout Mountain would tender better results. This desire was probably based upon a series of intelligence reports arriving at his headquarters purporting that Lookout

283 Mountain was only lightly defended In the end the Army of the Cumberland commander, supported by Smith and Dana, urged his superior to delay any major operations until Sherman arrived.^*

Grudgingly, Grant called off the attack. Later he wrote that this turn of events left him extremely fhistrated. Because he could neither aid Burnside nor attack Bragg, "I felt restless beyond any thing I had before experienced in this War." Once again, he was forced into a defensive posture because of problems outside of his control. As his past campaigns had shown. Grant chafed when unable to seize or maintain the initiative, especially if someone’s else's difficulties forced him into that position. As one of his staff officers, Horace Porter, later observed the general possessed an "inborn dislike to be thrown upon the defensive."-^ In addition to the pleas from Washington and Burnside to relieve the pressure on East Tennessee, the Chattanooga commander wanted to do something—anything—but hold still and pass the initiative to the enemy. But the episode with Thomas demonstrated how hastily he could make decisions to attack based upon very little information. Grant ordered Thomas to assail Missionary Ridge without having adequately reconnoitered the area himself or even knowing how far Bragg's right flank extended to the north or the strength of the forces defending that position. In his official report and later in his memoirs. Grant placed the onus on Thomas for delaying this offensive operation but neglected to acknowledge that he himself had ordered the assault based primarily upon the word of two deserters against a position he knew little about.^®

Grant thus resigned himself to waiting for Sherman's arrival before initiating large-scale operations. By November 14, however, Sherman's advance had reached

Bridgeport, over sixty miles away from Chattanooga. On that day Grant had already formulated a plan to be implemented once Sherman's column reached the city. It called for a general attack along the entire front, with Sherman and Thomas carrying the

Confederate right and center along Missionary Ridge while Hooker assaulted their left at

284 Lookout Mountain. Like the November 7 plan. Grant hoped to dislodge the Confederates

from their positions and then disrupt communications between Cleveland and Dalton, effectively severing Longstreet's force from the Army of Tennessee.^* But the commanding general also hoped to deceive the Confederates as to his real intentions.

Grant had learned that "the enemy now seem to be looking for an attack on his left flank

[Lookout Mountain]." He decided to confirm this notion in Bragg's mind by marching

Sherman's advance division, led by Brigadier General Hugh Ewing, up Lookout Valley to give the false impression that the Confederate left posted on Lookout Mountain was

indeed the main objective of Federal operations. In reality, however, the rest of

Sherman's men were to follow a different road concealed from enemy view toward their destination on the Union left opposite the northern end of Missionary Ridge. By providing evidence that seemingly confirmed Confederate assessments o f Union

intentions. Grant hoped Bragg would weaken the Missionary Ridge line to meet the perceived threat on his left.^-

At this time, it appears that Grant had moved past the idea of merely forcing

Bragg to recall troops from Burnside's front. Instead, he saw an opportunity to strike an

Army of Tennessee weakened by substantial detachments to East Tennessee. Already the

Chattanooga commander believed Bragg had only 30,000 men in front of the city. Grant's forces, with the addition of Sherman, would number over 70,000.^^ [f his plan was successful, Bragg would be sent reeling into Georgia and Longstreet would be forced to abandon his Knoxville campaign, not to aid Bragg, but to avoid being cut off from his base. As was characteristic of his generalship. Grant saw an opportunity to do more than force Bragg to shift troops between fronts. Here was a chance to unravel the entire

Confederate presence in eastern and southeastern Tennessee.

While developing these plans, however, disturbing news filtered into Grant's headquarters. Information gleaned from Union scouts and enemy deserters on November

285 15 indicated that forces under Joseph E. Johnston, then in Mississippi, were reinforcing

Bragg. Grant asked Hurlbut in Memphis and McPherson in Vicksburg to verify this report.^^ Before hearing their replies, however, Thomas probably eased his superior's mind. A day earlier Thomas had told Halleck that the rumors of Johnston's arrival, not to mention reports that troops from Mobile were also en route, were "unreliable." Although neither Hurlbufs nor McPherson's assessments could be found, the Chattanooga commander was apparently satisfied with Thomas'judgment and dropped the matter.^^

Nevertheless, the longer Union troops at Chattanooga remained idle, the more the Army of Tennessee would become a magnet for Southem reinforcements and allow Bragg the luxury of dispatching troops to crush Burnside in East Termessee.^^

While waiting for Sherman, Grant revised the November 14 plan to give his favorite subordinate the key role in the coming offensive. After a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's right flank on the northern end of Missionary Ridge revealed it to be "imperfectly guarded," Grant decided to direct the main thrust o f his operation against the Confederate right. Instead o f a general assault all along the line as envisioned earlier, on November 21 Union troops would divert Bragg's attention toward his left on Lookout Mountain while Sherman's force—supported by Thomas—pounced on the northern end of Missionary Ridge. The goal was to envelop Bragg's right flank and sever communications with Longstreet in East Tennessee. All that remained was for all of Sherman's column to reach the city and assume their positions. Once they did. Grant told Halleck, "A battle or a falling back of the enemy is inevitable [sic]

Unfortunately for the Chattanooga commander, muddy roads and other obstacles continued to slow Sherman's march from Bridgeport and forced Grant to postpone the attack until November 23. The enemy "have been able to send Longstreet off before my eyes, and I have not been able to move a foot to stop his advance... against Burnside,"

Grant lamented. "I am tired of the proximity of the enemy and do not intend to stand it if

286 it can be helped." In addition. Grant had concluded that Bragg had not been fooled by

Ewing's diversionary column operating in Lookout Valley, making him all the more anxious for Sherman to commence his attack on tlie enemy right.^^ By November 22, heavy rains and repairs to the broken pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry had caused further delays in getting Sherman's men into position and Grant grudgingly suspended the

November 23 attack another day. However, he soon received intelligence that led him to act despite these conditions."*®

Early on November 23 two deserters wandered into Union lines with news that

Bragg was supposedly retreating and that by evening there would be no Confederates left behind save for picket details. Not only did they corroborate information gleaned from a

Tennessee officer who had deserted two days earlier, the deserters' stories made sense of the recent heightened activity along the railroad in Bragg's rear and explained the heavy columns of troops observed marching along Missionary Ridge toward the Confederate right. In addition. Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis observed that Confederate camps on their right flank look deserted."** All this news gave Grant pause, for on November 20

Bragg had sent a dispatch under flag of truce advising him to clear Chattanooga of all non-combatants. At the time the message meant little, but in concert with the latest intelligence. Grant surmised that the Confederate commander had attempted to lure him into thinking that an attack was coming in order to cover his own a general move toward

Knoxville."*^ Even before the deserters appeared, the general and his staff had been privately fearing the Bragg might get away unscathed. "The issue or result is not doubtful unless Bragg runs," quipped Captain Ely S. Parker. Unwilling to let that happen. Grant ordered a reconnaissance in force by a portion of the Army of the Cumberland against the center of Missionary Ridge and ascertain the "truth or falsity" of the deserters' reports."*^

Thomas' demonstration on the afternoon of November 23 achieved that and more.

Four full divisions advanced across the open plain west of Missionary Ridge in full view

287 o f the Confederates manning the rifle pits at the base of the heights and those in the works lining the crest. Braxton Bragg even watched the martial display from his headquarters on the ridge. Not only did they determine that Bragg was not in the process o f withdrawing, Thomas' men captured Orchard Knob, a rugged hill over 2000 yards closer to enemy lines, and a low ridge extending south from it. The ease with which the

Fédérais seized the Confederate defenses at Orchard Knob buoyed Grant's spirits and led him to conclude that, if Bragg was not retreating before, he surely would now. As Dana noted later that evening, "Nothing shows decisively whether enemy will fight or fly.

Grant thinks the latter." On this day, luck appeared to be on his side.'^

In reality, however, Bragg was not in the process o f retreat prior to the loss of

Orchard Knob. After the engagement, Dana noted that Confederate prisoners "know nothing of any general evacuation." Grant later learned that the large movement Union signalmen had observed moving toward the Confederate right on November 22 was not part of a general retreat, but the shifting o f more troops—this time, the divisions of

Generals Patrick Cleburne and Simon Bolivar Buckner (11,000 men)—toward East

Tennessee to protect communications with Longstreet In fact, Bragg sent these divisions to counter the appearance of Sherman’s column north of the Tennessee River moving toward the Federal left. This force, he feared, might slip around his right and interpose itself between the Chattanooga Confederates and their compatriots in East Tennessee.

What Union signalmen saw, therefore, was not a general withdrawal, but instead a

Confederate redeployment to counter Sherman's appearance on the Federal left.

Moreover, the Confederate deserters had related only sketchy camp rumors. As

Grant later noted, these men had not intentionally misinformed him, but had only

"mistaken Braggs [sic] movements." Usually, the Federal commander shied away from placing much stock in information derived from deserters. A few weeks earlier, he had commented that information from deserters was usually reliable only when it pertained

288 "to their own Brigades or Divisions at furthest.in this case, however, their stories fit

with other bits of intelligence indicating that a withdrawal was in progress. And given

Grant's apparent concern that Bragg might get away, the evidence meshed with his own

perceptions of what the enemy would likely do in their situation.

Contrary to Grant's belief, Bragg had no intention o f falling back after losing

Orchard Knob either. This was merely the product of the Federal commander's past

experience with the western Confederate leadership. In many of his previous campaigns,

retreat or surrender had been their response to tight situations. Although shaken by the

events of November 23, however, Bragg planned to stay. His fortifications at the base and

particularly along the crest of Missionary Ridge remained formidable and would, he

believed, cost the Fédérais dearly if they attempted a direct assault to dislodge his army.

Moreover, although Thomas' seizure of Orchard Knob was a signal victory, especially

given that it was supposedly just a reconnaissance, it also had an effect that boded ill for

later Union efforts to turn the Confederate right flank. As a result of the Fédérais

advance, Bragg surmised that Grant was preparing to assault his immediate front on

Missionary Ridge. Thus the Confederate commander not only moved a division from

Lookout Mountain to his right, he also recalled Cleburne's command and placed it in

reserve behind Missionary Ridge."^^ This would not be good news for Sherman. During

his attack against the Confederate right on November 25, he found himself up against

Cleburne, one of the Confederacy's best soldiers leading one of its toughest divisions.

In the final analysis, the enemy movements and the deserters' information fooled

the Federal commander. But his swift aggressive reaction, especially given that he had

only the vaguest notions about the enemy's strength, demonstrated once again that seizing the initiative could reap benefits, even if predicated on inaccurate or faulty information.

By demonstrating against the center of the Missionary Ridge position, the heart of

Confederate strength. Grant tried the unexpected and achieved equally unexpected

289 results. Moreover, he forced Bragg to react, thereby disrupting his own plans to protect his communications with Longstreet In this instance, even though Grant operated on false assumptions and inaccurate information, the initiative and a measure of luck turned the situation in his favor.

Despite Thomas' gains and Grant's initial optimism that the enemy would probably retreat, Bragg's army remained in its trenches on November 24. But the

Confederate commander was befuddled by recent Union movements. Two days earlier, he had discovered what were believed to be Sherman's troops crossing the Tennessee into

Chattanooga. In response, he shifted troops from his left flank to meet the growing threat on his right.This left only two divisions for the defense of Lookout Mountain. Major

General Carter L. Stevenson, who commanded this force, complained that his position was "exceedingly weak" as a result and warned Bragg that, in his view, the Union activity on the Confederate right was merely a ruse to weaken the Lookout Mountain sector, the true Federal objective. On the evening of November 23, Stevenson sent Bragg a message transmitted by a signal detachment atop the mountain. "I observed closely the movements of the enemy until dark. [The] object seemed to be to attract our attention...

. If they intend to attack, my opinion is it will be upon our left [i.e. Lookout

Mountain]."^® Bragg, however, believed that the Fédérais were focused upon the

Missionary Ridge line and paid little attention to Stevenson's observations.

George Thomas, on the other hand, was greatly interested in what the Confederate commander atop Lookout Mountain had to say. Unknown to the Confederates, Union signalmen had cracked the enemy's signal cipher allowing them to read Stevenson's message.^* Thomas and Grant interpreted the intercept to mean that Bragg expected the

Fédérais to focus their efforts against Lookout Mountain. Earlier, Grant had used

Ewing's division in Lookout Valley to foster this perception, but later concluded that

Bragg had not been fooled. Now it appeared that the Confederate commander indeed

290 believed that his left was a primary target. To ftirther foster this mistaken belief. Grant ordered Hooker to demonstrate with a division against the Lookout Mountain defenses.

At roughly the same time, Sherman's divisions, now up and in position, would cross the

Teimessee below the mouth o f South Chickamauga Creek and seize the north end of

Missionary Ridge. Although Hooker's operation was designed to further deceive Bragg

into concentrating on his left while the main Union thrust fell upon his right. Grant gave

"Fighting Joe" permission to "take the point of Lookout if your demonstration develops its practicability."^^ Once again. Grant had acted upon an inaccurate assessment of the situation based upon the flimsiest of evidence.

Unknown to the Federal commander, however, Thomas' advance the previous day had caused Bragg to weaken his left flank, a move predicated upon the belief that

Lookout Mountain was not a primary Union objective, despite Stevenson's warnings to the contrary. In the end, Bragg was right and Grant was wrong. However, when

Hooker's men stormed Lookout Mountain on November 24 and eventually dislodged its defenders, that distinction no longer mattered. Similar to the unexpected success of the

November 23 recoimaissance. Hooker's demonstration the following day, designed to reinforce Bragg's supposedly mistaken assumption regarding Union intentions, achieved a stimning success despite the flawed intelligence and misperceptions upon which it was based. On November 24, luck and Braxton Bragg were the variables that worked in

Grant's favor. So much so that the Federal commander fully expected the Confederates to withdraw later that night under cover of darkness.

While Hooker advanced on Lookout Mountain, Sherman's divisions crossed the

Termessee and seized what he thought was Tunnel Hill, the key to turning Bragg's right along Missionary Ridge. However, due to Sherman's absence at the front, poor recormaissance work, and faulty maps, his forces had by that evening only reached Billy

Goat Hill, a detached elevation short the true objective. This mistake, in conjunction with

291 other problems, not the least of which was the fact that Cleburne's division soon moved

to defend Tunnel Hill, would reduce dramatically Sherman's chances of seizing the

northern sector of Missionary Ridge.

The following day, as the troops o f the Army of the Tennessee attacked Tunnel

Hill, Thomas' men sat idly by, listening and watching events unfold northeast of their

position. After Hooker's success. Grant, thinking that Bragg might retreat during the night

of November 23, had considered sending Thomas' men to probe the Confederate works at

the base of Missionary Ridge to determine if they were still occupied. But by morning

enemy soldiers were seen manning the rifle pits thereby obviating the necessity of the

demonstration. Thus, when Sherman's assault commenced, the Army of the

Cumberland's mission was to merely maintain a threatening position in front of Bragg's

center on Missionary Ridge. Grant hoped that their presence alone would be enough to

prevent Bragg from shifting troops from that sector to face Sherman. In addition, the

Chattanooga commander instructed Hooker to cross Chattanooga Valley, "carry the pass

at Rossville, and operate against Bragg's left and rear." Overall, Grant hoped to keep the

Confederates occupied on all fronts until they were crushed between the forces on both

flanks.

The commanding general, aware by morning that Bragg had not retreated and that

had even reinforced his right, observed Sherman's attack from his command post on

Orchard Knob.^^ Much to his chagrin, by mid-aftemoon it appeared as if Bragg had

successfully parried Sherman's attempt to envelop the Confederate right. More alarming

was the apparent movement of enemy troops from the center opposite Thomas' position toward Tuimel Hill.^* Grant saw this supposed redeployment as disturbing evidence that

Thomas' mere presence opposite Bragg's lines had failed to prevent the dispatch of troops

from the center to reinforce the far right. In reality, however, the troops seen heading toward the right had not come from the mid-Missionary Ridge, but from Lookout

292 Mountain. After the loss of that prominent height, Bragg had ordered Stevenson's command to join in defending the right flank. Thus, Grant believed Bragg had weakened his center when, in reality, it remained as strong as ever.^^

As the victories of the previous forty-eight hours seemed to slip away. Grant struggled to find a solution to this extremely vexing situation, compounded by the fact that Hooker's advance toward Rossville on the left remained far behind schedule. Faced with serious setbacks. Grant settled on a possible solution. Because of the supposed troop movements from Bragg's center to his right. Grant decided to send the Army o f the

Cumberland into action. Believing (erroneously, as it turned out) that Sherman would continue his assault despite his initial setbacks, the Chattanooga commander ordered

Thomas to demonstrate against mid-Missionary Ridge to halt Confederate redeployments to their right. With orders to seize and hold the rifle pits at the base of the ridge, ostensibly with the sole purpose of relieving pressure on Sherman, Thomas' men, under the immediate command o f Major General Gordon Granger, embarked upon what would become a legendary assault in the annals of Civil War history.

However, by this time, Sherman had already broken off his attack and Hooker remained too far away to support a move against the enemy’s central position. Unknown to Grant, moreover, Bragg had yet to weaken his center with detachments to the right.

Thus, Thomas would be advancing against the strongest point of the Confederate defensive line, unsupported on either flank. It appeared to be a recipe for disaster. As historian Wiley Sword observed, at that moment, "Grant had already been soundly beaten... But once again, luck—combined with the bravery and determination of the much-maligned Army of the Cumberland-saved the day for the Union.

Thomas' men advanced toward the rifle pits, captured them, and then, on their own initiative, continued upward toward the crest of Missionary Ridge into the teeth of the Confederate defenses. Although this spectacle caused Grant much distress because

293 they were disobeying his orders to merely demonstrate against the lower rifle pits, the

Westerners eventually breached the enemy's works, dislodged the defenders, and crushed the Confederate position, forcing Bragg to fall back into Georgia. Bragg's decisive defeat and Grant's swift action in sending a portion of his victorious army toward East

Tennessee also helped persuade Longstreet to abandon the siege of Knoxville. Except for the pounding Cleburne gave Hooker's pursuing troops during a nasty rearguard action at Ringgold, Georgia on November 27, Grant emerged victorious from Chattanooga and what would be his last Western campaign.

At three crucial junctures during the Chattanooga campaign. Grant had acted upon faulty information, misperceptions, and misinterpretations of evidence. But at all three times fortune had favored the Union commander. Perhaps John Rawlins reflected

Grant's own philosophy regarding the role of chance in warfare. "Whether it be called luck or military ability to which is attributed General Grant's successes, I have but little care," he wrote. All that mattered was ensuring that that well never ran dry.^^ In the final analysis, the key to Grant's victory, besides having Braxton Bragg as an opponent, remained his steadfast belief in the initiative and his willingness to risk defeat in order to achieve victory. Although intelligence certainly played a significant role. Grant demonstrated how even faulty information can be turned to advantage if one maintained the initiative and forced the enemy into making mistakes. If anything. Grant's conduct of the Chattanooga campaign revealed just how sweet the fruits o f intelligence and luck could be if one was unafraid of taking risks.

******

294 The astounding victory at Chattanooga not only added luster to Grant's ascending star, it also earned him another one for his epaulettes. For his accomplishments in the

West, Congress rewarded him with the rank of lieutenant-general in the regular army, a distinction bom only by one other soldier in the republic’s history; George Washington.

Moreover, Grant assumed the role as commander of all Union forces, a position that had too often been the graveyard for the careers of his predecessors. Opting to reside with the Army of the Potomac during the coming spring campaign in Virginia, he left the

Western theater with a three year education in waging war successfully. He had also learned a tremendous amount about intelligence. Although Chattanooga had not been his finest hour in that regard. Grant had learned through experience that intelligence was indeed an essential element in warfare. But he also understood that reliable intelligence was fleeting and too much emphasis on the pursuit of perfect information led to the worst of all sins: the forfeiture of the initiative and inertia. Now it remained for Grant to apply what he had learned against his toughest adversary—Robert E. Lee and the Army of

Northern Virginia.

295 NOTES

• Wiley Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire: Chattanooga Beseiged. 1863 (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1995), 9, 36-54.

^USG to Halleck, September 22, 1863, 9:229; USG to Halleck, September 30, 1863, Ibid., 253.

^Quoted in Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 50.

% id., 52-53; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 34; Welcher, The Union Army. 2: 1-3.

^Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2:313 [decapo]

^USG to Halleck, October 26, 1863, GE 9:321.

^Information on Rosecrans' Army Police is sketchy. See John Fitch, Annals of the Army of the Cumberland (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1864), 346-56.

*Feis, "Deception of Braxton Bragg," 10-21,46-53.

^USG to Halleck, October 26, 1863, GE 9:321.

'®Dana, Recollections, 109. For examples of information reaching Thomas, see RG 393, entry 958, Intelligence Reports Received by Gen. Thomas, 1863-1865, NA.

^*USG to Halleck, October 26, 1863, QE 9: 320; Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 86, 114; USG to Julia, November 14, 1863, GE 9: 396-97.

*2Sword Mountains Touched With Fire. 112-122.

Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 85-86; Peter Cozzens, The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 15-16, 152.

•"•Catton, Grant Takes Command,47-48; Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 106.

*^USG to Ambrose Burnside, October 26, 1863, GE 9: 325; Burnside to USG, October 27, 1863, Ibid., 325-26. No reinforcements were coming from Virginia. Only Confederate Gen. Samuel Jones' 6000 men occupied the southwestern tip of Virginia. Catton, Grant Takes Command 58-59.

296 * *^Connelly. Autumn of Glory. 263; Cozzens, Shipwreck o f Their Hopes. 103.

*^USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863, 9:558-59; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2; 49.

^^Sword. Mountains Touched With Fire. 150-51, 154-56.

(% SG to Halleck, October 28, 1863, GE 9:337; USG to Burnside, October 31, 1863, Ibid., 343; USG to Halleck, November 2, 1863, Ibid., 349.

“®USG to Halleck, November 2, 1863, Ibid., 349.

-^Dana to Stanton, November 4, 1863, QR 31, pt. 2; 56; USG to Burnside, November 5, 1863, GE 9; 359.

-^William F. Smith, "An Historical Sketch of the Military Operations around Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 22 to November 27, 1863," Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts 15 vois. (1881-1918; Wilmington, N. C.: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1990), 8: 192: Cozzens. Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 106-107.

^^USG to Halleck, November 6, 1863, GE 9: 264; USG to Burnside, November 5, 1863, Ibid., 359.

-%umside to USG, November 6, 1863, Ibid., 369; Dana to Stanton, November 7, 1863, QR31,pt. 2: 57-58.

-^USG to Sherman, November 7, 1863, GE 9:370.

^^USG to George H. Thomas, November 7, 1863, Ibid., 370-71.

^^Qouted in Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 108.

-^Ibid., 107-108; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 60-61; Smith, "Military Operations around Chattanooga," 193-94; Dana to Stanton, November 58, 1863,QE.31, pt. 2: 58. See also Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 149-50 and Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 107-108. With regard to the events of November 7, however, these last two sources are confusing in their interpretations and must be used with care.

“^ S G to Kelton, December 23, 1863, GE 9; 559; Horace Porter, Campaigning With Gmnt (1897; New York; Bonanza Books, 1961), 5.

^^Grant admitted that Thomas had "had a better opportunity of studying [the terrain] than myself." USG to Thomas, November 7, 1863, GE9: 371; USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863, Ibid., 559; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 50.

297 ^*USG to Burnside, November 14, 1863, QE.9:391; USG to Halleck, November 15, 1863, Ibid., 399-400.

^^USG to Burnside, November 14, 1863, Ibid., 391; Sword, Mountains Touched With Eire, 157-58.

^^Dana to Stanton, November 8, 1863, QE. 31, pt. 2: 59.

^^USG to Burnside, November 14, 1863, QE9: 393; USG to Halleck, November 15, 1863, Ibid., 400; USG to Burnside, November 17, 1863, Ibid., 405.

^^USG to Hurlbut and McPherson, November 15, 1863, Ibid., 417.

^^Thomas to Halleck, November 14,1863, QE31, pt. 3:142.

^^Apparently, there was evidence that this was indeed happening. See Dana to Stanton, November 22, 1863, Ibid., pt. 2; 63.

^^USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863, QE 9: 559; Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 188-89; USG to Burnside, November 17, 1863, QE 9:404-405; USG to Halleck, November 18, 1863, Ibid., 409.

^^USG to John Riggin, Jr., November 18, 1863, Ibid., 413; USG to Sherman, November 20, 1863, Ibid., 421. How Grant determined this remains unknown. Only two days earlier one of Thomas' scouts, Elisha Breedlove, visted Lookout Mountain and ascertained that "They are expecting you every minute." See Statement of Elisha Breedlove, Scout, November 16, 1863, Q E 31, pt. 3: 164. Bragg apparently expected an attack upon his left as late as November 22. See Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 124-25.

'^^USG to Sherman, November 22, 1863, QE 9:430; Sword, Mountains Touched With Eiie, 159, 162.

"'*Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood to Lt. Col. Joseph S. Fullerton. November 23. OR 31. pt. 2: 40; Dana to Stanton, November 23, 1863, Ibid., 64; Luther M. De Motte to Jesse Merrill, November 22, 1863, Ibid., 100-101; Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis to Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds, November 22, 1863, Ibid., 102.

'^^Dana to Stanton, November 20, 1863, Ibid., 63; USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863, QE 9; 560, 568; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2; 331

^*^Quoted in Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire, 176; USG to Thomas, November 23, 1863,QE31,pt. 2:41.

298 '^Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 175-85; Dana to Stanton, November 23, 1863, Q R 31,pt.2: 66.

^^Dana to Stanton, November 23, 1863, Ibid., 65; USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863, GE9: 560; Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 170.

4^USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863, OE 9: 560; USG to Halleck, October 26, 1863, Ibid, 321.

'^^Sword. Mountains Touched With Fire. 186,202.

"^*For Grant's ignorance of Confederate strength, see Dana to Stanton, November 24, 1863,QR31,pt. 2:67.

reality, Bragg saw the corps under Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard entering the city. Sword Mountains Touched With Fire. 186-87.

^®Carter L. Stevenson to Hardee and Bragg, November 2 3 ,1863, QE. 31, pt. 2; 674.

Willard Brown. The Signal Corps. U. S. A. in the War o f the Rebellion (New York: Amo Press, 1974), 481; Merrill to Reynolds, November 23,1863, Q E 31, pt. 2: 103; Sword Mountains Touched With Fire. 205.

^^Reynolds to Hooker, November 23, 1863, Q E 3 1, pt. 2: 105; Reynolds to Hooker, November 24, 1863, Ibid., 106.

^^Cozzens. Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 126.

^"^Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 231; Dana to Stanton, November 24, Q E 31, pt. 2: 67.

^^Sword Mountains Touched With Fire. 199-201.

56lbid, 232.

^^Dana to Stanton, November 25,1863, Q E 31, pt. 2: 67; USG to Kelton, December 23, 1863,029: 562.

^^Dana to Stanton, November 25, 1863, Q E 31, pt. 2: 67; Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, to Stanton, November 26, 1863, Ibid., 78.

^ ^ S G to Kelton, December 23, 1863, QE 9: 562; Sword Mountains Touched With Fire. 238,264.

299 ^°Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger to Brig. Gen. William D. Whippie, February 11,1864, Qg, 31, pt. 2; 132; Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire. 263-64..

6 Î Ibid., 265.

^^Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their Hopes. 387-88.

^^Wilson, Rawlins. 171.

300 CHAPTER 9

INTO THE DARKNESS. THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN, 1864

Perhaps echoing the sentiments of millions in the North, on March 23, 1864,

Grant's chief of staff John A. Rawlins expressed hope that "our former success in the

West will be with us here." The next day he accompanied Grant from Washington to his new headquarters at Culpeper Court House, Virginia, sixty miles southwest of the capital, to plan the 1864 campaign. ' After Chattanooga, Congress had revived the rank of lieutenant general in the regular army and awarded the rank to Grant on March 2. More importantly, Lincoln had named him general-in-chief of all Union armies in the hopes that the former Western general could work his magic in northern Virginia. Unlike his predecessors. Grant established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, camped north of the Rapidan River, instead of in Washington. Although he retained Major

General George G. Meade in direct command of the army, it was clear that the general in chief would be intimately involved with overseeing its future operations.- On the south bank of the Rapidan, General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, composed of two corps commanded by Lieutenant General A. P. Hill and Lieutenant General Richard

S. Ewell (joined later by Longstreefs corps returned from East Tennessee), remained poised to give the new Union commander an introduction to the war in the East.

Seemingly oblivious to the invincible aura surrounding Lee's veterans. Grant approached the next campaign as he had all others: with a willingness to take risks and complete faith in the inevitability of victory. He also remained convinced that seizing

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302 and maintaining the initiative would be a key to that success. According to his plan, all

Union armies would advance simultaneously to prevent the Confederates from shifting troops from inactive to active fronts on interior lines, as they had done in years past. In

Grant's vision, there would be no quiet sectors anywhere. More importantly, he stressed that "the conquering of the organized armies of the enemy" was the primary goal, not the acquisition of territory or strategic points. The two main thrusts would be made by

Sherman in Georgia and by Meade in northern Virginia, with both aimed at defeating their adversaries and preventing them from supporting each other. To support the major campaigns Grant ordered other Union forces in motion as well. In the West, Major

General Nathaniel Banks was to capture Mobile and move upon Montgomery, Alabama, while in Virginia, Major General Franz Sigel was to gain control of the Shenandoah

Valley and prevent Confederate forces in that region from reinforcing Lee.^

Perhaps the most important subsidiary campaign was Major General Benjamin P.

Butler’s advance up the James River to threaten Richmond from the east. Grant hoped that Butler would seize the Confederate capital quickly since "that would tend more than anything else"—save the destruction Lee's army—"to break the military power of the rebellion." By capturing the city or at least seriously threatening its rail lifelines, Butler’s

Army of the James would perform a valuable service. In either case Lee would suffer acute supply problems and the city garrison would be unable to reinforce the Army of

Northern Virginia. With Richmond in danger, Lee would have the choice of either reducing his own forces to defend the capital or transferring his entire army to save the city. If he chose that latter option. Grant planned to join Butler on the James and lay siege to the capital."^

After informing these commanders about their missions. Grant turned to the future operations of the Army of the Potomac, which consisted of Major General

Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps, Major General GouverneurK. Warren's Fifth

303 Corps, Major General John Sedgwick's Sixth Corps, and the Cavalry Corps under Major

General Philip H. Sheridan. Burnside's Ninth corps from East Tennessee also joined the campaign, though it remained outside of Meade's authority, coming instead under Grant's personal direction. Hoping Butler would accomplish great things on the peninsula, the general-in-chief also planned for his failure. Should Butler’s advance proved ineffectual,

"it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain enough for the defense of Richmond." To Meade he stressed that Lee's army —not Richmond- comprised his primary objective. "Wherever Lee goes there you will go also," he advised. Moving overland. Grant hoped to engage Lee outside the Richmond defenses while shielding Washington with the Army of the Potomac.^

For the Army of the Potomac to succeed depended in part upon Grant's ability to find and track Lee's army, something previous commanders had found difficult. At first, the general in chief also experienced difficulty in this endeavor. Shortly after their arrival at Culpeper, Rawlins complained about an information dearth at headquarters.

"No information comes from the enemy's lines," he bemoaned. "It is greatly different... from what it was out West," he continued, "There we were always getting some information that kept up an excitement and made it seem that we were doing something."^ Before long, however, Meade was making daily visits to Grant's headquarters armed with the latest information provided by an organization devoted solely to that mission.

In early 1863 Major General Joseph Hooker, then commander of the Army of the

Potomac, had created the "Bureau of Military Information" (BMI) within his Provost

Marshal General's Department. Headed by Colonel George H. Sharpe, a volunteer officer and civilian attorney, the bureau soon became an "all source" intelligence service, procuring information from a wide array of sources. Sharpe employed his own spies and

304 scouts, but spent the bulk of his time gleaning information from passive, yet extremely important, sources. Some of the most significant information came from the systematic interrogations of deserters, prisoners, refugees, and "contrabands" (former slaves). In addition, the bureau—sometimes called the "secret service"—collected and collated information from cavalry reconnaissances, visual observations, signal intercepts, captured correspondence, and enemy newspapers. The bureau staff, consisting primarily of Sharpe, Captain John McEntee, and civilian John C. Babcock, gathered the latest intelligence and presented daily summaries to the army commander.^

As a former employee of Allan Pinkerton's intelligence service during

McClellan’s tenure as commander of the army in 1862, Babcock brought valuable experience to the BMI. He kept the bureau records, prepared reports, drew maps, and became Sharpe's chief interrogator. McEntee organized scouting operations and traveled to other sectors of the Virginia theater to establish branch offices of the BMI. By the time Grant arrived in March, 1864, Sharpe had branches with Sigel in the Shenandoah and with Butler's Army of the James. More importantly for Grant, however, the bureau staff had formulated an Order of Battle for the Army of Northern Virginia and had cultivated important contacts among the citizenry in northern Virginia.* Although Grant had utilized Dodge's intelligence service in northern Mississippi, that operation paled in comparison to the sophistication, experience, and efficiency of Sharpe's bureau. The

BMI would provide information during the upcoming campaign and by mid-summer its impact on Grant's operations would increase dramatically.

To defeat Lee, Grant faced two key problems, both intelligence-related. First, he had to monitor the movement of Southern troops toward the Rapidan front, especially

Longstreefs corps rumored to be returning to Virginia from East Tennessee. Second, he had to decide upon the direction of Meade's advance. Wishing to avoid Lee's formidable entrenchment's along Mine Run south of the Rapidan, Grant chose, as he had done many

305 times before, to outflank his opponent and force him to either fight or retreat. But whether to target Lee's left (west) or his right (east) remained a crucial yet unanswered question as May approached.^

The BMI proved instrumental in solving the first intelligence puzzle.

Longstreefs force (First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia), which had wintered in East

Tennessee after abandoning the siege of Knoxville, was of utmost concern for the Union high command. Not only would his troops add to Confederate strength on the Rapidan, but its return to the Army of Northern Virginia would also bring back Lee's "Old War

Horse," James Longstreet, whose presence would be invaluable to the Confederate commander. In early April, the War Department informed Grant that Longstreet planned to invade Kentucky. Although Grant warned Sherman of this possibility, before long it became clear that Longstreet was returning to Virginia. Whether he would rejoin Lee below the Rapidan or perform some other mission, however, remained a mystery.

On April 25 Grant learned from the BMI that Longstreet had reached

Charlottesville but his troops were not destined for the Rapidan. Instead, Sharpe reported that the "old man," the sobriquet of Isaac Silver, a farmer southeast of Chancel lorsvi lie who had worked for the BMI before, predicted that Longstreet would march down the

Shenandoah Valley and outflank Grant at Culpeper. According to the agent, as

Longstreet advanced Lee would "open on the Union army" across the Rapidan. * * The following day a Confederate deserter corroborated this news, adding that troops under

General P. G. T. Beauregard, lately in Charleston, South Carolina, would join the First

Corps in its flanking maneuver. These reports fit with earlier news of Confederate forces concentrating in the valley "to cover... a formidable movement of the enemy by that route, northward." Fearful of losing the initiative to Lee, Grant worried that his opponent might move first and disrupt his plans. "Dont [sic] know exactly the day when 1 will start," he wrote on April 27, "or whether Lee will come here before 1 am ready to move."

306 This recent intelligence, however, convinced him to set a firm date for the commencement of the campaign. The next day he announced the Army of the Potomace would cross the Rapidan on May 4.

By April 29, the BMI had gained a better fix on Lee's "Old War Horse."

McEntee, on assignment with Sigel's valley command, telegraphed Sharpe that a reliable source reported Longstreefs corps "in the neighborhood of Gordonsville in easy supporting distance of Lee." That very day, in fact, Lee had traveled to Gordonsville to review Longstreefs men and welcome home his trusted subordinate. After McEntee's telegram Grant's concern for Longstreet dissipated noticeably. In fact, reports of possible reinforcements coming from as far away as northern Georgia failed to unnerve the lieutenant general. Although he kept the Ninth Corps ready in reserve in case

Confederate forces actually moved down the valley toward his rear, from this point on.

Grant concentrated foremost upon his own plans, not on the enemy's.

By the time Grant had located Longstreet barely five days remained before the campaign began. However, he had yet to tackle his second problem: whether to move by

Lee's right or left flank. Each route had significant advantages and disadvantages, but

Grant chose to cross the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's Fords, march south into the dense woods known as "The Wilderness," and turn Lee's right (eastern) flank. Logistical concerns and the desire to link with Butler's forces advancing up the James comprised the primary factors behind this choice. Even though the left flank route boasted an abundance of open expanses more suitable for combined arms operations and large-scale maneuvers, pursuing that option meant the army would have to rely for subsistence upon tenuous overland supply lines. The right flank, on the other hand, offered easy access to supplies brought by ships plying the navigable rivers off Chesapeake Bay. Perhaps remembering the disaster at Holly Springs in 1862, Grant chose to avoid dependence

307 upon vulnerable overland lines of communication that, if cut, could sink a campaign in

its infancy. This option would also enable Grant to maintain contact with Butler and

expedite the junction of the two armies outside Richmond.

Planning the movement devolved upon Meade's chief of staff. Major General

Andrew A. Humphreys. He formulated the plan based partly upon Lee's responses to

Meade's advance across the Rapidan the previous November. During the Mine Run

Campaign, Meade had crossed the river and moved west toward Lee's defenses along

Mine Run. Lee was slow to react and advanced cautiously to develop the strength of

Union advance. Deciding against an attack, the Confederate commander retreated to his

formidable entrenchments and dared Meade to assault. The Potomac commander,

however, retreated rather than dash his army needlessly against such strong fortifications.

Using Lee's earlier reactions as a guide, Humphreys developed a plan whose success

hinged upon the ability of the Army of the Potomac to cross the Rapidan undetected, drive rapidly through the Wilderness to the south, and turn the right flank of Lee's

Rapidan defenses. The Fédérais would then turn westward and get below the

Confederate's Mine Run fortifications, forcing Lee into the open where, due to his smaller force, he would be forced to retreat or fight at a disadvantage. The key was to steal a march on Lee and get through the Wilderness before the Confederate commander could intercept the Federal columns in the dense forests, which would effectively nullify the numerical advantage of the Army of the Potomac.

Although Humphreys relied upon past enemy behavior and a knowledge of the location of Lee's corps to formulate the plan, it seems that Grant had made the momentous decision to advance against Lee's right without such knowledge. Concerned mostly with logistics, maintaining contact with Butler, and gaining the initiative, he seemingly gave little thought to his opponent's intentions or possible responses, even though fully aware of "Bobby Lee's" capacity for celerity and boldness. In addition,

308 although that area was not new to Meade from the Mine Run Campaign, the maps and the army's collective knowledge o f the region were abysmally inaccurate. Neither Grant

nor Meade, moreover, had sent cavalry reconnaissances to the south bank of the Rapidan to determine what lay within the thick woods. In fact, the general in chief felt relieved when the army crossed on May 4 without meeting any significant resistance at the fords.

Up to that time, he had little notion of whether Lee would be waiting to welcome the

Fédérais to the south bank.

The absence of sufficient cavalry to perform reconnaissance missions further exacerbated the lack of intelligence. During the crossing, two-thirds of Sheridan's cavalry corps remained behind guarding the army's long supply train instead of probing for the enemy. The remaining division remained busy screening the movement and, when it did reconnoiter, performed poorly. Thus, when Meade discovered Confederate troops advancing toward the Union column on May 5, the word came from his infantry, not his mounted arm. "My own notions about our line o f march are entirely made up,"

Grant admitted to Halleck, because "circumstances beyond my control I [sic] may change them." Although flexible and willing to incur risks, it appeared as if Grant intended to plunge blindly into the Wilderness and then wait to see what would happen.

Given the vast gaps in his intelligence, this was basically what he had in mind.

However, that does not mean he forged ahead without thinking through the problems and choices he might encounter. "[BJeing within a few miles o f the enemy we had to condend [sic] against," he wrote later, "no orders were necessary further than for the first movement"-® across the river. With this statement. Grant illuminated a key element in his thinking. He knew that Lee's entire army—his primary objective—lay just across the river. What more did he need to know? Simply put, if the Army of the Potomac advanced first Lee would have little choice but to respond directly to Grant's challenge.

For the Union general in chief the endgame was not the capture of strategic points, but

309 the destruction of Lee’s army, and he could achieve this in one of two ways. He could fight him—either on more open ground or in the Wilderness—or force him to retreat. But an enemy withdrawal would only delay the inevitable; to prevail in this war the military might of the Confederacy had to be destroyed. This meant, at some point, he would have to stand toe to toe with Lee and beat him, regardless of the circumstances. Nothing short of this would guarantee the death of the rebellion. After the Federal army crossed the river into the Wilderness, Grant revealed that this was precisely what he had in mind.

On the morning of May 4 Union signal corps personnel on Stony Mountain intercepted and successfully deciphered several Confederate messages. One in particular indicated that instead of retreating, Lee was rushing troops toward the Federal columns lapping around his flank. When he received this news, a staff officer noted that the general "manifested considerable satisfaction." "That gives just the information I wanted," he apparently proclaimed, "It shows that Lee is drawing out from his position, and is pushing across to meet us." But whether Lee would retreat, attack the Fédérais in the Wilderness or, as he had done in November, wait for them behind his Mine Run fortifications still remained unknown. Lack of cavalry, poor reconnaissance by the remaining troopers, and un familiarity with the area exacerbated this intelligence gap. But the Army of the Potomac pressed on, unaware that to the west Lee's veterans were on a collision course with their old nemesis. "Forty-eight hours," remarked a confident Grant,

"will demonstrate whether the enemy intends giving battle this side of Richmond."-'

The following day Meade had the answer. The Potomac commander notified

Grant at 7:30 a m. that enemy infantry had appeared in battle lines on the Orange

Turnpike, one of the major east-west roads between Lee's camps and the Wilderness.

Even though fighting in the tangled thickets would negate Union superiority in men and artillery, not to mention interrupt Humphreys precious timetable to envelop Lee's flank, the ever-flexible Grant recognized that "circumstances beyond his control 1 [sic]" had

310 forced a revision. He turned to meet the enemy. "If any opportunity presents [itjself for pitching into a part of Lee's Army," he told Meade, "do so." If the Gray Fox wanted a fight. Grant was more than willing to oblige.^

Years later. Grant summarized the guiding rationale behind this perspective.

"[T]he armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for... three years," he wrote, "and neither had made any real progress toward accomplishing the final end." By 1864 the war had become a standoff and neither army "knew which could whip." He saw the 1864 campaign as the only way to break the stalemate and win the war. But, he noted soberly, "We had to have hard fighting to achieve this."-^ Sherman also understood why Grant had to engage Lee’s veterans. Only in combat could his friend

"impress the Virginians with the knowledge that the Yankees can and will fight." The strategy's psychological impact on both armies, he concluded, would "do more good than to capture Richmond."-'*

Plenty of hard fighting awaited Grant's men as they descended into the dark

Wilderness. From May 5-6 the Army of the Potomac battled Lee’s army resulting in over

25,000 casualties. When the firing ceased, however, the stalemate remained. Still sanguine in the inevitability of Union success. Grant informed Halleck that "all things are progressing favorably." Instead of retreating, he resolved to maintain the initiative and deny Lee any chance to gain the upper hand as he had at Second Bull Run and

Chancellorsville.-^ In Grant's mind, as long as the Army of the Potomac kept advancing, it was a victory.

Early on May 7, Grant knew very little about the enemy's position, movements, or intentions. Regardless, he abandoned his Wilderness positions and move southeastward around Lee's right toward the tiny crossroads hamlet of Spotsylvania Court House. The reason for this maneuver was the same as those that had guided him across the Rapidan three days earlier. He hoped to outflank the Confederates, interpose his army between

311 Lee and Richmond, and "draw him into the open field" by threatening his access to the city. By proceeding with scant knowledge of the enemy's movements, however. Grant once again revealed his faith in the initiative as a substitute for intelligence.-^

After dark on May 7 the Army o f the Potomac and Burnside's corps began the march to Spotsylvania Court House in the hopes o f reaching the crossroads before Lee.-^

Early the next morning Warren's Fifth Corps approached the village and met only slight resistance from Confederate cavalry. Believing that Lee's infantry had not yet arrived,

Warren informed Meade at 8 a.m. that the "opposition to us amounts to nothing as yet."

Charles A. Dana, once again at Grant's headquarters as Stanton's field correspondent, noted two hours later that the Fédérais had stolen a march on the enemy and captured

Spotsylvania Court House. "There are no indications that Lee has moved in any direction," he announced. More importantly, he added, "General Grant is decidedly of the opinion that he remains in the old place [his Wilderness line]."-^

At 10:15 a m. Warren wrote another optimistic report but also noted an ominous development: he had captured prisoners from Longstreefs corps. If so, then Lee had actually beaten the Fédérais to the town. But Meade and Grant still believed that the

Confederates remained ignorant of the Federal movements. The Potomac commander brushed off Warren's report, remarking that "I hardly think Longstreet is yet at

Spotsylvania." At 11 a.m.. Grant reflected Meade's optimism. "It is not yet demonstrated what the enemy will do," he told Halleck, but he felt "no apprehension for the result." In fact, his mind had already turned toward the future and the establishing a linkage with

Butler.-^ So confident was Grant that he dispatched most of Sheridan's cavalry on an extended raid to disrupt Confederate communications and defeat Brigadier General "Jeb"

Stuart's legendary horsemen. For the next sixteen days the Union army did without much of its chief reconnaissance instrument. But with Spotsylvania ostensibly in his grasp on

May 8, the campaign hatched on the Rapidan seemed to be proceeding on course.

312 Robert E. Lee, however, had other ideas. Shortly after noon on May 8 Warren sent another dispatch to headquarters, this time announcing his failure to capture

Spotsylvania. The town was now held by Southern infantry and Warren felt too weak to take it. The Fifth Corps had not only encountered enemy cavalry but had collided with two divisions of Longstreet’s corps that had marched all night to reach the crossroads, successfully eluding Union intelligence in the process. These troops repulsed Warren's advance and managed to hold the town while the rest of Lee's army rushed to join them.

The following day both sides began digging in and before long had erected extensive and formidable defenses above the town.^ ' This turn of events dampened Grant's earlier enthusiasm. "Enemy hold our front in very strong force," he wrote on May 10, "and evince strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last."

Unwilling to retreat, but with Lee blocking his way, he now faced the choice of fighting at Spotsylvania or attempting another flanking movement.

On the afternoon of May 9 he received news that the Confederates manning the enemy's left flank had apparently "disappeared." In addition, Burnside reported that his probes against the Confederate right had met with heavy opposition. Concluding that Lee had weakened his left flank to reinforce the opposite wing. Grant prepared to attack the weak point. He slated the attack against Lee's left for the evening of May 9, but delays and nightfall forced Hancock, the commander of the assault force, to postpone it. The delay gave Lee time to shore up his left and the next morning Hancock discovered that yesterday's thinly-held lines had been strongly reinforced. Frustrated, Grant called off the attack.

Despite the missed opportunity. Grant determined to drive the Confederates from their Spotsylvania defenses and, if necessary, "fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." On May 10, Grant launched a massive assault against Lee's entrenchments that resulted in savage fighting, severe losses, and minimal Union success. In part, the belief

313 that Lee's lines had to be weak somewhere drove Grant to attack . Rawlins also revealed

another reason why the general in chief believed his men could overcome Lee, even if

behind stout fortifications. "The feeling of our army is that of great confidence," he wrote

on May 9, "and with the superiority of numbers on our side, / think we can heat them

notwithstanding their advantage o f position." [emphasis suppi ied]-*"*

News of Butler’s problems also impelled him to assail Lee. Reports indicated that

the campaign to capture Richmond from the east had stalled, and that Butler was

strengthening his Bermuda Hundred lines rather than forcing Lee to detach troops from

Grant's front to defend the capital. As of May 11, Grant noted that there was "no

indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defence [sic] of

Richmond." With Butler's strike against Richmond a failure and his own campaign grinding to a halt. Grant concluded that the best option remained to "compel Lee to

retreat or to... cripple him." Given the circumstances, he chose to attack Lee's army in

its Spotsylvania works because only "hard fighting" could achieve either of those outcomes.^^

The Union commander's perception of enemy morale also fed his aggressiveness.

Even after the carnage of May 10 Grant concluded that "the enemy are very shaky and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertion on the part of their officers." This assessment echoed descriptions of his earlier opponents in the West. The previous fall at

Chattanooga, Grant believed that Bragg's men were demoralized and on the verge of collapse. The apparent ease with which the Western Fédérais drove them from seemingly impregnable entrenchments along Missionary Ridge seemed to validate his appraisal. Lee's men, he believed, had reached a similar state of despair and diminished combat effectiveness. Moreover, the Confederate defenses at Spotsylvania, though

314 formidable, seemed much less imposing than Bragg’s Missionary Ridge position. News

from Sheridan on May 12 also supported Grant's view. According to local citizens, reported the cavalry commander, "Lee is beaten.

The previous battle in the Wilderness and the fighting at Spotsylvania had provided little evidence to support the prediction of Lee's impending collapse.

Nevertheless, Grant continued to believe that the Army of Northern Virginia would crumble before a frontal assault. But the Confederates surprised him with their tenacity.

"The enemy are obstinate and seem to have found the last ditch," wrote a surprised Grant after unsuccessful assaults on May 12. As Meade pointed out later. Grant had learned a harsh lesson, that "Virginia and Lee's army is not Tennessee and Bragg’s army." Even so, two days later the Union commander still held that the enemy's situation was "desperate beyond anything heretofore known.By May 20, however, Lee had refused to budge.

The battle of Spotsylvania ended where it had begun—in a stalemate. And once again.

Grant pondered his options.

On the evening of May 20-21, the Army of the Potomac abandoned its

Spotsylvania works and marched to the southeast in another attemp to outflank Lee's right. On May 22, however, BMI scouts reported that Major General George E. Pickett's division, lately in Richmond, had joined Lee. Before long, prisoners captured from that division confirmed his arrival. This discovery indicated that Butler, who was now

"bottled up" behind his works at Bermuda Hundred, had failed in his mission not only to distract Lee, but to prevent forces in the capital from reinforcing the Army of Northern

Virginia. To make matters worse. Grant also learned that a force from the Shenandoah

Valley under Major General John C. Breckinridge had also joined Lee. Sigel's defeat at

New Market on May 15 and his retreat back down the valley had relieved pressure in that sector and freed Breckinridge to support Lee.^* With the Army of Northern Virginia receiving reinforcements and little hope of significant diversions from other fronts. Grant

315 approached the North Anna hoping again to catch Lee in the open where Fédérais could

maximize their numerical superiority. But the Confederates reached the river ahead of

the Fédérais. When Grant arrived at the North Anna on May 23, he discovered Lee

firmly entrenched in an inverted V-shaped position on the south bank. Over the next few

days the Confederates blunted Federal advances along the North Anna line. Seeing little

benefit in continuing operations against Lee's present position, on May 26 Grant once

more shifted his army to the southeast.^^

Despite the lackluster results of the North Anna encounter. Grant still felt that he

held the psychological, not to mention physical, advantage over the enemy. "Lee's Army

is really whipped," he informed Halleck on May 26. Dana observed that recently

captured Southerners appeared "more discouraged than any considerable number of

prisoners ever captured before." Using their statements as evidence, Dana echoed Grant's

assessment when he concluded that the "Rebels have lost all confidence, and are already

morally defeated." Feeling that victory over Lee was assured, the Union general in chief

sidled east and south toward a new position closer to Richmond, hoping to finally lure

the Army of Northern Virginia into a fight on his terms, feeling confident that his army

would prevail in the contest.'*®

After four days of maneuvering. Grant's army emerged near Cold Harbor, an obscure crossroads northeast of Richmond. To continue shielding the capital, Lee also

hastened to the Cold Harbor vicinity and quickly entrenched. On June 1 the Sixth Corps

nearly cracked Lee's lines, but nightfall and lack of support negated the Union gains.

Grant lengthened his lines, forcing Lee to compensate, and planned another major assault on June 2, hoping to strike before the Confederates could strengthen their works.

Although the attack never materialized. Union corps commanders were instructed to assess the strength of the enemy fortifications opposite their positions. Tired and exhausted from the march in the Virginia heat, many officers neglected to reconnoiter

316 their fronts. Moreover, Grant and Meade failed to ensure that their subordinates had

properly scouted their fronts. Across the no-man's land, the Confederates used the lull to

to work on their fortifications. When Grant ordered a general assault the following day,

he knew little about the actual strength of Lee's defenses.'^*

According to prisoners and estimates of recent Confederate losses. Grant again

believed that Lee's rapidly thinning ranks could not withstand the power the Fédérais

could muster ( 110,000 men) behind an all-out frontal assault. The near-success on June

1 and the fact that Lee had grown perceivably more reluctant to leave his works and

counterattack, an indication that perhaps Grant's perception was not far off the mark,

encouraged his already aggressive nature."The rebels are making a desperate fight,"

he wrote on June 1, "and I presume will continue to do so as long as they can get a

respectable number of men to stand." In Grant's estimation, that pool was fast running

out. The ghosts of past campaigns also effected his decision. "He had succeeded in

breaking the enemy's line at Chattanooga, Spottsylvania [sic], and other places under

circumstances which were not more favorable," explained Lieutenant Colonel Horace

Porter. "[T]he results to be obtained now would be so great," he continued, "that it

seemed wise to make the attempt." As on other battlefields, the Union commander based

his decision more on faith in the initiative, past experience, and an optimistic reading of

the enemy's condition than on hard intelligence. At Cold Harbor Grant's men paid dearly

for it. Lee's veterans repulsed the massive frontal assaults on June 3, inflicting over 7000

casualties in less than an hour.'^^

"Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make," Grant wrote

Washington two days after his disastrous attack, "all cannot be accomplished that I had

designed outside of the City." Abandoning the goal of defeating Lee's army north of

Richmond, Grant decided to slide to the left again, this time crossing the James River and joining Butler's army. Once on the south bank, he planned to cut the city's logistical

317 connections with the rest of the Confederacy, including seizing the important rail hub at

Petersburg. In conjunction with Grant's maneuver. Major General David Hunter, Sigel's successor in the Shenandoah, would ascend the valley toward the Confederate supply depots at Lynchburg and Charlottesville. Meanwhile, Sheridan and two-thirds of the

Army of the Potomac's cavalry would tear up the railroads between the capital and the valley, denying Lee access to the Shenandoah's bountiful resources.'^

Although Grant foresaw that the move south of the James might result in a siege, he hoped for one more opportunity to defeat Lee in battle and avoid protracting the campaign into the summer, especially since the war-weaiy Northern populace might interpret it as yet another costly failure and take out their frustration on the Lincoln administration in the upcoming fall elections. Despite the carnage at Cold Harbor, the general in chief remained committed to his post-Spotsylvania strategy of striking Lee when the opportunity arose. Moreover, his reading of Confederate morale again fueled his desire to pounce. If forced into a battle outside his works, the enemy would undoubtedly falter because "All the fight, except defensive and behind breast works, is taken out of Lee's army.'"^^

Forcing the Army of Northern Virginia to fight beyond the safety of its fortifications depended upon Grant's ability to get to the south bank of the James without

Lee's knowledge. The longer the Army o f Northern Virginia remained on the north side while Grant slipped to the south, the better chance the Fédérais had of seizing the logistical hub at Petersburg and forcing Lee to fight or face starvation. But to evacuate the Cold Harbor entrenchments, some within forty yards of enemy lines, march nearly fifty miles, cross two rivers (the Chickahominy and the James), and reach Petersburg without being detected posed a significant challenge. If Lee discovered the move early on, he could easily utilize his interior lines and either beat Grant to Petersburg or, worse yet, decimate the vulnerable Federal army as it crossed the James. To this. Grant had a

318 simple solution. "I relied," he later claimed, "upon Lee's not seeing my danger as 1 saw it."46 To complicate matters further, on June 11 Sharpe reported that "a large number of

[enemy] scouts are employed to continually approach and reconnoiter our lines in front, as it is their momentary expectation to find our lines withdrawn. . . to the James River."

To hoodwink Lee when he evidently expected such a movement made secrecy even more crucial—and more difficult—to achieve. Nevertheless, the Federal commander slated this risky "deep turning movement" for the night of June 12.4^

That evening Grant sent Wilson's troopers, the only remaining cavalry division in the Army of the Potomac due to Sheridan's absence, across the Chickahominy River to clear the roads toward Richmond. Warren's Fifth Corps moved next to secure the route the rest of the army would follow between the Chickahominy and the James. Both of these forces, however, remained north of the James, screening the other corps as they marched and protecting them from attack. Even though Lee discovered the empty Union trenches at Cold Harbor the next morning, the presence of Union cavalry and an infantry corps north of the river astride the roads leading to Richmond gave him pause. The movement appeared strikingly similar to Grant's patented flanking maneuvers and, combined with the presence of Wilson and Warren, convinced Lee to keep his army in place and await further developments. He dared not march for Petersburg until certain the Army of the Potomac had not stopped short of the James to attack Richmond from the southeast. Since a sizable portion of his mounted arm still pursued Sheridan, the lack of cavalry and the inability to pierce Wilson's screen directly contributed to Lee's lingering uncertainty.4*

By June 15 half of Grant’s army had crossed but Lee remained in the dark. He knew the Fédérais were heading southeast, possibly across the James, but certainty eluded him. To protect Richmond from the southeast, he cautiously moved his army south of the Chickahominy but advanced no further. Over the next two days vigorous

319 demonstrations by Wilson's troopers against Lee's new lines added to the uncertainty at

Confederate headquarters. "I do not know the position of Grant's army" and therefore "[I] cannot strip [the] north bank of the James River," Lee wrote on June 16. As the

Confederate commander cast about for information on the Army of the Potomac's whereabouts, the gathering Union forces south o f the river attacked and nearly captured lightly-defended Petersburg. Concluding that Grant had indeed crossed the James and aware of the acute danger to his valuable rail hub, on June 17 Lee finally ordered the

Army of Northern Virginia to Petersburg. Soon both sides had constructed massive fortifications stretching from below Petersburg across the James toward Richmond. The siege had commenced.'^^

During the crossing o f the James Grant had hoped to deceive his opponent but, similar to when he crossed the Mississippi during the Vicksburg Campaign, he possessed insufficient means of assessing the effectiveness of his efforts. At the time. Grant employed no spies in Richmond to monitor Lee's movements and, although Butler had cultivated some important contacts with the Union underground in the city, neither Grant nor Sharpe were acquainted with their operations nor in direct communication with them.^® Wilson's cavalry, the only Fédérais in contact with the enemy after June 13, spent much of its time fending off Lee's troopers, protecting the army, and demonstrating against Lee's lines south of the Chickahominy. Even if Lee had ordered his troops across the river immediately, some likely routes that Confederate reinforcements might take to

Petersburg were behind Southern lines and out o f the cavalry's reach. With little information, therefore. Grant and his staff could only guess at Lee's response once the operation commenced. On June 13 Rawlins surmised that the race to Petersburg might be close. "I have no doubt," he wrote, that "the enemy is also moving to the south side of the James." Apparently, what information they did possess did not reflect the true situation. On the first day of the maneuver, Dana observed that "there are strong

320 indications that Lee is moving troops to Petersburg." The following day, however,

Wilson brought more accurate news, reporting that two of Lee's three infantry corps had crossed the Chickahominy, but had stopped short of the James to "resist the farther approach of the [Union] army toward Richmond" from the southeast. Dana probably summarized Grant’s interpretation of this news when he wrote: "Lee appears to have had no idea of our crossing the James River."-^

Although gaining a two-day lead on his adversary, substantive intelligence had evaporated by June 16 and Grant remained nearly as uninformed as his adversary.

Nevertheless, he forged ahead, gambling that the perceived presence of Federal forces so close to Richmond on both sides of the James would temper Lee's boldness, allowing time to seize Petersburg. To prevent exposing the capital to Federal forces north of the

James, the Confederates had to be certain that all of Grant's army had crossed before committing the Army of Northern Virginia to Petersburg, which was protected by a small garrison. Aware that the burden of certainty rested with the enemy, the Union general in chief pressed on across the James, as the authors of one study concluded, "to catch Lee in a mistake."^- In Lee, however. Grant had found an opponent capable of turning the tables. When it came to taking risks, the Confederate commander had few equals. The

Fédérais would learn soon enough that, despite the attrition suffered over the past month, the Army of Northern Virginia—and Robert E. Lee—remained as dangerous and defiant as ever.

******

During the operations from the Wilderness to the crossing of the James River, known as the Overland Campaign, Grant again revealed relied upon his unskakable faith in the inevitability of Union victory and in the decisiveness of the initiative. As in

321 earlier campaigns, this outlook profoundly effected his attitude toward the acquisition and use o f military information. Believing that he would somehow win obviated the need for "perfect" information, which he probably believed was impossible to achieve anyway, and fostered a willingness to make decisions with little foreknowledge of the enemy. Moreover, gaining the initiative and forcing his opponent to react also reduced the role of intelligence in decisionmaking, as Grant demonstrated during the crossing of the James. But a commander might also pay a handsome price for these beliefs, as he discovered at Cold Harbor.

Throughout the campaign Grant also maintained—even when Lee's stubborn resistance demonstrated otherwise—that the Confederates were on the brink of collapse.

He mistook determination for desperation. Prisoners appeared to be the primary source of this perception, although given earlier assessments of the enemy in the West, the general in chief probably held this conviction from the beginning. Events on earlier battlefields only buttressed his faith in that viewpoint, even when dealing with the redoubtable Robert E. Lee and an army whose reputation hardly warranted such a conclusion. At Chattanooga Grant had sensed that Bragg's men, despite defending very strong positions, were thoroughly disheartened and, therefore, would break if pressed hard. When the Fédérais attacked, the Army of Tennessee fought desperately but eventually crumbled. Given his comments from May to June, 1864, Grant apparently expected the same results against the Army of Northern Virginia. Thus, his perceptions and experiences, and the drive to seize and maintain the initiative, not intelligence on the enemy, comprised the major operational guideposts for his Virginia campaign. Although referring specifically to Grant's James River operation, one historian captured the essence of Grant's decisionmaking calculus during the Overland Campaign, and perhaps throughout his earlier campaigns as well. The Union general in chief he concluded,

"relied on chance and improvisation to an extraordinary degree.

322 NOTES

^Wilson, Rawlins, 404.

“Catton, Grant Takes Command. 121 -22.

^Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 516-33; USG to Sherman, April 4,1864, 10; 251-53; USG to Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, April 15, 1864, Ibid., 286-87; USG to Banks, March 15, 1864, Ibid., 200-201.

“^Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 528-29; USG to Stanton, July 22, 1865, QR 36, pt. 1:17; USG to Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, April 2, 1864, QP 10: 245-247.

^USG to Stanton, July 22, 1864, Q R 36, pt. I: 17; USG to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, April 9, 1864, ÛE 10: 273-75.

® Wilson, Rawlins. 405.

^For a thorough discussion of the origins, organization, and services of the BMI prior to 1864, see Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War For the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 275-537.

*lbid., 153-54, 215, 293-94,420-23.

^Fishel, Secret War. 544; USG to Halleck, April 29, 1864, Q? 10: 370-71.

^^USG to Sherman, April 8, 1864, Ibid., 271. For BMI reports on Longstreet's return to Virginia, see Col. George H. Sharpe to Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, April 13, 1864; Sharpe to Humphreys, April 17, 1864, RG 108, Headquarters of the Army, Headquarters in the Field, entry 112, Reports Concerning Military Intelligence Received by Gen. Grant, box 1, NA; Sharpe to Humphreys, April 23, 1864, Ibid.

’ 'For Isaac Silver's previous services, see Fishel, Secret War. 272-73,315-18.

'^Sharpe to Humphreys, April 26, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, NA; USG to Sigel, April 15, 1864, GE 10: 287; USG to Julia Grant, April 27, 1864, Ibid., 363; USG to Butler, April 28, 1864, Ibid., 364.

'^Capt. John McEntee to Sharpe, April 29, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, Army of the Potomac, box 11, NA; Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness. May 5-6. 1864

323 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 21. The First Corps remained in that vicinity along the rail connections with Richmond to shield the capital and act as a mobile reserve until the Grant's intentions became evident. Gen. Robert E. Lee to Davis, April 29, 1864, O R 33: 1326.

‘^USG to Halleck, April 29, 1864, QR 10:370-71; USG to Meade, April 9, 1864, Ibid., 274-75; Rhea, Battle of the Wilderness. 49-52; Edward Steere, The Wilderness Campaign: The Meeting of Grant and Lee (I960: Mechanicsburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1994), 26-29.

^^Rhea, Battle of the Wilderness. 52-56; Steere, Wilderness Campaign. 29-35. See also Andrew A. Humphreys. The Virginia Campaign o f 64 and '65 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), 9-11.

t^For the inaccuracy of the maps used by Grant and Meade, see Theodore Lyman, "Uselessness of the Maps Furnished to Staff of the Army of the Potomac Previous to the Campaign of May, 1864." Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts 4: 77-80; Maj. Nathaniel Michler to Brig. Gen. Seth Williams, October 20, 1864, OR 36, pt. 1: 293; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 560. See also Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant ( 1897: New York: Bonanza Books, 1961), 40.

^^Rhea, Battle of theWildemess. 64, 69.

^^Ibid., 102; Steere, Wilderness Campaign. 94; William D. Matter, If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of Spotsylvania (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University Press of North Carolina, 1988), 2.

'^USG to Halleck, April 29, 1864, OR 10: 371.

-°USG to Stanton, June 20, 1865, Ibid., 15: 168.

Stony Mountain Intecepted Signal Messages, May 4, 1864, QR 36, pt. 2: 371-72; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 44; Rhea, Battle of the Wilderness. 70-78; USG to Halleck, May 4, 1864, QR 10: 397.

“ Meade to USG, May 5, 1864, Ibid., 10:399; USG to Meade, May 5, 1864, Ibid.

-^GranL Personal Memoirs. 2: 177-78.

“"^Sherman to Stanton, May 23, 1864, OR 38, pt. 4: 294.

^^Rhea, Battle of the Wilderness. 435,440,437; USG to Halleck, May 6, 1864, OE 10: 400.

324 ^^Wilson, Rawlins. 218; USG to Stanton, July 22, 1865, Qjg, 36, pt. I ; 18-19; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 211.

2^USG to Meade, May 7, 1864, fi£ 10:408.

-^Matter, If It Takes All Summer. 44-70; Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren to Meade, May 8, 1864, OR. 36, pt. 2: 539; Dana to Stanton, May 8, 1864, Ibid., pt. 1:63.

-^Warren to Meade, May 8, 1864, Ibid., pt. 2: 540; Meade's Endorsement of Warren's Dispatch, May 8, 1864, Ibid.; USG to Halleck, May 8,1864, G E 10:411.

^^Matter, If It Takes All Summer. 111-112; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 554.

Warren to Meade, May 8, 1864, QR 36, pt. 2; 540-41; Catton, Grant Takes Command, 213-17.

^2u SG to Halleck, May 10, 1864, Û E 10:418.

^^USG to Burnside, May 9, 1864, Ibid., 415; Matter, If It Takes All Summer. 110-111; USG to Halleck, May 9, 1864, Q E 10:414; Catton, Grant Takes Command, 218-19; USG to Burnside, May 9,1864, 10:415-16.

^“^USG to Stanton, May 11,1864, G E 10: 422; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 219; Wilson, Rawlins. 218.

^^Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 555-58; USG to Halleck, May 11, 1864, G£ 10:423; USG to Stanton, July 22, 1864, QR 36, pt. 1:17; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 558.

^^Meade to USG, May 10, 1864, QR 36, pt. 2: 596; USG to Halleck, May 11, 1864, GE 10:423; Sheridan to Meade, May 10, 18M, Ibid., 426; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 559.

^7USG to Halleck, May 12, 1864, GE 10:428; USG to Julia Grant, May 13, 1864, Ibid., 443; Meade, ed.. Life and Letters. 2:201. Confederate deserters helped foster this image. On May 17 Sharpe reported that one enemy deserter indicated that the "spirit of the men has somewhat failed." Sharpe to Humphreys, May 17, 1864, QR 36, pt. 2: 842.

^*USG to Halleck, May 22, 1864, GE 10:477; Sharpe to Humphreys, May 22, 1864, QR 36, pt. 3: 80.

^^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 250-53; USG to Halleck, May 26, 1864, GE 10: 490- 91.

325 '^®USG to Halleck, May 26, 1864, Ibid., 491 ; Dana to Stanton, May 24, 1864, QR 36, pt. I ; 78; Dana to Stanton, May 26, Ibid., 70.

"**Catton, Grant Takes Command. 259-262; Circular from Meade's Headquarters, June 2, 1864, QR 36, pt. 3:479; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 580; J. Michael Miller, "Strike Them a Blow: Lee vs. Grant on the North Anna," Blue & Gray 10 (April 1993): 13-22,44-55. See also Robert E. L. Krick, Michael Andrus, and David Ruth, "Grant and Lee, 1864; From the North Anna to the Crossing of the James," Ibid., 11 (April 1994): 21-22, 44, 46, 50.

42lbid., 50.

"*^USG to Julia Grant, June 1, 1864, QE. 11:5; Porter, Campaigning with Grant. 172; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 579-80; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 263- 67; Krick, et al., "Grant and Lee," 52-54, 56-58.

"^USG to Halleck, June 5, 1864, QE. 11: 19; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 274-79.

"•^Ibid., 294-95; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 570; USG to Washbume, June 9, 1864, QE II: 32.

"^^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 280-81; Brian Holden Reid, "Another Look at Grant's Crossing of the James, 1864," Civil War History 39 (December 1993): 299-300; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 448 (decapo).

'^^Sharpe to Humphreys, June II, 1864, Q R 36, pt. 3: 747.

'^^Reid, "Grant's Crossing of the James," 302; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 281-82.

^*^USG to Julia Grant, June 15,1864, QE. H: 55; Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, eds.. The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee (1961; New York: De Capo Press, 1987), 778-79, 780-81, 784; Wilson to Lt. Col. James W. Forsyth, February 18, 1865, QR 36, pt. 1: 883-84.

John Van Lew, brother of Elizabeth Van Lew, who headed a spy ring in Richmond, visited Grant on June 11 perhaps to advise the commander of his sister’s operation. Humphreys to Rawlins, June 11,1864, QR 36, pt. 3: 746; Fishel, Secret War. 552.

Wilson to Forsyth, February 18, 1865, QR 36, pt. I : 883-84; Wilson, Rawlins. 231; Dana to Stanton, June 13, 1864, QR 40, pt. 1: 19; Wilson to Forsyth, February 18, 1865, Ibid., 36, pt. 1: 884; Wilson to Humphreys, June 14, 1864, Ibid., 40, pt. 2: 34-35; Dana to Stanton, June 15, 1864, Ibid., 40, pt. 1:20.

326 S^USG to Butler, June 14, 1864, GE 11: 45; Grant, Personal Memoirs, 2; 281; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 588.

^^Reid, "Grant's Crossing of the James, 3 14.

327 CHAPTER 10

NEUTRALIZING THE VALLEY

In the late afternoon of July 3, 1864, Grant received an alarming dispatch from

Halleck. The Army chief of staff claimed that, at that moment, a Confederate infantry corps under Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early (Second Corps, Army of Northern

Virginia) was marching northward down the Shenandoah Valley towards the Potomac

River, perhaps with the goal of threatening Washington. However, Grant calmly replied that "Early's Corps is now here," assuring Halleck that no significant enemy forces existed in the valley. The general-in-chief based his response on earlier intelligence reports that showed Early's command still manning the trenches outside Richmond and

Petersburg along with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia. As Grant telegraphed his reply to Washington, however, 12,000 troops under "Old Jube" Early inched northward from Winchester in the Shenandoah toward the Potomac and Maryland, over one hundred miles from the siege lines before Richmond and Petersburg. *

In late May, After abandoning Cold Harbor and sidling southeast across the

James River, reports of valley troops returning to Lee helped convince Grant that few

Confederate troops remained in the Shenandoah. Moreover, by this time Grant's army had abandoned Cold Harbor, crossed the James River, and had Lee's army pinned behind in his trenches at Richmond and Petersburg. In this predicament,he reasoned, Lee would likely concentrate against Grant rather than waste valuable forces in a secondary theater.

He also had faith that both Hunter and Sheridan, on missions to sever the valley from

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Map 9 Richmond, would deny Lee access to the valley's bountiful harvests. Not only was the valley known as the Confederacy's "breadbasket," it also served as a natural invasion corridor into the North. Running southwest to northeast, the Shenandoah's northern reaches opened on the Potomac River and Maryland farmland within two or three days' march of Washington. As Northerners had learned in previous years. Confederate troops in the valley posed a significant threat to Washington.

Hal leek's claim o f substantial enemy forces—veterans of Stonewall Jackson's brilliant 1862 Valley Campaign, no less—weakened Grant's confidence in his latest intelligence assessment After further investigation, he found his information to be seriously flawed; Early had indeed departed the Richmond area and headed for the valley. This menacing gray tide now appeared destined for the Maryland shore of the

Potomac. On July 5, twenty-two days after the Second Corps had departed the Cold

Harbor lines for the valley. Grant finally admitted that there remained "no doubt but

Ewell's [Early's] Corps is away from here." Before Grant's awakening, however. Early had expelled Hunter's forces from the valley and had marched the distance to Harpers

Ferry at the confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac Rivers. On the same day as

Grant's revelation about his absence, "Old Jube" stood on the banks of the Potomac.

Washington lay barely fifty miles away.-

Grant had put his trust in Hunter to eliminate the Shenandoah threat once and for all. Ordered to advance up the valley and destroy the food-producing capability of the region. Hunter defeated Brigadier General William "Grumble" Jones' forces at Piedmont on June 5, seized Staunton, joined forces with Brigadier Generals George Crook and

William Averell (boosting his force to around 18,000 men), and headed toward the major supply depot at Lynchburg. As Hunter burned his way up the valley. Grant instructed

Sheridan and two cavalry divisions to tear up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James

River canal, both vital links between Richmond and the Shenandoah, and join Hunter.

330 Realizing that Grant intended to sever the Army of Northern Virginia from its supply

source, Lee rushed Major General Wade Hampton's cavalry westward to intercept

Sheridan. Hampton's troopers turned back the Union column at Trevilian Station on June

11, forcing Sheridan to abort his mission and leave Hunter on his own.^

The following day, still unaware of Hampton's success and fearing the

consequences of Hunter and Sheridan joining forces, Lee wrote Jefferson Davis that

clearing the valley of Fédérais would be advantageous but "the only difficulty with me is

the means" as it "would [take] one corps of this army." Although this would further

weaken Richmond's defenses in the face of the numerically superior Fédérais, he was

willing to risk it. Lee understood that if Hunter were allowed to proceed unchecked, he

would eventually control the valley and prevent the Shenandoah's rich harvest from

reaching his hungry army in Richmond. Reluctantly, he drained an infantry corps from

his already depleted army and rushed it toward Lynchburg to meet Hunter."*

For this mission Lee selected "Stonewall" Jackson's old Second Corps, eight

thousand strong commanded by Jubal Early, who had assumed command from the ailing

Richard Ewell. Many in the corps participated in Jackson's 1862 campaign and were

eager to give the Fédérais another lesson in valley warfare. Lee instructed his

subordinate to depart for Lynchburg at 2:00 a m. on June 13, defeat Hunter, and clear the

valley of Fédérais. He also urged his subordinate, if possible, to advance down the

valley, securing supplies as he went, cross the Potomac, and ultimately threaten

Washington. All forces currently in the region—including Breckinridge's troops, who had

returned to the valley on June 7, and remnant's of "Grumble" Jones' command —would also join in, giving the strike force approximately twelve thousand men.^

Lee hoped that Lincoln would force Grant to detach troops for Washington's defenses, meaning fewer Fédérais to handle in Virginia. If the Union general dispatched forces northward to stop Early, he reasoned, the Army o f Northern Virginia could then

331 attack the weakened Union lines and perhaps break the siege. On the other hand, if the

Federal commander attempted to force Early's recall by attacking the Confederate entrenchments, he risked a repeat of Cold Harbor. Overall, it appeared to be a gamble worth taking.^

The Second Corps, bivouacked in reserve behind Hill's Third Corps on Lee's left flank, departed at the appointed hour, and cleared its Gaines' Mill camps by daylight of

June 13. Since the mission's success depended upon its secrecy. Lee hoped Early's departure would not attract attention along Union lines or from Federal cavalry. He soon learned, however, that a Richmond newspaper correspondent had uncovered the plan and prepared to print the story. Knowing that Grant read Southern newspapers regularly for military information, the Confederate general asked Davis to "cause notice to be sent to all newspapers not to allude to any movement by insinuation or otherwise." O f course, even complete censorship of the print media could not guarantee the concealment of the move from an alert adversary. To ensure the secrecy of Early's departure, however, Lee received a hand from an unlikely source—Ulysses S. Grant.^

As dusk fell on June 12, Grant initiated his massive change of base maneuver across the James River. Warren's Fifth Corps abandoned its Cold Harbor trenches on the army's left behind Wilson's cavalry, crossed the Chickahominy, and prepared to cover the movement of the rest of the army. That same evening, Hancock's Second Corps slipped behind the screen and reached the James with the two remaining Union corps, from the center and right at Cold Harbor, following shortly thereafter. Major General William F.

"Baldy" Smith's Eighteenth Corps, Army of the James, had departed earlier June 12 on transports up the James to rejoin Butler at Bermuda Hundred. By June 16, the Army of the Potomac had reached the south bank.*

By June 17-18, as Lee rushed his army to Petersburg after confirming Grant's location. Early had traversed the distance to Lynchburg in time to meet Hunter. But

332 Grant still remained unaware of his absence. In fact, as late as June 14 Grant placed

Ewell's (Early's) corps south of the Chickahominy between White Oak Swamp and

Malvern Hill. By sheer coincidence. Grant's movement to the James had occurred almost

simultaneously with Early’s departure from the Cold Harbor vicinity. The first Fédérais

pulled out at dusk on June 12 while Early's command marched at 2 a m. the following

morning. By the time the Second Corps had embarked, the Union troops opposite its

position were marching in the other direction. After the last pickets were withdrawn, no

Fédérais remained to detect Early's departure. Moreover, Wilson's busy troopers were

fully occupied south of the Chickahominy screening the army, leaving no time for

reconnaissance north of the river.^ Grant had unwittingly opened a window of opportunity that Early—also unknowingly-had slipped through and vanished.

In addition to the cavalry's decreased effectiveness as an intelligence producer,

the army's other eyes and ears, the BMI, also encountered difficulties during and after the

move across the James. As the army marched, the bureau's operations were undoubtedly disrupted by the increased activity concomitant with a large change of base maneuver.

Not until June 17 did Sharpe issue his first summary of information to Meade since

leaving Cold Harbor. The colonel probably found himself occupied with his provost

marshal duties (sweeping up stragglers and prisoners, preventing destruction of private

property, arresting looters) leaving Babcock to shoulder much of the bureau's intelligence business, especially since McEntee remained absent with the valley command. As a

result, the BMI operated at less than peak efficiency during Grant's movement across the

James.

Sharpe's June 17 report dealt primarily with whether or not Lee had detected the

Federal move. The next day he issued five separate intelligence summaries, though only one mentioned Early. In that report, Sharpe noted only that Early had not yet arrived in

333 Petersburg but remained silent as to his present location. Most likely, the colonel assumed that the Second Corps—sighted only four days earlier south of the

Chickahominy—remained in its former position.*®

Despite the ambiguity of Sharpe's information, on June 17 Grant received some indication that some Confederate forces were moving toward the valley. He reported to

Halleck that Lee had apparently dispatched a division and two brigades to Lynchburg four days earlier. However, only one of the units he listed, Major General John B.

Gordon’s division, belonged to the Second Corps. Nevertheless, Grant evinced little concern over this detachment since he believed Hunter could handle a force of that size and that Lee would probably recall these troops once he realized the magnitude of the

James River operation. He also assumed that Hunter would discover the approaching column through his cavalry, noting that "such a force as he [Hunter] has should never be surprised." With faith in his assessment, Grant failed to acknowledge the possibility of a

Confederate advance down the Shenandoah. * *

The simultaneous movements of the Army of the Potomac and the Second Corps caused intelligence problems for both commanders, but in the end Lee profited more from the odd circumstances. Grant's massive change of base maneuver helped cloak

Early's departure better than Lee himself could have accomplished. Now, the burden of finding Early and determining his intentions fell to a lone Union intelligence officer in the valley.

Captain John McEntee of the BMI had traveled to the Shenandoah in early April to establish a bureau branch with Sigel's command. He corresponded regularly with

Sharpe and provided detailed accounts of the conditions in the area and his efforts to construct an effective intelligence system at Harpers Ferry. But he faced a very difficult task from the outset. On his second day of duty, he learned that Brigadier General Max

Weber, in command of the garrison at Harpers Ferry, employed no scouts and rarely

334 received reports from Union cavalry in the area, leaving him virtually blind to enemy activity. McEntee also discovered the few deserters or refugees came in to the town, and that the provost marshal knew little about gleaning useful information from those who did. With limited access to traditional sources coupled with seemingly incompetent or uncaring personnel, McEntee faced a formidable challenge.

McEntee tried to establish a scouting force by adopting some existing organizations in the area, including members of the Union League of Loudon County, to patrol areas beyond the reach o f Union cavalry. These arrangements amounted to little, however, because most residents in the vicinity were more concerned with protecting themselves from Confederate guerrillas than with providing information. McEntee also realized that the indigenous population was generally hostile toward Fédérais anyway.

"The cavalrymen say that there is no safety in a party of four or five men," he complained, since "the citizens bushwhack and rob them." If these small groups were not safe, then smaller scouting details would also be in danger from bushwhackers. He informed Sharpe on May 3 that two veteran scouts that had accompanied him west,

Henry W. Dodd and Benjamin F. McCord, were unable to perform their jobs efficiently because the countryside was "so infested with guerrillas they can do very little scouting."

Unable to penetrate very far up the Shenandoah where the Confederates bivouacked,

McEntee was force to rely upon information provided by the refugees and deserters who trickled into Harpers Ferry.

Despite these setbacks, Sharpe’s man in the valley worked to develop an effective

"secret service" in the valley command. But more obstacles emerged, however, to further frustrate his efforts. Upon his arrival, McEntee examined the files and papers relating to the existing intelligence system and was shocked to discover that Sigel had little knowledge of the Confederate order of battle or their current dispositions. After a thorough overview of the files, McEntee lamented to Sharpe that he could "make very

335 little of them, [as] the thing is so mixed." Further complications arose when Hunter succeeded Sigel in command of the Department of West Virginia after the New Market defeat in mid-May. McEntee complained that the new commander had little appreciation for the value o f an efficient scouting detachment or for the value o f intelligence in general. "General Sigel gave me every facility and seemed to feel an interest in organizing a good [scouting] party," he stated. "But Gen[ ] H[unter] feels little interested in it." By early June, the prospects for creating an efficient bureau branch in the valley appeared bleak.

Communications between McEntee and Sharpe also created difficulties in the transmission of real-time intelligence. In early June, Hunter’s army moved up the valley toward Lynchburg and away from the telegraph station at Harpers Ferry, the only rapid means of communication with the Army of the Potomac. To compensate for the lack of telegraphic access, as the army advanced McEntee sent messengers back to Harpers

Ferry. But these couriers were in constant danger of being captured by guerrillas, making the captain's communication links with Sharpe all the more tenuous. ”[T]here is so much difficulty in communicating what I do get to your as our lines are so long & unguarded," he observed. Furthermore, McEntee also complained that, as the army progressed, he saw fewer and fewer deserters and refugees. When Hunter reached Cedar Creek south of

Winchester, none came in at all.

McEntee also wrestled with a severe bout of homesickness for Sharpe and

Babcock and continually prodded the colonel to arrange his transfer out of the valley.

Being snubbed by Hunter’s staff only fueled his desire to leave the valley. When he attempted to aid Hunter’s provost marshal with constructing an intelligence system, he received a cold shoulder. "I would render him much assistance if he would permit me," fumed McEntee, "but he thinks I am interfering with his business” In the same letter, he

336 pleaded with Sharpe to write "as [ am again among strangers and feel mighty seasick."

As McEntee's efforts floundered, both Early and Hunter closed on Lynchburg. The stage was set for the Second Corps' disappearance down the valley.

Early reached Charlottesville on June 16 and learned that Hunter was only twenty miles from Lynchburg. Nearly sixty miles from the town, the Confederate commander had to act fast to win the race. The Second Corps boarded trains on the Orange &

Alexandria Railroad (O & A) in the hopes of saving Lynchburg from the fate that had befallen Lexington and other towns already visited by Hunter's army. The next day Early arrived in time to reinforce the small Confederate garrison and after a brief engagement on June 18 ended in stalemate. Hunter withdrew under cover of darkness. He noted later that "up to the morning of the 18th I had no positive information as to whether General

Lee had detached any considerable force for the relief of Lynchburg." As a result of

Grant's ignorance about Early's departure from Richmond Hunter, too, was unaware that a veteran Confederate corps awaited him at Lynchburg.

Claiming that by retracing his steps the army would be unable to collect supplies and would run the risk of being cut off. Hunter chose another route. Since ample supplies awaited in West Virginia, he headed westward towards the Kanawha River near

Charleston. Early pursued until June 22, then turned toward Staunton, letting Hunter take himself out of the Shenandoah. The Confederate commander realized that the

Fédérais would continue until they reached the Kanawha, over one hundred miles distant, as good roads and the lure of provisions left them little choice. To head north meant food shortages and guerrillas, while a westward route promised safety and supplies.

Hunter's withdrawal from the Shenandoah not only presented Early with an open road north, but also removed the valley's only intelligence service from action as well.

McEntee's hasty departure with Hunter's command meant that Sharpe—and Grant—would have little means of monitoring events in the valley. His continued absence guaranteed

337 that Harpers Ferry and the other Union garrisons in the lower valley would remain

ignorant of Early's future movements. Without McEntee, Grant knew even less about

enemy activity in the region, a dangerous situation since the general in chief had already

drained away most of the available manpower from Washington's defenses for his

campaign against Richmond.

Back at Grant's headquarters at City Point, Virginia, rumors indicating an

increased Confederate presence in the valley trickled in. On June 20, Sharpe reported

that a prisoner claimed that "Ewell's [Early's] corps left General Lee at Cold Harbor . . .

toward Lynchburg" and that he had "not seen any part o f it since, and is quite certain that

no part [of it]. . . is in our front." The following morning five prisoners from Hill's corps

corroborated this information. On June 24, the EMI chief noted that "I am satisfied ...

that no part of Ewell's [Early's] corps has returned or is in this vicinity." By this time,

most of the evidence suggested that Early had left the Richmond-Petersburg area, rescued

Lynchburg, and forced Hunter to retreat But there were no indications that the Second

Corps had turned toward the Potomac.^o

On June 28, the same day that Early reached Mount Sidney, Grant received the

first reports from Hunter and McEntee describing the recent affair at Lynchburg.

Hunter's account failed to provide substantive information about the forces that defeated

him, mentioning only that he withdrew in the face of superior forces "constantly

receiving re-enforcements from Richmond." McEntee's report contained more details.

He claimed that Hunter had "engaged part of Ewell's corps commanded by Early" and estimated its size at 20,000 men. More importantly, McEntee provided the first

significant information concerning the Second Corps' whereabouts since June 18 when he remarked that Early's command was "probably at Richmond again by this [time]. "

[emphasis supplied] Grant evidently agreed with this assessment even though McEntee had provided no evidence to support his claim. But the general in chief believed that Lee

338 needed every man he could find for the Richmond-Petersburg front and that the

Confederate commander had dispatched Early before he comprehended the danger posed by the Union movement across the James. Therefore, Lee would have little choice but to recall Early, making McEntee's conclusion more than plausible. Before long, more intelligence would emerge to lend more weight to the captain's assessment.^*

Hancock notified Meade on July 1 that three deserters from Mississippi regiments reported that "Ewell's [Early's] corps arrived yesterday and that part of it was marching to

[the Confederate] right." Later that day, Hal leek informed Grant of "conflicting reports about rebel forces in the Shenandoah Valley," warning that it "would be good policy for them while Hunter’s army is on the Kanawha. . . [to] make a raid in Maryland & Penn."

Despite the chief of staffs prophecy. Grant replied with assurance that same day, stating that "Ewell's [Early's] corps has returned here." The statements of the Mississippi deserters and McEntee's June 28 report provided the general in chief with enough evidence of Early's return to satisfy him. As the Confederates in the valley neared

Strasburg, less than forty-five miles from the Potomac, Grant felt confident that he could account for all of Lee's army.--

While Grant remained blissfully unaware of Early's advance, the small Union garrisons at Martinsburg, Harpers Ferry, and other posts in the lower valley began hearing rumors of a large Confederate force coming their way. John W. Garrett, president of the

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (B & O), recognized early on that a formidable enemy expedition was edging northward. He telegraphed Stanton on June 29 with these fears, stating that "Breckinridge and Ewell [Early] are reported moving up" and warning that "I am satisfied the operations and designs of the enemy in the Valley demand the greatest vigilance and attention." Knowing that the raiders would likely intercept trains and

339 perhaps destroy miles of B & O track and valuable rolling stock, Garrett was especially sensitive to these ominous reports. His warning went unheeded, however, after Grant allayed the fears of Lincoln and Stanton with his July 1 telegram.^

By July 2, however, the trickle of rumors reaching the valley garrisons had become a steady stream of frightening reports. Sigel, now in command of the

Martinsburg post, advised the War Department that a large, unidentified Confederate force was nearing Strasburg. The next day, reports of skirmishing and enemy sightings escalated. The Martinsburg telegraph operator wired that a large body of the enemy

"supposed to be the same that fought Hunter" lurked nearby, less than a dozen miles from

Harpers Ferry. Shortly after this transmission, the Martinsburg wire fell silent. Reports of further assaults against Union posts continued to filter in to the Halleck and Stanton.

As tension in Washington mounted, Garrett remarked to Stanton, referring to his earlier warning, that "I apprehend the information recently sent you of heavy forces in the Valley is about to prove correct." Disturbed by the growing clamor in the valley, Lincoln,

Stanton, and Halleck turned to City Point for answers.-"^

The chief of staff informed Grant on July 3 that Early and Breckinridge were reportedly moving down the Shenandoah. The Union general assured him that "Early's corps is now here," adding that "There are no troops that can now be threatening Hunter's

Dept" except the remnants of Jones' and Breckinridge's commands. Garrett, however, did not believe the Confederate threat was small. He told Stanton, with a note of sarcasm, "It is clear that if there is not a large rebel force they are being handled with great vigor and skill to make such numerous attacks at points so distant." To ease their concerns. Grant reevaluated his previous intelligence. "Is it not certain that Early has returned to your front?" he asked Meade. The Potomac commander replied that his only information concerning Early had come from deserters (probably the three Mississippians in

Hancock's dispatch of July 1 ) who stated that the Second Corps had returned from

340 Lynchburg. But he also noted that "No prisoners have been taken from any of the divisions of that corps" and that "It was never reported as in our front but only that it had returned." Later that evening. Grant repeated Meade’s response to Halleck, stressing that, despite having no prisoners from Early, "Deserters. . . from other Commands state

[Early's corps] returned five or six days ago." But sensing a gap in his information, especially with the conspicuous absence of deserters and prisoners from the Second

Corps, Grant continued his quest for hard intelligence of Early's return.-^

Independence Day brought more news to City Point. Sharpe learned from a deserter the current rumors circulating through Southern camps told of Early's departure for Maryland and that "he had taken Arlington Heights and was about to capture the city of Washington." In a telegram summarizing the colonel's information. Grant noted skeptically that "This report of Ewell's [Early's] Corps being north is only the report of a deserter" but that "we have similar authority for it being here and on the right of Lee's army." Reflecting his growing uncertainty, however, he added that "we know it does not occupy this position." It appeared as if Lee was paying Grant back tenfold for his stolen march to the James.-^

After July 4 Grant initiated an intense search for hard intelligence on Early, and

Sharpe and Babcock interrogated all prisoners and deserters on their knowledge of his current location. Since his June 17 report, Sharpe had issued twenty additional intelligence assessments; of those, four contained information intimating—but not explicitly stating—that Early's corps remained in the valley. The results of the BMI's intensified search were mixed. Some sources placed him in Maryland while others were convinced that he occupied the trenches outside Richmond. "Very little is known in their army of the whereabouts of Ewell's [Early's] corps," he concluded. By July 6, Sharpe remained uncertain of Early's whereabouts, although evidence leaned towards the conclusion that he was somewhere in the Shenandoah.-^

341 In two dispatches to Halleck Grant revealed the confusion that had emerged at his headquarters due to these contradictory reports. In the first telegram, he stated that

"Except for despatches [sic] forwarded from Washington in the last two days I have learned nothing which indicates an intention on the part of the rebels to attempt any northern movement." In a later dispatch, however. Grant was suddenly positive that

Early was gone, although he remained unclear whether he had gone to the valley. As a precaution. Grant sent one division of the Sixth Corps to Washington with the remainder to follow shortly thereafter. Only on July 6 did the general in chief finally acknowledge that Early was probably near the Potomac River. Three days later, however, no one at the general's headquarters knew for sure "how large a force the rebs have up there, nor... to what extent Lee has diminished his forces in our immediate front."-*

While Grant scrambled to get the Sixth Corps off and as Hunter tried to overtake

Early from behind, the responsibility for stopping the Confederates fell upon Grant's former division commander. Lew Wallace. Upon hearing the news of the enemy's approach, he positioned his small force along the Monocacy River near Frederick,

Maryland, where two roads—one leading to Baltimore and the other to Washington- crossed the river. Initially, Wallace was ignorant of who led the oncoming enemy force, nor did he know its size. He soon learned, however, that Early commanded the invasion and that he had already driven Sigel and Weber out of Harpers Ferry. When Brigadier

General James B. Ricketts arrived on July 9 with part of the Sixth Corps reinforcements, he received a shock when Wallace informed him that Early, whom Ricketts—like Grant- had assumed remained in Richmond, was supposedly lurking beyond the Maryland mountains. By the time Early's Confederates overwhelmed Wallace later that day and sent him limping toward Baltimore, daylight had faded and the Southerners were forced to halt for the night. Wallace's delaying action had cost Early time, allowing the remaining Sixth Corps divisions to reach the capital ahead of the Confederate advance.-^

342 The Sixth Corps, soon joined by the Nineteenth Corps, arrived in time to prevent the capture of the Federal capital. The Confederates had reached the outskirts by July 11 and probed the city's defenses the next day. Early realized he could not attack such strong entrenchments, now manned by Grant's veterans, without risking severe losses.

Had he been a day earlier, he might have taken Washington. The time lost on the

Monocacy had cost Early dearly. During the night of July 12, nearly a month after departing Lee's army, Early's command withdrew toward Leesburg, Virginia. Two days later, the last substantial threat to the Federal capital crossed the Potomac and melted back into the Old Dominion.^® In the final analysis. Grant had barely escaped the potentially disastrous consequences of his military intelligence failure.

As a result of the raid, officials in Washington and officers in the field retained little faith in Grant's intelligence capabilities. Meade evidenced this frustration when, at the height of the raid, he reported that not only had Early's corps disappeared, but suddenly the location of Lee's two remaining corps became in doubt. For example, on

July 12 Meade noted that one Confederate division in particular had been sighted "in our front—on our left & rear & on its way to P[ennsylvania]." Although plagued by similar reports, including some indicating that Lee's entire army was marching on Federal capital. Grant maintained a grasp on the true situation. "Summary of evidence gathered from deserters, scouts & Cavalry reconnoissance [sic]," he wrote on July 13, "show that none of Hill[']s or Longstreet[']s Corps [the remaining corps in Lee's army] have left our front." Moreover, Rawlins noted that same day that, despite the burgeoning rumors that at least Longstreefs troops were enroute to join Early's assault on Washington, the evidence indicated otherwise. "We have deserters from it daily and also make captures of prisoners from it." "This latter evidence," he continued, "never has failed us." Early's disappearance had taught Grant a hard but valuable lesson. Before coming East, he had looked upon information from prisoners and deserters as inconsequential, noting that

343 they "can tell nothing except of their own regiments or Brigade." He now recognized that

what was once viewed as a limitation on their usefulness was actually an asset. To

ascertain the presence or absence of enemy units, prisoners and deserters were invaluable

identification tools, especially since the close proximity o f the opposing siege lines

offered more access to both types of enemy soldiers. Unlike in the West, Grant had to

learn the enemy's order o f battle in order to track his movements through these passive

sources. Luckily for the general in chief the BMI had been keeping track of the

composition of Lee’s army since 1863.^*

Grant realized the dangerous precedent set by Lee and Early. Halleck reminded

him that as long as Union forces were concentrated outside Richmond and Petersburg,

the Confederates could make large detachments "unknown to us for a week or ten days"

and threaten the capital or Maryland and Pennsylvania. Since they had already shown

they could move an entire corps from under Grant's nose, shield it behind the Blue Ridge,

and bring it to the gates of Washington with little warning, what would stop them from

repeating the feat? Another raid like the recent one, moreover, might create more unrest

among the already war-weary Northern populace and jeopardize both Grant's Virginia

campaign and Lincoln's November reelection bid. Incessant grumbling from political

opponents, government officials, and Northern citizens, some believing that Grant's

stalemated campaign had already failed, plagued the Union commander and forced a

réévaluation of the strategic situation in Virginia.^-

Early made matters worse for Grant when, instead o f returning to Richmond, he

remained in the valley to gather the fall harvest and maintain a potential threat to

Baltimore and the Federal capital. Lee hoped that his continued presence in that region would force Grant to either detach more troops to defeat him, thereby compromising his own siege operations, or attack Confederate lines at Richmond and Petersburg and repeat

Cold Harbor. Now with two lines of operation in Virginia, Grant faced a complex

344 problem: how to keep Early at bay and sever Lee from his supply source in the

Shenandoah without jeopardizing his main operations against the Confederate capital. To isolate and defeat Early, secure Washington, and deny the enemy access to the valley's resources would hurt Lee irreparably. As a result, the Confederate commander would have to face Grant's growing multitudes with a hungry army and time running out.^^

The realization of this plan hinged partially on the Fédérais' ability to obtain accurate intelligence on enemy troop transfers between Richmond and the valley command—something woefully lacking during Early's raid. With access to this sort of information. Grant could coordinate movements in both theaters to keep both Lee and

Early pinned in place, unable to render support to each other. If he could utilize this information wisely. Grant could wrest from Lee his most potent weapon: strategic mobility. The BMI would take the lead in this effort, but until the inadequacies of the bureau made starkly apparent by Early's invasion were corrected, the present campaign would continue, as one War Department official lamented, "in the deplorable and fatal way in which it has.

Grant moved quickly to address the Shenandoah crisis. First he attacked the divided nature of the Union command structure in the region, which had severly hampered coordination during the raid. He created a Middle Military Division and placed one commander over the formerly separate military departments in northern

Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The Union Army of the Shenandoah, consisting o f the Sixth and the Nineteenth Corps and Hunter's Army of

West Virginia, comprised the teeth of the new command. To oversee this important region and direct operations against Early, Grant appointed Major General Philip H.

Sheridan. His mission was to locate Early and "follow him to the death," and destroy the valley's resources once and for all. After completing the consolidation and sending

345 Sheridan to his new post. Grant then turned to the BMI and made changes designed to

bolster his access to intelligence regarding Confederate troop movements between Lee

and his subordinate in the Shenandoah.^-

Prior to Early's raid, Sharpe's bureau operated out of the Army of the Potomac's

provost marshal general department under Provost Marshal General Marsena R. Patrick.

Due to this arrangement, any information Grant received from the BMI reached him

indirectly through Meade, who jealously guarded his authority and prerogatives from the

general in chief traveling with his army. After the raid, however. Grant realized that the

bureau's operations and his control over it needed rethinking. As a result, a tug-of-war of

sorts erupted in early July when he appointed Patrick as provost marshal of the newly

designated "Armies Operating Against Richmond" (AGAR), the umbrella organization

over the Armies of the Potomac and the James, based at Grant's City Point headquarters.

With this appointment, Patrick now had command over all the provost marshal

departments. Including the bureau and its branches. Patrick immediately requested that

Sharpe and the bureau staff accompany him to Grant's headquarters, claiming that Meade

"refused to let us do what was desired" for efficient intelligence operations. After the

order was granted, Meade—fearing that the move infringed upon his own authority-

open ly opposed the move, declaring that he wanted "no partnership with Grant." He also

lashed out at the BMI, probably as a result of its poor showing during Early's raid,

complaining that it was "good for nothing" and should be disbanded. By late July,

Meade and Grant reached a compromise with regard to the status of the BMI. Patrick

would remain with the Army of the Potomac, although retaining his new authority, and

most of the BMI would also stay at Meade's headquarters. However, Sharpe was assigned to Grant's staff as an assistant provost marshal of the AGAR and would oversee the BMI's operations from City Point. With Sharpe's transfer. Grant now had, for the first time, his own intelligence officer and the beginnings of a true intelligence staff

346 From the moment he arrived at City Point, Sharpe worked on developing a system to detect Confederate movements between Richmond and the valley. Fortunately, his transfer to Grant's side came at a critical time. In late July, Early once again occupied the lower valley and made threatening overtures, including a cavalry raid that resulted in the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Moreover, Lee was determined to reinforce the valley army whenever possible in order to maintain a constant threat against Washington.

Once Grant and Sharpe realized what Lee and Early were up to, the detection of

Confederate detachments from the Richmond-Petersburg front became of paramount importance not only to protect the capital, but to isolate the two theaters from each other as well. To obtain this kind of information, Sharpe needed more than Babcock and

McEntee and the small cadre of bureau scouts; he had to expand his personnel and operations to meet the demands of this important mission. The situation required on-site observers constantly monitoring Confederate troop movements around Richmond, and some watching for any detachments moving between the city and the valley. On July 21,

Patrick ordered Sharpe to "arrange matters [at City Point], and at Bermuda Hundred with

Butler, about sending off Scouts etc [sic] in the direction of Orange Court House to watch

Early and get into Richmond." Sharpe had soon devised a way to watch the railroad links between Lee and early and upgraded the network of spies who sought information from within Petersburg and the Confederate capital.

For the first component of this mission, Sharpe sent Babcock to Washington in early August to establish the means of monitoring Early’s main rail links with Richmond.

This operation centered upon three Virginia Unionists who lived in the vicinity of the depots of the 0 & A, the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac (R F & P), and the

Virginia Central Railroads. These men-lsaac Silver, James W. Cammack, and Ebenezer

McGee—visited the depots regularly, questioned passengers and railroad employees about the composition and direction of recent traffic, and watched specifically for troop trains

347 heading for the valley/* Six bureau scouts based in the Fredericksburg area, Benjamin

McCord, Henry Dodd, Sanford McGee, Phil Carney, and two others identified only as

Rose and O'Bryan, met with the three Unionists several times a week, collected their observations, and paid them for their information. After each visit, the scouts reported their findings to Babcock and Captain George K. Leet, on special duty from Grant's headquarters as a liaison officer with Hal leek's Washington staff. Leet or Babcock then wired the news to Sharpe and Major Theodore S. Bowers, an aide on Grant's staff.

Bowers and Sharpe then collated and analyzed these reports, combined with information from other sources, and issued a summary of information to Grant. By early September,

Babcock announced that he received information from his sources in the field "as often as five times in two weeks.

With the railroads being watched, Sharpe turned to the second part of his mission

- procuring information from inside Richmond and Petersburg. Sharpe relied primarily upon daily interrogations of deserters, prisoners, refugees, and contrabands and his knowledge of Lee's Order of Battle to track enemy movements. He also obtained

Southern newspapers on a daily basis for Grant, who regularly scanned enemy publications for intelligence."^^ Furthermore, Sharpe strengthened communications with loyal Unionists in Richmond. Two major groups supplied information to the Fédérais: the "spy ring" headed by Elizabeth Van Lew and another led by the superintendent of the

RF & P, Samuel Ruth, and his principal agents, Charles M. Carter and F. W. E. Lohman.

Both organizations overlapped somewhat, although Van Lew oftentimes paid more attention to the conditions in Richmond while Ruth reported on the movement of troops and supplies on Richmond's railroads. Nevertheless, both groups gave Grant the ability to peer behind enemy lines."^*

Sharpe cultivated particularly strong ties with Van Lew and her collaborators, crediting her with establishing a vital communication network between City Point and

348 Richmond Although Grant said little about Van Lew after the war, Sharpe wrote that the general in chief was well acquainted with "the regular information obtained by our

Bureau from the City of Richmond, the greater proportion o f which in its collection, and in good measure in its transmission we owed to the intelligence and devotion of Miss E.

L. Van Lew.'"^- Sharpe's other Richmond contacts, Ruth, Carter, and Lohman, also remained steadfast in their duty despite the brief incarceration of some members on suspicion of espionage. Ruth provided information on Confederate rail traffic and deliberately delayed the delivery of supplies to Lee's army. Carter worked as Sharpe's messenger between Ruth and Grant's headquarters. Lohman, an employee of Ruth's railroad, also smuggled intelligence out of the city. After the war, all three men requested compensation from the government for their wartime services. Sharpe verified their claims, as did Grant, who endorsed their petition stating that "Much of the information" claimed by the petitioners "was reported by [Sharpe] to me, and proved of great value to the service.With Van Lew, Ruth, and the railroad monitors on duty by mid-August, Sharpe had furnished Grant with a system to gather information on enemy troop movements between the Confederate capital and the valley. All that remained was to incorporate the Shenandoah theater into this system so that both Grant and Sheridan would always be apprised of enemy detachments traveling between the two theaters.

After Sheridan arrived at Harpers Ferry on August 6, he quickly established an intelligence unit within his army to operate in conjunction with the BMI. The new valley commander possessed a great appreciation for good intelligence, as evidenced by his conduct in northern Mississippi in 1862. However, his predecessor had done little to construct an effective intelligence service, a revelation that alarmed Sheridan. "I felt the need of an efficient body of scouts," he observed, "for the defective intelligence- establishment with which I started out from Harper's Ferry [sic]... had not proved satisfactory.'"^ In early September, Sheridan, convinced of "absolute necessity of more

349 reliable information o f the enemy's numbers and movements," created "a system of

espionage that would give me a more accurate knowledge o f him than I had as yet been

able to obtain.He recruited around fifty volunteers, all from the ranks, and organized

them into a special battalion of scouts commanded by Major Henry K. Young o f the First

Rhode Island Infantry.These men, often disguised as Confederates, scouted enemy positions, watched for movements and reinforcements, and frequently operated behind enemy lines. These scouts soon became an integral part of an intelligence system that kept one eye on Early and the other trained on Richmond. With both Sharpe's and

Young's men working in concert through their respective commanders. Grant could now monitor and direct operations in the Shenandoah and use the information they produced to keep Lee and Early in check.

Grant's new intelligence network, however, was still in its formative stage when

Early once again advanced toward the lower valley and the Potomac. To counter this threat. Grant sent Sheridan two cavalry divisions. Lee responded by sending Early Major

General Joseph B. Kershaw's division (Longstreefs corps). Major General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, and an artillery battalion commanded by Major Wilfred E. Cutshaw.

Fearful of losing the valley and its bountiful resources and despite his own tenuous situation on the Piedmont, Lee reasoned that it was wiser "to detach these troops than to hazard [Early's] destruction and that o f our railroads north o f Richmond. With

Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson in overall command, the detachment departed for the valley on August 6."*^

Rumors of valley-bound Confederate reinforcements surfaced at Grant's headquarters two days later. That day, Babcock reported that a "considerable" force of infantry-possibly Kershaw's division—had gone to Early. The following day Sharpe learned from a refugee from Richmond that on August 6 a large infantiy detachment had boarded the Virginia Central trains bound for the valley. The bureau chief put great

350 stock in this particular report since the source was a friend of a "Richmond man in our employ." Bowers forwarded this information to Leet in Washington and instructed that the "attention of the men sent by Col[.] Sharpe" should be directed toward the Virginia

Central depots.

On August 10 the bureau branch with Butler's army discovered from a deserter that a large cavalry force had been sent to Early four days earlier. Babcock reported the following day that another deserter had witnessed Kershaw’s division passing through

Orange Court House enroute to the valley, and on August 11 the railroad monitors warned that infantry from the Confederate First Corps had passed over the rails to the

Shenandoah. Later that evening. Grant wired Meade informing him that all evidence confirmed that Lee had detached a sizable force to reinforce Early. With no direct telegraphic link between City Point and Sheridan’s headquarters, a concerned Grant advised Halleck to alert the valley command.

Before news of this development reached him, Sheridan had forced Early to retreat to Fisher’s Hill south of Winchester. Upon receiving Grant’s relayed message on

August 13, the valley commander replied that his sources had also discovered the approaching Confederate reinforcements. Fearful that the advancing column might emerge from the mountain gaps and pounce unannounced upon his flank and rear,

Sheridan canceled a proposed assault on Early’s Fisher’s Hill position and, following

Grant’s advice to "act now on the defensive until movement here force[s] them to detach to send this way," retreated toward Hall town on August 15.^^

As promised. Grant unleashed his own offensive operations designed specifically to prevent Lee from detaching any further reinforcements and to "create a tendency to draw from [Sheridan’s] front." To accomplish this and to determine the composition and size of the enemy detachment already enroute to Early, Grant ordered an attack against the Richmond defenses to remind Lee that sending forces away only compromised his

351 already thinning lines. Although the August 14-16 offensive failed to breach Confederate

lines or to force Kershaw's recall, the Fédérais captured prisoners from various enemy

units that helped in ascertaining the correct identity of the recent detachment. After

reviewing the evidence from prisoners. Grant wired Sheridan on August 14 that "It is now

positive that Kershaw’s Division has gone."^- Between August 18-19, the general in chief once again tried to persuade Lee to recall Kershaw, sending Warren's corps to cut the Weldon Railroad, an important logistical lifeline running between North Carolina and

Petersburg. Although severing this vital rail line was one objective, the major thrust of the operation was to "make such demonstrations, as will force Lee to withdraw a portion of his troops from the Valley so that Sheridan can strike a blow against the balance."

Warren not only cut the railroad, but held on despite vicious counterattacks, leading

Grant to conclude that its capture would be "a blow to the enemy he cannot stand" and that Lee would be forced to abandon the valley in order to reopen the rail line. In addition, Warren's success further emboldened the Union general in chief to maintain the pressure on Lee so that he could not afford to send Early any more manpower.

By late August rumors surfaced of Kershaw's probable return to help recapture the Weldon. Moreover, Grant learned from Sharpe that "general talk among the southern soldiers" and a Richmond spy's report indicated that Early's entire command, save for a token force, would soon return to Lee. However, Isaac Silver had found no evidence to support this, and bureau officers with Butler reported that most deserters and refugees believed that neither Lee nor Early had any intention of abandoning the valley. Even though a bulk of the evidence supported the latter conclusion, Sharpe still warned

Babcock in Washington that Lee might yet recall infantiy from the valley, in which case, he noted, "we shall expect to hear the first information from you.

The expectation of a Confederate drive to regain the Weldon—buttressed by

Early's valley command—spread through Federal camps. On September 6, Grant advised

352 Sheridan about these increasing rumors. "From reports of deserters coming," he stated,

"we learn that Kershaw's Division arrived in Petersburg last night." The next day,

however, Sharpe refuted this assessment with information from a Richmond spy who

reported confidently that Kershaw had not returned. McEntee also uncovered substantial

evidence to corroborate Sharpe's version. From recent interrogations, the bureau officer

noted that several deserters apparently saw brigades from other First Corps divisions pass

through Petersburg toward Lee's right flank at about the same time that the rumors of

Kershaw’s alleged arrival emerged. McEntee surmised that this simple redeployment of

the First Corps "gave rise to the rumor" of Kershaw's return. Sheridan finally confirmed

that Kershaw remained in the valley when he reported that prisoners from that division

had been captured in recent skirmishes. On September 8 he informed Grant that "I am

able to say positively that no troops have left," and promised to "press hard" should Early

send any troops to Richmond.

Sheridan's plan to "press" the Confederates was the result o f a month of constant

moves and countermoves that drove Early from the lower valley. Despite the continuous

sparring. Early had frustrated Sheridan's plans to destroy the Confederate valley army and

transform the Shenandoah into a wasteland. But determining the size of the enemy's

forces had become an obstacle. Erring on the side of caution, Sheridan believed that

Early's army equaled his own and therefore remained on the defensive. "The Presidential

campaign in the north was now fairly opened," he explained, and "under no

circumstances, could we afford to risk defeat." Nor could he chance opening the valley

to another raid into Maryland so close to the November elections. As a result, Sheridan anxiously awaited the recall of Early's forces to Richmond. In the meantime, he resoved

to "take all the time necessary to equip myself with the fullest information and then seize an opportunity under such conditions that I couldnot.. fail." As he searched for

intelligence on Early's next move, Sheridan sought Grant’s advice on future plans, and on

353 September 14 the general in chief traveled to West Virginia to confer with his

subordinate. While enroute, however. Major Young's men informed Sheridan that the

long-awaited opportunity was at hand.^^

Meanwhile, Early had concluded that, due to his apparent reluctance to engage,

Sheridan "possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity." On the basis of

that perception, and knowing how desperately Richmond needed troops, he returned

Kershaw’s division and Cutshaw*s guns to Lee. On September 15, Kershaw and Cutshaw

departed Winchester for Richmond and three days later had reached Culpeper Court

House, far from supporting distance of Early. On the day Kershaw left. Young's scouts

located a former slave who possessed a permit to travel through Confederate lines to

Winchester. They devised a plan wherein Laws would go to town to sell vegetables and

secretly pass a message to a Unionist resident. Miss Rebecca Wright. In the note

Sheridan requested that she provide any news concerning the movements of Early's

troops. The messenger delivered it the day after Kershaw's departure. Wright replied

that although she knew little specific information, she had heard from a Confederate

officer that Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery had returned to Lee, that Early's

strength was far less than Sheridan supposed, and that "no more [reinforcements] are

expected, as they cannot be spared from Richmond.

As it turned out, Wright provided Sheridan with a key bit of information that

corroborated other reports of the recall of troops and "was most important in showing

positively that Kershaw was gone." In addition, her last sentence indicated that Grant's

relentless pressure would prevent Lee from sending any more troops to Early. Seeing

Kershaw's departure as evening the odds, Sheridan felt confident that he could "strike the balance" with success. Armed with this information, the Union valley commander met

Grant with a plan to assault Early's weakened command. Impressed with his subordinate's enthusiasm. Grant gave him but one simple order: "Go in!"^^

354 Sheridan followed this brief command to the letter. On September 19, while

Kershaw continued on toward Richmond, the Fédérais attacked and defeated Early at

Winchester, forcing him back across Cedar Creek.. Three days later Grant ordered a one- hundred gun salute when Sheridan crushed Early again at Fisher’s Hill. The last victory brought the lower valley, from the Potomac to Strasburg, under Union control. The twin triumphs. Grant told Sheridan, had "wipe[d] out much of the stain upon our arms by previous disasters in that locality." And in a statement revealing the intimate connection between events in the two theaters. Grant proclaimed that if Sheridan continued on the present course, his "good work [would] cause the fall of Richmond.

After Fisher's Hill, Sheridan claimed the upper valley for the Union. The retreating Confederates found refuge at Rockfish Gap on the western edge of the Blue

Ridge, giving the Fédérais the opportunity to fulfill Grant's strategy of reducing the bounty of the Shenandoah to nothing but a memory. As they moved up the valley

Sheridan's men burned crops, bams, mills, and anything of military value as far south as

Harrisonburg and Port Republic. The Union valley commander believed that this pyrotechnic display had closed the final chapter of the 1864 Valley Campaign. After recommending that portions o f his army be sent elsewhere, Sheridan marched back down the valley and bivouacked along Cedar Creek south of Middletown. Early, however, did not see things the same as his opponent. He tailed Sheridan’s columns back to the lower valley and prepared one last surprise.^®

With Early on the ropes. Grant decided to press Lee again to make him think twice about helping his beleaguered subordinate. He battered the Confederate lines north and south of the James from September 29 to October 2. These attacks resulted in the capture o f Fort Harrison, a formidable redoubt outside Richmond. The engagements south of the river forced Lee to extend his already thin lines another three miles

355 southwest of Petersburg. Although these offensives failed to break the enemy’s lines.

Grant had prevented Lee from ever again sending substantial reinforcements to the

Shenandoah. Early was now on his own.^^

Furthermore, Sheridan's twin victories had not only punished Early, they forced

Lee on September 23 to send Kershaw, who had not yet reached the capital, hack to the

valley. Kershaw's return to Early denied the Confederates at Richmond and Petersburg

much-needed reinforcements when Grant launched his simultaneous offensives on

September 29. "Kershaw’s absence," claimed an authority on the subject, "nearly resulted

in disaster on both sides of the James." Utilizing quality intelligence. Grant and Sheridan

had effectively isolated Kershaw while in transit between the two theaters, denying both

Early and Lee the services of a veteran division at critical times. On a larger scale, the

intelligence provided by Sharpe's and Young's scouts succeeded in isolating Early's forces

from Richmond and precluded Lee from again using the valley as a diversionary

theater.

As the war entered another October, events soon foreshadowed a grim future for

Confederate valley operations. On October 9, Sheridan's cavalry defeated Early's

troopers at Tom's Brook and sent them fleeing up the valley. Certain that his adversary

possessed no more offensive punch, Sheridan departed for Washington on October 15 to

meet with War Department officials and decide on a future course. Only one day into his journey, however, he received startling news from his Cedar Creek headquarters. A

message arrived informing him that a Union signal station had intercepted an enemy

message transmitted to Early at Fisher’s Hill. Federal signal operators, in possession of

the Confederate signal code, quickly deciphered the intercept, which read: "Be ready to

advance on Sheridan as soon as my forces get up, and we can crush him before he finds

out I have joined you." The message was signed "J. Longs treet."^^ Since this new

information ran contrary to what his intelligence sources had told him, Sheridan asked

356 Halleck if Grant possessed anything that might shed light on the subject. Halleck replied that Grant believed Longstreet was indeed heading for the valley but that he "brought with him no troops from Richmond." Perhaps remembering Grant's intelligence failure during Early's raid, the chief of staff remarked that he had "very little confidence in the information collected at his headquarters." To be safe, Sheridan canceled a scheduled cavalry raid and urged his army to remain vigilant. Feeling "confident of good results" even if the intercept proved true, the valley commander hastened to Washington to keep his appointment.^

In reality, Longstreet had not joined Early, nor had Lee reinforced the valley army. The signal dispatch was a ruse perpetrated by Early to prevent Sheridan from siphoning off his army to the Richmond theater. Knowing that the Fédérais were reading his signal traffic. Early planted this information to fool his opponent. But Sheridan failed to be taken in by the subterfuge and rode on toward the Federal capital. Despite the failure of his deception. Early taught Sheridan that even good strategic intelligence was no guarantee against tactical surprise. On October 19, the Confederate Army of the

Valley pounced upon the supposedly vigilant Union camps without warning and had won the day when Sheridan appeared, rallied his army, and drove the enemy from the field, sending the remnants fleeing up the Valley Pike.^^

Despite losing several engagements and a substantial portion of his army. Early somehow kept the remnants together and made a final stand in early March. After learning of Sheridan's advance toward Lynchburg in late February, the Confederates constructed defenses at Waynesboro on the Virginia Central and prepared to meet them.

Unfortunately for Early, Sheridan had learned all about Confederate deployments and their strength from a female spy in his employ. Guided by this information, on March 2 the Fédérais swept aside Early's tattered remnants with ease. The once feared Army of the Valley ceased to exist after that day, effectively ending the Valley Campaign of 1864.

357 Sheridan had finally destroyed Early's army and the valley they defended, leaving only a trail of smoke, the charred remains o f bams and mills, and the searing memory of "The

Burning" in the minds o f the Shenandoah's inhabitants.^^

Attempting to exorcise the ghosts of his earlier intelligence failure. Grant improved his intelligence system to prevent a repeat of the debacle of June and July.

Eventually, he and Sheridan reaped the rewards of their improved network and eventually isolated the valley, making it difficult-and costly—for Lee to shuttle troops between Richmond and Early's army. In early August, the BMI's timely discovery of

Kershaw's departure from Richmond and Young's even more timely discovery of its recall had a profound impact on the valley campaign. The news of Kershaw’s departure on September 15 presented Sheridan with an opportunity to attack a weakened foe, resulting in two major Confederate defeats. In both engagements, Kershaw’s presence might have tipped the balance in the Confederates' favor. In fact, one historian of the campaign contends that "had Joseph Kershaw's division been with the army. Early would have won at Winchester." Similarly, Early's troubles forced Lee to retum Kershaw’s command to the valley, leaving him without an entire veteran division at a time when he desperately needed all the men he could muster to blunt Grant's September 29-October 2 offensive.^^

The dual Union intelligence system developed by Grant and Sheridan provided quality information that led to Kershaw’s absence from both theaters at critical times.

This "misuse" of his division, argues historian Richard Sommers, "was one of the worst miscalculations [Lee] ever made." Stated another way. Grant's and Sheridan's "use" of

Kershaw—through the collection and utilization of good intelligence that ultimately denied Lee strategic mobility—was one of several important factors that doomed Jubal

Early and his Army o f the Valley.

358 NOTES

would like to thank John T. Hubbell and Kent State University Press for granting permission to reprint portions of my articles "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early’s Raid, June 12-July 14,1864." CWH 36 (September 1990): 209-225 and "Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865," Ibid., 39 (September 1993): 199-215. Halleck to USG, July 3, GE IT. 166; USG to Halleck, July 3,1864, Ibid. For Early’s raid, see Frank E. Vandiver, Jubal’s Raid: General Early’s Famous Attack on Washington in 1 &64 (New York: McGraw-Hill, I960) and B. F. Cooling, Jubal Early’s Raid on Washington. 1864 (Baltimore, Md.: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., 1989).

-Vandiver, Jubal’s Raid. 6,20; USG to Halleck, July 5, 1864, GE IT 170. Cooling, Early’s Raid on Washington. 40-41; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 600.

^USG to Meade, June 5, 1864, QE 11:21; USG to Hunter, June 6,1864, Ibid., 24; Dowdey and Manarin, eds.. Wartime Papers. 767; Clifford Dowdey, Lee’s Last Campaign: The Story of Lee and His Men Against Grant. 1864 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1960), 308-309; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 297.

"'Dowdey and Manarin, eds.. Wartime Papers. 774-75; Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography. 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934-35), 3:401.

^Special Order No. 139, June 4,1864, Q E 34, pt. 3: 873-74; Jubal Anderson Early, War Memoirs: Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative o f the War Between the States, ed. Frank E. Vandiver (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1960), 371-72,331.

^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 309-310.

^Freeman, R. E. Lee, 3:401; Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Dispatches: Unpublished Letters o f General Robert E. Lee. C. S. A. to Jefferson Davis (New York: G. P. Pumam’s Sons, 1915), 240-41; Dowdey and Manarin, Wartime Papers. 772; Early, War Memoirs. 371.

^Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2:288; Dowdey, Lee’s Last Campaign. 316; Catton, Grant Takes Command 280-83; Itineraries, Army of the Potomac and Army of the James, OR 40, pt. 1: 178-218.

^Cooling, Early’s Raid on Washington. 10-12; USG to Butler, June 14, 1864, GE IT 45; Dowdey and Manarin, Wartime Letters. 791; Early, Memoirs. 372; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 281.

359 *®Sharpe to Humphreys, June 17, 1864, OR 40, pt. 2: 119; Sharpe to Humphreys, June 18,1864, Ibid., 159-60; Sharpe to Humphreys, June 18,1864, Ibid., 158-59.

• 'USG to Halleck, June 17, 1864, G E11:67; USG to Halleck, June 19, 1864, Ibid., 130.

•^McEntee to Sharpe, April 17, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA.

^^McEntee to Sharpe, April 18, 1864, Ibid.; McEntee to Sharpe, May 3, 1864, Ibid.

^^McEntee to Sharpe, May 20, 1864, Ibid.; McEntee to Sharpe, May 24, 1864, Ibid.

'^McEntee to Sharpe, May 7, 1864, Ibid.; McEntee to Sharpe, May 20, 1864, Ibid.

^ ^McEntee to Sharpe, May 24,1864, Ibid.

•^Vandiver, Jubal's Raid. 43; Hunter to Adjutant General, U. S. Army, August 8, 1864, QR37,pt. 1:99.

•^Hunter to Adjutant General, U. S. Army, August 8,1864, Ibid., 101-102.

^^iary of Capt. W. W. Old, Jubal Anderson Early Papers, Rice University, Houston, Texas; Vandiver, Jubal's Raid. 57-58,142-47.

^^Sharpe to Humphreys, June 20,1864, OR 40, pt. 2:235; Sharpe to Humphreys, June 21, 1864, Ibid., 271; Meade to USG, June 21, 1864, G E11: 102; Butler to USG, June 23, 1864, Ibid., 113; Sharpe to Humphreys, June 24, 1864. OR 40. pt. 2:375-76.

Hunter to Adjutant General, U. S. Army, June 28, 1864, Ibid., 37, pt. 1:683-84; McEntee to Sharpe, June 28, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, Army of the Potomac, NA.

-^Hancock to Williams, July 1, 1864, QR 40, pt. 2: 566; Halleck to USG, July 1, 1864, GEll: 154; USG to Halleck, July 1, 1864, Ibid., 153.

-^John W. Garrett to Stanton, June 29, 1864, OR 37, pt. 1:694-95.

^'’Sigel to Adjutant General, U. S. Army, July 2, 1864, QR 37, pt. 1: 174-75; Garrett to Stanton, July 3, 1864, Ibid., pt. 2: 17; Sigel to Adjutant General, U. S. Army, July 3, 1864, Ibid., pt. 1: 175-76; Garrett to Stanton, July 3, 1864, Ibid., pt. 2: 16.

25u SG to Meade, July 3,1864, GEll: 167; Meade to USG, July 3,1864, Ibid.; USG to Halleck, July 3, 1864, Ibid.

^^Sharpe to Humphreys, July 4, 1864, QR 40, pt. 2:620; USG to Halleck, July 4, 1864, GEll: 169.

360 ^^Sharpe to Humphreys, June 20, 1864, QR 40, pt. 2:235; Sharpe to Humphreys, June 21, 1864, Ibid., 271; Sharpe to Humphreys, June 24,1864, Ibid., 375-76; Sharpe to Humphreys, July 4, 1864, Ibid., 620; Sharpe to Humphreys, July 6,1864, Ibid., pt. 3; 37- 38.

2»USG to Halleck, July 5, 1864, QE 11: 169; USG to Halleck, July 5, 1864, Ibid., 170; USG to Halleck, July 6,1864, Ibid., 178; Capt. Ely S. Parker to Leet, July 9, 1864, William R. Rowley Papers, ISHL.

F. Cooling, Symbol. Sword, and Shield: Defending Washington during the Civil War (Hamden. Conn.: Archon Books, 1975), 192; Wallace to Col. E. D. Townsend, [n.d.], QR37, pt. 1: 195; Vandiver, Jubal’s Raid. 112,161-64; USG to Halleck, July 9, 1864, QE 11: 197-98.

^%SG to Lincoln, July 10,1864, QE 11: 201; Vandiver, Jubal's Raid. 172.

^'Meade to USG, July 12, 1864, QE 11:225; USG to Halleck, July 13, 1864, Ibid., 233; Wilson, Rawlins. 244; USG to Hurlbut, February 27,1863, Ibid., 7:361. For examples of BMI Order of Battle tabulations, see "Index of the Army of Northern Virginia," John C. Babcock Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D. C. (henceforth LC); "Organization of the Rebel Army of N. Va," May 10,1863, Miscellaneous Civil War Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, N. C.

^^Halleck to USG, July 19,1864, QE II: 286-87; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 603.

^^Gary W. Gallagher, ed.. Struggle for the Shenandoah: Essays on the 1864 Valley Campaign (Kent, Oh.: Kent State University Press, 1991), 11; Jeffry Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 (Carlisle, Pa.: South Mountain Press, 1987), 8; Lee to Davis, June 29, 1864. OR 37. pt. 1: 769-70; Lee to Davis, July 11, 1864, Ibid., pt. 2: 594-95.

3^Dana to USG, July 12,1864, QE 11:252-53.

^%SG to Sherman, August 7, 1864, Ibid., 381; USG to Meade, August 1, 1864, 368; Special Orders No. 68, August 2, 1864, Ibid., 369; USG to Halleck, August 1,1864, Ibid., 358; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 29.

^®For Patrick, see David S. Sparks, "General Patrick's Progress: Intelligence and Security in the Army o f the Potomac," Civil War History 10 (December 1964): 371-84; David S. Sparks, ed.. Inside Lincoln's Army: The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. Provost Marshal General. Army of the Potomac (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1964), 392-93, 382.

361 ^^Gallagher, éd.. Struggle for the Shenandoah. II; Dowdey and Manarin, eds.. Wartime Papers. 818-20; USG to Sheridan, September 2, 1864, QE 12: 181; USG to Meade, July 30, 1864, Ibid., 11: 352; Sparks, ed.. Inside Lincoln's Army. 400-401.

^^Babcock to Sharpe, August 21,1864, RG 393, entry 3980, NA; Babcock to Sharpe, August 27, 1864, Ibid.; Babcock to Sharpe, September 5,1864, Ibid. For more on Silver, Cammack, and McGee, see Fishel, Secret War. See also Meriwether Stuart, "Colonel Ulric Dahlgren and Richmond's Union Underground," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 72 (April 1964): 197-98. (henceforth VMHB^

^^orter. Campaigning With Grant, 34; Sharpe to Andrew A. Humphreys, September 15, 1864, QR42, pt. 2: 382-83; Babcock to Sharpe, September 5,1864, RG 393, entry 3980, NA.

"*®For Grant's and newspapers, see Maslowski, "Military Intelligence Sources," 48-49.

"^^Fishel, Secret War. 551-55; Stuart, "Dahlgren," 153-204. Examples of Van Lew's transmissions are found in the Elizabeth Van Lew Papers, New York Public Library (NYPL), New York; RG 393, entry 3980, box 9, NA. See also David D. Ryan, ed., A Yankee Spy in Richmond: The Civil War Diary of "Crazy Bet" Van Lew (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1996). For Ruth's activities, see U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Samuel Ruth, W. F. E. Lohman. and Charles M. Carter. 43d Cong., 1st sess., 1874, H. Rept. 792 (Serial 1627); and Idem., F. W. E. Lohman. Samuel Ruth. Deceased, and Charles M. Carter. 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1876, H. Rept. 823, (Serial 1716).

"^^Lecture by George H. Sharpe, Harlem Congregational Church, Kingston, N.Y., Van Lew Papers, NYPL; Sharpe to Cyrus Comstock, January, 1867, Ibid.

^^Meri wether Stuart, "Samuel Ruth and General Robert E. Lee: Disloyalty and the Line of Supply to Fredericksburg, 1862-1863." VMHB 71 (January 1963): 90-101. For Ruth's description of his service, see Ruth to Stanton, December 21,1865, Samuel Ruth File, box 2, Hillyer Papers, UVaL. See also Angus J. Johnston, II, "Disloyalty on Confederate Railroads in Virginia." VMHB 63 (October 1955): 418-22. Grant's endorsement o f the three petitioners is in H. Rept. 792, 1874, (Serial 1627). Examples of Ruth's messages can be found in RG 393, entry 3980, box 9, NA.

'^Sheridan to USG, August 6, 1864, GE. II: 380; Sheridan, Memoirs. 2: 1; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 317-18.

"^^Sheridan's "Report of Activities in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864-65," (henceforth "Activities in the Shenandoah"), RG 108, entry 32, Correspondence on Various Subjects of Special Concern to Army Headquarters, 1863-99, box 9, NA.

362 more on Young, see William Gilmore Beymer, On Hazardous Service: Scouts and Spies of the North and South rNew York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1912), 100-132; Henry Edwin Tremain. Last Hours of Sheridan's Cavalry (New York: Bonnell, Silver, & Bowers, 1904), 97-101.

"^^Sheridan, Memoirs. 2: 1-2; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 40.

"^*Ibid., 33-34, 38; Grant, Personal Memoirs, 2:216-17; Lee to Davis, August 4, 1864, Ü&42, pt. 2: 1161.

"^^abcock to Humphreys, August 8, 1864, QR 40, pt. 2: 86; Sharpe to Lt. Col. Theodore S. Bowers, August 9,1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Bowers to Leet, August 10, 1864, G E 11: 395.

^®Butler to USG, August 10, 1864, QR 40, pt. 2: 106-107; Babcock to Sharpe, August 11, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA; Leet to Bowers, August 11,1864, OP 11: 402; USG to Meade, August 11,1864, QR40, pt. 3: 115; USG to Halleck, August 11, 1864, 11:401.

^^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 360; "Activities in the Shenandoah," RG 108, entry 32, box 9, NA; Sheridan, Memoirs. 2:478-81; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 34-35.

^“USG to Sheridan, August 9,1864, G E 11: 388; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 321-22; Sharpe to Babcock, August 12, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA; Lt. John 1. Davenport to Sharpe, August 12, 1864, Ibid.; USG to Halleck, August 14,1864, GE H: 415-16; USG to Sheridan, August 14, 1864, Ibid., 420.

^^USG to Meade, August 17, 1864, GE 12:21-22; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2:323-26; USG to Sheridan, August 21,1864, GE 12: 54,96-97.

^■^Sharpe to Bowers, September 1, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, box I, NA; USG to Sheridan, September I, 1864, GE 12: 118; Lt. Frederick L. Manning to Sharpe, September 1, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Babcock to Sharpe, September 1, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA.

^^Manning to Sharpe, September 6, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Sharpe to Babcock, August 25,1864, Babcock Papers, LC; USG to Sheridan, September 6,1864, GE 12:133; Sharpe to Bowers, September 7,1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; McEntee to Sharpe, GE 12: 133; Sheridan to USG, September 8, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA.

363 ^^Early had around 14,000 men compared to Sheridan's 40,000. Gallagher, ed.. Struggle for the Shenandoah, 47; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 26,30-31,38-40; Sheridan, Memoirs, 2:499-500; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 327-28.

^^Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 40-42; Sheridan, Memoirs. 2; 2-6.

5*Ibid., 5,9; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2; 328; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 363; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 43.

^^eport of James P. Simms, Kershaw's Division, December, 1864, OR 43. pt. 1; 589-90; Sheridan, Memoirs. 2: 11-32; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek, 47-116; USG to Sheridan, September 22,1864, QE. 12; 191; USG to Sheridan, September 23,1864, QR. 43, pt. 2: 152.

^®USG to Sheridan, August 26,1864, GE 12:96-97; Sheridan to USG, October 7, 1864, OR 43, pt. 1: 30-31; Sheridan to USG, November 27, 1864, Ibid., 37-38; Gallagher, ed.. Struggle forthe-Shenandoah,11,67; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek. 167-72.

^^For a detailed examination of Grant's "Fifth Offensive," see Richard Sommers, Richmond Redeemed: The Siege o f Petersburg tNew York: Doubleday, 1981).

^^Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek, 134; Dowdey and Manarin, eds.. Wartime Papers, 847-50; Babcock to Sharpe, September 30, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA; Leet to USG, October 2,1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Early, War Memoirs. 435; USG to Halleck, September 30, 1864, GE 12: 242; Sommers, Richmond Redeemed. 421.

^^Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek, 161-66. For the intercepted dispatch, see Brown, The Signal Corps. 213; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 338; Sheridan, Memoirs. 62-65; Sheridan to Halleck, October 16, 1864, OR 43, pt. 2:386.

^Sheridan to Halleck, October 16, 1864, Ibid., 386.

^^Wert, Winchester tO.Cgdar Creek, 177-238; Gallagher, ed.. Struggle for the Shenandoah. 33-39,67-74.

^^Early, War Memoirs. 462-63; Sheridan, Memoirs. 2: 115-116; Activities in the Shenandoah, RG 108, entry 32, box 9, NA; Wert, Winchester to Cedar Creek, 250-51.

^^Ibid., 10. Kershaw's subsequent battlefield performance lends credence to Wert's view. See Dowdey and Manarin, eds.. Wartime Papers. 847-50, 853-63; Sommers, Richmond Redeemed. 421.

68lbid., 421-22.

364 CHAPTER 11

THE LAST CAMPAIGNS: PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX

Although the Shenandoah Valley had become a key concern for Grant after his

move south of the James River, his most pressing problem remained the siege of

Richmond and Petersburg. He had vowed to "fight it out" all summer, but the

approaching elections and the growing perception that the recent campaign had failed

made Grant more anxious to defeat Lee. His main objectives were to pin the Army of

Northern Virginia within its works and prevent the detachment of troops to the valley or

to Georgia, continue the destruction of the city's already diminished lines of

communication, force Lee to exhaust his thinning manpower, and, more importantly,

exploit any opportunities or weaknesses the enemy might present. To accomplish these

goals, especially the search for chinks in Lee's armor, ascertaining the dispositions and

movements of Lee's army along its interior lines became of utmost importance. Once

again, the BMI's knowledge of Lee's order of battle and their ability to track his

movements through prisoners and deserters would prove invaluable.

As the two opposing armies settled into their trenches in mid-June, Grant

continued operating against Lee's logistical lifelines and sought opportunities to crack his

seemingly impregnable defenses. On June 22 he sent forces south and west of Petersburg to cut the Weldon and threaten another crucial supply link, the Southside Railroad.

Although the offensive fell short of the railroads, it forced Lee to extend his right flank to compensate. * After Early's withdrawal from Washington's suburbs in mid-July, the

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M ap 1 0 general in chief tried again to find and exploit any weak points, even though somewhat

impaired by the departure of the Sixth Corps and the loss of the Nineteenth Corps to

Washington. On July 25, Grant proposed sending Sheridan's cavalry north o f the James

to destroy the rail connections north of Richmond, especially the Virginia Central. At the

same time, Hancock's corps would demonstrate against the Richmond defenses and

protect Sheridan's rear. Grant hoped that Hancock might "surprise the little garrison of

Citizen soldiery now in Richmond and get in." If that failed, however, he believed that

Hancock's demonstration might at least "force them to weaken Petersburg so that we can

take it" with the Union forces south of the James. Once underway. Grant advised Meade, whose army was opposite Petersburg, to remain vigilant and prepared "to take advantage of any movement of the enemy" away from his front.^

Once Lee detached troops to the north bank of the James, Grant hoped to punch through the enemy's Petersburg defenses and capture the town. To facilitate this, the general in chief planned to create a hole in the enemy's defenses before the assault commenced. In early July Burnside had proposed digging a tunnel underneath

Confederate lines, filling it with explosives, and setting it off. The resulting explosion, in theory, would create a gap in the enemy's defenses large enough for Union troops to charge through, overcome their dazed opponents, and seize Petersburg. This plan depended heavily upon the success of Hancock's and Sheridan's diversion north of the

James, which would result in Lee's weakening of his Petersburg lines. The burden of discovering whether or not the enemy commander had risen to the bait fell primarily upon Sharpe, Babcock, and the BMI.^

On July 26 Grant revealed that Sharpe's bureau was performing well. "Deserters come in every day enabling us to keep track of every change the enemy makes," he informed Halleck. In addition, Meade forwarded a report from Babcock containing important information on the layout of Lee's Petersburg defenses. From a deserter

367 Babcock learned that "there is no second line o f works to the rear... between their

present line and Petersburg." In fact, he added, "This is the repeated statement of all

deserters" from the enemy corps opposite Burnside's lines. This intelligence revealed that

Meade's engineers, who believed a key impediment to the success of the mine was the

presence of another line of entrenchments behind the first, were misinformed, meaning

the Burnside's attack force had a clear path to Petersburg after breaching the front line."^

From this and other reports. Grant concluded that his plan stood an excellent chance of

success. "[T]he enemy," he wrote, appeared to be "looking for a formidable attack either

from Bermuda [Butler] or north of the James and... will detach from Petersburg heavily

to prevent its success." As Hancock and Sheridan crossed the James on the night of July

26, the general in chief remained sanguine that Lee would leave Petersburg vulnerable in

order to protect the capital. The key to success, however, lay in Grant's—and the BMI's—

ability to determine when those detachment were enroute.^

Meeting heavy opposition, Hancock's demonstration against the Richmond

defenses and Sheridan's raid fell short of their objectives the following day. But Lee had

swallowed the bait. "The enemy evidently became very sensitive over our move to the

North bank," Grant wrote late on July 28, "and have been moving to meet it ever since

they discovered it." The same day Babcock and Sharpe questioned deserters who

claimed that brigades from different Confederate divisions had departed Petersburg and

moved north. Hancock found further corroboration from an "intelligent prisoner" who

claimed that most of Longstreefs and Hill's corps had already crossed the James. A

bureau agent fresh from Richmond also reported that at least two divisions had marched

north from Petersburg and that most citizens believed an attack on the capital to be

immanent.^ Based upon this information, by July 29 Meade and Grant had concluded that only three divisions—one from Hill's corps and two from Beauregard's city garrison-

368 remained south of the James. With five-eights of Lee's infantry on the north bank, Lee

had only three divisions to defend over five miles of entrenchments along the Petersburg

front. ^

With the enemy "evidently piling up everything" in the Richmond vicinity. Grant

moved to seize Petersburg. A little before 5 a m. on July 30 Burnside's mine exploded, vaporizing a large section of the Confederate line and the men who manned it, creating an enormous crater one hundred and seventy feet long, fifty feet wide, and thirty feet deep. Shocked Confederates further down the lines abandoned their positions seeking safety, leaving a gap nearly a quarter of a mile wide for the attacking Fédérais to exploit.

Despite this rare opportunity, Burnside's assault sputtered due to poor leadership, lack of coordination, and the dogged determination of the Confederates who eventually turned the crater into a death trap for the Union soldiers plunging through the gap. By mid- morning Grant called off the attack and the Southerners regained control of their lines.

The so-called Battle of the Crater was a disastrous failure for the Fédérais. All the good intelligence, planning, and destruction caused by the mine had amounted to nothing.

"Such an opportunity for carrying fortifications 1 have never seen and do not expect to have again," wrote an embittered Grant. And the siege continued.^

Between August 6 and October 2 Grant remained occupied with tracking the movements of Southern troops between the valley and Richmond, attacking Lee's lines north and south of the James to prevent further detachments, and stretching enemy lines as much as possible.^ Although failing to crack Lee's defenses, he had extended his lines across the Weldon railroad, edged closer to the Southside, and captured Fort Harrison, a key Confederate stronghold north of the James. After another attempt to sever the

Southside failed at Hatcher's Run in late October, large-scale operations around

369 Richmond and Petersburg ground to a halt until the following spring. During the winter of 1864-65, the BMI kept busy monitoring Lee's army and observing other activities behind enemy lines.

Believing that Sheridan had crushed Early and that Lee desperately needed troops to man his ever-lengthening lines. Grant and the BMI awaited the return of the

Confederate valley command. In early November evidence surfaced indicating that Lee had indeed recalled the depleted Second Corps, still hurting from their defeat at Cedar

Creek. On November 18 Sharpe learned from the Richmond underground that all rolling stock on the Virginia Central had been sent toward the valley to retrieve Early's men.

Two days later the BMI chief informed Grant that Kershaw's division had returned. "The fact of it's return," commented Rawlins the same day, " is undoubted" because some of

Kershaw's men had visited the Petersburg markets upon their return and "one of our agents[,] a market man[,] had his stall robbed by them." The agent in question probably needed little urging to determine the identity of the culprits and, in doing so, discovered valuable information. * *

In early December Early began returning the rest of his forces to Lee. Two of

Second Corps three infantry divisions, under Major General John B. Gordon and

Brigadier General John Pegram, departed for Richmond on December 7. McEntee soon heard through a Richmond spy about the arrival of "the greater part of Early's command." Four days later—at the same time the two units were trudging into

Richmond—Grant wired Sheridan that "there is no doubt but that all of Gordon's and

Pegram's divisions are here." The general in chief now knew that Early had but one

Second Corps infantry division remaining. On December 19, however, a Richmond spy— with amazing accuracy-brought news that this last division, under Brigadier General

Bryan Grimes, had also returned from the valley, leaving Early with remnants of

Breckinridge's command and assorted cavalry units. Ironically, the same Confederate

370 corps that had befuddled Grant for nearly a month the previous summer now returned under the watchful eyes of the BMI. A sa result o f these reductions, the once-feared

Confederate Army of the Valley eventually crumbled under Sheridan's assault at

Waynesboro in March, 1865.

In addition to tracking the Second Corps' return, the BMI also sought intelligence concerning the morale of Confederate soldiers and civilians behind the siege lines.

Aided by the Richmond underground, with whom Sharpe had regular contact, the BMI tapped into the psychological condition of the enemy military and civilian population to measure their will to continue the war. For example, on March 19, 1865, Sharpe reported news from Richmond agents who indicated that Southern resolve had hit bottom. A week earlier, Sheridan, on his way back to join Grant, had skirmished with

Confederate forces north of Richmond, causing great consternation in the city. "When the alarm-bells were rung last week in Rich[mond] for citizens to turn out (on Sheridan's account)," claimed the Union agents, "only some 20 appeared with guns." This lackluster response, they continued, was viewed by many as indicative "of the general abandonment of the cause.

The Richmond agents, in particular Van Lew and Ruth, also kept Grant apprised of Confederate government activities, the price o f gold, flour, and other important commodities, the availability of food, and passed along newspapers and other correspondence. Van Lew revealed the dire circumstances in the city during the winter when she wrote that "we are all in an awful situation here. There is great want of food."

On February 8 another Richmond agent claimed that failure of the recent peace negotiations (i.e., the unsuccessful Hampton Roads Conference held five days earlier)

"although used by the war party to arouse the people, is having a veiy depressing effect generally." As evidence, he noted that food and gold prices, which had been falling, were again rising as a result of the abortive negotiations. Another message told of Jefferson

371 Davis' preparations for leaving the city if it fell, and included a catalog o f "some portions of his household effect[s]... sold at private auction." As for the determination of the soldiers defending Richmond, another spy informed Grant not to worry since the local defense forces guarding the city "are prepared to run."*^

Another concern of the BMI in early 1865 was the possible evacuation of

Richmond. To detect such a movement. Grant had the bureau watch Lee's movements for any signs o f a withdrawal to that the Fédérais could "pitch into him" before he escaped. Rumors to that effect had been circulating since January and, as a result,

Sharpe directed Samuel Ruth to question employees of the Richmond & Danville

Railroad (R & D) to find the truth. Although Ruth's investigation revealed that the

Confederates were indeed preparing for an evacuation, Sharpe reached the opposite conclusion. Based on information from "the best informed of our friends in Richmond" and aware of the political ramifications of relinquishing the city, the BMI chief concluded that the city "will not be evacuated because it is the capital o f the

Confederacy, and so long as they retain their capital, they are as much of a country as they have ever been." Nevertheless, Van Lew and Ruth remained alert for any sign of a retreat from Richmond.

Perhaps the most interesting concern for the BMI in the winter of 1865 was the prospect that the Confederacy might recruit and arm black slaves to fight for Southern independence. Davis had advocated the recruitment of blacks for service in the

Confederate armies since November, 1864, and the following March the Confederate

Congress, after much argument, passed a bill authorizing the use of slaves as soldiers.

Three days after the House passed the bill, Sharpe wrote to Bowers and provided a fascinating analysis on how black Confederate troops might be employed. If the enemy placed 50,000 black troops in the Richmond-Petersburg lines, Sharpe observed, the enemy could maintain their grip on these key points while freeing the white troops "for

372 supporting and aggressive movements." To prevent this, the colonel proposed that the

Fédérais disorganize and destroy the black regiments "before, by habit, discipline and experience with arms, they shall have grown to that aptitude of a soldier which will bring them to obey orders under any circumstances." He recommended recruiting blacks from the Union ranks to infiltrate the new Confederate regiments, spread disaffection, and foment mass desertion in the hopes of "bring[ing] them over in bodies to us." Although the Confederate experiment failed and Sharpe's plan remained on paper, to the end of the war the BMI monitored Southern efforts to recruit and train their slaves.

In early March officials in Washington again raised the possibility that Lee might again detach a force to threaten the Federal capital without Grant's knowledge. But the general in chief calmly replied that Lee no longer had that option. First, Lee could ill- afford to detach troops because, at present, he had barely enough men to defend points

"necessaiy for the very existence of his Army." Grant also believed that the Army of

Northern Virginia could not move for fear of mass desertions by its demoralized soldiers.

"A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men even if we did not follow," he predicted. More importantly, he continued, "The great number of deserters and refugees coming in daily enables us to learn if any considerable force starts off almost... as soon as it starts." Revealing his abundant faith in Sharpe's bureau. Grant stated confidently that Lee "could not send off any large body without my knowing it." As far as intelligence was concerned. Grant had come a long way since those dark days in

June.

The Confederate commander's plans, however, focused more upon surprising

Grant outside Richmond than on another invasion of the North. On March 25 Lee assaulted Fort Stedman hoping that Grant would have to shorten his own lines to plug the gap. The Confederates captured the fort but Federal counterattacks eventually drove them back with serious loss. Lee had gone on the offensive for the last time. Grant

373 apparently had no forewarning of the attack as the bureau apparently missed the concentration of over 18,000 troops in the vicinity of Colquitt's Salient, the origination point o f the attack. Content that Lee possessed little offensive punch and that his men were "demoralized and deserting very fast," Grant was consumed with his own plans when the attack occurred.'^ Also distracting him was the possibility—fostered by intelligence coming out of Richmond—that Lee might slip away and unite with Joseph E.

Johnston's army facing Sherman in North Carolina. Grant's perceptions smashed against reality when the Confederates attacked Fort Stedman. But sensing that the Confederacy had drawn its final breath, the general in chief took Lee's last bold gamble in stride.-^

Typical of his generalship, after Fort Stedman Grant chose to seize the initiative and crush Lee before he joined Johnston, thereby precluding a "long, tedious and expensive campaign" to defeat their combined armies. Fearing that he might awake to find the Confederates gone, he ordered Sheridan to outflank the enemy position south and west of Petersburg and cut the railroad connections with North Carolina, thereby preventing "the rapid concentration of Lee's and Johnston's Armies."^* On April 1

Sheridan punched through the Confederate right at Five Forks and moved toward the

Confederate rear. The next day the Fédérais attacked along the entire front and finally overwhelmed the defenders. Facing disaster, Lee evacuated Richmond and Petersburg that night. With the roads illuminated by the fires raging in the capital, the Army of

Northern Virginia marched toward an unknown.-^

In the early evening of April 2 AGAR headquarters received the first news of the impending evacuation and the next morning the Fédérais began their pursuit. Lee's objective remained unclear, but Grant surmised that he would probably head toward

Danville via Burkeville, a major depot on the R & D railroad. If Lee reached Danville, he would be that much closer to Johnston. In fact, Grant warned Sherman about that possibility, noting that "It is reported here that Johnston has evacuated Raleigh and is

374 moving up to join Lee." From an earlier intelligence report, however. Grant knew that the enemy had constructed fortifications along the R & D at Amelia Court House. This

led him to conclude that Lee would first "make a stand" there to protect his southern escape route as well as the connection with Lynchburg.-^ Intelligence reported the following day altered this assessment somewhat. A railroad engineer reported that

Jefferson Davis and his cabinet had passed through Burkeville a day earlier bound for

Danville. More importantly, the informant saw two trainloads of supplies heading for

Farm ville, which he claimed was Lee's immediate destination before turning south to

Danville. Armed with this information. Grant ordered Sheridan's cavalry to intercept the enemy.

Although Grant believed that Farm ville was Lee's objective on April 4, his assessment proved premature. Not until the following day did the Confederate commander reach that decision and march his troops in that direction. Lee reached

Amelia Court House on April 4 and expected to find trains loaded with rations waiting for his hungry men. Finding the tracks empty, the Confederates remained in the vicinity until the next day foraging for bacon and com. But Lee he soon discovered that Federal troops had reached Jetersville, halfway between Burkeville and Amelia Court House on the R & D, blocking his path to Danville. Changing his objective, Lee marched for

Farm ville later that evening, hoping to cross the Appomattox River, bum the bridges, and reach Lynchburg, where ample supplies and an opportunity to rest and regroup awaited them.-^

Contrary to Grant's April 4 appraisal regarding Farm ville as the Confederate objective, Sheridan's scouts had discerned that the enemy was actually concentrating at

Amelia Court House. Moreover, Sheridan had captured orders from Lee's commissary general directing that supplies be sent from Lynchburg and Danville to Burkeville, a strong indication that Lee intended to move toward the latter depot along the R & D. To

375 prevent their escape by this route, on April 4 Union cavalry and three infantry corps cut

the R & D at Jetersville and waited for the enemy to advance toward its supplies. The

following morning Sheridan ordered a cavalry reconnaissance to determine whether the

Confederates, with their path to Burkeville and Danville blocked, were escaping toward

Farm ville instead. The patrol confirmed that Lee had indeed chosen this course and

Union forces rushed toward the town. On April 6, several miles west of Farm ville,

Sheridan's cavalry and elements of the Sixth Corps intercepted and overwhelmed part of

Lee's column at Saylor’s Creek, capturing around 6000 prisoners and several high-ranking

Confederate officers. Although the rest of Lee's army reached the Appomattox River safely, Sheridan's scouts, effective cavalry reconnaissance, and a spirited pursuit had resulted in a stunning victory that helped seal the fate o f the Confederacy.^^

Despite the losses at Saylefs Creek and from straggling and desertion, Lee pressed on toward Lynchburg. Once again, Sheridan moved to block his escape, selecting Appomattox Station, near the village of Appomattox Court House, as the place to position his forces accomplish that end. The cavalry commander chose that location based on the report of Sergeant James White, one of Young's scouts, who saw four trainloads of supplies waiting for Lee at the station. On April 7 Sheridan's cavalry moved quickly toward the station and captured the trains, burning one and sending the other three toward Farmville out of Lee's reach. Soon Union infantry arrived and, by the following day, had Lee boxed in near Appomattox Court House. Seeing the road to

Lynchburg closed, and without enough strength to punch through Grant's encircling army,

Lee surrendered his army on April 9. The war was over^?

******

376 Throughout the Richmond-Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns, the intelligence provided by Sharpe's BMI and later Sheridan's scouts played a significant role in the defeat of Lee's army. The BMI's expertise at compiling order of battle intelligence from deserters and prisoners became an essential element in his overall strategy. Knowing the enemy's organization and possessing the ability to track its movements prevented Lee from utilizing both his operational and strategic interior lines.

Fortunately for Grant, the BMI—created while he was still in the West—specialized in that kind of information and, toward war’s end, helped him become not only a very successful commander, but the best informed as well.

377 NOTES

•Catton, Grant Takes Command. 296; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, 613.

^Catton, Grant Takes Command, 318-20; USG to Meade, July 25, 1864, GE 11:313-14.

^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 319-20.

“^USG to Halleck, July 26, 1864, GE 11:317;; Babcock to Humphreys, July 26, 1864, QR 40, pt. 3: 459.

% SG to Meade, July 26, 1864, GE 11: 322.

^USG to Halleck, July 28, 1864, Ibid., 332-331 Babcock to Humphreys, July 28, 1864, O R 40, pt. 3:556; Major General Winfield S. Hancock to Meade, July 28,1864, Ibid., 561-62; Sharpe to Rawlins, July 29, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA.

^Humphreys to Warren, July 29,1864, QR40, pt. 3:605. See also USG to Halleck, July 30, 1864, GE 11: 345; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 320.

% id., 320-25; USG to Halleck, August 1, 1864, GE 11:361.

^For this phase of Grant's intelligence operations, see Chapter 10.

‘^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 351, 366-67.

* * 'Sheridan, Memoirs. 2: 98; Dowdey and Manarin, Wartime Letters. 868; Sharpe to Bowers, November 18, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Rawlins to USG, November 20, 1864, GE 13: 13-14; USG to Sheridan, November 19,1864, Ibid., 5; Sharpe to Babcock, November 20, 1864, RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA.

'^USG to Sheridan, December 9, 1864, GE 13:95; USG to Sheridan, December 10, 1864, Ibid., 110.

'^Sharpe to Bowers, March 19, 1865, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA.

''^Van Lew to [unknown], March 15, [1865], RG 393, entry 3980, Box 9; Sharpe to Bowers, February 8, 1865, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Message of Unidentified Richmond Agent, n.d., RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA; Sharpe to Bowers, March 31, 1865, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA; Message of Unidentified Richmond Agent, n.d., RG 393, entry 3980, box 11, NA.

378 *^USG to Sherman, March 16, 1865, GE 14: 174; Sharpe to Bowers, February 23, 1864, RG 108, entry 112, box 1, NA.

* * ^Sharpe to Bowers, February 23, 1864, Ibid.

^^USG to Stanton, March 2, 1865, GE 14:83; USG to Sherman, March 16, 1865, Ibid., 175.

'^USG to Stanton, March 2, 1865, Ibid., 82; USG to Stanton, March 2, 1865, Ibid., 83.

^ ^ o ah Andre Trudeau, The Last Citadel: Petersburg. Virginia. June 1864-April 1865 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), 330-54; USG to Sherman, March 16, 1865, GE 14: 175; USG to Sherman, March 22,1865, Ibid., 203..

^ ^ S G to Meade, March 24, 1865, Ibid., 211-14; USG to Sheridan, March 21, 1865, Ibid., 196; Dana to USG, March 21, 1865, QR 46, pt. 3: 62.

21 USG to Stanton, June 20, 1865, GE 15: 198-99.

22Edwin C. Bearss and Chris Calkins. Battle of Five Forks ILyncburg. Va.; H. E. Howard, Inc., 1985), 73-113; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 444-45.; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 673.

2^USG to Meade, April 2, 1865, GE 14: 315-16; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 449-50; USG to Sherman, April 3, 1865, GE 14: 339; USG to Sheridan, April 3, 1865, Ibid., 336.

24u SG to Sheridan, April 4, 1865, Ibid., 344

2^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 450-53.

2^Starr, Union Cavalry. 2:463-73; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 453-54.

22starr, Union Cavalry. 2:477-82.

379 CONCLUSION

In many respects. Grant's experience with military intelligence reflected that of many Civil War commanders. His intelligence operations were mostly ad hoc affairs driven by necessity. And, until 1864, he had no specific organization charged with collecting, analyzing, and distributing information. From command of a regiment to command o f the Armies of the United States, Grant acted as his own intelligence officer.

As his command responsibilities grew, he delegated the collection and summarization of information, but never abdicated his prerogative as the final arbiter. Grant was also wary of the quality, reliability, timeliness, and relevance of the information he received, relying more upon his own personal judgment, perception, and intuition to guide decisions. Unlike some officers, he realized early on that even the best intelligence could not answer all questions nor dictate a course of action. In the Civil War, as Grant discovered, there were few substitutes for intuitive risk-taking.

In the West, Grant enjoyed enormous success despite lacking intelligence on several occasions. His victories resulted in part from his ability to "read" his opponents and anticipate their behavior. Polk, Pillow, and Floyd were easy marks. Albert Sidney

Johnston surprised him but Pemberton did not. Grant's boldness and penchant for doing the unexpected undoubtedly contributed to the timidity of his counterparts. Assessments of enemy morale also factored in to Grant's willingness to take risks. Throughout the

Western campaigns he constantly asserted that enemy soldiers were utterly demoralized

380 and deserting in droves, and that those still in the ranks would undoubtedly crumble in the next engagement. Even when he possessed little information to support that assessment, he never doubted it.

Grant reached a similar conclusion with regard to Lee's Army of Northern

Virginia in 1864, even though the Wilderness and Spotsylvania seemed to indicate otherwise. He placed Lee in the same catagory as Bragg and Pemberton and fully expected the Virginian to bend to his will. Due in part to limited intelligence, the

Vicksburg and Chattanooga Campaigns had been planned more or less in a vacuum with only minor emphasis placed on anticipating enemy responses. The initiative, determination, and "pressing on" had worked in Mississippi and Tennessee; he expected the same in Virginia.

But Lee was different. He possessed remarkable skill and a penchant for boldness that few Western Confederates could match. Much to Grant's embarrassment, Early's departure and subsequent appearance outside Washington, as well as the Confederates' stubborn defense of their capital, provided stark proof that Lee's reputation for cunning and audacity were well-earned and that the Overland Campaign had done little to curb it.

Clearly, Grant had to pay more attention to his adversary or suffer the consequences.

And with the November elections in the balance, the repercussions of another intelligence failure could prove disastrous for the Union. In order to neutralize the

Confederate general's key weapon—strategic and operational mobility—Grant grew more reliant upon intelligence and on the BMI to keep track of Lee's army. By April, 1865, the general in chief had at his disposal the most sophisticated military intelligence system of the war, and one that played a significant role in Lee's defeat.

"I tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world," Sherman wrote about Grant, "He don’t care a damn fo r what the enemy does out o f his sights but it scares me like hell!" [emphasis supplied]^ This simple statement perhaps comes closest to

381 describing Grant's perspective on military intelligence. What separated him from other

generals like Halleck, McClellan, Rosecrans, and Buell was his willingness to make

decisions and act with little or no intelligence. What these officers saw as an obstacle.

Grant viewed as an opportunity. As Sherman observed, "He uses such information as he

has according to his best judgment" and then "issues orders and does his level best to

carry them out without much reference to what is going on about him." This does not

denote disrespect for or an ignorance of this important command function. On the

contrary, as the previous chapters have shown. Grant's experience with intelligence

revealed that he understood uncertainty to be a constant in warfare, regardless of the

amount, or the accuracy, of information in one's possession. More importantly, he

understood that managing uncertainty was far more productive and more realistic than

waiting for "perfect" intelligence to eliminate it.

Though hazardous. Grant believed siezing and maintaining the initiative provided

the best hope for piercing the fog of war and finding opportunity. And since both sides

dealt with roughly equal unknowns, whomever advanced first tipped the scales of

uncertainty against the other. In 1861 Grant recognized that the enemy faced the same

problem o f finding the truth in an environment clouded by baseless rumors and

tantalizing gossip. Instead o f being paralyzed by a lack of information or conflicting

reports, he sought advantage in the initiative. Grant would have agreed with Clausewitz's observation on this point. "Given the same amount of intelligence," noted the theorist,

"timidity will do a thousand times more damage in war than audacity."^ Bold action

involved greater risks, but forcing the Confederates to respond increased their chances of committing a disastrous error.

The desire to transfer uncertainty to the enemy and to "try conclusions" drove

Grant's generalship throughout the war. Although he remained an avid consumer of information and understood its intrinsic value, he refused to view intelligence as a

382 panacea. He relied more on intelligence in 1861, probably to buttress his judgment and intuition. Paducah demonstrated the depth of his sagacity and validated his intuitive risk- taking approach. The Belmont campaign revealed that even good information meant little unless quickly translated into action. Forts Henry and Donelson, Vicksburg, and

Chattanooga seemed to validate his remarkable prescience and his confidence in the initiative as a substitute for intelligence. On the other hand, the frustrating experiences in

1862 at Shiloh, where overconfidence and a misreading of intelligence cost him his command, and in northern Mississippi demonstrated that relinquishing the initiative, even briefly, tipped the scale in the enemy's favor. The difficulty in tracking Confederate forces moving toward luka, Corinth, and Holly Springs convinced him even more that, without the benefits of the initiative, relying on intelligence alone courted disaster. By

1864-65, Grant had become convinced that the combination of the initiative and intelligence, especially if supplied by a sophisticated organization like the BMI, could prove decisive, even against Robert E. Lee.

383 NOTES

^Quoted in Preface, QE2; xix-xx.

^Clausewitz, On War, 191.

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Theses and Dissertations

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