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EXFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UM[ films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy, ffigher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 FINDING THE ENEMY: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, 1861-1865 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By William B. Feis, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1997 Dissertation Committee. Approved by Professor Allan R. Millett, Adviser Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr. Adviser Professor Mansel G. Blackford Department of History UMI Number: 9721093 Copyright 1997 by Feis, William Burhans All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9721093 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by William B. Feis /997 ABSTRACT "The art of war is simple enough," Ulysses S. Grant observed. "Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on. " This statement captures the essence of Grant's generalship during the Civil War. In the past, however, historians have focused primarily upon the "striking" and the "moving on" aspects of his generalship but have paid little attention to the most crucial ingredient in his recipe for success-finding the enemy. This dissertation addresses that shortcoming by examining how Grant obtained and used military intelligence during the Civil War. In the Western theater. Grant enjoyed enormous success despite lacking intelligence on several occasions. His victories resulted in part from his ability to "read" his opponents and anticipate their behavior. In the absence of intelligence, the initiative, determination, and "pressing on" worked well in Mississippi and Tennessee. However, in order to neutralize Robert E. Lee's key weapon—strategic and operational mobility-Grant had to adapt, becoming more reliant upon intelligence and on the Army of the Potomac's "Bureau of Military Information" to track the Confederate army. In 1864-65, Grant had at his disposal the most sophisticated military intelligence system of the war, and one that played a significant role in Lee's defeat. Grant’s experience with intelligence revealed that he understood uncertainty to be a constant in warfare. More importantly, he realized that managing uncertainty was far more productive and more realistic than waiting for "perfect" intelligence to eliminate it. ii During times when uncertainty prevailed. Grant turned to the initiative as a substitute for intelligence and as a means of piercing the fog of war. Although he remained an avid consumer of information and appreciated its intrinsic value, he refused to view intelligence as a panacea. By war’s end. Grant had become convinced that the combination of the initiative and intelligence could prove decisive, even against Robert E. Lee. Ill ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people played an indispensable role in helping to complete this dissertation. I give full credit to the people I am about to mention for the merits of this work, but I willingly shoulder the blame for all errors. First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor. Professor Allan R. Millett. He taught me a tremendous amount about the Civil War, military history, and the historical profession, but I am most thankful for the great friendship we developed while "campaigning" at Gettysburg, Camifex Ferry, Franklin and Nashville, and the Wilderness. A finer scholar and "pard" would be hard to find. Professor Peter Maslowski was the model of scholarship and professionalism that inspired me during my undergraduate and graduate days at the University of Nebraska- Lincoln. Together we discovered the world of Civil War military intelligence and came up with the idea to study Grant's use of intelligence. I believe the findings in this study have justified our early enthusiasm. I am also thankful for his friendship and advice. His faith in me helped transform my love of history from a hobby to a profession. To him I owe a considerable debt. Edwin C. Fishel, the dean of Civil War military intelligence, has been with me since the begirming of this project. His encyclopedic knowledge of intelligence matters during the war, and his mastery of the resources available at the National Archives made my research much easier. Moreover, his willingness to share ideas, research notes, and insights gained from decades of research is a model scholarly cooperation and iv selflessness. Most of all, the long research trips to Washington were always brightened by the many dinners shared with Ed and his wife Gladys at the Cosmos Club. Also deserving of high praise is Michael Musick and Micheal Meier of the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives. Their knowledge of the collections and their thoughts on where I might find intelligence-related material paid off handsomely. Their devotion to public service and to preserving American history is inspirational. E. Cheryl Schnirring of the Illinois State Historical Library also pointed me in many profitable directions. I would also like to thank the U. S. Army Center of Military History for a Dissertation Year Fellowship, the Ohio State Department of History for the Ruth Higgins Summer Fellowship, the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University for providing graduate assistantships at critical times, and Mrs. Cecile Guthrie for honoring me with the Gerry D. Guthrie Fellowship. The funds provided by these institutions and by Mrs. Guthrie allowed me to complete my research and pay the bills. I could never repay the enormous debt of gratitude I owe my parents, Gil and Polly Feis, my sister, Mary Christy, and my grandparents. Bill and Anne Doering and LaVeta Feis, for their steadfast support and endless faith . I would also like to thank my mother- and father-in-law, Sharon and Dick Bartholomew, for not only sharing their daughter, but also for making West Virginia my second home. My dear friends John Stull, Greg Keller, Steven Helm, Beth Russell, Joyce Grimes, and Suzanne Studer were always there for me. Their ability to brighten the endless days at the computer meant more to me than they could ever know. Finally, to my wife, best friend, and soulmate, Dixee Bartholomew-Feis, I owe everything. Her love, patience, and understanding, not to mention her exceptional editing skills, made this dissertation possible. VITA August 31, 1963 ..............................Bom - Franklin, Nebraska 1989.................................................. M.A. History, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 1996 - present.................................. Assistant Professor of History, Buena Vista University, Storm Lake, Iowa PUBLICATIONS 1. William B. Feis, "Intelligence Activities," in Steven E. Woodworth, ed.. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Research and Literature (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996). 2. William B. Feis, "Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865." Civil War History 39 (September 1993): 199-215. 3. William B. Feis, "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12-July 14, 1864." Civil War History (September 1990): 209-225. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History VI TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ...........................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................iv Vita ...................................................................................................................................vi List of M aps..................................................................................................................... ix Chapters; Introduction......................................................................................................................1 1. Early Intelligence Education: From West Point to M exico ...........................5 2. The First Test: Missouri,