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Summer-2013.Pdf Our 35th Anniversary Celebration was generously supported by these special Silent Auction Donors Harrison Hot Springs Resort & Gurvin Jewellers Julianna Torjek Spa Vancouver Canadians Pam Horton Elke Kite, BC Ferries Professional Baseball Club PJ Artman Krasicki and Ward Emergency Hair Today, North Vancouver Christine Gordon Preparedness Ltd. Sylvia Hotel, Vancouver Simon Cox, Technology for Heleen Pannekoek, Fort Berens Ivan Bilenki, University Golf Independent Living Estate Winery, Lillooet Club Lillian Wong Bard on the Beach Wayne Braid, Notary Bruce Godkin and William Diego Iribar Document Systems Foundation of BC Dickson (Ferndale Institution, Direct Valerie Thoem Mission) Mark McAndrews, Mount Dennis Robertson Jeanette Andersen Brenton Golf Course Robin Loxton Johanna Johnson Jon Goodridge, Space Salon Kevin Anderson and Tom Karen Martin Starbucks Coffee Company McGregor Judy Horton Fairmont Empress Hotel, Janis Walsh Anonymous Donor Victoria Nancy Hiew INSIDE SUMMER 2013 FEATURED ARTICLES SELECTED CONTENT REGULARS Editorial by Karen Martin ______ 4 Our 35th Anniversary Celebration Everyday Resilience: Social and Fundraiser ______________ 8 Connection Get Me Out of Here!® Emergency by Shelley Hourston _________ 22 Evacuation Program by Barbara Obituary | Ted Hobbs ________ 14 Purdy ______________________ 6 Advertise with BCCPD _______ 25 Emergency Planning Preparing for Decontamination Workshops ________________ 17 Planned Giving _____________ 29 by Laurie Pearce ____________ 10 New Resource for Local We’re Here to Help with Personal Preparedness Tips Governments ______________ 18 CPP Disability ______________ 31 and Resources______________ 12 ME/FM Awareness Day ______ 19 BCIT Expands Planning by Cheryl Sokol _____________ 15 Working Together at Kickstart 5 _________________ 23 Hurricane Sandy ____________ 15 Two Yellow Shirts Ambulance Service Using by Jill Stainsby ______________ 27 C-MIST ____________________ 17 Own Beautiful Art by The Japan Disability Forum PJ Artman _________________ 29 by Nicole Kiyooka ___________ 20 The Power of Hippotherapy ___ 30 Online E-Training: Workplace Emergency Planning _________ 24 Surrey Demonstrates Inclusive Emergency Planning by Tara Cleave ______________ 25 Frequently Asked Questions by Karen Martin ____________ 26 CANADIAN Publications MAIL Product SALES AGREEMENT NO.40051676 | ISSN 0842-5124 PAGE 4 TRANSITION MAGAZINE | SUMMER 2013 Editorial |BY KAREN MARTIN Whether at school, work or play, proactive in their own prepared- people with disabilities should ness as possible. have access to the same emer- There are also some links to gency information, notification, stories about people with disabili- evacuation, and response services ties and their experiences during and facilities as other members of Hurricane Sandy in New York in their community. In an emergency November 2012. They show the or disaster, no one should be left ongoing need for communities behind. and governments to work with BCCPD has been working since the disability community and to 2006 to ensure this access and plan for the needs of people with disabilities. inclusion for people with disabili- During Hurricane Irene in the ties in emergency planning and As we continue our work in emer- US, one-third of the population response in British Columbia and gency planning and response, affected used social media to let nationally. We have been educat- there are two key areas for consid- loved ones know they were safe. ing local governments, training eration. First, emergency commu- During the 2007 San Diego County community organizations, busi- nications and the growing use of fires, there were one million hits nesses and post-secondary institu- social media in disasters. Second, on Twitter. tions, and empowering individu- is the impacts of climate change als living with disabilities to be on the health and safety of people Twitter, Facebook and YouTube prepared. with disabilities. were used during earthquakes in the past few years in Chile, Haiti, This emergency preparedness edi- Using Social Media New Zealand and Japan. People tion of TRANSITION highlights some report on emergencies in real- Social media and new technolo- of the important work being done. time, from the streets. People gies are changing the face of Just as important, we provide created information about specific disaster communications. There people with tips on how to be locations–warnings, help requests, is a need to explore how social prepared and highlight some key environmental conditions, food media can be used to benefit resources that BCCPD has devel- and water shortages–which com- populations at high-risk during oped: handbooks, e-courses and plemented traditional media and emergencies, such as people with workshops. We want to encourage government reports. This powerful disabilities and seniors. people with disabilities to be as Just as important, we provide people with tips on how to be prepared and highlight some key resources that BCCPD has developed: handbooks, e-courses and workshops. We want to encourage people with disabilities to be as proactive in their own preparedness, as possible. BC COALITION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES BCCPD.BC.CA TRANSITION MAGAZINE | SUMMER 2013 PAGE 5 ABOUT TRANSITION Editorial Statement During Hurricane Irene in the US, one-third of the population The views and opinions expressed affected used social media to let loved ones know they were within the pages of TRANSITION are safe. During the 2007 San Diego County fires, there were one not necessarily those held by the total million hits on Twitter. membership or Board of Directors. The material presented is meant to tool needs to be used by com- and children); people living in be thought-provoking and to promote munities and emergency program poverty; and, those living in more dialogue. providers. densely populated urban areas, Planning Team often associated with greater envi- Jane Dyson, Shelley Hourston, The Impact of Climate ronmental exposure. Nicole Kiyooka, Ann Vrlak Change As you’ll see in this TRANSITION, Editor and Layout Ann Vrlak As Canada’s population grows we’re beginning to see the fruits of and climate change expands the our labour. Key organizations like Cover Design geographical range, frequency and the Justice Institute of BC, BC Insti- Fiona Gamiet intensity of many existing climate- tute of Technology, BC Ambulance related hazards, people’s expo- Service and others, are incorporat- Subscriptions and Ads sure to extreme weather events, ing disability-related perspectives TRANSITION is published four times a airborne or water-transmitted in their training programs and ser- year by BC Coalition of People with diseases, extreme heat and air pol- vices. We’re so pleased to develop Disabilities. Subscriptions are $15/year. lution, will increase. these community partnerships. Any advertising in TRANSITION is In addition, expected population BCCPD will continue to engage the for readers’ benefit and does not growth and chronic disease trends disability and emergency man- constitute an endorsement by the tell us that the proportion of Cana- agement communities in British BCCPD. dians highly sensitive to climate- Columbia and Canada. Together, related health impacts will grow we hope to address the ongoing Submissions and Reprints over the coming decades. This may and emerging issues for people Comments, articles and graphics are vary by region and be influenced with disabilities in emergencies welcome for consideration. by factors such as access to health and disasters. We welcome any TRANSITION content may be reprinted care and community support ser- interested stakeholders to work without prior permission, as long vices (Human Health in a Changing with us. as the material is published in its Climate, Health Canada). KMAREN artin IS BCCPD’S entirety, along with this citation: “From Emergency Preparedness Project TRANSITION magazine, BC Coalition of Climate change literature shows COORDINATOR. SHE ALSO LOOKS People with Disabilities, [edition date].” that there are underlying risk SMASHING IN A TIE. T factors and a higher vulnerability Contact Us to the effects of climate change BC Coalition of People with Disabilities for certain populations: those 204-456 W. Broadway, with underlying health conditions Vancouver, BC V5Y 1R3 (chronic conditions, cardiovascular, T: 604-875-0188 F: 604-875-9227 respiratory, renal disease, diabe- TRANSITION: [email protected] tes, psychiatric illness, alcohol and Ads: [email protected] drug dependency); age (seniors BCCPD: [email protected] Web: www.bccpd.bc.ca/transition BCCPD.BC.CA BC COALITION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES PAGE 6 TRANSITION MAGAZINE | SUMMER 2013 Get Me Out of Here!® Emergency Evacuation Program by BARBARA PURdy, PhysiOTHERApist any people do the best they Moving People Without more confident that they could Mcan to prepare for emergen- Equipment better evacuate people and not cy situations. They install fire -ex risk injury to themselves. tinguishers and sprinkler systems I wondered: “In an emergency, in homes and workplaces. They without electricity, how would the Everyone Can Use This may plan evacuation routes in the caregivers move patients quickly Training event of fires, earthquakes and without all of this equipment?” People with limited mobility are floods, and might have first aid kits This led me to develop the Emer- everywhere in our communities. and emergency food supplies on gency Evacuation Program Get Me More and more of us are choosing hand. All this planning is based
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