Cryptanalysis of a Reduced Version of the Block Cipher E2
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Related-Key Cryptanalysis of 3-WAY, Biham-DES,CAST, DES-X, Newdes, RC2, and TEA
Related-Key Cryptanalysis of 3-WAY, Biham-DES,CAST, DES-X, NewDES, RC2, and TEA John Kelsey Bruce Schneier David Wagner Counterpane Systems U.C. Berkeley kelsey,schneier @counterpane.com [email protected] f g Abstract. We present new related-key attacks on the block ciphers 3- WAY, Biham-DES, CAST, DES-X, NewDES, RC2, and TEA. Differen- tial related-key attacks allow both keys and plaintexts to be chosen with specific differences [KSW96]. Our attacks build on the original work, showing how to adapt the general attack to deal with the difficulties of the individual algorithms. We also give specific design principles to protect against these attacks. 1 Introduction Related-key cryptanalysis assumes that the attacker learns the encryption of certain plaintexts not only under the original (unknown) key K, but also under some derived keys K0 = f(K). In a chosen-related-key attack, the attacker specifies how the key is to be changed; known-related-key attacks are those where the key difference is known, but cannot be chosen by the attacker. We emphasize that the attacker knows or chooses the relationship between keys, not the actual key values. These techniques have been developed in [Knu93b, Bih94, KSW96]. Related-key cryptanalysis is a practical attack on key-exchange protocols that do not guarantee key-integrity|an attacker may be able to flip bits in the key without knowing the key|and key-update protocols that update keys using a known function: e.g., K, K + 1, K + 2, etc. Related-key attacks were also used against rotor machines: operators sometimes set rotors incorrectly. -
On the Decorrelated Fast Cipher (DFC) and Its Theory
On the Decorrelated Fast Cipher (DFC) and Its Theory Lars R. Knudsen and Vincent Rijmen ? Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, N-5020 Bergen Abstract. In the first part of this paper the decorrelation theory of Vaudenay is analysed. It is shown that the theory behind the propo- sed constructions does not guarantee security against state-of-the-art differential attacks. In the second part of this paper the proposed De- correlated Fast Cipher (DFC), a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard, is analysed. It is argued that the cipher does not obtain prova- ble security against a differential attack. Also, an attack on DFC reduced to 6 rounds is given. 1 Introduction In [6,7] a new theory for the construction of secret-key block ciphers is given. The notion of decorrelation to the order d is defined. Let C be a block cipher with block size m and C∗ be a randomly chosen permutation in the same message space. If C has a d-wise decorrelation equal to that of C∗, then an attacker who knows at most d − 1 pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts cannot distinguish between C and C∗. So, the cipher C is “secure if we use it only d−1 times” [7]. It is further noted that a d-wise decorrelated cipher for d = 2 is secure against both a basic linear and a basic differential attack. For the latter, this basic attack is as follows. A priori, two values a and b are fixed. Pick two plaintexts of difference a and get the corresponding ciphertexts. -
Hemiunu Used Numerically Tagged Surface Ratios to Mark Ceilings Inside the Great Pyramid Hinting at Designed Spaces Still Hidden Within
Archaeological Discovery, 2018, 6, 319-337 http://www.scirp.org/journal/ad ISSN Online: 2331-1967 ISSN Print: 2331-1959 Hemiunu Used Numerically Tagged Surface Ratios to Mark Ceilings inside the Great Pyramid Hinting at Designed Spaces Still Hidden Within Manu Seyfzadeh Institute for the Study of the Origins of Civilization (ISOC)1, Boston University’s College of General Studies, Boston, USA How to cite this paper: Seyfzadeh, M. Abstract (2018). Hemiunu Used Numerically Tagged Surface Ratios to Mark Ceilings inside the In 1883, W. M. Flinders Petrie noticed that the vertical thickness and height Great Pyramid Hinting at Designed Spaces of certain stone courses of the Great Pyramid2 of Khufu/Cheops at Giza, Still Hidden Within. Archaeological Dis- Egypt markedly increase compared to those immediately lower periodically covery, 6, 319-337. https://doi.org/10.4236/ad.2018.64016 and conspicuously interrupting a general trend of progressive course thinning towards the summit. Having calculated the surface area of each course, Petrie Received: September 10, 2018 further noted that the courses immediately below such discrete stone thick- Accepted: October 5, 2018 Published: October 8, 2018 ness peaks tended to mark integer multiples of 1/25th of the surface area at ground level. Here I show that the probable architect of the Great Pyramid, Copyright © 2018 by author and Khufu’s vizier Hemiunu, conceptualized its vertical construction design using Scientific Research Publishing Inc. surface areas based on the same numerical principles used to design his own This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International mastaba in Giza’s western cemetery and conspicuously used this numerical License (CC BY 4.0). -
Report on the AES Candidates
Rep ort on the AES Candidates 1 2 1 3 Olivier Baudron , Henri Gilb ert , Louis Granb oulan , Helena Handschuh , 4 1 5 1 Antoine Joux , Phong Nguyen ,Fabrice Noilhan ,David Pointcheval , 1 1 1 1 Thomas Pornin , Guillaume Poupard , Jacques Stern , and Serge Vaudenay 1 Ecole Normale Sup erieure { CNRS 2 France Telecom 3 Gemplus { ENST 4 SCSSI 5 Universit e d'Orsay { LRI Contact e-mail: [email protected] Abstract This do cument rep orts the activities of the AES working group organized at the Ecole Normale Sup erieure. Several candidates are evaluated. In particular we outline some weaknesses in the designs of some candidates. We mainly discuss selection criteria b etween the can- didates, and make case-by-case comments. We nally recommend the selection of Mars, RC6, Serp ent, ... and DFC. As the rep ort is b eing nalized, we also added some new preliminary cryptanalysis on RC6 and Crypton in the App endix which are not considered in the main b o dy of the rep ort. Designing the encryption standard of the rst twentyyears of the twenty rst century is a challenging task: we need to predict p ossible future technologies, and wehavetotake unknown future attacks in account. Following the AES pro cess initiated by NIST, we organized an op en working group at the Ecole Normale Sup erieure. This group met two hours a week to review the AES candidates. The present do cument rep orts its results. Another task of this group was to up date the DFC candidate submitted by CNRS [16, 17] and to answer questions which had b een omitted in previous 1 rep orts on DFC. -
Provable Security Evaluation of Structures Against Impossible Differential and Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis ⋆
Provable Security Evaluation of Structures against Impossible Differential and Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis ⋆ Bing Sun1,2,4, Meicheng Liu2,3, Jian Guo2, Vincent Rijmen5, Ruilin Li6 1 College of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, Hunan, P.R.China, 410073 2 Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 3 State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P.R. China, 100093 4 State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing, P.R. China, 100878 5 Dept. Electrical Engineering (ESAT), KU Leuven and iMinds, Belgium 6 College of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, Hunan, P.R.China, 410073 happy [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract. Impossible differential and zero correlation linear cryptanal- ysis are two of the most important cryptanalytic vectors. To character- ize the impossible differentials and zero correlation linear hulls which are independent of the choices of the non-linear components, Sun et al. proposed the structure deduced by a block cipher at CRYPTO 2015. Based on that, we concentrate in this paper on the security of the SPN structure and Feistel structure with SP-type round functions. Firstly, we prove that for an SPN structure, if α1 → β1 and α2 → β2 are possi- ble differentials, α1|α2 → β1|β2 is also a possible differential, i.e., the OR “|” operation preserves differentials. Secondly, we show that for an SPN structure, there exists an r-round impossible differential if and on- ly if there exists an r-round impossible differential α → β where the Hamming weights of both α and β are 1. -
Historical Ciphers • A
ECE 646 - Lecture 6 Required Reading • W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security, Chapter 2, Classical Encryption Techniques Historical Ciphers • A. Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Chapter 7.3 Classical ciphers and historical development Why (not) to study historical ciphers? Secret Writing AGAINST FOR Steganography Cryptography (hidden messages) (encrypted messages) Not similar to Basic components became modern ciphers a part of modern ciphers Under special circumstances modern ciphers can be Substitution Transposition Long abandoned Ciphers reduced to historical ciphers Transformations (change the order Influence on world events of letters) Codes Substitution The only ciphers you Ciphers can break! (replace words) (replace letters) Selected world events affected by cryptology Mary, Queen of Scots 1586 - trial of Mary Queen of Scots - substitution cipher • Scottish Queen, a cousin of Elisabeth I of England • Forced to flee Scotland by uprising against 1917 - Zimmermann telegram, America enters World War I her and her husband • Treated as a candidate to the throne of England by many British Catholics unhappy about 1939-1945 Battle of England, Battle of Atlantic, D-day - a reign of Elisabeth I, a Protestant ENIGMA machine cipher • Imprisoned by Elisabeth for 19 years • Involved in several plots to assassinate Elisabeth 1944 – world’s first computer, Colossus - • Put on trial for treason by a court of about German Lorenz machine cipher 40 noblemen, including Catholics, after being implicated in the Babington Plot by her own 1950s – operation Venona – breaking ciphers of soviet spies letters sent from prison to her co-conspirators stealing secrets of the U.S. atomic bomb in the encrypted form – one-time pad 1 Mary, Queen of Scots – cont. -
The QARMA Block Cipher Family
The QARMA Block Cipher Family Almost MDS Matrices Over Rings With Zero Divisors, Nearly Symmetric Even-Mansour Constructions With Non-Involutory Central Rounds, and Search Heuristics for Low-Latency S-Boxes Roberto Avanzi Qualcomm Product Security, Munich, Germany [email protected], [email protected] Abstract. This paper introduces QARMA, a new family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers targeted at applications such as memory encryption, the generation of very short tags for hardware-assisted prevention of software exploitation, and the con- struction of keyed hash functions. QARMA is inspired by reflection ciphers such as PRINCE, to which it adds a tweaking input, and MANTIS. However, QARMA differs from previous reflector constructions in that it is a three-round Even-Mansour scheme instead of a FX-construction, and its middle permutation is non-involutory and keyed. We introduce and analyse a family of Almost MDS matrices defined over a ring with zero divisors that allows us to encode rotations in its operation while maintaining the minimal latency associated to {0, 1}-matrices. The purpose of all these design choices is to harden the cipher against various classes of attacks. We also describe new S-Box search heuristics aimed at minimising the critical path. QARMA exists in 64- and 128-bit block sizes, where block and tweak size are equal, and keys are twice as long as the blocks. We argue that QARMA provides sufficient security margins within the constraints de- termined by the mentioned applications, while still achieving best-in-class latency. Implementation results on a state-of-the art manufacturing process are reported. -
A Proposed SAFER Plus Security Algorithm Using Fast Walsh Hadamard Transform for Bluetooth Technology D.Sharmila 1, R.Neelaveni 2
International Journal of Wireless & Mobile Networks (IJWMN), Vol 1, No 2, November 2009 A Proposed SAFER Plus Security algorithm using Fast Walsh Hadamard transform for Bluetooth Technology D.Sharmila 1, R.Neelaveni 2 1(Research Scholar), Associate Professor, Bannari Amman Institute of Technology, Sathyamangalam. Tamil Nadu-638401. [email protected] 2 Asst.Prof. PSG College of Technology, Coimbatore.Tamil Nadu -638401. [email protected] ABSTRACT realtime two-way voice transfer providing data rates up to 3 Mb/s. It operates at 2.4 GHz frequency in the free ISM-band (Industrial, Scientific, and Medical) using frequency hopping In this paper, a modified SAFER plus algorithm is [18]. Bluetooth can be used to connect almost any kind of presented. Additionally, a comparison with various device to another device. Typical range of Bluetooth communication varies from 10 to 100 meters indoors. security algorithms like pipelined AES, Triple DES, Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible Elliptic curve Diffie Hellman and the existing SAFER plus to general wireless networking threats, such as denial of service attacks, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, are done. Performance of the algorithms is evaluated message modification, and resource misappropriation. They based on the data throughput, frequency and security are also threatened by more specific Bluetooth-related attacks that target known vulnerabilities in Bluetooth level. The results show that the modified SAFER plus implementations and specifications. Attacks against algorithm has enhanced security compared to the existing improperly secured Bluetooth implementations can provide attackers with unauthorized access to sensitive information algorithms. and unauthorized usage of Bluetooth devices and other Key words : Secure And Fast Encryption Routine, Triple Data systems or networks to which the devices are connected. -
On Recent Attacks Against Cryptographic Hash Functions
On recent attacks against Cryptographic Hash Functions Martin Ekerå & Henrik Ygge 1 Outline ‣ First part ‣ Preliminaries ‣ Which cryptographic hash functions exist? ‣ What degree of security do they offer? ‣ An introduction to Wang’s attack ‣ Second part ‣ Wang’s attack applied to MD5 ‣ Demo 2 Part I 3 Operators Symbol Meaning x ⊞ y Addition modulo 2n x ⊟ y Subtraction modulo 2n x ⊕ y Exclusive OR x ⋀ y Bitwise AND x ⋁ y Bitwise OR ¬ x The negation of x. x ≪ s Shifting of x by s bits to the left. x ⋘ s Rotation of x by s bits to the left. 4 Bitwise Functions Function IF (x, y, z) (x ⋀ y) ⋁ ((¬ x) ⋀ z) XOR (x, y, z) x ⊕ y ⊕ z MAJ (x, y, z) (x ⋀ y) ⋁ (y ⋀ z) ⋁ (z ⋀ x) XNO (x, y, z) y ⊕ ((¬ z) ⋁ x) ‣ The functions above are all bitwise. 5 Hash Functions ‣ A hash function maps elements from a finite or infinite domain, into elements of a fixed size domain. 6 Attacks on Hash Functions ‣ Collision attack Find m and m’ ≠ m such that H(m) = H(m’). ‣ First pre-image attack Given h find m such that h = H(m). ‣ Second pre-image attack Given m find m’ ≠ m such that H(m) = H(m’). 7 Attack Complexities ‣ Collision attack Naïve complexity O(2n/2) due to the birthday paradox. ‣ First pre-image attack Naïve complexity O(2n) ‣ Second pre-image attack Naïve complexity O(2n) 8 Cryptographic Hash Functions ‣ It is desirable for a cryptographic hash function to be collision resistant, first pre-image resistant and second pre-image resistant. -
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods
NIST Special Publication 800-38A Recommendation for Block 2001 Edition Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques Morris Dworkin C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y ii C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 December 2001 U.S. Department of Commerce Donald L. Evans, Secretary Technology Administration Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director iii Reports on Information Security Technology The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. -
Safer Than You Think! Revising the Transit Safety Narrative 1 September 2021
www.vtpi.org [email protected] 250-508-5150 Safer Than You Think! Revising the Transit Safety Narrative 1 September 2021 Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute Abstract Public transportation is overall a relatively safe (low crash risk) and secure (low crime risk) mode of transport. Transit travel has about a tenth the traffic casualty (death or injury) rate as automobile travel, and transit-oriented neighborhood residents have about a fifth the per capita crash casualty rate as in automobile-oriented areas. Transit also tends to have lower overall crime rates than automobile travel, and many transit service improvements can further increase security by improving surveillance and economic opportunities for at-risk populations. Despite its relative safety and security, many people consider public transit dangerous, and so are reluctant to use it or support service expansions in their communities. Various factors contribute to this excessive fear, including the nature of public transit travel, heavy media coverage of transit- related crashes and crimes, and conventional traffic safety messages which emphasize danger rather than safety. Transit agencies can help create a new safety narrative by better measuring and communicating transit’s overall safety and security impacts, and providing better guidance concerning how users and communities can enhance transit safety and security. A summary version of this report was published as, “A New Transit Safety Narrative” Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2014, pp.121-142; at www.nctr.usf.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JPT17.4_Litman.pdf. It was also published as, The Hidden Traffic Safety Solution: Public Transportation, American Public Transportation Association (www.apta.com); at www.apta.com/mediacenter/pressreleases/2016/Pages/Hidden-Traffic-Safety-Solution.aspx Todd Litman 2013-2021 You are welcome and encouraged to copy, distribute, share and excerpt this document and its ideas, provided the author is given attribution. -
Camellia: a 128-Bit Block Cipher Suitable for Multiple Platforms – Design Andanalysis
Camellia: A 128-Bit Block Cipher Suitable for Multiple Platforms – Design andAnalysis Kazumaro Aoki1, Tetsuya Ichikawa2, Masayuki Kanda1, Mitsuru Matsui2, Shiho Moriai1, Junko Nakajima2, and Toshio Tokita2 1 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 1-1 Hikarinooka, Yokosuka, Kanagawa, 239-0847Japan {maro,kanda,shiho}@isl.ntt.co.jp 2 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, 5-1-1 Ofuna, Kamakura, Kanagawa, 247-8501 Japan {ichikawa,matsui,june15,tokita}@iss.isl.melco.co.jp Abstract. We present a new 128-bit block cipher called Camellia. Camellia supports 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, i.e., the same interface specifications as the Advanced Encryption Stan- dard (AES). Efficiency on both software and hardware platforms is a remarkable characteristic of Camellia in addition to its high level of se- curity. It is confirmed that Camellia provides strong security against differential and linear cryptanalyses. Compared to the AES finalists, i.e., MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish, Camellia offers at least comparable encryption speed in software and hardware. An optimized implementation of Camellia in assembly language can encrypt on a Pen- tium III (800MHz) at the rate of more than 276 Mbits per second, which is much faster than the speed of an optimized DES implementation. In addition, a distinguishing feature is its small hardware design. The hard- ware design, which includes encryption and decryption and key schedule, occupies approximately 11K gates, which is the smallest among all ex- isting 128-bit block ciphers as far as we know. 1 Introduction This paper presents a 128-bit block cipher called Camellia, which was jointly developed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.