Mauriel Phillips Joslyn, ed.. A Meteor Shining Brightly: Essays on Maj. Gen. Patrick R Cleburne. Milledgeville, Georgia: Terrell House Publishing, 1997. ix + 299 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-9662903-0-1.

Reviewed by Thomas A. DeBlack

Published on H-CivWar (November, 1998)

Recent months have witnessed a renewed in‐ names of lower-level ofcers or overly long ex‐ terest in Patrick R. Cleburne. The February 1998 cerpts from the Official Records. issue of Civil War Times Illustrated was largely In some instances, authors need better docu‐ devoted to Cleburne, and 1997 saw the publica‐ mentation to support their assertions. For exam‐ tion of both Craig L. Symonds^Òs Stonewall of the ple, in her discussion of the debacle at Spring Hill, West: Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War , in which John Bell Hood held Cleburne (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas) and A Me‐ at least partly responsible for allowing a seeming‐ teor Shining Brightly: Essays on Maj. Gen. Patrick ly trapped Federal army to escape, Alethea Sayers R. Cleburne. notes that "the majority of historians believe the Though presented as a collection of essays, A fault should rest on the army commander, Gener‐ Meteor Shining Brightly is more straightforward al Hood (p. 261)." But neither in her text nor her biography than interpretation. The eleven essays endnotes does she list those historians or their are presented in chronological order and discuss works. Similarly, in his discussion of the battle of various aspects or periods of Cleburne^Òs life Franklin, Thomas Cartwright strongly challenges from his early years in his native to his Hood^Òs version of his last conversation with Cle‐ death at the battle of Franklin in November of burne. In Advance and Retreat, Hood recalled that 1864. The contributors to this volume include sev‐ Cleburne^Òs fnal words to him before the battle eral professional historians, a retired military were "General, I am ready, and have more hope in man, a journalist, and the great-nephew of Cle‐ fnal success of our cause than I have had at any burne^Òs adjutant. Each is knowledgeable about time since the frst gun was fred." But Cartwright Cleburne and the Civil War, but the quality of the contends, "If this was not an outright falsehood by writing varies greatly. Some chapters are thor‐ Hood, the comment by General Cleburne was sar‐ oughly documented and well-written, while oth‐ castic at best. Most historians feel it was the for‐ ers are burdened with an overabundance of the H-Net Reviews mer (p. 269)." Yet nowhere does Cartwright tell ern independence. "As events transpired," Hull the reader who these historians are. notes, "it soon became clear that Major General This reservation notwithstanding, Cleburne could not have been more wrong (p. Cartwright^Òs essay on the battle of Franklin is 146)." Cleburne^Òs proposal was met with rejec‐ one of the volume^Òs better chapters. Cartwright, tion and rebuke by Confederate authorities and the executive director of the Carter House in may have done severe damage to his chances for Franklin, Tennessee, is one of the leading authori‐ promotion. Ironically, the Confederate Congress ties on the battle of Franklin, and his expertise is passed a measure similar to Cleburne^Òs in evident here. His essay makes it perfectly clear March 1865. By that time it was too late. that Cleburne knew Hood^Òs plan for a massed Hull^Òs assertion that Cleburne "could not frontal assault on the entrenched Federal position have been more wrong" about Southerners^Ò at Franklin was foolhardy and that the attack willingness to give up slavery to save Southern in‐ would mean certain death for many in his com‐ dependence is one of the few instances in the mand. Yet, despite his misgivings and the animosi‐ book where an author is willing to admit that Cle‐ ty he felt toward Hood, Cleburne attempted to car‐ burne might ever have been wrong about any‐ ry out the order with his usual courage and dar‐ thing, and that is one of the book^Òs weaknesses. ing and gave his life in the process. Craig Symonds (Stonewall of the West) paints Cle‐ Another of the volume^Òs better chapters is burne as an inspiring and courageous leader but University of Arkansas at Little Rock historian also sees him as something of a romantic who un‐ Carl Moneyhon^Òs essay on "Cleburne^Òs Early critically accepted the rhetoric of Southern na‐ War Years." Moneyhon contends that Cle‐ tionalists while failing to understand the crucial burne^Òs actions in 1862 "clearly demonstrated relationship of slavery to the Southern cause. Un‐ his leadership qualities" and "showed him to have fortunately that uncritical and romantic attitude traits of command and leadership that can be de‐ has also characterized many who have examined scribed only as natural (p. 86)." Cleburne was, he Cleburne^Òs life, including some of those who concludes, "born to command on the battlefeld contributed to A Meteor Shining Brightly. (p. 86)." Moneyhon^Òs essay is crisply-written, The authors continually hammer home the and his endnotes refect a thorough knowledge of point that Cleburne was not only a skilled and relevant scholarship. courageous commander but a man of sterling Perhaps the volume^Òs most interesting es‐ character, much beloved and respected by the say is Mark M. Hull^Òs "Concerning the Emanci‐ men who fought under him. These are points that pation of the Slaves." Hull, an associate professor few seriously challenge. But in this book, any criti‐ of history at Alabama A&M, clearly and concisely cism of Cleburne is written of or explained away. describes the most controversial action of Cle‐ For example, Mauriel Phillips Joslyn notes that burne^Òs career. In the winter of 1863-1864 Cle‐ "Cleburne^Òs touchiness could frequently fare burne proposed that the Confederacy immediate‐ up (p. 191)." But she dismisses Gen. St. John Lid‐ ly begin training "a large reserve of the most dell^Òs comment that "Cleburne was resentful, courageous of our slaves, and further that we exceedingly ambitious, friendly to those useful to guarantee freedom within a reasonable time to him, until they stood in the way of his advance‐ every slave in the South who shall remain true to ment" as "a misreading" by someone "who had ev‐ the Confederacy in this war (p. 146)." Cleburne as‐ idently not been accepted into [Cleburne^Òs] in‐ sumed that patriotic Southerners would willingly ner circle of friends (p. 191)." "Cleburne was am‐ give up their slaves if that was the price for South‐

2 H-Net Reviews bitious," Joslyn notes, "but never to the detriment nations for Cleburne^Òs proposal to emancipate of others (p. 191)." Never? slaves in return for their service to the Confedera‐ Even more disappointing is the book^Òs fail‐ cy, but he fails to explain how Cleburne could ure to adequately address some of the more sig‐ have so misread his adopted region. nifcant questions regarding this important and In his foreword, Wiley Sword writes, "The sto‐ fascinating fgure. Why was a man of such charac‐ ry of Pat Cleburne is... one of the most notable and ter, talent, and ability denied promotion to a high‐ fascinating, if tragic, of the war (viii)." But the real er command, especially in an army "bedeviled by tragedy goes far beyond Cleburne^Òs failure to command incompetence and operational medi‐ gain the promotion many felt he deserved and his ocrity (vii-viii)?" In Stonewall of the West, untimely death. Cleburne gave his life in a useless Symonds cites several of the most commonly of‐ battle, following orders he knew to be wrong‐ fered explanations for Cleburne^Òs failure to at‐ headed, from a commander whose competence he tain the rank of corps commander--his foreign questioned, dying for a cause that he never fully birth, his lack of a West Point education, his par‐ understood. That, it seems, is the ultimate tragedy ticipation in the movement to oust , of Patrick Cleburne. his proposal for arming the slaves--but fnds them Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ all unsatisfactory, particularly in light of the pro‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft motion of Benjamin F. Cheatham, who shared educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ most of the same liabilities. Symonds concludes thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ that Cleburne^Òs superior, friend, and mentor, tact [email protected]. William Hardee, may have concluded that "while Cleburne was unquestionably a superb division commander, he lacked that spark of independent initiative necessary to be efective in the com‐ mand of a corps.... It may be that Hardee had come to believe that for all his virtues, Cleburne had reached his proper rank as a major general (Symonds, p. 223)." Symonds further notes that in the one instance in which Cleburne was in com‐ mand of a corps (at Jonesboro, Georgia, in the At‐ lanta campaign) the results were disappointing (Symonds, 239). This is a controversial assertion and one that deserves closer examination. But aside from Wi‐ ley Sword^Òs statement in the foreword that Cle‐ burne was the victim of "internecine political ma‐ neuvering (viii)," A Meteor Shining Brightly adds little to the discussion. Another issue that calls for closer examina‐ tion is the question of why Cleburne, a man of such obvious intelligence, so completely failed to understand the region and the cause for which he fought. Hull discusses some of the possible expla‐

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Citation: Thomas A. DeBlack. Review of Joslyn, Mauriel Phillips, ed. A Meteor Shining Brightly: Essays on Maj. Gen. Patrick R Cleburne. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. November, 1998.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=2453

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