CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 255, December 2019, Editor: Fabien Merz

New Technologies for Border Controls in Europe

Rapidly increasing mobility, especially with regards to air traffic, poses new challenges for the border agencies in Europe. New technologies may help to manage the movement of people and ensure security. As a Schengen member, can benefit from these develop- ments. However, a number of adaptations are required.

By Julian Kamasa

One of the main purposes of the Schengen Area is to provide for open borders in Eu- rope. Today, it encompasses all EU member states except the UK and Ireland, which continue to conduct border controls. Nev- ertheless, the UK makes use of the Schen- gen Information System (SIS). The EU members and future Schengen member states Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Cy- prus continue to implement border con- trols. Bulgaria and Romania have been making full use of the SIS since 2018. Ice- land, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzer- land are member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). As such, they enjoy associate status in the Schengen Area and thus unlimited access to the SIS.

The Schengen Area of 26 participating states without border controls is predicated Eight automated passport control gates can be used voluntarily at since 2017 for entry and since 2018 five of them for exit.KAPO Zürich on a number of preconditions, including that the external borders must offer suffi- cient security and that police authorities’ access to a central database must function smoothly. These tasks have become more which they are tackling in various ways. For specified rationale – a serious threat to do- and more complex in recent years due to instance, in autumn of 2015, following an mestic security or risk of terrorism – which rather strong migration movements, trans- increase of migration and terrorist attacks, means that these measures now appear to national crime, international terrorism, and numerous European states made use, in line be permanent rather than temporary. a constant increase of tourist numbers. with their own requirements, of certain reg- ulations in the Schengen Borders Code that Migration patterns vary between regions Increasing Mobility Needs allow for temporary border controls to be and may trigger strong national defensive Both in quantitative and in qualitative introduced for up to six months (cf. Fig. 1). mechanisms. Tourists, on the other hand, terms, the national border agencies in Eu- These temporary measures have since been are very welcome in Europe, mainly based rope are confronted with new challenges, renewed every six months based on the on economic considerations. Nevertheless,

© 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 255, December 2019

Temporary identity checks at border crossings within the Schengen Area difficult to estimate the number of third- state citizens whose permits have expired. Austria Land travel from Slovenia and Hungary, temporary controls on entries from Italy and Slovakia (since 16 September 2015, until 12 May 2020) Rough estimations assume that there are Denmark Land and sea travel from Germany and Sweden (since 4 January 2016, until 12 May 2020) between two and four million such people living in the EU. France State of emergency affecting all border crossings, mainly air travel (since 14 December 2015, until 30 April 2020) In 2013, the EU Commission proposed a Germany Land travel from Austria, temporary controls of air travel from Greece (since 13 September 2015, until 12 May 2020) package of measures under the label “Smart Norway All border crossings, with particular attention on sea travel from Germany, Denmark, Borders” that includes an Entry/Exit Sys- and Sweden (since 26 November 2015, until 12 May 2020) tem (EES) for short-term entries designed Sweden No specific delimitation, may affect all border crossings to manage these risks at the external bor- (since 12 November 2015, until 12 May 2020) ders of the Schengen Area. Specifically, the Source: EU Commission (as of 12 November 2019) EES regime aims both to register the bio- metric personal data (facial image and four fingerprints) of third-state citizens using an electronic stamp and to store this per- sonal data in a central electronic EES dos- sier. This facilitates the unequivocal identi- this movement of people, which is increas- checkpoints were installed for testing pur- fication of individuals as well as the ing every year, must also be managed. In- poses at Zurich Airport that may be volun- reconstruction of the entry path, if neces- creasing wealth in populous countries such tarily used by adult travelers arriving with sary. The regulation stipulates that such as India or China is leading to a constant biometric EU/EFTA passports from non- data be retained for three years after depar- rise in the number of entries from non- Schengen countries. Based on this success- ture, or for five years in cases of non-depar- member countries. The EU estimates that ful test, eGates are now also used at depar- ture, and deleted after the end of the data by 2025, it will see 302 million cross-bor- ture. The travel document, which incorpo- retention period. Following the adoption der movements by 76 million citizens from rates a microchip, is placed on a third countries, to which must be added scanner that not only verifies its EU and EFTA citizens have for travelers with EU/EFTA passports, which validity, but also checks for out- some years had the option of are also checked at the Schengen Area’s ex- standing arrest warrants for the ternal border crossings. Given the limited person in question. Following using automatic checkpoints. scalability of the work done by humans at a successful verification, image counter in terms of spatial and organiza- recognition is used to compare the face with of the draft law by the EU parliament in tional requirements, using new technolo- the passport data. TheKantonspolizei (Zu- December 2017 and a two-year period for gies such as electronic passport checkpoints rich ), which is responsible harmonization of legislation, EES is ex- could relieve pressure on the border agen- for security at Zurich Airport, is only in- pected to enter into use at all external cies. volved if the electronic checkpoints refuse Schengen borders from February 2022 on- entry due to technical failure, an outstand- wards – including at Swiss airports. Technology-Backed Border Controls ing arrest warrant, or suspected forgery or In the following, for the purposes of border theft of the travel document. Data Protection entry and the related identity check, a cru- Initially, the Commission’s first proposal cial distinction will be made between pas- The same method could be used for third- for “Smart Borders” was highly controver- sengers with EU/EFTA passports and state citizens with biometric passports sial in the EU parliament and also in the members of third countries, even though seeking entry to the Schengen Area. How- Council of the European Union, mainly for the same technology could be applied for ever, while the data of air passengers with reasons related to data privacy. While a border controls in both cases. EU and EU/EFTA passports are deleted immedi- parliamentary majority for the proposal EFTA citizens have for some years had the ately after entry into or departure from the seemed unlikely, given the far-reaching na- option of using automatic passport check- Schengen zone, the data relating to citizens ture of the plans for data acquisition for all points, known as “eGates”. The UK has al- of non-member states will be electronically travelers and for long-term data storage, ready been checking biometric data with stored from February 2022 onwards. Until certain countries that had been immedi- image recognition technology since 2008 now, travelers arriving from third states for ately affected by terrorist attacks, such as at 264 electronic checkpoints, positioned at short stays (90 days) have received manual France and Belgium, demanded a ten-year more than 15 air and rail traffic locations. stamps in their travel documents, which in- data retention period. In addition to the In view of the fact that entries have been volved no storage of data and thus facili- Commission and the EU parliament, Ger- increasing annually on average by 4 million tated a simple identity check process. The many was among those opposed to long- travelers since 2009, the eGates have cer- disadvantages of this streamlined process term data retention and championed data tainly proven their practical efficacy. In are that manual stamps are prone to forg- protection, despite also having experienced 2018, about half of the 122 million travel- ery and error, but mainly that no register is many terrorist attacks. ers with EU or EFTA citizenship made kept. Thus, it is not possible, for example, to use of this option. exactly determine in retrospect where and A number of measures were introduced to when a person entered the Schengen Area assuage concerns over data privacy. For in- The only external Schengen borders that from a third state. There is also the risk that stance, the Commission diluted the overall Switzerland must police are at its interna- travelers can disappear more easily because package and removed certain controversial tional airports. In September 2017, eight they leave fewer traces. Accordingly, it is elements, such as the registration of fre-

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Technical Challenges Air passengers, Switzerland 2009 – 2018 At the federal level, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) plays a key role in the le- gal implementation and in transmitting re- quirements and directives to the respective border authorities of the cantons in ques- tion. The core challenges here are not so much political in nature, but rather relate to technical and organizational issues as well as state policy. To meet technical challenges in connection with the collection of bio- metric data of third-state arrivals, the staff responsible for border controls at airports must be trained accordingly. This includes the correct way of creating EES dossiers and changes to the underlying legal frame- work that must be internalized by the au- thorities. The partial automation and digiti- zation of , which is among the EES goals, will raise the professional demands of the responsible personnel (bor- der guards and cantonal police forces) and thus enhance their relevance.

At the organizational level, the spatial di- mensions of airports are a key factor. In view of the increase in passenger numbers, which have nearly doubled at Swiss air- ports in the past decade from 33.5 million in 2009 to 58.8 million in 2018 (see illus- quent travelers (National Facilitation Pro- tion authorities should carry out regular tration), technical aids for screening pas- gramme, NFP), from the mandatory legal inspections. sengers to and from third countries may regulation. It now leaves it to the states to also relieve the burden on the Swiss au- implement these aspects on a voluntary ba- In Switzerland, too, data protection played thorities. Thus, in Zurich, the construction sis. Based on cost-benefit considerations, a key role in connection with the EES reg- of an additional terminal has been brought Switzerland for example has decided not to ulation. Under the Schengen Association forward to ensure conformity with EES. introduce the NFP. Agreement (SAA) approved by the Swiss eGates are also expected to be introduced, electorate in 2005, Switzerland as an asso- which may require spatial and organiza- A financial and technical study was com- ciated state in the Schengen Area is com- tional adaptations. At ’s airport, which plemented in 2015 by a practical test, seen mitted to the mandatory dynamic adoption is located on French territory, the situation largely as a symbolic measure, that involved of the legal developments of the Schengen is a complex one. For a number of years, the a broad range of relevant institutions and Acquis. The federal decision to approve this EuroAirport has been noticeably exceed- actors. The test was carried out by the Eu- regulation was accepted in spring of 2019 ing its spatial capacity, a situation that is ropean IT agency eu-LISA. It comprised by both chambers of parliament. While the further aggravated by the state of emergen- 12 states with 18 air, sea, and land traffic Council of States supported its implemen- cy that France proclaimed in 2015 and border crossing points and involved 350 tation unanimously, fundamental criticism which has seen a return of border controls. border guards as well as 58’000 volunteer over data protection was voiced in the Na- travelers from non-member states. At the tional Council. Here, the proposal was ad- The example of the EuroAirport shows institutional level, the test incorporated not opted, with 23 votes opposed to it from the that installing eGates should be accompa- just the member states and the responsible left and right of the political spectrum. This nied by holistic spatial planning consider- EU agencies, but also the European Data result may be explained by the fact that the ations and is likely to be in line with the Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Frontex, desire for good relations with the EU pre- commercial interests of airport operators. and the European Union Agency for Fun- vailed among the parties that emphasize When combined with the introduction of damental Rights. Ultimately, the develop- the importance of data protection, while new technologies, optimization of spatial ment of the EU’s General Data Protection domestic security is a paramount consider- capacities ultimately facilitates efficient Regulation (GDPR) in 2015 may also have ation among EU-skeptic members of par- implementation of border controls. The re- served as a confidence-building measure. liament. A crucial factor may have been sulting positive effects can be seen at many Among other elements, it calls for citizens that data protection is traditionally held in levels. For instance, a location may become to gain more control over their personal high esteem both at the cantonal and the more attractive as a hub, more space may be data while requiring that corporations take federal levels, and that no Swiss authorities freed up for commercial use, and travelers on more responsibility. The EU Commis- will store EES dossiers; rather, they will may be able to spend more time on con- sion requires that during and after the im- transmit the data via a standard national sumption in the tax-free zone beyond the plementation of EES, national data protec- interface to the central European system. border control checkpoint.

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In addition to the efficient use of spatial ca- authorities at all state levels, which will in- be confronted with a conflict of objectives pacities, given the desire for maximum us- volve a great deal of effort in a federal sys- between ethical principles and a desire for er-friendliness in carrying out border con- tem. maximum security. Such developments trols, passenger management plays a key should always be considered in light of the role. Passengers must be given clear guid- Need for Adaptation fact that absolute security can never be ance as to which type of travel document The modernization of border controls and achieved even with new technologies. they can use to transit which type of border associated systems will comprise numerous control. Tests carried out at Frankfurt Air- important aspects of Schengen treaties. In this context, it is also fair to note that port have shown that EES-compliant Further legal developments relating to the that the EES is of questionable efficacy in identity checks on average take one minute Schengen Acquis are still undergoing con- security terms, contrary to the communica- longer than those without EES. In terms of sultation processes in Switzerland. On the tions of the EU Commission. In particular, time-saving considerations, it would there- one hand, these relate to the introduction it is likely that this new feature will mainly fore make sense to check citizens of non- of new systems such as the European Trav- heighten the deterrent potential, eliminate member states at different desks or eGates el Information and Authorisation System ambiguity in identity checks, and contrib- than the EU and EFTA passengers. At air- (ETIAS) and the overhaul of the Schen- ute to a general modernization of border ports that are less busy such as , Lu- gen Information System (SIS II). These controls. Significant security gains would gano, Sion, or St. Gallen, passport checks necessary adjustments will very likely result require more comprehensive adaptations at will first be carried out at a booth window, in new systems that are technically and lo- the national and supranational levels. In since eGates are too expensive. Checkpoint gistically more complex than EES. In order the context of terrorism, the perpetrators booths can also be EES-compliant if they to allow the border authorities to carry out have usually proven to be citizens of the are equipped with a camera and fingerprint their duties effectively in the future, dy- countries in question and were in fact often reader. namic and flexible adaptations to ongoing registered as security risks in certain data- and future development will be required. bases, but were overlooked due to blind Considerations of state policy, such as Complexity is likely to increase in the fu- spots in preventive policing attributable to Switzerland’s federal structure, are signifi- ture, and will bring growing challenges for a lack of information exchange. Thus, in cant for the implementation of EES, which personnel. Switzerland, too, EES could give an impe- manifests itself in particular at airports. tus towards complementing both the pro- Each of the country’s three main airports Thus, a partial automation of border con- tection of Europe’s external borders and handles border control responsibilities dif- trols with a fairly comprehensive scope of the Schengen Information System through ferently. While the cantonal police is in human control will not replace the work of a national harmonization of cantonal po- charge of border controls at Zurich Air- the responsible authorities, but rather com- lice data. In the coming years, numerous port, in , it is the Swiss Border plement it. Neither is there any cause for systems will become obsolete, creating an Guard that serves as the first line of con- concern from an ethical point of view, at opportunity to replace these systems in a trol, with the cantonal police having only a least for the time being. Technological sup- sensible, sustainable, intelligent and effi- subsidiary role. At the EuroAirport in Ba- port for border controls is transparent, ex- cient way and adapting them to complex sel, the Swiss corps carries plicable, and not subject to a fully autono- security requirements. out identity checks in cooperation with the mous decision-making process. French border authority, the Police aux Nevertheless, a development leading to Frontières (PAF). This means that training complete automation cannot be entirely of the staff members responsible for border excluded. Identity checks at borders of all controls in connection with EES takes kinds have always been geared towards fil- Julian Kamasa is a Researcher at the Center for place in accordance with the respective re- tering out individuals considered to be Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. He conducts sponsibilities at the airports and not in cer- risks from the broad mass of people. If this research on Swiss and European security policy, tain units of a department. Therefore, the is done with automated systems and using with a special focus on artificial intelligence and SEM will implement EES together with Artificial Intelligence, Europe is likely to new technologies.

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