The Rise of the Islamists

may/ june 2o11 The Rise of the Islamists How Islamists Will Change Politics, and Vice Versa Shadi Hamid Volume 9o • Number 3 The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©2o11 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.org/permissions for more information. The Rise of the Islamists How Islamists Will Change Politics, and Vice Versa Shadi Hamid For decades, U.S. policy toward the Middle There is no question that democracy East has been paralyzed by “the Islamist will make the region more unpredictable dilemma”—how can the United States and some governments there less amenable promote democracy in the region without to U.S. security interests. At their core, risking bringing Islamists to power? Now, however, mainstream Islamist organiza- it seems, the United States no longer has tions, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in a choice. Popular revolutions have swept Egypt and Jordan and al Nahda in Tunisia, U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes from have strong pragmatic tendencies. When power in Tunisia and Egypt and put Libya’s their survival has required it, they have on notice. If truly democratic governments proved willing to compromise their form in their wake, they are likely to in- ideology and make di⁄cult choices. clude significant representation of main- To guide the new, rapidly evolving stream Islamist groups. Like it or not, the Middle East in a favorable direction, United States will have to learn to live the United States should play to these with political Islam. instincts by entering into a strategic Washington tends to question whether dialogue with the region’s Islamist Islamists’ religious commitments can co- groups and parties. Through engage- exist with respect for democracy, pluralism, ment, the United States can encourage and women’s rights. But what the United these Islamists to respect key Western States really fears are the kinds of foreign interests, including advancing the Arab- policies such groups might pursue. Unlike Israeli peace process, countering Iran, the Middle East’s pro-Western autocracies, and combating terrorism. It will be bet- Islamists have a distinctive, albeit vague, ter to develop such ties with opposition conception of an Arab world that is confi- groups now, while the United States still dent, independent, and willing to project has leverage, rather than later, after they influence beyond its borders. are already in power. Shadi Hamid is Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. [40] The Rise of the Islamists in 2005 called Reintroducing the Brother- SMART POLITICS hood to the West. The Middle East’s mainstream Islamist When it comes to foreign policy, movements, most of which are branches mainstream Islamists have rhetorically or descendants of the Egyptian Muslim retained much of the Muslim Brother- Brotherhood, began as single-issue parties, hood’s original Arab nationalism and preoccupied with proselytizing and insti- anti-Israel politics. Today’s Egyptian tuting sharia law. Beginning in the 1990s, and Libyan Muslim Brotherhoods and however, for various reasons in each case, Tunisia’s al Nahda refuse to recognize they increasingly focused on democratic Israel’s right to exist and call for the lib- reform, publicly committing themselves to eration of all of historic Palestine. They the alternation of power, popular sover- also view Hamas not as a terrorist group eignty, and judicial independence. That but as a legitimate force of resistance. said, Islamists are not, and will not become, Still, Islamist groups did not create the liberals. They remain staunch social con- anti-Israel sentiment that exists in Arab servatives and invariably hold views that societies; they simply reflect and amplify most Americans would find distasteful, it. In a 2005 Pew Global Attitudes poll, including that women’s rights should be 100 percent of Jordanians polled were limited and the sexes segregated. Given found to hold unfavorable views of Jews. the chance, they will certainly try to In Morocco, home to the Arab world’s pursue socially conservative legislation. largest Jewish community, the figure was Yet to the consternation of their own 88 percent. The Middle East provides conservative bases, the region’s main- such fertile ground for public posturing stream Islamist groups have also shown against Israel that many groups—not only considerable flexibility on core ideologi- Islamists but also leftists and national- cal concerns. Despite popular support in ists—seek to outdo one another in the Arab world for the implementation demonstrating their dislike for Israel. of sharia, for example, many Islamist A country’s physical proximity to the groups, including the Egyptian Muslim Israeli-Palestinian conflict informs how Brotherhood, have gradually stripped their aggressive such posturing is. It is no political platforms of explicitly Islamist accident that Jordan’s Islamic Action content. In the past few years, instead Front—the political arm of the Jorda- of calling for an “Islamic state,” for ex- nian Muslim Brotherhood—is one of the ample, the Muslim Brotherhood began more vehemently anti-Israel Islamist calling for a “civil, democratic state with groups in the Arab world, given that a an Islamic reference,” suggesting a new- majority of the Jordanian population is found commitment to the separation of of Palestinian origin. Unlike many of its mosque and state (although not of religion counterparts, the iaf still uses religious and politics). This move seems to have language to frame the conflict; in its 2007 been deliberately aimed, at least in part, electoral platform, the party a⁄rmed that at alleviating international fears; with the the conflict between the Israelis and the goal of improving its image, moreover, Palestinians is “theological and civiliza- the group launched an internal initiative tional,” and not one of borders or territories, foreign affairs . May / June 2011 [41] as many groups now frame it. The iaf’s so- called hawks, who tend to be of Palestinian origin, advocate even closer ties with Hamas. In Algeria and Tunisia, by con- trast, Palestine ranks much lower as a priority for local Islamists. FROM SHADOW TO STAGE Although most Islamist groups share a broadly similar ideology, their expression of it has diªered depending on their unique domestic and regional constraints and whether the group happens to be included in government. When a group is not included in government, and the ruling elite is unpopular and generally pro-Western, Islamists are more likely to define themselves in opposition to the government’s policies to garner support. Taking a hard line against Israel, for example, has been an eªective way for Islamists in opposition to criticize regimes that they see as beholden to Western interests and antidemocratic. For example, before Jordan’s 2007 parliamentary elections, the iaf released a statement arguing that freedoms in Jordan had diminished after Amman signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Their attempt to connect pro-Israel policy with a loss of freedom was convincing, because it happened to be true. In 1989, before the treaty, Jordan had held free elections for the first time in decades, and Islamists and nationalists won a majority of the seats. the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and But with peace with Israel on the horizon al Nahda will likely try to move from in the early 1990s, the king grew increas- the opposition into coalition or unity ingly more autocratic, dismissing the governments. During the euphoria of parliament and enacting a new electoral the democratic transition, new political law designed to limit Islamists’ power parties—perhaps including Salafi groups at the polls. that are more hard-line than the older As political systems across the Middle Islamist organizations—will proliferate. East open up, Islamist groups such as As the parties compete for votes, the . [42] foreign affairs Volume 90 No. 3 incentives for Islamists to indulge in anti- a full electoral slate; the Egyptian Muslim American posturing to win the votes of the Brotherhood, for example, has explicitly faithful may be greater. stated that it will not seek a parliamentary Once actually in government, however, majority. Islamists will be satisfied with a new set of constraints and incentives will dominating narrower parts of the gov- prevail. Rather than ruling, Islamists will ernment. They are likely to try to gain likely be partners in coalition or national influence in ministries such as health and unity governments. Indeed, none of the Is- justice, while avoiding more sensitive port- lamist groups in question even plans to run folios, such as defense and foreign aªairs. foreign affairs . May / June 2011 [43] Shadi Hamid Notably, the Middle East’s generally voted for it: the Bush administration secular security establishments have been exerted heavy pressure and oªered billions hesitant in the past to hand over control of dollars in aid. And even Hamas—still of defense and foreign aªairs to Islamists. regarded as the most radical of the main- Consider, for example, Necmettin Erbakan, stream Islamist groups—tempered its the former leader of Turkey’s Welfare policies toward Israel after its 2006 electoral Party, who was elected prime minister in victory, saying it would accept the 1967 1996, making him the first-ever democrat- borders between Israel and the Palestinian ically elected Islamist head of government territories. anywhere. Before coming to power, For similar reasons, even before coming Erbakan had routinely denounced Israel to power, some o⁄cials in the Egyptian and pledged to revisit existing military and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods arrangements with the Jewish state. Yet have explicitly stated that they would once in o⁄ce and faced with a powerful respect their countries’ peace treaties with secular military and judicial establishment, Israel (although others have threatened he reversed course.

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