may/ june 2o11

The Rise of the Islamists

How Islamists Will Change Politics, and Vice Versa Shadi Hamid

Volume 9o • Number 3

The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©2o11 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.org/permissions for more information. The Rise of the Islamists

How Islamists Will Change Politics, and Vice Versa Shadi Hamid

For decades, U.S. policy toward the Middle There is no question that democracy East has been paralyzed by “the Islamist will make the region more unpredictable dilemma”—how can the United States and some governments there less amenable promote democracy in the region without to U.S. security interests. At their core, risking bringing Islamists to power? Now, however, mainstream Islamist organiza- it seems, the United States no longer has tions, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in a choice. Popular revolutions have swept Egypt and Jordan and al Nahda in Tunisia, U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes from have strong pragmatic tendencies. When power in Tunisia and Egypt and put Libya’s their survival has required it, they have on notice. If truly democratic governments proved willing to compromise their form in their wake, they are likely to in- ideology and make di⁄cult choices. clude significant representation of main- To guide the new, rapidly evolving stream Islamist groups. Like it or not, the Middle East in a favorable direction, United States will have to learn to live the United States should play to these with political Islam. instincts by entering into a strategic Washington tends to question whether dialogue with the region’s Islamist Islamists’ religious commitments can co- groups and parties. Through engage- exist with respect for democracy, pluralism, ment, the United States can encourage and women’s rights. But what the United these Islamists to respect key Western States really fears are the kinds of foreign interests, including advancing the Arab- policies such groups might pursue. Unlike Israeli peace process, countering Iran, the Middle East’s pro-Western autocracies, and combating terrorism. It will be bet- Islamists have a distinctive, albeit vague, ter to develop such ties with opposition conception of an Arab world that is confi- groups now, while the United States still dent, independent, and willing to project has leverage, rather than later, after they influence beyond its borders. are already in power.

Shadi Hamid is Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

[40] The Rise of the Islamists in 2005 called Reintroducing the Brother- SMART POLITICS hood to the West. The Middle East’s mainstream Islamist When it comes to foreign policy, movements, most of which are branches mainstream Islamists have rhetorically or descendants of the Egyptian Muslim retained much of the Muslim Brother- Brotherhood, began as single-issue parties, hood’s original Arab nationalism and preoccupied with proselytizing and insti- anti-Israel politics. Today’s Egyptian tuting sharia law. Beginning in the 1990s, and Libyan Muslim Brotherhoods and however, for various reasons in each case, Tunisia’s al Nahda refuse to recognize they increasingly focused on democratic Israel’s right to exist and call for the lib- reform, publicly committing themselves to eration of all of historic Palestine. They the alternation of power, popular sover- also view Hamas not as a terrorist group eignty, and judicial independence. That but as a legitimate force of resistance. said, Islamists are not, and will not become, Still, Islamist groups did not create the liberals. They remain staunch social con- anti-Israel sentiment that exists in Arab servatives and invariably hold views that societies; they simply reflect and amplify most Americans would find distasteful, it. In a 2005 Pew Global Attitudes poll, including that women’s rights should be 100 percent of Jordanians polled were limited and the sexes segregated. Given found to hold unfavorable views of Jews. the chance, they will certainly try to In Morocco, home to the Arab world’s pursue socially conservative legislation. largest Jewish community, the figure was Yet to the consternation of their own 88 percent. The Middle East provides conservative bases, the region’s main- such fertile ground for public posturing stream Islamist groups have also shown against Israel that many groups—not only considerable flexibility on core ideologi- Islamists but also leftists and national- cal concerns. Despite popular support in ists—seek to outdo one another in the Arab world for the implementation demonstrating their dislike for Israel. of sharia, for example, many Islamist A country’s physical proximity to the groups, including the Egyptian Muslim Israeli-Palestinian conflict informs how Brotherhood, have gradually stripped their aggressive such posturing is. It is no political platforms of explicitly Islamist accident that Jordan’s Islamic Action content. In the past few years, instead Front—the political arm of the Jorda- of calling for an “Islamic state,” for ex- nian Muslim Brotherhood—is one of the ample, the Muslim Brotherhood began more vehemently anti-Israel Islamist calling for a “civil, democratic state with groups in the Arab world, given that a an Islamic reference,” suggesting a new- majority of the Jordanian population is found commitment to the separation of of Palestinian origin. Unlike many of its mosque and state (although not of religion counterparts, the iaf still uses religious and politics). This move seems to have language to frame the conflict; in its 2007 been deliberately aimed, at least in part, electoral platform, the party a⁄rmed that at alleviating international fears; with the the conflict between the Israelis and the goal of improving its image, moreover, Palestinians is “theological and civiliza- the group launched an internal initiative tional,” and not one of borders or territories,

foreign affairs . May / June 2011 [41] as many groups now frame it. The iaf’s so- called hawks, who tend to be of Palestinian origin, advocate even closer ties with Hamas. In Algeria and Tunisia, by con- trast, Palestine ranks much lower as a priority for local Islamists.

FROM SHADOW TO STAGE Although most Islamist groups share a broadly similar ideology, their expression of it has diªered depending on their unique domestic and regional constraints and whether the group happens to be included in government. When a group is not included in government, and the ruling elite is unpopular and generally pro-Western, Islamists are more likely to define themselves in opposition to the government’s policies to garner support. Taking a hard line against Israel, for example, has been an eªective way for Islamists in opposition to criticize regimes that they see as beholden to Western interests and antidemocratic. For exam- ple, before Jordan’s 2007 parliamentary elections, the iaf released a statement arguing that freedoms in Jordan had diminished after Amman signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Their attempt to connect pro-Israel policy with a loss of freedom was convincing, because it happened to be true. In 1989, before the treaty, Jordan had held free elections for the first time in decades, and Islamists and nationalists won a majority of the seats. the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and But with peace with Israel on the horizon al Nahda will likely try to move from in the early 1990s, the king grew increas- the opposition into coalition or unity ingly more autocratic, dismissing the governments. During the euphoria of parliament and enacting a new electoral the democratic transition, new political law designed to limit Islamists’ power parties—perhaps including Salafi groups at the polls. that are more hard-line than the older As political systems across the Middle Islamist organizations—will proliferate. East open up, Islamist groups such as As the parties compete for votes, the

. [42] foreign affairs Volume 90 No. 3 incentives for Islamists to indulge in anti- a full electoral slate; the Egyptian Muslim American posturing to win the votes of the Brotherhood, for example, has explicitly faithful may be greater. stated that it will not seek a parliamentary Once actually in government, however, majority. Islamists will be satisfied with a new set of constraints and incentives will dominating narrower parts of the gov- prevail. Rather than ruling, Islamists will ernment. They are likely to try to gain likely be partners in coalition or national influence in ministries such as health and unity governments. Indeed, none of the Is- justice, while avoiding more sensitive port- lamist groups in question even plans to run folios, such as defense and foreign aªairs.

foreign affairs . May / June 2011 [43] Shadi Hamid Notably, the Middle East’s generally voted for it: the Bush administration secular security establishments have been exerted heavy pressure and oªered billions hesitant in the past to hand over control of dollars in aid. And even Hamas—still of defense and foreign aªairs to Islamists. regarded as the most radical of the main- Consider, for example, Necmettin Erbakan, stream Islamist groups—tempered its the former leader of Turkey’s Welfare policies toward Israel after its 2006 electoral Party, who was elected prime minister in victory, saying it would accept the 1967 1996, making him the first-ever democrat- borders between Israel and the Palestinian ically elected Islamist head of government territories. anywhere. Before coming to power, For similar reasons, even before coming Erbakan had routinely denounced Israel to power, some o⁄cials in the Egyptian and pledged to revisit existing military and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods arrangements with the Jewish state. Yet have explicitly stated that they would once in o⁄ce and faced with a powerful respect their countries’ peace treaties with secular military and judicial establishment, Israel (although others have threatened he reversed course. During his one year to leave the organization if it ever recog- in o⁄ce, Erbakan presided over a deep- nizes Israel). Despite the recent alarm, ening of relations with Israel and signed if Islamists join a coalition government military agreements that allowed Israeli in Egypt, moderation will likely prevail, pilots to train in Turkish airspace. His and the country’s 1979 Camp David peace government also set up joint naval drills agreement with Israel will be accepted, with Israel in the Mediterranean. however reluctantly, as a fact of life. Moreover, mainstream Islamist groups are surprisingly sensitive to international ACCIDENTALLY ALIGNED opinion. They remember the outcry that Islamist and U.S. interests can come to- followed Islamist electoral victories in gether almost incidentally as well. The Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian terri- Syrian Muslim Brotherhood—brutally tories in 2006 and know that a great deal is repressed by President Hafez al-Assad at stake—hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1980s—has long shared U.S. fears of Western assistance, loans from inter- of a powerful Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah national financial institutions, and trade axis. Its opposition to the Syrian regime and investment. Islamists are well aware is well documented; the government made that getting tied up in controversial foreign mere membership in the Brotherhood policy eªorts would cause the international punishable by death. Like the United community to withdraw support from the States, the group has often criticized Iran new democracies, thus undermining as a dangerous sectarian regime intent the prospects for a successful transition. on projecting Shiite influence across the That is why, for example, in 2003, Arab world. Defying public opinion, although Turkey’s staunchly secular Syrian Muslim Brotherhood figures Republican People’s Party overwhelmingly even criticized Hezbollah for provoking voted against supporting the U.S.-led Israel to attack Lebanon in 2006. war in Iraq, most of the ruling Islamist- Similarly, the Lebanese Muslim Brother- leaning Justice and Development Party hood, known as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya,

. [44] foreign affairs Volume 90 No. 3 has opposed Syria and Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon and allied itself with the pro-U.S. March 14 alliance. Elsewhere, mainstream Sunni Islamists, while ap- plauding Iran’s support of Palestinian resistance, have been careful to maintain their distance from the Shiite clerical regime, which they see as a deviation The Internship from traditional Islamic governance. This is not to say that the United Program States has nothing to be concerned about. The Council on Foreign Relations is seeking Democratic governments reflect popular talented individuals who are considering a career in international relations. sentiment, and in the Middle East, this Interns are recruited year-round on a semester sentiment is firmly against Israel and U.S. basis to work in both the New York City and hegemony in the region. If the Arab- Washington, D.C., offices. An intern’s duties Israeli conflict persists or, worse, war generally consist of administrative work, breaks out, Middle Eastern governments— editing and writing, and event coordination. Islamist or not—will come under pres- The Council considers both undergraduate sure to take a strong stand in support of and graduate students with majors in International Relations, Political Science, Palestinian rights. Economics, or a related field for its internship In mature and young democracies alike, program. such pressure can be di⁄cult to resist. A regional specialization and language skills The case of Jordan in the early 1990s is may also be required for some positions. In worth considering. In 1991, the Muslim addition to meeting the intellectual Brotherhood, which had won a plurality requirements, applicants should have excellent skills in administration, writing, and research, of the vote in the 1989 elections, gained and a command of word processing, control of five ministries, including edu- spreadsheet applications, and the Internet. cation, health, justice, religious aªairs, and To apply for an internship, please send a social development, as part of a short-lived résumé and cover letter including the coalition government. (This marked the semester, days, and times available to work to first time—and one of the only times— the Internship Coordinator in the Human Resources Office at the address listed below. the Brotherhood has held executive power Please refer to the Council’s Web site for anywhere in the world.) When, in late specific opportunities. The Council is an equal 1990, the United States began preparing opportunity employer. to take military action against Saddam Hussein in response to his invasion of Kuwait, Jordan’s parliament condemned the Western aggression and intensified its pressure on King Hussein to oppose the Council on Foreign Relations Human Resources Office U.S. intervention—which he did, despite 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065 the obvious international consequences. tel: 212.434.9400 fax: 212.434.9893 For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood—a [email protected] http://www.cfr.org staunch opponent of Saddam’s secular

[45] Shadi Hamid regime—at first spoke out against the Iraqi view, central in propagating. At their core, aggression and expressed full support for the revolutions sweeping the Middle East Kuwait. But as Jordanians took to the are about dignity and self-determination. streets to protest the war, the Brotherhood For the protesters, dignity will mean play- reversed course, riding the wave of anti- ing a more active and independent role Americanism to even greater popularity. in the region. The moment of apparent convergence between Islamists and the THE ISLAMIST EXPERIMENT United States during the revolutions does So what does all of this mean for Tunisia, not mean that they will—or should— Egypt, and other countries facing popu- agree on all foreign policy questions in lar upheaval? Like many others, Muslim the future. Brotherhood activists in Egypt’s Tahrir During the uprisings, the protesters Square broke into applause when, on Feb- have sensed that U.S. pressure on the ruary 1, U.S. President Barack Obama autocratic regimes would prove critical called for a meaningful and immediate to their success. Like any political group, transition to genuine democracy in Egypt. Islamists are more cautious when they Numerous Muslim Brotherhood members are vulnerable. But once Islamist groups even said they wished the Obama admin- solidify their position, they will have less istration would more forcefully push for patience for U.S. hectoring on Israel or Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. Meanwhile, the peace process. Already, they have Sobhi Saleh, the only Brotherhood mem- started speaking more openly about their ber on the country’s newly established regional ambitions. On February 17, constitutional committee, told The Wall Mohammed Badie, the Egyptian Muslim Street Journal that his organization was Brotherhood’s “general guide,” stated that “much closer to the Turkish example,” sug- the revolution “must be a starting point gesting that the Brotherhood would evolve for Egypt to take up its place in the world in a more pragmatic, moderate direction. again, through recognizing the importance For their part, the Western media have of our responsibilities toward our nations tended to idealize the revolutions sweep- and defending them and their legitimate ing the Middle East. Tahrir Square was demands.” Meanwhile, Hammam Said, portrayed as a postideological utopia and the hard-line leader of the Jordanian Egyptians as pro-American liberals in the Muslim Brotherhood put it more bluntly: making. True, Egyptians (and Tunisians “America must think seriously about and Libyans) have wanted democracy changing its policy in the region, for for decades and showed during their people will no longer remain submissive revolution a knack for protest, peaceful to its dictates.” expression, and self-governance. It will take a while for the new gov- But for all the changes of the past ernments in Tunisia and Egypt to form months, the United States remains a cogent foreign policies, but Washington status quo power in a region undergoing should start thinking ahead to mitigate the radical change. Arabs across the region long-term risks. In the transition phase, have been protesting an authoritarian the introduction of constitutional and order that the United States was, in their institutional reforms to devolve power

. [46] foreign affairs Volume 90 No. 3 The Rise of the Islamists will be critical. Proportional electoral accommodation with Israel, this will systems that encourage the formation eªectively resolve other Islamist groups’ of coalition governments may be better Israel problem. Emboldened by the rev- than majoritarian systems because they olutions, however, Hamas is unlikely to would make foreign policy formulation be so cooperative. a process of negotiation among many For decades, Islamists postponed the parties, necessarily moderating the result. di⁄cult question of what they would do Already, most mainstream Islamists have in power for a simple reason: the prospect significant overlapping interests with the of power seemed so remote. But the United States, such as seeing al Qaeda democratic wave sweeping the region dismantled, policing terrorism, improving has brought Islamists to the fore. What living standards and economic conditions comes next may be the Arab world’s across the Arab world, and consolidating first sustained experiment in Islamist democratic governance. integration. Fortunately, for all their By initiating regular, substantive dia- anti-Americanism, mainstream Islamists logue with Islamist groups to work on have a strong pragmatic streak. If they areas of agreement and discuss key foreign have not already, they will need to come policy concerns, the United States might to terms with regional realities. And, for discover more convergence of interests its part, the United States—and the rest than it expects. Indeed, one of the few of the international community—will need low-level dialogues the United States has to finally come to terms with Islamists.∂ had with an Islamist group—that with Morocco’s Justice and Development Party—has been successful, leading the party to be relatively restrained in its criticism of the United States. At any rate, the revolutions have made the short- sightedness of current U.S. policy— studiously avoiding formal contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded groups—clear. The West knows much less about Egypt’s most powerful opposition force than it should, and could. The United States can take precautions—and it should—but this does not alter an unavoidable reality. Anti- Israel public opinion will remain a feature of Middle Eastern politics until a final and equitable peace treaty is struck. Whether that happens anytime soon will depend in part on Hamas. If Hamas finally joins a national unity government in the Palestin- ian territories that then negotiates an

foreign affairs . May / June 2011 [47]