MENNEN Southern Africa Vol. 6No. 1 D- CD July 1990

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, MAY 7. RomtJLITM ,&fyAgm Vol. 6 No. 1 6--7 REPORT July 1990 Contents

Editorial: Whose Media? ......

Keeping the Right Image: The Mainstream Media in South Africa ......

When Actors Become Authors Radical Communications In The 1980s ......

Perish or Publish: Southern Africa Consolidating the Alternative Voice ...... REPORT Hard Pressed: is produced 5 times a year by a Bi-Cameral Racism and the Globe and Mail ...... volunteer collective of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) The I Love Lucy Show: 427 Bloor St. W. The "Taking Strides" Consultative Forum, May, 1990 Toronto, M5S 1X7 Tel. (416) 967-5562 Building Civil Society: Submissions, suggestions and help in Moses Mayekiso Interviewed ...... 21 production are welcome and invited. ISSN 0820-5582 Nicaragua Revisited? SAR is a member of the Canadian Peace and Democracy in Angola Magazine Publishers Association. Subscriptions Zimbabwe Ten Years After: Prospects for a Popular Politics . .. Annual TCLSAC membership and Southern Africa Report subscription rates are as follows: SUBSCRIPTION: Individual (1 year) . ... $18.00 Individual (2 years) . ... $35.00 SAR Collective Institution ...... $35.00 Chris Cavanagh, David Cooke, MEMBERSHIP: (includes subscription) David Galbraith, Dave Hartman, Carole Houlihan, Johan Jacobs, Regular ...... $35.00 Jay Jervis, Judith Marshall, Alberto Mourato, Unemployed John S. Saul, Joe Vise, Anne Webb, Student ...... $18.00 Maureen Webb, Barbara Willey Senior Sustainer ...... over $100.00 Overseas add $5.00 Cover design by Hartman Cover photos by Afrapix & Hartman ______I Second class mail registration N~ '844 at Action Print Printed byby Union La3bourLabour at Action Print .N t - - Second class mail registration 844 Whose Media? Philosophy 101. If a tree falls in the vering attention of the fickle and fad South Africa! It is no more of an forest and no-one is there to hear dish international media themselves. accident - as Jo-Anne Collinge and its fall, does it really make a noise? Beyond fads, however, there is David Niddrie reveal in our lead ar Communications 101. If a revolu also the question of power. It is ticle - that powerful media voices tion is taking place and television a truism to say that, left uncon inside South Africa itself are seek cameras fail to record it, is it really tested, the mainstream media re ing to shape perceptions of the ne taking place? flects primarily the opinions and in gotiations process in ways similarly terests of the politically and eco unsympathetic to the imperatives of The latter is a question the anti genuine change. apartheid movement has had to ask nomically powerful. And this is no itself many times over the years. less true for Canada than it is for However, in South Africa (if not When the apartheid government had South Africa. It is no accident that in Canada) the very success of the some success in suppressing media Toronto's Globe and Mail (see the popular movement that has forced coverage of events in South Africa article entitled "Hard Pressed") now negotiations onto the agenda has also begun to force hard questions and in keeping the starkest im finds itself sympathetic not - heaven ages off the small screen in Canada forbid - to apartheid, but certainly regarding the media out into the and elsewhere public concern for the to the "reasonable" efforts of the open. There is certainly an im struggle tended to recede. Equally South African government to consti petus to do so that carries over important have been the ebbs and tutionally protect "property rights" from the precedents established as flows of coverage imposed by the wa- from "majority tyranny" in a new part of the broad-gauged struggle for

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 democracy of recent years: as Don here at home. Recent issues of SAR still very far from committing itself Pinnock demonstrates in this issue have suggested something of the de to an "irreversible" process of de ("When Actors Become Authors"), bates that swirl within the south mocratization. True, too, that Can guerilla communications - the de ern Africa support network around ada has, in recent years, supported velopment of alternate media - has such issues as how best to relate to a a number of quite positive initiatives been one key means by which the Mozambique whose original revolu on the ground inside South Africa democratic movement has succeeded tionary trajectory has been substan if not supporting, in any very mean in undermining the repressive status tially altered. And similarly com ingful way, the ANC itself. quo. Yet it is an even greater chal plex questions spring from analyses lenge to now contemplate the struc in this issue of the troubled situa But surely no reader of Linda turing, on entirely new premises and tions in Angola and Zimbabwe. Freeman's annual surveys of Cana on a society-wide basis, of a full dian policy in these pages can doubt blown democratic network of com There is also the very consider the slipperiness of official Canada's munications, particularly when the able challenge of effectively charac anti-apartheid stance - not least society is one as hierarchical and as terizing a quickly changing South on the very issue of the imple complex as that of South Africa. African scene (the discussion of mentation of sanctions, for exam the interplay between "civil society" ple. Nor can there be much doubt Certainly, the wielders of me and the political realm broached by that a free-trading, welfare-bashing dia power are not prepared to pro Moses Mayekiso in the interview re Tory government will be far less en vide a stationary target for such counted here providing particularly thusiastic about the need for dra an effort. As Collinge and Nid rich food for thought in this respect) matic socio-economic changes in a drie also reveal, such actors as the and of moving forward to link sup formally-democratic, post-apartheid South African Broadcasting Corpo portively to fresh developments in South Africa than will most anti ration and the Argus Group are side South Africa. Indeed, this lat apartheid activists. Indeed, we have already moving quickly to protect ter challenge premised much of the made the point editorially before themselves and their privileged role debate at a recent national meet ("Opportunism Knocks," SAR, De in the production of ideology by ing of Canadian anti-apartheid ac cember, 1988) that on those occa preemptive means (by privatization, tivists, the "Taking Strides" Consul sions when the Canadian govern for example, and by the whipping tative Forum held in Ottawa on the ment has taken a relatively advanced up of hysteria about the threat of weekend of 4-6 May. position on South African questions, nationalization). Indeed, the very it has done so precisely to rein in, complexity of the challenges that As will be seen from our re by preemptive action, a process of are beginning to arise regarding the port on the Forum ("The I Love change in South Africa that might democratization of the media (in Lucy Show"), the question of how otherwise become too radical. cluding, as another example, in the best to position South Africa's sphere of progressive publishing here leading liberation movement, the Confrontation, then? Not for its analyzed by Glenn Moss) provides African National Congress, within own sake certainly, although this is an exemplary case-study of the kinds the Canadian anti-apartheid move what anti-apartheid moderates, at of dilemmas that face a democratic ment gave rise to some controversy. the Ottawa Forum and elsewhere, movement - if, as and when it comes More startlingly, however, contro seem to seek to imply when they to power - in virtually evcry sphere versy emerged around the question wave the term around in an attempt of South African life. of what stance the Canadian move to discredit their critics. What is re ment should be adopting towards quired, however, is unremitting pop Not that the ANC or anyone else the Tory government in Ottawa re ular pressure, the better to realize professes to have any easy answers garding the latter's South Africa some very concrete goals. The bet to the media question - as the state policy. Should our stance vis-a-vis ter to keep the Canadian govern ments cited by Collinge and Niddrie the government be "conciliatory" or, ment honest on sanctions. The bet from ANC national executive mem as moderates at the Consultative Fo ter to encourage it to support, ever ber Aziz Pahad make clear. For the rum sought to pigeon-hole the alter more overtly and wholeheartedly, moment, however, what is impor native position with which they dis the true protagonists of change in tant is that changing conditions at agreed, "confrontational"? South Africa (especially the ANC). last begin to make it possible to pose The better to make it as difficult as such questions concretely and in a It is true that the Canadian gov possible for our government to "reasonably" fall in promising manner. ernment has been slower than many behind outcomes (con * * * other western governments to ques stitutional or otherwise) to negotia tion the necessity of sustaining sanc tions in South Africa that could help If no glib answers are available tions in order to bring pressure to undermine real political and socio in South Africa, this is equally true bear on a South African government economic democratization.

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT Keeping the Right Image: The Mainstream Media in South Africa

BY JO-ANNE COLLINGE 9z turing communication between sig talk to the ANC? Probably not, talks are in DAVID NIDDRIE nificant business figures and leaders but the Groote Schuur of the Mass Democratic Movement tune with the times. The fact that Jo-Anne Collinge and David Niddrie within South Africa. they are happening - regardless of are journalists based in Johannesburg whether any sticking points emerge Eloff argues that "radicals" at working for Work In Progress - is the most hopeful sign for a both ends of the political spectrum peaceful resolution of South Africa's Since De Klerk lifted the restrictions are ensuring that the ANC and the on the African National Congress National Party are interdependent. conflicts that has yet emerged." and other banned political organiza "In the transitional period, the ANC However, in tandem with such tions on February 2, released Man and the National Party should be acknowledgements, most major dela and started on the path towards come constitutional allies," he says. newspapers and the state-controlled negotiating with the ANC, there has "And this should be welcomed and South African Broadcasting Corpo been a startling similarity in the encouraged by all right-thinking and ration (SABC) have given promi political messages projected by the peace-loving South Africans." nence to critics of specific ANC poli National Party, the state-controlled re cies. media and major commercial news This single page in Rapport recurrent themes in the Under particular attack are the papers. flects two political tune the media are cur notions of simple majoritarianism This new-found unity has some rently singing - recognizing the le a one-person-one-vote system with thing to do with the National Party gitimacy of the ANC and giving a out concessions to "minority" or moving into political territory long lot of space to criticizing its policies. "group" rights; economic policy, es contemplated by more liberal but pecially nationalization; and the The ANC, after nearly 30 years less powerful white groups. But it ANC's longstanding and staunch al of illegality, has been restored not also has an air of the privileged few liance with the South African Com sinking their differences in the inter only to legality but to unprece Its mas munist Party. ests of controlling change. And one dented political legitimacy. Surprisingly, some of the strong of the most important changes they sive constituency has been graphi are working towards is to ensure cally displayed in the papers and on est criticism came from the liberal coverage of that a majority government does not television, with extensive national daily, Business Day. Editor Ken Owen has declared one-person control the media as the apartheid the mass rallies addressed by Nelson one-vote undesirable but inevitable. regime has done. Mandela and other ANC leaders. "There is no escape from one man, Managing reform Sympathetic coverage one vote, or from majority rule." "South Africa has only just put be The first face-to-face talks between Owen calls on liberals to fight hind it more than a decade of crisis the government and ANC on May to ensure that "the power to op management. What is needed now is 2 in the run-up to negotiations, re press be subjected to every possible effective management of reform. It ceived massive and sympathetic cov curb and restraint." The Afrikaans must be accepted that every step to erage. Newspapers across the lan daily, Beeld, also concerned to pre wards reform will feed black expec guage divide sought out the colour serve the rights of minorities, has tations and white fears. Therefore, and the human asides in the historic been milder in its presentation of reform must be managed so that nei moment. But above all, they strove the case. Positioning itself be ther of the two elements can become to stress the element of progress hind the 12-point plan for protection uncontrollable," read an editorial in the possibility of discovering suffi of minorities outlined by Constitu a May edition of the Afrikaans week cient common ground from which to tional Development Minister Gerrit end paper, Rapport. launch true negotiations. Viljoen, Beeld charges the govern On the same leader page was a As the talks-about- talks pro ment with the task of persuading piece by Dr. Theuns Eloff, executive gressed through three days, the the ANC by "taking the sting out of director of the Consultative Business largest daily paper, The Star, edito well-intentioned proposals" (group Movement, an organization which rialized: "Did the government have rights, for example), by ensuring for almost two years has been nur- a mandate from the electorate to that nothing smacks of racism.

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 Unanimity or a shoot out structuring on this premise for some And with well over half the adult time. population functionally illiterate The objective, says Beeld, is to But if the owners of South thus exclusively reliant on radio or "chafe away at representative view Africa's print and electronic media TV for anything other than word points until a workable unanimity are happy with the negotiating pro of-mouth information - SABC ex is achieved. The choice is this ap cess, they are less so with the idea ercises a powerful influence on the proach or shooting it out." of the ANC intervening in any mean thinking and attitudes of millions of One of the areas where a lot of ingful way in the country's media af South Africans. public chafing has occurred in the ter apartheid. media is the economy - the questions of nationalization and redistribution of wealth and resources. It is no ac cident that The Star, in an editorial before the Groote Schuur, urged the ANC to drop the notion of nation alization (and the government stop enforcing the race classification law, the Population Registration Act) to "reduce friction" during talks.

The National Party mouthpiece, Die Burger, at the same stage car ried a cartoon in which a sculptor creating an image of the ANC, re marks: "I can't improve your image with all the baggage you're carry ing." The baggage being national ization, SACP general secretary Joe Slovo and an AK-47 rifle. Typically more cutting, Busi ness Day, commented: "The longer the threat of nationalization is kept

9S. " alive, the longer capital flight will - '" -' Z continue and the longer investment "I can't improve your image with all the baggage you're carrying" in manufacturing and job-creation Cartoonfrom National Party mouthpiece, Die Burger will be put off. If the ANC hopes to inherit the country, it must soon Pre-emptive moves Segregated media come to a decision to stop soiling its The owners of both the country's For 40 years it has done so exclu patrimony." electronic and print media have be sively in support of the National Despite an evident antipathy to gun pre-emptive moves to deny the Party government and its policies. nationalization and a wariness on ANC or any other post-apartheid It rigidly segregated its stations and questions of redistribution, The Star government the kind of control the programmes along race and lan carried an interview with Slovo on apartheid government and business guage lines when grand apartheid ANC economic policy (Slovo is also exercises over radio, television and was in motion; then stealthily added a member of the ANC national ex print. black faces to TV screens and black ecutive). The opening assertion by The government-run South voices to radio as Pretoria's policy Slovo is that "Pretoria will concede African Broadcasting Corporation shifted towards establishment of a black majority rule if it can guar (SABC), in particular, is an attrac multi-racial buffer against demands antee that white economic privilege tive target: In a country in which for non-racial democracy. will survive the end of apartheid." daily newspaper sales run to well be The country's print media No doubt the remark struck a res low two million, SABC's 23 internal and particularly its newspapers onant chord of recognition among radio stations reach an estimated 14 are only marginally less central the managers and directors of Argus million listeners a day. Combined ized with four publishing corpora Holdings which owns The Star- and with its four television channels, its tions accounting for almost 98% the bulk of the country's English daily audience on occasion nudges 20 of newspapers published in South language press. The media, no less million - almost two-thirds of the to Africa. The four corporations, two than other key sectors, have been re- tal South African population. strongly pro-government, also own

4 july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT the only non-government television the change, it recognizes it as serv Afrikaner Broederbond - always a channel, and hold shares in one of ing De Klerk's interests as much as strong influence at SABC. theirs - withdrawable whenever it only two non-government radio sta Even before the public an tions. With two exceptions, South suits the government. nouncement of the task force, how Africa's English-language dailies The ANC demand is part of a ever, De Klerk had indicated in what produced for including the only one broader ANC insistence on a general direction he would like to see SABC black readers - are ultimately con withdrawal of National Party au headed. Only weeks after the le trolled by Anglo-American Corpora thority over the institutions of state, galization of the ANC, SABC an tion. The biggest of the four me culminating, in the ANC view, in an scuttling of large sec dia groups, the Argus Group, ac nounced the eventual formal hand-over of power tions of its foreign broadcasting ser counts for more than 60% of daily to an interim authority at the start vice, Radio RSA. This dovetails newspapers sold. This figure is set of elections for a constituent assem to increase, following the decision neatly with other strands of govern bly. ment strategy. Formerly, govern by its Johannesburg-based flagship, ment thinking held that to defeat The Star, to produce a morning edi But with the struggle to end apartheid increasingly one of ideas, its opposition, it must international tion - mainly to counter the launch the ANC sees the process of normal ize the country's conflict, pushing its of a daily by the publishers of the izing South African political life opposition as far as physically possi liberal Weekly Mail. the foundation of its negotiation pre ble from South African soil. A corol Limiting losses conditions - as requiring an end to lary to this is that a major portion Nationalist control of the country's of the propaganda battle takes place For the past three years Argus ex most powerful information and pro in the international arena. ecutives have been quietly relocat paganda medium. In advance of the and By drawing the ANC back into ing the bulk of their capital ANC demand, however, Pretoria has the country and offering to talk, Pre control structures from their news begun investigating how to extend toria has taken on the movement papers' publishing companies into to SABC its attempt to place other its centralized holding company in a contest of ideas on a battle state institutions beyond the reach a move intended to limit losses if field where the state holds the high of a post-apartheid government ground. a post-apartheid government nation through privatization and deregula alized any or all of its papers. tion. SABC has embarked on a pro The SABC, too, is investigat cess of scrapping its foreign lan Media task force ing means of removing the air guage services to concentrate on waves beyond the reach of a demo In late March, the government an the local market. It is combining cratic, post-apartheid government. nounced the appointment of a spe the African language TV2 and TV3 This follows an early demand from cial task force to investigate the channels. These have, however, only ANC foreign affairs secretary Thabo broadcast industry and to include the medium-term benefit of increas Mbeki - made while the Groote in its investigation "future broad ing the capacity of a National Party Schuur talks were still in progress casting requirements," including pri dominated SABC to intervene in the that the corporation should cease vatization and deregulation. The contest of ideas. functioning as a 24-hour-a-day Na make-up of the force is strongly sug It will not help much if the SABC tionalist Party political broadcast, gestive of the directions in which is politically 'neutralized' during a and that control should be shared it is looking: In addition to transition period, as Mbeki seemed by "more than one party to the con the fairly predictable representatives to suggest. Nor would it help once flict." from the SABC itself, and the De - as De Klerk has acknowledged is partments of Information and Posts likely - an ANC or ANC-led alliance Ironically, as Mbeki made his de and Telecommunications, it includes mand, the ANC and its leaders were inherits the broadcasting corpora the chaplain-general of the South tion when it takes power. enjoying a bigger and better me African Defence Force, the SADF's dia profile that at any time in the director of 'technology and elec Privatizing the media movement's 78-year history. Once tronic warfare', the Department of Well in advance of the task force's for De Klerk recognized the need Foreign Affairs official with special appointment, government and pro with the movement, he be talks responsibility for the homelands, as government media managers have gan, through SABC, to acclimatize well as representatives of Military been investigating possibilities for broadcast audiences to the fact. Intelligence and the National Intel denying a post-apartheid govern Most South Africans had never ligence Service (NIS). All task force ment access to the massive influ heard ANC officials talking before, members are white males and, ac ence the SABC has provided the Na nor seen their faces. And while the cording to the Weekly Mail, more tional Party. At least four years liberation movement is happy with than half are members of the secret ago, Ton Vosloo, Managing Direc-

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 tor of Nasionale Media (publishers of the major pro-government newspa pers), was arguing strongly for pri vatization of regional broadcasting networks, and the licensing of local, city or town stations. Vosloo's Nasionale, which had just acquired the bi-weekly City Pressnewspaper as a means to drive government policy into the town ships, was on the lookout for fur ther vehicles. KwaZulu's Gathsa Buthelezi, whose Inkatha movement had just bought the Zulu-language flanga, was another potential buyer. STOP Under P. W. Botha, who exercised even more personal control over STOFFEL'S SABC than any of his predecessors, the government refused to surrender GAGS control - even to economic and po SAVE THE PRESS litical allies. The task force has re opened the debate. Journalistsprotest government curbs on the media, Cape Town, 1988 Among the issues feeding the de cision to do so was growing pres orders - by which Pretoria has, over has been the most vocal. In a com sure from M-Net, a fifth TV chan the past four decades, guaranteed ment column published while the nel launched in 1986 with a license the profitability and survival of the ANC delegates to the Groote Schuur specifically prohibiting the broad two main pro-government newspa talks were still in the country, Har cast of news or current events. per groups. vey Tyson, editor of The Star and a Owned by the country's major news strong advocate of Argus expansion, paper groups, but with Vosloo's Na Disgruntled private producers say the SABC system has re attempted to divert ANC thinking sionale as the biggest single share away from nationalizing the coun holder, M-Net has been agitating for cently been formalized, with single try's major papers. a second channel with the right to programme tenders now replaced broadcast news, and to do so openly, by long-term, multi-programme con rather than through the costly de tracts. This effectively means that, Constant danger with the exception of sports and coders currently needed to see all "We have a long way to go towards news, there is little of SABC's but two hours of M-Net's daily diet normalization (of the press) and a locally-produced content not in pri of 12 hours of largely North Ameri better-serviced society," he wrote. can trivia. vate hands. Whoever inherits SABC will thus be both contractually "The press will be in constant dan A second process of de facto pri ger unless it ensures that there is locked into a system which denies vatization has been underway virtu room for every kind of ownership to ally since the launch of SABC TV in it direct control of much of what it broadcasts, and - even if it chose cater for the extraordinarily wide va 1976. This has involved tendering riety of needs. The media may even to break that tie-in - without the out documentary and drama pro need to include state-owned and cer physical resources to produce alter duction to private film companies, tainly state-subsidized publications natives. in terms of an SABC-defined mech as well as party-owned and privately anism which effectively excludes all Equally concerned at a hands-on owned newspapers. but a handful of the country's dom ANC media policy, South African inant private producers. "Politics will demand a national press barons and their editors are paper propagating the official line The Broeder Five already offering up alternatives to of the ruling party (post apart attract the ANC away from ear This preference given to the heid). Nationalization remains a ma lier suggestions of nationalization or jor producers, known derisively as threat ... Far better would be for anti-trust legislation to break up the 'the Broeder Five,' is similar to the the financially-independent press to media monopolies. process of preferential government anticipate such moves by support printing contracts - for telephone di As the most vulnerable of the ing a more diverse privately-owned rectories and other large government media groups to such action, Argus press at all levels. Even in Britain

july 1990 9 outhern AXrica AtFORT the idea is being mooted of a central that "experiences in Eastern Europe other interests than big business fund to nurture new 'diverse' news shows that a press that becomes a should have access, through control papers through their launch period." mouthpiece of the party in power and ownership, of the press. Ironically, Tyson's nervousness is cannot be a healthy press, and can Regarding possible constraints increasingly out of touch with the di not create conditions for democracy on journalists under an ANC govern to flourish ... a free and critical rection of thinking within the ANC ment, Pahad said: "We don't want itself. While it remains strongly press is necessary to enable the val journalists to be propagandists for ues for which we are all fighting to opposed to the South African me our movement. The ANC would dia's highly-centralized ownership, grow." welcome and encourage constructive the ANC appears to be moving away The idea of anti-trust legislation criticisms of our policies." The from past advocacy of "taking con to force diversified ownership of the ANC, he said, would require "re trol of the commanding heights of media is clearly still on the ANC's sponsible journalism," adding that the media" through nationalization. agenda: "Are we going to allow the "we do not want a situation in which monopolized commercial press to re ,responsible' means 'controlled'." In the first major ANC contri and other bution to local audiences on the main as it is? Or are we And while an ANC-linked daily interested parties going to work out subject, national executive mem seems increasingly unlikely, Pahad formulae to democratize the press?" ber Aziz Pahad acknowledged to a said "we are considering a paper gathering of the anti-apartheid As He argued that this process which would reflect the democratic sociation of Democratic Journalists should be directed at ensuring that and alternative voices generally." When Actors Become Authors Radical Communications inthe 1980s BY DON PINNOCK in sight, it was a time for reassess othe left's willingness to press the ment. We were left with many or new print technologies into the ser Don Pinnock is a South African ac a vice of the struggle led to a qualita tivist currently lecturing in the Depart ganizations crippled or banned, tive and quantitative leap in the use ment of Journalism and Media Studies much-reduced terrain of operations of print media at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. and fundamental questions. What is mass communication? What *the emergencies were the apartheid This article is a condensed version of a is the relationship between media system's answer to a massive leak longer paper entitled "Popularize, Or and movements, and between move age of executive legitimacy. While ganize, Educate and Mobilize: Some ments and technology? How do no the Pretoria government seemed to reflections on South Africa's left-wing be winning most of the battles of press in the 1980s" written in 1989. tions of class and the national demo cratic movement articulate? There the period by force and repression, The left-wing media which evolved were also broader questions. What, it was rapidly losing the people to in South Africa during the first half in ideological and cultural terms, an oppositional culture whose sym of the 1980s have been the subject of were the 1980s in South Africa? bols were daily regenerated and re much discussion. Many ideas have How much credence can be given to fined through popular communica emerged during late-night sessions the state's claim that a revolution tions channels. This makes more over light tables and letraset. Anal was imminent? In the turbulence of comprehensible the shift of execu yses with media activists and stu the time there had been little space tive power from parliamentary to dents following the crippling press for reflection. By the late 1980s, it para-military structures, and ex restrictions of the second state of was essential. plains why one of the main recipients emergency have also contributed to Given that theories and conclu of state restriction was the press. the debate. sions are provisional, and that ac The state - a failure of legiti By the mid-1980s nearly 30,000 tivists tend to colour their history macy South African activists had been de from their own paint-box, three gen tained under the various states of eral agreements have emerged: The South African state, with its emergency and a considerable num *radical communication practices obedient television, radio and press ber of them were media workers of played a far greater role in the rise networks, did not just provide a fo one sort or another. For the sur of this insurrectionary climate than cus for political opposition. It also vivors of those heady years, when is generally accepted by all but the set boundaries and often provided the end of apartheid seemed to be state the spaces within which (and over

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 C___ which) popular struggles occurred. papers, have been defensive when From the late 1970s on, a new Some have characterized the 1970s it is suggested that they may be mood and a new practice of democ shift, from the limited Westmin writing anything but the obvious racy had begun to emerge. The ster parliamentary system towards truth. But by simply conform Freedom Charter was once again a military-dominated elite with the ing to particular professional prac published and became a rallying State Security Council, as a "creep tices, they work within the confines point. The Fatti and Monis strikes ing coup." The extended powers of a guild of understanding which in 1979 brought the community into granted to the SSC from 1977 rep tends to serve definitions of real an active link with labour. Strikes, resented a massive centralization of ity of the dominant forces in South school boycotts and a proliferation power. It was followed by a hawk African society. These guild prac of community and student organiza ish foreign policy and an attempt to tices are both professional and cul tion emerged. By 1981, 29 unions defuse growing trouble in the town tural blinkers which narrow the cir had come together to talk about ships by initiating reforms designed cumference of the journalists's vi forming a strong labour central. to win black allies and divide the sion. For many, this framing process disenfranchised by offering limited blocked their political understand The United Democratic Front powers to elected township council ing at a time when popular insurrec (UDF) was launched in 1983 at a lors. tion demanded acute peripheral vi rally in Cape Town and by the end Despite the use of state TV and sion. And if the journalists saw lit of the year, had more than 500 or radio to sell these initiatives, the tle, media management saw less. ganizations as members. The launch success with which itself became a symbol with more popular ideology In the townships, the position and the popular movement system was different. As the news frame of than 12,000 people present. As a atically shredded them would even the guild media moved further and broad popular assembly of organi tually throw the state into zations, the UDF had less resem a crisis of further away from township real legitimation and control. But at the ity, people there continued to watch blance to a political party or orga time, political spaces opened up and TV, listen to the radio and read nization than to an "over-ground" issues emerged around which the na commercial newspapers. But in legal vehicle for channeling politi tional democratic movement could creasingly, the information which cal discontent. The UDF's style of and did organize. informed their choices and action operation, its emphasis on demo cratic accountability, its populariza Another unexpected space which came from elsewhere. It came from appeared was in the judiciary. Em the popular circuits of communica tion of songs and symbols of resis tance, boldened by the growth of the mass tion and from events around them and a rapidly-developed sym pathetic movement and undoubtedly with an which together added up to a funda media network, served to ear to overseas opinion, sections of mental social transformation at the catalyze a culture of resistance. Its the judiciary began to make more level of popular consciousness. red, black, and gold badge spread liberal judgments. These acted as a like hot currency, appearing as but partial brake on excesses and often The Congress Movement - a tons, posters, T-shirts, banners and forced the state to reveal its hand in new political force newspapers through the townships key cases against the press and the and in schools, colleges and univer The period between 1980 and the national democratic movement. sities. declaration of the second state of The Guild Press - a failure of emergency in 1986 saw a breathtak Alongside the political ferment will ing consolidation of popular senti in the community, a strong trade The mass communications networks ment and action around the symbols union movement was taking shape. contributed by default to the rise of the Freedom Charter, mass action By 1985, the giant Congress of South of the left press. They appeared and democratic organization. In the African Trade Unions (COSATU) to lose popular legitimacy at a time ensuing battle with the state, forces was launched in Durban. With lead when their owners would have most which are best described as popular ership many layers deep, COSATU wanted to influence the course of were to engage in a bitter struggle put militant trade union politics political events. This corresponded for cultural hegemony in townships, firmly on the map. to an increase in the credibility of factories and schools. History may popular media. The media are, of show that the cultural gains at the course, more than mere business en level of popular lifestyles and under terprises. They are also purvey standing far outweighed those made The new technologies - actors ors of a class culture - the beliefs, in direct political confrontation with become authors mores, customs and maps of mean the state. Rather than finding a The significant mobilizing power ing of the dominant social groupings. new way to "do politics," the pop of the new print technologies was South African journalists, particu ular movement found a new way to an important factor in the po larly in the English-language news- "do society." litical groundswell. The older

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT head projectors to magnify onto cloth, producing huge banners of great complexity and sophistication, and portable video cameras for use in local organizing. Initially, access to the new equip ment was through universities, but 4' it could be found in the of by 1985 fices of many service, political and labour organization. The cheap technologies led to the development of smaller newspapers, producing camera-ready pages for printers with little more than a typewriter, pho tocopier and light table. Mass par ticipation in a socialized production process was widely available. By 1984 the first IBM personal computers found their way onto campuses. IBM clones appeared in 1986. The real breakthrough, how ever, was through Apple computers with their exceptional graphics ca pabilities. In 1985, journalists from the just-deceased Rand Daily Mail got together to start a weekly tabloid with minimal funding. With some Apple Macintosh computers, an op tical scanner and a laser printer, they were able to do the work of the entire editing and page make up section of a normal newspaper New Era & Grassroots were banned for 3 months in 1989 in the space of a large desk - at a fraction of the cost. They soon print systems - letterpress, photo duction of copiers which could ex added fax, teletype and inter-city typesetting, offset litho- were costly pand or reduce the size of the image. computer networking. The appear ance of the Weekly Mail on the and required sophisticated skills and As a result of the photo organizational backup. Indeed, from streets demonstrated the possibili copy boom, cheap facsimiles of ties of cheap high-tech newspaper the workers' point of view, freedom books, articles and images suddenly production ... and issued in the era to express opinions had always been abounded. Copyright laws were vir of desk-top publishing. a fiction, barred as they were from tually impossible to enforce with the means of ideological production. the proliferation of photo copy ma Based on the "Mail's" experi The dramatic changes in print chines. Artful innovators, armed ences - and despite the state of technologies changed all that. In with photocopy machines and type emergency - other weeklies using South Africa, the number of treated writers, went into the pamphlet similar technology began to emerge. paper copiers increased steadily business. Photocopiers became This in turn created a pool of users throughout the 1970s, but it was the miniature printing presses, giving able to support a growing network use of the Xerox plain-paper copier rise to a flood of pamphlets and of independent news agencies based in industry and universities which newsletters. With the addition of on the same data-transfer systems. started the photocopy boom. Pho letraset and pirated images, these These agencies, like many of the tocopying was fast, relatively cheap had reached remarkable sophistica newspapers they served, became an and produced near-perfect prints tion by the beginning of the 1980s. swerable to popular organizations in great numbers on ordinary pa Other technologies were added, like and often acted as training grounds per. Another technological leap took inexpensive printing processes for T for community journalists. The ac place in about 1979 with the intro- shirts and "struggle" badges, over- tors were becoming authors.

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 The new media - culture as communication Popular communications are vital to the development of popular culture, the way the dominated classes de velop distinct patterns of life and give expressive form to their social and material life experiences. Pop ular culture encompasses social re lations, systems of belief, customs and patterns of social and politi cal organization. Popular commu nications include labour and union press, neighborhood press, univer sity and school press, literacy pub lications, information bulletins and one-off publications, political mani ganda, aimed at more structured in festos, pamphlets, posters and graf terventions in social conflicts. Their fiti. In the townships one should also aim at this level was to agitate, profound changes by the state. Pop add popular performance, commu organize and mobilize people on a ular communications networks artic nity video, mass meetings, songs and scale ranging from a single commu ulated this project, making explicit even funeral orations. Social com the content of a new society while munication is more than simply facts nity to the whole country. Banners, demonstrating the repressive nature and images. There is also a sym flyers and student, community and union newspapers were key instru of the old. These communications bolic, and in a sense "hidden", com munication. This is well illustrated ments here. forms did not all speak with one voice. in an interview with the leader of the What developed was a move The third and ment of active community military chant called "toyi-toyi," of more complex practices level of communication practices in and forms pressing on each ten sung at political funerals: other, the 1980s took place at the level of sometimes deliberately, sometimes Toyi-toyi is a way of communication. culture. Numerous organized and not. It was a process rich with Through it we know what is hap relatively stable groups together de contradiction and self-contradiction, pening in the bush with the com veloped a political lucidity and dis from which a new historical world rades who have left. You get to know tinct regional and national forms of view began to develop. behaviour and ways of "doing soci about their training, their ranks and The circuits of popular commu ety." This shift from propaganda to how they operate ... guns down, nication were vital to the unfold cultural struggle began to go deeper guns up ... you feel as if you are ing political processes. The and deeper into the most sedimented polit in training ... you can see the peo ical turmoil of the time was lead layers of the African population. By ple sweating when they are doing the ing to the educating, organizing and mobiliz ideological transformation toyi-toyi ... they feel involved. I'm of a nation. On this level, culture one of the people who normally leads ing people, this struggle served to escalate the tempo of conflict. Ev became a site of struggle between toyi-toyi. When I'm leading I feel the dominant class attempting ery blow by the state became a focus to like a generaland I feel like I'm hold win a measure of consent for its re for further mobilization. For exam ing my AK ... in that way toyi-toyi form process, and the popular ple, when all other gatherings were demo makes you strong. People use it as cratic and labour organizations ar banned, funerals became political transport ... the cheapest transport ticulating a range of alternative rad rallies. This provoked police action there is. ical projects through mass meetings, which gave rise to more funerals and local organizations and the popu more political meetings. Through Popular communications during lar media. The cultural revolution out all of this, a class culture was be the 1980's, then, functioned on from below has demonstrated its re ing constructed, one which towards at least three levels of complex silience in the face of repression. the mid-1980s, became increasingly ity. They functioned at the level While the heavy repression of 1987 self-conscious in the struggle for ide of information, corresponding to a and 1988 caused a temporary lull in ological hegemony. minimal organization structure with activities, the vibrancy of the pop speeches, songs, slogans, signs, graf The popular media of the 1980s ular movement has reasserted itself fiti and limited publications. They was the expression of a popular po again in the current phase as a vital functioned at the level of propa- litical project, making demands for dimension of the ongoing struggle.

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT Perish or Publish: Consolidating the Alternative Voice

BY GLENN MOSS. ing houses which fulfil similar roles lets - especially those in the ma Glenn Moss is manager of Ravan Press, for different constituencies. jor urban centres - are prepared to Vice-President of the Independent Pub As currently constituted, most of stock the books, newspapers and lishers' Association of South Africa and the "alternatives" can never be eco magazines published by the "alter past editor of Work In Progress. nomically viable or even hold their native" sector, the vast majority are own in a hostile and badly-distorted not. And this means that the more South Africa's "alternative" media distant a reader is from Johannes market. As a result, they have lit for so long the target of government burg or Cape Town, the more dif tle potential to reach the majority of action - faces a new threat to their ficult it is to obtain a range of their target audiences, and face the existence. thoughtful and relevant reading ma Bannings and closures may not danger of producing "mass media" terial of quality. yet be issues of the past. Certainly, for elites in society. But this is not the only difficulty the legal mechanisms of censorship A myriad of constraints confront associated with the monopolization and control are still very much in the "alternatives" in their attempts of retail outlets for books and mag force, and the statute books boast to develop larger economies-of-scale, azines. The financial terms under over a hundred laws which limit financially, and become more viable which these outlets will stock read publication of information. But reach larger audiences. Two impor ing material are crippling. Discounts changing political and social circum tant monopolies - in paper and in are en stances pose an even greater threat retail outlets for books, magazines of fifty percent and more forced on small publishers who can to this section of the media, which and newspapers - are high on this not absorb this blow through large has a new and more difficult battle list of impediments. South African sales. And the magazine publish for survival on its hands. produced paper is generally priced ers face a standard fifty percent dis at just below the import cost of For more than a decade, this count to the retailer, who pulps all equivalent paper. And the giants stream of media has provided in unsold copies after a specified time! formation, perspectives and analy which dominate the paper indus sis which its less democratic rela try adjust prices upwards every six Most alternative or progressive tives in the mainstream have ig months. This is forcing the price publishing in South Africa has been heavily subsidized from inception. nored. Bravely challenging cen of printed media up beyond a range church com sorship, risking closure and impris of most South Africans who read, Development agencies, munication projects, large founda onment of personnel, the "alterna changing books - for example - into tions and foreign governments have tives" reflected a world-view influ luxury items. been prepared to pour millions into enced by opposition and resistance So bad is the crisis of paper pric this sector as a contribution to the to apartheid. They focussed on ac ing that, despite the weakness of Without tors and forces largely ignored by the the South African rand against other anti-apartheid struggle. this assistance few - if any - of "commercials" - owned and domi currencies, imported books are no the democratically-oriented publish nated by various financial interests. longer much more expensive than lo ing programmes would have started, They challenged conventional wis cal productions. Some publishers survived. dom, and often confronted the more are even investigating the possibil never mind repressive institutions of the state ity of printing books in Europe and Within their small economies-of police, army, prisons, intelligence North America - at cheaper rates! scale, few of the existing "alterna agencies and the like. The structure of the retail trade tives" have the potential for greater Despite the growing influence is a second major factor transform financial self-sufficiency. High costs and size of this section of the me ing printed media into a luxury. Al of production and distribution, dif dia, it has always carried within it most every South African media out ficulties in reaching larger reader the seeds of failure. This is as true let of note is part of the massive ship markets, and limited prospects for the magazines and newspapers CNA-Gallo group, which in turn is for generating advertising revenue which form the bulk of the "alterna owned by the giant Premier con have left most progressive publica tives" as it is for the book publish- glomerate. While some of these out- tions dangerously dependent on sub-

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 sidies. Little was done to build up be overlooked. Building a broadly are beginning to explore these mat self-sufficiency and subsidies have, based non-elitist reading culture is ters as an urgent priority. Coop thus far, been fairly easily available. an important task in the develop eration between progressive publish warehousing Now, this is changing: many ment of a democratic order, and this ers - as they explore distribution and joining forces agencies which previously supported is not something which will be facili and a wide range of anti-apartheid tated by conventional commercially to challenge the paper and retail mo projects are adopting a narrower de oriented book, magazine and news nopolies - is one of the few ways velopmental approach involving pro paper publishers. It is the embry forward in the attempt to create a vision of basic infrastructure and so onic "alternatives" which have the vibrant and democratic reading cul cial services, job creation, and for best starting point to undertake this ture. The duplication in infrastruc mal education. In terms of strict daunting task - as long as they ture which has been so obvious in "alternative" publishing priorities, this may well be a correct can overcome the substantial imped is at last orientation, with the potential to im iments to their viability discussed being challenged, although much of prove the material quality of life for above. the commitment to shared resources and facilities is still more rhetori many South Africans. Organizations like the recently cal than real. However, the im formed Independent Publishers' As Yet the less-quantifiable bene peratives of survival are likely to sociation of South Africa - IPASA - fits of a vibrant media must not change this, as the "alternatives" at tempt to transform themselves from marginal voices of opposition into mainstream structures of influence. The danger, of course, is that the very diversity of democratic per spective which is a hallmark of the alternative press could be lost in this process. Smaller and weaker book, magazine and newspaper pub lishers may fold, or be absorbed into growing enterprises as economies-of scale demand increasing centraliza tion in production and distribution. The seeking of advertising revenue - probably the only major option to replace the donor funding - may impose a caution and uniformity on those media currently known for their bravery and diversity. And pressures to promote political uni formity and uncritical support for the mainstream of opposition could intersect with these other factors threatening the independence of the progressive media. The stakes are high in con fronting these new dangers. Sur vival in the face of a hostile gov ernment is no longer the priority for progressive media. Moving from the politics of opposition to the reali ties of influence and power - with out abandoning the diversity, criti cal perspectives and vibrancy which is the essence of a democratic media > - is the battle which the progressive media must win as their contribu I tion to the building of democratic South Africa.

12 july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT Hard Pressed: Bi-Cameral Racism

,1 0SUR &

South African President F. W. De would "elect members through a The Globe and Mail may re Klerk has shifted the terms of debate system of universal suffrage," the joice to find in such constitutional about South Africa's future with ap editors accept that another (the "checks and balances" a guarantee palling ease - at least in some cir "house of communities") should be that black South Africans can be cles. A case in point: Toronto's made up "of representatives of the blocked from correcting the deep Globe and Mail newspaper. Both country's various racial, ethnic and seated socio-economic inequalities correspondent Michael Valpy ("Pre other groups." This second cham that are so characteristic of South toria plan keeps 'brake' on major ber would have powers to "safe Africa's apartheid society. But the ity rule," Globe and Mail, April 19) guard group interests such as lan rest of us should not be naive about and Globe editorialists ("A bicam guage, education, culture and prop the significance of the phrase "prop eral model for South Africa," April erty rights." Sounds reasonable erty rights," so blandly slipped in 23) now apparently agree with South enough to Canadians, eh? But it's alongside "language" and "culture," African constitutional planners that not. as something legitimately to be pre a bi-cameral political solution would served. be a useful antidote to "the unbri The previous issue of SAR De Klerk continues, quite ruth dled power of majority rule" in that (Vol. 5, No. 5) charted President lessly, to use the security arm of the country. They even seem to think F. W. De Klerk's current strat state to advance his purposes (as that Canada's federalism has some egy. In the wake of South Africa's witness another, very different re thing to teach South Africans. near insurrection of 1984-86, Preto port by Michael Valpy on "Preto ria chose the route of systematic re ria's Brute Force" in the Globe of It is not the first time the Globe real reform, to pression, rather than April 21). But De Klerk's introduc has been tempted by such argu safeguard the slatus quo. Yet by ments. Last year, after a private tion of the mumbo-jumbo of con 1989, dramatic internal resistance stitutional manipulation (including briefing of the Globe editorial team even if it still fell short of being by South Africa's ambassador to bicameral-speak) into the political a full-scale revolutionary threat equation is no accident. Neither is Canada, Bennie De Klerk, the paper had also revived and resuscitated the whistled up a "news story" ("Cana his attempt to gain ground by an global anti-apartheid lobby. dian Constitution viewed as guide other age-old policy of the National for Pretoria," October 18, 1989) Sensing that the stalemate cre ist Party, that of divide and rule. in which the ambassador likened ated by repression can not be main Not that De Klerk has himself the situation of his embattled white tained, the De Klerk team has created the linguistic and cultural confreres to that of the Qu~b~cois. moved to open up the political pro differences that do exist in South ("South Africa is looking to Can cess to new possibilities. Africa. Yet the Nationalist Party's "separate ada's Constitution as an example of Faced with "negotiations," De development" policy was how to change the country - com Klerk now hopes to safeguard both designed to breathe political life into plete with a distinct society provi business interests and a significant such differences at the very moment sion to protect whites, Ambassador proportion of the privilege that ac in history when economic change Johannes Hendrik de Klerk says.") crues to white South Africans. One and urbanization are making them Now, with the threat of real ne sector is education, where the vast ever less tolerable for black South gotiations on the agenda, Globe ed discrepancies in the state allotment Africans. As bantustans like the itorialists have gone much further of educational expenditures along Transkei and the Ciskei now seek on their own (although their edi racial lines has been one crucial de to reverse their "independences," it torial still reads too much like a terminant of privilege. This repre makes even less sense than ever to press release from the South African sents an injustice that requires re embrace the apartheid regime's own embassy). While one chamber of dressing, not a "right" that warrants language of "ethnic group" represen "safeguarding." this new "bi-cameral" South Africa tation as an excuse of bicameralism.

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and his "ethnic representation" in a "house The Globe and Mail may think of constitution-making Kwazulu-based Inkatha movement of communities," as the Globe edi the days arrived. The ANC, is no exception. The consider torialists now apparently seek to do, have definitely to be on able violence in South Africa's Na would be a cruel irony. while it will certainly have guard against allowing De Klerk to tal province is not about violence The same goes for the defense of set the agenda of constitutional ne between ethnic groups. It is pre "racial groups," a short-hand for so cisely because more and more Zu gotiations, is unlikely to make the much else that could come to bedevil knows that lus have come to embrace nationally same mistake. The ANC South Africa. How much better it De Klerk, in fact, is still very far focussed democratic organizations would be to take seriously the ANC's like the United Democratic Front from offering up even the half-loaf own promise of respect for linguis of bi-cameralism to the democratic and the Congress of South African tic and cultural differences within Trade Unions that Buthelezi (tacitly movement. The ANC, quite cor a fully democratized, "non-racial" that sub backed by the South Africa state) rectly, persists in stating South Africa than to entrust a De stantial pressure, internal and exter has moved to defend his own polit Klerk with their defense. sanctions), must con ical turf so brutally. Ignoring this nal (including And how much better to al tinue to be applied upon De Klerk reality is another misrepresentation and company. that is fast becoming the stock in low for open-ended economic ex trade of willful Canadian journalists. perimentation on the part of a It should be emphasized that the new, democratically-elected, non for "one person, one Take as one depressing example ANC's demand racial South African government a united South Africa" is the Toronto Star's Johannesburg bu vote in than to attempt, constitutionally, to only "reasonable" posi reau chief, Bill Schiller, his fawning really the pre-empt it. of the mat interviews with Buthelezi ("Africa's tion on offer. The fact Zulu leader Buthelezi fights 'collab It's late in the day for anyone to ter is that the Canadian "model" orator' image," April 15, 1990) and feel absolutely confident of the ex of bicameralism has little to teach his misleading articles about the Na act meaning or purpose of "social South Africans who really want to tal violence ("No one really wants ism" anywhere in the world, includ transform their country. Its invoca peace: All sides share blame as ing South Africa. Yet some major tion as a model, whether by Ambas fear, ignorance and death stalk a measure of redress of the economics sador De Klerk, the Globe and Mail lush, green land," the Star, April of apartheid is in order. South or possibly, further down the road, 27, 1990). To grace Buthelezi with African whites, so long the beneficia the Canadian government, can only the legitimacy of such a reasonable ries of the crudest forms of exploita serve to obscure the essence of the sounding posture as the demand for tion, cannot be allowed to veto that. South African situation.

m july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT The I Love Lucy Show The "Taking Strides" Consultative Forum, May, 1990

Canadian anti-apartheid activists Conference directives ignored pers and invited the 100-plus par who gathered in Ottawa in May for ticipants, who included representa their third national conference were Yet this was not the whole story. tives from member organizations of hoping for great things - new ideas, Both the 'successes' of the confer IAWGSA, anti-apartheid coalitions new approaches, perhaps the forma ence have a negative side. Some and groups from across Canada, the ANC and SACTU and other South tion of a national network. Only directives established by the con some of that emerged. And along ference for setting up the national Africans. And finally, the commit a "resource with their disappointment, partici network have already been ignored. tee identified number of persons" and "facilitators" for the pants took home with them a feel And however firmly the conference working groups into which the Fo ing that the movement, created and participants may feel about the role nourished by grass-roots activists of the Canadian government, Exter rum was to break from time to time. since the late 60s was in serious dan nal Affairs was clearly there to talk, Even in the run-up to the Confer ger of being domesticated. not to listen. ence, there were signs of behind-the-

The title chosen for the Ot tawa meeting sought to capture the moment: "Taking Strides Towards a Non-racial Democratic South Africa" and stated the "main objective" to be "to come up with concrete means of intensify ing support for the democratization of South Africa through improved support for the African National Congress and intensified applica tion of Canadian sanctions against South Africa." Or, in the words of one of the other directive doc uments of the conference, the Fo rum's goal was "to bring together Paulus Mashatile, Ted Scott & Nomvula Mokonyane at opening session anti-apartheid activists from across the country to develop strategies to (a) strengthen support for sus Organizing for the meeting was scenes manoeuvrings by NGO del tained/increased sanctions and (b) done by the NGO-dominated Inter egates on the Steering Committee to strengthen support for the ANC Agency Working Group on South that suggested an attempt to nar and democratic forces inside South ern Africa (IAWGSA), established row and control the Forum's agenda. idea of having "resource Africa." as a committee of the Canadian The whole Council for International Coopera people" was put in doubt by sev tion (CCIC) and representing some eral on the steering committee, at There were some good reasons twenty NGOs. It worked through a the eleventh hour of preparation for to think the results of the Forum steering committee that also drew the Forum. They apparently feared were positive. We seem to be closer in several additional members that designated resource people like to the establishment of a national one each from the anti-apartheid Ottawa's Linda Freeman, Toronto's anti-apartheid network. The meet networks in B. C., the West and John Saul and Calgary's Don Ray ing also re-affirmed our insistence the Atlantic region and a rep would be a bit too outspokenly crit that the Canadian government act resentative from the African Na ical of Canadian government pol ever more firmly against the South tional Congress. This committee icy. Although the Steering Commit African government - and for the in turn set an agenda, commis tee entertained the idea of cancelling ANC. sioned a series of background pa- participation by the resource people,

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 ((fiaffiL~______they rejected that in favour of warn No anti-apartheid voice what he terms "irreversible change." ing them against 'dominating' dis But there are also severe limits to delegates were aghast that cussions. Many how far Canada is prepared to go no-one of comparable stature from and there is a Canadian government These manoeuvrings were not the anti-apartheid movement was agenda that seeks to limit change in readily visible to conference dele the platform to given a position on South Africa as much as it seeks to gates, but in the very first ple challenge Edwards' remarks - and facilitate it. The Forum would have nary there were visible signals that governrtient. Cer the Canadian been an excellent opportunity for ac all was not well. Two delegates tainly, Linda Freeman (who an tivists from across Canada to reach from South Africa spoke - Paulus nually chronicles the shortcomings critical understand Mashatile of the United Democratic of Canadian government policy in a common and ing of official Canada's policies. It Front and Nomvula Mokonyane of SAR) would have been an obvious was an opportunity lost. the Federation of Transvaal Women. candidate for this task. Suzanne (The third scheduled South African, Dansereau of CIDMAA and Dennis "Mistakes were made" Moses Mayekiso of COSATU and Lewycky in Ottawa had also written In response to strong criticism from the Alexandra Civic Organization an informative background paper on the next day's working groups of was unavoidably delayed and spoke the subject for the conference. the decision to give Lucy Edwards a platform, the Conference's steer ing committee admitted a "mistake" had been made. But the evidence suggests it was more than a mistake. Key members of that committee Ted Scott, former Anglican Church Primate and government-appointee to 1985's Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group, and Ann Mitchell, executive director of the Ottawa based International Defense and Aid Fund of South Africa (IDAFSA) were frank in private conversation >, about their feeling that a "concil , iatory" approach to the Canadian 3 government is in order, rather than -J what they feel is the old-fashioned • "confrontational" approach. These differences are not new. Lucy Edwards & Ted Scott at opening session Ted Scott, despite his long and honourable history of anti-apartheid the next morning). But no This background paper, and oth work, has always been seen by spokesperson from the Canadian ers prepared and paid for by the church militants as something of anti-apartheid movement was in Forum, were included in delegate a mixed blessing. His commit vited as the third speaker. The kits, but were never referred to ment to the southern African cause only other speaker chosen by the throughout the course of the con has helped legitimate anti-apartheid Steering Committee was Lucy Ed ference. Some critical questions for work, in the eyes of government and wards, head of the Southern African the speakers did come from the floor parishioners. But it is testimony to Task Force of the Ministry of Ex and Peter Mahlangu, the ANC's rep his 'acceptability' with government ternal Affairs. Edwards didn't say resentative in Canada who was also that he now holds a number of key much that hadn't been heard before. at the dais, took the opportunity to positions in the proliferating NGOs. She presented Canadian sanctions query some of Edwards' more out He is considered the de facto church in the most positive light, ignoring rageous statements as to the exem representative to External Affairs, statistics that show trade with South plary nature of Canada's sanctions he is on the board of the South Africa continues to increase. She performance. African Education Trust Fund, pres milked the government role in estab The Canadian government's ident of the IDAFSA and, since ear lishing the Mandela Fund for all it record is not the worst in the world. lier this year, chair of IAWGSA. But was worth and suggested that there Clark has resisted the temptation to he has remained conservative in his was money for 'non-political' ANC abandon the idea of sanctions un political outlook and something of a activities. til there are much stronger signs of "loose cannon" in his political style.

16 july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT ( ,, ,5) W PM (o ;M

Are the benefits he brings to the nations there exemplified the dan democracy in South Africa," includ movement (not least the credibility gers identified in an earlier SAR ar ing "maintaining and extending the he lends it) outweighed by his role in ticle ("Buying Silence?", February, economic sanctions against South helping, however unconsciously, to 1990). Africa; downgrading diplomatic re with official South Africa and domesticate it? In any case, the real loss to the lations upgrading relations with the ANC conference was the fact that virtu Something of the ambiguous feel and the anti-apartheid movement in ally none of these issues were de ings the movement has towards South Africa." Scott's role surfaced in the Fo bated by delegates to the Forum. ANC agenda rum when Lucy Edwards herself an Part of this may also have been The ANC had its own agenda at the nounced that Scott would be brief due to the Forum structure. In Forum, some signs of which also sur ing Joe Clark on the Monday fol the laudable pursuit of a genuine faced during the period of run-up to lowing the Forum on the results of the proceedings, democratization the Ottawa meeting. The ANC rep of its deliberations. Most dele emphasis fell upon the six to eight resentative on the conference steer gates seemed to feel Scott's willy workshop sessions for doing the bulk ing committee queried the propriety nilly appointment as sole conference of the Forum's work. In many of of a paper prepared by SAR at the spokesperson to the federal govern questions about the underly these, request of the conference coordina ment was not quite adequate as a ing of our activities did sur premises tor. The problem? The paper raised way of representing the views of the energy generated in face. But the question of socialism in South the assembled anti-apartheid move rarely found its way back the groups Africa too overtly and was too crit ment. inter to the brief plenary sessions ical in its examination of the vari throughout the two full days Different strategies needed spersed ous forces working for and against of the Forum. There is room for different strategies the long-term socio-economic trans by different anti-apartheid groups However, by the end of the con formation of the South Africa that in dealing with the Canadian gov ference some momentum had been is now in the making. ernment. It's too simple to see recouped from the first day. The ba What seemed even more crucial Ann Mitchell's preference for tam sic mood of the delegates, particu to ANC preoccupations was its con ing the anti-apartheid movement as larly from the broad anti-apartheid cern to further institutionalize its springing directly from the fact that network and from Canada's re centrality - perhaps even to guar IDAFSA is the beneficiary of Cana gions, was much more sceptical of antee for itself exclusive standing dian government funding. But most the Canadian government's south at the core of the Canadian anti of us are experienced enough as ac ern Africa record and consequently apartheid movement. There's no ar tivists to know that receiving gov more confrontational than sorde of gument against the proposition that ernment money plays a role in the the Steering Committee may have the ANC is the key political actor for decisions you make about your work. wished. In its final communiqu4, the democratic change in South Africa It was hard for SAR workers who Conference did "call on the Cana at present, and so deserves the full were present at the Forum to escape dian government to adopt a clearer support of all Canadians and of the the feeling that some of the machi- and bolder approach in support of Canadian government.

A small group workshop session

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 0

But there are other questions to Inkatha. They saw themselves close youth organizations "instead of be ing guided by the aspirations and be raised about South Africa by in spirit to the position of Moses Ma ... anti-apartheid activists. One of the yekiso, the COSATU representative interests of their constituencies for most important is what degree of ex who spoke Saturday morning, and were turned into support bases the ongoing dictates of the state and clusivity of support for the ANC is confirmed that this issue is up for advisable. The descriptive phrases debate within South Africa itself. party apparatus" with entirely neg ative results. "Old-style comman in the two guidelines for the con Without querying the crucial im dism and sectarianism" must give ference quoted earlier speak, in one portance of the ANC, Mayekiso autonomy" and case, of "support for the ANC," in way to "effective made the strongest of cases for the "political pluralism," says Slovo. the other of "support for the ANC existence in South Africa of au The same position can be found and democratic forces inside South tonomous trade unions and civic as Africa." The conference seemed sociations. These organizations, he in statements by ANC National Ex member Aziz Pahad, who to oscillate back and forth between argued, deserve the direct support ecutive ANC these two positions. The tension of Canadians both in their capac recently said that the must to between the two formulae was one ity as prominent voices for demo become a broad front in order rights from the De that remained implicit in much that cratic change in its own right and wrest political Klerk can occurred during the conference, but as a force for keeping the long-term government: "A front was never was one more point that necessity for socio-economic trans not just be a get-together of all ten really talked through. In conse formation on the agenda of even a dencies where there are no ideolog quence, the potential implication of formally democratized South Africa. ical battles taking place. The very such issues on the terms of our sup (See "Building Civil Society: Moses nature of a front is that you fight port work was largely lost. Mayekiso Interviewed" in this issue for positions." In short, in addi tion to support for the ANC, sup Building a "civil society" of SAR). port for the building of a strong and The case for "pluralistic support" Other prominent ANC members diverse "civil society" (in Mayekiso's is not an easy point to make in have voiced similar points of view. phrase) must be seen as an essential a context like the Ottawa Forum. Joe Slovo, a member of the ANC part of an effort to create effective Both the ANC delegation and some negotiating team meeting with De political and socio-economic democ Canadian participants in the Fo Klerk, has written of his concern racy in South Africa - whatever po rum tended to regard any qualifi that in the failed "socialisms" of litical party may be in power. cation of support for the ANC as Eastern Europe a key weakness was ANC network hostility. Yet those who raised the that "the trade union movement role in national question were not agents of forces became an adjunct of the state The majority of delegates to the Fo like the Pan-Africanist Congress or and party" and that women's and rum did not see the importance of

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT 18 iuly 1990 Southern Africa REPORT such questions - although a related decision-making, such rights would that the voices and needs of women, matter did surface more heatedly. be superfluous. workers, youths and others who de It was the question of how the on Yet almost immediately there mand real transformation don't get going relationship between the ANC after Mahlangu was on his feet muffled. and the new national anti-apartheid again, querying the use in the fi Nelson Mandela Fund network-in-the-making is to be insti nal communiqug of the phrase "it tutionalized. The ANC saw itself as is important to support the demo All members of the network will sup becoming not just an integral mem cratic anti-apartheid organizations" port the ANC pretty unreservedly ber of that network, but a member of (used once, in a text with numerous and if the network can put new re any national coordinating commit other direct references to the ANC) sources at the ANC's disposal, that tee that is now to be established. as insufficiently specific with regard will be a laudable outcome. There to the primacy of the ANC. is already in existence the Nelson Only in the Ontario regional cau Mandela Fund, a non-governmental cus was this premise seriously ques initiative to collect untied funds in tioned. Some Ontario delegates Canada to be put at the disposal of felt the idea of the ANC becom the ANC. This was originally sug ing an actual member of a Cana gested by Joe Clark as an alterna dian organization, let alone a mem tive to direct governmental support ber of its coordinating committee, to for the ANC's political struggle. It be both unprecedented in support may also have been his attempt to work experience and to be ques simultaneously distance the Cana tionable practice in political terms. dian government from overt political One delegate wondered what might support for the ANC, while scoring happen in a situation where ei points with the movement for tak ther the ANC disagreed with the ing its cause seriously. It is therefore anti-apartheid network or the anti something of a two-edged sword for apartheid network disagreed with those who seek to expose the contra the ANC. The ANC is being forced dictory nature of Tory foreign and to develop very complex relation domestic policies. the Canadian govern ships with Beyond the Mandela Fund there ment. It's not too difficult to imag is also the question of possible direct ine a situation in which the ANC, Canadian governmental assistance for perfectly good diplomatic rea to the ANC. Lucy Edwards fudged take a sons, found it advisable to this issue at the Forum, ignoring the Cana softer public line towards the Peter Mahlangu addresses a plenary government's bleak record on this dian government than the Canadian session front over the years. But she did was pre anti-apartheid movement suggest the door is now wide open pared to do. Wouldn't an arms The strong support by confer for the Canadian government to length relationship be more advis ence delegates for ANC centrality back the movement's "non-political" able all round? was the argument. tended to mask an uneasiness on the activities. And finally, what about In any event, in the Ontario cau part of others, including those from the ANC's "Relocation Fund"? It cus, the principle of ANC inclusion some of the larger constituencies was designed by the ANC as a global as a member of the national coordi within the network (the churches, initiative to help facilitate the re nating committee carried the day by for example), at the ANC-Canada's turn to South Africa of thousands of straw vote. propensity to seek to control out exiles and refugees and identified in In the final plenary, the majority comes. These constituencies have the Forum's final communique as a for ANC inclusion was overwhelm formed their own direct links with priority item. Shouldn't the Cana ing, most delegates feeling comfort South African counterparts in ways dian government be expected to con able with a definition, in practice, that manifest some of the best sup tribute to that Fund - and shouldn't of anti-apartheid activists as a vir port work by Canadians. This work it be pressured to do so? tual support network for the ANC. is increasing in importance because Peter Mahlangu declined the voting of the growing number of western There is, in short, plenty of work rights on the coordinating commit interests - including the Canadian awaiting the new network. How tee that some delegates now urged government - looking for 'reason soon will that network become a upon him, arguing that, in any able' voices they can support. The concrete reality? That brings us to case, with the ANC on the commit anti-apartheid movement must in the last disturbing aspect of the con tee, and the practice of consensus tensify its own work, making sure ference.

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 The 'how' of the new network discussion, the unpopularity of that that has the most to lose in a high suggestion was obvious. A change profile, vocal, critical anti-apartheid The need to propose some mecha was made - leave it to the expanded network, is at the helm, its most nism for following through on Fo committee (comprised of the Steer important task the drawing up of a rum decisions should have been fore ing Committee plus about eight model for a national anti-apartheid seen by organizers. Apparently it more people who had acted as "fa network. wasn't. In the final plenary, after re cilitators" at the forum and who did If the Consultative Forum did gional groups had discussed and pre represent a rather wider regional and anything, it exposed the complex sented what they felt the national sectoral spread than the Steering ity of issues around anti-apartheid network was to look like, delegates Committee alone). Many objected work in Canada. Many of those is had to decide who would organize to giving the conference organizers sues have not been fully explored the Forum's recommendations, in such a pivotal role in setting up the by activists. In the months to fol cluding the new network. Some national network. But there was a low many anti-apartheid groups will delegates wanted a brand new in vote, and the Conference Committee meet as regions, to carry forward terim executive, with strong repre became the proposed network's In their own work. Eventually they will sentation from grass-roots forces, to terim Committee by a narrow mar be called on to examine - and accept avoid the Ottawa-centric nature of gin. or reject - the structure that so much of the Forum activity. A the net Ironically, when this Interim work's Interim stalemate was developing. Committee will pro Committee met immediately after pose. That means that this impor the final plenary session, a resolu tant issue - what we want the net But many participants were tion, put forward by a member of the work to do and how we want to do it within minutes of departing for the original Steering Committee, pro - will be back on our plates within airport. The pressure to find a posed that the work be left solely the next few months. It will need solution very quickly was strong. to that Committee. Objections were all our attention, plus close consul One delegate suggested it be left in made, but they were overruled. And tation between regions, to make sure the hands of the conference Steer so the very group that had brought that it truly reflects the wishes of all ing Committee. Even without any us the "I Love Lucy Show," and true activists.

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT Building Civil Society Moses Mayekiso Interviewed

Socialism. The need for many voices same one he delivered to many nomic freedom is being posed. Not to be heard within the South African trade unionists during his brief that the struggle for such freedom revolutionary process, from a robust stay in Canada, notably to the can be reduced to some crude for and assertive "civil society." These delegates of this year's Canadian mula like "nationalizations." What were Moses Mayekiso's terms of ref Labour Congress annual convention is needed, according to Mayekiso, erence when he spoke at the "Tak in Montreal. Mayekiso underscored is "democratic control" of the econ ing Strides" Consultative Forum in the socio-economic dimensions of omy, with the people having a pow Ottawa in May. They struck a chal the struggle now being waged in erful say regarding the pattern of lenging note at the otherwise rather South Africa. Ie argued that De investment, the distribution of sur sanitized proceedings of that meet Klerk's approach to "negotiations" pluses and the like. What he sees ing (see "The I Love Lucy Show," evidences merely a continuing de to be necessary is socialism. In Ma p. 15). sire on the part of the white com yekiso's eyes, recent global develop munity to retain power for itself, ments do not suggest that socialism Mayekiso has become something but by new and rather more so has failed - although the model of of a legendary figure, with demands phisticated means. It is crucial to what he terms to be "a commandist for his release from detention hav state-centred economy" has failed. ing been a focus of international De Klerk to interpret proposed qual ifications to the principle of "one But, he emphasized, it is the free en campaigns throughout the four years terprise system that has failed South (1985-89) of his incarceration. He person, one-vote" in South Africa as exemplifying a "special kind of Africa. The parameters of a new has come to exemplify the close South Africa's own brand of social link between trade union and town democracy" well-suited to the pecu liarities of South Africa. ism are currently under debate, but ship struggles. He emerged from the radical direction of Mayekiso's the shop floor of Toyota's Transvaal But, said Mayekiso, all the chief concerns were patent through plant to become General Secretary currently fashionable talk about out his Canadian visit. of the Metal and Allied Workers "minority protection" and "group Union (MAWU) and, later, of its rights" is primarily designed to blunt A second theme surfaced in Ma successor organization, the National any challenge to South Africa's yekiso's Ottawa presentation. He Union of Metalworkers, South Africa socio-economic inequalities. "We emphasized the necessity to con (NUMSA). But he was also to be know we can't tilt the balance of sider the Congress of South Africa come President of the Alexandra socio-economic power at the nego Trade Unions (COSATU - the large Civic Organization, the spearhead tiating table, but we need genuine umbrella workers' organization of of an innovative pattern of grass political democracy in order to have which NUMSA forms a part) not roots community organizations in the possibility, eventually, of real as an appendage of the ANC, but that Johannesburg township during izing economic equality ... If we as both the latter's ally and as an the dramatic upsurge of popular re talk now of merely getting political autonomous voice of the organized sistance of the early 1980s. It was power, this won't, in itself, overcome working class in South Africa. He this role that led most directly to his the imbalances created by three hun identified COSATU as the "main prolonged detention. dred years of white power," said Ma machine" fighting such crucial bat Now back at work both in the yekiso. There is a very real dan tles as those directed against the trade union movement and with ger, he emphasized, of a preoccu Labour Relations Act and against community groups, Mayekiso proved pation with minority rights giving such abusive labour practices as the to be an exciting and innovative in white-cum-capitalist interests a veto hostel system. He also saw it as a formant on the theory and practice over such transformations, allowing crucial actor, in the longer run, in of the South African struggle when the desperate economic plight of the guaranteeing the socialist content of SAR interviewed him in Toronto vast majority of black people to go the transformation process in South shortly after the Ottawa weekend. unredressed. Africa. The message Mayekiso brought Thus, in the very first rounds Mayekiso's views on "negotia to the Ottawa Forum was the of negotiations, the question of eco- tions" were instructive. Even with

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 wmtRA mfyAgm

the best of intentions on the part of the ANC, he said, these could degenerate into an intra-elite bar gaining process - if mass-based or ganizations are not further devel oped to focus steady strong pressure upon all participants. It was at this point that Mayekiso sought to ex pand the terms of discussion about the likely nature of the transition to democracy in South Africa. lIe reaf firmed the importance of the ANC and of the present moment that finds the ANC transforming itself from a liberation movement to a political party. He also stressed the need to work further to build and strengthen the ANC and to deepen its own mass base. But even while doing so, he stressed that solutions could not be found only in the political realm in habited by a movement-cum-party like the ANC. What he chose to term "civil society" is of at least equal importance to the democrati zation of South Africa. Moreover, this civil society must be built up and'strengthened independently and in its own right. What is "civil society"? Maye kiso describes it as the population at large as it gives expression, through its own grass-roots organizations, to demands that its most immediate needs be met. "The masses are not interested in political parties, as such. Their interests are in houses, schools and health care. The job of a political party is to respond to these demands. Leadership must commu nicate with the masses, responding to this level of need either with reso lution of the problems, or with clear communications about why this is not possible."

The idea of a vibrant network of such grass-roots organizations is not an abstraction in South Africa. The revolutionary process there has thrown up an array of trade unions in the workplace, of civic asso ciations in the townships, of vil lage committees in some of the ru ral areas and of women and youth

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT organizations as well. These or ganizations must be strengthened and guaranteed autonomy from both party and state. Not merely the substance of negotiations, but the health of a future South Africa de pends on this, Mayekiso urged. The trade union movement is the most developed example of this kind of crystallization of the institutions of the civil society. COSATU has now allied itself for many purposes with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, but it also strug gles independently on many fronts. At the same time, it gives broad programmatic guidance to its work ing class members through initia tives like its "Workers' Charter." "COSATU members axe urged to get involved in civic associations as members," says Mayekiso. "Unions & Shirley Carr are involved, not as unions, but Moses Mayekiso through their members, who bring iterated a key point mad, in his their issues separately and vent their organizational know-how that can Ottawa speech: that independent anger and frustration in sessions contribute to building strong civic linkages be established by Canadian with other women. By the time organizations." supporters with unions, churches, these issues are raised is assemblies struc with men, the emotion is gone and Drawing on his own Alexan civic associations and other it is just rhetoric ...they bring the stressed tures that make up the civil society. dra experience, Mayekiso finished product to the congress and that local civic associations should A particularly interesting part want immediate assent. Since men quite independent of local ANC of the interview turned around the be haven't been involved in preparing organizing undertaken by women branches, and be able to accommo the decision, this feels like having committees peo around their own issues and de date in their street things railroaded through. Since the ple from many different political ten mands. At one level, Mayekiso could men have not been involved, they Similarly, the rural-village see a case to be made for establishing dencies. feel it is just a women's issue and structure - though less an autonomous national women's or committee tend to undermine it or get defen highly developed at present - must ganization, parallel to the national sive." from and (around the trade union central or a national also recruit "I'm not sure about some of for example) orga civic association. He did suggest, question of land, these things," Mayekiso acknowl spectrum of peo however, that this would not be as nize across a wide edged. "Maybe I'm not saying the easy to accomplish as in these other ple possibly linked to diverse politi working cases. "Women's organizations have right thing - but it isn't cal tendencies. very well as it is now. COSATU a history of existing as a right arm of It is these institutions of the civil on record with progressive the ANC," he said, "or as branches today is society that may then "push any po not ev of other organizations. That makes motions about women, but that may find itself in in shap litical party it harder to build an autonomous or erybody has been involved ... push it for changes bene ing them." power ganization." And he even felt some ficial to the masses." That includes misgivings, he confessed, about the Moses Mayekiso had no easy an "Because the ANC, says Mayekiso. very principle of women organizing swers. But there was plenty of the of the nature of the broad alliance as women. spark and crackle that spring forth of social forces that the ANC has when serious political issues are be come to represent, there may well "In COSATU, women are orga nized in a women's section but it ing discussed by an intelligent and be limits beyond which that party deeply committed shaper of history. cannot go" in terms of radical pol isn't very satisfactory. It separates out what are 'our' issues as women A rewarding interview. And one icy - unless, that is, it is driven for more promising herald of the new of a well from what are 'your' issues as men," ward by the insistent voices South Africa's future. organized civil society. Mayekiso re- says Mayekiso. "Women deal with

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 Nicaragua Revisited? Peace & Democracy inAngola BY DANIEL DOS SANTOS in April 1990, UNITA accepted the supported, financed and manipu AND FRANK LUCE principle of the sovereignty of the lated by American foreign policy? Daniel dos Santos is a sociologist at the state but not the legality of the gov The peace process University of Ottawa. He recently re ernment; it agreed to the integra Portugal, the former colonizer, turned from a visit to Angola. Frank tion of UNITA's fighters into the An has already become a replacement Luce is a labour lawyer writing a thesis golan armed forces and to sign a for Zaire as the principal out on labour law in Angola. He recently ceasefire. side protagonist in the peace pro returned from a visit to Portugal. It is true that surrounding cess. Face to face talks were en All sides in the Angolan conflict the Angolan peace process, there gineered through the office of the now favour peace and democracy. are questions whose implications Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco How peace should come about and are both important and dangerous. Silva. While Zaire's President what shape democracy should take What should democracy mean for Mobutu remains the official media remain subjects of contention. For Angolans? Can the MPLA's social tor, the Portuguese-inspired process the MPLA and its supporters, it's an ist project, already struggling for involves direct talks without media open question whether the price of survival, be maintained in a multi tion, at least in the initial stage. peace will be to put further barriers party democracy if the electorate, There is no doubt that Por in the way of the socialist project. as in Nicaragua, is faced with the tuguese politicians and businessmen prospect of endless warfare inspired, harbour neo-colonial ambitions. It Recent developments in the peace process, the military situation and the domestic political scene in dicate how open the question re mains. The Angolan government and UNITA have entered a phase of face to face talks from positions which seem to be quite opposite. On the one hand, the government has proposed a nine-point peace plan which requires full recognition of the sovereignty and the legality of the state and the government, to be fol lowed by a ceasefire. The govern ment considers both steps to be es sential pre-requisites for the secu rity of the population and for eco nomic recovery; only then could a reasonable discussion about politi cal reform take place. UNITA, on the other hand, presents a position which is full of contradictions and which changes virtually from week to week. UNITA initially accepted the government's plan at Gbadolite in mid-1989, and then rejected it completely. UNITA demanded in stead a transitional government and elections in 18 months in a multi party system. Only with this al ready agreed to would UNITA enter tain a ceasefire. Nearly a year later,

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT Mia 'go,ME0 is Portugal's economic weakness in At the invitation of Durio Bar integrated into a transitional gov the European community which has roso, the Angola's Vice-Minister of ernment pending general elections. brought about the ambition to "re Foreign Affairs recently spent two The MPLA may be less inclined to turn to Africa." That same weak days in private talks with UNITA accept the legitimacy of Savimbi's ness requires Portugal to rely on its representatives near Lisbon. The leadership, and the role of UNITA in cultural and linguistic ties and pro negotiators signed a memorandum the future political life of Angola re pose for itself the role of interme of agreement with respect to the mains uncertain. After Gbadolite, it diary for European and American conduct of future negotiations, the is difficult to imagine that dos San capital. Portugal may also hope contents of which remain secret at tos would be prepared to meet Sav to rely on the thousands of "Luso present. Since that time, Savimbi imbi personally at this stage. Angolans" and Angolans resident in has called for a ceasefire to take ef Mobutu had succeeded in manip Portugal who have now accepted the fect in June, and he has called on ulating Savimbi and dos Santos into reality of political independence and Angolan President Jos6 Eduardo dos agreeing to a ceasefire agreement at are prepared to do business in and Santos to meet with him personally Gbadolite in June 1989, in the pres with Angola if the co:.ditions are to attempt a final settlement. ence of 14 African heads of state. ripe. The response of the Angolan When the Angolan armed forces, The prospect of sponsoring a government will likely be decided FAPLA, let down its defences to put peace agreement for Angola has by the party's Central Committee, the ceasefire into effect, UNITA at given rise to open competition be which was scheduled to meet in May. tacked. It appears that Mobutu had tween Prime Minister Cavaco Silva Dos Santos has already made some neglected to consult the American and President Mario Soares. Soares moves to introduce political reforms State Department about the terms told the audience at the celebrations that aim at a separation between of his "African solution" to the con for the anniversary of the April 25 the party and the state, the com flict, and America was not prepared coup that the time had come for Por plete autonomy of mass organiza to allow UNITA's demise. Savimbi tugal to return to Africa. Soares tions, civic and professional associ reneged and denied that any such is, however, known as a friend of ations, a new electoral law which agreement had been reached, leaving UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi forces party candidates to compete Mobutu in a state of embarrassment. and he is remembered for his opposi with independents, the opening up The government now appears ea tion to the recognition of the MPLA of party membership, and a consti ger to bypass Mobutu's attempts at government when he was Foreign tutional review in two to five years. mediation. Dos Santos was quoted Minister during the decolonization None of the contending tendencies recently as saying that Mobutu, process. inside the MPLA has questioned the himself a recent convert to multi Cavaco Silva and his Secretary one party system. That debate party democracy, is an interested of State for Foreign Relations and should come as part of the consti party in the conflict. Millions of Cooperation, Durio Barroso, have tutional review. Angolans live in Zaire, and Zairian won the confidence of both sides; The SEF (Economic and Finan forces invaded Angola in support they have been described by the An of the FNLA. American supplies to cial Reform) meanwhile is progress golan Ambassador to Portugal as UNITA now arrive through Zaire, ing slowly, and there remains some "good friends of Angola." Never with Mobutu's approval and sup resistance to the "structural adjust port. theless, Cavaco Silva has his own ment programme" prescribed by the agenda for Portugal's return to World Bank and the IMF. A party The military situation Africa. During South African Pres congress is scheduled for December When it became obvious after ident De Klerk's recent tour of Eu 1990, when the competing tenden rope, Cavaco Silva announced that Gbadolite that there was no cease cies, described generally as "hard fire, dos Santos backed an attempt his government would lead the cam line" and "moderate," will likely paign in the European community at a military recovery in order to contest openly for control. Some put more pressure on UNITA to re to have sanctions lifted immediately. people are already asking that the South Africa has a Portuguese com turn to the negotiating table. The Congress be moved ahead to July to military operations centred on the munity of several hundred thou speed the pace of both political and sands, many of whom fled there in southeastern province of Cuando economic reform. supposed fear of the FRELIMO and Cubango, where Angolan forces de MPLA governments, and who would Savimbi now recognizes the legit feated the South Africans at Cuito be pleased to renew business links imacy of dos Santos as head of state Carnavale. UNITA is headquartered between South Africa, Portugal and but refuses to recognize the MPLA at Jamba, also in Cuando Cubango Angola. Already these Portuguese government. On May 14, how province. Within a 100 kilometres South Africans are investing heavily ever, Savimbi told the foreign press of Cuito Carnavale is the town of in Mozambique. that UNITA no longer sought to be Mavinga which has a major airbase

Southern Africa REPORT .July 1990 for resupplying troops. It also has a dislodged from the region. But this A few weeks later, American bridge that gives access to the cen defeat was a major set back for U. S. Secretary of State James Baker tral highlands where UNITA forces UNITA. reportedly made it clear to Angolan are relatively free to move among the The Bush administration was President dos Santos that under mostly Ovimbundo population, the mobilized into action, and emer no circumstances would the Bush ethnic group upon which UNITA de gency supplies were sent to UNITA administration tolerate the fall of pends for its tribally-based support. in Zaire. Mobutu allowed UNITA UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. Faced with the certainty of further U. S. intervention were a military solution to the civil war attempted, dos Santos decided to back down and again try for a negotiated set tlement. With the abandonment of FAPLA's strategy to move on to Jamba, and the shift of focus by UNITA towards the north, the gov ernment withdrew from Mavinga on May 8. UNITA then claimed that FAPLA had fled Mavinga in the face of a UNITA assault that, in fact, never occurred; Savimbi toured the area in the company of the foreign press on May 14 to show the scene of the UNITA "victory." The increased American inter vention has enabled the Bush ad ministration to block a military vic tory, leaving the current negotia tions as the government's only way out. The June ceasefire date pro posed by UNITA may be unsuit able to the government since June marks the start of the dry season when FAPLA would have the capac ity to move against UNITA's gueril las in a conventional manner. With out a ceasefire, the government will be faced with continuing guerilla ac tivity in the Luanda region. This is the strategy which U. S. advisors have favoured since they took over from the South Africans as UNITA's sponsors. The war in Angola be comes increasingly Contra-like. to cross into Zairian territory to re FAPLA launched a major of a third ceive American supplies. UNITA The emergence of fensive against Mavinga in Decem force? ber 1989, the first conventional con could again infiltrate back into the flict between FAPLA and UNITA north of Angola, shifting the fo The Alvor Accord, which led to without the presence of the South cus of its attacks to the northern Angolan independence in 1975, ex Africans or the Cubans. FAPLA's provinces and closer to the capital cluded from the political process any strategy was to control the bridge of Luanda. The Angolan govern parties other than the three indepen and the airbase at Mavinga; once ment has alleged that Zairian army dence movements (MPLA, UNITA, Mavinga was consolidated, FAPLA officers and Portuguese mercenaries and the FNLA). Recently the gov would move on for a final assault on are involved in these sabotage oper ernment has signalled its openness Jamba. After three months, FAPLA ations, and it accuses South Africa to the development of organizations won control in February, although of allowing its extreme right to back completely independent of state or UNITA's forces were never totally UNITA in the south. party control, sparking the forma-

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT ERA goCl(KIM tion of a number of private groups. At the request of the Congress ironic. UNITA has a deplorable In Luanda, the Angolan Civic As organizers, the Angolan government human rights record which contra sociation (ACA) has formed as a refrained from active participation dicts its claim to be the guarantor of private organization, independent of in the proceedings and deliberately democratic freedom. Savimbi leads party and state. refrained from any form of partisan through a power cult and tolerates from Lu no opposition. UNITA's claim to be In Lisbon, Mario Pinto de An presence. The technocrats anda who spoke were not members a patriotic force is tainted by its con drade, the first president of the sistent history of dependence on for MPLA and the former leader of of MPLA, and their presentations were restricted to the technical as eign sponsors, first Portugal, then MPLA dissidents known as the Ac pects of the issues at hand. South Africa, and now the United tive Revolt, is prominently involved States. Moreover, UNITA's support with a "study group" on Angolan The way was left open to UNITA within Angola depends on its ap peace. The group has made a well to attempt to manipulate the pro peals to tribalism; it commonly at received proposal that peace talks ceedings in its favour. The accep tacks the MPLA government along take place in Angola, mediated by tance of the legitimacy of UNITA is racial lines with the claim that it is prominent Angolans. Their pro of course implicit in the concept of dominated by mulattos. posal is symptomatic of the growing multi-party democracy. The partici strength of Angolan nationalism as pants made repeated calls for multi What kind of democracy? a force for peace and national recon party elections as a pre-condition for In the context of recent events in ciliation. A less likely source of in the "return" of the expatriates to Eastern Europe and America's abil ternal mediation is Holden Roberto, work in Angola. The concept of ity to ensure the organizational sur who has resurfaced with the sug remuneration and living conditions vival of UNITA, the MPLA govern gestion that his FNLA, a spent commensurate with those available ment will likely be forced to accept force militarily and organizationally, abroad, and at least equal to those some sort of multi-party elections maintains a claim to a share in provided for foreign experts in An in order to bring about a negoti power under the terms of the Alvor gola, received wide applause. While ated peace. The MPLA proposal Accord. Roberto has claimed that almost all participants called for to democratize its own party and to he may be able to bring the two peace and democracy in the name hold open elections in which individ sides together, although lie clearly of patriotism, absent from the dis uals may oppose party candidates is would be unacceptable in MPLA cir cussions was any mention of the unlikely to satisfy UNITA and the cles and UNITA would not be willing peasants and the workers who form Bush administration in the current to give him a major role. the vast majority of the population context, since their real goal is the and who have no hope of achieving MPLA's complete destruction. It The potential strength of petit the living standards the profession may be in the interest of the MPLA bourgeois interests was evident in als were demanding as the price of to allow the private groups like the Lisbon in April when prominent An their return. ACA to prosper so that popular dis golans held the First Congress of At the closing ceremonies, the content with the war and the dis situation, for which it Angolan Cadres Abroad. The con UNITA delegation paraded into the mal economic MPLA govern ference was aiming at a patriotic auditorium after everyone else was is easy to blame the ment, will not translate into votes platform, to bring together expatri seated; their supporters rose on for UNITA. ate professionals to discuss develop cue for a standing ovation. The ment problems in a non-political at Jornal de Angola concluded that At this stage, and even if the mosphere. About 1,500 Angolans the Congress had been manipulated Ovimbundu are the largest ethnic from around the world attended the into becoming a forum for UNITA. group, it is far from certain that Congress, although the vast major Of those who rose to cheer the UNITA could win an election. This in Portugal. Party ity are resident UNITA delegation, most were what is why UNITA tries so hard to by the orga politics were forbidden Soares had described in his opening flirt with the petty-bourgeois elite which neverthe nizing committee, remarks as "Luso-Angolans," Por abroad, as only a fraction of that less made clear its advocacy of a tuguese who had left Angola at inde same social class inside Angola, multi-party democracy in Angola. pendence and who now wanted to be which has supported the MPLA Congress organizers recognized the part of Portugal's return to Africa; since the beginning, would ever vote legitimacy of the Angolan govern among them was a former colonial for Savimbi. During a recent trip Embassy ment, and the Angolan governor-general. to Angola, most people interviewed sponsored the official dinner which seemed desperate. They are un closed the Congress on April 28. The tacit alliance which ap happy with the war, they are tired UNITA had a large delegation in at pears to be developing between of working without results; but even tendance but was denied official sta UNITA and patriotic Angolan pro if they are not satisfied with MPLA's tus. fessionals and small businessmen is

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 administration of the state, they still think it would be worse with UNITA. In the face of this situa tion, it is essential for the govern ment to implement reforms rapidly and compromise with new forces in 1- ( an alliance that can isolate UNITA. What is crucial to the MPLA position is that multi-party elec tions be held two or three years af- DO Qu ter a ceasefire, when UNITA's army has been demobilized and the econ omy has gone off a war footing. _ __/ Immediate elections demanded by N( UNITA could mean a repeat of the Chamorro campaign in Nicaragua. The electorate would be asked to choose between a promise of peace and American development assis tance with Savimbi, or the threat of a renewal of an American financed "civil war" if MPLA retains power. Even if MPLA is reasonably con fident it will remain in government, the question remains what policies it will adopt amidst the shifting and conflicting array of forces. Apart from international economic pres sure exerted mainly through the World Bank and the IMF, inter nal pressures arising out of the need to open up to the influence and demands of the technocrats may further weaken those forces in the party still committed to the social ist project. The party's base among the workers and the peasants whom socialism is intended to benefit re mains weak. A democracy for the workers and peasants would require structures which are not found in the existing multi-party models which have recently come into fashion. The next MPLA congress be comes, in this context, of crucial im portance. The congress will focus on a major restructuring of Angolan so ciety, to make it more open. But will it also try to preserve a politi cal, economic and social space vital to the struggle against "underdevel opment" and in favour of a socialist and democratic Angola? In the past, 26' MPLA has argued that democracy without social justice is an empty shell.

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT G7?0h1 Zimrba bwe Ten Yea rs After Prospects for A Popular Politics

BY LEE COKORINOS rocked by scandal and repression, is irregularities and lack of a genuine beginning to consolidate itself; con Lee Cokorinos is the Political Action popular opposition force. The head trol of the judiciary has been taken of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Co-chair of the Association for Con out of the hands of racist Rhode (ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangi cerned Africa Scholars . Unions sia Front-appointed judges. The rai, was detained three times last Zimbabwe's celebration of ten years Mugabe government on several oc year under emergency regulations of independence on April 18 provides casions stood up to the Reagan inherited from the Smith regime. a good opportunity to look back, not administration on international is Women delegates to the Decem only on the achievements and set sues like the Grenada invasion and ber ZANU(PF) congress complained backs of the past decade, but also destabilization of Nicaragua, and they had not been allowed an in at those of the North American sol brought credit on itself by its effec put into the draft party constitution. idarity movements with respect to a tive stewardship of the Non-aligned "Some of the women at the cen key Frontline state. Much has been movement. It has resisted Amer tral committee meeting were booed written about the dashed hopes and ican and British arm-twisting tac before they could even make their sobering effects of Zimbabwe's ex tics against the Angolan government contributions," according to Then perience of majority rule, but less when other Frontline and African jiwe Lesabe, deputy secretary of about what might be learned by ex states displayed more flexible back the united ZANU party's Women's amining the effects of Zimbabwe's bones. And the legal regime cover League. Young people face massive independence on the fairly potent ing women's rights, while still leav unemployment, with some 100,000 movement in solidarity with the Pa ing much room for improvement, school-leavers chasing about 7,000 triotic Front that existed at the end has been made less repressive. Per new jobs a year. The decisions of of the 1970s. These lessons may haps most importantly, the politi the judiciary have been repeatedly be useful as we continue to dis cal/military contradiction that dom challenged and ignored by the gov cuss how recent political changes inated not only the first decade of in ernment. The student movement at in South Africa affect the strategic dependence but the entire liberation the university and polytechnic has horizons of the anti-apartheid move struggle - that between ZANU(PF) faced severe repression, and its lead ment (see Bill Martin and Jim Ca and PF-ZAPU - was resolved by the ership was detained for daring to son in SAR Vol. 5 No. 5, May 1990, merger of the two parties. protest the discrepancy between so p. 22). When majority rule comes cialist words and capitalist deeds. to that country, such lessons will be Nevertheless, serious problems Even grumbling about the lack of come even more relevant. confront Zimbabwe in all these benefits from the unity accord is be areas. Any discussion on Zimbabwe ing heard. Zimbabwe ten years after today will inevitably point out that On "balance," Zimbabwe's setbacks although peasants bore the brunt of Mixed election results and difficulties over the past decade the Smith regime's repression and have been outweighed by its achieve provided the majority of rank-and For the solidarity movement, one questions re ments. Peasant agriculture un file guerillas for the liberation move of the more vexing der the ZANU(PF) government has ments, they have still not received garding the March elections was the absence of an effective opposi experienced mixed but unmistak the land and resources they were articulated the in able success (at least for those who promised. Many ex-combatants who tion that clearly terests of poor peasants, workers, have land, credit and inputs); for dropped out of school and sacrificed women, the unemployed and the mal racial segregation in public fa their education have seen others who radical intelligentsia. By now there cilities has been outlawed; clinics sat out the war and gained creden is ample evidence that ZANU(PF), and schools became available for tials land lucrative positions in the while containing within its ranks the first time for millions of poor state and private business. Segrega dedicated and honest representa people; regular elections were held tion has taken on new forms, more of these strata, which gave the population a voice economically than racially based. tives and members is dominated by what Tsvangirai in government they never had be The most recent election, held in fore; university enrollment skyrock late March, was characterized by has called "the old African national ist leadership" seeking to "close off eted; the labor movement, though widespread intimidation, procedural

Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 NAMCbfficbwG

challenges to their long-term bene have vocally opposed both "dog tlement" leader Ndabaningi Sithole, fits." The "wait and see" attitude matic socialism" and the one-party who now lives in Maryland - won vis-a-vis Zimbabwe held by many state. The experiences of the past in Chipinge South (where the oppo in the solidarity movement in the decade certainly have had an effect sition candidates won 17,500 votes early 1980s (in some ways paralyz in shaping such attitudes, since es to the ZANU(PF)'s 3616). Over ing it politically) has clearly become tablishing a one-party state would all, however, the number of oppo untenable. The opposition Zimba involve banning opposition parties sition MPs only rose from two to bwe Unity Movement (ZUM), on the like ZUM, and of course preclude three, though Tekere is likely to win other hand, stands for an even more the formation of parties to the left a delayed poll in the Chimanimani vigorous and free-wheeling capital of ZANU(PF). Dabengwa has been constituency along the Mozambique ism the Zimbabwean downtrodden drawing huge crowds, while the cam border. could hardly be expected to vote paign appearances of some other ex There for. ZUM also concluded a foul ZAPU officials associated with gov have been reports from alliance with the Conservative Al ernment policy were virtually ig villagers and security forces in this liance of Zimbabwe, the party of nored. The point here is that Zim border area of signs of stepped up Ian Smith. Before his desertion of babweans are paying attention to collaboration between MNR ban the ruling party, it should be added, what their politicians are saying and dits and some locals in Manicaland. ZUM leader, Edgar Tekere, had also do not relate to the candidates as Although more complaints are be distinguished himself as one of the interchangeable commodities. This ing heard about the lack of secu most feared intellectual authors of also casts a different light on the rity force presence than abuses, the U. S.-based the atrocities in Matabeleland in the widely touted voter apathy in the human rights organiza tion, Africa mid-1980s. Who does one support in elections. Watch, citing MNR ac tivity and the government's such a situation? eviction Coverage focusing on the one of peasants from their land, recently Much of the limited information party/multi-party issue has also ob drew a parallel between the situa available about Zimbabwe in the scured the fact that the process tion in the east and in Matabeleland West came through the distorting for selecting ZANU(PF) candidates, in the mid-1980s. "Instead of mak prism of the dominant media, which while centrally controlled, did take ing a clear distinction between le frequently cast the Zimbabwe Unity place under new rules which made gitimate political dissent and armed Movement as a persecuted south for some sharp contests over pol ern African equivalent of the "move opposition," Africa Watch said, the icy and program. Western politi government "is amalgamating ZUM, ments for democracy" in eastern Eu cal analysts managed to ignore the rope. Not that there are no par Renamo and South Africa, in pre fact that important issues were at cisely the same manner as it did allels. To take two examples: in stake in some ZANU(PF) candidate the election campaign Tekere made in Matabeleland." The report asks selections or deselections. The inde whether "the lessons of Matabele liberal use of comparisons between pendent Zimbabwean monthly PA the government's support for a one land have been learned - or whether RADE, by contrast, did note that in the human rights emergency is des party state and the experiences of some cases these contests "enabled eastern Europe; and a day before the tined to be repeated in eastern Zim the grassroots organs of the party to babwe." events which lead to the overthrow deliver a clear message against com of Ceausescu, Mugabe made warm placency to their representatives," Nonetheless, ZANU(PF) won and subsequently embarrassing ref though the experiment ultimately the election resoundingly, taking 116 erences to his Romanian "friend." ended a fortnight later "with tears, of 120 elected parliamentary seats (Ceausescu, by the way, shared a joy, tribalism, fights, regionalism, (30 more are appointed by Mu freedom of Hararehonour with Nel feasting ...and finally dictatorship gabe). This exceeded the widely son Mandela as the result of a 1983 prevailed." quoted predictions of some "inde visit). pendent observers," such as the Yet the contending parties in Several patterns emerge from the Catholic Commission for Justice and the election have grown out of elections. The first of these is that Peace. In a separate presidential Zimbabwe's distinctive society and ZANU(PF)'s influence in the east poll, Mugabe received 2.5 million history, and cannot be under ern part of the country, along the votes to Tekere's 413,000. Although stood by referring to examples else border with Mozambique, is declin Mugabe stated that he took the re where. Senior ZANU figures like ing. Votes for opposition candidates sults as a mandate for a one-party Dumiso Dabengwa, the former mili in one district in the border town of state, this plank had in fact been tary leader of PF-ZAPU, public ser Chipinge totalled over 15,000 to the quietly removed from his party's vice minister Eddison Zvogbo and ZANU(PF) candidate's 7065. The election manifesto. The manifesto the current Minister of State for Na candidate for the ZANU-Ndonga instead warned that "any division or tional Security, Sydney Sekeramayi, party - that of former "internal set- split in the ranks of the main pro-

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT ducing classes must be resisted and Another pattern emerging from many who voted for ZUM's candi prevented as such division will pro the poll was ZUM's national show dates did so more out of protest at vide the petty bourgeoisie with the ing, particularly in the larger towns. the slow pace of ZANU(PF)'s trans opportunity to defeat the objectives While generally taking a drubbing formation of the economy (see SAR of socialism. The workers and peas in rural areas not on the east December 1989) than out of agree ants have thus everything to gain ern border, Tekere's party was able ment with ZUM's commitment to and nothing to lose by uniting under to attract some significant support the "free-market" and "democratic the umbrella of ZANU(PF) ... The from disaffected urban voters. This pluralism." In a medium of social next phase of our revolution will seek demonstrates once again the danger crisis, political dissent seems to have to give the people economic power of drawing simple equations of class expressed itself either in a protest and independence." support for particular parties, since vote for ZUM, or, more frequently,

...... ' 4 Southern Africa REPORT july 1990 7

in a boycott of the poll altogether: fore deciding to accept a deputy ants who cherish access to regional the turnout was only 54% of the ministry in Home Affairs. One inter markets, wants autarky. reported 4.5 million registered vot pretation of this move might be that ers (which, as the British historian the criteria of accountability must Solidarity with whom & what? Terence Ranger has noted, is proba be extended beyond the boundaries Before independence in 1980, there bly an inaccurately high figure). It of the good graces of party central. was a vibrant and well-organized cannot be known where these vot Zimbabwe support movement in ers would have gone if an opposi Secondly, the experience with North America which was taken se tion party standing firmly for, say, ZUM means that any militants con riously by the Washington policy more spending on education and job templating such a move would have establishment. That is no longer creation, distributing land to poor to ensure that the alliances they the case. As the basis of solidarity peasants, or opening up the collec formed were not ones that would shifted from morality to economics, tive bargaining process, had been on compromise them. Some politi from opposing white minority rule to the ballot. But almost certainly the cally quite sound people were badly opposing the logic of "structural ad ruling party would have gotten a run burned by Tekere. justment" in Zimbabwe, the move for its money. Finally, any serious Zimbabwean ment not only shed support but lit erally disappeared. The irony in this Structural constraints militant would have to assess for him/herself the scope that exists for is that many of the same issues that In a very real sense, however, think making a direct challenge to the ex animated the liberation struggle it ing along those lines involves more isting social structure. Could Zim self and galvanized overseas sup idealism than sober reflection. For babwe cope with a cut-off of loans port - disproportionate white power a party to the "left" of ZANU(PF) from international agencies like the in Zimbabwean economy and soci to emerge, some necessary condi IMF and World Bank? What would ety, unequal distribution of land, in tions would obviously have to ex be the effect of an end to com equality in educational opportunity, ist. First, leaders with credibility mercial lending? Would the agri lack of labour rights, political disen among poor and working Zimbab cultural and manufacturing sectors franchisement and scorn, remain in weans would have to be willing to be able to survive outside pres some cases at the same or even worse bolt from the ruling party. While sure? Is the degree of political unity levels than they were in the 1970s. some have done so, or, as in the case among socialist forces - and between In the meantime, elsewhere in of many militants from the war, have these forces and their "mass base" Africa, some World Bank and IMF simply gone home and dropped out - strong enough to withstand such officials have begun to talk about of politics, by and large genuine so pressures until the economic bene the need to "rethink the question cialists have stayed in ZANU(PF) fits of self-reliance, diversification of of national sovereignty." One se while combining their party mem trade and increased domestic pro nior World Bank official remarked bership with activity that consoli duction come on line? lasf year on what he saw as the need dates and hopefully extends mobi to "rethink the viability" of Niger lization along class lines. There have Many in the solidarity movement as a nation. Going almost unno been reports, for instance, that some would give automatic "no" answers ticed as the dramatic struggles senior ZANU(PF) figures, not want to all the above questions. Many of the continent's "last colonies" ing to compromise their positions in Zimbabw.e, however, knowing the are reach ing their conclusion is a trend in the state, remained secret mem costs of the present economic strat to ward the recolonization of the rest bers of ZUM. Others have said that egy, feel the answers might be "yes," of Africa. By this such accusations are a smokescreen though perhaps to less dramatically I do not mean indirect economic "neocolonialism" for intra-party witch-hunts. Even if posed questions. Zimbabwe's indus of the type Kwame Nkrumah true, however, it could not be taken trial base is already under attack wrote about so eloquently, but for granted that those riding two by the Bretton Woods institutions. political colonialism- "direct" and partisan horses in this way would Its financial system is fairly sophis "indirect" necessarily be doing so to prepare ticated. If people need your prod rule, the massive presence of "bilat eral," World the way for launching a left alter ucts, such as maize and tobacco, Bank, and IMF person nel within the African state. They native to the ruling party. They they will buy them, as they did be are said by these institutions to be might simply be 'expanding their fore 1980. And "structural adjust bringing, as in days of old, "good options' the way opportunist politi ment" can place strains on politi governance" to Africa. cians everywhere do. For the time cal unity at least as bad as impe being, a more open and politically rial wrath. There were and are se Such talk has yet to reach Zim far-sighted strategy may have been rious debates about "the lessons of babwe (though it is being more followed by Dabengwa, who report Nicaragua." Virtually no one, least frequently heard just over the edly consulted his constituents be- of all Zimbabwe's workers and peas- Zambesi), but is this to be the future

july 1990 Southern Africa REPORT G5;;)0 IW

of all of southern Africa as well in a brella organizations doing the same relations of solidarity will involve a few decades time? If so, what will work in Africa. prodigious task of hooking up with become of the "happily ever after" both rural and urban cooperatives, scenarios which so often guide the vi At home this involves actual the alternative press, the students' sion of the solidarity movement, sen organizing against the IMF/World movement, and the trade unions. timents which we recently saw again Bank, in an attempt to gum up, The links forged with South Africa in abundance in Windhoek? Has disrupt, and discredit their work as along these lines show that they can nothing been learned? If this course thoroughly as the formal and in be made, despite official skepticism is to be resisted, a shift of emphasis formal "public relations" apparatus or resistance. must take place from simply fighting of the apartheid regime was under mined by the solidarity movement Besides creating and strengthen racial domination to fighting imperi ing movements to press for the po they during the last decade. It also alism. Though often confused, litical and economic liberation of our are not one and the same thing. involves being analytically sharper and more vocal in criticizing the own countries, the soundest form of solidarity we can extend to the poor Two tasks stand out many corruptions of socialist ideas here: re and exploited in southern Africa is constituting the political and so in African "liberation movements" to make the leap with them from the cial base of the solidarity move and in the solidarity movement. Judging by events, these will have struggle against racial domination to ment at home (involvement in the that against global marginalization fight against cutbacks, racism, capi to be more rigorous and thorough than those being currently deployed and domination. Judging from the tal flight, plant closures, slashing the past decade's experience regarding social wage, etc.); and linking up in eastern Europe, where the depre Zimbabwe, this will not occur by it with grassroots movements fighting dations of capitalism are less directly self. In fact, it suggests we may well austerity familiar than they are in Africa. and the economic destruc look back on the early 1990s as the tion of Africa. Both tasks will be Regarding Zimbabwe itself, re high point in intercontinental soli exceedingly difficult to manage. constructing systematic and regular darity, which would be a tragedy. Intellectually, this means fight ing the language and mentality of "competitiveness" at home, and "structural adjustment" in countries like Zimbabwe. One lesson of the past is that the intellectual tools to Information to Help You do this are not necessarily sharp ened in a fight against racial dom Change the World! ination, not least since all classes of Don't have time to keep oppressed African populations suffer up with what is being written, from white minority rule, and the done, and thought in the social change movement? ruling classes of the West have eas ily supported such struggles under the guise of "democracy." They are THE CONNEXIONS DIGEST doing so once again with millions of " Makes it easier to keep informed about what is important to you welcome "National Endowment for * Is a social change sourcebook that brings you information about Democracy" dollars for the ANC. hundreds of publications, events and projects. " THE CONNEXIONS ANNUAL -- a special issue of the Digest Nor are the organizational al liances adequate. Solidarity work included in your subscription -- is a book that has been called the must also be restructured on the ba most comprehensive reference tool on social, environmental, sis of a critique of production rela peace and community issues in Canada. tions in Africa, and an understand ing of how the world economy has Subscribe Now! changed since the 1960s and 1970s when many of the original critiques Subscriptions $25/year; Sample issue $2. of neo-colonialism and imperialism Connexions, were formulated. What is politically 427 Bloor St. W, Toronto, Ont. M5S 1X7 at issue in these struggles can only be learned through direct links with both the grassroots and larger, urn-

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