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International Court of Justice Case Concerning Oil

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International Court of Justice Case Concerning Oil INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) REJOINDER SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TABLE OF CONTENTS REJOINDER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INTRODUCTION ....................................................... PART 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................... INTRODUCTION ....................................... CHAPTER 1 IRAN ATTACKED U.S. AND OTHER NEUTRAL SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND USED ITS OIL PLATFORMS IN THESE ATTACKS ...................... Section 1. Iran Systematically and Deliberately Attacked U.S. and Other Neutra1 Shipping ............................... Section 2. Iran Used its Oil Platforms in its Attacks on U.S. and Other Neutra1 Shipping .................................. A. The Iranian Exclusion Zone and the Channel for Neutral Shipping ........................................ B. The Iranian Navy's Own Documents Confirm Iran's Use of the Platforms to Collect and Disseminate Military Intelligence on the Movements of Foreign Shipping in the Gulf ................................................... C. The International Shipping Community Was Aware of Iran's Use of its Oil Platforms in its Attacks on U.S. and Other Neutral Shipping .............................. D. Iran's Assertions About the Character of the Platforms Do Not Refute the Evidence of Their Use in its Attacks on U.S. and Other Neutra1 Shipping .......................... 1. The Platforms Did Not Require Technologically Advanced Equipment to Perform Their Military Role ...... (b) Communications equipment ........................ (c) Helicopter landing pads ............................ 2. The Military Equipment Iran Placed on the Platforms Could be Used Offensively as Well as Defensively .......... CHAPTER II IRAN OPPOSED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS TO PROTECT NEUTRAL SHIPPING FROM IRANIANATTACKS ................................... Section 1. The International Response to Iran's Attacks on Neutral Shipping ........................................ A. Reflagging ............................................. B. Naval Escorts and Minesweepers .......................... Section 2. Iran's Opposition to Efforts to Protect Neutra1 Shipping ...... CHAPTER III IRAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON SEAISLECITY ........................................ Section 1. The Evidence Demonstrates Iran's Responsibility for the Attack on Sea Isle City ................................... Section 2. Iran Used the Rostam Platform to Monitor and Report on the Movements of Sea Isle City ............................. Section 3. Iran's Pattern of Missile Launches from the Faw Area is Consistent with its Acknowledged Policy of Targeting Kuwait's Oil Trade ............................. Section 4. Iran's Efforts to Deny its Responsibility are Inconsistent andIncredible .......................................... Iran's Shifting Story on the Existence of Missile Sites intheFawArea ......................................... Iraq Did Not Maintain a Missile Launching Site in the Faw Area at the Time of the Attack on Sea Isle City ........... Iraq Could Not Have Attacked Sea Isle City Using a Missile That Traveled Along a Circuitous Path ............... The Missile That Hit Sea Isle City Was Not Launched FromtheAirorSea ..................................... CHAPTER IV IRAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON THE USSSAMUEL B. ROBERTS ......................... 48 Section 1. The Evidence Demonstrates Iran's Responsibility for the Aîtack on the USS Samuel B. Roberts ....................... 48 Section 2. Iran's Denial of Responsibility for Mining is Refuted by the Evidence and Conclusions of the International Shipping Community .................................... 49 Section 3. Iraq is not Responsible for the Attack on the uss ~amhelB. ~oberts................................... 52 CHAPTER V THE UNITED STATES TOOK LIMITED, LAWFUL DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRANIAN OFFSHORE OIL PLATFORMS IN RESPONSE TO IRAN'S ATTACKS ON SEA ISLE CITY AND USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS .............................. 54 PART II THE COURT SHOULD DENY IRAN THE RELIEF IT SEEKS BECAUSE OF IRAN'S OWN ILLEGAL CONDUCT ............................................. 57 INTRODUCTION ....................................... CHAPTER 1 THE COURT SHOULD DENY RELIEF TO IRAN BECAUSE IRAN ACTED IMPROPERLY WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DISPUTE .............................................. 58 CHAPTER II THE COURT SHOULD DENY RELIEF TO IRAN BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF VIOLATED OBLIGATIONS IDENTICAL TO THOSE THAT ARE THE BASIS FOR ITSAPPLICATION .................................... 61 CHAPTER III THE COURT SHOULD DENY RELIEF TO IRAN BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES ACTIONS WERE TAKEN IN SELF-DEFENSE AS A RESULT OF IRAN'S OWN ILLEGAL CONDUCT ...................... 64 PART III THE UNITED STATES DID NOT VIOLATED ARTICLE X(l) OF THE 1955 TREATY BECAUSE THE ATTACKS ON THE PLATFORMS DID NOT AFFECT "COMMERCE" THAT WAS "BETWEEN THE TERRITORIES" OF IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES .................................. INTRODUCTION ....................................... CHAPTER 1 THE COURT'S 1966 JUDGEMENT DID NOT DECIDE WHETHER THE EXTRACTION OF CRUDE OIL AT THE IRANIAN PLATFORMS CONSTITUTES "COMMERCE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 1955TREATY .......................................... CHAPTER II THE EXTRACTION OF CRUIDE OIL AT THE IRANIAN PLATFORMS IS NOT "COMMERCE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE X(l) OF THE1955TREATY ..................................... Section 1. The Term "Commerce" in Article X(l) Refers to "Maritime Commerce" ................................... The Context of Article X(l) Shows That it Relates to Maritime Affairs ........................................ The History of Article X(l) Reinforces its Maritime Character ..................................... Section 2. Even a Broad Interpretation of the Term "Commerce" Would Not Sustain Iran's Interpretation .................... A. The Oscar Chinn Case .................................... B. Definitions ............................................. C. United States "Commerce Clause" Jurisprudence ............. Section 3. "Freedom of Commerce" Within the Meaning of the 1955 TreaQ also Does not Include the Oil Extraction Activities of the Platforms ......................................... CHAPTER III DURING THE RELEVANT PERIOD, IRANIAN OIL FROM THE PLATFORMS WAS NOT PART OF "COMMERCE" "BETWEEN THE TERRITORIES" OF IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES, AS REQUIRED UNDER ARTICLE X(l) OF THE 1955 TREATY ............ Section 1. The Oil Platforms Were Not Engaged in Maritime Commerce ............................................. Section 2. The Oil Platforms Were Not Engaged in "Commerce" Even Under an Interpretation of the Term Not Limited to Maritime Commerce ................................... A. The Function of Iran's Oil Platforms Did Not Include the Production of Crude Oil in a Form Capable of Being Exported, and Thus Did Not Involve Commerce ............. B. Neither the Platforms Nor the Pipelines Possessed a Transport Function Within the Meaning of "Commerce" in Article X(l) ............................... C. OiUGas Separation on the Platforms Does Not Constitute the Improvement of a Good Within the Meaning of "Commerce" Under Article X(l) ................ Section 3. The Activities of Iran's Oil Platforms Did Not Relate to Commerce "Between the Territories" of Iran and the United States ........................................ A. The U.S. Embargo Prevented Iran from Exporting Oil from the Platforms to Customers in the United States During the Relevant Time Period .......................... B. Iran's Assertions About U.S. Purchases of Petroleum Products From Western Europe are Irrelevant .............. 1. The Odell Report Describes Iranian Oil Sales to Western Europe, Not to the United States ................. 2. Iran's Oil Sales to Western Europe Had No Connection with the Territory of the United States ......... (a) Transactions between U.S. buyers and Western European sellers had no connection with the territoryofIran .................................. (b) The goods that U.S. bought from Western Europe constituted different products than those Iran sold to Western Europe ................... C. Damage to the Platforms Had No Effect on the Amount ofOilIranProduced ..................................... PART IV ARTICLE XX(l)(d) OF THE 1955 TREATY EXCLUDES FROM ITS OPERATION AND APPLICATION THE U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST THE OIL PLATFORMS .............. INTRODUCTION ...................................... CHAPTER 1 THE UNITED STATES ACTIONS WERE "NECESSARY ...TO PROTECT ITS ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS" ............................... Section 1. The Ordinary Meaning of Article XX(l)(d) .................. Section 2. Iran Threatened "Essential Security Interests" of the United States and the U.S. Actions to Protect Such Interests Were Necessary ................................ Section 3. Iran's Interpretation of Article XX(l)(d) Deprives it of Meaning, Contrary to Basic Principles of Treaty Law ......... CHAPTER II THE COURT SHOULD ALLOW THE PARTY INVOKING ARTICLE (l)(d) A MEASURE OF DISCRETION IN ITS APPLICATION ..................... Section 1. Sound Legal Principles Support According a Measure of Discretion to the Party Invoking Article XX(l)(d) ............. Section 2. Discretion is an Established Judicial Principle ................ Section 3. The Nicaragua Judgment Supports the Principle of Discretion of the Party Invoking Article XX(l)(d) ............ CHAPTER III THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE XX(l)(d) WOULD OBVIATE ANY NEED
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