Identities We Think We Have : Why the Military Might Help Build Nations in their Own Mind

By Elisheva Rosman

What happens when people believe an academic theory to be true ? Can it influence the

way they think about themselves and their social group ? Does this belief have further

implications ? Can it change behaviour ? Can all of this happen even if reality indicates the

theory in question might be mistaken ? This theoretical issue becomes an empirical puzzle when examining after their compulsory . Many Israelis believe that serving under arms in the 1 Defense Forces (IDF) changed their social identity. That as veterans, they are more accepting of other social groups, precisely because of the experience they shared with them in the military. They tell of their memories, present their friends as proof and are visibly affronted that anyone would refute the Contact Hypothesis2 : that a meaningful shared experience (such as military service) is apt to teach citizens to accept others who come from very different social backgrounds from their own and treat them as equal members of the collective. It seems, however, that they believe in a theory that does not truly manifest itself in reality. In the past, Krebs (2004) argued against this accepted understanding of military service as a social tool. He posited that the military cannot truly close social gaps. At best, the effect of military service is short-term and veterans quickly return to their previous preconceptions of social groups. In the long-run, the Contact Hypothesis cannot truly change who is included in the collective and who is not.

In the past decade, this argument has become more accepted when discussing the social roles of armed forces. scholars such as Stuart A. Cohen (2008, 2012)3 have posited that not only does the IDF not contribute to the healing of social rifts, but at times it even exacerbates them. Looking at the discrepancy between research and public perceptions, the obvious conclusion is that the public is wrong. People interpret their experiences in retrospect, and their personal experiences are merely anecdotal when viewed with an academic lens.

 The author wishes to thank Zipi Israeli, Ronald R. Krebs, Jonathan Rynhold and Eyal Ben-Ari for their helpful remarks on earlier drafts of this article. 1 This is also true of veterans of other armed forces : see Krebs, 2004 p.90, passim. 2 The “Contact Hypothesis”, derived from Samuel A. Stouffer et al.’s findings published in Studies in Social

Psychology in World War II (1949, vol.1, chap.10 : “Negro Soldiers”), was first conceptualized by Gordon W.

Allport in The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1954 ; abridged Anchor edition : 1958). 3 For a layman’s perspective, see an op-ed by an Israeli veteran : Hadad, 2014.

Published/ publié in Res Militaris (http://resmilitaris.net), vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 2

However, perhaps the discourse regarding whether or not the contact hypothesis (or any other social theory for that matter) is valid is irrelevant. Perhaps we should be looking not at the theory itself, but at what individuals do with the theory : how they think it affects them and how they handle the resulting cognitive dissonance when reality does not necessarily fit in with their belief in the theory. The purpose of this article is to look at the accepted concept of the military as an agent of socialization from the opposite end of the prism : not to test hypotheses using empirical evidence, but re-frame questions around a new point of departure – that of the subjects themselves. Not necessarily asking what they do but rather what they think they do. The question thus becomes : does the belief that military service changes the social identity of soldiers have implications for individuals and groups, even if this belief is not grounded in any proven evidence ? Social identity is a subjective and relative concept. As will be described below, militaries can play a part in the way individuals see it. Since being a soldier may be seen as a social category employed by individuals, after briefly examining the contact hypothesis in military context, the article will delve into social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT). The idea that perceived change can influence behaviour, while not new,4 is difficult to prove. Therefore, the following section of this article will limit itself to offering suggestive examples drawn from an examination of how two minorities in Israel respond to the notion that military service can impact identity. While the behaviour of minorities towards military service cannot prove the concept of perceived collective identity, it can indicate if the idea itself is plausible. Using Israel as an example is helpful since its military is still - based.5 After discussing these examples, the article will present thoughts on further research. It should be noted that its objective is not to prove or disprove the theories raised here. Rather it aims to raise an alternative way to look at them and suggests ideas for testing it. Therefore, its empirical examples are only aimed at illustrating the issues involved, and are not a true empirical study attempting to offer proof.6 Contact Hypothesis, Social Identities and Social Cohesion

When examining the role armed forces play in social identity and cohesion, discussion usually begins with the contact hypothesis. Allport (1958) posited that when individuals from

4 See Rose, 1999, pp.2-3. 5 All young Israelis, both male and female, are required to serve in the IDF when they turn 18. However, though they may enlist as volunteers, minority groups (such as ) are not drafted. Exemptions have been in place since the birth of Israel for religious students. 6 This author is presently working on building a research plan that will attempt to isolate variables and examine the effect of belief on the drawing of social boundaries, rather than on the resulting action. This article thus serves to outline the contours of a research programme in progress.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 3 different social groups come into contact, there is a genuine possibility for social acceptance. This process is not necessarily irreversible and is sometimes painfully slow, but it can and 7 does happen on certain conditions : “contact must reach below the surface in order to be effective in altering prejudice” (Allport, 1958, p.264). Change occurs when members of the majority group view members of the minority as equals. In this respect, Allport supports the idea that having a common goal that brings people together is significant and encourages them to cooperate.8 When this happens, true contact occurs and undermines prejudice.9 Further to Allport’s study of what was considered successful integration of racially heterogeneous units in World War II, the contact hypothesis was used in the US military

context to advance two more agendas : the integration of women in the ranks, and accepting gays openly into the military (specifically abolishing the earlier “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy – DADT). A case in point is MacCoun and colleagues’ detailed argument that the contact hypothesis has to a large extent been proven in armed forces and that “research indicates that mere group membership – e.g., randomly assigning individuals to ad-hoc

groups – is sufficient to create an in-group bias” (MacCoun et al., 1993, p.300) ; in other words, that a military unit is more favourably predisposed towards its members (those considered part of “we”) than towards members of other units, even if its members are of heterogeneous socio-ethnic or racial backgrounds.10 The integration of women in the military has raised the issue of professionalism as a prerequisite for task cohesion : a unit is cohesive if its members perceive each other as adept at their military task. In other words, members of a military unit will trust other members – even if they are not of the same gender or ethnic group – if they see them as being capable of executing the military task before them (King, 2013 ; MacKenzie, 2015, pp.134-154).

In all of these cases, research focuses on the feelings toward the “in-group” – members of the specific military unit at hand – rather than on the effect of “contact” on feelings towards

7 For a comprehensive exposition of Allport’s thesis, see Krebs, 2004. 8 While the scope of this article does not allow for an examination of unit cohesion, one aspect of this issue is the dispute between social cohesion (where personal friendships are seen as important to the cohesion of a unit) and task cohesion (where the importance of the completing a common goal well is considered most important to the cohesion of a unit). While this is certainly not the topic of the present article, it is worth pointing out that both positions agree that soldiers are taught, and trust, that social cohesion is important : soldiers themselves believe their social cohesion to be central, even if this is not true in practice. See : MacCoun et al. 2006 ; Wong et al.

2003 ; Wong, 2006. 9 Allport, 1958, pp.264-267. Allport does not discuss the way minority groups relate to the majority group, but some of his observations might hold true in this case as well. Subsequent studies have examined this aspect. See for example : Guimond, 2000. 10 An additional important variable in unit cohesion is leadership. Without proper leadership, unit cohesion can lead down dangerous roads. With good leadership, even a unit with weak social cohesion can have good battlefield performance. See : Tziner & Vardi, 1982 ; Gal & Gabriel, 1984 ; MacCoun et al., 1993.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 4 all members of a minority. This tendency to accept in-group members11 may be explained with the help of the idea of social identity. Social identity, a fluid concept, has assumed different meanings and interpretations.12 Originally a term from social psychology, SIT posits that in some contexts, people think of themselves and of others as members of a group, rather than as individuals with defined personal identities, and their behaviour is affected accordingly (Ellemers & Haslam, 2011). Individuals are willing to accept others and see them as having something important in common, even if this perception is created by arbitrary selection. In other words, when placed in a group and told they belong together for a certain reason,13 members of the group will

accept each other as part of the same collective : part of “us” as opposed to “them”. It therefore follows that if veterans see themselves as a group, under specific conditions, they will favour other veterans over people who did not serve in the military, irrespective of other social classifications (such as gender or minority status). Following Tajfel’s definition, for the purpose of this essay social identity will be defined as “that part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional

significance attached to that membership” (emphasis in original : Tajfel, 2010, p.2). When relating to individual identity, people tend to think in terms of “I”. When relating to social identity, people think in terms of “we”. Individuals shift between their individual and social identities and can retain a combination of these at any given time (Hornsey, 2008 ; Griffith, 2009, pp.41-42). What group identity includes or does not include is based on of each 14 member’s subjective belief (what I think group identity is), and each member may see this identity differently. Individuals relate to others around them in many ways, ranging from purely inter- personal (the other individual I am interacting with is a human being with no attachment to any social category whatsoever) to purely intergroup (the individual I am interacting with has no personal characteristics and is only a representative of his or her group). This spectrum

11 That said, social cohesion can actually be detrimental to performance. A unit whose members so enjoy one other’s company might be afraid of losing comrades on the battlefield and therefore be less effective. Conversely, a socially cohesive unit might use this as a source of empowerment and become insubordinate (Winslow, 1997). Therefore even if social cohesiveness may seem like a good strategy when encouraging unit cohesiveness, it might not be the best tool to use when seeking unit cohesion. In this respect, it would seem professionally far more prudent to encourage task cohesion. See: MacCoun et al. 1993; MacCoun & Hix, 2010; and from another vantage point : Cohen, 2008 ; Cohen, 2012, pp.89-103. 12 For a survey of the social identity approach, see : Hogg & Kipling, 2000 ; Hornsey, 2008 ; Ellemers & Haslam, 2011. 13 Even if the reason is untrue or inconsequential. 14 SIT has its supporters as well as critics. For a broader explanation of both schools of thought, see : Ellemers & Haslam, 2011. Despite the criticism levelled against it, it is still a core theory and even its critics must contend with it.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 5 allows people to relate to themselves and to those around them within a broad range of categories (Hornsey, 2008). Our relations can be more interpersonal or more within a group context. This can also include combinations of categories at a given time since people, aside from their own complex personal identity, always belong to more than one social category at a time. It seems safe to say that identity, particularly social identity, comes into play when individuals are unsure of their place or context : where they belong (Bauman, 1996). Social identity, in this respect, allows individuals to place themselves reassuringly within a group (or groups). The group and our place within it dictates how to act,15 whom to accept as an equal, who is to be trusted and who is not. In this way social identity has implications for individual identity. It defines not only which group we belong to, but our place within that group : who “I” am within “us”. Tajfel, Turner and others have established that individuals favour their in-group even when their connection to the group is not based on meaningful social categories but only on the assumption that this is “my” group as opposed to “theirs” (out-group).16 People tend to favour their own group over others as a result of wanting to have a positive group identity (Hogg & Kipling, 2000). That said, SIT does not claim that when social identity comes into play it automatically produces in-group favouritism : only that it does so if the situation is defined in ways that allow for it (Turner & Reynolds, 2011). In other words, under certain circumstances, military veterans will favour other veterans, feeling that they have something in common with each other as “those who served”, and will tend to see membership in the veteran “group” as a positive thing.17 Favouritism will usually happen when veterans turn to this aspect of their identity for various reasons (such as wanting preferential treatment or rights, speaking out regarding military matters, and so on). In this sense, it constructs “irreal spaces”, to use Rose’s term (1999, pp.32-33), while using tangible procedures. The idea of favouritism and the meaning of membership in a group holds for members tie in to that of self-categorization theory (SCT), which is a part of social identity theory. While very similar to social identity, self-categorization theory tries to explain how people choose to use which component of their identity when. Since individuals belong to a range of groups (such as family, ethnicity, nationality, fan of a sports team) and hold many identities (such as parent, bus driver, American, left-handed), the question of when they choose which to use can be important. Choosing a social category at a given time is influenced by a range of

15 Donald (1996) takes this idea to certain extremes in his discussion of identity and citizenship. 16 Eye colour, gender, and even random assignment of people to groups while telling them they have something in common with other members, can all bring about the same affect. What matters is that members assume there is something they all have in common, be it fundamental (such as beliefs or ideology or nationality) or a seemingly inconsequential (preference for the colour blue). For a survey of Tajfel and Turner’s work in this context see : Hornsey, 2008. 17 However it is possible that having served in uniform might mean different things to different veterans.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 6 variables.18 For the purposes of this essay, self-categorization is described as the “subjective sense” of what a social category includes and the attributing of certain characteristics to all members of that category, including attitudes, emotions, accepted behaviour, and so on (Hornsey, 2008). In other words, when individuals categorize themselves within a certain social group, they see themselves as part of a certain set of values and behaviours that constitutes “us”, although this construction may be entirely subjective and with no grounding in reality : in a way, an imagined collective identity. For example, being a soldier includes adhering to a soldier’s creed or code of conduct, which varies across militaries and may even vary among units in the same military.19

SCT posits that as people see themselves as part of a category and include others in this same category (e.g., gender as a defining category in a mixed gender situation), they will be more inclined to see all members of this category as similar (e.g., women are nurturers).20

Turner and Reynolds defined the process of self-categorization in four steps : (1) individuals

define themselves according to a social category ; (2) they learn the behaviours, norms and

attitudes associated with this category that make it distinct from other categories ; (3) they internalize these norms and see themselves as acquiring the expected characteristics of this

social category ; and (4) individual behaviour becomes more normative according to category membership (Turner & Reynolds, 2011, p.406). In other words, if I am part of a sports team and understand that this team never cheats and its members think cheating is shameful, I will internalize this norm and behave accordingly. This will be the case even if in the past I didn’t think it was so terrible to cheat. Group norms will fundamentally change the way I view cheating.21 At the same time, it may well happen that members of the collective are confronted with a situation in which group norms or values are not observed. At these times, members will experience various forms of cognitive dissonance and will attempt to reconcile reality with what they feel group norms should be (Festinger, 1962 ; Cooper & Fazio, 1984). The idea that individuals have many identities and pick and choose when to employ which, together with the concept that group identities are not necessarily grounded in reality (Ellemers & Haslam, 2011), can be transferred to the context of civil-military relations. As

18 The scope of this article does not allow for an in-depth examination of this theory. For a detailed description of self-categorization theory, see : Turner & Reynolds, 2011 ; Hogg & Kipling, 2000 ; Hornsey, 2008. 19 See for example the different social categorization in two Israeli infantry brigades : Kachtan, 2012. This is not the same as stereotyping, which is generally resistant to change. Self-categorization is relative and the set of concepts associated with a certain category changes in relation to a given situation or context. See : Hornsey, 2008. Where stereotyping usually refers to other groups, SCT is first a perception of self. See : Hogg & Kipling, 2000. 20 Turner & Reynolds, 2011. 21 While this is an extremely simplistic example, it demonstrates the point at hand.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 7 discussed above and in previous scholarship, armed forces have consistently been seen as playing a part in building the social identity of the State, connecting citizens to it and building its ethos (Gaub, 2010). This idea also ties in with Rose’s ideas on governmentability and the need to classify space, society, identity, and so on, as a way of creating order out of the chaos of modern life (Rose, 1999, pp.7-10, 29-40). While Rose focuses on freedom, his notion that concepts are important particularly for what they do, rather than what they mean, is most relevant to this discussion. In the field of civil-military relations and military psychology, research asks how the military as an organization (or units within it) can cause members to perform well as a group, even die for each other, despite differences. One of the ways to do this is through socialization and bridging social rifts, and therefore civil-military relations analysis has focused on the contact hypothesis as the accepted tool in achieving this. According to this perception, the military plays an active and passive role in trying to form or “correct” the social identity soldiers bring with them from civilian life. It attempts to cause soldiers to adopt an alternate or substantiating interpretation of their pre-service social identity in order to feel part of the group/ military unit (Guimond, 2000) and to undergo a process of self-categorization in this context. As part of this process, the military system wants its soldiers to accept as equals members of social groups and sectors they did not view as belonging to their in-group before induction (Krebs, 2004 ; Matthews, 2014, pp.110-127). To use Tajfel’s thinking – to change their original conception of what “we” means. For the military organization, this is important internally (in order to foster unit cohesion and loyalty) and allows it to receive legitimization from society (by being seen not only as a wielder of violence but a promoter of positive values). For the State, this is important since categorizing and drawing social boundaries assists in governmentability (Rose, 1999, pp.36-47). The discussion concerning the contact hypothesis in the military and the ability or inability of contact to bridge social rifts seems to be diverting the debate regarding the influence of military service on social identity. If soldiers self-categorize themselves as a result of service and think that “true soldiers” include minorities within their in-group (of active service members and veterans), and this influences their social identity, perhaps we should be looking at the way social identity is perceived, rather than just at the contact hypothesis. Put differently, perhaps bringing individuals into contact with others from different backgrounds is a way to assist the implementation of SIT and SCT in a military context, but the key factor lies in the acceptance of contact theory as viable and not in its actual validity. We should therefore be paying closer attention to the ideas within SIT and SCT when looking at social roles armed forces play.

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We can assume individuals do not always identify with the wish to include all others in their in-group,22 particularly in a conscript-based force where soldiers do not truly choose to enlist. Yet, individuals and groups accept that military service will “do something” to their social identity, even if they cannot explain what exactly this is and even if it is not necessarily a long-term effect. Looking at the social role militaries play from the vantage point of individuals, we can ask : can the belief that shared military service affects soldiers’ social identity cause them to behave in a certain way ? Can it cause their social groups to adjust their behaviour in accordance with this belief even if there is no proof that military service 23 influences social identity or if the evidence is to the contrary ? Trying to answer these questions directly is difficult and poses methodological problems.24 Components mutually influence one another and it is difficult to identify what variables influence which components. Since we are attempting to analyze the way individuals perceive the social identity changes they undergo while in uniform, it may be helpful to approach these quandaries from a different angle. Using the military allows us to partially isolate variables. This is even truer if we use the example of a conscription-based military. Traditionally, militaries have seen themselves as able to produce group cohesion and to use self-categorization, accepting uniform norms in order to create one cohesive group despite initial differences of background among its members. But more importantly, it seems that minority social sectors and groups within civil society believe the military is able to do this. This is evident in the Israeli case. Consequently, they might take steps to protect themselves from (or enhance) the effects they believe military service has on their members. On the other end of the spectrum, the majority group believes its members will also go through a process of socialization that will benefit them and teach them to accept their peers from other social sectors. If society and its individual members believe change in social identity to be a probable outcome of military service, could these beliefs result in practical behaviours, even if research points to the contrary ? If minorities think military service will amend their social identity and this brings them to behave in certain practical manners, this may teach us more about the way perceptions affect behaviour in the context of military service. Therefore examining the attitudes of minorities towards conscription might help us understand the questions before us.

22 As demonstrated in many recent works, such as Belkin’s (2012) book on masculinity in the military and Basham’s (2013) volume on gender and race. 23 The idea of “perceived cohesion” was examined in the past by Bollen and Hoyle. While the context is not exactly the same or comparable, the idea is – at its root – similar. See : Bollen & Hoyle, 1990. This idea will be discussed below. 24 See for example the points highlighted by Gross & Martin, 1952. Although their criticism is directed mainly at the study of small groups, the issues they raise are applicable on other research levels as well and are still relevant today. In general, social identity theory has been seen as limited to a certain extent and difficult to examine empirically. See : Ellemers & Haslam, 2011.

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Social Identity Formation, Self-categorization, and the IDF The following section does not attempt to be a true empirical study. Rather, using Israeli society, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and specifically, two minority groups – Arab Israeli Christians and Religious Zionists25 –, it will attempt to show that the questions raised here stand. In both these cases, not only does the military framework behave in a way that admits belief in the validity of the contact hypothesis as a tangible outcome of service, but social groups seem to believe this to be equally true and respond accordingly. This example can prove helpful since it is an extreme case. The IDF is based on universal conscription and therefore is not a self-selected sample in the usual sense of the term.26 Israeli society is usually seen as one with substantial social rifts and looks to its military to play a part in bridging them

(Horowitz & Lissak, 1989 ; Cohen, 2008). As described below, even though in practice the IDF comprises a number of homogenous units, in public opinion it is still perceived as a “melting pot” and an important social agent (Nevo & Shor, 2002 ; Harel, 2013). Examining the reactions of minority groups to military socialization is also an extreme case that can say something about majority groups. If it is considered a criterion for acceptance into the in-group, minority groups have much to gain from military service. At the same time, they stand to lose their specific social identity, and they may resent the pressure to conform to norms they do not necessarily recognize or accept. On the other hand, the reactions of majority group members to military service with minority members cannot be measured in terms of gains and losses in this context. The pressure to conform is not as great and conformity requires less effort. While these examples are certainly not definitive ones, being extreme cases, they are therefore a good place to begin a discussion when looking at the way society perceives the social effects of military service.

The IDF was constructed as a people’s army and still sees itself as such. One of the more heated debates in Israeli society, beginning at the end of the 20th century and continuing st into the 21 , is whether or not it is time for the IDF to abandon conscription and become an all- volunteer force (AVF). Those who support the present conscription of all Jewish 18 year-old men and women refer to the philosophy of Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion stated that conscription is the last opportunity for young Israelis from all walks of life to meet on equal ground. Military service provides a meaningful experience that causes them to come to know each other and bridge social schisms. While he did not call it this, clearly Ben-Gurion was a firm believer in the contact hypothesis. To his mind, the IDF would

25 These examples are far from exhaustive. One could easily ponder this issue using other ethnic minority groups such as or , socio-cultural minorities such as the ultra-orthodox (haredi) community, women, LGBTs and so on. 26 Due to the fact only 75% of Jewish men actually serve, for various reasons, there is some truth to the IDF also being a self-selected sample to a certain extent. However, due to conscription, it is not entirely so.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 10 be a true “school for the nation”, not only in the sense of education or indoctrination per se, but first and foremost as an element capable of changing social conceptions and building a shared, collective, social identity.

The IDF itself seems to still firmly believe that bridging social rifts, as well as other social missions, are part of its mandate.27 It would like its members to see themselves as part of one collective, adopt certain norms and values (, loyalty, etc.) and, as a result, behave according to the code of conduct, and become an IDF soldier. Since the IDF sees itself as a people’s army, soldiers are supposed to see themselves also as citizens and to treat each other as members of the same collective.28 Minorities in Israel (whether cultural, ethnic, national or religious) behave as though this assumption is true and believe that service in the IDF is apt to influence social identities. Some of them fear conscription or, at least, are apprehensive about it specifically because they think it will affect the identity of those who serve and might “convert” them to the dominant culture. Military service will constitute a significant experience for minority members, as they will see that other segments of Israeli society are not so different from their own minority group as far as morals and values are concerned, and consequently will affect them deeply. Perhaps so much so, that they will forsake their minority identity in favour of a more general “mainstream Israeli” one.29 Two Israeli examples in point are the Christian Arab minority and Religious Zionists.

Recently, Christian Arabs holding Israeli citizenship (henceforth : Arab Israeli Christians) 30 have been joining the IDF in larger numbers than in the past. One of the arguments against this trend posits that the young men and women who enlist will “lose their identity” (Khoury, 31 2014 ; Smooha & Lichtman, 2010) and will be socialized into the IDF, causing them to adopt the majority (Israeli) identity (Khoury, 2014b).32 Yet, the numbers of Arab Israeli Christians in the IDF are still very small (estimates range around 300). The fact that the issue of identity continues to serve as a deterrent is important. Studies regarding minority social identity in Arab Israeli Christian youth indicate this issue is indeed a significant one. This minority is preoccupied with maintaining its distinct identity while still wanting to integrate into general

27 Much has been written on this point. For example: Nevo & Shor, 2002 ; Harel, 2012 ; Hadad, 2014. 28 This does not mean that all soldiers act in such a way, only that this is what the military system expects. 29 Although in the fragmented modern society that is Israel today it is difficult to define “mainstream Israeli identity”, it is still possible to say that there is such a thing. See the premise in : Kachtan, 2012, as well as on Israeli sociologist Oz Almog’s site on Israeliness: http://www.peopleil.org/ (accessed July 2014). 30 In the March 2014 enlistment cohort, 148 Arab-Israeli Christians enlisted, as opposed to 97 enlistees in total in all of 2012 (see : https://www.facebook.com/giyus.haeda.hanotsret/timeline, June 2, 2014, “Israeli Christians Enlistment Forum”, accessed 30 June 2014). This does not include Christians who are of other ethnic or national origin, who are conscripted in Israel as a rule. See : Orgad, 2007. 31 Interestingly, this echoes feelings in the Muslim Arab-Israeli community during the 1950s, when Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon attempted to enforce the draft in the Arab-Israeli community. See : Geller, 2014. 32 Studies of minority groups elsewhere have shown that the most powerful predictor of assimilation of minority groups in the majority is actually formal education. See for example : Borhek, 1970.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 11 society.33 As they are a minority within a minority (Christians who are also Arab and also considered Israeli nationals), theirs is a difficult identity to maintain and they feel conflicting

expectations from different identity components : the Jewish Israeli majority expectations clash with the expectations of both parallel minority groups these individuals have cultural dialogues with (Muslims and Palestinian-Arabs). They must also contend with their identity as Christians of Eastern Churches.34

Since Israeli citizenship includes serving in the IDF, minorities understand conscription as a way to join society as full members (Levy, Lomsky-Feder & Harel, 2007 ; Enloe, 2000). Those who support joining the IDF argue that if Christian Arab Israelis wish to be full citizens, they need to accept this obligation, too (Friedman, 2013).35 This is despite the fact that the meaning of has evolved and is no longer considered the only way to be a part of mainstream Israeli society. Members of the pro-enlistment group are willing to undergo a process of socialization in return for acceptance to the majority group, utilizing the republican model of citizenship (Smooha & Lichtman, 2010). In response to the criticism levelled against those who wish to enlist from within their minority, a group of Arab Israeli Christians established an organization that supports community members who enlist in the IDF, organizes meetings for those interested in information regarding military service, and manages an active Facebook page that offers “encouragement, nurturing [and] strengthening” to community members who wish to enlist “and guides them in (…) swift and smooth integration” into Israeli society, including assistance after discharge. It also responds to critics within Palestinian-Israeli communities and publishes inspirational messages to those who are interested in service (Israeli Christians’ Recruitment Forum page, 2014). While this minority group understands that the “Christian Arab Israeli” category is not the same as the category of “IDF soldier”, it strives to emphasize these are not mutually exclusive. In Israel, being a “good citizen” includes being a “good soldier” and therefore it is possible, if difficult, to belong to both social categories if one seeks to be a good citizen. This will not change their social identity as a cultural, ethnic and religious minority, but will cause them to undergo a certain process of social re-categorization within the IDF. This trade-off is considered acceptable. Their position within Israeli society and their relatively inferior social

33 See for example : Horenczyk & Munayer, 2007 ; Mana et al., 2012. This is a topic discussed in social media.

See for instance a post in the Facebook group encouraging conscription of Arab Israeli Christians (25 Feb. 2014) : https://www.facebook.com/?ref=tn_tnmn#!/giyus.haeda.hanotsret/photos/a.477677242320526.1073741827.4762 04255801158/580483185373264/?type=1&theater (accessed 25 Feb. 2014). 34 Interestingly, it seems that a significant part of those supporting conscription among the Christian minority, identify themselves as Arameans. See comments and discussions on the Facebook page of Israeli Christians’ Recruitment Forum : https://www.facebook.com/?ref=tn_tnmn#!/giyus.haeda.hanotsret. Many of the respondents identify themselves as Aramim – Aramaic Christians – and discuss the importance of this particular identity. 35 For the purpose of rights and integration in Israel, service includes ( ezrahi), which is accepted as a possible alternative for minorities and religious women. See: Smooha & Lichtman, 2010.

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status influences their perception of social boundaries : who is part of the collective and what one must do in order to be part of it. The fact that in reality military service will not necessarily award them the social dividends they expect does not deter them or change their behaviour.36

An even more prominent example of a social group that believes service in the IDF will effect change through self-categorization and socialization, and acts upon this belief, is that of .37 This sector, composed of orthodox who are part of general Israeli 38 society, encourages its young men (though not women ) to serve in the IDF, but prefers that they be drafted only after a course of religious study (lasting a year or two) in order for them to strengthen their religious identity before joining the IDF’s “melting pot”. This sector has carefully constructed an entire matrix of pre-service programmes to this end,39 in essence attempting to pre-empt the effects of contact with other groups and, in essence, SCT. The Religious Zionist sector in Israeli society fears that military service will cause its youth to forsake its observant way of life and adopt the self-categorization the IDF inspires. The fear is that when entering a new social group (becoming soldiers), the young Religious Zionists will begin a process of new self-categorization, adopting the majority group’s norms and values and ultimately abandoning their original social identity – becoming secular.40 Religious Zionist schools and groups estimate that 20% of religious male soldiers become 41 secular during their service. Whether or not service in the IDF is the reason for this cannot be proven either way : would these young men have remained observant had they not been conscripted, or was the IDF merely a convenient venue for a process that these young men

would have gone through regardless once leaving their childhood environment ? In any case, Religious Zionism tends to blame contact with other groups and IDF socialization for the secularization of some of its youth during military service, when it occurs.42

36 This may be explained using parts of cognitive dissonance theory. See : Festinger, 1962. 37 While it is not possible to classify this group precisely, for the purposes of this article, suffice it to say that its members wish to live religiously as orthodox Jews, but also as full citizens of a democratic State. See : Cohen & Susser, 2000 ; A. Cohen, 2002. 38 Though approximately 25% of female graduates of the religious education system do in fact serve in the IDF.

Religious women who choose to serve are not perceived as an accepted norm within their social group. See : Rosman-Stollman, 2009 ; Sela, 2012 ; Budaie-Hyman, 2012. 39 For a detailed exposition of these programmes (, Mekhinot, Shiluv and programmes for women that are not wholly endorsed officially), see: Rosman-Stollman, 2014. 40 Similar feelings can be found in the ultra-orthodox (haredi) minority. See : Zoldan, 2009 ; Stadler, Lomsky- Feder & Ben-Ari, 2008 . 41 Opinions differ as regards female soldiers, but the main accusation levelled at the IDF in this respect is that most religious female soldiers not only lose their religious observance, but their reputation, values and morals while in uniform. Some studies show the opposite : that religious women’s socio-religious identity is actually bolstered while in uniform. See for example : Peso, 2013. 42 See, for example, the late R. Yehuda Amital’s explanation for the establishment of the Hesder programme : Amital, 2000.

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In order to neutralize secularization while serving in the military, Religious Zionism constructed two main archetypes of pre-service religious in-depth study programmes for young men – Hesder and Mekhinot – of up to two years’ duration before induction into the 43 IDF, depending on the programme. The Hesder programme is geared towards thorough study of the Torah. Students are then conscripted, and assigned to their own homogenous units where their religious needs are met more easily and they come into less contact with their secular counterparts, as well as with female soldiers (Cohen, 1993).44 In the context of this essay, the Hesder programme chooses to cope with contact and socialization by keeping to a minimum the time its members spend outside their social group, fortifying their unique social identity (Lichtenstein, 2002) and in general reminding these soldiers constantly of their distinctiveness within the collective identity, thus attempting to weaken the possibility of a new self-categorization. While it recognizes that students will undergo a certain process of self-categorization as soldiers, the programme expects them to integrate these values and norms with the original code of behaviour they always followed. Thus, the components of “soldier” and “religious individual” are supposed to be included within a single social category and not contradict each other fundamentally. In this way the Hesder programme hopes to ensure members’ loyalty to their original social group throughout their service. Mekhinot students focus more on theology (emuna) during their study time. They also prepare physically for service. After a year and a half at most, they are conscripted, serving a full three years in uniform in heterogeneous units in the IDF (Rosman-Stollman, 2014, chap.5). While their programme does not constantly remind them of their individual identity, Mekhina graduates are expected to be “fortified” enough during their period of study to sustain their identity as religious individuals. This programme is not as worried about the effect of military service on its members’ identity and obviously feels the IDF is not able to induce extensive change. It feels that its members will be able to withstand challenges to their minority identity and that the IDF will not overtly pressure them to conform to the secular majority’s norms. In this programme, too, “soldier” and “religious individual” are expected to be part of the same social category and if one is a “good soldier”, it seems to follow that one is also a “good observant Jew”. Clearly, both the Christian minority and the Religious Zionist sector believe the military is capable of affecting social identity, to varying extents, and this influences their actions. They are not alone in this feeling : the ultra-orthodox (haredi) sector is likewise

43 These programmes were not constructed solely in order to counter secularization. They are also part of a long tradition of religious study academies (yeshivot). For the purposes of this essay, I focus on the aspect that expresses the intention behind them : to counter identity changes military service is capable of invoking. 44 Soldiers who do not serve as regular infantry soldiers, serve in more heterogeneous units. See : Rosman- Stollman, 2014, chap.4.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 14 apprehensive regarding the effect military service and contact with other groups will have on its members. The Druze minority also believes service will bring acceptance as full citizens and is willing to pay a price in return. These examples, which are far from exhaustive, indicate that minorities view service as a way to join the collective. They are willing to do so even though they perceive the effects of contact with others and, as a result, new self-categorization as plausible outcomes of service. Collective service is accepted as a way of redrawing social boundaries. Furthermore, the fact that social dividends are not always realized, despite this belief, does not change the way these minorities behave : that the majority does not necessarily accept them as equals after military service does not deter second and third generations from serving in the IDF. In other words, despite evidence to the contrary, minorities in Israel continue to behave as though social identity can change during service, indicating some form of cognitive dissonance at work.

While not all sectors in Israeli society believe the IDF should engage in nation-building tasks such as education, most still do. Israeli society still expects the military to fill the lacuna left by the State in dealing with disadvantaged youth and new immigrants. It also, to a large extent, still expects the IDF to serve as a social melting pot and heal its social rifts (Harel, 2013). This feeling is echoed by a substantial portion of the individuals themselves. Many conscripts believe they will leave its ranks as improved versions of themselves : physically, better prepared for the job market, and also more socially integrated (Avidar, 2013).

Perhaps these feelings explain the following findings : in an opinion poll conducted in Israel by the INSS and the Association for Civil-Military Scholars in 2011, 70% of respondents believed their children would still serve in the IDF even if conscription were to be abolished (Blumenfeld, 2011). Clearly, Israelis find it difficult to imagine their military as an all- volunteer force. Conscript service is still, in their eyes, an important part of Israeli society and plays a central role in the shaping of a collective identity, even if much research points to the contrary. As a result, they perceive military service through a social prism – again indicating that belief in the effects of military service results in behaviour even if there is little practical basis for this belief. Very little research has been done on the long-term effects of military service in Israel

(Dar & Kimhi, 2001 ; Wald & Feinstein, 2010). However, certain aspects of long-term effects of intermingling and of military socialization have been tested unintentionally, through seemingly unrelated research. Non-Jewish veterans of the IDF, particularly Druze veterans, encounter prejudice when returning to civilian life.45 When identified as Arabs, they are discriminated against by the majority of Jewish-Israelis who do not wish to allow them into

45 For an in-depth survey of the views on military service in the Druze community in Israel, see : Amrani, 2010.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 15 society (for instance when it comes to renting an apartment to a Druze in a Jewish neighbourhood, or to granting him a job interview). However, once it is established that the minority member served in the IDF, identification can switch and society is more willing to accept him as a full member. In general, both Christian and Muslim Arab Israelis view military or national service as a way to join the collective and gain rights. While realizing that this will entail a process of “Israelization” and close contact with the majority group, some are ready to do this (Smooha & Lichtman, 2010). Following Tajfel’s definition of social identity, this can be seen as a willingness to adopt a common Israeli social identity, to a certain extent at least.46 In an unrelated study by this author which followed religious conscripts throughout their military service, an interesting fact surfaced. The more homogeneous their assigned unit was (meaning that the soldier served mostly with other religious soldiers and had limited contact with secular soldiers), the less likely these soldiers were to continue friendships with secular soldiers after service. The more heterogeneous the venue of service (religious soldiers serving with a majority of soldiers from secular homes), the more likely they were to continue friendships two or three years post-service (Rosman-Stollman, 2005). A pilot study conducted for the purposes of this article revealed similar findings. It would seem this indicates at least a willingness among veterans to maintain connections to former comrades in arms. But what if, beyond the sustaining of army-buddy friendships, the effect of heterogeneous service were also a mental change ? Could it be that having substantial contact with members of other social groups in the IDF causes veterans to be more willing to strike up future friendships with 47 members of social groups other than their own ? Still, these thoughts do not tell us much about long-term effects of socialization through military service. They do tell us that these young men and women are willing to act in a certain way (enlist voluntarily, join national service programmes) because of what they think will happen and how it will benefit them. These feelings continue despite the fact that their community as a group is not rewarded enough, in their opinion, for their service.48 It also tells us that the majority group thinks it is willing to accept minority group members, providing it

46 Interestingly, during the summer of 2014, in light of racist and violent outbursts against Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship (or Israeli Arabs), a number of prominent members of this group (Sayed Kashua, Mira Awad, Nadia Hilu and Zoher Bahalul, as well as others) publicized their feelings regarding being members of a minority. While none of them served in the IDF, the premise of all of these editorials was that they wish to be full citizens, with full rights, and that the Israeli collective is unwilling to accept them. See for example : Kashua, 2014 ; Awad, 2014. 47 This point can better be discussed when focusing on reservists : how do these units function socially ? Do members accept each other as members of an in-group, irrespective of their membership in minority/majority groups ? Is reservist motivation to serve linked to social identity ? The scope of the present article does not allow for such a discussion. That said, other studies have shed light on this aspect and may likewise serve as a starting point for future inquiry. See for example : Lomsky-Feder, Gazit & Ben-Ari, 2008. Griffith has discussed the social identity of reservists in an AVF. See : Griffith, 2009. 48 See for example : Amrani, 2010, chap.4.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 16 feels they are part of the in-group (veterans). It does not tell us how members of the majority group will act in practice towards minority members when encountering such a situation : if a Jewish veteran who served with minority soldiers is in a position to grant a job interview to a minority member he perceives as part of his in-group (another veteran), will he do so, based on his military experience of serving with members of the minority group ? While this does not always translate into reality, minority members continue to enlist, 49 meaning that they believe in the capacity of military service to allow them into the in-group : service will open up educational options,50 job options and in general label them as “good citizens”. At times, minority members realize they are not getting the social dividends they feel they earned. Yet this results more in vocal protests than in a reluctance to enlist.51 Recent studies indicate that psychological factors are becoming more important in modern warfare (Matthews, 2015). It seems the effect of such factors spills over into society through veterans, thus enhancing their importance. The idea that perceptions are an important variable in actual behaviour towards out-groups has been examined by social psychologists

(Turner et al., 2008 ; Crisp & Turner, 2009). It seems that even the prospect of positive

interaction with members of minorities is conducive to changing social perceptions : if we believe interaction with a minority member will be favourable, this belief will influence the way we relate to members of that minority in reality. Additionally, knowing someone from my in-group who has friends from other groups will predispose me to positive attitudes towards these same out-groups. These findings highlight that perceptions and beliefs are important when we consider social identity and self-categorization since they stress that what people think will happen in a social interaction influences what will actually happen. While these studies have some methodological problems and deal only with civilians, their findings might indicate that positive interaction with minority members during military service (“I served with a Christian Arab and he was the nicest person”) or having friends who had positive interactions with

49 In the sense of belonging to a national collective. See : Levy, 2003. In Israel this concept is problematic since the (Israeli) collective includes a religious (Jewish) dimension. However, it seems that minorities that enlist believe they will be able to join the broad (Israeli) in-group even without this religious component. See Amrani, 2010 ; Levy, 2003 ; as well as various posts and responses by Israeli Christian Recruitment Forum, specifically a

28 June 2014 post and subsequent responses regarding drafting “invitations” sent to Arab Israeli Christians : https://www.facebook.com/?ref=tn_tnmn#!/giyus.haeda.hanotsret. Respondents argued over the possibility of being labelled officially as Arameans rather than Arabs so that their loyalty as Israelis would not come into question. The underlying assumption of the entire conversation is that conscription equals loyalty and that loyal Israeli citizens enlist. 50 Including eligibility for scholarships and fellowships. 51 Recently the Druze community, who are conscripted, has seen a slight decrease in motivation to serve due to this feeling. The community does not see social dividends to the extent it thinks it should and conscription has dropped accordingly. However, though this might indicate a future change, at present this decrease is not substantial. See : Levy, 2003 ; Amrani, 2010 ; Bader, 2014.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 17 minority members (“my friend had a religious buddy in the army and he was a great guy”) will influence future interactions and cause majority members to respond positively toward minority members. In general, Israeli scholars agree that military service affects veterans in multiple facets of their lives. These include, but are not limited to, gender identity and power structures

(Sasson-Levy, 2006 ; Izraeli, 2001) ; militaristic tendencies (Kimmerling, 1993) ; job market

opportunities ; and perceptions of republican participation (Levy, 2003). However, the long- term effect of military service on the issue of bridging social gaps and its broader social implications, are largely neglected academically,52 and future research in this field is needed.

Concluding Remarks : Believing in Collective Identity

While scholars argue over the validity (or lack thereof) of the contact hypothesis in the military and beyond, it seems that in reality, armed forces and individuals still believe military service can influence social identity and create a uniform force with shared social values. Most importantly, the examples sketched here illustrate that even if, based on research findings, one is not convinced of the ability of armed forces to influence social identity and self- categorization, real people believe this happens and are motivated to act in a certain way : to prepare for service in order to withstand pressure ; to explain to members what social identity price might have to be paid ; and what is to be gained in return. Anderson (2006) has already pointed out the importance of “imagined communities” and what a powerful incentive such communities are or can be. This line of thinking can and should be developed further in civil-military relations : is perceived contact influential when discussing soldiers and veterans ? Are there differences between active-duty soldiers and veterans, conscripts and volunteers, in terms of SIT and SCT effects ? Do they affect reservists ? Is there any long-term effect of military service on social identity ? These are only some the questions that perceived social identity and self- categorization raise in the context of armed forces and their social impact. The military’s ability to bridge social rifts, the degree of probability and limits thereof, tell us not only about its social context. They may also give us more insight regarding its capacity to shape troops’ identity, cohesion and, perhaps, tell us something about success on the battlefield. It can also help us understand the role soldiers and veterans are apt to play in driving social change, the way civilians relate to them, the implications these points have for

52 Again, this is not surprising. It is virtually impossible to isolate the desired variables when attempting to assess the impact of military service on in-group perceptions in Israeli society. For example, in the pilot study carried out for this article, the following questions arose : when examining the bridging of religious gaps, how does one treat masorti’im (traditional) Jews who do not see themselves as part of any group or as part of all groups? Additionally, it is virtually impossible to isolate the effect of family and community in relation to military service when attempting to assess effects of military service on social cohesion.

Res Militaris, vol.6, n°2, Summer-Autumn/ Été-Automne 2016 18 civil resilience during prolonged conflict. Even in a world where conscription is no longer the norm, these are important issues, deserving of further research.

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