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US 20150.067853A1 (19) United States (12) Patent Application Publication (10) Pub. No.: US 2015/0067853 A1 Amrutkar et al. (43) Pub. Date: Mar. 5, 2015 (54) SYSTEMIS AND METHODS FOR DETECTING Publication Classification MALICOUS MOBILE WEBPAGES (51) Int. Cl. (71) Applicant: Georgia Tech Research Corporation, H04L 29/06 (2006.01) Atlanta, GA (US) (52) U.S. Cl. CPC ...................................... H04L 63/14 (2013.01) (72) Inventors: Chaitrali Amrutkar, Atlanta, GA (US); USPC ............................................................ 726/23 Patrick Gerard Traynor, Atlanta, GA (US); Young Seuk Kim, Atlanta, GA (57) ABSTRACT (US) The disclosed technology includes techniques for identifying (73) Assignee: Georgia Tech Research Corporation, malicious mobile electronic documents, e.g., webpages or Atlanta, GA (US) emails, based on static document features. The static features may include mobile-specific features, such as mobile web (21) Appl. No.: 14/218,760 API calls, hosted mobile-specific binaries, noscript content, or misleading URL tokens visible on a mobile-specific inter (22) Filed: Mar 18, 2014 face. The static features may instead or also include various JavaScript (JS) features, HTML features, and URL features Related U.S. Application Data detected in numbers outside ranges expected for desktop (60) Provisional application No. 61/870,372, filed on Aug. electronic documents. These features may be used with 27, 2013, provisional application No. 61/884,460, machine learning techniques to classify benign and malicious filed on Sep. 30, 2013. documents in real time. 800 WARNING kAY} has hocked access to fittp://inobile paypai, coni.guti initiinii, coni.ar/ his page is suspicious and 240 possibly maicious, Weakygii. 33: {e costisse assway38 {{{2:33eisiisk. Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 1 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 ZET08T ZZI I (,) ZOI Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 2 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 FIG. 2 270 280 275 2OO Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 3 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 | i 83ixi:38.88: 83:38. 3 &: 8. : 88: w's 8 8 t : :8 :Y: -- 8s cs. 8.9co (D : () : L s: x: 83 x Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 4 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 s s s Spe wa ne wa N w y N s N w w Sin IOI Saisedgaw aqout Jo it Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 5 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 5 l 8.^: wit: & er Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 6 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 s Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 7 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 (O,OI it o iss: to: ...it ties: : Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 8 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 WARNING 820 kAYO has blocked access to http://mobile paypal.com.gua intunit.com, ary This page is Suspicious and 240 possibly malicious. wic:3sixty:::::::: x} xxxii.338 3xy ways 830 Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 9 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 6"SDI | 8906 Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 10 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 FIG. 10 START 002 Receiving a request to evaluate an electronic document, the request including location information associated with the electronic document 004 Responsive to receiving the request, determining an electronic document accessed based on the received location information 006 Responsive to determining the accessed electronic document, extracting one or more static mobile-specific features from the accessed electronic document, the static mobile-specific features including an indication of at least one of mobile-specific application programming interface (API) calls and mobile-Specific files hosted at a domain associated with the accessed electronic document 008 Determining, by a processor and based on the extracted static mobile Specific features, a likelihood of the accessed electronic document being malicious END 000 Patent Application Publication Mar. 5, 2015 Sheet 11 of 11 US 201S/OO67853 A1 START F.G. 11 1 102 Receiving, from a client computer, a request to evaluate a webpage, the request including URL and browser information 04 Responsive to receiving the request, determining a webpage accessed based on the received URL and browser information; Responsive to determining that the accessed webpage is a mobile webpage, extracting one or more static mobile-specific features from the accessed webpage, the static mobile-specific features including an indication of at least one of misleading words located within a predetermined number of characters of a beginning of the URL and an indication of noscript content associated with the webpage 08 Determining, by the processor and based on the extracted static mobile specific features, a likelihood of the accessed webpage being malicious Sending, to the client computer, an indication of the likelihood of the accessed webpage being malicious END US 2015/OO67853 A1 Mar. 5, 2015 SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR DETECTING based on the received location information. The method may MALICOUS MOBILE WEBPAGES yet further include, responsive to determining the accessed electronic document, extracting one or more static mobile CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED specific features from the accessed electronic document. The APPLICATIONS static mobile-specific features may include an indication of at 0001. This application claims priority to, and the benefit least one of mobile-specific application programming inter under 35 U.S.C. S 119(e), of U.S. Provisional Patent Applica face (API) calls and mobile-specific files hosted at a domain tion No. 61/870,372, filed 27 Aug. 2013, and U.S. Provisional associated with the accessed electronic document. The Patent Application No. 61/884,460, filed 30 Sep. 2013, the method may also include determining, by a processor and entire contents and Substance of which are hereby incorpo based on the extracted static mobile-specific features, a like rated by reference as if fully set forth below. lihood of the accessed electronic document being malicious. 0007 According to another example embodiment, a com BACKGROUND puter program product is provided. The computer program 0002 Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are product may include a computer-readable medium. The com increasingly being used to access the web. However, in spite puter-readable medium may store instructions that, when of significant advances in mobile processing power and band executed by at least one processor of a system, causes the width, the browsing experience on mobile devices differs system to perform a method. The method may include receiv considerably from the browsing experience on personal com ing, from a client computer, a request to evaluate a webpage. puters. These differences may largely be attributed to varia The request may include URL and browser information. The tions in form factor. In particular, the portrait orientation and method may further include, responsive to receiving the dramatic reduction of screen size affect the content, function request, determining a webpage accessed based on the ality, and layout of mobile webpages. received URL and browser information. The method may yet 0003 Static webpage features such as the frequency of further include, responsive to determining that the accessed iframes or the number of redirections have previously been webpage is a mobile webpage, extracting one or more static assumed strong indicators of malicious intent when assessing mobile-specific features from the accessed webpage. The desktop webpages. However, due to the significant changes static mobile-specific features may include an indication of at made to accommodate mobile devices, such assumptions least one of misleading words located within a predetermined may not carry over to mobile-specific webpages. For number of characters of a beginning of the URL and an example, whereas requiring multiple directions might be indication of noscript content associated with the webpage. flagged as Suspicious in the desktop setting, many popular The method may also include determining based on the benign mobile websites require multiple redirections before extracted static mobile-specific features, a likelihood of the arriving at a content page. Conventional static analysis tech accessed webpage being malicious. Moreover, the method niques also fail to consider mobile-specific webpage ele may include sending, to the client computer, an indication of ments, such as calls to mobile APIs. the likelihood of the accessed webpage being malicious. 0004 Moreover, many mobile-specific URLs return 0008 According to another example embodiment, a sys empty pages when rendered in a desktop browser. Thus, con tem is provided. The system may include at least one memory ventional dynamic analysis techniques that preview operatively coupled to at least one processor and configured webpages in Sandboxed desktop browsers are similarly inef for storing data and instructions. The data and instructions, fective for mobile-specific webpages. Even signature-based when executed by at least one processor, may cause the sys tools, such as Google Safe Browsing, currently only work tem to receive, from a web browser, a request for a webpage. with desktop browsers. The request may include URL information. The data and instructions may further cause the system to, responsive to SUMMARY receiving the request, determine that a webpage accessed 0005 New tools and techniques are necessary to identify based on the URL information is a mobile webpage. The data malicious pages in the mobile web. Some or all of the above and instructions may yet further
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