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Centrists Vs Salafists on the Islamic Concept of Peace

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Centrists Vs Salafists on the Islamic Concept of Peace Review Article Glob J Arch & Anthropol Volume 5 Issue 1 - June 2018 Copyright © All rights are reserved by Sagi Polka DOI: 10.19080/GJAA.2018.05.555653 Centrists Vs Salafists on the Islamic Concept of Peace Sagi Polka* Arabic Language and Islam Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Submission: May 22, 2018; Published: June 25, 2018 *Corresponding author: Sagi Polka, Arabic Language and Islam Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, Email: Abstract The following article discusses the Islamic conceptualization of peace, juxtaposing wasatiyyah Muslim relations with non Muslims. The paper focuses on each movement’s contemporary response to the various Israeli Arab Peace Treaties. Al Anfal 8, 61 is widely referenced as the “Peace Verse”, and a close examination of classical and modern (Centrist) Quranic and exegesis Salafi Jihadof this attitudes verse its towards context sheds a great deal of light on Islam’s conceptualization of peace. From this examination we conclude that peace and Jihad are close conceptual kin in the ideological house of Islam, since the verse in question purposes merely to legitimize a hudna (ceasefire) with nonMuslims engaged by Jihad amongif and where them. such Centrists an agreement are pragmatic serves in the that Muslim they are interest, willing and to exploit at all events juridical only tools for ain definite order to and balance limited Sharia period imperatives of time. Some with tension reality. isThey clearly are welldiscernable aware of between Islam’s twoimage Islamic in the perspectives world, and in on the the West matter: especially, Centrists and on so the they one take hand great and pains Salafists to represent on the other, Islam especially as a religion the whoseSalafi Jihadists essence Muslimsis peace between who invade Muslims Muslim and territory. infidels. OnThe these Salafi grounds, Jihadists too, repudiate the peace the accords peace accords with Israel with are Israel objectionable as these run counter to the very fundamentals of Sharia law. As leader of the Centrist movement, Al Qaradawi stresses that jihad is not waged against non Muslims qua infidels, but against non­ Keywords: Salafists; Peace; Islamic; Globalization; Judaism; Zionism; Critique; Wasaṭiyya; War; Emperor; Migration; Ideology; Battle; Holy city; Victory; Sword Verse; Idolaters; Traditional Introduction error in understanding the term Jihad, which in its view is far Al Qaradawi’s Response to the Pope’s Critique of Islam - broader in scope than the term qitāl Wasa iyya Wasaṭiyya as Islamic PR highlights various kinds of Jihad in Islam that do not involve Various Muslim Scholars, not least Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al­ , meaning fighting. ṭ Qaradawi, raised some claims in rebuttal to Pope Benedict XVI’s September, 2006 address in Germany. Ideological light of the fighting,Muslim stressing scholars also like Islam’s Sheikh inclination Yusuf al to Qaradawi peace generally are adamant [1]. wasatiyya or Centrist school of thought, al Qaradawi sees himself that Islam not only desires peace, but actively strives for it, peace as ideological heir to Hassan al Banna, founder of the Muslim being a cornerstone of Islamic proselytization (da wa likewise depict Islam as war averse, a religion that ever strives Brotherhood, in which al Qaradawi was formerly a member. The ʿ ). They Pope had quoted seventh century Byzantine Emperor Manuel II, war does make itself heard among men, Islam does all it can to who said: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, to avoid the bloody upshot of battle; and when, alas, the din of command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” Cited in support of al Qaradawi’s position regarding Islam’s and there you will find things only evil and in human, such as his diminish its impact and aftermath [2]. Al Qaradawi’s response to the Pope is part of a broad­spectrum peaceable nature is the following: effort to cultivate a Centrist Islamic discourse in an Age of a. The Arabic words “peace” and “Islam” are derived from Globalization, as Al Qaradawi writes “Our Islamic Discourse in The the same root, s l m. In fact, Quranic exegesis interprets the Age of Globalization.” In the proposed discourse, terror is rejected word silm, as it appears in Surat al Baqara 2, 208, to mean both, (marfū since originally silm denotes surrender (istislām one must distinguish between the terror just described and the (to Allah, i.e. inqiyād tark al­ ḍ) that results in the deaths of innocents. Nevertheless ), subjugation matter of terrifying (irhāb munāza a To terrify the enemy is a divine commandment in al Anfal 8:60, ), and abandonment of quarrel ( ) the enemies of Allah and the Muslims. interpreted by al Qaradawi to refer to intimidating the enemy so b. Islamʿ ) [3]. endears the term “peace” to Muslims in manifold as to avoid all out war. Wasa iyya seeks to correct the widespread is alsal ām ṭ ways, to wit: One of Allah’s Good Names (asmā’ Allah al ḥusna) (Surat al Ḥashr 59, 23). The Garden of Eden is also Glob J Arch & Anthropol 5(1): GJAA.MS.ID.555653 (2018) 0010 Global Journal of Archaeology & Anthropology called dār alsal ām inclined towards peace (jana ū li l silm everywhere recite the altashahhud text, wishing peace upon greatly there from, for many of the Quraysh converted to (Surat al ‘Anʿām 6, 127). In prayer, Muslims ḥ ), and he benefited Muhammad, themselves, and their nation. Prayer ends with Islam. the taslīm, the formulaic “Peace and the Mercy of Allah Be h. According to one tradition attributed to the Prophet, arb or “war” is a most unsightly word. The Arabs of the pre­ uponc. SayYou”, the spoken scholars, twice, a firstMuslim to the does right, not then welcome to left war,[4]. but Islamic jāhiliyya ḥ were wont to name their sons ḥarb, to wit and vigor. The idea that Muslims are compelled to war against peace; however, if war befalls him he must wage it with strength Ḥarbi. b. Umayya, father of Abu Ṣufyān [8]. their will can be traced to Surat al Baqara 2, 16. Likewise, in months” of the year al‘ashhur al urum. These are: Dhu al­ the Hadith tradition Muhammad speaks the following: “Do not Islam prohibitsth war during the four “forbidden (or holy) yearn to meet your enemy, and ask Allah for well being. But if ḥ (12th th Qaʿda (the 11 month in the Muslim calendar), Dhu al Ḥijja know that heaven is under the shadow of the swords.” ), Muḥarram (1st) and Rajab (7 ). More specifically, war you do meet your enemy, endure (the tribulations of war) and unless Muslims are attacked, whereupon it is essential they is forbidden (Surat al Baqara 2, 217) during these months d. The siege laid by Quraysh and the confederate tribes against Medina, in what is commonly referred to as ghazwat of Islamic Jurisprudence agree that the prohibition on war reciprocate war (Surat al Baqara 2, 194). All four schools ala zāb or ghazwat al khandaq during the four holy months is abrogated (mans Indeed, no battle was engaged thanks to Allah’s timely sending there are still some, like Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyya, who claim ḥ (627 A.D.) ended in failure. ūkh), although of angels and a strong wind against the confederate besiegers. otherwise. Note that the question is not whether Muslims may was Allah for the believers in battle (wa kafa Allah almu’min īn war themselves during these months. The Quran records in Surat al Aḥzāb 33, 25: “And sufficient fend off an infidel attack, but whether Muslims may instigate alqit āl j. ajj and the ritual texts associated with it urge the ).” Al Qaradawi points out that the fact that Allah was ajj for which the believers must be thankful. Therefore, it is The ḥ sufficient for the believers in battle is a point of divine grace one of the aforementioned holy months, in the “holy city” (al­ ludicrous to claim that Islam is a war mongering, blood lusting devout towards peace. The ḥ takes place during Dhu al Ḥijja, balad al arām (i rām ḥ ) of Mecca, and in a special state of holiness religione. [5]. l al udaybiyya, the ten year truce al M ḥ ), when a Muslim may not kill, or even hunt (see Surat (hudna fat The Quran calls ṣu ḥ ḥ ā’ida 5, 95). mubīn, a decisive victory, on the heels of which descended Surat Al Anfāl 8, 61: Interpretation ) between Muhammad and Quraysh in 628 A.D., ḥ l al udaybiyya the “Arab Peace Initiative” which in a previous incarnation, it was In March 2007 22 member states of the Arab League ratified Surat al Fatḥ. A certain tradition recalls one of the Prophet’s called the “Saudi Peace Initiative”. The main thrust of the initiative Companions asking the Prophet: “Is it [ṣu ḥ ḥ ] victory to a truce is clearly the sign of a peace loving religion a victory? Said (the Prophet): “Yes, a victory it is.” Imputing was to end the Arab Israeli conflict and normalize relations, on Palestinian State would be proclaimed with its capital in East f. condition that Israel withdraw to the borders of 4 June 1967. A [6]. Jerusalem, and a just solution would be found for the Palestinian to keep death and damage to a minimum. For example, the If Muslims must fight, they are commanded nevertheless Prophet forbade killing those not conscripted to the actual version of the initiative echoes al Anf refugees in accordance with U.N. Resolution 194. The Arabic āl 8, 61: “The Council [of fighting forces. Thus Islam protects the innocent, not least of towards peace by proclaiming likewise a just peace as her strategic the Arab League] asks Israel to reexamine her policy and incline whomg.
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