Navigation a Selection of Articles Previously Published by Gard AS 2 Navigation

Navigation A selection of articles previously published by Gard AS 2 Navigation

Introduction...... 4 Anchoring within Malaysian waters off Singapore...... 5 Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area...... 6 Damage to fixed objects when manoeuvring in confined waters ...... 7 “What if...?” – Planning for the unexpected before an emergency develops...... 9 Pilot error survey...... 12 What happens to the pilot after a casualty? ...... 12 Global wave watch system...... 13 Typhoon season precautions – Hong Kong area...... 14 Double typhoon trouble...... 15 Don’t fall asleep on the job - No let-up in fatigue-related casualties...... 17 Collisions at sea - Unavoidable? ...... 20 A collision that should have been avoided...... 23 Is the pilot a part of the bridge team?...... 25 Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea...... 28 Amazon Region – Danger of Grounding...... 29 Hydrodynamic interaction between ships...... 29 Operations in extremely cold climates...... 30 Winter season in Northern Baltic Sea...... 32 Severe ice conditions in the northern Baltic Sea...... 33 AnchoringGetting into a safe haven or into a potential disaster?...... 34 Rubicon - The point of no return...... 36 “Pilot on board!”...... 37 Pilot on the bridge - Role, Authority and Responsibility...... 39 Who is to blame? ...... 44 Collisions - Why do they occur?...... 46 Amendments to the Collision Regulations...... 47 TRICOLOR - The collision, sinking and wreck removal...... 48 Wash damage...... 51 Hull and Machinery incident - The innocent victim ...... 52 (of an unsuccessful berthing manouevre)...... 52 Hull and machinery incident - Consequences of a blackout...... 53 Reducing maritime casualties through awareness of nautical safety...... 54 Ship simulators - Virtual reality without P&I liability...... 56 Voyage Data Recorders - Black box technology paves its way into shipping...... 58 Computerisation of bridges and engine rooms - Progress or regression?...... 60 The interface between hull and machinery insurance and P&I from the P&I claims handler’s perspective...... 62

Disclaimer

The information contained in this publication is compiled from material previously published by Gard AS and is provided for general information purposes only. Whilst we have taken every care to ensure the accuracy and quality of the information provided at the time of original publication, Gard AS can accept no responsibility in respect of any loss or damage of any kind whatsoever which may arise from reliance on information contained in this publication regardless of whether such information originates from Gard AS, its shareholders, correspondents or other contributors. 3 Navigation

This booklet contains a collection of loss prevention materials - High commercial pressure relating to navigational accidents, training and other issues - Larger and faster ships which have been published by Gard over the last five years. - Reduced manning The compilation may be used for individual studies, as parts of - Increased administrative tasks on board training schemes, or as individual topics in safety meeting or - Increased number of inspections education. - Fatigue - Lack of experience There is a growing concern within the industry about the increase - Lack of competence in navigational claims. The pattern seems to be a steady number - Poor decision making of claims per ship but the severity of each claim increases every year. In the last 4 years alone, Gard has seen a doubling in The discussion about these factors will continue as long as ships the value of the claims paid as a result of navigational errors. ply the seas but there are some areas that need to be addressed Navigational incidents represent approximately 40 per cent of the by ship operators to improve the performance of the shipping numbers of all claims and 50 per cent of the costs. industry:

There is a human error behind the majority of navigational Education, training and crew selection is paramount to obtain claims. The occasional technical failure, normally resulting in and keep high quality crew. Lack of positive corrective action is a limited damage to piers and ships’ sides are rare and not of major common direct cause of accidents. concern. Human error is the cause behind at least 80 per cent of all navigational accidents. This figure seems to be the generally Situational awareness is a term used to describe what is agreed industry wide. missing within the bridge team when this happens. To achieve such awareness it is necessary to conduct teamwork and Several factors have been pointed out as possible reasons for the communication training. increasing number of human error incidents: The human being is the only intelligent barrier in our systems and - Integrated and complicated bridge systems only the crew can halt the current development and protect the - High traffic density value of ships, cargo and environment.  4 Navigation

Earlier this year we addressed the problems of anchoring in Recommendations congested areas off Singapore.1 In this circular we address the Fines for non-payment of harbour dues etc. are not covered by problems encountered when anchoring within Malaysian waters Gard Rule 47 and are therefore outside the P&I cover. Our advice off Singapore. So far, three vessels covered by Gard have been to Members and clients entering Malaysian Territorial Waters is arrested and fined for not having notified Malaysian authorities to arrange for notification of arrival and the payment of dues of their arrival and anchoring outside the outer port limits of through a Malaysian shipping agent.  Tanjun Pelepas and Johor ports and for non-payment of light dues. 1 Gard Loss Prevention Circular No. 11-09: Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area. It is well known that there are no “international waters” outside 2 MDC Legal Advisers, “The Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952”, Singapore waters; ships are either in Singapore, Malaysia or MDC Publishers Printers, 1996. Indonesia. When anchoring off Malaysia, it should be borne in 3 MYR = Malaysian Ringgit. mind that Malaysian territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles 4 Marine Department Malaysia, Malaysian Shipping Notice MSN from the baseline, if not limited by other State boundaries. 15/2009, dated 13 Oct 2009. 5 Laws of Malaysia, Act 250, Federation Light Dues Act 1953, Amendments to The Merchant Shipping reprint 2006. Ordinance 1952 6 Additional information can be found at Marine Department Section 491B of the Malaysian Merchant Shipping Ordinance Malaysia www.marine.gov.my/ 19522 stipulates which ships must notify the Director of Marine of activities within Malaysian waters. The Director may impose terms and conditions including fees on the activities permitted. The owner, master or agent of the ship may be found guilty of an offence, as well as risking a fine of MYR 100,0003 or imprisonment for up to two years, for contravening the ordinance.

The Marine Department of Malaysia has recently amended the Merchant Shipping Ordinance to also include vessels engaged in activities such as: a. Laying up b. Welding and other hot works c. Anchoring in non-anchorage areas d. Any form of underwater operations

The Marine Department of Malaysia advises4 that notification to the Director of Marine can be made at the nearest port office during normal working hours. As for the payment of Light Dues, this is regulated by Act 250, Federation Light Dues Act 1953,5 which states that “every ship which in the course of a voyage enters any port or place within Peninsular Malaysia, other than ships exempted, shall pay light dues as prescribed.”6

Risk of fines It should be noted that once vessels have been arrested for non-payment of light dues, it can be rather expensive to obtain their release. A rate of Registered Net Tonnage x MYR 0.20 X 10 has been levied as a penalty. Authorities may request a bond of MYR 50,000 issued by a local registered bank, prior to releasing the vessel. The Marine Department appears to prefer to deal with a local registered shipping agent rather than with a P&I Club representative, and will only accept a Letter of Undertaking from shipping agents while waiting for security guarantees to be issued by a bank, which may take up to five working days. 5 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 Loss Prevention Circular No. 11-09 Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area The Maritime and Port Authorities of Singapore (MPA) recently called a meeting with representatives of the P&I Clubs to discuss particular problems of dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area.

Vessels not anchoring within Singapore port limits are, for commercial reasons, opting to anchor in outer port limit areas (OPL). The East and West OPL areas used for anchoring are, however, rather narrow spaces situated between the port limits and the traffic separation scheme (TSS) through the Singapore Strait. These areas are becoming very congested, being popular with owners for the purposes of bunkering, taking supplies, change of crew, repairs or just waiting for cargo operations. Due to the congestion, some anchored vessels are straying into the TSS, and are thus violating the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREG). The MPA states that vessels in breach of COLREG Rule 10 (g) by anchoring in the TSS are being reported to their respective flag administrations. It appears from the vessels having been reported, that Singapore authorities also seem to report vessels anchored in Precautionary Areas for being in breach of COLREG.

When it comes to bunkering at Singapore, and the tendency to bunker in OPL areas, it should be noted that the risks factors The problem of congestion of vessels off Singapore is not easy concerning both bunker quality and quantity have been to solve, but there is always the possibility of seeking designated considered higher in OPL areas than from suppliers operating anchorages inside Singapore port limits. Vessels should not within the much more regulated port limits. There are also two anchor in the TSS or Precautionary Areas, and care should be bunker anchorages in the western sector of the Singapore Port, taken not to anchor too close to subsea cables and pipelines. located conveniently close to the TSS, where vessels of 20,000 Claims for damage caused by anchoring in way of cables and GT and above, staying less than 24 hours, may take bunkers at pipelines, or by dragging anchors across such equipment are very reduced port dues. Vessels other than gas tankers and chemical costly to the Club. tankers, with a draft of 11.5 meters or less, may also be exempted from compulsory pilotage at these bunkering stations. There have been a number of contact damages between ships at anchor in OPL areas during recent months, mostly in the East The MPA has also pointed to several instances of damage to area. For anchoring in congested areas, full alertness is required subsea cables by incorrect anchoring and has alerted the P&I and anchoring at night should be avoided if possible. In locations Clubs to this problem. When a vessel is anchoring too close to such as the congested Singapore OPLs, wind and tidal currents charted cables and pipelines, the owners of the cables/pipelines must be considered; an anchor watch should be kept at all times are informed of the vessel’s particulars, to enable them to make and the engine at the ready. For the time being, when anchoring a claim against the vessel, should any damage occur. OPL is a off Singapore, the key message is extreme caution.  “loose” term, but the Eastern OPL is considered bound to the north by Johore Port limits and to the south by the westbound For further information on anchoring in general please see the TSS. It should be noted that this 5 mile long area is very narrow following Gard publications and there are several submarine cables running the length of it. Gard News 193 What if... ?’ - Planning for the unexpected before an emergency develops We have also been advised that the MPA is in discussion with Gard News 177 Anchoring - Getting into a safe haven or into a Malaysian and Indonesian port authorities, in order to reach potential disaster? an agreement for vessels anchoring in the TSS, or damaging Gard Loss Prevention Circular No. 14-08: Anchoring and subsea cables and pipelines, to be penalised by the State having deteriorating weather conditions jurisdiction over the area. Gard Guidance to Masters, section 2.14.3 Anchoring.

Meeting between the MPA and the P&I Clubs and their representatives in Singapore, 26th June 2009. 6 Navigation

Gard has recently seen a noticeable increase in cases involving 2. Unfamiliarity with the ship’s manoeuvrability significant contact damage to fixed objects by vessels A pilot will know the local waters best, however, the master manoeuvring in confined waters, mostly within port. Fixed objects is more familiar with his vessel’s manoeuvrability. Due to the include berths, docks, locks and shore side equipment such as rotation of crew, familiarity with the ship’s own manoeuvring cranes. The contact damage has resulted in some very large systems can be lacking, and, as technology and computerisation claims for the repair and/or loss of use of such objects. Outlined is becoming ever more prevalent, training may be needed below are five of the most common factors, in Gard’s experience to ensure that crew members are familiar with the vessel’s in cases involving contact damage to fixed objects in confined systems.2 It is important to include information as to the vessel’s waters.1 These incidents also risk harming people and the manoeuvrability in the master/pilot information exchange before environment (e.g. pollution from breached oil tanks), and the ship the commencement of the pilotage.3 The effect of changes in the itself is often left with expensive repairs and loss of trading time. vessel’s draft, trim and windage characteristics must also be taken into consideration when discussing the vessel’s manoeuvrability. 1. Prevailing and forecast conditions not properly assessed 3. No agreed manoeuvring plan The cumulative effect of wind, sea, current and tidal conditions Just how the vessel will manoeuvre when in close proximity on the ship may not have been fully appreciated. As a result to fixed objects is often not planned and/or agreed in advance of the above factors the vessel can experience difficulties in within the bridge team and/or with the pilot.4 This not only manoeuvring in a controlled fashion and within safe parameters. concerns the location that the vessel is proceeding to/from, but Insufficient allowance has been made for the forces acting on the also other fixed objects which the vessel will pass within critical ship. These can easily turn out to be greater than expected and close proximity. Often, insufficient time is invested in advance beyond the capabilities of the ship and, due to the unforeseen to consider how the vessel can be expected to behave, given its effects of the prevailing and/or forecast conditions, insufficient manoeuvring characteristics and the prevailing conditions. The tugs would have been employed to handle the vessel. There are closest points of approach are often not calculated as are critical instances where manoeuvrings in confined waters should be bearings, transits and ranges to assist in determining the limits of deferred until conditions have improved. This also includes cases the safe manoeuvring parameters. of reduced visibility. 7 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 4. Poorly executed manoeuvre period. Less obvious factors involve squat and/or interaction. Even the best ship handlers occasionally get it wrong, although Although a loss of manoeuvring capability will inevitably make it is perhaps surprising how very wrong in some cases. Excessive contact avoidance more difficult, exercises and drills can be used speed is a common factor as is pilot error and the bridge team to test back-up systems, including use of the ship’s anchors. can be reluctant to intervene when the pilot is clearly making Having something in reserve is important, but being able to put mistakes. that reserve to effective use is equally important.

5 Communication with tugs, terminals and mooring crews Recommendation leading to misunderstandings has also been a contributory It is better to abort the manoeuvre and make a second attempt factor. Even where a manoeuvring plan is agreed, prevailing than to fail on the first. During drills, exercises and tests of circumstances can require the plan to be changed and there may equipment prior to arrival, the Master should ensure that the be little time to react to new situations. In particular, changes crew is able to respond at any time to an emergency situation in wind conditions and the movements of other vessels often related to manoeuvring. Tasks should be properly defined and create problems. In a number of cases it appears that aborting the assigned to qualified personnel, and the Master should ensure manoeuvre to try again has not been considered or has been left that the company procedures are fully understood by everybody too late. involved. Effective and clear communication is important. The Master should closely monitor the manoeuvres and should not 5. Loss of manoeuvring capability hesitate to comment, give advice, or even abort an approach if he The loss of engines, propulsion, steerage, or thrusters is, perhaps is uncomfortable with the situation.  surprisingly, a less common factor than those mentioned above. There are instances where such a loss has occurred immediately before/after manoeuvring systems have been, or are due to be, repaired or overhauled. Unfortunately, during these periods of increased risk, additional precautions appear not to have been taken. Pre-sailing and pre-arrival checks on manoeuvring systems are important, especially after a long ocean passage or stationary

1 See also “Bumps and scrapes can be costly!” from Gard News 183. 2 Some shipowners have sought to standardise equipment across vessels in their fleet and to always assign senior officers to the same class of vessel. 3 See “Master/pilot exchange of information” from Gard News 154. 4 See Guidance to Masters 2.13.4 Navigation in confined waters – Bridge Resource Management. 5 See also Loss Prevention Circular no. 04-00: Pilot on the bridge - Role, authority and responsibility. 8 Navigation

We plan very well for situations which we know will cause us The obvious common factor in these two incidents is that both problems. The situations which we tend not to plan for very well, vessels were at anchor. In contrast to cases where vessels have and which therefore catch us by surprise, are those where the been caught out by bad weather when alongside a berth and potential for harm has not been foreseen or is considered too when the ship’s crew will often be very busy, these two cases remote. suggest that potentially dangerous scenarios are simply being overlooked, even during the more relaxed (perhaps too relaxed) Things could have been different for over 1,500 people who periods when at anchor. lost their lives in that incident if the master and officers of the TITANIC had asked themselves (amongst other things): “what if What if…? – Pilot error the ice has progressed further south so as to affect our intended Pilot error is probably not the first thought to come to mind when course?”. a pilot walks onto the bridge. Perhaps it should be – they are not expected to make mistakes, but they do. A recent five-year In today’s busy world, especially on ships, there is little time study of claims in excess of USD 100,000 recorded by each of the to stop and think about potential problems, to ask “what if…?”. Clubs in the International Group of P&I Clubs revealed that some There are response plans and checklists available for emergency 262 claims were caused by pilot error, with an average cost per situations which have the clear potential to cause the crew and incident of USD 850,000.1 Several cases from Gard’s claim files ship harm – for example, steering gear failure and fire. However, have been previously featured in Gard News.2 In a recent case, many serious incidents start life when there is no emergency as the shipowners’ dock damage liability resulted in a payout of such, and develop into emergencies because the potential for several million dollars. The case involved the berthing of a partly harm has not been foreseen or has been considered too remote. laden VLCC. The vessel had three tugs, the tide was slack and the Instead of asking ourselves “what if…?” we tend to persuade wind light. However, one of the two pilots was in his final phase ourselves that something bad will not happen. In the wider of training for the ship type/berth and he had the control of context, asking “what if…?” is very much a part of situational the vessel. It was night and the shore Doppler readout was not awareness. The development of bridge resource management working. The approach speeds, angles and bow/stern distances has done much to address deficiencies in situational awareness, were therefore communicated to the pilot by VHF (one can by stressing the importance of a team approach. However, if the imagine the difficulty). The vessel was not brought under control members of a team are too preoccupied with tasks at hand, or before she made her final approach to berth and investigation other human factors (such as fatigue) are at play, there will be a suggests that she exceeded the maximum angle (three degrees) much greater chance of potential emergencies (or “what ifs…?”) and speed (21 ft/minute) of approach, making contact at about not being considered at all. six degrees and a speed of 60 feet/minute (which interestingly increases the berthing force by a factor of nine). Insurers often What if…? – The weather do not get to hear about cases where the master intervened and There is a lot of current debate about climate change and stopped the pilot, aborted the approach and started again. Of storms which are more severe or sudden than forecast. Claims course, it is a difficult situation for masters, but there is a need experience, however, suggests that in many cases the crew to be decisive, especially since it is he and the owners who are simply underestimates the effects of weather on the ship. A case most likely to bear the brunt of the consequences of a pilot error. mentioned in a recent UK investigation report serves as a useful It should be kept in mind that the master is in command of the example. A tanker was in ballast (riding high) and dragged its vessel’s navigation at all times with only one exception: when anchor across a gas pipeline in bad weather. The report concluded transiting through the Panama Canal. that the master chose to remain at the anchorage despite it not being a recommended anchorage in the circumstances and A United States Coast Guard investigation report into the despite deteriorating (but forecast) weather conditions, which grounding of a bulk carrier serves as a good example of the need increased the potential risk of windlass failure. Such failure did to be strong when a pilot has the control of the vessel. The report indeed occur due to shock loading and the crew were unable concluded that the pilot, who failed to give a helm order at a turn to slip the anchor due to tension on the bitter end. Had the in a channel, asserted his responsibility on the bridge by refusing master considered the potential problems (i.e., the “what ifs…?”), to honour the master’s request to sign the pilot exchange card. he would probably have left the anchorage and rode out the The report went on to say that the pilot’s authoritative presence storm. Another recent case was the subject of an investigation on the bridge created an atmosphere wherein the mate did not by the Australian authorities, who found that the master did not feel he could “speak up” or “challenge” the decision of the pilot. appropriately ballast the vessel and did not weigh anchor until it dragged in very bad (but forecast) weather. The investigation report went on to find the master had incorrectly assumed that the port authority would instruct ships to put out to sea when conditions were bad – he probably did not ask himself “what if 1 See article “Pilot error survey” in Gard News issue No.186. they do not, and what if my anchor does not hold?”. 2 See article “Pilot on the bridge – Role, authority and responsibility” in Gard News issue No.160. 9 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 What if …? – Risk of collision the recommended direction of traffic flow and the available time Asking “what if…?” where there is a risk of collision should for evasive action considerably reduced. be natural for the bridge watch-keeper. Unfortunately, the growing number of navigational accidents suggests that this What if …? – Repairs at sea is not the case. In a recent incident it was fortunate that both If recent media reports are to be believed, many incidents today crews escaped unharmed and that there was minimal pollution. involve damage to engines, often on board new ships, indicating However, one of the vessels was badly damaged and foundered, that machinery systems are not becoming more reliable. Any requiring an expensive salvage operation of ship and cargo. The vessel with an engine problem, especially a new and expensive incident is described in Image 1, below. one close to the shore, generates a certain level of concern. Even vessels that at first find themselves far off land in no immediate danger can end up perilously close when repairs do not progress as expected. In some cases repairs carried out by crew are unsuccessful and external assistance is called in to save the day. In others assistance is not called for or does not arrive in time and vessels find themselves in trouble. A classic example of the latter was featured in an article in Gard News issue No. 1813 in a case where the chief engineer’s optimism as to when repairs would be successfully completed was shared by the master for too long. When the master finally sought external assistance there were no vessels or tugs available in the area that could possibly reach the vessel in time. The vessel grounded and became a total loss, luckily without loss of life. In Image 1 the two vessels are seen approaching each other in a routing scheme. Vessel A is heading south and vessel B is heading A multitude of “what if …?” questions arise and ought to be north-east. Both are roughly following the route as depicted by considered in such cases, quite apart from the obvious one as to purple wavy lines, which meet south-east of a buoy marking the when external assistance can reach the ship. For example, what if westerly edge of the route. The intention of vessel A was to alter the engine fault has been wrongly diagnosed, what if the wrong to starboard at the buoy to follow route X as opposed to route spare part is on board, what if someone gets injured during the Y. Unfortunately, vessel B was not sure which route vessel A repair? intended to follow. As the vessels closed, vessel A altered course to starboard as intended and very shortly after that vessel B A very tragic case of another vessel grounding after unsuccessful altered course to port. The incident resulted in insurance claims repairs was the subject of an investigation by the US authorities. totalling in excess of USD 20 million and perhaps it could have The vessel found itself in extremely bad weather in a very been avoided had the bridge team on vessel B asked themselves remote part of the world and several crew members died during “what if vessel A intends to alter to starboard to route X rather evacuation from the vessel. Soon after the engine failure the than carrying straight on to follow route Y?” and the bridge team ship’s superintendent was called by the master and told that the on vessel A asked themselves “what if my intentions (in terms of vessel was in no immediate danger or close to land (she was 46 which route I intend to take) are unclear?”. The investigation into nautical miles from the closest point of land – an island). The the incident concluded that neither vessel made timely contact superintendent agreed with the proposed action to repair the with the other to arrange for a safe passage. engine, but it soon became apparent that external assistance would be necessary. The first tug arrived some 30 hours after The above collision was one in which both vessels had plenty of the engine had failed, by which time engine repairs had been time to react, but that may not always be the case. In another stopped due to the danger posed to the crew by the extremely collision case investigated by the Danish authorities, the vessels rough weather. A second tug arrived ten hours later, but never were passing on reciprocal courses in a one mile wide deep connected a line, and after a further three hours the first tug’s water route. One of the vessels suffered a steering failure at the line had parted. The weather prevented other attempts to connect moment of passing and even the double hull of the other vessel, tow lines and, despite the use of the vessel’s anchor as she a tanker, could not prevent a large spill of fuel oil from one of approached shallower water, she eventually grounded some 53 her cargo tanks. What could the tanker have possibly done? The hours after the engine had initially failed. investigation report concluded that a contributing factor was the decision of both vessels to use the route, when there was It is perhaps questionable whether, in this case, a state of a note on chart saying that the route should only be used by emergency existed at the time the engine failed, particularly given ships which, because of their draft, are unable to safely navigate the remote location and bad weather. Either way, asking “what if outside. By using the route, the closest point of approach (CPA) …?” at that moment might have bought some extra time. between the vessels was considerably less than if they had used 3 “Rubicon – The point of no return”. 10 Navigation 10

© Gard AS, April 2010 Planning for the unexpected – Problems happen, then chances are that they will not consider “what if…?” How do you plan for something you do not foresee happening? scenarios and will not react properly in a developing situation. Often there is no checklist or response plan specific to each Training, exercises and drills are good opportunities to test crew exact situation and it is impractical to produce checklists and reaction to scenarios that have the potential to develop into plans for every eventuality, every “what if …?”. Indeed, checklists an emergency. It is also possible to encourage people to think can be dangerous because they may omit to refer to crucial in terms of “what if …?”. One way to do that is to give positive considerations specific to the circumstances. Perhaps at the praise for challenging attitudes and prudent over-reaction. So if end of every checklist the question “have you considered other a junior officer challenges a senior officer on his choice of course eventualities?” should be added. he should be praised, even if the junior officer’s concern turns out to be unfounded. The junior officer should not be chastised. If the Another problem is that sometimes there may be very little time master’s decision to take an extra tug is not wholly unreasonable, to take action, and that is particularly relevant to pilot error. his action can be supported. However, before the pilot embarks, the plan can simply be to identify the critical aspects of the pilotage where the bridge At the moment a situation does arise, which calls for a plan, team will have to be particularly alert. The plan can also involve it will be important to bring together minds to discuss “what reminding the whole bridge team that pilots can make mistakes if…?” scenarios. In many of the cases mentioned above, the deck and that it is therefore important for the team to be mentally alert officers could have had a quick brainstorming session before and prepared to speak up if there is any concern over the pilot’s they found themselves in a developing situation which required orders. Perhaps a final consideration to a pre-pilotage plan would them to react without a plan. In cases involving engine failure, be whether or not to proceed with the pilotage. If, for example, the session would obviously involve the engineers and the value the weather conditions become marginal or the master is not fully of shore staff involvement should not be underestimated, since satisfied with the pilot’s plan (or even his competence) he may they are likely to be less distracted by the situation itself. An deem it prudent to hold back and to re-assess the situation. agenda for a “what if…?” brainstorming session might include the following: Many situations, such as those mentioned in the above cases, – situation description occur on ships every day and although each situation will be – what are the main dangers/risks to the crew/vessel? different, time will often permit a plan to be developed to deal – what could change that would increase/ alter the danger/risk? with a situation from the moment it becomes real. – what are the worse case scenarios? – what is the plan? Planning for the unexpected – Barriers – what is the back-up plan? It is important to recognise potential barriers to planning for the – what if …? unexpected and, perhaps more importantly, to carrying out plans. Amongst many that could be mentioned, the following examples In a collision situation, a brainstorming session is less likely to are given: be practical, but the officer of the watch should not be afraid to – Language and cultural differences – These can generate discuss potential problems with the lookout, e.g., “do you think reluctance within the bridge team to speak up if there is concern that vessel clearly understands our intentions?”. in a particular situation. The pilotage case involving the bulker grounding mentioned above is a good example. The investigation of near misses is worth a mention. These can – Shore staff support – Even if only perceived, a suspicion may be vital in terms of detecting whether any barriers exist and may exist on the vessel that the shore staff will not support a decision provide an opportunity to do something about them before a taken on the vessel, for example not to proceed with a pilotage. near miss becomes an emergency which is out of control. – Customer satisfaction – The need to avoid upsetting a charterer by taking a longer route. Conclusion – The need for speed – To quote a recent UK investigation report Asking “what if …?” in a developing situation on board a ship and on a major casualty, “speed and quick turnarounds appear to planning accordingly may make the difference as to whether or have become the focus of the industry at the expense of the safe not that situation develops into an emergency. At the very least, it operation of its vessels.” may buy the crew and ship vital extra time. Even if your own ship – The desire to save money – For a vessel without her engines far has what is considered to be the best crew, the much debated off land one can appreciate the temptation to attempt repairs skills’ shortage and ever-expanding world fleet raises questions before calling in potentially expensive external assistance. about watch-keepers on other vessels, pilots and whether they will behave as expected. As for the weather, it can always do the Planning for the unexpected– Solutions unexpected and perhaps climate change will make forecasting Perhaps the most important solution is mental preparation. If even less reliable. crew members have their minds preoccupied with other things, or have persuaded themselves that something bad will not Two small words, “what if …?”, are worth keeping in mind.  11 Navigation 11

International Group of P&I Clubs reports on pilot teams to keep a proper look-out and not to forget that their eyes error-related claims are still the most sophisticated aid to do so. The Pilotage Sub-committee of the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) has published a report on claims over USD 100,000 Groundings, pollution and general average/salvage cases involving pilot error. Information pooled by IG Clubs relating to involving pilot error each accounted for about three per cent of 260 such claims has been included in the study, which covers the the incidents by number. There were on average two incidents period from 20th February 1999 to 20th February 2004. in each of these categories every year. Groundings accounted for 35 per cent of all incidents by cost. The average cost of each Important observations grounding involving pilot error was USD 7.85 million and of each The average number of incidents per year involving pilot error was pollution incident involving pilot error the average cost was USD 52. The frequency did not increase from year to year. The average 1.8 million. The report recommends better training or briefing of cost of each claim over the five year period was USD 850,000. The the bridge team management to operate with the pilot on board, average cost did not increase from year to year either. with emphasis on the master/pilot exchange of information.

Claims for damage to fixed and floating objects (FFO) involving Groundings are the most expensive pilot error claims. They are pilot error accounted for 65 per cent of claims by number (37 more than four times as expensive as pollution claims and almost claims per policy year) and 33 per cent by cost. The average cost 20 times more expensive than FFO claims. of each claim for damage to fixed and floating objects was USD 400,000. The report recommends better training or briefing of The IG is currently maintaining a database of pilot error incidents bridge team management to operate with the pilot on board, from 21st February 2004 to the present and thereafter. especially in relation to passage planning. The complete report can be downloaded from the IG website at Collisions involving pilot error accounted for 24 per cent of claims www.igpandi.org under “News and Information”.  by number and 24 per cent by cost. On average there were 14 collision cases per year involving pilot error and the average cost of each case was USD 800,000. The report recommends bridge

What happens to the pilot after a casualty? Gard News 186, May/July 2007

A glimpse at pilot error from a different perspective. in fact are properly sanctioned. In the case in question, the pilots’ association’s investigation concluded that the pilot was When a vessel with a pilot on board is involved in an accident, responsible for: the usual practice is that the pilot leaves the vessel as soon as – wrong understanding of the distance between his vessel and possible, often being replaced by a new pilot. Hence, examination the moored vessel with which it eventually collided; or questioning is avoided. The pilot is “the shipowner’s servant”, – his approach was too fast; and faults or errors made by the pilot are generally covered by – the timing of turning was wrong; the shipowner’s insurance policies. Only in major casualties can – other waiting vessels made him over-hasty in his operations. one expect that the pilot will be forced to give evidence and to be cross-examined. In these cases, the normal procedure is for the Due to the above, the pilot was suspended from business for pilot to demand a written letter of indemnity from the shipowner 21 days. He was degraded to a lower rank for three months, prior to any hearing. including a salary cut of USD 1,000 per month for the same period. In addition, he was forced to take navigational simulator One should therefore believe that pilots involved in casualties training at his own expense. do not get any reproach as a consequence of their faults. However, some (or perhaps most) pilots’ associations have their Notwithstanding, the damage to the vessels had to be covered by own internal investigations following a casualty, although very the shipowner’s insurers.  seldom is one made aware of sanctions imposed. In a particular recent collision case, Gard received a copy of the relevant pilots’ association’s investigation, which proved that some pilots 12 Navigation

The winter season in the northern hemisphere has again claimed and the service sets out the main wave patterns produced by the victims at sea as severe weather conditions continue to be a different pressure systems. The model shows significant waves, challenge for ships and their crews. The majority of the large swell, wind waves and whitecap probability. The heights and casualties occurred when the ship was affected by stormy directions are indicated by two different color schemes. WW3 is weather. It appears information about and preparations for severe presenting the forecast wave development in 12 hour intervals up weather conditions may not be at the required level. to a maximum of 6 days ahead.

Wave Watch III The forecasts are presented as lower resolution pictures which One important piece of information is an accurate and can easily be copied and forwarded by e-mail for vessels with understandable weather forecast. Ships limited internet connection on board. already receive information about the expected winds and temperatures but not all have access to wave information. The web page can be found at https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil and the WW3 is found at the bottom left of the page under the menu Wave Watch 3 is a service provided by the US Navy through the item Oceanography or https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil/PUBLIC/WW3/ Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center. The index.html.  service is open to the general public and free of charge and may be subject to periods of non-availability.

Wave Watch 3 (WW3) is a web service which provides global wave forecasts. It presents the forecasts for different oceans in a self explanatory and informative way. Not all ocean areas are covered 13 Navigation

Introduction Recommendations Severe weather continues to be a challenge for vessels and — The master of a ship moored at a government mooring may, their crews. Owners, agents and charterers should remind at his discretion, drop a bower anchor under foot to lessen their ship masters of the need to take precautionary measures the tendency to sheer. This should not impair the efficiency during the approach of tropical cyclones. This circular provides of the mooring, although an anchor should not be used information on specified mooring regulations in operation in during normal weather conditions. Hong Kong during typhoons, however, due considerations for — Masters are reminded that every vessel within the waters proper moorings should be made during typhoon conditions in of Hong Kong must maintain a continuous listening watch any location. Similar requirements may also apply in ports other on the VHF radio channel appropriate to the VHF sector than Hong Kong and owners may be well advised to check for any in which the vessel is located, or another VHF channel additional requirements if their vessels call at such ports. as may be specified by the Vessel Traffic Centre (call sign “Mardep”) unless the vessel is released from this obligation Specifications by the Centre. The Centre will broadcast tropical cyclone Masters, owners, agents and other individuals in control of vessels information from time to time when the tropical cyclone are reminded of their obligation under Sections 61 and 62 of warning signals have been hoisted. Masters should listen the Shipping and Port Control Ordinance, Cap. 313 of the Laws to local radio broadcasts for advisory weather information of Hong Kong SAR, to comply with any direction of the Director bulletins. of Marine concerning the safe operation of vessels at the port, — ome vessels have been found to not have adequate or in relation to any matter as to which the Director may give manning onboard during periods when tropical cyclone directions under the above Ordinance. All government Class “A” warning signals are hoisted. The attention of masters, and “B” moorings are available for use during typhoons with the owners, agents and charterers of vessels is therefore drawn exception of: to Regulation 26(1) of the Shipping and Port Control — “A” mooring – A17, A29, A35, A39, A43, A46; and Regulations, which states that: — “B” mooring: B1, B2, B3, B4. “A ship shall, while within the waters of Hong Kong, have onboard at all times such number of crew as is, in the The status of any government Class “A” and “B” moorings is opinion of the Director, qualified and capable of carrying subject to change without prior notice. Up-to-date information out all duties which may reasonably be required to ensure can be obtained from the Vessel Traffic Centre, at telephone +852 the safety of the ship having regard to the circumstances 233 7808, telex 63607 MDVTS, or facsimile +852 858 6646. pertaining thereto.”  14 Navigation

The incident described below occurred when a vessel sailed right through the centre of a typhoon in Japan.

The incident The incident involved a two-year-old car-carrier with space for about 6,000 cars.

One afternoon, while loading at Yokohama for carriage to the West Indies and US, the vessel was requested by the port authorities to leave the port due to the approach of typhoon HIGOS. The vessel left Yokohama promptly. The intention was to circumvent the Izu-Oshima Island for Suruga Wan and drift until the typhoon had passed Tokyo Bay. Unfortunately, the typhoon followed a different course from that expected by the master. This caused the vessel to come more or less in the dead centre of HIGOS, leading to loss of speed and engine force due to the heavy waves she encountered. Additionally, the tall ship-sides acted more or less as a sail in the fierce winds. Finally, in the early evening the vessel grounded on a rocky seabed in shallow waters approximately 50-60 metres from the shoreline near Habu Port on the south eastern tip of Izu- According to the 1976 Limitation Convention1 as incorporated Oshima Island, after first having been forced onto a bank where her into Japanese law, the owners’ limit of liability for property claims rudder and propeller were lost. based on the vessel’s tonnage was about USD 11.5 million. Two months after the incident the shipowners established a limitation All members of the crew were rescued by the Japanese Coast fund in the Tokyo District Court, which was secured by depositing Guard during the early hours of the next morning. There were no with the court a letter of undertaking issued by Gard. personal injuries. Following medical checks and interrogation by the Japanese authorities the crew members were repatriated to Pollution the Philippines. At the time of the incident the vessel had about 1,300 tons of heavy fuel oil in her bunker tanks, as well as some marine After the grounding the vessel developed a list of 16-18° to diesel and lubricating oils. The Japanese authorities ordered port. Various inspections revealed severe structural damage to the shipowners to eliminate the risk of pollution, failing which her double bottom. Parts of the bottom had been lifted by as the authorities would take appropriate measures and pursue a much as nine metres. The engine room was flooded and most of recovery claim for all their costs from the owners. A contract for the double bottom fuel tanks appeared to be empty. Significant fuel removal from the tanks and car decks was entered into with quantities of oil had penetrated the car decks above. Further Nippon Salvage Co. structural damage to the hull occurred over the next few days as a result of heavy weather. The estimated quantity of fuel remaining on board after the grounding was approximately 300 tons, which means that some Salvage 1,000 tons of oil escaped from the vessel during the first couple The shipowners immediately entered into a Lloyd’s Open Form of days after the casualty. Fortunately, despite this significant 2000 salvage contract with Nippon Salvage Co. Scopic was escape of oil, there were only limited traces of oil on the beaches invoked by the salvors from the beginning. It soon became and shorelines in the vicinity of the wreck. The very heavy clear that the vessel could not be salved. The owners claimed weather apparently caused the oil to be washed out into the a constructive total loss, which was accepted by the hull open sea, and to smother and emulsify in the water. Pollution underwriters and Scopic remuneration was paid. prevention measures were also taken by the Japanese authorities, and local fishermen were employed to assist in this regard. Limitation Following meetings with Japanese lawyers, it was made clear that Fisheries the shipowners would not be entitled to limit liability in respect Izu-Oshima Island is a national park area. The grounding took place of Scopic remuneration paid to the salvor, or liabilities, costs and in the middle of a special fishing area for abalones and various shells. expenses incurred in respect of wreck removal or pollution clean- Claims totalling USD 14.5 million were presented by local fishery up and prevention. The owners were entitled to limit liability in unions. An expert from Tokai University, Tokyo was appointed by the respect of cargo claims and other pollution damage, including shipowners to carry out local damage assessment. ITOPF and London claims from fisheries for, inter alia, loss of revenue. experts were also retained for this purpose. The largest claim related

1 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 1976. 15 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 and a recovery claim for costs would be pursued against the owners. Invitations for tenders for removing the wreck were then submitted. However, shortly before expiry of the deadline for bids, another typhoon passed through the area, which caused the vessel to break up. A severe fire broke out on board, which was probably caused by twisting of the wreck in the mid section area, causing car lashings to break and cars to smash into each other with consequent release of petrol. The combination of petrol vapours and friction-generated sparks probably caused ignition. The fire caused the wreck and cargo to be totally burnt out. Subsequently, the hull further disintegrated to the extent that substantial wreck parts and cargo were spread on the seabed.

At the time of the incident the vessel had about 1,300 tons of heavy After a new round of tenders and negotiations, the owners fuel oil in her bunker tanks. entered into a wreck removal contract with Kasel Salvage (Hong Kong) Limited. The contract was on the Bimco Wreckstage 1999 to restoration works to the seabed, which had been damaged by the Form amended by various rider clauses, and subject to a lump impact of the vessel. This part of the claim was deemed by the experts sum price plus possible additional payments for delays capped at to be unfounded and was later withdrawn. The fishery unions’ claims 50 days. Due to the weather situation in the area it was important were settled amicably for a reasonable sum. for the owners to limit the cost of this operation. Payments were to be made in seven stages in accordance with completion Cargo of defined services as confirmed by the shipowners’ special At the time of the casualty, the vessel was loaded with 3,876 representative. new and second-hand cars, as well as some high and heavy construction vehicles and spare parts. A helicopter was also part The intention was to have the wreck removed within of the cargo. The estimated total sound value of the lot on board approximately 24 months. Unfortunately nature did not co- was about USD 42 million. All cargo had been loaded in Korea and operate and the operation lasted 36 months instead. In order Japan. Due to a fire on board (described below), the cargo was to maintain good relations with the inhabitants of the island, damaged to the point of being deemed to have no residual value including the fishermen, the shipowners chose to have a P&I beyond scrap steel. The disposal of the damaged cargo was part correspondent on the spot all this time. This prevented a lot of of the wreck removal operation. misunderstanding and agony due to the prolonged operation and was a cost-effective measure. All claims for loss of cargo were handled by the Tokyo District Court under the limitation proceedings. Due to difficulty in Total exposure getting hold of some cargo interests, the cargo claims/limitation The shipowners’ total liability in this matter was just over USD 40 proceedings were protracted but were finally completed after four million.  and a half years.

Wreck removal The Japanese authorities also ordered the shipowners to remove the wreck, failing which appropriate measures would be taken 16 Navigation

Fatigue at sea is a problem which needs urgent attention. As mentioned in the 2002 article, it is natural for shipowners, operating in a very competitive environment, to wish to keep A serious problem their operating costs to a minimum. Thus many owners will There continues to be a sharp and detailed focus on seafarer crew their ships with no more than the minimum number of fatigue. The Centre for Occupational and Health Psychology people required by the Standards of Training, Certification and at Cardiff University in Wales has recently (November 2006) Watchkeeping Convention (STCW). This is perfectly legal and published an 87-page report into seafarer fatigue.1 The Nautical they are quite entitled to do so. Understandably, very few owners Institute is concentrating several of its forthcoming “Alert!” will, voluntarily, place themselves at what they would see as a bulletins on this issue. Other industry and industry-related commercial disadvantage by employing more crew than they are organisations, notably the International Transport Workers’ legally obligated to do. Federation, have carried out studies into this problem. Five years ago an article in Gard News2 reported on fatigue-related Unfortunately, evidence collected in recent years by many casualties and pointed out that all sides of the industry were organisations inside and outside the industry in relation to expressing concern about fatigue in seafarers, especially officers. fatigue-related casualties suggests that the problem remains a The article said that “there are signs that the fatigue problem serious one. Despite all the attention and publicity the problem is getting worse, not better.” What – if anything – has changed is not going away. Indeed, with the growth in world trade and since then and how? consequent expected increase in the number, size and value of ships, it is a major concern that not only are fatigue-related Regrettably, the answer seems to be “very little”. If anything, casualties going to be with us for the foreseeable future, but also increased and increasing commercial pressure within the that they are likely to increase. shipping industry means that companies and individuals in these companies are continually required to provide the best possible Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study service, in the shortest time available and at the lowest cost In July 2004 the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch possible. This is not to say that any or all of these objectives are, (MAIB), published a report entitled “Bridge Watchkeeping Safety by definition, wrong or dangerous. It is, however, undeniable that cutting costs is often the easiest to achieve of these three objectives and it is sometimes the case that the greatest and 1 Copies can be obtained from Gard. Alternatively, further information may be obtained by e-mailing the author at [email protected]. possibly disproportionate emphasis is placed on the cost factor. 2 “Are we tired of hearing about fatigue-related casualties?” in Gard News issue No. 166. 17 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 Study”. The report may be found at www.maib.gov.uk/publications/ The vessel operated with seven crew (one more than stipulated safety_studies.cfm. Gard strongly recommends every shipowner in her Safe Manning Certificate). The master and chief officer and operator to read this report, especially those operating in the operated a “watch-on/watch-off” system. Many of the other crew short sea and container trades. Based on its own investigations members had dual roles. The chief officer was on watch when into many casualties around the UK coastline, the MAIB takes the he fell asleep. He was alone on the bridge, despite the provision view that, in certain trades at least, the minimum manning levels within STCW that “the OOW may be the sole lookout in daylight and required hours of rest provided for in STCW are insufficient to conditions” (our emphasis). The chief officer woke up only when prevent fatigue-related casualties continuing to occur. Particular the vessel went aground. reference is made to the system of a six-hours-on/six-hours-off watch practised on many short sea vessels, where the master and Investigations indicated that the chief officer had become chief officer – the only two deck officers on board – each stand fatigued shortly before the incident during periods of intense two watches in one 24-hour period. These watches are in addition work and had been unable to obtain enough proper rest before to all the other tasks which these officers have to perform. The the voyage. When he fell asleep, there was nobody on the bridge MAIB comments that “as ships operating with just two bridge to wake him up. The vessel was not fitted with a “dead man’s watchkeepers including the master, working in opposite watches, alarm”. Nor was she required to be. are likely to have fatigued OOWs, and the masters of these vessels are frequently unable to discharge all of the duties required of For the reasons stated above, it is not known what the final cost them, the need for more than two watchkeepers is obvious”. This of this incident will be. However, the master has been prosecuted view is shared by the Nautical Institute, which, in Bulletin 13 by the UK authorities (the MCA) for breach of one section of the of its “Alert!” magazine, says that “in these cases, the solution Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and, having pleaded guilty, he has is simple: increase the manning to remove the master from the had to pay a fine and now has a criminal record in the UK. The watchkeeping roster and consider an alternative watchkeeping MCA has indicated that it also intends to bring criminal charges pattern”. The MAIB believes that their research “illustrates that the against the shipowners. hours of work and lookout requirements contained in STCW 95, along with the principles of safe manning, are having insufficient It is too early to say what the total financial cost will be. It is, impact in their respective areas”. however, likely to be significant. This ignores the human cost to the master and chief officer. The report contains recommendations to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), the agency responsible for Example 2 implementing the UK government’s maritime safety policy A small (approximately 6,000 GT) container feeder vessel ran throughout the UK, to take the findings of the report to the aground on an island in the Aegean Sea. This vessel had cover International Maritime Organisation (IMO) with a view to for loss of hire with Gard, but her P&I cover was with another reviewing the guidelines on safe manning for vessels operating a Club. As in the previous example, the chief officer was the OOW “master and mate” system and the requirements of STCW relating and was alone on the bridge at the material time. Due to fatigue, to a designated (and dedicated) lookout, working as an integral he fell asleep, the vessel failed to change course as planned and part of the bridge team. grounded at full speed. The vessel sustained serious bottom damage. Oil from her bunker tanks was spilt. An LOF salvage Gard has seen many cases which mirror the problems identified agreement was signed with salvors. The vessel was re-floated and by the MAIB. A couple of examples will suffice. repaired.

Example 1 The vessel was out of service for over 94 days. The bill for the This is the “classic” case of a sole officer of the watch (OOW) repairs and costs associated therewith came to around EUR 2 falling asleep while on watch. The vessel, a small short-sea million. The amount awarded to or agreed to be payable to the general cargo trader, entered with Gard for P&I risks, was on a salvors is not yet known. Nor is the amount paid by the P&I voyage from Iceland to the UK. While passing between the north Club for the oil pollution or for any other third party liabilities, of Scotland and the Orkney Islands during the early hours of but it is clear that the cost to owners and their various insurers the morning, a time at which the human body is perhaps most arising from the chief officer’s fatigue and the lack of anyone (or vulnerable to falling asleep, the OOW did exactly that. As a result, anything) to alert either him or another member of the crew to the vessel failed to change course and went aground on an the problem was substantial. island. The vessel sustained substantial damage to her bottom. A salvage contract, on LOF terms, with SCOPIC incorporated, was In addition, the chief officer was criminally prosecuted by the signed with a salvage company. The amount of the salvage award Greek authorities for causing oil pollution. He was found guilty remains to be established or agreed, as does any cargo claim. and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The sentence was appealed and suspended. Nevertheless, he too has a criminal record. 18 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 Conclusion The secretary general of the IMO suggested that particular Are all masters and chief officers who take a watch without being attention should be paid to the levels of safe manning so as properly rested criminally negligent? No, of course they are not, to ensure that watches and watchkeeping hours are correctly but there may be many who would, from their own experience, performed and observed. The International Shipping Federation, support the conclusion that, particularly on certain trades, they representing many of the world’s leading shipowners, reportedly are consistently overworked and are unable to obtain the hours called for STCW to be reviewed and brought up to date, taking of rest stipulated by STCW. In such circumstances, it is difficult to into account developments in ship operation and technology avoid the conclusion reached by the MAIB that, in certain trades, since the convention came into force. the requirements of STCW may not be good enough to prevent more officers falling asleep while on watch. It is therefore disappointing to see reports of a recent meeting of the IMO sub-committee on STCW stating that there was When one adds in the fact that, as the examples show, the OOW apparently “a lot of opposition at that meeting, mainly on is often the only person on the bridge and there is no alarm financial grounds” to amending the existing regulations. which operates so as to alert either the OOW or anyone else to According to the reports, certain countries, which one might the fact that there is nobody navigating the vessel, one has a expect to be at the forefront of safety at sea, have opposed any recipe for disaster. The examples are merely the tip of the iceberg. tightening of the rules and in fact may be seeking changes which could well exacerbate the fatigue problem. If owners, insurers and legislators wish to remedy the problem, an industry-wide approach is needed. It has been shown that, Fatigue at sea is a problem which continues to affect shipowners where the will exists, agreement can be reached and legislation and operators, their customers, the environment, insurers and enacted quickly. The MAIB report was published in July 2004. The most importantly, the people on board. Gard believes it is a MCA appears to have accepted its views and recommendations, problem which needs urgent attention. Whether it receives it and the IMO was looking at the issues of seafarer fatigue, work remains to be seen.  and rest hours and the appropriate levels of safe and minimum manning. 19 Navigation

Once a collision has occurred people often ask whose fault it was. The major concern, however, should focus on the cause of the collision and what can be done to avoid a similar accident in future. Only then come the question of fault and the allocation of liability.

Multiple effects Serious collisions have multiple effects. Often – too often – crew or passengers become injured, or even worse, lose their lives. This may cause individual grievance and sorrow: wives lose their husbands, children lose their fathers, their financial situation becomes uncertain.

If oil or other harmful substance is accidentally spilled, the environment may become seriously affected, harming not only the aquatic fauna and flora, but too often also the coastline, affecting those who earn their living from the sea or the coast. Expensive clean-up operations may follow as well as endless disputes with aggrieved parties.

The cargo carried on board may become damaged, often causing Various publications exist on the subject of proper watch- serious disruption to commercial relations between seller and keeping and collision avoidance. Nevertheless, the same errors buyer, which can be more damaging than the pure material loss. and mistakes occur, again, and again. To be fair, one has to make distinctions when looking at the causes of collisions. Finally, the shipowner and the insurances behind him can be seriously affected by a collision. Huge financial losses may result Manning not only from the cost of possible salvage and repairs, but also One fundamental problem is ships’ manning. Ship managers apply from the loss of time. for the lowest possible number of crew and flag states are often too lenient and accept managers’ statements, neglecting the Causes of collisions requirements for qualification and training of those assigned for Every period in the history of shipping has had its own main watch-keeping duties. As a result, we have chronically under- cause of collisions. Before the age of steam, adverse winds and manned ships, especially in the short-sea trade. This in turn weather and lack of manoeuvrability were the main causes of causes a dilemma for the master, who is required to maintain safe collisions, combined with poor or no navigational lights. Old navigational watches on board his ship. “salties”, having sailed on wind-jammers, told that the main cause at the turn of the last century was underestimation by the How can the master of a ship comply with the necessity of on-coming steamer of the speed of a sailing ship. During the age posting a lookout during every watch, if the ship’s complement is of steam, but before the introduction of radar for commercial reduced to the lowest legal limit? How can the master ensure that shipping, insufficient lookouts as well as lack of uniform collision his and his officers’ maximum working hours under the STCW prevention rules could be considered the main cause. Once the Convention1 are not strained to their limit, or even exceeded? radar was introduced, and as ships’ speed increased, improper radar plotting, wrong evaluation of the radar observations, Long hours combined with insufficient or complete lack of lookouts, caused Watch-keeping periods of nine hours and longer in coastal waters collisions. are not uncommon in the short-sea container trade. Surveys have shown that the attention of the officer of the watch declines And today, in an age of highly sophisticated electronic rapidly towards the end of a normal watch of four hours.2 So, navigational aids, where do we look when examining the multi- how can an officer of the watch be vigilant after eight or nine faceted possible causes of collisions? hours, adding that during the last two hours’ sailing upriver dense fog prevailed and the officer had to take care of the VHF traffic More and more flag states take their responsibility to investigate for shore radar guidance? Failure will be guaranteed under such maritime casualties seriously. Thus we know more about today’s circumstances. causes of collisions – and we are given lessons to be learnt.

1 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978 20 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 Short-sea navigation in confined waters, in adverse weather out into the fresh air in the bridge wings will soon fall asleep, conditions and dense traffic, with an officer of the watch especially if his watch-keeping and working hours are excessive. suffering from fatigue, with no assistance of a lookout, creates There will be nobody to talk to during his watch if no lookout is the perfect condition for a collision. posted. Even if a lookout is there, communication may often be difficult despite the requirement of the ISM Code for a common Bridge team management working language – are they proficient enough in the common Another problem is improper bridge team management. If the working language to communicate with each other also on different responsibilities are not clearly allocated, members of the subjects not related to work? bridge team may not take the required action to avoid a collision. The officer of the watch, especially if he has little experience, may Fatigue and social isolation on board ships with reduced crews assume that the master’s appearance on the bridge automatically combined with lack of motivation due to low or delayed wage passes the responsibility to the master, when in reality the latter payments, delayed relief for vacations and pressure from the ship only wants to supervise his new officer. If a dangerous situation managers to keep the ship’s schedule are the best ingredients for arises then, perhaps none of the two will take the necessary steps an inadequate watch. to avoid a collision. The same may occur if the master and the officer of the watch rely on the pilot, without careful observation In such “sterile conditions prevailing on many ships, with crews and evaluation of the pilot’s manoeuvres. The time a pilot boards of mixed nationalities often existing in a system of voluntary a ship is not a time for rest – it is a time for increased awareness apartheid”5 it is no wonder that there are other thoughts in and vigilance, because pilots may not be fully aware of the the mind of the officer of the watch than the on-coming vessel manoeuvring characteristics of the ship just boarded. steering on a course which cries for disaster. If his attention is re- focused, it is often too late for proper evaluation of the electronic Paperwork navigation instruments. The consequence is a false perception of A lookout is required not only during periods of darkness or the other ship’s speed and course and of his own ship’s position. reduced visibility, but also during daylight.3 During night watch, as long as normal visibility prevails, the navigational lights can This officer may perhaps have joined the vessel only recently, not be made out easily, provided the officer of the watch and the yet being fully familiarised with its manoeuvring characteristics, lookout keep a proper watch. Additionally, a proper watch on in which case he will most probably be unable to take evasive the radar will assist and alert the officer of the watch in time. action. The result can be easily predicted. During daytime officers of the watch are too often distracted by paperwork, a result of the increasing bureaucracy imposed upon Over-reliance on electronic aids seafarers by various international and national legal requirements. The over-reliance on electronic navigational aids and the data A serious collision a few years ago in the English Channel provided by the various displays – often not arranged under between a modern containership, equipped with a sophisticated ergonomic requirements – is another cause of today’s collisions. bridge navigation system, and a passenger ship, whose officer of An indicated Closest Point of Approach of one nautical mile may the watch was distracted by paperwork, is the classic example. cause the officer of the watch to become complacent, with the Fortunately no fatal injuries occurred. Lookout duties are not only false perception that the passage may be without problems. The performed for compliance with international regulations – they other vessel may not be closely monitored and consequently any are also carried out for the safety of all on board. They must never last-minute changes of course may remain unnoticed until it is be neglected. too late – as another recent collision in the Baltic Sea has proved, this time resulting in the tragic death of three seafarers. Proper lookout Statistics show that the most common causes of collisions are The proper working function and reliability of electronic lack of awareness combined with poor watch-keeping practices, navigational aids should be checked regularly, but they rarely i.e., the lack of a proper lookout.4 Lack of awareness arises are. There is hardly any officer of the watch who compares the often out of insufficient evaluation of information provided by course indicated by the gyro compass with that of the magnetic electronic navigational aids as a result of insufficient qualification compass, although the logbook shows the corresponding entries. and training of those who are assigned as watch-keepers. All of a sudden the wrong course maintained by the automatic Complacency adds to it and professional mistakes are the result. helm is discovered – often too late for proper evasive action. If the officer of the watch had taken the time to look out of the Sterile conditions window, he would have noticed the other vessel nearby. Over- Another relevant factor is the environment on board and the reliance on instrument displays without a sense of the reality layout of modern bridge arrangements. An officer keeping the outside the windows of the wheelhouse is an alarming trend of watch in rough weather in a warm, enclosed wheelhouse, sitting our time. in a comfortable armchair in front of his navigation panel, with no or hardly any possibility of opening windows or walking 21 Navigation 21

© Gard AS, April 2010 Mobile phones Even if all instruments are working properly and the course is free from landfalls or crossing vessels, the need to talk to somebody other than the shipmates may bring about another cause of “modern times” collisions: the use of mobile telephones may distract the officer of the watch and even the lookout – if one is posted – from looking ahead or evaluating the nautical instruments. A master on the bridge, having taken over the watch from the officer, being in the process of an evasion manoeuvre, is suddenly called on the mobile by the manager’s office, relaying a totally unimportant message. He becomes distracted and fails to notice the sudden impact of tidal currents and wind, whereby the ships collide. Again, modern times, but avoidable.

VHF When the officer of the watch has not evaluated his own vessel’s position properly, the position of other ships in the immediate vicinity can not be properly assessed either, perhaps with the additional aggravating factor of faulty settings of AIS and other instruments. If an emergency arises, as a last resort the officer of the watch often considers communicating by VHF to find out the other ship’s intentions. Confusion may arise if no clear language is used and the other ship replies in an ambiguous way. Valuable time can be lost in the process. The time when the last The environment on board and the layout of modern bridge fundamental evasion manoeuvre can be carried out may pass and arrangements are relevant. the collision may become inevitable.

Collision Regulations are exactly the same. The trim and draught of the ships may It is hard to understand why the Collision Regulations6 are still be different, the wind and weather, the speed of both ships not properly followed. Combined with failure to reduce speed approaching each other, the sea area, the visibility and other (so not to compromise commercial schedules) and gain time to factors. Consequently, every approaching situation must be taken assess a situation properly, lack of compliance with the Collision seriously and properly evaluated with all information available Regulations is one of the most common causes of collisions. from the electronic navigation instruments combined with the physical assessment of both ships’ position by looking out of the Disregard of natural elements window. When navigating a ship, the natural elements are often neglected, either as a result of “indoor navigation” in enclosed wheelhouses Conclusion – Are collisions unavoidable? or lack of application of professional seamanship. The impact of Despite the problems mentioned above, and irrespective of ship the wind on ships in ballast and ships with a high container load size, watch-keeping remains the most important duty on board. is often underestimated. The sudden occurrence of wind gusts in All other crew members rely upon the officer of the watch and specific areas is not taken into account. Tidal currents, so different his lookout. They rely upon his attention, vigilance, seamanship, in all parts of the world, are not sufficiently considered when professionalism and courage as he is responsible for the safety carrying out a manoeuvre to avoid a collision. In addition, the of life and property on board his ship – and also on board other ship’s manoeuvrability is overestimated and the assumption that ships. Proper and clear communication by and between everybody “it may go clear” fails miserably. in charge of the navigation of the vessel and compliance with the Collision Regulations are also very important factors. Self-complacency Finally, self-complacency is a common problem. The belief that It may not be possible to avoid all navigational incidents, but the because one has successfully taken a certain action before it must frequency of collisions and their often dramatic consequences work this time as well is a deception. No two collision situations can be reduced if officers of the watch are given the necessary

2 John Cappelow, Why aircrafts don’t collide, North East Branch of the Nautical Institute seminar “Collisions – Controlling the Chaos”, Newcastle, 11th November 2006. 3 Captain Michael Lloyd FNI, Why ships really collide, SEAWAYS October 2006, p. 10. 4 Svein A. Andersen, “Navigation-related incidents – what the claim figures tell us” Gard seminar “Bridge over troubled waters”, Oslo, March 2006. 5 Captain Michael Lloyd, Why ships really collide, SEAWAYS, October 2006, p. 11. 6 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs). 22 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 support to perform their duties and obligations with utmost Finally – and this is an appeal to ship managers and operators – vigilance, care and foresight, applying proper professional skills globalisation, international competition and the expectation of and seamanship. shareholders are no excuse to compromise the safety of seafarers, passenger and the environment. 

A collision that should have been avoided Gard News 185, February/April 2007

The incident reported below shows how failure to comply with Vessel B contacted port radio when entering the area and was the Collision Regulations causes collisions that could be avoided. informed that vessel A was the only vessel departing the port. From that time vessel A was monitored on the AIS. A bit later The COLREGs vessel B’s course was altered to 334 and the master took over the The Collision Regulations1 (COLREGs) are basic rules to avoid command from the second officer. At the same time the speed collisions, which are well known by all officers on merchant was reduced gradually to slow ahead. vessels. Nevertheless, infringement of one or more of the apparently easy-to-follow collision rules is the single most The master of vessel B now observed vessel A visually as she common cause of collisions. came out from the breakwater. When vessel A was about two miles away, the master of vessel B ordered dead slow ahead and Following are some of the main rules in the COLREGs: starboard 10. Rule 2 – Navigation in accordance with good seamanship Rule 5 – Lookout Vessel B noticed that vessel A was picking up speed about one Rule 6 – Safe speed mile away, and called her up on the VHF. The master of vessel Rule 7 – Determination of risk of collision B said that vessel A should alter course to starboard in order to Rule 8 – Action to avoid collision perform a standard port-to-port passing. The master of vessel A Rule 9 – Sailing in narrow channels said he would pass ahead of vessel B, probably due to the shallow Rule 10 – Behaviour of vessels in or near traffic separation area on vessel A’s starboard side, and asked vessel B to stop schemes the engine and not to alter to starboard. The master of vessel B Rule 12 – Actions to be taken when approaching other vessels replied that this was impossible, but received no reply. Rule 13 – Overtaking Rule 14 – Head-on situations The master of vessel B ordered full astern and hard starboard. Rule 15 – Crossing situation Vessel A did not notice vessel B before they called him on the Rule 16 – Action by give-way vessel VHF. The master of vessel A claimed that he could not turn Rule 17 – Action by stand-on vessel starboard, that he informed the master of B accordingly, and said that he was picking up speed and would pass ahead of vessel B. The incident The master of vessel B replied that it was not possible to pass The following casualty involved two medium-size modern ahead of his vessel. The master of vessel A claimed that he had container vessels. requested vessel B to stop her engines and turn starboard.

Vessel A departed from her loading port. It was a dark evening The master of vessel A then ordered hard port. but visibility was good. A pilot was on the bridge, together with the master, the third officer and the helmsman. After passing the At this time, the collision was unavoidable. Vessel A had a heading breakwater the pilot disembarked. The vessel had a course of 095, of about 060 and a speed of 13.6 knots when the vessels collided. with a speed of about 8 knots and increasing. Vessel B had a heading of 340 and a speed of about 8 knots. The angle of blow was about 80. Both vessels suffered significant Vessel B was heading towards the area with a course of 353 and damage. a speed of 13.5 knots. Port authorities were informed about the vessel’s ETA. The master entered the bridge approximately one The cost of repairs and the loss of income paid by the insurers hour before arrival. were in excess of USD 5.5 million. The apportionment of liability was 75/25 against vessel A.

1 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs). 23 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 Analysis and lessons learned Vessel B was the stand-on vessel, but must take its share of the Several breaches of the COLREGs caused the collision. The most blame for the collision. According to the rules, the stand-on vessel severe breaches were the following. is obliged to maintain her speed and course. However, vessel B had the opportunity to alter course as soon as it became apparent This was a crossing situation, and vessel A was the give-way that vessel A was not taking the expected actions. Rather than vessel because she had vessel B on her starboard side. According calling vessel A on the VHF, vessel B had the opportunity to to the rules, she should have taken early evasive manoeuvre(s), for reduce speed earlier. An early starboard manoeuvre most probably instance by reducing speed, stopping or waiting. Instead, vessel would have prevented the collision. A acted as if she was the stand-on vessel. Vessel A increased the speed to full ahead in order to cross ahead of vessel B. Crossing Vessel B had the opportunity to give vessel A more sea room ahead of another vessel when there is a possibility or probability in order to pass port-to-port. There was plenty of sea room for of collision is not considered to be in accordance with good vessel B on her starboard side to stay away from the shore-side seamanship. on her port side. This is considered a breach of good seamanship.

Vessel A kept the heading and increased the speed. In order to Lesson learned: following the simple rules of the COLREGs will avoid collision vessel A should have taken positive action in ample reduce the number of collisions at sea significantly.  time and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship. Vessel A changed heading only about one minute prior to the collision, hence not in enough time and not in accordance with good seamanship.

Vessel A did not observe vessel B before being contacted on the VHF. By proper use of lookout and radar, vessel B should have been discovered at an earlier stage.

If vessel A had used its ARPA radar properly, it would have been evident that crossing ahead of vessel B would increase the risk for collision. 24 Navigation

Hopefully the answer to the above question is yes, but this comes The BT’s responsibility is to ensure a well-functioning Bridge at a price. Resource Management (BRM). Some of the main objectives of BRM are: I have been a Captain for the last 20 years, starting in the Royal – To assist the ship master in managing the vessel’s bridge Norwegian Navy, later becoming a pilot on the Norwegian coast, team for each voyage so that personnel are rested, trained and until I decided to change trade and became a cruise vessel prepared to handle any situation. captain. Over the years I have worked on and managed a lot of – To help the ship master recognise workload demands and other bridges, some well-functioning and the odd ones not working at risk factors that may affect decisions in setting watch conditions. all. – To ensure bridge team members are trained and aware of their responsibilities. Most readers will certainly know the purpose of a well- – To help bridge team members interact with and support the functioning bridge team. Hopefully gone are the days when master and/or the pilot. the Captain – with a capital C – took all the decisions without discussing with anyone, and not listening to advice from others. Pilot’s responsibilities On bigger ships the master now has a team around him on board The pilot is on board to assist in navigation and manoeuvring. to support him in his decisions: the bridge team. The exchange of information between master and pilot does not shift the responsibility for the safety of the vessel from one to the Bridge team and its responsibilities other. There are many combinations of environmental and other factors for setting different watch conditions, but as a minimum on ships Fatigue with crews of more than 6-7, the bridge team (BT) consists of the Chapter VIII (Fitness for duty) of the STCW Convention1 sets master, the officer on watch (OOW) and a sailor as helmsman and limits on the hours of work and minimum rest requirements for lookout. With several shipping companies, especially within the watchkeepers. cruise and oil industry, additional crew joins the BT.

1 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978. 25 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 A pilot’s work environment (irregular and lengthy working hours, of times and the master – not having been here before – has working at night, unpredictable duty rosters, and travelling to and made his own assumptions on how the approach should be from their jobs) can significantly contribute to fatigue. Moving handled. a large vessel in confined waters is a high-risk task and the pilot assigned to that task has a responsibility to the state, the port I have experienced pilots embarking at the breakwater, not authority and the ship’s master. giving us time to meet and greet at all, forcing me more or less to disregard the pilot as there is no time to discuss or exchange Pilots are managers of high-risk situations that require intense information. This is very often the case in Mediterranean ports concentration and skill levels so that any decrease in performance where you only have a breakwater and a berth or two. The pilots can potentially lead to a catastrophe. A pilot error caused by are just there as an advanced linesman showing us where to fatigue can endanger the ship, crew, port and the environment. berth. This is a very unsatisfactory situation as the pilot is not integrated with the BT and sometimes just creates clutter to the Only national rules apply to pilots and they are not subject to the organisation. same regulations as the ship-board crew. I have met pilots who have been on the run for more than 36 hours without a decent In general the pilots are on the bridge in due time in order to nap, and I can assure you it does not bring back happy memories. allow for a thorough “handover”/information exchange. In this case the master has a vital role in making the pilot feel welcome, Communication and the pilot needs to remember how it was coming into a new Communication can not be overrated. It is the most vital part (complicated) port for the first time. of bridge team management. Communication with pilots and their organisation starts already during passage planning. Some A lot of information has to be exchanged between the pilot and countries have pages and pages with information within our the master in a relatively short time, when the master normally planning material, and the information often ends with the has “the conn” and the ship is moving in confined waters (to have statement “…failing to report… might cause x hours’ delay”. If the “the conn” is to have sole responsibility to control, or direct by master/ship has not been to the port before the stress level within order, the movements of a ship, i.e., to give proper steering and the BT begins to rise. engine orders for the safe navigation of the ship).

The next crucial point of contact is when the OOW uses the VHF Typically the following information is to be exchanged between to report to Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) or pilot station. Most the pilot and master during the approach: ship details; originating stations are very friendly and helpful, but others do not reply at authority; manoeuvring details; propeller details; main engine all when ships try to comply with the compulsory rules to report details and equipment defects; berth and tug details; local the required number of hours before arrival. The OOW has been weather and sea conditions; details of passage plan, including informed via passage plan that he must get in touch with the pilot navigational hazards, abort points and emergency plans; local station by a specific time otherwise the ship might be delayed. regulations, including VTS reporting, maximum allowable draft, If there is no reply he will continue with repeated calls on all etc.; ship’s agent; year built; IMO number; cargo type (IMO codes possible means, dive back into the publications to double check if dangerous cargo); last port; etc. the passage plan information and take the focus away from his main duty – to navigate. This in turn again increases the stress At this stage it is very important that the chemistry between level. the pilot and the master is good. Otherwise it might lead to dangerous situations. Then the pilot boat is approaching. Being a former Norwegian pilot myself I know how important it is to have optimum The next step is transition of “the conn” from the master to conditions for the pilot boat when the pilot is boarding. It can the pilot. I have met pilots coming on the bridge and, without look very calm down there from the bridge wing, but being in the acknowledging anyone, giving the helmsman orders based on the pilot boat is a different story. Very often the pilot boat master ship’s heading when he left the pilot boat, not realising we were has a specific heading he wants us to steer. Coming into the UK on the correct heading for the approach. After the exchange of is a pleasure: they are always very polite using phrases such as information summarised above I always clearly inform my bridge “Please, Sir” and “Captain”. Others merely observe the formalities team with the phrase “Pilot has the conn” and in turn my OOW and make you feel ill-at-ease. This is not a good start as you are and helmsman acknowledge the information: the closed loop. waiting for a person from that particular pilot boat to come up on the bridge expecting him/her to be a part of the bridge team. The “closed loop” is a communication protocol where information is given, repeated by the receiver and normally confirmed by Eventually the pilot is on the bridge. How the master and the the issuer. This is the only way one can be sure an order is being pilot meet and greet each other is the key to how the rest of the followed and is a vital part of the bridge team management. passage will be. The pilot has (maybe) done this passage hundreds Having observed this from all sides, it is obvious to me that you 26 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 can minimise the risk of misunderstanding if the “closed loop” is Mongstad oil terminal I have experienced that my helm orders working. In a Canadian study where 200 accidents were related to had to be translated into three different languages before they human error, 84 (42 per cent) involved misunderstanding between were executed by the helmsman. In that situation it was difficult pilot and master and some could probably have been avoided if to establish a closed loop. the “closed loop” protocol had been used. The pilot is a vital part of the bridge team Language Provided a few essential premises are taken care of, the pilot is a I have recently returned from a voyage to the French part of very vital part of the bridge team. Canada. In the St Lawrence River ships the same size as mine always have two pilots on board taking one hour watches. As in In my opinion, fatigue, language barriers, lack of chemistry, an many other countries, a new generation of pilots is being trained open loop and, last but not least, cell phone calls from the pilot’s and in addition to the two pilots we had apprentices on board. It family are threats to ships’ safety. was too easy for them to fall back on speaking French between themselves instead of speaking English and in turn creating two “Welcome on board, Mr Pilot. Coffee or tea?”  “bridge teams”, which should be avoided.

Sometimes it is not possible to avoid two teams due to communication difficulties, either on the crew or on the pilot’s side. Based on my experience, most pilots speak more than good enough English, but as a pilot conning a ship heading for 27 Navigation

This circular is based on a recent letter received from The sailing through the Great Belt or The Sound follow IMO’s Danish Maritime authorities highlighting the increased number recommendation on navigation through the entrance of the of navigational accidents in Danish waters, and Gard’s own Baltic Sea. experience with similar accidents in the same area. Denmark has also launched a procedure whereby all vessels As members and clients are aware, IMO resolution MSC.138 entering Danish waters without ordering a pilot in accordance (76) provides recommendations on navigation through the with the IMO recommendation will be contacted in order to draw entrances to the Baltic Sea, namely the Great Belt (Route T) their attention to the recommendations on the use of pilots. and The Sound. The recommendations include the use of pilots When a ship does not comply, the master will be informed that for certain types of ships in high traffic density waters. The Denmark finds it inconsistent with safe navigation practices and purpose of IMO resolution MSC 138(76) was to provide those procedures to neglect an IMO recommendation. These ships will responsible for the operation of ships with recommendations on be reported to the maritime authority in the ship’s flag state. safe navigation through the entrances of the Baltic Sea with the objectives to ensure safety, prevent human injury or loss of life, The following documents are available at www.gard.no under and to avoid damage to the environment, in particular the marine News in the Loss Prevention section: environment, and to ships and their cargoes. · The Danish Maritime Authority Letter. · IMO resolution MSC.138(76) In a letter to the International Group of P&I Clubs, the Danish · Intertanko model charterparty clauses in recognition and Maritime Authority has drawn the shipping industry’s attention support of IMO res MSC 138(76). to IMO resolution MSC.138 (76) and indicating that a number of ships are disregarding the recommendations. According to a General information on Pilotage in the Baltic can be found at the safety study conducted by the Danish Maritime Authority, during Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission website at: http://www. the period from 1st January 2002 to 30th June 2005 alone, 22 balticpilotage.com and http://www.pilotage.dk ships grounded in the Great Belt and none of these ships had a pilot on board at the time. Vessels to which the IMO recommendations do not apply are advised to navigate with extra caution through the entrances to The Danish Maritime Authority letter illustrates and emphasises the Baltic Sea, i.e. the Great Belt (Route T) and The Sound. A guide that it is highly recommended to utilise the expertise and to navigation in Danish waters can be found at: http://www.frv. local knowledge of pilots, and that as a minimum, vessels dk/en/ifm/navigation/navigation_ntdw.htm  28 Navigation

We have received an urgent warning from our correspondents, · Contact local agents for updates on the conditions in the Messrs. Williams Brothers Ltda, in Brazil advising us that the relevant river before entering the area and thereafter at frequent Amazon region is presently suffering from one of the worst intervals. droughts in years, resulting in unusually low water levels in local · Request the assistance of local pilots. rivers. The water levels are predicted to sink further with the · Exercise extreme caution when navigating in the area at all approaching summer season in the southern hemisphere. times. · Ensure that all possible precautionary measures are taken, In view of the increased risk of groundings, Members and ship’s including ensuring the vessel maintains a safe under keel masters are advised to: clearance at all times, making allowances for ship squat and take appropriate action to avoid ship interaction and bank effect. · Focus on the danger of cooling water intakes becoming clogged.

Members are also advised that any salvage operations in this area can be very expensive and time consuming due to the limited availability of equipment.

It has been reported that the drought conditions are so far not affecting other rivers in the area. However, we would like to emphasise the generally high level of attention required when trading in rivers and river delta areas. 

Hydrodynamic interaction between ships Gard News 173, February/April 2004

The United Kingdom Maritime and Coastguard Agency Marine when it does arise. During passage planning depth contours and Guidance Note No. 199 (M) contains advice on the causes of channel dimensions should be examined to identify areas where hydrodynamic interaction between ships and the measures that interaction may be experienced. The United Kingdom Maritime can be taken to reduce its effect. and Coastguard Agency has issued the extremely helpful Marine Guidance Note No. 199 (M), which provides advice on the causes When two ships operate in close proximity, like for instance when of hydrodynamic interaction and the measures that can be taken performing ship-to-ship re-fuelling, cargo transfer between to reduce its effect. Gard recommends that owners bring the moving ships, or when harbour tugs assist ships in port, they contents of Marine Guidance Note No. 199 (M) to the attention of will be attracted to each other and consequently collision might their navigators. The full text of the note is available from https:// happen. Hydrodynamic interaction between ships continues to be mcanet.mcga.gov.uk/public/c4/mld/section03/MGN199.pdf.  a major contributory factor in marine casualties and hazardous incidents. An awareness of the nature of the pressure fields round a vessel moving through the water and an appreciation of the effect of speed and the importance of rudder action should enable a vessel handler to foresee the possibility of an interaction situation arising and to be in a better position to deal with it 29 Navigation

Introduction Deck mounted equipment Operations in extreme cold environments are perhaps the most – Frozen pipelines are perhaps the most common damage that demanding and challenging that a vessel and her crew may occurs. The pipelines should be properly drained well in advance. experience. The extreme cold reduces the crew’s efficiency Do not forget fire hoses and couplings, which in some cases considerably. In addition, sensitive deck-mounted equipment and may become inoperative if not properly drained. Exposed piping pipelines are often at risk of damage if precautions are not taken should be insulated to prevent freezing where necessary. in time. There is also the risk that ice damage to vessels may – Periodically purge air lines on deck to remove water result in oil spills. condensation. – Fresh water piping systems are particularly at risk of freezing. Damage related to extreme cold and navigation in ice occurs every Consider circulating water in the fresh water piping system. year. They are more frequent at the beginning of a cold period, and – Deck-mounted winches and other sensitive equipment vessels entering such waters infrequently are more exposed than should be covered to avoid icing from freezing spray. Hydraulic other vessels. Extreme cold causes damage to cargo, vessel equipment equipment should also be started several hours before use, in and injuries to the crew, while navigation in ice causes damage to the order to achieve proper oil temperatures on hydraulic hoses hull, propellers and/or rudder. before they are exposed to high pressure. In some cases it is recommended to keep the equipment going constantly. Check An article in Gard News issue No. 1271 outlined guidelines to that the lubeoil has the necessary specifications for these prevent cold weather damages to vessels and their equipment. climates. Gard Services has also tried to obtain information based on – Consider stowing mooring ropes and pilot ladders below deck experiences gained by shipowners operating in extreme cold to prevent freezing and reduce the chances of ice build up. environments on a frequent basis. The following list is not meant – If possible, ballast tanks should be filled with water with a high to be exhaustive, but should serve as a reminder, as temperatures salinity (and consequently lower freezing point). Furthermore, to in the Northern Hemisphere are again very low. avoid freezing of the air pipes, the ballast level should be dropped. Frozen air pipes may cause severe damage both to tank structure and pumps alike.

1 “Navigation in ice – Cold weather procedures”. 30 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 – All spare electricity should be used to heat the accommodation – http://www.cis.ec.gc.ca provides information about ice and compartments exposed to the ice and cold (fore peak, etc.). conditions in Canada; and Be aware of the fire danger if industrial heaters or gas torches are – http://fram.nrsc.no/CEO_Training/Present.htm provides general used. Keep doors closed to retain the heat. information on ice conditions in the Baltic region. – Engine ventilators may in some cases be turned off (but remain – Local meteorological stations are more than willing to share open) to avoid freezing of sensitive equipment in the engine important information when contacted. Ice charts are also room. received on the weather facsimile receiver. – Ice on deck should preferably be removed with wooden ice – Instructions from icebreakers and local authorities should be mallets, to avoid damage to the hull paint coatings and also carefully followed. If you are taking shortcuts and are caught by to prevent frozen and brittle metal from breaking. It is also the ice it may be difficult to receive timely assistance. recommended to keep sufficient stocks of glycol and salt to – The effect of current on ice should not be underestimated. If remove and prevent ice build up. you are caught in the ice with the current in an unfavourable – Safety equipment should be checked frequently, including direction, this may expose the vessel to collision, grounding or safety hand lines, if rigged. Remember the fresh water tanks in other types of contact damage. the life boats. – Reversion of propellers in ice should be done carefully and – Move anchors periodically in order to prevent chains and controlled to avoid damage to the rudder and propeller blades. It winches from freezing. may be advantageous to run the engines ahead to wash away ice – Alterations in speed and/or course should be considered to around the propeller and rudder before attempting to run astern, reduce the effects of freezing spray. which again should be kept to a minimum to avoid the rudder or – Deck and navigation lights can easily be damaged by the cold propeller being exposed to solid ice. and ice, and should be checked frequently to ensure they remain – Especially in ballast condition, the cooling water inlets may be in proper working order. chocked with ice. This can subsequently lead to a loss of cooling water. Engine crew must be properly briefed and made aware in Cargo holds order to avoid such situations. Several types of cargo are exposed to contamination from – For vessels with high air draft or exposed rigging, icing can water, and low temperatures may in some cases increase the affect the stability of the vessel. Therefore, vessels may need to condensation problem. lay by and remove ice with mallets or other suitable tools. – If cargo ventilation (if installed) is used, snow and moist cold air may lead to condensation and should not be blown into the cargo The shipyard holds. – If the vessel is at the repair yard or dock, the vessel’s crew – When cleaning the holds, keep the use of water to an absolute should check all items at risk of cold damage, and not leave this minimum. Sweep holds properly in advance of using water. Use to the yard or sub-contractors. pre-heated water whenever possible. Prevent dirty water from – If the vessel is at the repair yard as a result of damage, and aggregating and freezing by removing excess water in locations additional damage is incurred due to extreme cold whilst at the where freezing could occur. yard, the additional damages will be subject to a separate claim – Remove ice and snow from hatchoaming top before closing and will in many cases, be below the applicable deductible. This the hatches. Otherwise, this may later melt, and create leakages. applies to both hull and machinery and loss of hire. Leakages may also be created by water freezing between the hatchcover panels. Bunkers – Whilst at port or at the repair yard in locations with an Crew extremely cold climate, it is imperative that heavy fuel oil bunkers – Low temperatures reduce the crew’s physical ability, remain properly heated at all times in order to retain enough effectiveness, and can impair judgement. Proper clothing is viscosity to be pumpable and to be used. If the fuel oil is not kept therefore essential to maintain crew safety and awareness. at the proper temperature, it could take days before it is heated – Review rotation of watches for crewmembers working in sufficiently to be used and, will thus delay the sailing of the excessively cold areas to ensure exposure is kept at a minimum. vessel.  – Always brief the crew properly in advance of any operation that is not carried out on a regular basis.

Navigation in ice – A considerable amount of information on ice conditions and navigation in ice is available on the Internet. For example: – http://www.natice.noaa.gov/ provides global and regional sea ice analyses and forecasts from the United States National Ice Center; 31 Navigation 31

The 2002/2003 winter season was the worst on record since Navigation when the vessel is part of a convoy is a risky the winter of 1987. Our statistics appear to indicate that the operation, and the crew must be alert and maintain a proper preceding relatively mild winters may have lulled seafarers into lookout at all times. It is essential that all relevant regulations a false sense of security. How this and future winters will unfold are properly complied with. Breach of COLREGS 72, especially the remains to be seen, but shipowners and operators would be well below mentioned rules, appears to be the most common cause of advised to ensure that their seagoing personnel are well aware of collisions: the planning, preparation and care required while navigating in – Rule 5 – Proper look out ice. – Rule 6 – Safe speed – Rule 7 – Risk of collision Approximately 30% of all averages which occurred in connection – Rule 8 – Action to avoid collision with navigation in ice in the Baltic Sea during the past winter – Rule 13 – Overtaking vessel season, were collision cases. This is a substantial number and – Rule 17 – Action by stand-on vessel leads us to again remind shipowners of the issues involved. – Rule 27 (a) (i) – vessel not under command (stopped) to show two red lights The most common cause was collision between vessels in an ice convoy. Under normal circumstances blame has been apportioned The Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter Navigation” equally between the colliding vessels. Otherwise, in determining require liability, emphasis was placed on: (a) Strict watch keeping both visually and especially by radar 1. How the watch keeper had been alerted by the vessels involved, and immediate notification by VHF radio when loss of speed is 2. How vessels ahead and abaft had been warned by the vessel experienced. which was stuck or slowed down in the ice, 3. Distances kept between the vessels, and of course (b) In case of stoppage: 4. The ice situation in general. – Immediate signalling in case of failure of other means of communication In some collision cases, and in particular when an assisting – Immediate engine manoeuvring icebreaker is involved, the case may be settled on a “knock-for- – Immediate rudder manoeuvring knock” basis. This means that both parties cover their own cost of repairs. The same principle may also be used or agreed upon Recommendation between the parties, when two merchant vessels, assisting each When navigating in ice or in the vicinity of ice, shipowners other when navigating in ice, are involved in a collision. However, must ensure that their onboard personnel are well aware of the the above “knock-for-knock” practice is only used in “standard” regulations governing such navigation. Furthermore, masters cases caused by difficult ice conditions. If gross negligence or must be advised of the requirement to ensure proper compliance other similar causes are involved, other methods of apportioning with the governing regulations and also of the utmost care blame will be used. required in order to promote safe navigation.

Analysis of the collision cases shows that the vessels involved are This circular has been produced with the valuable assistance very often blamed for not complying with the applicable rules; of former Hull Claims Manager, Captain John Hammarén in The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Finland.  1972 (COLREGS 72), and the Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter Navigation”.

The Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter Navigation” are endorsed by Germany, Denmark and the Baltic States. In addition to directing navigation during the winter period in Finland and Sweden, these Rules set the standard for ice navigation in the Baltic, including navigation in ice in conjunction with icebreakers in the majority of the Baltic.

For further details about the “Rules for Winter Navigation” please see the Finnish Maritime Authority’s home page at http://www. fma.fi/e/functions/icebreaking/ 32 Navigation

Introduction experiencing main engine, propeller, rudder etc., damages may Due to heavy ice conditions in the northern Baltic Sea, not receive immediate assistance as long as the crew or ship is navigational restrictions have been issued. This circular provides not in danger, or, alternatively, until such time as the ice-breaking information on where to find up to date information on ice operation consider they have the time to assist the vessel. conditions in the northern Baltic Sea. In addition, please refer to the Gard Services Loss Prevention Circular 10-01, Operations in Ice-breaking assistance is free of charge. Assistance beyond extremely cold climates. Copies of this circular can be found on helping vessels getting to and from ports will be charged the Gard Services website at www.gard.no. according to a tariff, which is considered a statute. These tariffs are, as far as we have been able to establish, more expensive in Ice condition information Finland than in Sweden. As all aspects of the services by the ice- The latest ice and navigational information can be found on the breaking operation (tariffs, liability etc.) are considered statues, Internet at the following addresses: Lloyds Open Form (LOF) is not applicable.

- Finnish Institute of Marine Research ice service (www. It is worth noting that ice-breakers will not assist in towage merentutkimuslaitos.fi) provide daily ice reports in Finnish, operations if another tug is already engaged. Where a vessel, Swedish and English, ice charts, the Baltic Sea ice code, and ice incapable of manoeuvring out of the ice by its own power, needs forecasts. to go to a repair yard, owners would first need to contract the · Finnish Maritime Administration (www.fma.fi) provides ice-breaking operation and then meet up with a commercial tug information on ice breaking and restrictions to navigation. in ice-free waters. · Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (www. smhi.se) provides information on ice charts, ice reports, fairway Recommendations information and ice forecasts. · All efforts should be made to ensure that current up to date · Swedish Maritime Administration (www.sjofartsverket.se) ice conditions are made available to all vessels transiting the provides information on ice breaking. northern Baltic Sea. In addition, companies should ensure they · In addition, Oy Gard Services (Baltic) AB, Helsinki and Gard are properly informed on the specifics of ice breaking assistance Services Sweden AB, Gothenburg receives the latest Baltic Sea including the Nordic Agreement for the territorial waters of all ice charts. They can provide up to date navigational information, countries that the vessel will transit through. restrictions on navigation, ice breaker positions and reporting · Shipowners, ship managers and charterers should make every points for those vessels bound for Finnish ports and requiring effort to ensure that vessels trading in the Baltic have the proper icebreaker assistance. The contact details for Oy Gard Services ice class as required by the appropriate authorities. Although (Baltic) AB, Helsinki are: tel. + 358 9 6188 380, fax. +358 9 6121 000. operating in some of the trading areas affected by this ice problem, · Capt. Y.Nazarovs of Pandi Services East has provided information does not represent a breach of trading warranties, owners may on restrictions in St. Petersburg, Russia. St. Petersburg’s Harbour not be covered by insurance as this is an expected and foreseeable Master’s order No.1, dated 5th January 2003, states that as of risk. The consensus in Sweden is that entering these waters 13th January 2003, ice navigation is not permitted in the port of without sufficient ice-class (as defined by the Swedish Icebreaking St. Petersburg for the following types of vessels: Authority), constitutes a breach of the safety regulations. If you – all ships with ice class less than Ëó-3 of the Russian Maritime have any questions or doubts concerning insurance cover, please Register of Shipping classification or corresponding ice class by contact your relevant underwriter or Club. other Classification Societies (LR – 1B, GL – E2, E2K or E2m, BV – · For vessels transiting through Finnish waters inbound or outbound Glace 11, DnV – Ice B or Ice 1B, ABS – BO – 1B); and to Russian ports in the Baltic Sea, please note that the ice class – all ships with main engines power 3500 h.p. and less. requirements differ between Finnish and Russian authorities. For example, vessels meeting the requirements inbound to or In certain cases, special ice pilotage can be arranged with express outbound from St. Petersburg may not meet the requirements of the permission of the Harbour Master. the Finnish authorities, should the vessel be trapped in Finnish waters. In instances, the vessel would be subject to the multi-state Nordic Agreement on ice breaking assistance for the Baltic Sea agreement mentioned above. A Nordic Agreement exists between Finland, Denmark, Norway, · Ice breaking assistance will be available not only in an Sweden and Germany to co-ordinate their efforts to assist ships emergency, but also if required by ships. The following traffic and keep the vessels moving during winter. However, this instructions are currently in force: agreement does not set out in detail how and when assistance – ships requiring icebreaker assistance in the Gulf of Finland, on should be provided. The Swedish ice-breaking operation is their way to a Finnish port, shall report to Helsinki VTS on channel governed by law, including their tariffs, and similar arrangements 67 when passing the Hanko longitude. may apply in other countries. – Vessels destined for harbours in the Sea of Bothnia and the Bay of Bothnia are requested to report name, nationality, destination and speed The ice-breaking operation will assist any vessel in an emergency to VTS Stockholm on VHF channel 84, via coastal radio or telephone

situation. However, a vessel without sufficient ice-class, direct +46 8 666 66 22 when passing the light house Svenska Björn.  33 Navigation

Over the years Gard has seen incidents where serious casualties The vessel had eight shackles of chain (approximately 220 m) have resulted from anchoring problems. Many of these incidents in the water. The master estimated turning radius of about two have been caused as a result of inadequate manning and/or cables. improper watch arrangements on the bridge and/or in the engine room. This article describes some incidents related to anchoring The vessel was moored on a heading of 150 degrees and, in the and discusses lessons learned from them. Often such incidents master’s estimation, outside the 20 m contour line should she have resulted in subsequent grounding. swing right round. The vessel’s echo sounder transponder was situated in the bow of the vessel and when she initially anchored Being on the high seas, with lots of leeward space to land is it was observed that there were 33 m of water indicated under every master’s delight. With a firm hand on the wheel and an the keel. alert lookout, combined with well-run machinery, he can have a comfortable rest without being awaken by unfamiliar vessel The pilot assured the master that the vessel was on good holding movements. ground and that the loaded draft would be 11.8 m. The master was satisfied that the ship was anchored in a good position. On Lying at anchor, on the other hand, may cause any master a fitful the final day of loading (four days later), the wind had shifted to sleep. the west and the vessel was now on a heading of 289 degrees. The master’s intention was that the ship should arrive at its Any small boat skipper knows his boat by the signals he gets discharge location with an even keel. Therefore, the plan was to through his various senses, and he senses immediately when complete loading with a trim by the stern of 45 cm. In order to something is amiss. Larger vessels give the same signals, but they achieve this, it was agreed that the last 700 tonnes of cargo were become more distorted and are not so easily recognisable. Hence, to be used for trimming purposes. a more rational and meticulous approach is required to safeguard the operation of the vessel. At 1520 hrs the feeder vessel gave notice to commence loading the remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, the chief officer of the The experienced small boat skipper will know immediately when vessel boarded the feeder vessel and noted the draft of his vessel his vessel is about to drag anchor, thus enabling him to counter was 11.12 m forward and 10.52 m aft. The trim at the head the effects before becoming adrift. On a larger vessel such surprised him. He was concerned that they were not able to attain operation takes time, hence an alert watch, which can prepare for the 45 cm stern trim. He checked his calculations and in addition contingencies in case of a shift in weather or other conditions, he requested that the ballast tanks be sounded since he believed is a must. It is therefore of utmost importance to pick your that the ship should not have had a head trim at the time. At anchoring spot carefully, taking into consideration prevailing 1600 hrs the first officer notified the master of his concern. winds and currents, nature of anchoring surface, the topography both ashore and underwater, the duration of stay, the density At 1615 hrs the aft draft was checked again. It remained at 10.52 and proximity of traffic, restraints that may be imposed by the m despite continuous loading into No. 7 hold. They then realised state of the engines and anchoring equipment. The importance the vessel was aground and loading was suspended at 1620 hrs. of maintaining the anchoring gear in good condition can not be The ship’s heading remained steady at 289 degrees. At 1800 hrs over-stressed. The condition of the gear must be carefully checked the steering gear was extensively damaged with the rudderstock prior to anchoring. There is no point in a good holding ground, protruding approximately 20 cm above the steering flat. if the anchor brake lining is worn and only able to function at a fraction of the design holding power, or if the additional chain The following causes contributed to this incident:– When the stoppers are not in proper shape and fit for use. wind veered, the anchor position changed from being in the lee of the land to being on the windward side of the land, a most Two incidents are described below, from which important lessons unfortunate position to be anchored in. At that point in time it can be learned. would have been prudent to change anchor position towards the other shore. Incident 1 – Eight shackles of chain for 33 m anchoring depth was Having arrived at port to load, a strong east to south-easterly somewhat excessive. The recommended ratio is three to four wind prevented the vessel from commencing cargo operations times the depth depending on depth and holding ground. via feeder vessels. On the following morning, the master received – Neither the vessel nor the pilot had the proper charts with the orders from his agents to proceed, with pilot embarked, to a more required contour details of the location where the vessel was protected location to commence cargo operations. However, finally anchored. British Admiralty Charts of the area were not particularly detailed. – The vessel’s crew made incorrect assumptions as to the The pilot had only a photocopy of a larger scale local chart. consequences to the ship if she swung about. The crew should have taken continuous soundings at the location they were At around 1600 hrs the port anchor of the vessel was dropped anchored since limited information was available.

34 Navigation approximately on the 50 m contour line on the photocopy map.

© Gard AS, April 2010 – The ship’s crew were over-confident of the pilot’s assessment as should always be a qualified individual on the bridge, someone to the water depth of where the ship was anchored. This should who can initiate necessary action when needed. If the anchor have led them to be more diligent. position is exposed, do not hesitate to keep the engine room on standby. An ordinary start-up routine takes at least half an hour Incident 2 and this is time you do not have in an emergency situation. The ship approached the loading port and was directed by the – If the weather is deteriorating it is often much easier to leave harbour master to a nearby anchorage. The master was asked your anchoring position in good time instead of staying there whether he would like the assistance of a pilot. The master until you are forced to leave, which may be too late. politely rejected the offer and proceeded to the anchoring position. Important factors and loss prevention Experience from accidents during anchoring shows that a lack The vessel anchored in a position 7.5 cables (approximately of focus on the basics of anchoring is often the root cause of 1,400 m) from the shoreline, which was a sandy beach. The echo these accidents. The following key factors should be considered sounder indicated the depth of the water to be 31 m and the carefully, and their importance and consequences must be master ordered five shackles (approximately 140 m) on deck. communicated to the ship’s crew: The wind was a light breeze from south-west and everything – Bottom conditions and depth of water versus length of anchor looked rather smooth. The master rang finished with engines. A chain. combination anchor watch and fire guard was established on the – The importance of detailed maps and local knowledge. bridge. – How to handle inaccurate or lack of information. – Positioning aids: use, precision and errors. Initially the vessel was supposed to start loadingthe next day, – Change in prevailing conditions: wind, currents, tides, draft, but loading was delayed due to problems at the terminal. In the traffic density. meantime the weather forecast was indicating stronger winds – The point of no return off the lee shore. from north-west. The harbour master also informed the ships at anchor that strong winds were expected. History shows that humans underestimate the potential consequences of developing situations. Accident studies During the early hours of the next day the wind force increased demonstrate that signals and indications of something wrong rapidly. The anchor watch, who was alternating between the happening are constantly ignored by watch-keepers. It is bridge and fire guard duty, registered the increase in wind but did important to impress on a ship’s complement that recognising not react. After another 15 minutes, as he arrived on the bridge and appreciating such signals and indications is the first step he realised the ship was not in the position it was supposed towards avoiding a casualty. It is also important to have in place to be. He contacted the chief mate who arrived on the bridge a system which identifies and provides necessary training on an some minutes later. He realised immediately the seriousness of ongoing basis.  the situation and contacted the engineer on duty and ordered an emergency start of the main engine. The first mate was sent on deck in order to let go of the other anchor. The wind was continuing to increase and the shore line approached rapidly. The second anchor was dropped but the ship did not stop drifting. By the time the engine was started, the ship was stranded.

The ensuing refloating operation was very expensive and the loss of time and repairs to the ship were even more expensive.

The following causes contributed to this incident: – A pilot has local knowledge and is familiar with anchoring positions. The refusal of a pilot in this case may have contributed to the choice of a less attractive spot to anchor. – It is important to find an anchorage with the most suitable bottom conditions. Sand is usually a good holding ground but here the ground was a combination of sand and rock and the vessel probably anchored on rocks. The lack of consideration for common wind and current direction when deciding where to anchor may have caused the dragging of anchors. – The watch-keeping system must be adequate to handle a situation that might occur, such as the one described. There 35 Navigation

Delaying action until it is too late may have disastrous The above situation is extreme, but from time to time Gard consequences. experiences incidents in which a proper estimate of worst-case scenario and point of no return would probably have reduced a Rubicon, or the point of no return, may be defined as a line serious accident to a minor incident. that, when crossed, permits no return and typically results in irrevocable commitment, that is, one can no longer physically Estimating point of no return turn back. The expression has its origin in Caesar’s crossing of the First of all, a worst-case scenario should be established: what river Rubicon in 49 BC, which at that time was the ancient border will be the consequences if our estimates are wrong? Are spare between Italy and Gaul. parts and tools available, and does the crew have the necessary competence to complete their task? Then the point of no return Occasionally, we experience groundings that include major should be established. In order to properly estimate the point of damage to the vessel, total losses, major environmental pollution, no return it should be kept in mind that vessels drift, so the time and in some cases also loss of human lives. Such accidents often and distance to the nearest danger point should be established. have their origin in an engine failure, or failure of other vital This includes an assessment of weather conditions, current and technical installations on board the ship. Investigations that wave height. Further on, one should locate the closest point of follow such accidents very often reveal that the vessel’s initial assistance (normally tugs but in some cases spare parts suppliers assessment of the situation was inadequate, and that this initial or special workers), and determine their availability and transit lack of risk assessment contributed to, or in some cases caused, time to the vessel. The transit time will determine time available the fatal outcome of the accident. A thorough assessment of the for repair, and it is then possible to estimate the latest time for worst-case scenario as well as a correct estimate of the point of requiring assistance. This should be clearly marked as a line in no return are therefore decisive for a satisfactory outcome in a the vessel’s chart. When the line is crossed, assistance must be critical situation. immediately requested, so that it can reach the vessel in time.

The human factor Salvage It is part of human nature to look for – and focus on – the easiest When a vessel is undergoing repairs at sea, the need for external way out of a critical situation. One hopes for the best, and the support and/or salvage will always have to be considered. If solution causing least worries and problems is often accepted time permits, such support should always be required in close without much reflection on what to do if it fails. Being unaware co-operation with the shipowner and his hull insurers. In many of this mechanism may prevent the ship management team (SMT) cases hull insurers have standing agreements with local towing from assessing the worst-case scenario in the situation, and companies and may also put the vessel in contact with local valuable time and information may be lost. agents that may provide valuable support.

In a recent case, the vessel had an engine failure and the Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF) is also a matter of consideration. As a chief engineer reported a repair time of 15 hours. The incident rule, most cases of external assistance are settled at an early happened in good weather and far away from the shoreline – stage on a fixed-cost basis. However, if the situation is allowed there was no immediate danger. The chief engineer’s solution was to develop and the vessel drifts beyond the point of no return, a accepted without further questions from the master because it LOF may be the only possible way out of the situation. Early and fitted well with his own perception of the situation. When the correct assessment of the situation is therefore very important. estimated repair time had elapsed, the engine had still not been repaired and the wind was increasing. A new estimate from the Summary chief engineer indicated a further 8 hours of repair time, which 1. Establish worst-case scenario. again was accepted by the master. Again the repair time elapsed, 2. Inform shipowner and other relevant authorities. and again the engine was not repaired. The chief engineer was 3. Locate available external resources. still optimistic, and gave a new indication of a further 6 to 8 4. Establish the latest point for requiring assistance. hours of repair time. The ship had now drifted closer to the 5. Maintain close communication with assisting parties.  shoreline, the weather was getting worse and a rough calculation indicated that the ship would ground in about 10 to 15 hours if the engine was not repaired. The master started to look for potential external assistance. It turned out that there were no vessels or tugs available in the area that could possibly reach the vessel in time. To cut a long story short, the engine was never repaired, the vessel grounded and became a total loss. Luckily, there was no loss of life. 36 Navigation

Gard News looks at some aspects of the relationship between related to the cargo that the ship is carrying. In some countries the pilots and seafarers. master’s experience is assessed, after a number of pilot-assisted port calls the master may be approved for entry without pilot. Areas of risk There can also be other reasons related to, for instance, military “Despite the pilot’s duties and responsibilities, his presence on installations in the area. It is also important to note that pilot board does not exempt the Master and the OOW from their duties requirements are at each individual country’s discretion. Rules may and responsibilities for the ship’s safety.” This is quoted from the and will therefore vary from country to country. IMO Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices, and should be well known to seafarers. It is, however, a fact that a large portion So in situations where the navigational risk exceeds a given of navigation-related accidents occurs when a pilot is on board. limit, national authorities respond by sending a pilot on board. The reason for this is obvious: the pilot is sent on board because This is where the challenges start: to a large extent bridge team the national authorities consider the area an increased risk, and in management training focuses on co-operation among the bridge increased risk situations there will always be accidents. However, team and less emphasis is placed on situations where “outsiders” it is Gard’s clear understanding that pilots prevent far more are introduced. Bridge manuals refer to “pilot to pilot navigation” accidents than they cause, but the picture is complex, and there is and little or nothing is said about how to act when the pilot has reason to study this in more detail. embarked. In short, the pilot is expected to deliver the service he is paid to deliver and limited consideration is given to his Navigation-related accidents are traditionally split into three co-operation with the bridge team. For that reason in many main groups: collisions, groundings and contact damage (typically situations one does not achieve the desired increased level of collisions with piers, etc.). Despite more advanced technology, the safety; on the contrary, the responsibility for navigation is simply implementation of STCW 95 and a strong focus on the human transferred from one person to another. element as well as fatigue, the expected decline in number of accidents per year has not taken place. In addition, the tendency Communication is that accidents are more severe and more expensive than ever In accidents where a pilot is involved there is one factor that before. is frequently present: limited or no communication between the master and the pilot. There may be language problems and As indicated above, a pilot is sent on board because the national misunderstandings, unclear instructions to the bridge personnel authorities have assessed that there is an increased risk in the area. about how to monitor the pilot’s actions and the bridge personnel This risk can be related to navigational hazards, geographical areas may be over-confident about the pilot’s abilities. In some that are vulnerable to pollution, there can be special regulations situations the pilot may not be familiar with the particular design 37 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 of the navigational systems available on board. Very often these In particular, this may be a problem when the master is not on accidents may be avoided if there are clear instructions available the bridge. It is therefore important that all members of the from the ship management on how to handle situations with bridge team have the necessary authority and confidence to pilots on board. interfere if they are in doubt. This can only be achieved by active leadership and involvement by the master. The IMO Code of Lessons learned Nautical Procedures and Practices also states: “If in any doubt It is possible to extract some lessons from the above examples. as to the pilot’s actions or intentions, the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall seek clarification from the pilot and, if Voyage planning used to be a critical factor and the common doubt still exists, shall notify the master immediately and take response from the crew was “why should we plan the passage whatever action is necessary before the master arrives”. when the pilot always brings with him an alternative passage plan?”. It is Gard’s experience that this has improved: electronic Common understanding charts have made it easy to adjust the ship’s voyage plan The first step to reduce the risk of navigation-related accidents according to that brought on board by the pilot and attention when a pilot is on board is a common understanding by the bridge from port state control officers has put this item on the agenda. team of the risks involved. These include geographical hazards as It is also imperative that the pilot be briefed about the vessel’s well as cultural and management-related challenges. Introducing manoeuvring capabilities. This includes rate of turn, propeller company “pilot handling procedures” in the ship management arrangement, output on the various manoeuvring orders and system has proved to be effective. In addition to voyage planning, general ship data. In short, any information that can improve the these should include routines for pre-voyage briefing, monitoring pilot’s performance must be available. Many shipowners have of the pilot’s activities and communication between pilot and developed so-called “pilot cards” for that purpose. These have officer of the watch (OOW)/master. Exchange of information proved to be effective and greatly appreciated by the pilots. is also mentioned in the IMO Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices: “The master and the pilot shall exchange information Language barriers have been and will continue to be a challenge; regarding navigation procedures, local conditions and the ship’s these can be related to communication between the pilot and characteristics”. the crew, as well as understanding the communication between the pilot and assisting parties such as shore staff, mooring boats Conclusion and/or tugs. Very often these barriers can be greatly reduced by a In summary, much progress will be achieved by implementing thorough review of the passage prior to commencing it. The pilot some simple steps in the ship procedures: can also be requested to communicate with external parties in a – Active use of pilot cards for transfer of ship information. common language, or to translate his communication with them – Implementation of company procedures for pilot handling. for the bridge team. Many accidents are rooted in surprises and – Making bridge teams aware of cultural challenges that may unexpected situations that could have been avoided if the pilot occur when a pilot is on board, and giving them the confidence and the bridge team had a common understanding about how the and authority to seek clarification when in doubt. passage would be carried out. – Taking into consideration the commercial pressure that may be imposed by pilots, charterers and terminals. The impact of commercial pressure should not be underestimated. This may result from a variety of reasons: Bon voyage!  – the terminal wishes to maximise utilisation of the piers and requires effective (high speed) approach to the terminal; – some pilots are paid per pilotage and increase speed for that reason; – charterers require maximum utilisation of the ship, and under keel clearance may be challenged. This occurs particularly in river passages. The availability and suitability of tugs and mooring boats should also be considered: in many situations these are too small or too few for the purpose, but are accepted due to the commercial pressure.

Cultural differences should also be considered. The pilot is perceived as an authority and in many cultures it is difficult to correct or even question a decision made by an authority. Corrections to obvious errors may therefore be delayed and in some cases not put forward at all. Reluctance to get involved in a situation has contributed to several severe marine accidents. 38 Navigation

Introduction As you are aware, many navigational incidents leading to As a result, the vessel lost control and could not be stopped groundings and collisions involve pilots. The primary problems before colliding with the mooring dolphin. Extensive damage was involve the role, responsibility and authority of the pilot onboard. caused both to the ship and to the mooring dolphin. This Loss Prevention Circular focuses on 4 case study examples of pilot aided grounding and collision followed by general guidance The following causes contributed to this incident: on the prevention of these types of incidents. (1) The vessel’s speed was excessive when trying to connect to the tugs. Case 1: Collision with terminal dolphin (2) There was a lack of communication between the pilot and the At 0200 hrs, Vessel 1 was given instructions to leave a pre- master at many stages while transiting the channel. There was designated anchorage and proceed to load cargo at the terminal. little or no information exchanged regarding the docking plan The vessel was underway at 0254 hrs and two pilots boarded at and how the 4 tugs were to be put to use and coordinated. 0354 hrs. The vessel entered the breakwater with the Master on (3) The Master did not insist that pilot not exceed the maximum the bridge. allowable speed as it entered the breakwater. (4) The pilot, when communicating with the tugs, was speaking The vessel made routine visits at that location thus the Master a language that was not understood by the Master. This made it thus felt comfortable with the berthing routines. The vessel difficult for the Master to have a proper situational awareness. passed the breakwater at 8.5 knots even though the maximum (5) The Master was over-confident as to the abilities of the pilot. permitted speed was only 5 knots. Case 2: Grounding at mooring Although the Master observed that they were exceeding the Having arrived at port to load, a strong east to south-easterly maximum speed, the Master did not attempt to bring this to the wind prevented Vessel 2 from commencing cargo operations attention of the pilots. via feeder vessels. On a following morning, the Master received orders from his agents to proceed, with pilot embarked, to a more Four tugs were requisitioned to assist the vessel in berthing at protected location to commence cargo operations. However, the terminal. Due to the excessive speed of the vessel, the tugs British Admiralty Charts of the area are not particularly detailed. had difficulty maintaining speed to keep up with the vessel as she The pilot had only a photocopy of a larger scale local chart. made her way to the terminal. At 1606 hrs the port anchor of the vessel was dropped As the vessel approached the terminal, all verbal communication approximately on the 50 m contour line on the photocopy map. between the pilots and the tugs were in the local language (non- The vessel had 8 shackles of chain (approximately 220 m) in English) that was not understood by the Master. The aft tug was the water that, the Master estimated, gave a distance of about made fast after the vessel entered the breakwater and was quite two cables from the anchor to the stern of the vessel and thus close to the berth. provided a turning radius of about two cables.

The forward tug approached while the vessel was only 50 metres The vessel was moored on a heading of 150° and, in the Master’s from the berth. Furthermore, before the line could be made fast estimation, outside the 20 m contour line should she swing right on the vessel, the tug started pulling on the line, thereby the round. The vessel’s echo sounder transponder is situated in the entire line was run out and was no assistance to the vessel. The bow of the vessel and when she initially anchored it was observed two remaining tugs were of no assistance at all. that there were 33 m of water indicated under the keel.

The pilot assured the Master that the vessel was on good holding ground and that the loaded draft would be 11.8 m. The Master was satisfied that the ship was anchored in a good position.

On the final day of loading (four days later), the wind had shifted to the west and the vessel was now on a heading of 289° . The Master’s intention was that the ship should arrive at its discharge location with an even keel. Therefore, the intention was to complete loading with a trim by the stern of 45 cm. In order to achieve this, it was agreed that the last 700 tonnes of cargo were to be used for trimming purposes.

At 1520 hrs the feeder vessel gave notice to commence loading the remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, the Chief Officer of the

vessel boarded the feeder vessel and noted the draft of his vessel 39 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 towards the other shore. (2) Eight (8) shackles of chain on 33 meters depth was somewhat excessive. The recommended ratio is three to four times the depth depending on depth and holding ground. (3) Neither the vessel nor the pilot had the proper charts with the required contour details of the location they finally anchored. (4) The vessel crew made incorrect assumptions as to the consequences to the ship if she swung about. The crew should have taken continuous soundings at the location they were anchored since limited information was available. (5) The ship’s crew were over-confident with the pilot’s assessment as to the water depth of where the ship was anchored. This should have led them to be more diligent.

Case 3: Grounding while navigating At 2040 hrs Vessel 3, a pilot and his apprentice at the wharf boarded the general cargo ship. The vessel had completed loading at approximately 1600 hrs and was preparing a transit to a new port where additional cargo was to be loaded. It was estimated was 11.12 m forward and 10.52 m aft. The trim at the head that it would take 25 hours to complete the passage. surprised him. He was concerned that they were not able to attain the 45 cm stern trim. Loading was suspended while he checked The vessel had not made the engines ready for passage at the his calculations. In addition, he requested that the ballast tanks time the pilots boarded. They had determined that the vessel be sounded since he believed that the ship should not have had had approximately 12 hours more than necessary to make the a head trim at the time. At 1600 hrs the First Officer notified the passage. The Master was aware that some pilots would not take Master of his concern. the vessel through the passage at night and told the pilot that departure could be postponed until daybreak.

At 16.15 hrs the aft draft was checked again. It remained at 10.52 The pilot assured the Master that it was safe to sail at night. The m despite continuous loading into no. 7 hold. They then realised Master then suggested that they take a route where the channel the vessel was aground and loading was suspended at 1620 hrs. was wider. However, the pilot preferred and recommended The ship’s heading remained steady at 289° . At 1800 hrs the another passage. This passage was recommended for day steering gear was extensively damaged with the rudderstock passage only and required a number of sharp turns to navigate. protruding approximately 20 cm above the steering flat. However, due to commercial pressure, night passage for the route suggested by the pilot was allowed. The following causes contributed to this incident: The Master and pilot exchanged more information about the (1) When the wind veered, the anchor position changed from vessel and then the Master ordered the engines to be prepared for being in the lee of the land to being in the lovart side of the land, departure. At 2100 hrs the crew was called to their manoeuvring a most unfortunate position to be anchored in. At that point stations and began unmooring. At 2137 hrs full manoeuvring in time it would have been prudent to change anchor position speed was ordered and executed.

Five persons were in the wheelhouse: the Master, pilot, apprentice, OOW and the helmsman. The OOW used one of the radars when unoccupied by one of the pilots and plotted fixes on the chart on average of every 5 minutes.

A number of minor manoeuvres were made between 2127 hrs and 2218 hrs. At 2218 hrs, the ship prepared to make a 60-degree turn to port at 11.5 knots. At 2225 hrs, the pilot began the planned port turn by ordering a 10 degrees port rudder. Having observed the vessel’s reaction to this rudder angle was not quick enough, the pilot increased the rudder angle to 20 degrees. The rate of turn increased but after the turn was completed, the vessel ended up closer to the shore on her starboard side than was intended. 40 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 From this moment on, the Master became particularly vigilant ingress into an empty ballast and fuel tanks. and closely monitored the rudder orders. He did not communicate his concern to the pilot. There was little or no time to exchange The following causes contributed to this incident: opinions on this matter since the vessel was approaching another (1) There was a lack of proper voyage planning. The time between tight turn of 50 degrees to starboard to pass between two islands. when the pilots boarded the vessel and when the ship got underway was quite short particularly since they had 12 hours At the required location, the pilot issued a 10 degrees starboard more than necessary to make the transit to the next port. rudder at a point at a point where one of the islands was 3.5 (2) The pilot insisted transiting a direction that was recommended cables (0.55 km) ahead of the vessel’s wheelhouse. The Master for day travel. The Master should have insisted in following the considered this rudder angle may be have been insufficient to recommended route. However, he was also familiar with the pilot obtain the required rate of return but hesitated to change the since he had made routine visits to this location and felt over- pilot’s orders. He did however make sure the rudder indicator confident in the pilot’s recommendations. needle moved to the requested 10° to starboard. (3) There was a significant breakdown of communication between the Master and the pilot. Once the first order for 10 degree rudder The pilot observed that the vessel was slow to react to his order didn’t result in the required rate of change in direction was made, of 10° starboard rudder and ordered a 20° starboard rudder. the Master should have been aware that another 10 degree Neither the time nor the vessel’s exact position was recorded rudder order in the second turn would not acquire the desired when this order was given, however, the distance to the island results. He should have communicated this to the pilot and/or was decreasing. discussed the manoeuvring characteristics: (1) during the pre- voyage briefing, (2) after the first 10 degree rudder order that was Having heard the pilot’s last order, the Master ordered the rudder changed to a 20 degree rudder, and/or (3) just after the pilot’s hard to starboard. The Master’s order was repeated by the pilot second 10 degree rudder command. and was executed by the helmsman. The bow of the vessel cleared (4) There was a lack of fundamental seafaring skills used for the the island and kept sweeping to starboard. However, the vessel’s tight turning manoeuvre to starboard. A standard practice of port side was observed to be quickly approaching the island. reducing the speed of the vessel, commanding the turn, and then bringing the vessel back up to manoeuvring speed should have At 2231 hrs, with the island’s northern tip several metres off been used. of the vessel’s port side and ahead of the wheelhouse, the pilot ordered the rudder hard to port and stop engine. A slight Case 4: Grounding while navigating vibration was felt followed by the distinct touch of a hard object. At 1300 hrs Vessel 4 departed partially loaded with two pilots Some seconds later, air was heard escaping from the tanks. on board. The pilots agreed to alternate their watch. Pilot 1 was to conduct the vessel between 1300 and 1800 hrs and Pilot 2 Although no oil was spilled in the water, the vessel was between 1800 and 2300 hrs and so on. From 1300 to 2300 hrs ascertained to have damage to her side shell plating. The shell the passage was without any significant incident other than the plating was punctured in several places allowing seawater to vessel encountering some concentrations of fishing vessels. 41 Navigation 41

© Gard AS, April 2010 After the change of watch at 0000 hrs, personnel on the bridge Shortly after reaching the new heading, the pilot realised that comprised of the second officer, who the OOW, Pilot 1, and the the vessel was not on the proper course and ordered a hard-a- quartermaster who was at the helm. The visibility had been good starboard helm in the hopes of bringing her around but this was until approximately 0100 hrs when the vessel entered a light haze. unsuccessful and the vessel grounded at 0135 hrs. The radars had been placed on the 12-mile range at the time. By 0125 hrs, the visibility had decreased to about 150 metres. No Depth soundings were taken in the area of the grounding and dedicated lookout was posted. it was determined that the bow was firmly aground and the stern was afloat in deeper waters. The vessel sustained extensive At approximately 0113 hrs the vessel reported its position to damage to shell plating and internals in way of stem to No. 3 the local Marine Communications and Traffic Service (MCTS). double-bottom tanks. The vessel also stated that their ETA to the point where the next course alteration was planned was 0240 hrs. The following causes contributed to this incident: (1) There was a substantial lack of bridge resource management Communication between the pilot and the OOW was conducted (BRM). The OOW and/or the Master should have been more in English and there were no communication barriers. diligent about ensuring that the OOW was there to reconfirm decisions made by the pilot. This could have been done through The OOW had been recording the position of the vessel at better verbal communication between the pilot and the OOW. approximately 15-minute intervals on the chart in use. The pilot (2) The pilot did not reconfirm his mental model of his position did not refer to those positions nor did he refer to the chart to before making the critical turn. The OOW, did not have the proper refresh his memory. The pilot carried a personal course book that situational awareness with regard to the vessel’s position. The he used to navigate the vessel. This book had no provisions for pilot did not reconfirm the vessel’s position prior to the course recording of ETA or the actual time of course alternations. The alteration. When the pilot gave the order to turn, the OOW only pilot relied solely on his memory to keep track of the vessel’s focused upon whether the helmsman made the turn. He didn’t position. reconfirm that they turned at the proper location. (3) The weather played a marginal role in the grounding. However, At approximately 0130 hrs, the pilot saw on the radar, what as a precaution, the vessel may have considered placing a he believed, to be the entrance to the passage and began dedicated lookout. the required course alteration to starboard. The pilot did not reconfirm the vessel’s position prior to the course alteration. The Recommendations and Lessons Learned OOW took a range and bearing of a point of land and noted these (1) The Master is in command of the ship at all times with only values on the chart. Before the OOW had time to plot the vessel’s one exception: when transiting through the Panama Canal. position on the chart, the pilot began a course alteration. The Therefore, it is always the duty of the Master and OOW to keep OOW returned to the conning position and ensured the helmsman a situational awareness of all activities of the pilot. Although promptly executed the pilot’s orders. the pilot is most knowledgeable about local waters, it is the responsibility of the Master/OOW to verify position through 42 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 proper use of charts, radars and other position fixing devices and (6) Ensure that the vessel is equipped with the necessary updated follow local rules on speed and routing. charts for the intended voyage. It is not sufficient to rely on the pilot to provide this information. (2) Voyage planning is crucial in all situations including when pilots are on board. Sufficient time should be allowed for proper (7) The OOW should always closely monitor the activities of the communication between the Master, pilots and OOWs. This pilot. Many times, the pilot will not necessarily communicate with voyage plan should include every important activity starting from the OOW regarding the vessel and/or voyage. The OOW should not the embarkation of the pilot, in and out of the berth, and finally hesitate to communicate with the pilot on any relevant matters the disembarkation of the pilot. regarding the vessel or the voyage.

(3) If the pilot is to command tugs and/or personnel at a berth in (8) The OOW should not only be diligent with regard to his duties a language that is foreign to the crew, the Master must demand to ensure the pilot’s orders are properly followed but also to that the pilot communicates with the Master and/or OOW in a monitor the pilot’s activities. If the OOW has concerns regarding common language the pilot’s activities, he should contact the Master immediately.

(4) When the piloted voyage is taking the vessel through narrow (9) The vessel should have clear procedures and instructions to waters, you should mark “wheel-over” points either on the chart Master’s and OOWs on what to do with a pilot onboard. These or at the radar screen in order to know when you are reaching should be included as part of the ships safety management “points of no return”. This helps to allow the pilot, Master, and/or system (SMS). OOW to keep a better situational awareness. (10) BRM is an important activity to ensure safety. Any (5) The ship’s crew is normally the most knowledgeable regarding BRM training should include how to handle the change in the manoeuvring capabilities of the ship. Detailed descriptions of communication, command, and control when a pilot takes over the ship’s manoeuvring characteristics should be communicated navigation of the ship.  during the voyage planning stage. In addition, the Master and/ or OOW should communicate manoeuvring capabilities during the voyage, as necessary. The Master and OOW should never feel hesitant to discuss these matters with the pilot if they feel it necessary to do so. 43 Navigation

Useful lessons can be learned from the following incident, which our present speed, as we are rapidly approaching the inner part could happen anywhere, any time, with almost any ship. of the harbour. The master is tempted to ask the pilot to reduce the speed, but for some odd reason he does not. The pilot orders The incident half ahead and continues to talk in his mobile phone. We are “Good afternoon, Mr Captain. I’ll take over. Starboard 10, come to approaching the berth and the master is more and more anxious two five six degrees and full ahead.” about the speed, so he politely suggests the pilot to reduce the speed. The pilot explains that there is another ship waiting to “Starboard 10 to two five six degrees, full ahead. She is all yours, leave the berth and he has to board it as soon as possible. Mr Pilot.” The first tug is closing in on port bow and is ready to receive We are on board an ordinary tanker, on an ordinary day, the heaving line from the ship. The second mate, who has just approaching an ordinary terminal somewhere in the Western left the bridge, is now on the forecastle making his first attempt Hemisphere. The weather is grey but the visibility is not too bad, at the heaving line, but misses the tug. He sees that they are although it is early evening. The speed is slowly increasing and now alarmingly close to the berth and hurries to do his second the last light of day is rapidly disappearing. The atmosphere on attempt. This time he succeeds and reports back to the bridge that the bridge is relaxed. the line from the tug is on board and secured. At the same time the pilot, who has just finished his telephone call, is at the bridge, “Full speed, Mr Pilot, 14 knots.” hectically instructing the tugs on how to berth the ship, still in the local language – this time with a raised voice. “Full speed. Thank you, Mr Captain.” The tugs seem to have problems keeping up with the speed of our The pilot and the master continue talking about everyday matters ship and this is communicated to the pilot. The distance to the such as the weather, how long they are staying at the berth, etc. berth is rapidly diminishing and the pilot asks for slow astern. The master, who is really getting nervous now, orders slow astern and “I’m leaving the bridge”, says the master. “I have to prepare some even increases this to half astern. The pilot orders the aft tug to papers before we berth. The second mate will assist you. If you start pulling in order to reduce the speed of our ship. need me, just tell him and he will get hold of me.” The master finally realises that there is no way he can avoid The voyage continues and the pilot gives instructions regarding hitting the berth and orders full astern. Because of the full astern the necessary course alterations, as the fairway becomes manoeuvre, the ship does an uncontrolled starboard turn and hits gradually narrower. The ship is still at full speed. the berth with a speed of 2 knots, making a 3-metre long gash on the starboard bow and causing extensive damage to the berth. The pilot calls the harbour master (in his native language) and tells him that ETA (estimated time of arrival) will be in half an What went wrong hour. He also gives the three tugs waiting to assist berthing the The situation described above could happen anywhere, any time, ship an update on the situation (also in his native language). with a lot of ships trading the seven seas of today. There is no request for translation from the second mate and no information is volunteered by the pilot. Can we learn something from this incident? – The vessel’s speed was excessive. We continue full ahead. Traffic increases as we enter sheltered – When trying to connect to the tugs the ship’s speed was too waters. The background lights from the harbour area make it high. difficult to see the difference between moving and stationary – There was lack of communication between the pilot and the objects. master at many stages while transiting the fairway. There was little or no information exchanged regarding the docking plan “Mr Mate, can you prepare to receive the first tug on port bow? and how the three tugs were to be put to use and co-ordinated. We will have starboard side alongside.” (Two other tugs are also – The master did not insist that the pilot should reduce the speed ordered but this is not mentioned by the pilot). as they approached the harbour area. – The pilot, when communicating with the tugs, was speaking a “Aye-Aye, sir”, says the mate. language that was not understood by the master. This made it difficult for the master to be fully aware of the situation. The pilot contacts the tugs on the VHF again (still in the local – The master was over-confident of the abilities of the pilot. language) and, as he is talking, his mobile phone rings. The mate – And guess what: the pilot will of course blame the master for calls the master, who enters the bridge after a couple of minutes. interfering in his efforts to manoeuvre the ship safely alongside He consults the radar and although it is many years since the because he ordered full astern! last time he was in this harbour, he feels somewhat uneasy with 44 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 Recommendations and lessons learned regarding the vessel and/or voyage as necessary. The OOW should – The master is in command of the ship at all times with only one not hesitate to communicate with the pilot on any relevant exception: when transiting through the Panama Canal. Therefore, matters regarding the vessel or the voyage. it is always the duty of the master and the officer of the watch – The OOW should not only be diligent with regard to his duties (OOW) to be aware of all actions of the pilot. Although the pilot to ensure that the pilot’s orders are properly followed, but should is more knowledgeable about local waters, it is the responsibility also monitor the pilot’s activities. If the OOW has concerns of the master/OOW to verify the position through the proper use regarding the pilot’s activities, he should contact the master of charts, radars and other position fixing devices and follow local immediately. rules on speed and routing. – The vessel should have clear procedures and instructions to – Voyage planning is crucial in all situations including when masters and OOWs on what to do with a pilot on board. These pilots are on board. Sufficient time should be allowed for proper should be included as part of the ship’s safety management communication between the master, pilots and OOWs. This system (SMS). voyage plan should include every important activity starting from – Bridge resource management (BRM) is important to ensure the embarkation of the pilot, entry and exit from the berth and safety. Any BRM training should include how to handle the finally the disembarkation of the pilot. change in communication, command, and control when a pilot – If the pilot communicates with tugs, etc., in the local language takes over navigation of the ship. (which is likely), the master should ask him to explain what was said in a common language (probably English). Who is to blame? – When the voyage under pilotage takes the vessel through Who is then to blame? In practice, both, master and pilot, but it narrow waters, one should mark “wheel-over” points either on the is important to keep in mind that as the master is in command of chart or at the radar screen in order to know when “points of no the ship, he is the one who gets the blame!  return” are reached. This helps the pilot, master, and/or OOW to have better situational awareness. – The ship’s crew is normally the most knowledgeable regarding the manoeuvring capabilities of the ship. Detailed descriptions of the ship’s manoeuvring characteristics should be communicated during the voyage planning stage. In addition, the master and/or OOW should communicate manoeuvring capabilities during the voyage, as necessary. The master and OOW should never hesitate to discuss these matters with the pilot if they feel it necessary to do so. – One should ensure that the vessel is equipped with the necessary updated charts for the intended voyage. It is not sufficient to rely on the pilot to provide this information. – The OOW should always closely monitor the activities of the pilot. Many times the pilot will not communicate with the OOW 45 Navigation

Introduction When ships collide, the cost of repairing damage to two (or more) sophisticated and valuable ships and of damage and/ or loss of their cargoes, bunkers, oil spills, etc., can run into millions of dollars. When personal injuries occur and/or lives are lost, the figures involved become even greater. We are perhaps not experiencing more collision claims in number than before; however, costs for collision claims are becoming higher, so the maritime industry needs to put greater efforts in finding the underlying causes.

Claims analysis for a ten-year period (1992/2002) indicates that only 3.1 per cent of all P&I claims in number related to collisions. However, 12 per cent of total P&I claims in value for the same ten- year period (1992/2002) related to collisions. The graph shows that 12 per cent (in value) of all P&I claims in the period 1992 to 2002 were related to collisions. Common underlying causes of collisions One might assume that most collisions take place in dense traffic Case studies have indicated that equipment failure (such as but areas under difficult circumstances, which could include poor not limited to engine and/or steering failure) was found to be the visibility, equipment failure, etc. However, contrary to general underlying cause of at least 20 per cent of all collisions. However, belief, case studies have indicated that most collisions happen due recent reports on a number of collisions and casualties suggest to negligence and failure on part of the bridge team in carrying that computerisation of bridges (integrated bridges, GPS, ECDIS, out basic navigational duties. Recent reports on a number of etc.) may have been one of the contributing underlying causes of major casualties suggest that simple principles of bridge watch- collisions. keeping at sea were not being followed and that human error was found to be the main underlying cause of at least 68 per cent of There are numerous recent examples whereby mariners have made all collisions. The common underlying causes were found to be as expensive and even tragic mistakes despite having been provided follows: with all this technology. Investigations indicated that the “human- – Insufficient watch-keeping. technology” interface revealed many shortcomings. – Lack of situational awareness. – Failure to set priorities – lack of positive action. The common underlying shortcomings in the human-technology – Preoccupation with administrative tasks. interface were found to be as follows: – Failure to communicate intentions (officer/master/pilot). – Failure to operate equipment correctly. – Lack of assertiveness – failure to challenge incorrect decisions – Failure to understand limitations of systems or equipment. (officer/master/pilot). – Lack of awareness of the “distraction” factor. – Failure to comply with standard procedures and international regulations. Once again, failure on the part of ship management in bridging – Failure to utilise available data and resources. the human-technology interface was found to be the main – Lack of training – “human-technology” interface. underlying cause.

The graph shows that 3 per cent (in number) of all P&I claims in The graph shows that equipment failure accounts for 20 per cent the period 1992 to 2002 were related to collisions. of all collisions and that human error accounts for 68 per cent.

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© Gard AS, April 2010 improvements in navigational aids and technology and of training through various STCW3 conventions, collisions still occur. The general consensus is that the Collision Regulations are not being adhered to and are disregarded all too frequently.

Conclusion Investigations of recent cases suggest that despite improvements in technology and of training through various STCW conventions, ISM, etc., a majority of collisions continue to occur due to a failure of the bridge team in following simple principles of bridge Collision Regulations1 disregarded watch-keeping and violations of the Collision Regulations. The A recent international survey2 was carried out with 452 key to a safe and efficient ship is a well-trained crew, teamwork respondents representing a good cross-section of sea staff, and resource management. Most shipowners are taking steps to training staff and examiners from 31 countries to discover the enhance bridge procedures by ensuring their officers and crew norms, problems and influences which affect decisions on the receive on-going training in the operation of their vessels as well bridge. Respondents were invited to give their opinion on a as other industry platforms such as Teamwork & Bridge Resource number of questions. One of the questions was the respondent’s Management courses. Training is a proactive approach to safety. opinion on reasons of manoeuvres contrary to the Collision It requires the identification, analysis and mitigation of hazards Regulations. The replies are summarised in the table below. before they can affect the safe operation of the vessel. In the years to come, maritime technology development will require a blending According to the late Captain François Baillod, the initiator of advanced computing and simulation-based technology, of the UK Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS), 74 per concepts of dynamic analysis, of risk and reliability and of human cent of reported incidents related to uncertainty, violations and capabilities and behaviour.  disregard for the Collision Regulations. As can be noted from the table below, answers from the 452 respondents confirm current suspicions engendered by MARS and other sources that the 1 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (as amended). 2 Survey carried out by Captain Roger Syms, of The Nautical Institute. Collision Regulations are often misunderstood, misinterpreted or 3 Standards of training, certification and watch-keeping for seafarers. just plain ignored and disregarded on frequent occasions. Despite

Amendments to the Collision Regulations Gard News 172, November 2003/January 2004

Amendments to the Collision Regulations will enter into force on and avoid impeding their navigation and also that a WIG craft 29th November 2003. operating on the water surface shall comply with the Rules as for a power-driven vessel; The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing – Rule 23 (Power-driven vessels underway) will include a Collisions at Sea, 1972 (the Collision Regulations, or COLREGs) requirement that WIG craft shall, in addition to the lights was adopted in 1972 and entered into force in 1977. prescribed in paragraph 23 (a) of the Rule, exhibit a high-intensity Amendments introduced in 1981, 1987, 1989 and 1993 are all-round flashing red light when taking off, landing and in-flight already in force. The convention was last amended in November near the surface; 2001. These latest amendments, which will enter into force on – Rule 31 (Seaplanes) will include a provision for WIG craft; 29th November 2003, are the following: – Rules 33 and 35 (Equipment for sound signals and sound – Rule 3 (General definitions) will include the definition of wing- signals in restricted visibility) will cater for small vessels; in-ground (WIG) craft; – Annex I (Positioning and technical details of lights and shapes) – Rule 8 (a) (Action to avoid collision) will make it clear that any will be amended with respect to high-speed craft (relating to the action to avoid collision should be taken in accordance with the vertical separation of masthead lights); and Annex III (Technical relevant rules in the COLREGs and to link Rule 8 with the other details of sound signal appliances) will be amended with respect steering and sailing rules; to whistles and bell or gong to cater for small vessels. – Rule 18 (Responsibilities between vessels) will include a requirement that a WIG craft, when taking off, landing and Copies of the Collision Regulations in English, French or Spanish in flight near the surface, shall keep clear of all other vessels may be purchased from the IMO (www.imo.org).  47 Navigation

In October 2004 the last remains of TRICOLOR were removed from The emergency response the seabed some 20 nautical miles north of Dunkirk. With that The shipowners Wilh. Wilhelmsen’s emergency response team one significant chapter in the whole story following the loss of (ERT) was assembled two hours after the collision at their TRICOLOR was brought to an end. This article contains an account headquarters in Lysaker, Oslo, Norway. The owners’ insurance of the ordeal from the shipowners’ point of view. partners, Norwegian Hull Club and Gard P&I, were involved from the very beginning and supplemented the ERT from their A dark December night locations. Their dedicated assistance was of cardinal importance The story starts with the collision between KARIBA and TRICOLOR in that they have highly professional claims handlers, local in the early hours of 14th December 2002. The evening before, representatives and expert maritime lawyers who can be activated TRICOLOR, a 49,792 GT, 1987-built car-carrier laden with a cargo and operative at very short notice. In a crisis like this it is also of 2,871 luxury cars, had left Zeebrugge bound for Southampton, reassuring for a shipowner to receive a personal phone call which was the last port in Europe before the Atlantic crossing from his P&I Club’s top management with a statement of full to the US. The crew had routinely made the vessel ready for sea dedication and attention as Wilh. Wilhelmsen did from Gard in and gone to rest for the night in their cabins, except for those the very early hours of this case. on watch. The two things that seafarers probably dread the most are collisions and fire. Knowing, however, that they had A very important task for the ERT was to organise the landing duly and properly prepared the vessel for sea for the voyage to and care of the crew. Many people were engaged locally in France Southampton and also trusting their shipmates on watch to and Belgium to receive the crew and arrange for medical care and navigate the vessel safely through the night in the very busy lodging. As they had lost all their belongings, there was a need English Channel, they could go to sleep and rest before arrival to meet the crew’s basic needs as well as to organise provisional in the morning and another busy port stay. Despite the crew’s identification and travel documents for their repatriation. It was efforts to prepare the vessel for sea and the officers’ attention to also necessary to shield the crew from the media, make them safe navigation in busy waters, the crew’s worst nightmare would available for questioning by authorities and giving statements to become a reality that night and TRICOLOR was never to make it to the shipowners’ own lawyers. the next port. Another very important task for the ERT was to make sure that all At about 0215 hrs everybody on board TRICOLOR was shaken by a relatives of the crew members were properly informed as soon as sudden impact and a terrifying noise. Immediately following the possible so that their first knowledge of the disaster would not be impact the general alarm was sounded and everyone except those from the media. This was immediately attended to by the crewing on the bridge hurried from their cabins to the mustering station. agent in the Philippines. The third engineer in the engine room miraculously managed to evacuate through the elevator shaft and accompanied the others Pollution prevention and safety of navigation on deck as TRICOLOR took on a rapidly increasing port list. They There were two major problems that needed the ERT’s immediate managed to launch an inflatable life raft and all managed to attention. Although there were no reports of pollution from the escape the sinking vessel safely. sunken vessel, it was considered that there was imminent danger of pollution from the 2,155 cbm of bunker oil within the vessel. On the bridge the Captain, the second mate and the lookout had observed the vessel that they were about to overtake on a Regardless of whether there was a possibility of salving the vessel parallel course on their port side. Suddenly they became aware for repairs or whether she was a total loss beyond repair, it was of the same vessel turning hard to starboard and witnessed the established that the bunker oil had to be removed to avert the vessel abeam on their port side steaming right at TRICOLOR. The danger of pollution. Captain immediately put the rudder hard to starboard but there was no way to avoid the other vessel and KARIBA hit TRICOLOR with its bow on TRICOLOR’s port side just aft of the bridge. The Basic facts about the collision: men on the bridge of TRICOLOR immediately sounded the general On 14th December 2002 TRICOLOR was overtaking KARIBA alarm to alert their resting companions and they also managed on a parallel course on KARIBA’s starboard side in the to send out distress signals on the radio before the heavy list to west-bound lane of the traffic separation scheme out of port forced them off the bridge and into the cold sea and the Antwerp and Zeebrugge. KARIBA turned starboard and her dark night. Luckily they were picked up by the KARIBA’s crew, who bow hit and penetrated TRICOLOR’s port side. The collision managed to launch a life boat very quickly and initiate a search damage to TRICOLOR breached the watertight integrity for the TRICOLOR’s crew. The crew in the life raft was picked up of the hull and caused flooding of her holds to the extent by the tugboat BOXER that happened to be in the vicinity. All 24 that she rolled over to rest port side down on the seabed people on board TRICOLOR were rescued without any injuries at a depth of about 34 metres, about the same depth as other than the obviously horrific experience of suddenly finding her breadth.  oneself in utter danger by being forced to escape into the cold

48 Navigation sea on a dark December night.

© Gard AS, April 2010 A further concern was the fact that the position of the sunken Clean-up vessel did constitute a severe danger to navigation in one of the Clean-up operations at sea and on the beaches were initiated as world’s busiest shipping lanes. Smit Salvage, who happened to the oil started to emerge at different locations in nearby waters have vessels in the vicinity, were contracted in the early hours and beaches. Extensive sampling analysis later established to of 14th December 2002 to start preparing for the oil removal a certain extent what portion of the oil had originated from immediately. They were also instructed to guard TRICOLOR TRICOLOR and what had not. It is clear that part of the pollution temporarily, with special regard to traffic in the vicinity and originated from unidentified sources and some from the tanker any possible escape of oil. The ERT also co-ordinated with the VICKY, which collided with the wreck on 1st January 2003. Some French authorities to have the position properly marked and issue oil pollution in the area was also thought to be oil that had navigational warnings. In spite of that, the wreck was actually drifted from the tanker PRESTIGE, which had sunk earlier off the hit by other vessels on two occasions. Wilh.Wilhelmsen and Gard coast of Spain. then contracted two especially dedicated guard ships to protect and secure the position of TRICOLOR. This proved to be a wise There was further speculation that some passing vessels may precautionary measure as later there were several near-collisions have taken advantage of the situation and discharged some of that were averted by the interception of the guard vessels. their slop in the vicinity of the wreck, but this has never been proven to be true. The actual pumping of the oil from the hull started on 23rd December 2002 and was conducted under very difficult Media management conditions due to strong tides and winter weather. The oil Another task for Wilh. Wilhelmsen to deal with was the removal operation was finished on 22nd February 2003. Out media attention that a spectacular case like this attracts. The of a total of 2,155 cbm of bunkers, 1,455 cbm had then been information department is a vital part of the ERT and they had recovered and it was estimated that about 100 cbm remained their hands full responding to calls and requests from media inside as clingage in the tanks. It was also estimated that about from the very beginning. Wilh. Wilhelmsen consider it vital to be 50 cbm were trapped in slots from where pumping was not transparent and open on facts and appreciate that good co- possible. Sixty cbm remained in inaccessible settling tanks in the operation with the media is an important way of communicating engine room. The integrity of these tanks was, however, not in with the general public. As the case developed throughout the danger. winter and spring of 2003, Wilh. Wilhelmsen, in co-operation with Gard P&I, London Offshore Consultants and later SMIT Salvage, Unfortunately, the calculations showed that about 490 cbm of arranged press meetings in Rotterdam, Antwerp, London and heavy fuel oil were unaccounted for and thus might have escaped Dunkirk. In France, the press meetings were co-ordinated with to sea. Out of these 490 cbm, it is thought that about 210 cbm and included the French authorities. escaped during one unfortunate incident when a valve broke due to rough weather during the oil removal operation. Wreck removal Shortly after the collision and sinking of TRICOLOR, it was agreed with the hull underwriters that the vessel was damaged beyond 49 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 repair and should be declared a total loss. Soon thereafter, matters to be dealt with that concern the monetary loss and the French authorities, through the Préfecture maritime liabilities resulting from the incident. Proceedings are presently de l’Atlantique (Premar), issued an order addressed to the pending in the commercial court of Antwerp and in New shipowners to have the wreck removed. The shipowners and Gard York. There are also legal actions going on in France and other immediately went ahead with the necessary arrangements. After jurisdictions may yet become involved, as there is still time to file issuing a tender and a thorough review of the bids received, on suits. 11th April 2003 the wreck removal contract was signed with a consortium formed by SMIT Salvage, Multraship, Scaldis and URS. Throughout the whole ordeal the shipowners have relied heavily on the excellent assistance from their insurance The consortium presented a feasible plan for cutting the wreck partners Norwegian Hull Club and Gard P&I, as well as technical in sections which could be lifted and transported to shore, a experts London Offshore Consultants, ITOPF and Scandinavian method with which they had previous experience. The plan Underwriters Agency, Antwerp. The London office of the also included a strategy to deal with the cargo, environmental Norwegian law firm Wikborg Rein has been appointed as the issues and media-handling, which was of vital importance. The main law firm and is assisted by local lawyers Fransen in Belgium, operation as a whole had to be conducted in strict conformity Holman Fenwick & Willan in France and Holland & Knight in with local and international environmental regulations. The New York. Northern Shipping Logistics has represented Wilh. salvors also had resources to deal directly with the general Wilhelmsen in the negotiations and settlement of the pollution public’s great interest in the wreck removal operation. claims in France. The co-operation and relationship with Premar of France and authorities in the other coastal states involved The contract was on a fixed price basis and had an estimated time (Belgium, Holland and UK) have also been very good and frame for the operation that seemed promising. Unfortunately, constructive. that time frame later proved to be too optimistic. The support and involvement of the P&I Club and the hull and At this time there was considerable interest from the media, machinery insurers is of paramount importance in a case like especially with regard to the oil and wreck removal operations. this. There are a number of issues to be dealt with from the very In order to provide prompt and correct information, salvors beginning that a shipowner can not take on alone. The shipowner and owners set up the website www.tricolorsalvage.com, which needs to direct his attention to his business and normally does covered every aspect of the operation step by step. not have resources that can be fully dedicated to deal with all issues arising in the aftermath of a disaster such as the one in On 11th November 2003 the wreck removal operation had to be question. So as soon as the Wilh. Wilhelmsen emergency response temporarily halted due to the adverse winter weather. At this team could be demobilised, a team consisting of representatives time all the necessary cutting of the wreck had been finished and from owners and underwriters took over the further handling of roughly half of the wreck had been removed and landed at the the case. reception and demolition plant in Zeebrugge. Conclusion All security measures with regard to guarding the wreck were still The TRICOLOR has demonstrated very clearly to Wilh. Wilhelmsen in place and astonishingly enough there were still incidents of the importance of running and maintaining a high standard near-collisions that were averted by the two guard vessels. operation and having reliable and competent partners by their side when disasters like this strike. It is worth noting that this The remaining parts of the wreck were now deteriorating rapidly also serves the general public and those being affected by such and it was clear that the next phase of the wreck removal, unfortunate events.  starting in the spring of 2004, would be more of a grabbing process.

The operation resumed in May 2004 and finally completed in October 2004, by which time the wreck site had been thoroughly surveyed and found to be clear of wreckage and debris. The French authorities then promptly declared that the wreck removal order had been complied with and could be lifted.

Claims Concluding the wreck removal operation was of course a great relief to all involved, but this was, however, only one milestone in a long journey to deal with all the issues arising in the aftermath of a major disaster like this. There are still a variety of legal 50 Navigation

During the last ten years the Association has registered about What is considered safe speed for the vessel to steer and 30 claims per year resulting from wash damage. Vessels are manoeuvre can, under certain circumstances, be found excessive frequently involved in cases described as “wash damage” when when looking at the consequences vis-à-vis the other vessels. It they are sailing in rivers and other narrow waters. The allegation will be up to the master of the vessel to prove that he proceeded is that a vessel proceeded at too high speed and that the with safe speed under the present circumstances and without displacement of water caused the waves to rise and fall which the risk of causing damage to other vessels or property in the had the effect of causing other vessels started to move alongside area. A surge effect between the vessels could also easily happen the quay. If the effect is too strong or a vessel not properly when vessels are passing in narrow waters. One of the vessels, moored or if the mooring facilities ashore not sufficiently strong, usually the smallest, could be pushed away by the bow-wave and the mooring lines will break or bollards may be pulled out of their afterwards sucked against the hull of the other vessels, or the bases. Damage may also be caused to fenders and to the quays other vessels could lose steering and collide with a third vessel or when the vessel is pressed against the quay or dolphins. run aground.

Gangways connected to the vessel can easily be damaged or When passing in waters where other vessels could be exposed pushed against loading or discharging equipment ashore which, to the wave effect it is always of importance to notice whether as a consequence, also may sustain damage. In a situation where the vessels alongside are moving and whether their mooring a tanker connected to loading or discharging hoses or chicksan lines were properly attended to or slack. It is also important to arms is affected by wash from a passing vessel, the loading arms record the speed of one’s own vessel, as well as the time and may be pulled out of position and break. The consequences could approximate distance to the object if something unusual is be a claim for several hundred thousand dollars of damage to the observed or notice of damage received from other vessels. The shore installation plus a claim for million of dollars for pollution wave effect of one’s own vessel could also be influenced by other caused by the broken hoses. vessels passing or one’s own vessel could be held liable for wash caused by another vessel. High speed vessels like liners and deep draft vessels are often involved in wash or surge-damage claims. When a vessel is When our local correspondents are called in to assist they will ask proceeding with high speed, serious wave effects could cause for log extracts, speed and course recorder tapes, report from the damage even if the vessel is relatively far from the vessels moored vessel and other information which may be of help to reconstruct alongside or other objects ashore which could be damaged. the sailing at the time of the alleged incident. They will also try Damage could be caused even if the vessel is proceeding with a to interview the pilot and get all possible information from local speed less than the prescribed limit within the river or port area. authorities who may have taped VHF Communications and radar There are many factors which may affect the creation of waves or observations. When there is an allegation of damage caused the extent of damage caused. There is often an allegation that the to a vessel it may also be of importance to find out whether vessel causing the damage passed too close to the other vessel other vessels in the area did experience any problems during the or vessels moored alongside. If the river is narrow and the vessel passage of the suspect vessel. deep drafted the effect of the displaced water will increase. 51 Navigation 51

© Gard AS, April 2010 Propeller wash claims also frequently occur. When approaching the propeller could also cause excavation of the ground under or the berth and in an attempt to stop the vessel in time, excess in close vicinity to the berth. Passenger ferries often have their propeller wash may be caused. This could easily damage mooring landings close of the centre of cities where pleasure boat marinas boats or tugs which will be affected by the increased current usually are situated. Boats in these could easily be affected by the and can be pushed against the quay or dolphins or other vessels wash caused during manoeuvring to berth. nearby. Small boats can even be filled with water which could cause them to capsize and result in personal injury or death. About 40 per cent of the wash claims registered over the last few Propeller wash during mooring or unmooring could also cause years occurred in US waters and 35 per cent in North European other vessels moored alongside to start moving and collide with waters.  a third vessel or damage shore property. The current caused by

Hull and Machinery incident - The innocent victim (of an unsuccessful berthing manouevre) Gard News 162, May/July 2001

The situation arose when a Client’s vessel (the first vessel) was Records had to be made available regarding every decision, tied up, port side alongside, undertaking cargo operations. Two of strategic and operational, which had the slightest connection the crane jibs were protruding outside on the seaboard side, well with the decision to repair the crane or run the vessel without lit and marked. The stevedores and crew were having a meal break the crane temporarily, the company’s scrapping policy, the use when another vessel (the second vessel) approached in order to of redundant cranes after scrapping of other vessels in the fleet, dock starboard side alongside behind the stern of the first vessel. chartering of substitute tonnage. Decisions taken on various However, something went terribly wrong and the well-planned levels in the organisation over a span of several years, or actions manoeuvre ended up in total disaster. The approaching vessel hit taken on a detailed operational area throughout the handling the two jibs of the first vessel’s crane in succession, leaving one of of the claim, had to be documented through memos, minutes the cranes inoperative and the other in need of immediate repairs. of meetings, etc. Because the decisions and actions in question were of the sort that are traditionally taken rather informally in The two vessels endured the inescapable after-effects of a shipping companies, it became quite difficult to document them. major claim: surveyors and lawyers attended, statements and reports were to be prepared. Exchange of securities, choice of Thus, the requests meant a lot of time and effort had to be law and jurisdiction occupied the claims handlers on both sides. spent to search for documents or interview people in order to Investigations into possible repair solutions were carried out. recapitulate the relevant facts. Eventually, owners of the first vessel and their insurers elected to have the repairs carried out abroad. The decision was based This incident shows that, even in what appears to be the most on past experience and local knowledge. Hence, the crane most straightforward of cases, it is of paramount importance to be badly damaged was shipped for repairs. The vessel continued able to document one’s actions and decisions and to keep records trading, but without the original crane capacity. Once the crane accessible.  was completed the vessel was deviated for refitting and rigging. Eventually the vessel was back in trade in the same condition as she was before the incident took place.

A simple matter to most, repairs are carried out and paid, and the “wrongdoer” indemnifies the innocent party for the loss and damage. But not so simple!

Although there was agreement between the parties as to the liability of the other vessel, a lengthy debate took place about the decision taken regarding repairs and the reasonableness of the actions. In spite of various joint surveys throughout the repair process, further documentation was requested. 52 Navigation

All the engineers on board this particular vessel were quite sure that the emergency generator was in good working condition, as it was regularly tested. The problem was that during the last test they had forgotten to switch back to automatic mode.

The pilot was on board and the vessel was outbound in a narrow river. Everything was normal until the vessel had a problem with the fuel supply for the auxiliary engines which resulted in a blackout and again shutdown of the main engine and loss of all power (all three auxiliary engines were running on diesel oil). Since the emergency switch was on manual mode, the generator did not start, which again resulted in loss of steering gear power, and the situation suddenly started to be critical.

Before the blackout the vessel speed was approximately five knots. The master lost all steering power and the vessel turned to starboard and “luckily” ended on a sand bank.

The engineers managed to solve the fuel supply problem very quickly and found out why the emergency generator had not started. The vessel was moved with the assistance of tugs and was taken to anchorage to carry out underwater hull inspections.

There are many reasons for a blackout, one of them being human No damage to the hull was found but the vessel had to stay error. in anchorage for 24 hours because of the investigations being carried out by the coast guard. Blaackouts are every mariner’s nightmare, especially if they occur in narrow waters with lots of traffic or during canal passages There are still a lot of vessels trading with this particular “design or in harbour entrances. Even in open waters, blackouts can be weakness”. Vessels with this design should have routines to avoid a problem during periods of heavy weather. There have been incidents like the one described above, which could lead to major several cases during canal passage or in harbour entrance where breakdowns and unnecessary costs. Needless to say, one should a blackout could have led to serious breakdown. also ensure that such routines are followed properly. 

The incident reported below was caused by crew negligence on a vessel heading from one of the rivers in the Gulf of Mexico leading to the Panama Canal. The vessel was loaded with explosive cargo bound for the Far East.

During normal sea trade on motor vessels the electric power is supplied from either shaft generators or auxiliary engines through the main switchboard. In case of a blackout, the vessel in question was also equipped with an emergency generator with a separate emergency switchboard in a separate room. The emergency generator delivered power to the steering gear, emergency lights, etc. Such emergency generators are normally designed with a switch on a switchboard, which indicates “automatic” or “manual mode”. During normal trade the switch will be on automatic mode. The manual is only used for manual start and testing.

The normal practice is that the emergency generator is tested once a week by being started with the switch in manual mode and then switched back to automatic, otherwise the emergency generator would not start in case of a blackout. A lot of vessels today have this particular design, which is very common. 53 Navigation

A new interpretation of SOLAS requirements relating to safety of Today, nearly two years after the implementation of the SOLAS navigation, which applies to ships contracted for construction on 2000 Amendments, most vessels built to SOLAS standards are or after 1st January 2005, may enable a significant reduction of still built without fully implementing the aims of Chapter V maritime accidents through detailed requirements applicable to Regulation 15. Hopefully, the future will change this based on the the total bridge arrangement on board SOLAS ships. present IACS interpretation of Chapter V Regulation 15.

Unified interpretation Nautical awareness gives positive results The SOLAS Amendments 2000, Chapter V, Regulation 15 Some of the IACS members offer top level voluntary nautical contain a set of principles relating to bridge design, design and safety notations which exceed the safety level of the IACS arrangement of navigational systems and equipment and bridge Unified Interpretation of Chapter V Regulation 15. Focus on the procedures that have not previously been explicitly covered by total bridge system, incorporating four main parts – the human SOLAS. The present international understanding and application operator, the technical system, the man/machine interface and of Regulation 15 is diversified and the handling of the Regulation the procedures – is imperative for safe navigation. is in many ways left to the subjective interpretation of the different flag states. A general trend within the development of navigational equipment is that different types of equipment are included in The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) more and more integrated systems, and that the instrumentation has recently published a unified interpretation of SOLAS Chapter is getting more sophisticated. In this respect the configuration, V Regulation 15. IACS Unified Interpretation for Bridge Design, interfacing and final tuning and testing of the systems are Equipment, Arrangement and Procedures (UI SC181) sets forth of great importance. A proper on-board testing of the bridge a set of requirements for compliance with the principles and equipment during sea trials ensures that the bridge equipment is aims of SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 15 relating to bridge design, tuned and fit for purpose. design and arrangement of navigational systems and equipment and bridge procedures when applying the requirements of For instance, a recent study concluded that vessels classed by Regulations 19, 22, 24, 25, 27 and 28, and taking Regulations 18 Det Norske Veritas (DNV) with additional nautical safety class and 20 into consideration.1 notations are involved in fewer nautical accidents compared to vessels built to SOLAS only. The study was carried out to compare The requirements of the above-mentioned Regulations are the risk of nautical accidents in vessels built to one of DNV’s harmonised with IMO guidelines MSC/Circ. 982 (Guidelines additional nautical safety class notations and vessels built to on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge Equipment and Layout) and basic SOLAS requirements. The study included all DNV-classed relevant ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and vessels above 6,000 gross tonnage built after 1990 over the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) standards for period from 1990 to 2001. Nautical accidents were defined application of the Regulations with the aim of: as collisions between ships, groundings and contact damage, – facilitating the tasks to be performed by the bridge team which together account for more than 50 per cent of all marine and the pilot in making full appraisal of the situation and in accidents irrespective of criterion. The result of the study shows navigating the ship safely under all operational conditions; that the accident rate was reduced by 50 per cent in vessels with – promoting effective and safe bridge resource management; the additional nautical safety class notations compared to vessels – enabling the bridge team and the pilot to have convenient and built to basic SOLAS, which can be characterised as a significant continuous access to essential information which is presented reduction. in a clear and unambiguous manner, using standardised symbols and coding systems for controls and displays; Other studies also confirm the relevance of addressing the total – indicating the operational status of automated functions and bridge system and the requirements to bridge equipment. For integrated components, systems and/or sub-systems; instance, it is estimated by DNV that the appropriate use of – allowing for expeditious, continuous and effective information an approved Electronic Chart Display and Information System processing and decision-making by the bridge team and the pilot; (ECDIS) may significantly reduce the number of groundings and – preventing or minimising excessive or unnecessary work and collisions, while statistics from Canada (relating to ships greater any condition or distraction on the bridge which may cause than 1,500 gross tonnage) show that accidents have decreased by fatigue or interfere with the vigilance of the bridge team and the about 75 per cent since the ships were equipped with Differential pilot; Global Positioning System (DGPS) and ECDIS. By using the ECDIS, – minimising the risk of human error and detecting such error if the navigator can focus his or her attention on one, “complete”, it occurs through monitoring and alarm systems, in time for the navigation system. This will reduce the chances of miscalculation, bridge team and the pilot to take appropriate action. whilst giving the navigator more time to keep a proper lookout.

1 UI SC181 can be found at www.iacs.org.uk/interpretations/UISC.pdf on page 156. 54 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 The opportunity of having the electronic charts implemented Statistics show that DNV’s additional nautical safety class with the radar picture in a chart radar will add benefits to the notations significantly increase safety for ships. There should also information obtained from the ECDIS. Recent studies show a very be good reasons for believing that the new IACS UI SC181 will do positive safety effect of this equipment both in correlation to the same and secure the fundamental aspects of a total bridge anti-grounding and anti-collision, as the relative and true picture system.  of the situation is presented on one screen with all essential information available to make qualified and safe decisions.

Conclusion Lessons learned from studying nautical casualties are that the reliability of the total bridge system depends not only on the reliability of each individual component, but also on its fitness for use as an element in a larger system. It does not matter which part of the system fails if the consequences are the same. When analysing “human factor casualties” in detail, one will observe an elementary or a series of elementary events that in many cases could have been avoided by a well designed total bridge system. The ability to operate a ship in a safe and efficient way becomes increasingly sensitive to arrangements and technical solutions, in particular with respect to human capabilities and limitations. The bridge is becoming more and more the total control centre of the vessel, from where all main functions are monitored and controlled. Therefore, when addressing overall safety and efficiency in bridge operations, it is very important to focus on the performance of the total bridge system. This requires careful consideration of all factors which influence performance and reliability of both the human operator and the equipment as parts of a total system. 55 Navigation

Today’s advanced maritime simulators can be more than just effects as well as sound effects to increase the sense of being training tools. on board a ship. The bridge has a full range of navigational and vessel control equipment copied from the various types of vessels Introduction from the Evergreen fleet. The simulator software presently covers As in the airline industry, simulator training offers an important 16 ports in nine countries and together this gives the crew a contribution to the education and in-service training of crew, chance to familiarise themselves with different vessel types under with one of the main advantages being that a modern simulator various port situations. A system is also in place to evaluate makes it possible to create and streamline realistic exercises the training performance and to continuously improve the which would be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous education. The training programmes offered are tailor-made for to carry out in real life. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the Evergreen fleet and also for vessels under development. The simulator equipment and technology should have the potential following programmes are available at the Training Centre: to improve the competence of vessel crews and thereby prevent – Standard ship bridge simulator training for deck officers; accidents from happening. Whereas only a limited range of – Standard propulsion plant simulator training for engine officers; simulator training and assessment is mandatory under the STCW- – Hazardous cargo handling training; 95,1 in recent years Gard Services has seen ship operators who – GMDSS training station drills; have made major investments in developing their own training – CBT training course modules; facilities and simulators with a level of sophistication high above – Deck and engine officer refresher training and updating; the prescribed standards. In this issue Gard News visits two – Bridge resource management training courses; members of Gard P&I who are among those. – Basic Electric, Electronic and Automation control training course. Evergreen Group - Evergreen Marine Corporation The Evergreen Seafarer Training Centre in Taoyuan outside Taipei, Evergreen received the Lloyd’s List Commitment to Training and occupies 5,000 square metres and offers a wide range of crew Education award at the 2003 Lloyd’s List Maritime Excellence training facilities operated by a staff of 19 people, including 13 Awards. instructors. Captain Lin Ting-shyang, Junior Vice President of the Training Centre, explains that their main piece of equipment is Star Cruises a Polaris bridge simulator manufactured by Kongsberg Maritime The Star Cruises Ship Simulator (SCSS) is located in Port Klang, Ship Systems in Norway, but that they also have several other Malaysia. The SCSS is the centre of a wide range of training training tools, such as a GMDSS simulator room, smaller activities such as ship handling courses, human factor and crew bridge simulators, Nabco main engine control simulators and a resource management and emergency management. It is a full propulsion plant training room with real-size engine components, mission bridge simulator where the bridge is copied from Star to mention some. The training centre was ISO-certified in Cruises’ twin mega-ships, SuperStar Leo and SuperStar Virgo. The June 2001. The main simulator is equipped with a 360-degree simulator was delivered by STN Atlas and completed in 1998 at projection screen and the simulator produces rolling and pitching a cost of USD 5 million. SCSS is managed under a joint venture 56 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 with the Danish Maritime Institute. The main bridge has a full training is important not only for navigation and manoeuvring range of instruments, displays and manoeuvring systems and practice, but also for training of engineers and technicians. In employs advanced techniques for image generation to provide addition to skills improvement, focus may also be placed on a 210-degree field of view which can be rotated to cover 360 increased attentiveness and correct attitude. Obviously vessel degrees. There is also a secondary bridge with a 135-degree simulators can not replace on-the-job training and real life field of view. To recreate realistic berthing manoeuvres it is experience, but high-quality simulator training will improve also possible to change point of view, for example from the equipment familiarisation and enhance safety awareness in an bridge wing. The center console on the main bridge, together industry to which the human element is crucial. A simulator with the visual system, can be turned 90 degrees to simulate does not necessarily have to be of the types described in this situations when the master is conning the vessel from either article to be useful in a particular training situation, but the bridge wing. Sound recordings from various ports provide an increased sophistication of the equipment which is available authentic background of VHF radio. A motion system together opens new areas where simulators can add considerable value. with recorded sounds from wind and weather is also added to Simulator-based port studies and incident analysis such as the create a realistic bridge environment. With all features combined ones mentioned in this article are examples of activities which the simulator creates a virtual-realistic environment from actual undoubtedly must be expected to improve safety and reduce ports. There are presently 25 ports (including one artificial) accidents for those shipowners who make these efforts. Gard from 11 countries available in the simulator database. From a Services therefore welcomes and encourages the continued separate room the instructor controls and monitors the events commitment to this area of operation that has been shown by and assumes the role of other ships, pilots, tugs, etc., during the the shipowners featured in this article and also by several other different scenarios that are played out. Both bridges have video members and clients, as well as the industry that continuously and audio recording equipment and the various recordings are develops and improves the equipment. Gard Services is also synchronised and used in the debriefing process. As regards vessel supporting a number of projects that involve both simulator types, there are presently more than 200 simulations available. training and development of new training methods. One of The simulator also interfaces with the existing voyage data the most recent projects is a joint venture between the Royal recorders fitted on Star Cruises vessels so that actual events can Norwegian Naval Academy, Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi be recreated in detail and replayed for training and investigation AS and Gard Services. The project concentrates on pilot handling purposes. This forms a part of Star Cruises’ Nautical Learning and developed a concept for training of deck officers in how to Event Report system for which Star Cruises won the Safety & organise their duties when a pilot is embarked. Special attention Environment award at the Lloyd’s List-SMM 2002 Awards. was given to attentiveness, crew resource management and bridge organisation. This concept is now available both as a Spare simulator capacity is made available to a number of laptop presentation or workshop for crew conferences as well other ship operators, organisations and research institutes. The as a simulator training course. More information about the SCSS is also used for performance evaluation. As an example, pilot handling programme is available from Gard Services upon the Australia Marine Pilots Association uses the SCSS for their request.  competency audits. The simulator can also play a role in port studies, and has been used in the development of new cargo terminals to develop safe operation and calculate docking and undocking parameters for different vessel types under different weather and current conditions. The simulator is also regularly used by Star Cruises to prepare safe calls to new ports.

Captain Gustav Gronberg, Vice President of Star Cruises’ Nautical Department, says: “It is an enormous advantage for a shipping company to design, own and operate a simulator centre. The simulator can be tailor-made with the same equipment as on the real ships, with this only a minimum of time needs to be spent on familiarisation etc. when the officers come for training. They are also training in the same environment as in real life, as the ports have been developed in the simulator. It is also a very good tool to foster teamwork and good co-operation between our bridge teams and the local pilots in the various ports that we are calling to.”

Gard Services’ view 1 Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code, 1995. Training and assessment in state approved simulators is mandatory in respect of use of radar and Gard Services sees simulator training as a very important tool ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aids).

to improve the skills of members’ and clients’ officers. Simulator 57 Navigation

Voyage Data Recorders may play an important role in maritime collect and store information concerning the position, movement, accidents investigations. physical condition and command and control of a ship. IMO requirements state that a VDR should be installed in a protective Black boxes in aircraft capsule that is brightly coloured and fitted with an appropriate The so-called “black box” carried by aircraft is in fact not black, but device to assist location. It should operate completely automatically. orange and has reflective strips along its sides. The reason is to make it more easily identifiable to crash site investigators. There are two The UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has separate boxes inside the box: a flight data recorder and a cockpit commented that VDRs are playing an increasing role in their voice recorder. Aircraft have had them for many years. The first flight efforts to establish the cause(s) of accidents, but they said their data recorder was used in 1958 and the first cockpit voice recorder investigations have been hampered by the fact that no less than 13 was used in 1965. Black boxes are standard on both passenger and different models of VDRs have been or are being developed. Each of military aircraft. For obvious reasons, they have to be extremely the 13 uses slightly different technology to store and play back the strong and capable of surviving extremes of shock, penetration, information. The MAIB is working closely with IMO in relation to the pressure, fire and water. Normally, they are carried in the after end proposed standard model. of the fuselage, or the tail, as this area generally suffers (relatively) less damage than the nose. Practical considerations Not everyone in the industry agrees with the steps that have been The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) each taken. In a letter to a trade newspaper in July this year, a senior serves a different purpose. The FDR can record hundreds of separate figure at a shipowning and operating company said: “It is absolutely pieces of information about the technical performance and condition ridiculous that the regulations stipulate a type of black box that will of the aircraft – the position of the rudders for example. As its name sink with the vessel. Who will go down 2,000 metres to 3,000 metres implies, the CVR records everything that is said in the cockpit for a to pick the device up and if so, what will the cost be?” The writer 30-minute period before a crash. of this letter goes on to suggest that the answer is that the box should be “free-floating”, similar to an EPIRB (Emergency Position The impact on the shipping industry – EU and IMO Indicating Radio Beacon), but this will still have to be retrieved in requirements some way. No doubt the location of the incident will dictate the time Voyage Data Recorders (VDR) are now having an impact more and and cost involved. Black boxes carried on aircraft are fitted with an more on the shipping industry. Some ships, mainly passenger ships, underwater locator beacon. have been required to fit a VDR as from 1st July 2002, the date on which changes to the SOLAS Convention, approved by IMO’s The writer could perhaps have added: “and who will pay the cost?” Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), came into effect. Also required Whose property is it? As part of the ship’s equipment, paid for to fit a VDR are ships, other than passenger ships, of 3,000 GT and and provided by the shipowner, it is presumably the shipowner’s upwards built after 1st July 2002. Soon the majority of ships will be property, at least until the hull insurers take over title to the ship. In required to fit them. turn, this perhaps brings us to the question: “who will benefit from the use of a VDR?” The European Union has already decided on its requirements, which are set out in Directive 2002/59/EC.1 IMO has agreed to adopt Space does not allow a full discussion of this question, but in the worldwide carriage requirements which are in line with those widest possible sense, one answer might be “the whole shipping contained in this Directive. industry”. In the airline industry, information learned from casualties, especially information which would not have been available but The MSC has also endorsed the findings of a feasibility study for the black box, is or should be used to avoid a similar accident undertaken by another IMO sub-committee, on Safety of Navigation, in future. This is not (yet) the case in the maritime industry. which looked into the need for the mandatory carriage of VDRs on Unfortunately, however, the very large amounts of money which are existing cargo ships. Under a draft amendment to SOLAS Regulation often at stake in high-profile maritime casualties, coupled with the V/20 agreed by IMO, all cargo ships of 3,000 GT and upwards built prevalence of the “blame culture” and the increasing use of criminal before 1st July 2002 must be retrofitted with a VDR no later than 1st proceedings against both individual crew members and companies, January 2008. Cargo ships of 20,000 GT and upwards must comply mean that many shipowners and their insurers are, understandably, by 1st January 2007. reluctant to disclose information which may be used against them, not only in civil, but also in criminal proceedings, later on. However, the EU Directive requires VDRs to comply with more stringent standards than those proposed by IMO for the “simplified” Potential benefits? VDR. Whilst IMO has yet to finalise its required standards, it is Nevertheless, Gard Services sees a potential benefit to its members understood that the framework so far in place requires the VDR to and clients in the fitting, use and recovery of a black box. Many

1 See article “EU vessel traffic monitoring and information system” in Gard News issue No. 171. 58 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 cases involving significant damage to property and therefore large as with all vessels in the fleet in question, she was fitted with a sums of money do not hit the headlines. VDR. Details of the circumstances leading up to the incident and in particular, the actions taken and orders given on the bridge in the The black box may be able to provide at least some of the quick minutes before contact were thus available to the MAIB when it and detailed information which property and liability insurers need, carried out its investigation into the casualty. It is understood that the especially in the early stages of a claim, to evaluate their potential MAIB relied “heavily” on the information obtained from the vessel’s liability and to plan their strategy for the weeks, months and years VDR. The MAIB report contains a number of recommendations, ahead. For example, in a collision action, it is not uncommon to especially concerning the need to improve bridge communication. discover that a vessel’s course recorder was switched off or was not working. This may mean that vital evidence covering the period Fortunately, neither vessel was insured by Gard Services. immediately before the collision has been lost. Sometimes, the gap can be (partly) filled by the evidence obtained from the crew, Conclusion but since humans are involved, there is, inevitably, an element Black boxes are here to stay for most ships. The benefit of of subjectivity in such evidence. The information provided by a (retro-) fitting these boxes may however be rather more real and functioning course recorder or other piece of equipment can remove recognisable for owners (and their insurers) than the benefit which that subjectivity. owners have seen from other EU and indeed IMO initiatives. The sort of information which a black box will collect is information which If a vessel is lost, or suffers a serious casualty such as grounding, might well otherwise be lost in the event of a serious casualty. For resulting in extensive damage to the ship and perhaps the cargo, the reasons explained above, shipowners and their insurers should there are likely to be significant claims arising out of that incident. be able to obtain, from the black box, technical information that The cause of the casualty may be difficult to pinpoint. From the could prove invaluable to them in trying to reconstruct events perspective of the claim under the hull insurance policy, both the immediately before the casualty. shipowner and the hull insurers are likely to be keen to find out exactly what happened on board immediately before the vessel was If this information can be made available to a wider audience than lost. The shipowners’ liability insurers will also wish to secure access the shipowners and their insurers, without fear of it being used to such information, as it will prove vital in their investigation and against them, lessons can be learned and mistakes avoided. The decision-making process. industry as a whole should be made safer and the cost of carriage by sea may be reduced. The “new” information may even make the Insofar as the information obtained from a black box may be specific resolution of disputes quicker and cheaper. to a type or size or vessel, or to a particular trade or cargo, it may also assist those responsible for risk assessment and for setting the The Chief Inspector of the MAIB has recently said that he is ashamed premium for that risk. of how the shipping industry compares with the airline industry in how it handles safety concerns. In the fields of evidence recording, Examples evidence recovery and the opportunity and ability to constructively Two examples may suffice. The first incident in question, although use such evidence to prevent a similar accident happening in future, serious, did not involve loss of life or pollution. Further, immediately the shipping industry may have much to learn from the airline after the incident, it was possible for detailed investigations to be industry. It is a challenge to all concerned to learn that lesson.  made. The facts were that the MARIA H, a small (1,300 GT) cargo vessel, struck a railway bridge over the River Trent in England. Both ship and bridge were badly damaged. The master suffered an injury to his leg which, fortunately, was not serious. The incident was investigated by the MAIB. It found that a manoeuvring plan had not been properly agreed and understood before the vessel was moved in a flood tide. Among other comments, one of which was about possible communication problems between the six-man crew, consisting of three Poles, one Italian, one Brazilian and one Portuguese, the MAIB said that the lack of a VDR meant that the extent of the agreed manoeuvring plan could not be verified and they were unable to say exactly what (if anything) had been agreed.

In the second incident, the cross-channel ferry PRIDE OF PORTSMOUTH caused severe damage to the frigate HMS ST. ALBANS. The warship was berthed at Portsmouth when the ferry came in to berth in bad weather. Due to a wrong helm order given by the master, the ferry contacted and badly damaged the nearly-new

warship. The ferry herself sustained relatively little damage, but, 59 Navigation

Lead, log and lookout answer to applying integrated machinery control and monitoring There was a time when sailors navigated around the world with in a simple and easy to use fashion. lead, log and lookout. In principle, modern navigators do much the same but they are aided by extraordinary electronics and Engines are being converted from the standard camshaft granted a precision denied to their predecessors. operation to electronic control of fuel injection and exhaust valve actuation. This makes engine adjustment possible through Information technology is having an impact on many industries electronic control. The whole concept of electronic control is and the shipping industry is no exception. Bridge, engine room intended to ensure better combustion efficiency in its various and cargo operations are awash with maritime technology. Every manifestations across a ship’s full operating profile. Unlike a third new ship built today and many more existing ships are being standard engine, fuel injection characteristics can be optimised outfitted with the latest Integrated Bridge System (IBS) and “total at many different load conditions, and maximum pressure can concept” engine room automation systems. be kept constant over a wider load range, offering improved consumption and emissions performance at part-load and light The basic bridge configuration includes thin film transistor/liquid loads. The facility to switch to low emission modes, to meet crystal display screen radar (TFT/LCD)/ARPA, voyage management particularly stringent local emission controls, often far tougher system (VMS), electronic chart display and information system than international limits, is considered to be very advantageous. (ECDIS), duplicated GPS and DGPS, doppler log, gyrocompass, The spreading of marine emission and smoke control regulations steering console with adaptive autopilot, echo sounder with gives added significance to such arrangements. Electronic engine playback memory, magnetic compass, wind sensor, voyage data operation is advantageous in tuning the engine to the differing recorder (VDR) and automatic identification system (AIS). ignition properties of the fuel oil bunkered by the vessel at various points around the world. A typical voyage management system includes: - TFT electronic chart display with the choice of radar overlay. Given the worldwide trading pattern, many ships draw bunkers - Conning information display (navigation, machinery and alarm from various locations. Even for fuel of consistent viscosity, status). which is normally used, quality is said to vary considerably. While - Voyage planning (ECDIS chart correction, route planning, vessels are equipped with a homogeniser, the electronic system weather routing and voyage optimisation). has proved to be a useful tool for the ship’s engineering staff in - Navigation/ECDIS interface (fully interfaced with autopilot and optimising combustion performance with heavy fuel oil (HFO) of speed control systems). varying properties. Significantly, HFO has been used quay to quay - Hull monitoring system (warnings of excessive hull stress, with the engine set up in electronic mode. It is probably too early acceleration and bottom slamming). to quantify the impact of electronic operation on overall fuel consumption, or on maintenance costs, although the shipowning All ships built after 1st July 2002 are required to be fitted sector at large will have certain expectations in this regard. with VDR and AIS and tankers will be required to have an AIS transponder fitted no later than the first safety equipment survey Continuous development of marine technology on or after 1st July 2003. The VDR is fully interfaced with the As we look into the future, it is likely that there will continue to radars and most other bridge equipment. Even though it is not be changes in the way ships are designed and built. Twenty years a requirement to do so, AIS are being interfaced with the radar ago, the assessment of the structural strength of a ship was systems. Passenger ships are being fitted with a duplicated system based on static loads, semi- empirical formulations and successful consisting of two independent IBS with all critical components service experience. Today naval architects are able to accurately duplicated. predict the dynamic loads impacting on a ship’s structure as well as the dynamic response or resulting stresses in that structure. On the other hand, engine rooms are being flooded with Using advanced theories of ship motions and hydrodynamics and tailor-made “total concept” state of the art automation systems with further advances in computer technology, naval architects incorporating Universal Monitoring & Control (UMS/UCS) will be able to apply and analyse ship motion and structural with alarm and control panels in the accommodation and the response to a wide range of sea conditions. bridge, Diesel Manoeuvring System (DMS) as a complete bridge control system offering fully automatic remote control of the It is unlikely that there will be a quantum change in the way main engine from the bridge and engine control room, Diesel ships are designed and built. So what can be expected from the Protection System (DPS), the stand-alone diesel engine slowdown continuing development of maritime technology? It is hoped that and shutdown safety system for automatic power reduction the result will lead to maritime operations which are safer, more to protect the propulsion system against damage, Electronic reliable, durable and cost effective. Governor System(EGS) for accurate control of speed in a fuel efficient manner even at low RPMs and automatic overspeed Today’s mariners are provided with technology and precision that prevention in heavy seas, Propulsion Control System (PCS) as the their predecessors would have envied. With all this technology, 60 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 bridge watch-keeping and engine room operations ought to be sufficient in catching up with ever-changing technology? The safer. Are they? If not, why not? million dollar question is: “are shipowners ensuring that their crews are properly trained in understanding and operating high There are indications that high technology equipment is a technology before they are handed the responsibility of operating contributing factor behind a number of collisions and casualties. modern vessels, or are they solely relying upon the education that There are numerous recent examples whereby mariners have their crews have received in the past - or are they relying upon made expensive and even tragic mistakes even when provided STCW 95 to do so?” with all this technology. The latest Safety Digest of the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) suggests a number of Training is a proactive approach to safety. It requires the solutions to this problem, which has almost everything to do with identification, analysis and mitigation of hazards before they the human element. The “human-technology” interface reveals can affect the safe operation of the vessel. In the years to many shortcomings. MAIB Chief Inspector Admiral John Lang come, maritime technology development will require a blending notes, under his human element concerns, that there are three of advanced computing and simulation-based technology, issues which must be considered: an ability to operate the system concepts of dynamic analysis, of risk and reliability and of human or equipment correctly, an understanding of any limitations and capabilities and behaviour. an awareness of the “distraction” factor. Standardisation of the layout of equipment could also play an important role in assisting In conclusion, it is imperative that shipowners ensure that in the operation of high technology equipment. the gap in the human-technology interface is bridged by providing competent comprehensive training in operating and Furthermore, it goes without saying that such electronic understanding the limitations of high technology equipment and equipment may provide a false sense of security. The navigator an awareness of the “distraction” factor, with special emphasis on dazzled by all this navigational waponry monitors his own and the false sense of security that such high technology equipment other ships’ positions as bright symbols with vectors, dots and may provide. target data menus on integrated radar screens and electronic charts may consider this as precision navigation and an accurate “Man is the single greatest asset the shipowner has”, notes MAIB indication of other ships’ intentions for collision avoidance and Chief Inspector Admiral John Lang. “He is worth looking after, and fail to check his own ship’s position by alternative conventional money spent training him to understand and operate technology means or ascertain the movement of other vessels in the vicinity will pay handsome dividends.”  by simply looking out of the window. Similarly, the engineer hypnotised by all this engine room automation may complacently monitor the various electronic engine control and alarm panels and fail to carry out regular checks and planned maintenance of critical engine machinery.

Training Some owners may be lured by manufacturers into buying sophisticated shipboard equipment by highlighting the additional safety as well as the long-term savings in operational costs without sufficient attention being given to the training of those who are going to have to use the equipment.

As anyone who has worked a computer knows, a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing and the user left to his or her own devices may get a result, but not by the best method. Training is the key and it must embrace both normal and abnormal situations.

Advances in shipboard technology have previously centred on making the equipment more reliable and robust; however, it is imperative that emphasis be placed on the man-machine interface.

Many maritime colleges have been expanding the amount of technology they use, with emphasis on simulators, VTS training and ensuring seafarers comply with STCW 95, but is this training 61 Navigation 61

Gard News has a look at the cover for collision liability and A limitation that applies to all standard hull conditions is that the liability for contact damage to third party property under the owner is insured for collision liability up to the insured value of most common standard hull terms and the P&I Rules, and the vessel, but no further. In certain circumstances, the collision considers how the two types of cover interact in practice. liability may exceed that insured value, in which case the P&I insurance will respond. This is the so-called “excess collision Introduction liability cover”. P&I insurance is primarily intended to cover a shipowner or operator’s liability to others and it generally excludes damage Another intriguing aspect is that there are variations in the to the insured’s own property.1 Hull and machinery is basically standard hull conditions in different markets on the extent and insurance for the client’s ship as its primary asset. Where the two type of collision liability cover. One example: if the other vessel types of insurance interact is in the area of collision liability and sinks as a result of the collision and a wreck removal is ordered liability for contact damage to third party property. by the authorities – would the hull cover respond to the collision liability proportion of the wreck removal costs? The answer will Is it necessary for those handling P&I claims to understand the differ across conditions and markets,3 and since the P&I insurance basics of hull and machinery terms? For those handling liability will respond to the liability that falls outside the hull insurance, for property claims, the answer is a definite “yes”. Hull and the P&I underwriter must obtain information as soon as possible machinery and P&I are often complementary when it comes in order to properly assess the exposure and protect his interests. to collision liability and liability for damage to piers, loading cranes and other third party property. As a matter of fact, the Some shipowners have placed full (four-fourths) collision liability first need of protection insurance (the “P” in P&I) arose because under their P&I insurance. This collision liability cover would be hull underwriters in the mid-1800s were not prepared to cover the most comprehensive liability cover, because all third party more than three-fourths of shipowners’ collision liability. Mutual liability arising out of the collision would in principle be covered insurance associations of shipowners evolved to protect each without restrictions or monetary limitations. However, the other in respect of losses arising out of bearing one-fourth shipowner would still need his hull and machinery insurance to liability as self-insurance. deal with the loss of or damage to his own vessel.

Liability arising out of Collision or Striking Standard hull and machinery conditions also provide cover in Collision liability means the liability of the insured to third parties respect of liability arising out of the striking by the insured ship who sustain injury, damage or loss as a result of the collision of of third party property other than a ship. The insurance covers the insured vessel with another vessel. Such third parties can be the risk of loss or damage caused by physical contact between the owner of the other vessel involved in the collision, owners the hull or the insured vessel (or equipment permanently affixed of cargo on board the other vessel, persons on board the other to the vessel) and third party property, for example a pier or buoy. vessel who may sustain injury, or other parties affected by the Americans sometimes refer to such incidents as “allision” but this consequences of the collision, e.g., by the escape of bunker oil is not a universal term. FFO (damage to fixed and floating objects) from the other vessel. is the shorthand for striking damage under the English terms.

All standard hull conditions cover collision liability, but English Whereas collision liability is sometimes apportioned three- terms cover only three-fourths. Hence, under English conditions fourths/one-fourth between hull and P&I, the FFO liability risk it is envisaged that the assured will place insurance for the is very rarely split in this way. Standard English hull conditions remaining one-fourth liability elsewhere – typically added to the exclude the FFO liability risk, which the shipowner would then P&I insurance. Such addition must be explicit in the P&I terms of add to the P&I insurance. Under Norwegian conditions, the entry. FFO liability risk is usually placed under the hull insurance. The same goes for German conditions, which also provide cover for Under the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan, a shipowner may damage to third party property caused by the movement of the insure his full (four-fourths) collision liability with the hull insured vessel even absent any physical contact – e.g., property underwriter, but even in such a case there are certain liabilities damage caused by a wave created by the insured vessel passing arising out of a collision that would not be covered, e.g., liability at excessive speed. in respect of death or personal injury sustained by persons on the other vessel, or liability for pollution arising out of a spill from the Again, the cornerstone of the P&I insurance is that it responds to other vessel.2 liabilities that are not covered under the hull insurance. Hence,

1 Rule 63 of Assuranceforeningen Gard’s 2005 Rules for Ships excludes damage to the ship or any part thereof unless it forms part of a claim for confiscation under Rule 49. Rule 50, however, allows recovery where the member is the owner of the damaged property and would have been liable had the property been owned by a third party. 2 Liability for the cost of cleaning the other ship oiled in a collision, however, is covered by hull insurance to the same extent hull insurance covers collision liability. 3 For example, Norwegian and German hull conditions include removal of the wreck of the other vessel as a collision liability. English and Swedish conditions do not. 62 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 the P&I insurance would cover “wave damage” liability when the Claims handling considerations ship is insured on English hull conditions. What considerations drive a shipowner to place collision and striking (FFO) risks with either hull and machinery or P&I? A vital There are also variations in standard hull conditions across factor will always be price, but there are other important factors markets as to the scope of cover for liabilities not caused by as well. From a claims handling standpoint, there are certain collision or striking as defined above. Examples are property benefits of placing the full collision and FFO liabilities with one damage caused by the use of the ship’s equipment in the course insurer that ought not to be overlooked. of operations, for instance the dragging of a sub-sea fibre cable by the ship’s anchor or the damage to terminal equipment by the In a serious collision or FFO incident, the interplay between the ship’s crane. Again, the P&I insurance will respond to liabilities shipowner and affected underwriters is of vital importance. that fall outside the terms of the hull insurance. Several aspects must be considered and co-ordinated at an early stage. One such aspect is security for claims to third parties in Comparison of conditions order to prevent the arrest of the insured ship. Such an arrest may It is beyond the scope of this article to set out all the variations in cause material losses as it will delay the inspection and repair of standard hull conditions around the world, but some of the more the ship, which may increase the exposure for the hull and loss important differences between English, German and Norwegian of hire underwriters. Hence, there will usually be some pressure conditions are tabled below. on the underwriters to provide security. The more “patchy” the conditions of cover, the more difficult this is likely to be. P&I cover for collision, striking and other property damage Sometimes the P&I underwriter is requested to provide a P&I The P&I insurance is designed as a named risk cover, where only Club letter of undertaking (LOU) to cover liability that should risks that are positively mentioned in the terms of entry and the properly fall on the hull underwriters, e.g., in a collision case Club’s Rules will be covered. The member is covered for the risks where the hull underwriters cover three-fourths of the liability. specified in Parts II, III and IV of the Rules as are agreed between One reason is that an LOU from an International Group Club is the member and the Association. P&I cover for collision, striking more often accepted than letters of undertaking from the hull and damage to property begins only where standard hull terms underwriters, and can be arranged more quickly and with less leave off. This is made explicit in Rule 71.6 cost. Gard’s policy in these circumstances is that a P&I Club LOU can be “injected” as security for liabilities covered by the hull Rules 36, Collision with other ships,7 and 37, Damage to fixed underwriters if Gard Marine has claims lead on the hull policy. or floating objects,8 cover the liability not covered by the hull Gard P&I will do so against a letter of counter-security from Gard insurance. Further, Rule 39, Loss or damage to property,9 will pick Marine covering all hull underwriters. No bail fee will be charged up liability for property damage that is not customarily covered by Gard P&I from Gard Marine in such a case, but Gard Marine by standard hull terms. For example, liability for damage to third will require adequate counter-security from each of the other hull party property caused by the ship’s use of equipment is not underwriters for their respective shares of the potential liability covered by standard hull terms. Thus, damage to the dock caused and charge a bail fee from each of them. by the ship’s cargo gear while engaged in cargo operations would be a P&I liability. Because standard hull conditions differ, and If, on the other hand, the hull insurance is placed elsewhere, because P&I is designed to pick up liability only where standard Gard P&I may be prepared to issue an LOU as security for any hull terms leave off, the P&I claims handler must know the facts liability cover by hull, but only against adequate counter-security of the incident and the terms of the hull policy before deciding from one provider (lead hull, bank or other financial institution) whether the particular property claim falls within the P&I cover. with an acceptable credit rating. The collection of a multitude of

Summary of conditions for collision and FFO cover under main hull and machinery terms available

English – ITC Hull 834 German – D.T.V.5 Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan (and other Scandinavian hull terms)

Running Down Clause (RDC): Collision (RDC) and striking (FFO) Collision (RDC) and striking (FFO) covered Three-fourths to be covered by covered by hull and machinery terms by hull and machinery terms. hull and machinery terms, plus liability for damage caused by one-fourth to be covered by P&I. movements of the vessel or navigational Fixed and Floating Objects (FFO): measures including wave damage. Four-fourths to be covered by P&I 63 Navigation

© Gard AS, April 2010 counter-securities from various underwriters who participate on between hull terms and P&I is determined early, there will be the hull “slip” in sometimes very different markets – all of which more effective decision-making regarding the roles of the various are subject to varying credit ratings and enforceability terms – is insurers. Before deciding on placing the RDC and FFO risks with not attractive for Gard when attempting to assist a shipowner a particular hull underwriter, owners should consider the service member in need. aspects that come with the insurance; i.e., what will be the likely response to the incident from the underwriters involved when the In such cases, Gard P&I will charge a bail fee of one per cent of need for assistance arises? There is more to this equation than the security amount. An additional bail fee of one per cent per the insurance compensation at the end of the day. Immediate, annum will start to accrue if the Gard LOU is pending one year attentive and specialised casualty handling that is well co- after it was issued. ordinated under insurance arrangements that are seamlessly aligned will save money. Gard P&I and Gard Marine are both in Conclusions the position of being able to provide the full range of insurance Effective claims handling in high value property cases rests on the and service that shipowners need to sleep easy when it comes to ability of the claims handler to understand how the facts of the collision and FFO risks.  incident may interplay with different hull conditions. In essence, where should a loss fall at the end of the day? When the interplay

4 The Institute Time Clauses, Hulls, 1.10.83 (ITCH 83) remain the most widely-used version of English conditions. Under their latest version (International Hull Clauses 2003) four-fourths RDC and FFO are optional. 5 Deutschen Transportversicherungs Verband; DTV Hull Clauses 1978, revised in 1982, 1984,1992 and 1994. 6 “Rule 71 Other insurance The Association shall not cover: Liabilities, losses, costs or expenses which are covered by the Hull Policies or would have been covered by the Hull Policies had the Ship been fully insured on standard terms (…)”. 7 “Rule 36 Collision with other ships The Association shall cover liability to pay damages to any other person incurred as a result of a collision with another ship, if and to the extent that such liability is not covered under the Hull policies on the Ship, including: – one fourth of the liability incurred by the member; or – four fourths of such liability; or – such other fraction of such liability as may be applicable and have been agreed with the Association (…)”. 8 “Rule 37 Damage to fixed or floating objects The Association shall cover: (a) liability for loss or damage to any fixed or floating object by reason of contact between the Ship and such object, when not covered under the Hull Policies (…)”. 9 “Rule 39 Loss or damage to property The Association shall cover liability for loss of or damage to property not specified elsewhere in Part II of these Rules.” 64 Navigation

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