Legal Interpretivism by Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013): He is the greatest legal philosopher ever and is among the most influential moral and political philosopher of our time. He developed an original legal theory, which not only has transcended the Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law into a branch of political morality. Interpretivism views law as being interpreted by the practice of lawyers and jurists, and claims this is the nature of law itself.

Unlike other schools of legal philosophy, interpretivism views law not as something imposed from outside, but as a product of the practice of law.

Interpretivists claim law has a relationship with ethics and morality, but that they are not the same.

Legal interpretivism was developed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It emerged into a legal world dominated by two ways of thinking about the philosophy of law namely legal positivism and natural law theory.

Interpretivism has some similarities to both schools of thought and some important differences. It has sometimes been thought of as a middle ground between the two.

Natural law theory is the older of the two schools of thought. But there is an underlying natural law that serves as the foundation for manmade law.

Natural law consists of basic principles of fairness, justice, and equity that transcend cultural boundaries, and manmade or "positive" law should respect these. In some traditions, natural law is believed to proceed from divine or supernatural sources, while others see it as inherent in human nature.

Dworkin integrates morality both into the choice of legal theory and into the legal argument itself. In particular, this paper will explore Dworkin’s theory of Legal Interpretivism and how it appropriates the prior concepts of Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism.

For Dworkin, the goal of a lawyer is to construct law through his profession. Dworkin then uses this professional objective of “what lawyers and those versed in the law aim to build” as a denition for the law.

This important responsibility is vested in individuals with a love of those subject to the law – society’s ideal lawyers.

The main claims of interpretivism are that

 Law is not a set of given data or physical facts, but what lawyers aim to construct in their practice.  There is no separation between law and morality, although there are differences. This is not in accordance with the main claim of legal positivism.  Law is not immanent in nature nor do legal values and principles exist independently and outside of the legal practice itself. In the English speaking world, interpretivism is usually identified with Ronald Dworkin's theses on the nature of law as discussed in his text titled Law's Empire, which is sometimes seen as a third way between natural law and legal positivism. Ronald Dworking is one of the main opponents of legal Positivisms. Interpretative Approaches to Law : To resolve legal disputes, courts often need to interpret sources of law such as constitutions and statutes and precedents, and they need to interpret the communications by which parties try to order their own and others' legal rights and duties (such as leases and wills). Ronald Dworkin argues that law is an 'interpretive concept', by which he means that any true statement of law is true because it follows from the best interpretation of the legal practice of the community.

Interpretivism about the nature of law is the view that legal rights and duties are determined by the scheme of principle that provides the best justification of certain political practices of a community: a scheme identifiable through an interpretation of the practices that is sensitive both to the facts of the practices and to the values or principles that the practices serve.

Interpretivism has been developed by Ronald Dworkin in a number of publications over 30 years or so.

Interpretivism as developed by Dworkin includes the claim that interpretation is sensitive to values in the way just explained, and that it is fundamental to the nature of law.

Many theorists accept that, given the law, interpretation that is sensitive to values is necessarily employed in its application.

For example, the rationale of giving up one's seat to a senior in the name of courtesy may be to show respect; if so, the display of respect would constitute the point of the practice, so that, if faced with the question what the practice requires that one do in a different context, the right answer would be sensitive to that point.

For another example, which greatly simplifies a far more complicated practice, the rationale of awarding compensation for injuries caused by defective products may be that manufacturers should bear the cost of the risk associated with the use of the relevant products. Such a rationale would justify awarding damages when such injuries occur, whether or not the manufacturer is at fault — i.e. would justify no-fault liability.

Case study

To see how Legal Interpretivism plays out in practice, an example is important. We will turn our attention to a historic New York case, Riggs v. Palmer.

In this foundational case, the testator Francis B. Palmer left a bulk of the estate in his will to his grandson, Elmer E. Palmer, and a lesser amount to his two daughters, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston.

Fearing that the favorable will could be altered, Elmer Palmer then willfully murdered Francis Palmer and proceeded to claim title to the property that was left to him in the will. Here was the issue: even though the defendant, Elmer, was charged with his grandfather’s murder, there was no legal statute in place preventing Elmer from claiming the inheritance! The law of society at that time had no statutory prohibition on Elmer claiming title in this circumstance, and the defendant factually argued, “the testator is dead; that his will was made in due form and has been admitted to probate, and that, therefore, it must have effect according to the letter of the law.”

However, the New York Court of Appeals’ decision states, “It was not the intention of the legislature, in the general laws passed for the devolution of property by will or descent, that they should, and they do not, operate in favor of one who murdered his ancestor or benefactor in order to speedily come into possession of his estate.”

Instead of adopting a verbatim understanding of the textual law, the courts “favor a decision which upholds common decency and common morals, and violates no rule of law or equity.”

There existed a value society saw as representing legal justice, which was not articulated in the statutes, “No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own inequity or to acquire property by his own crime.”

The plaintiffs successfully argued to the Court of Appeals that Elmer would be unfairly profiting from his crime, which is inconsistent with what society viewed as just even though it was technically legal.

The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs reasoning that the legislative statute (that is society’s law) was not adequate. Because Elmer committed the harm, he was not entitled to the compensation of the will because of a moral principle that had not yet been articulated by the law. Here, Legal Interpretivism is valuable, since it does not fall into the trap of Legal Positivism, which isolates law from morality.

Conclusion

Dworkin challenges the emerging positivist viewpoint that rejects the natural theory. In doing so, Dworkin claims that there are historical moral terminologies. They may derive from the Eternal Law in the holy books, or from society’s established principles of what is fair and just. Because of this, Dworkin concedes that morality is and always will be a part of the law, even though societies may change with time.

Ultimately, it is the legal profession’s responsibility to maintain this presence of morality in the law. Legal principles have the ability to be moral, but this requires a sincere effort on behalf of the law–makers, law–executers, and law–deciders in a given society. This responsibility of the three branches of governance is to not be overlooked according to Dworkin’s appropriated Legal Interpretivism.