Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 PL ISSN 0081-685X DOI: 10.2478/V1067-010-0171-8

Adam Niemczyński

Katowice School of Economics and Jagiellonian University

DEPARTURE FROM TOWARDS THEORY IN SEARCH FOR BALANCE IN OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The author marks a disproportionally small amount of work on theory in comparison to the ample production of empirical information in contemporary psychology. To restore the balance between the two, it seems nec- essary to reply to the possessive doctrine of empiricism by revealing its theory of and to matching it with the scientific worldview of . The positivistic climate in science of the late nineteenth century swept up all the aspirations of nascent modern psychology. Brentano and Wundt were the first to attempt to emancipate themselves from the empiricism theory of cognition but psychology failed to followed suit. The same underlies the of human ontogeny being conducive to concep- tualisations in biological terms. Piaget turned out to be ingenious in his invention to elaborate the very same empiricist epistemology. Szuman also stayed under its influence, although his work on the role of upbringing in clearly has the power of argument for emancipation from biology. Vygotsky seems to be equivocal in this respect, too. The attempts of Brentano and Wundt consisted in arguing for the irreducibility of the mind to physiology of living organism. There is a continuous need in developmental psychology to reject the reduction of the mind to the adaptive functions of the human organism. Emancipation from the doctrine of empiricism may open the way to reaching a balance between psychological theory and research on the human mind and personality development.

“Why are we carrying out our research in de- of the need to move away from empiricism. velopmental psychology in the very way that Questioning empiricism is not tantamount to we are, while holding the hope to get psycho- embracing other than the empirical sources of logical knowledge of human development?” psychological cognition. It is the rejection of The article aims to lead the reader into an interpretation, which is inadequate to these a discussion conducive to gaining a greater empirical sources. self-consciousness in developmental research. The direct reason for me proposing a dis- Such a discussion, by its very nature, belongs to cussion on the role of theory in development epistemological discourses. The title of this in- research is the dwindling interest in devel- troduction suggests that we will be attempting opmental theories that I have observed over to define the role of theory in empirical devel- the past several decades in Poland and other opmental research. countries. I have the impression that this is Thus, I posit two theses. One is the claim of driven – at least partially – by the disregard the dominance of empiricism in human devel- for theory underpinned by the convictions of opment research. The second is the assertion about the very nature of scientific 14 Adam Niemczyński knowledge. It is precisely the value of empiri- have a sufficient level of statistical confidence. cism, as a theory of knowledge, and positivism, Statistics tell us in how many cases we will ob- as the of scientific cognition culti- tain the same result when repeating the study. vating empiricism, that I call to question in We agree that we will be taking into account the name of getting knowledge of the human those and only those outcomes that stand mind and its development in the individual life a chance of turning out to be different in no course. more than in one study out of twenty repeti- tions. Once our research successfully passes these statistical tests then we have an estab- THE EMPIRICISM OF lished finding or even a series of scientific PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH findings, more modestly called results of sci- entific cognition. We easily forget that we are Empiricism is a philosophical thesis on our not waiting for 20 repetitions of our research knowledge about the world originating from as nobody seriously treats such a mass of rep- sensory experience, and only from this expe- etitions as a true postulate, not just a statistical rience. It counters the claims of knowledge façon de parler. originating from still other sources. It pervades It is this route from positing a hypothesis science with the force of an entire empire. It to the acceptance of that and only that which has established itself and settled right in both is supported with empirical data, which is psychology and developmental psychology. called the path from a scientific discovery to This has resulted in an emphasis on empiri- its acceptance. It becomes only then clear what cal studies as the sole and exclusive source of a scientific finding is and it can parade around knowledge and in the unparalleled popularity in the costume of scientific knowledge, which of the so-called psychological research meth- hols a sign of , that is, intersubjec- odology where the statistical analysis of data tive verifiability. Otherwise we don’t know collected through , experiments or whether our findings are of scientific value or surveys and questionnaires plays a major role. constitute metaphysics, mere speculation, de- The developmental research plans also have lusion or fantasy. They can easily be exposed their own rules as cross-sectional, longitudinal, by subjecting them to the empirical verification mixed, and sequential cross-sections of devel- or particularly and necessarily falsification. opment, which do not assume anything about Where hypotheses are derived from is of no the nature of development apart from that de- importance. And the decisions as to which velopmental changes take place with lapse of hypotheses deserve empirical verification of time within the life span of the investigated in- falsification standing a chance of becoming dividuals. The accuracy of conclusions that are a finding is particularly mysterious. drawn about the explored reality with the aid When psychology was becoming a science, of statistics are meant to result from the formal the modern philosophy of positive science was justification of these research plans. Proceeding also being born and referred to as the second according to the indications of this methodolo- positivism. It has been the philosophy of the gy is meant to ensure that we will ultimately be natural sciences of Ernst Mach (1886/2010) relying on solid foundations. and Richard Avenarius (1988/1990) with the What follows from this is that we stand on thesis of empiricism as its foundation. Its im- sufficiently solid ground when we accept these pact on psychology has been made through its and only these assertions, towards which we subsequent incarnations in the works of the

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 Departure from Empiricism Towards Theory in Search for Balance in Psychology of Human Development 15 representatives of the and un- reflection apply across all the sciences, which doubtedly still dominates it. The criticism of can ultimately be reduced to the claims of fun- empiricism of the Vienna Circle by Karl Pop- damental science in relation to the edifice of per (1935) did not take him beyond empiricism positivist knowledge about the real world. though he contributed to its development sig- This fundamental position is usually taken nificantly. However, this development does not on by physics and, lately, also by information at all weaken the anti-theoretical approach of technology, although psychology, particularly empiricism but even strengthens it, especially developmental psychology seems to reduce it to in the social sciences. This positivist concept biology since Darwin (1859) came up with the of science invariably and absolutely dominates theory of evolution, providing psychologists psychology. It does not belong to any science at with the permanent conviction on the subject all, neither the natural nor social or humanist. of their research as a multitude of psychologi- It is a philosophical thesis from the domain of cal (mental) functions of the organism which epistemology which considers all kinds of our serve the purpose of adaptation, that is, the knowledge, not only the scientific one. survival of the representatives of the homo sa- Leszek Kołakowski (2009) pointed to four piens species in the natural living environment rules that positivism imposes on scientific cog- of this species. Information Technology – inte- nition. The first is , that is, the grated into the mechanist tradition (l’homme that there is no distinction between the machine) – provides a popular model for the entity and the phenomena being cognised, and causal explanation of phenomena by cogni- searching for it under the surface of phenom- tive processes, that is, the ways (mechanisms) ena that are directly available to our research of information processing coming from the is futile. This does not mean that phenomena environment and serving, after appropriate have no causes which produce them. On the processing, the control of behaviour in the contrary, these causes – as the mechanisms of environment. That, which is psychological phenomena – are the goal of cognition using (mental) is reduced by psychologists to what is hypotheses that are directly verified by inves- biological (physiological) and mechanic, which tigating the course of phenomena. The second can be explained as being independent of the rule is nominalism, in other words, the prohi- will, decisions, and a person’s responsibility. bition of supposing that knowledge formulated The reduction of the person to the mecha- in general categories has other counterparts nisms of behaviour in the environment is also than individual specific objects. All ideal con- served by the psychology of individual differ- structs (of logic, mathematics) that are used ences. It reaches back to the times of Charles in the natural sciences are created solely for Darwin (1859/2009)), whose distant cousin, the purposes of the conceptual organisation Francis Galton (1869) endowed it with statis- of empirical data. The third rule of scientific tics and applied statistics within it. He started positivism is denying any cognitive value of from differences in and others fol- evaluating judgements and normative state- lowed suit and included in the investigations ments, which are arbitrary by nature. And the differences in temperament and personali- finally, the fourth rule is that of the unity of ty, developing statistical methods of analysis of the method of acquiring knowledge, that is, variances and covariances in results of various the assertion that the same methods of gaining psychological tests that were meant to measure knowledge and the same stages of the process- these differences on construed psychomet- ing of data from experiences by theoretical ric scales. Each of the studied persons can be

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 16 Adam Niemczyński attributed relevant points on these scales, which life vital processes taking place in tune with can then be used as empirical information on the environment of the representatives of the the individual persons (their intelligence, tem- species. It follows from this that the psyche perament, and personality). The aim of these (mind) essentially develops in the same way as efforts is predicting their behaviour (to be the stomach, lungs, and every other vital organ more precise: differences in behaviour) in the of the homo sapiens. We have several concep- situations set in their environment, involving tual models for this development in literature. intelligence, temperament, and personality in 2. The psyche (mind) and every compo- the chain of causes and effects (mechanisms) nent of the psyche (mind) plays a specialised determining coping with environmental chal- role in the entire living process of the organism lenges and tasks. of the homo sapiens. Thinking is this special- ised vital function of the organism or a set of such functions; hence, such a vital function is EPISTEMOLOGY IN HUMAN speech, also divided into its partial functions DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY making up the entirety of speech functions in the life of the organism. Emotions or affects Returning to research on human development are another vital function; apart from that, and moving on to the role of theory in such needs, drives, motivations are yet other func- research, we have empiricism as a theory of tions of this kind. All psychological functions the scientific cognition of development, and are – like physiological functions – necessary biology with its concepts and theories as the to execute the functions of the entirety of the foundation for every conceptualisation and vital processes, in other words, to adapt to the every theory of individual human development environment. We can also encounter in litera- during the lifecourse. This fundamental set ture many theories of psychological (mental) comprises: (1) the concept of ontogeny; (2) the adaptation to the environment. concept of the psyche (mind), in other words 3. The determination of all ontogenetic de- of that, which is subject to developmental velopment takes place through heredity, which changes; and (3) the concept of laws (correct- leads to the formation of the representative of ness, determination) of development. Below is the species, and through the living environment a succinct explanation of these concepts. of the species, which is an essential condition 1. Ontogeny as the development of specif- for this. The laws of this development are the ic representatives of the species can constitute laws of (a) maturation, (b) learning from ex- the subject of human developmental psy- perience, (c) transformation of own activity, chology research if the psyche (mind) is maintaining the balance of the organism in the considered a part of the biological construct environment, and (d) internalisation of the so- of the representatives of the homo sapiens cio-cultural ways of regulating the relationships species. Whatever the biological nature of the and cooperation of people. We can find a multi- phenomena studied by us means, the psyche tude of developmental theories in literature that (mind) has such a nature. Modern biology is either take only one kind of these four factors rooted in the theory of evolution, therefore, the into account, or two or three of them, and also ontogeny of the human psyche (mind) has the theories referring to all four factors for human same nature as the ontogeny of the stomach, development during the individual life course. lungs, etc., that is, of every organ, system, and Psychoanalysis and part of the organism taking part in its complex theories, in all their forms, refer to the laws

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 Departure from Empiricism Towards Theory in Search for Balance in Psychology of Human Development 17 of maturation. Behaviourists and cognitive while interacting with them and then using the psychology, referring to the processing infor- assimilated forms to regulate the behaviours mation about the environment, also rely on the of others when playing, interacting, and coop- rules for learning from experience. erating, is the next phase of entering into the (1967), and the plethora of theories stemming human world of culture and civilisation. The from his conceptual model of development, third phase is an internalisation phase, started point to the adaptation of the spontaneous by directing the cultural measures of regula- mental activity to environment and the innate tion to one’s own activity and finalised by the and rooted in experience conditions when reconstruction of one’s own activity to a typ- it comes to the development of this activity. ically human form, i.e., cultural and civilised, This gets complicated with the fourth factor, and it closes the cycle. This is an activity that namely, pertaining to the issue of if and how has the form of a free choice among desires to separate it. The authors of the theory of mat- that are recognised and have their axiological uration and/or environmental determinism place in the world, and possible to actualise in distinguish different types or aspects of envi- this world of culture and civilisation. ronmental impact (physical, social and, within It is uncertain whether Vygotsky would it, also educational, cultural, and historical), agree with such an interpretation of his theo- but this does not necessarily lead to the concept ry, moving out towards the dualism of biology of various environmental factors for develop- and culture in human nature. He might have ment. With Piaget and the stream of emerging struggled with it, probably just like both Ste- trends influenced by him, for example, we fan Szuman (1959), my scientific protoplast, have the appearance of the symbolic function and Maria Przetacznikowa (1973), his student (which is, of course, a cultural phenomenon) and my master struggled with their dualism of without any import of it from the environment, similar kind. In fact, they both outlined a solu- and it rather appears as a continuation of the tion to these difficulties in their research on inner developmental transformations of senso- the development of children and adolescents. ry-motor intelligence (Piaget, 1939, 1966). Szuman presented four factors of this develop- It seems that in the distinction by Lev ment, which were later somewhat differently Vygotsky (1971) – in fact following suit on formulated by Maria Żebrowska (1985) in the (1897) – of the primary and Developmental Psychology textbook that she higher psychological functions, a detach- edited. Przetacznikowa, however, made Szu- ment of development of higher psychological man’s innate and environmental factors the function from the laws of biology emerged. subject of conditional analysis, and made the Cultural measures of regulating children’s ac- child’s own activity and education the matter tivity used by parents, guardians, educators, of causal analysis. The aim of causal analy- and teachers open up before them a completely sis is to show the developmental changes of different path of development – social, cultural, the own actions of a child, which are taking and historical – on which symbolic, semantic, place during the upbringing process, lead- and interpretative constructs play a central ing to them to taking on the forms that are role. These interpersonal activities taking place dependent on upbringing. In my attempt at with the help of semantic constructs cannot be the theory of human development in the full reduced to the adaptation of relevant persons individual life course (Niemczyński, 1980, to the environment. The first step is an assim- 1994, 2007), I am following Szuman and Prze- ilation by a child of cultural forms from adults tacznikowa, and the thesis of Vygotsky (1971)

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 18 Adam Niemczyński on the relation of behaviour to development trying to hide his scepticism towards the use- unveiled a completely new perspective on the fulness and overall possibility of carrying out third and fourth factor, along with a causal the experiments in this field of research due analysis. This has deepened my dualism taken to their social, cultural, and historical nature from Przetacznikowa and Szuman. I mention (Wundt, 1990-1920). this because Szuman, the founding father of Brentano (1874/1999), however, introduced developmental and in a divide into physiological psychology and our country (Stefan Baley approached educa- descriptive psychology, highlighting the tion rather from the side), referentiality of mental acts, absent from psy- was a naturalist as well as a humanist. It is as chophysiological processes. One and the other though he carried within him the distinction clearly and explicitly stressed that research between the natural sciences, on the one hand, belonging to Geisteswissenschaften on the and social and humanist sciences, on the other operations of the mind and research on the (German Naturwissenschaften und Geisteswis- psychology of the peoples (Voelkerpsycholo- senschaften). This distinction from the th19 gie) are empirical sciences and both criticised century was crucial for Wilhelm Wundt and introspection as conceived by Wundt’s stu- Franz Brentano, two central figures of nascent dent, Edwin Titchener, by a student of Fechner psychology. (1860), Hermann Ebbbinghaus (1885 ), and by Piaget (1967) also had very pronounced a student of Wundt, Oswald Külpe (1893). This views on the problem of epistemological du- triplet of classical introspectionists, resistant to alism, which can be seen in his extensive and the criticism of introspection by Wundt (1897) frequently appearing in successive mono- and Brentano (1874, 1999), belong to the pre- graphs justifications for selecting his own path cursors of ignoring the significance of the between apriorism and empiricism. For Piaget, theory of Wundt and the theory of Brentano, genetic epistemology ultimately engulfed two at the same time disregarding the efforts re- excluding theories of cognition in the structure quired to create any solid theory, including the of cognition as biological adaptation. efforts of empirical insights into the researched The distinction known to Szuman, Piaget, mental processes (social, cultural, and histori- and Vygotsky between the natural sciences and cal), which cannot be reduced to phenomena the social sciences and the humanistic scienc- of physics or physiology, or even to phenom- es was used earlier – as already mentioned by ena from evolutionary biology circles. Edwin me – by Wundt and Brentano. Wundt (1897) Boring (1929, 1950), Titchener’s student, con- clearly distinguished the lower and higher psy- tributed to consolidating the absence of Wundt chological (mental) processes. Experimental from mainstream psychological research and , that is, the field of research on to the banishment of Brentano to philosophy. sensory processes, deals with the His textbook, which former. According to Wundt, a laboratory ex- dominated both sides of the Atlantic for many periment is out of the question in psychology years, fails to address the theory of Wundt but of higher mental processes but other means stops merely at his laboratory as the first in the of scientific research are possible. He argued history of , and Bren- this in the 10 volumes of the psychology of the tano is not visible at all in the psychological peoples (Voelkerpsychologie), and he almost research mainstream. entirely dedicated the first several of these What is enlightening in this is precisely volumes to speech and thinking without even that Ebbinghaus, Külpe, and Titchener were

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 Departure from Empiricism Towards Theory in Search for Balance in Psychology of Human Development 19 completely oblivious to the empirical nature of It is most probably Aristotle’s Metaphysics research that was being conducted by Wundt that resonates in this distinction of Brentano’s and Brentano when analysing mental process- (2009): „…Knowledge, perception, notions, es. The thing is that Wundt and Brentano were and thinking always have a different subject, set on differentiating introspection from inner they only deal with themselves incidentally…” perception. The former was rejected as being Macnamara (1999) suggests for this inner per- fallible, and even – like Brentano – actually ception to be rather called intuition so as to impossible. Fear of something or a reminis- clearly differentiate it from introspection. He cence of something disappears once we direct also adds here that, contrary to the epistemo- our attention to it, wanting to observe it. For logical doctrine of intuitionism, the ‘insight Brentano, this essentially proves the impossi- into the nature of things’ does not necessary bility of introspection. Titchener, Külpe, and have to be always considered as reliable and Ebbinghaus completely ignored the criticism incorrigible, or as the highest type of cog- and its author. nition. This kind of empirical cognition has What Wundt and Brentano had in mind been categorically and absolutely excluded by was the reliable inner perception of the acts of empiricism. It is also noteworthy that thus un- the mind. It was recently excellently pointed derstood intuition is, however, also involved in out in Polish literature by Ryszard Stachowski the cognition of nature using the external sens- (2013) that Wundt was not an introspectionist. es. Positivism also does not reject it altogether This is how Brentano characterises this inner but only warrants it in the context of a finding, perception after the rejection of the possibil- that is, it rejects the epistemological doctrine ity of introspection. “It is a universally valid of intuitionism but does not contest the reality psychological law that we can never focus our of intuition. It seems, in this respect, that it is attention upon the object of inner perception. not, however, capable of granting it full status (…) It is only while our attention is turned of a source of cognition in both contexts or toward a different object that we are able to phases of the cognitive cycle – in the phase of perceive, incidentally, the mental processes reaching a discovery and in the phase of justi- that are directed towards that object (1999, fying it alike. p. 43).” John Macnamara thus developed this It is not difficult to notice why intuition thought: “If you see a cow, for example, the cow cannot be acknowledged by empiricism as is the object of your vision, and you may attend an independent source of cognition – as ex- to her a much as you wish. You are also aware, perience subject to correction. The subject of incidentally , that you are seeing her, not imag- intuitive cognition is surely not the subject ining or touching her. You are further aware, of sensory perception (sight, hearing, smell, incidentally, that it is you, not your friend, who taste, and touch). So what is it? Mathematical is having this experience of seeing. The cow and logical cognition cannot go without intu- is the object of the outer perception; the facts ition. This is what clearly and explicitly allows that you are seeing, not touching, and that it is the mind to come to know such ideal objects you who is having the experience are given in- as a point, a straight line, parallel lines, prime cidentally in inner perception. (1999, p. 205)” numbers, and even numbers, etc. If the ide- (Macnamara is Irish and a cow in that culture als are available to intuition as real objects of has a very positive sentimental value, which mathematical cognition then this is the fall of does not completely correspond to the Polish the nominalism of positivism. The objects of sentiment.) sensory experience are not the only objects

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 20 Adam Niemczyński of cognition by the human mind. Apart from ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENTAL that, logic and mathematics also serve coming RESEARCH BEING FREED FROM THE to know nature. Positivism does not dispute LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRICISM this but it does fail to accept the real existence of the objects of mathematics and logic, they I have advanced two theses beginning this are to exist nominally, one could say that they introduction to the discussion. The first was comprise useful fiction in cognition for the that empiricism, as a concept of science, dom- purpose of the structuring of sensory data. inates in developmental psychology research. Leszek Kołakowski (2009) rightly considers I end with widening this observation to all the positivist philosophy as a peculiar doctrine. research in psychology. The second thesis is I hasten to add that it has all the earmarks of the assertion of the need to move away from ideology, scientific worldview, which is eagerly empiricism. Its inadequate concept of experi- adopted and forced by scientists because it po- ence restricts the role of theoretical invention, sitions science and scientists in contemporary having no adequate appreciation of the impor- society in an elite position, as the only authentic tance of theory in psychological research. experts in natural science and social processes If the positivist version of empiricism is from whom every modern person can find out responsible for the atrophy of psychological genuinely useful , vital to coping in indi- theory in research not just on the development vidual and collective life. Scientists often have of the human mind, then we now have an open divergent views but it is they and they alone path to asking questions about the role of theo- who have the right to argue over, debate about, retical . With empiricism, we have and settle possible controversies, of course, ac- rejected understanding them as simply report- cording to scientific principles, passing absolute ing on sensory experience. Admitting inner judgements as to what constitutes knowledge perception as a source of corrected experiential and what groundless speculation. Everyone else knowledge (intuition, in Macnamara’s under- outside their narrow scope are laymen, ignora- standing), we are extending the empirical base muses not entitled to take part in such a debate for scientific knowledge. In order to reach, in because, not belonging to the select group, they light of experience – whether inner or external, have no understanding of things. or one and the other – knowledge on reality The history of psychology has proven that that is available to our experience, we have to scientists can also exclude scientists in this formulate these theorems. Positivism does not way. Wundt turned out to be a false empiri- provide the answer to the question of how this cist and the Voelkerpsychologie, on which it can be done. Popper, a critic of positivism, by would be better to cast a veil, is proof of this. adding falsification to the verification of theo- Brentano does not merit the name of a genuine rems that are already posited, also leaves this empiricist so his place is among philosophical question unanswered. Where do theorems, speculations and not among solid, scientific which are subject to verification or falsification psychology. This history of exclusion with the as hypotheses in light of empirical data, come motivation of faith in empiricism is still alive from? and faring well. I myself am not a follower of Stachowski (2013) reminded that the testing this faith and I am not alone in this resistance of reaction times by Wundt and his students – to the pressure of empiricism to reduce our in other words, obtaining empirical data about discipline to biology and reduce research on the physical size of time intervals between the the mind to the physiology of the brain. presentation of a stimuli and the execution

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 Departure from Empiricism Towards Theory in Search for Balance in Psychology of Human Development 21 of a response – was not at all the aim of the multiple times and, possibly, also capture in it research programme of Wundt (1987). The the two components of the act of perceiving the objective was testing the theory of appercep- differences between experimental exposition tional-volitive functions, that is, the theory of stimuli – apperception and the act of the will. apperception as the will in action. Appercep- Stachowski (2013, p. 75) is close to grasping tion, according to this theory, is the selective this difference between intersubjective control focus of attention on the object and takes place through the repetition of research, applicable through the will. The mentioned time intervals, to all experimental research, and the multiple i.e., reaction times, should therefore be divid- repetition of a phenomenon which is difficult ed into two sections. One of them is the time to pick up in inner perception. Surely the same spent focusing on the stimuli exposure, that is, occurs in the case of the perception of objects on the object of sensory perception, in order in the surroundings. Sometimes they are dif- to possibly differentiate between stimuli. This ficult to perceive and many attempts must be is the perceptual component of apperception. made for them to be clearly and explicitly per- The second component is decision time, thus, ceived. Accurate and reliable inner perception an act of the will, culminating in the selection – for example, of the phases of the process of of reactions in the form of a perceptual judge- seeing (differences in brightness of successive ment on the differences between stimuli. The light flashes in the laboratory) – is never easy, respondent, and Wundt was one too, has access and the course of inner perception is short, within inner perception to this perception of hence, must be repeated multiple times, rec- external stimuli of him or her and to deciding reating the experiment so as to ultimately be on the difference. Inner perception occurs in- able to capture the phases of this perception cidentally (German neben), as it were, on the of differences in brightness of the light flashes. side plan of attention focused on the object of This is the point and the aim of the experiment, external perception. to see if the biphasic nature of the process is If the inner experience of the perception of available directly to the observer. The theory what has been exposed incidentally provides of apperception demands such a type of data insight into the course of apperception, the if they are to indicate whether the theory is phase of focusing on the object and the phase true or false. Only such type of data provided of decision about what is being perceived (the by inner perception can be taken into account same, or two different stimuli in a sequence) and the reports of the respondent supply this may, possibly, be captured. The fact that the kind of data. respondent repeats this inner perception mul- Wundt was not an introspectionist but an tiple times is rather down to it being tricky to excellent researcher who performed tena- capture that, which can only be captured while cious experimental research using the method focusing on something different. To have these of inner perception. And their tenacity came numerous occasions, the procedure of the ex- from his theoretical invention and boldness periment must be repeated. Once Wundt, as of hypothetical thinking based, among others, the respondent, established – as a result of these on empirical data, but most of all thanks to numerous inner insights into his perception of the breadth and depth of his approach to the external stimuli – that both apperception and human mind, the meaning of mental processes the act of the will make up this perception, in social life and in the history of mankind. The then his doctoral students and any other ex- issue of how the mind works in sensory percep- perimenters may repeat this gaining of insight tion is the axis around which the experimental

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 22 Adam Niemczyński programme of Wundt (1897) revolved. Inves- the development of the mind and personality tigating the mentality of societies and nations of children, adolescents, and adults needs lib- in the cultural history of humankind is the eration from the infertile, closed thinking on programme of Wundt’s Voelkerpsychologie development in the nineteenth-century di- (1900-1920). Although he failed to see the role lemma of Galton (1874) – nature vs. nurture. of the experiment in this project, but he did Physics refused to allow itself to be contained not have the slightest doubt that it is not only is in the empiricist philosophy of cognition bur- scientific and implies empirical evidence , but geoning at the time. As did all the other natural he was also conceived that it requires effort to sciences. Even social or human science (Ger- build theories and posit hypotheses on its basis man Geisteswissenschften), emerging during to refer to all aspects of culture and the compo- this time of romantic nineteenth-century cul- nents of the mentality of the nations, to ideas ture, were served on the European continent driving and shaping the behaviour of societies, rather with the concept of the nobility of the and to historical social-cultural changes. And spirit than the nobility of birth, but they too this is not a simple task. It requires extensive were prone to stratifying society into the elite knowledge, and, most of all, not a narrow and the common mass. empiricist spirit but the broad horizons of psy- I invite you to a discussion where no view is chological thought, and also countering the apriori excluded. In my introduction, I clearly suppression of the freedom of research and advocate the dualism of physiological psychol- investigations with the cry of ‘away with spec- ogy and the psychology of the mind. And I am ulation’, cutting down like a sword any attempts against reducing the mind to the physiology of thought liberated from the dominion of sta- of the brain. Research of psychophysiological tistics and psychometric methodology. changes with age according to the methodolo- The logic of scientific cognition is not sta- gy of biological studies is one thing. Research tistics and . It would be good to on the development of human mental func- know why logic, particularly the logic of scien- tions is something completely different, taking tific cognition, was – for a long time – nowhere place during the course of his/her biological to be seen in psychological studies (includ- maturation of transformation, which leads ing PhD programmes). The postulates of the their development out from under biological rational recognition of convictions and inter- determination and subjects it to socio-cultur- subjective communication and the correction al regulation. Upbringing and education, the of claims, accepted after Ajdukiewicz (1934, essence of which is historic, intergenerational 1958) (Brzeziński, 2008, pp. 181-189), are im- cultural content, are the source of this so- portant and undoubtedly necessary principles cio-cultural regulation of the development of but carrying insufficient logic and epistemo- persons as individuals. logical knowledge bases to mould a researcher The discussions vary. The moderator of our in psychology. This thread, however, is best left discussion and I propose a discussion that – for a separate discussion. as Roman Ingarden (1972) would have said Since the times of Galton (1874), attempts – has no assumptions. This means that its par- have been made to measure and weigh the ticipants are entering into the debate without human person convinced in the success of this assuming which position (including their own) endeavour that is worthy of a better cause. It is is acceptable, or rather with the intention of in- time to try to set ourselves free from this fu- vestigating what empiricism is and what argues tility once and for all. Especially research on in favour of it, what is its criticism, rejection,

Studia Psychologiczne. t. 55 (2017), z. 2, s. 13–24 Departure from Empiricism Towards Theory in Search for Balance in Psychology of Human Development 23 and what grounds do they have. May our aim Ebbinghaus, H. (1885) Uber das Gedachtnis. Untersu- not be to convince anyone to anything. Science chungen zur experimentalen Psychologie. Leipzig: is not politics or an ideology. It is an attempt of Drucker & Humblot. the mind, searching for appealing arguments Fechner, G. (1860) Elemente der Psychophysik. in a contested matter. Leipzig: Breitlopf und Hartel. Galton, F. (1869) Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences. London: Macmillan. Galton, F. (1874) English Men of Science: Their Na- REFERENCES ture and Nurture. London: Macmillan & Co. Ingarden, R. (1972) Książeczka o człowieku [Little Ajdukiewicz, K. (1934) Logistyczny antyirracjonalizm Book on Man]. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie. w Polsce [Logistic Anti-Irrationalism in Poland], Kołakowski, L. (2009) Filozofia pozytywistyczna. (Od Przegląd Filozoficzny, 38/4, 399-408. Hume’a do Koła Wiedeńskiego) [Positivist Philos- Ajdukiewicz, K. (1958). Zagadnienie racjonalności ophy. (From Hume to the Vienna Circle]. Warsaw: zawodnych sposobów wnioskowania [The Prob- Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. (4th Edition.) lem of the Rationality of Fallible Methods of Infer- Kulpe, O. (1893) Grundriss der Psychologie: Auf ence]. Studia Filozoficzne, 4, 14-29. experimenteller Grundlage Dargenstellt. Leipzig: Aristotele (2009) Metaphysics. Warsaw: Wydawni- Wilhelm Engelmann. ctwo Naukowe PWN. Mach, E. (1886) Die analyse der Empfindungen und Avenarius, R. (1888-1890) Kritik der Reiner Erfarung. das Verhaltnis des Physischen und Psychischen. I-II Bande. Leipzig: Fues Verlag. Jena: Verlag von Gustaf Fischer. Polish translation: Boring, E. History of Experimental Psychology. New Analiza wrażeń i stosunek sfery fizycznej do psy- York: Century Company chicznej [Analysis of Impressions and the Relation Boring, E. A History of Experimental Psychology. of the Physical Sphere to the Psychological]. War- 2nd ed. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts. saw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2010. Brentano, F. (1874) Psychologie vom Empirischen Macnamara, J. (1999) Through the Rearview Mirror: Standpunkte. Leipzig: Verlag von Dunker Historical Reflections on Psychology. Cambridge: & Humbold. Polish translation: Psychologia z em- Bradford Books. pirycznego punktu widzenia [Psychology from an Niemczyński, A. (1980) Modele indywidualnego roz- Empirical Standpoint]. Wydawnictwo Naukowe woju człowieka [Models of Individual Human De- PWN, 1999. velopment]. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Brzeziński, J. (2008) Metodologia. Podstawy me- Jagiellońskiego. todologiczne i statystyczne prowadzenia badań Niemczyński, A. (1994) O autonomii rozwoju. Zarys naukowych w psychologii [Methodology. Meth- problematyki [On the Autonomy of Development. odological and Statistical Fundamentals for Con- An overview], Kwartalnik Polskiej Psychologii ducting Scientific Research in Psychology]. In: Jan Rozwojowej, 2(1), 3-11. Strelau and Dariusz Doliński, Psychologia. Pod- Niemczyński, A. (2007) Inner Regulatory Device of ręcznik akademicki. [Psychology. University Text- Adult Development. Polish Psychological Bulletin, book] Chapter 4, pp. 173-302. Gdańsk: Gdańskie 38(3), 1333-1339. Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne. Piaget, J. (1966) Narodziny inteligencji dziecka [The Darwin, C. (1859) On the Origin of Species by Means Origins of Intelligence in Children]. Warsaw: Pań- of Natural Selection, or Preservation of favou- stwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. Translated from: red races in the struggle for life. London: Murray Jean Piaget, La naissance de l”intelligence chez (1st ed.). New translation into Polish: O powstawa- l’enfant. Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestle, 1939. niu gatunków drogą doboru naturalnego [On the Piaget, J. (1967) Biologie et Connaissance. Essai sur les Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection]. relation organique et les processus Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszaw- Cognitf. Paris: Gallimard Collection L’Avenir de la skiego, 2009. Science.

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Popper, K. (1935) Logik der Forschung. Vienna: Julius pp. 65-78. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Springer Verlag. Polish translation: Logika odkry- Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. cia naukowego [The Logic of Scientific Discovery]. Szuman, S. (1959) O czynnikach kształtujących psy- Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, chikę dziecka w wieku przedszkolnym [About the 1977. Factors Shaping the Psyche of a Pre-School Child]. Przetacznikowa, M. (1973) Podstawy rozwoju psy- Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny, 4, 145-158. chicznego dzieci i młodziezy [The Fundamentals Wundt, W. (1897) Grundriss der Psychologie. Leipzig: of the Psychological Development of Children and Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann Adolescents]. Warsaw: Państwowe Zakłady Wy- Wundt, W. (1900-1920) Voelkerpsychologie,10 Baen- dawnictw Szkolnych. de. Leipzig: Engelman. Stachowski, R. (2013) Dlaczego psychologia Wilhel- Vygotsky, L. (1971) Wybrane prace psychologiczne ma Wundta nie jest psychologią introspekcyjną? [Selected Psychological Works]. Translated by: [Why is Wilhelm Wundt’s Psychology not an In- Edda and Józef Fleszner. Warsaw: Państwowe Wy- trospective Psychology?] In: Teresa Rzepa and dawnictwo Naukowe. Cezary W. Domański (Ed.) Na drogach i bez- Żebrowska, M. (Ed.) (1979) Psychologia rozwojowa drożach historii psychologii [On the Highways dzieci i młodzieży [Developmental Psychology of and Byways of the History of Psychology]. Vol. 2, Children and Adolescents]. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Adam Niemczyński

Górnośląska Wyższa Szkoła Handlowa i Uniwersytet Jagielloński

ODEJŚCIE OD EMPIRYZMU W STRONĘ TEORII DLA RÓWNOWAGI W BADANIACH NAD ROZWOJEM CZŁOWIEKA

STRESZCZENIE

Autor wskazuje na dysproporcję miedzy praca nad teorią psychologiczną a obfitą produkcją informacji em- pirycznej. Przywrócenie równowagi teorii i empirii skupia się na odparciu zaborczego empiryzmu przez ukazanie jego teoriopoznawczej natury, komponującej się z naukowym światopoglądem pozytywizmu. Epi- stemologiczny klimat empiryzmu dziewiętnastowiecznego zagarnął rodzącą się nowoczesną psychologię. Brentano i Wundt podjęli próbę emancypacji, zignorowaną w dalszym rozwoju psychologii. Również psy- chologowie rozwoju człowieka praktykują epistemologię empiryzmu, redukując swoje myślenie do biologii. Z genialną pomysłowością rozbudował tę epistemologię Piaget. Szuman nie wyzwolił się z niej, chociaż jego myśl badawcza o roli wychowania w rozwoju dziecka nie mieści się w tej redukcji. Podobnie Wygotski nie wypada jednoznacznie pod tym względem. Próba emancypacji w wykonaniu Brentano i Wundta polegała na wskazaniu niesprowadzalności umysłu człowieka do fizjologii jego organizmu.. W badaniach nad rozwojem człowieka wciąż jest potrzebna obrona przed redukcją umysłu do adaptacyjnych funkcji organizmu. Emancy- pacja spod doktryny empiryzmu przywrócić może chwytaną już przez Brentano i Wundta równowagę teorii i doświadczenia w dochodzeniu do wiedzy psychologicznej o rozwoju umysłu i osobowości człowieka.

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