DOCSLIB.ORG

UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Baconian Foundationalism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Baconian Foundationalism UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Baconian Foundationalism and the Problem of Certainty A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Daniel Schwartz Committee in charge: Professor Donald Rutherford, Chair Professor Craig Callender Professor Tal Golan Professor Samuel Rickless Professor Robert Westman 2014 Copyright Daniel Schwartz, 2014 All rights reserved. The dissertation of Daniel Schwartz is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on mi- crofilm and electronically: Chair University of California, San Diego 2014 iii EPIGRAPH [Bacon] is usually considered, not only as having asserted some general principles, but laid down the special rules of scientific investigation; as not only one of the Founders, but the supreme Legislator of the modern Republic of Science; not only the Hercules who slew the monsters that obstructed the earlier traveler, but the Solon who established a Constitution fitted for all future time. -William Whewell iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page . iii Epigraph . iv Table of Contents . v List of Figures . vi List of Tables . vii Acknowledgements . viii Vita . ix Abstract of the Dissertation . x Chapter 1 Introduction . 1 1.1 The Instauratio ....................... 6 1.2 Outline of the Dissertation . 10 Chapter 2 The What and the Where of Certainty in the Instauratio . 15 2.1 Kinds of Certainty . 16 2.2 Bacon and the Skeptics . 21 2.3 The Certainty of Part Six . 27 2.3.1 Arguments for Restricting Certainty to Part Six . 27 2.3.2 Goals and Terminology of Baconian Science . 30 2.3.3 The Certainty of Rules as Non-Epistemic . 41 Chapter 3 The Certainty of Sense-Perception . 47 3.1 What are the Immediate Objects of Sense-perception? . 50 3.1.1 Ancient Views . 51 3.1.2 Bacon’s View . 57 3.2 What is the Relationship Between Reason and Sense- perception? . 60 3.2.1 Ancient Views . 60 3.2.2 Bacon’s View . 61 3.3 What is the Epistemological Status of the Reports of Sense-perception? . 65 3.3.1 Ancient Views . 65 3.3.2 Bacon’s View . 68 3.4 What are the Consequences of Withholding Assent to the Reports of Sense-perception? . 75 v 3.4.1 Ancient Views . 76 3.4.2 Bacon’s View . 78 3.5 Conclusion . 80 Chapter 4 Baconian Natural History and Scientific Progress . 82 4.1 What is a Baconian Natural History? . 86 4.2 The Unity of Discovery and Justification . 93 4.2.1 The Scholastics’ Discovery-Justification Distinction 93 4.2.2 Evidence that Bacon Rejects the Distinction . 97 4.3 First-Level Notions . 103 4.3.1 Which Notions are First-Level? . 106 4.3.2 Gradualism and First-level Notions . 109 4.3.3 The Nature and Justificatory Force of the Ab- straction of First-level Notions . 113 4.4 The Initial Justification of Natural History . .117 4.5 Scaffolding and Revision Mechanisms . .122 4.5.1 Degrees of Certainty . 123 4.5.2 Enhancement . 126 4.5.3 Self-Correction . 132 4.6 Objections and Replies . 134 4.6.1 Problem Cases for Discovery-Justification Unity . 135 4.6.2 Two More Problems for Revision Mechanisms . 140 4.7 Conclusion . 142 4.8 Acknowledgements . 143 Chapter 5 Induction . 144 5.1 Rival Interpretations and Assessments . 149 5.1.1 Gaukroger . 149 5.1.2 Jardine . 159 5.1.3 Urbach . 165 5.1.4 McCaskey . 170 5.2 A New Interpretation of Bacon’s Method . 177 5.2.1 Destruction and a New Beginning . 179 5.2.2 Elimination and the First Vintage . 182 5.2.3 Prerogative Instances . 189 5.3 Crucial Instances . 197 5.3.1 General Observations about Crucial Instances . 198 5.3.2 Examples of Certain, Affirmative Crucial Instances 201 5.3.3 The Reliance on Background Knowledge and Aux- iliary Assumptions . 204 5.3.4 The Exhaustiveness of the Alternatives . 207 5.3.5 Reasoning Affirmatively vs. Reasoning Negatively 209 5.4 Overview and Conclusion . 214 vi Chapter 6 Conclusion . 216 6.1 A Proposed Revision to Bacon’s Method . 218 6.2 Case Studies . 224 6.2.1 Newton’s Optics . 224 6.2.2 Robert Hooke’s Crucial Experiments . 235 6.3 Summary of the Dissertation . 243 Appendix A Guide to the Prerogative Instances . 249 A.1 Informative Instances . 250 A.1.1 Instances of the Lamp . 250 A.1.2 Instances Informative to the Intellect . 252 A.2 Instances Primarily Directed Towards Operation and Prac- tice: Practical Instances . 258 A.2.1 Instances with a Preparative Function (in the cre- ation of a natural history) and Inductive Func- tion: Propitious Instances or Benevolent Instances 258 A.2.2 Practical Instances With a Primarily Inductive Function: Mathematical Instances or Instances of Measure . 259 Bibliography . 261 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4.1: The Order of Discovery and the Structure of Justification . 84 Figure 5.1: The Stages of Baconian Induction . 178 Figure 6.1: Inverted Prisms . 227 Figure 6.2: Newton’s Crucial Experiment . 229 Figure 6.3: The Detection of Stellar Parallax . 240 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 4.1: Literate Experience . 128 Table 5.1: The Degree of Certainty of Axioms as a Function of the Com- pleteness and Degree of Certainty of a Natural History . 146 ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the support of Donald Rutherford as the chair of my committee. This dissertation is the end result of a very Baconian process of revision and self-correction, and much of that transformation is the result of his gentle poking and prodding over the course of many drafts. I would also like to acknowledge Samuel Rickless for his attention to detail and his help with my eliminating some inconsistences that were present in earlier drafts, as well as the whole UCSD History of Philosophy Roundtable for tolerating early drafts of my work and providing helpful feedback. Chapter 4, in part, significantly reproduces material that has been pub- lished in The Journal of Early Modern Studies (Volume 3, Issue 1) in the form of an article titled “Is Baconian Natural History Theory-Laden?” The dissertation author is the sole author of that article. I would, however, like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Donald Rutherford as well as two anonymous reviewers. Their feedback on that article resulted in many improvements that made their way into Chapter 4 of this dissertation. x VITA 2006 B.A. in Liberal Arts, St. John’s College, Annapolis 2006-2014 Graduate Student, University of California, San Diego 2014 Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of California, San Diego PUBLICATIONS Daniel Schwartz, “Is Baconian Natural History Theory-Laden?”, Journal of Early Modern Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring 2014. xi ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Baconian Foundationalism and the Problem of Certainty by Daniel Schwartz Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, San Diego, 2014 Professor Donald Rutherford, Chair Francis Bacon is one of the architects of the modern conception of scientific method. Yet Bacon’s corpus remains little studied and poorly understood. My dissertation is an account of his method with a focus on his reasons for believing that the it enables us to acquire knowledge of the nature of things (i.e., of forms) and thereby to establish causal claims with epistemic certainty. It thus has both an interpretive and an evaluative dimension. By way of a new interpretation of Bacon’s method, I defend him against those who have too casually dismissed his aspirations to certainty as a result of their reading him through deductivist or falsificationist lenses. I reconstruct Bacon’s method beginning with its foundation in sense- perception. I argue that Bacon (despite his remarks on the faults of the senses, xii which other interpreters have overemphasized) takes the side of the Epicureans against ancient skeptics. He holds that all sense-perceptions are true, by which he means that they always causally register mind-independent objects. I then argue that Bacon’s aspirations for certainty in natural history hinge on his mod- erate empiricist foundationalism. Part of his account is an original analysis of the self-correcting character of science, according to which erroneous instances in a natural history are eliminated over time as a result of their conflicting with con- clusions overwhelmingly supported by the rest of the instances. The guarantee that sporadic errors can be corrected in time is an important element in being able to secure certainty about forms. The culmination of my interpretation is a discussion of Baconian induction, which is usually understood in deductivist terms as a form of eliminative induction. I argue for an alternative interpretation which emphasizes the non-eliminative role of Bacon’s prerogative instances. Although the method that I describe should be subjected to further scrutiny, not even Bacon believed that he had the last word to say on scientific methodology; he viewed his method as an inductive discovery which would have to be revised. Accordingly, I offer Bacon’s method as a promising approach which contains within itself the resources to further expand its heuristic and justificatory power. xiii Chapter 1 Introduction Francis Bacon nourished grand hopes for the future of science. He devoted his intellectual life to the design and the partial completion of a six-part Instauratio magna or Great Renewal of the sciences. It carved the sciences up, identified deficiencies, and set down a new method in order to “throw open the doorsto [nature’s] inner sanctum” and lead us to “certain and ostensive knowledge” in the sciences and a corresponding explosion of technological progress. 1 The method was to be “a form of induction which will unbind experience and separate it out, and reach necessary conclusions by proper exclusions and rejections.” 2 In today’s era of epistemological humility, scholars looking back on Bacon have been tempted either to attack him for the hubris of thinking that scientific induction could ever provide us with epistemic certainty3 or to defend him against these attacks by reinterpreting him as more of a Popperian, more of a fallibilist, more of a skeptic, or, in short, as more of a modern.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1 Armand Maurer. the Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its
    Armand Maurer. The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999. Someone must be looking out for William Ockham. Excommunicated and exiled in his own lifetime, Ockham's philosophical works were revitalized in the twentieth century like those of no other medieval author. The two best medieval monographs of the century, from a philosophical point of view, were studies of Ockham.i And while the still unfinished Opera Omnia of Aquinas and Scotus plodded along, a brilliant group of scholars assembled in Olean, New York, to publish Ockham's Opera Philosophica et Theologica over a mere twenty-three years.ii And in a century that saw sophisticated bodies of philosophical scholarship grow up around the ancient and early modern periods, only Ockham among the medievals can lay claim to anything remotely analogous.iii Now Armand Maurer, at a mere 84 years of age, has managed to slip one more contribution into a century that, for Ockham Studies, was already venerable enough. It should be said from the start that Maurer's volume cannot compare, in philosophical detail and sophistication, with Marilyn Adams's even longer book on the subject. But this is nevertheless an important and valuable work. Maurer seeks to provide an introduction to Ockham's philosophy (10) and he succeeds entirely, in a manner worthy of comparison to Copleston and perhaps even Gilson. 1 It is surprisingly difficult to determine just what Maurer means by `the philosophy of Ockham.' He does not have in mind the medieval sense of `philosophy.' Though the volume begins with logic and metaphysics, and devotes a long chapter to physics, it is Ockham's Opera Theologica that receive most of Maurer's attention.
    [Show full text]
  • Values in Science Beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilSci Archive Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk Matthew J. Brown Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology The University of Texas at Dallas [email protected] July 12, 2012 Abstract The thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires social value- judgment, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden, has been gaining acceptance among philosophers of science. The main pro- ponents of the value-ladenness of science rely on either arguments from the underdetermination of theory by evidence or arguments from inductive risk. Both arguments share the premise that we should only consider values once the evidence runs out, or where it leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical pri- ority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. The problem of wishful thinking is indeed real|it would be an egregious error to adopt beliefs about the world because they comport with how one would prefer the world to be. I will argue, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake, and unnec- essary for adequately avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science than proponents of the underdetermination and inductive risk arguments have suggested. 1 Introduction This paper is part of the larger project of trying to understand the structure of values in science, i.e., the role of values in the logic of scientific practice.
    [Show full text]
  • Skepticism and Pluralism Ways of Living a Life Of
    SKEPTICISM AND PLURALISM WAYS OF LIVING A LIFE OF AWARENESS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE ZHUANGZI #±r A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY AUGUST 2004 By John Trowbridge Dissertation Committee: Roger T. Ames, Chairperson Tamara Albertini Chung-ying Cheng James E. Tiles David R. McCraw © Copyright 2004 by John Trowbridge iii Dedicated to my wife, Jill iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In completing this research, I would like to express my appreciation first and foremost to my wife, Jill, and our three children, James, Holly, and Henry for their support during this process. I would also like to express my gratitude to my entire dissertation committee for their insight and understanding ofthe topics at hand. Studying under Roger Ames has been a transformative experience. In particular, his commitment to taking the Chinese tradition on its own terms and avoiding the tendency among Western interpreters to overwrite traditional Chinese thought with the preoccupations ofWestern philosophy has enabled me to broaden my conception ofphilosophy itself. Roger's seminars on Confucianism and Daoism, and especially a seminar on writing a philosophical translation ofthe Zhongyong r:pJm (Achieving Equilibrium in the Everyday), have greatly influenced my own initial attempts to translate and interpret the seminal philosophical texts ofancient China. Tamara Albertini's expertise in ancient Greek philosophy was indispensable to this project, and a seminar I audited with her, comparing early Greek and ancient Chinese philosophy, was part ofthe inspiration for my choice ofresearch topic. I particularly valued the opportunity to study Daoism and the Yijing ~*~ with Chung-ying Cheng g\Gr:p~ and benefited greatly from his theory ofonto-cosmology as a means of understanding classical Chinese philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony Using the Term “Reasonable Scientific Certainty”
    NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE Testimony Using the Term “Reasonable Scientific Certainty” Subcommittee Reporting and Testimony Type of Work Product Views Document Statement of the Issue It is the view of the National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS) that legal professionals should not require that forensic discipline testimony be admitted conditioned upon the expert witness testifying that a conclusion is held to a “reasonable scientific certainty,” a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” or a “reasonable degree of [discipline] certainty.” The legal community should recognize that medical professionals and other scientists do not routinely use “to a reasonable scientific certainty” when expressing conclusions outside of the courts. Such terms have no scientific meaning and may mislead factfinders [jurors or judges] when deciding whether guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Forensic science service providers should not endorse or promote the use of this terminology. The Commission recognizes the right of each jurisdiction to determine admissibility standards but expresses this view as part of its mandate to “develop proposed guidance concerning the intersection of forensic science and the courtroom.” Forensics experts are often required to testify that the opinions or facts stated are offered “to a reasonable scientific certainty” or to a “reasonable degree of [discipline] certainty.” Outside of the courts, this phrasing is not routinely used in scientific disciplines, a point acknowledged in the Daubert decision (“it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.”). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Aenesidemus Upon Fichte and Schopenhauer
    Richard Fincham 97 Pli 10 (2000), 96-126. subject from both object and subject and is referred to both".4 Fichte shows that although this may suffice as the first principle of theoretical knowledge, it cannot be the first principle of all philosophy.s Therefore, for Fichte, principles of theoretical knowledge can only be satisfactorily grounded upon the self qua reflective consciousness of Kantian and Reinholdian transcendental idealism once the existence of such reflective The Impact of Aenesidemus upon Fichte and consciousness is itself grounded upon an absolute foundation. It is of Schopenhauer course in response to this perceived requirement that Fichte constructs a system of transcendental idealism which asserts that the self itself ­ conceived of as primordially an absolute self-reverting activity - should RICHARD FINCHAM be the absolute foundation of all philosophy. This article will show why it is that for Fichte, 'reflective consciousness', which for Kant was the ground of all explanation, becomes conceived of as itself requiring explanation. It will be argued Fichte's reconfiguration of Kantian transcendental idealism is motivated that this is due to an engagement with a sceptical attack upon the by an engagement with two specific 'commentaries' upon it. Firstly, transcendental idealism of Kant and Reinhold named after (and Fichte was clearly convinced by Reinhold's complaint that the Critique's supposedly expounded by) the neo-Pyrrhonean sceptic Aenesidemus, principles can only "become universally binding"l by being grounded [I which was published anonymously in 1792, but was later revealed to be upon a universally valid and indubitable "self-explanatory,,2 foundation, the work of G.
    [Show full text]
  • Architectural Theory and Practice, and the Question of Phenomenology
    Architectural Theory and Practice, and the Question of Phenomenology (The Contribution of Tadao Ando to the Phenomenological Discourse) Von der Fakultät Architektur, Bauingenieurwesen und Stadtplanung der Brandenburgischen Technischen Universität Cottbus zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktor-Ingenieurs genehmigte Dissertation vorgelegt von Mohammadreza Shirazi aus Tabriz, Iran Gutachter: : Prof. Dr. Eduard Führ Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Karsten Harries Gutachter: Gastprofessor. Dr. Riklef Rambow Tag der Verteidigung: 02. Juni 2009 Acknowledgment My first words of gratitude go to my supervisor Prof. Führ for giving me direction and support. He fully supported me during my research, and created a welcoming and inspiring atmosphere in which I had the pleasure of writing this dissertation. I am indepted to his teachings and instructions in more ways than I can state here. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Karsten Harries. His texts taught me how to think on architecture deeply, how to challenge whatever is ‘taken for granted’ and ‘remain on the way, in search of home’. I am also grateful to other colleagues in L.S. Theorie der Architektur. I want to express my thanks to Dr. Riklef Rambow who considered my ideas and texts deeply and helped me with his advice at different stages. I am thankful for the comments and kind helps I received from Dr. Katharina Fleischmann. I also want to thank Prof. Hahn from TU Dresden and other PhD students who attended in Doktorandentag meetings and criticized my presentations. I would like to express my appreciation to the staff of Langen Foundation Museum for their kind helps during my visit of that complex, and to Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • History and Theory of Philosophy
    FEDERAL STATE BUDGETARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION "BASHKIR STATE MEDICAL UNIVERSITY" OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTHCARE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (FSBEI HE BSMU MOH Russia) HISTORY AND THEORY OF PHILOSOPHY Textbook Ufa 2020 1 UDC 1(09)(075.8) BBC 87.3я7 H90 Reviewers: Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Head of the department «Social work» FSBEI HE «Bashkir State University» U.S. Vildanov Doctor of Philosophy, Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History FSBEIHE «Bashkir State Agricultural University» A.I. Stoletov History and theory of philosophy:textbook/ K.V. Khramova, H90 R.I. Devyatkina, Z.R. Sadikova, O.M. Ivanova, O.G. Afanasyeva, A.S. Zubairova-Valeeva, N.R. Mingazova, G.R. Davletshina — Ufa: Ufa: FSBEIHEBSMUMOHRussia, 2020. – 127 p. The manual was prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Federal State Educational Standard of Higher Education in specialty 31.05.01 «General Medicine» the current curriculum and on the basis of the work program on the discipline of philosophy. The manual is focused on the competence-based learning model. It has an original, uniform for all classes structure, including the topic, a summary of the training questions, the subject of essays, training materials, test items with response standards, recommended literature. This manual covers topics related to the periods of development of world philosophy. Designed for students in the specialty 31.05.01 «General Medicine». It is recommended to be published by the Coordinating Scientific and Methodological Council and was approved by the decision of the Editorial and Publishing Council of the BSMU of the Ministry of Healthcare of Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Grade 7 Work Packet
    Grade 7 Work Packet Student Name:_____________________________ Dear Student, The work in this packet will help you continue to practice what you have been learning in school. We recommend that you complete the assignments for each subject based on the schedule below. You can use the Table of Contents on the next page to quickly move through the packet. Packets are due completed to your teacher when you return to school. Thank You, Teaching and Learning Team Day Assignments Day 1/2 ● ELA: Text Reading and Questions ● Math: Fluency Practice and Mixed Practice ● Science: Earth’s Structure Reading and Questions Day 3/4 ● ELA: Text Reading and Questions ● Math: Fluency Practice and Mixed Practice ● Science: Changing Earth Reading and Questions Day 5/6 ● ELA: Text Reading and Questions ● Math: Fluency Practice and Mixed Practice ● Science: Energy Transformation Reading and Questions Day 7/8 ● ELA: Text Reading and Questions ● Math: Fluency Practice and Mixed Practice ● Science: Thermal Energy Transfer Part 1 Day 9/10 ● ELA: Text Reading and Questions ● Math: Fluency Practice and Mixed Practice ● Science: Thermal Energy Transfer Part 2 1 Table of Contents: ● ELA Day 1/2……………………………………………………………………………………….Page 3 ● Math Day 1/2………………………………………………………………………………………Page 6 ● Science Day 1/2…………………………………………………………………………………..Page 11 ● ELA Day 3/4……………………………………………………………………………………….Page 16 ● Math Day 3/4………………………………………………………………………………………Page 24 ● Science Day 3/4…………………………………………………………………………………..Page 29 ● ELA Day 5/6……………………………………………………………………………………….Page 35 ● Math
    [Show full text]
  • The Function of Reason in Hume and Consequences for the Classical
    Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2004 If Reason Is Not Sovereign: The Function of Reason in Hume and Consequences for the Classical/Positivist Divide, Rational Choice Theory, Low Self-Control Theory, and the Criminal Propensity Construct Michael Jason Kissner Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IF REASON IS NOT SOVEREIGN: THE FUNCTION OF REASON IN HUME AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CLASSICAL/POSITIVIST DIVIDE, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, LOW SELF-CONTROL THEORY, AND THE CRIMINAL PROPENSITY CONSTRUCT By MICHAEL JASON KISSNER A Dissertation submitted to the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2004 The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Michael Jason Kissner defended on November 10, 2004. _______________________ Daniel Maier-Katkin Professor Directing Dissertation _______________________ Barney Twiss Outside Committee Member _______________________ Cecil Greek Committee Member Approved: __________________________ Thomas Blomberg, Dean, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................Page
    [Show full text]
  • Michel De Montaigne and the Politics of Skepticism
    CHAPTER FOUR MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE AND THE POLITICS OF SKEPTICISM When Henri Estienne and Gentian Hervet brought out Latin trans­ lations of the work of Sex tus Empiricus in 1562 and 1569, they fig­ uratively set off a bombshell of ideas that had been virtually for­ gotten by the learned world.1 Michel de Montaigne holds a crucial place in the history of skepticism in early modern Europe because he was one of the most influential members of the first generation to become reacquainted with the work of Sex tus Empiricus. The politics of this great Gascon writer of the sixteenth century was above all a politics of human fallibility. Again and again, Montaigne's observations and recommendations concerning govern­ ment and politics focus on the weaknesses and limitations of human beings. This vision of fallibility, in turn, is best understood as a development of key categories, strategies, and vocabulary of the ancient skeptics. If it can be established that Montaigne's politics of human fall­ ibility belongs in the tradition of skepticism, this will be an im­ portant corrective of recent work that casts his politics as largely Stoic or Epicurean. In addition, if it can be shown that Montaigne's politics of skepticism was neither wholly conservative nor glibly liberal, another set of common assumptions will be undermined. Fi­ nally, a careful analysis of Montaigne's work is significant in itself as an example of one of the forms that a skeptical politics can take. The ancient skepticism that had come down to Montaigne consist­ ed largely of the writings of Diogenes Laertius and Cicero, along with the new translations of Sextus Empiricus.
    [Show full text]
  • Thermometer 1 Thermometer
    Thermometer 1 Thermometer Developed during the 16th and 17th centuries, a thermometer (from the Greek θερμός (thermo) meaning "warm" and meter, "to measure") is a device that measures temperature or temperature gradient using a variety of different principles.[1] A thermometer has two important elements: the temperature sensor (e.g. the bulb on a mercury thermometer) in which some physical change occurs with temperature, plus some means of converting this physical change into a numerical value (e.g. the scale on a mercury thermometer). A clinical mercury-in-glass thermometer There are many types of thermometer and many uses for thermometers, as detailed below in sections of this article. Temperature While an individual thermometer is able to measure degrees of hotness, the readings on two thermometers cannot be compared unless they conform to an agreed scale. There is today an absolute thermodynamic temperature scale. Internationally agreed temperature scales are designed to approximate this closely, based on fixed points and interpolating thermometers. The most recent official temperature scale is the International Temperature Scale of 1990. It extends from 0.65 K (−272.5 °C; −458.5 °F) to approximately 1358 K (1085 °C; 1985 °F). Thermometer Thermometer 2 Development Various authors have credited the invention of the thermometer to Cornelius Drebbel, Robert Fludd, Galileo Galilei or Santorio Santorio. The thermometer was not a single invention, however, but a development. Philo of Byzantium and Hero of Alexandria knew of the principle that certain substances, notably air, expand and contract and described a demonstration in which a closed tube partially filled with air had its end in a container of water.[2] The expansion and contraction of the air caused the position of the water/air interface to move along the tube.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Ghazali and Descartes from Doubt to Certainty: a Phenomenological Approach
    AL-GHAZALI AND DESCARTES FROM DOUBT TO CERTAINTY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH Mohammad Alwahaib Abstract: This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and Descartes, with the goal to articulate similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. As such, its primary focus is on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and doubt arguments, until their arrival at truth. Both philosophers agreed on the ambiguous character of ordinary everyday knowledge and decided to set forth in undermining its foundations. As such, most scholars tend to agree that the doubt arguments used by Descartes and Al-Ghazali are similar, but identify their departures from doubt as radically different: while Descartes found his way out of doubt through the cogito and so reason, Al-Ghazali ended his philosophical journey as a Sufi in a sheer state of passivity, waiting for the truth to be revealed to him by God. This paper proves this is not the case. Under close textual scrutiny and through the use of basic Husserlian-phenomenological concepts, I show that Al-Ghazali's position was misunderstood, thus disclosing his true philosophic nature. I. Introduction This paper clarifies the philosophical relation between Al-Ghazali, a Muslim philosopher (1058--1111), and the French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596--1650), with the objective of articulating the similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. Historical evidence on whether Descartes did in fact read or had knowledge of Al-Ghazali’s work will not be discussed in this paper. Instead, this paper focuses primarily on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and the arguments used by each to destroy or deconstruct the pillars of our knowledge and thus reach truth.
    [Show full text]