Prescriptivism

Prescriptivism proposes that moral language makes recommendations about action. Prescriptivism is an anti-realist position, so denies that ethical language refers to the world, and is also non- cognitivist, so denies that ethical discourse is informative and descriptive, and denies that they are statements expressing true or false beliefs.

Hare

In ‘The Language of Morals’, R.M. Hare begins by giving a rough outline of what Prescriptive language is:

Prescriptive Language

Imperatives Value - Judgements

Singular Universal Non-Moral Moral

All of these kinds of statements are examples of prescriptive language as they give recommendations of how to act, though Hare primarily focuses on moral value- judgements.

Hare proposes that moral language works like an imperative – Similar to how when a doctor gives you a prescription they are recommending a course of action, if I say that ‘eating meat is wrong’, I am actually giving a recommendation of action that ‘you should not eat meat’. Therefore ethical language is meaningful as it is giving a command to do, or not do, something.

Emotivism

Prescriptivism developed out of emotivism, though Hare dismisses the theory as too simplistic. Warnock highlights the differences between emotivism and prescriptivism: emotivism sees moral language as an attempt to influence others, so if someone tells us ‘it is wrong to join a terrorist organisation’ they are trying to affect our attitudes and behaviours so that we don’t join a terrorist organisation. Whereas prescriptivism sees moral language as a way to guide our actions, not just influence them; so we are actually being told ‘do not join a terrorist organisation’. Emotivism doesn’t have much more to add, as the theory argues that ethical language is non-rational. Hare’s prescriptivism accounts for our expectations that the person telling us that it is wrong to join terrorists would be able to offer reasons for the instruction, and be able to have a discussion with us about these reasons. (CJH)

Good

‘Good… The most general adjective of commendation, implying the existence in a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are either admirable in themselves, or useful for some purpose’ – Oxford English Dictionary

Hare argues that we use the word good when we want to commend something to someone – for each type of thing the standard is different, but in each case we are commending it. So saying that ‘this chocolate is good’, or ‘donating to charity is good’, is saying they are praiseworthy in some way. This is distinct from just describing chocolate, or donating to charity – I am commending these things, not just describing them. So calling someone a good person is recommending that everyone should try to behave more like this person.

Universal Imperatives

If we have two identical things, we cannot call one good and the other not good. Whenever we apply a standard in making a prescription, we are committed to making that same judgement for two things that match the standard in the same way – if we say this chocolate is good, but that chocolate is not, I must think that there is a relevant difference between the two.

Prescriptivism is sometimes called Universal Prescriptivism - for Hare, moral judgements are universal imperatives: they do not just speak of a particular person’s obligation in a certain situation, but imply that everyone in a similar situation would be likely obliged to act in this certain way. A moral judgement that I make must be founded on certain features of that situation, thus accordingly I must be consistent in applying the same moral judgements in any situations with the same features. Hare follows Kant in regarding universalizability as essential to moral judgements.

Objections

Warnock makes two objections to Hare’s theory:

Ethical Language: not only does ethical language prescribe, but has many other functions. It can be used to exhort or implore someone, confess, complain, and so on. Hare can respond that the central point of prescriptivism is that morality guides choices and actions, though he doesn’t say that a recommendation of action is made on every occasion; the most important point Hare makes is that in holding a certain moral judgement, you are committed to acting on it.

We should accept this point, but Warnock argues that we shouldn’t accept Hare’s explanation of it. Just by connecting ethical language to action, Hare hasn’t shown that ethical language must be prescriptive; ethical language can be used in many different ways, and express different psychological states.

Moral reasoning: Hare argues that moral judgements must be consistently universalised. There is disagreement on certain judgements; Singer states that the suffering of humans and the suffering of animals is the same. Unless we can show there is a relevant difference, we must say that the suffering of animals is wrong if we say the suffering of humans is wrong.

Warnock objects that the only rationality Hare finds in moral arguments is consistency. Unlike Kant, Hare does not argue that the standards for a good person (the good will) are themselves objectively set by reason. Therefore neither empirical facts nor reason entails we have certain standards rather than others – I could argue that racism is morally right and equality is morally wrong, as long as I am prepared to universalise these claims.