Case Study Middle East Conflict

UNIVERSITEIT GENT

FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

Normative Power Europe and Peace Nation Norway: pulling the same strings in their peacebuilding efforts? Case study Middle East Conflict

Wetenschappelijke verhandeling

aantal woorden: 20 845

Anneleen Gheysen

MASTERPROEF EU-STUDIES

PROMOTOR: PROF. DR. Hendrik Vos

COMMISSARIS: Annelore Ost

COMMISSARIS: Petra Huyts

ACADEMIEJAAR 2009 - 2010

Abstract

Literature concerning peace promoting actors on the international scene mainly focuses on the achievements of nations or intergovernmental organisations and their role played in specific negotiations. The literature however lacks clarification about how multiple identities or roles exclude one another, require cooperation or seek to influence each other. This thesis focuses on the peace promoter role of both Norway and the European Union since those two players postulate to act as peace builder in international conflict resolution in their foreign policy. Furthermore both actors have their own strengths and weaknesses and preferable approach. Four hypotheses are derived from the rich literature on peace promotion and conflict resolution and transformation. Those hypotheses are tested with the Middle East conflict acting as case study. The statements deal with the history of both actors and their peace promoting efforts. Also the interaction between self-image and international appeal, and self-interest aspects of peace negotiator roles in conflict situations are examined. The main part of the thesis focuses on the Egeland thesis ‘potent small state – impotent big state’ and its applicability on the Norway – EU relation.

Citations

The EU is one big mediation and conflict resolution machine, based on law and non-stop negotiations. This puts us in a position to not only advocate preventive diplomacy, but also to implement it.

Javier Solana, EU Representative for the common foreign and security policy on the occasion of receiving the Carnegie Wateler Peace Prize, 23th November 2006, The Hague

As a Christian culture nation, the work for peace has been one of the bases that Norway has built on for centuries. That is perhaps our most well-known hallmark internationally. This work will continue. (...) Norway shall be a peace nation.

Kjell Magne Bondevik, former Prime Minister of Norway, speech at the launching of the Centennial Anniversary Programme 2005, Oslo

Samenvatting

Nederlandstalige Samenvatting

In deze thesis ga ik op zoek naar hoe de vredesrol van Noorwegen en de vredesrol van de Europese Unie in de internationale arena zich tot elkaar verhouden. Aan de hand van een literatuurstudie worden vier hypothesen naar voor geschoven die de gelijkenissen en verschillen tussen de Noorse en de Europese vredesbevorderende rol naar de voorgrond brengen. Eerst en vooral blijkt de geschiedenis van beide actoren een belangrijke impact te hebben op hedendaagse pogingen tot conflict resolutie. Niet enkel de afgelegde weg tot het bekomen van een internationale vredesidentiteit, ook gedrag en verwezenlijkingen in het verleden zijn van belang. Tradities en de opbouw van een vredesbevorderend discours vormen de rode draad doorheen de zoektocht naar feiten die de overige hypotheses staven of verwerpen.

De tweede hypothese kijkt naar hoe het baanbrekende onderzoek van Jan Egeland uit 1988 die stelt dat de Verenigde Staten als supermacht niet bij machte is om mensenrechten te promoten in de wereld, terwijl kleine, geïndustrialiseerde, Westerse naties zoals Noorwegen dat wel zijn, kan worden toegepast op de EU. Volgens Ian Manners behoort de EU tot het selecte groepje grootmachten van de 21ste eeuw. Hoewel de EU zich niet leent tot vergelijkingen met klassieke grootmachten, is haar normatieve macht in deze wereld een niet te onderschatten kenmerk. In zijn theorie ‘Normative Power Europe’ doet Manners uit de doeken hoe de EU ook als grootmacht kan worden beschouwd zonder de nadruk te leggen op militaire mogelijkheden.

Egeland baseert zijn thesis op een elftal criteria die positief worden beoordeeld voor Noorwegen, maar in het geval van de Verenigde Staten vaak op een negatieve evaluatie stoot. De criteria zijn ondergebracht in drie categorieën. De kenmerken die pijlen naar het internationaal image van de actoren luiden als volgt: geen nalatenschap van buitenlandse buitensporigheden zoals kolonialisme, imperialisme of interventionisme; respect voor internationale normen in verband met mensenrechten; uitgetrokken budget voor buitenlands hulp en ten slotte geleverde steun aan het dekolonisatie proces.

Ook structurele voorwaarden worden onder de loep genomen. Deze zijn: beleidsconsensus; conflicterende belangen in het buitenlands beleid; expertise en institutionele ervaring en een steeds groter wordend fonds voor projecten aangaande buitenlandse hulp.

Tot slot worden drie kerndomeinen bekeken. Het gebruik van bilaterale mensenrechten initiatieven, het gebruik van buitenlandse hulp als mensenrechten instrument en deelname van intergouvernementele mensenrechten organisaties in het promoten van mensenrechten zijn een absolute plus in vredesbemiddeling.

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Samenvatting

De evaluatie van Noorwegen en de VS die in het boek ‘Impotent superpower – potent small state: potentials and limitations of human rights objectives in the foreign policies of the Unites States and Norway’ door Egeland werd gevoerd, wordt in deze thesis herzien in het licht van de ontwikkelingen die zich sinds 1988 in de wereld hebben afgespeeld.

De focus ligt echter op de EU en in welke mate zij aan de vooropgestelde criteria voldoet. Aan de hand van literatuur, media en praktijkgevallen worden, in de mate van het mogelijke de criteria getoetst. Uit dit alles blijkt dat het Egeland statement nog steeds relevant is voor wat betreft de VS, maar dat de EU een beter rapport kan voorleggen. In tegenstelling tot de VS heeft de EU een goed status verworven in verband met het respecteren van internationale mensenrechten conventies en ook haar grote budget voor humanitaire hulp is een absolute plus. De goede score van Noorwegen wordt niet geëvenaard maar gezien de buitengewone samenstelling van de EU en de consensusgerichte samenwerking tussen EU lidstaten, heeft de EU alsnog heel wat te bieden.

Het derde deel van de thesis behandelt het statement dat de vredespromoter rol van de EU vooral gedeeld wordt in zijn naburige omgeving terwijl het aanvaarden van de identiteit van Noorwegen eerder een wereldwijd fenomeen is. In de praktijk blijk dat beide actoren vooral een zelfbeeld hebben gerelateerd aan vrede, maar dat de rest van de wereld er een minder uitgesproken mening op na houdt. Bovendien kan de identiteit van de EU niet beperkt wordt tot zijn naburige omgeving, ook andere naties lijken het door de EU vooropgestelde beeld als bruggenbouwer te onderschrijven.

Tot slotte is er de veronderstelling dat beide actoren voornamelijk handelen uit eigenbelang. Door middel van mensenrechten promotie proberen zowel Noorwegen als de EU hun eigen belangen na te streven en haalt altruïsme niet altijd de bovenhand. De meningen hierover zijn van uiteenlopende aard, maar concluderend kan gezegd worden dat een mengeling van eigenbelang en altruïsme de basis vormt voor inspanningen om conflicterende partijen tot een uitweg te doen komen.

Voorwoord

Met deze thesis sluit ik een heel bijzonder jaar af met heel wat ervaringen om nooit meer te vergeten. Niet enkel kon ik mij een jaar lang te laten onderdompelen en verbazen door de Europese politiek, ook kreeg ik de kans om naar het Hoge Noorden te trekken dit alles in het perspectief van een niet EU-lid te plaatsen. Vijf maanden lang was Noorwegen mijn tweede thuis en vijf maanden lang leerde ik iedere dag bij. Het woord Erasmuservaring is mij niet meer vreemd, met een grote nadruk op ervaring.

Bovendien had ik het geluk dit werkstuk te schrijven over een onderwerp dat me nauw aan het hart ligt. Het was een voorrecht om in de literatuur te grasduinen en op zoek te gaan naar de pareltjes in het onderzoeksveld. Mijn groeiende interesse voor het onderwerp heeft me meer dan eens door moeilijke momenten heel geholpen.

Dit dankwoord is voor mij de ultieme gelegenheid om de mensen die dit laatste jaar mogelijk hebben gemaakt eens in de bloemetjes te zetten. Meer dan eens is me duidelijk geworden dat je een masterproef nooit alleen schrijft. Het is de kers op de taart na een vier jaar durende studie, maar het is een proces dat de nodige inspanning vergt. Het is onbeschrijflijk hoe de steun van vrienden en familieleden kan bijdragen tot een goede afloop.

Eerst en vooral wil ik van harte mijn promotor Dr. Prof. Hendrik Vos danken voor de hulp die hij mij geboden heeft ondanks zijn drukke werkschema. Zijn goede raad, vele tips maar vooral niet aflatend enthousiasme waren meer dan eens een opsteker om verder te werken. Ook al waren de omstandigheden niet altijd ideaal en dreigde mijn verblijf in het buitenland een hinderpaal te worden voor een uitgebreide samenwerking, toch nam zijn hulpvaardigheid niet af en was hij een meester in het to the point beantwoorden van vragen via mail.

Verder heeft mijn vriendenkring zich dit laatste jaar meer dan eens laten opmerken in de positieve zin. Anouk, Hanne en Marie jullie interesse en medeleven zowel tijdens mijn verblijf in Noorwegen als na thuiskomst was beklijvend. Ik kon tot dagen nadien teren op de energie die de door jullie gekozen zotte uitjes mij gaf. Die ontspanning was een welgekomen afwisseling van het bij wijlen saaie bestaan achter de computer.

Also the international students that made my stay in Tromsø, Norway unforgettable contributed to this thesis, each in their own way. Bea, takk for de mange diskusjoner om fred, Norge og Midtøsten. Din entusiasme er smittende, og din bred interesse har åpne mine øyne og har forme denne avhandlingen. Hélène, c’était merveilleux d’avoir une amie Belge là-bas qui avait le même sentiment de démission après la chute du gouvernement et qui a éclairé le sentiment Wallon vers l’Union Européenne. Maintenant je n’ai plus le moindre doute que les Wallons et les Flamandes sont d’abord Belge mais

Voorwoord aussi fière d’être Européenne. Furthermore, Natasja, Astrid, Anna and Karen you were part of an incredible journey and more than once helped me find a good balance between travelling, studying and focussing on my thesis. You all made me treasure my months abroad even more and moreover our conversations in English, German, Norwegian or Danish improved my language skills which made it possible for me to write this thesis in English.

Tot slot zijn er nog een aantal familie en gezinsleden die een verwijzing in dit dankwoord meer dan waard zijn. De oprechte interesse en het liefdevolle begrip van opa wanneer ik na een alweer veel te kort bezoekje de deur achter me toe moest trekken om de deadline van deze masterproef niet in het gedrang te brengen heeft mij gesterkt om intensief te blijven doorwerken en elke minuut ontspanning oprecht te appreciëren.

Verder heeft David zijn hulp bij het lay out werk van deze masterproef mij heel wat kostbare tijd en onnodige opwinding bespaard. Ik stel zijn bijdrage dan ook heel erg op prijs.

Daarnaast hebben papa en mama hun dikke merci meer dan verdiend. In Noorwegen werd ik op geregelde tijdstippen op de hoogte gehouden van het reilen en zeilen thuis en spraken ze me moed in om de thesis tot een goed einde te brengen. Hun geduld was eindeloos en bewonderenswaardig. Bovendien zorgde mama na thuiskomst voor een ideale omgeving om ongestoord te kunnen schrijven. Hotel mama was een verademing en was er eentje met vele sterren.

Tot slot wil ik nog een heel speciaal duo bedanken. De steun van grote zus Katelijne heeft dit jaar werkelijk bovenmenselijk proporties aangenomen. Zelfs toen ze haar ja-woord gaf in volle blok- en examen periode bleef het welslagen van haar kleine zus een grote bekommernis. Met volle overgave bleef ze oprecht geïnteresseerd in de vorderingen van dit werkstuk ook al stond er haar een veel grotere beproeving te wachten. Met verve slaagde ze erin mij niets laten missen van haar zwangerschap via urenlange telefoon en webcam gesprekken. Ook toen ik na thuiskomst mij met volle overgave op het schrijven concentreerde en zo nog steeds haar nakende moederschap niet van dichtbij kon volgen, bleef begrip haar codewoord. Woorden ontbreken om mijn bewondering en dankbaarheid hiervoor te beschrijven.

En last but not least, kleine Ewout. Je was een geweldige stimulans om niet te treuzelen bij het schrijven. Even werd mijn planning in de war gestuurd toen je drie weken te vroeg ter wereld kwam, maar het levert je wel een dikke merci op in dit voorwoord.

Het afgelopen academiejaar was een les in time management, stressbestendigheid en relativeringsvermogen. Maar het was er eentje om nooit meer te vergeten! En Ewout, mocht je er met al die exacte wetenschappers rondom jou nog aan twijfelen, ook politieke wetenschappen kan best cool zijn!

Abbreviations

List of abbreviations

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States CAAS International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment CCM Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages CDE Convention against Discrimination in Education CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CNASL Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CRS Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness CRUFTM International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries CSR Convention relating to the Status of Refugees CSSP Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons CSTP Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others DAC Development Assistance Committee EC European Commission EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association ENP European Neighbourhood Policy EPA Economic Partnership Agreement EU European Union FA Foreign Affairs FRA European Agency for Fundamental Rights Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide GCPCPTW Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War GCTPW Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income HR Human Rights ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR-OP1 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR-OP2 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICESCR-OP Optional Protocol of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICRMW International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families IGO Intergovernmental Organisation No. 29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) No. 87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) No. 98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) No. 100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) No. 105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) No. 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) No. 122 Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122)

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Abbreviations

No. 138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) No. 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) No. 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) NPE Normative Power Europe OAU Organisation of African Unity ODA Official Development Assistance OP-CAT Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment OP-CEDAW Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women OP-CRC-AC Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict OP-CRC-SC Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography OP-CRPD Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities P-CGOC Protocol Instituting a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission to be responsible for seeking a settlement of any disputes which may arise between States Parties to the Convention against Discrimination in Education P-GC-I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) P-GC-II Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) PNN Peace Nation Norway P-PSPTP Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime P-SC Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 P-SMLSA Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime SC Slavery Convention SC-AS Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery

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Tables & Figures

List of tables and figures

Tables

Table 1: Status of ratification of the Core International HR Instruments as of 24 June 2010 ...... 23 Table 2: Total amount of ratified 30 Universal Human Rights Instruments ...... 24 Table 3: OECD DAC members’ Net ODA volume 2008 and ODA per capita 2008 ...... 26 Table 4: European Development Aid Commitments 2006-2010-2015...... 36 Table 5: Top ten providers to the UN family of organizations in absolute terms accompanied with their relative contribution per capita...... 39 Table 6: Subjective evaluation of the criteria leading to the potent small-impotant big state thesis ..... 40

Figures

Figure 1: Norwegian human rights decision-making ...... 30 Figure 2: European Union human rights decision-making (CFSP) ...... 30

Graph

Graph 1: Evolution of the ODA percentage of GNI for EU-15, Norway and the United States...... 35

Index

Abstract ...... i Citations ...... ii Nederlandstalige Samenvatting ...... iii Voorwoord ...... v List of abbreviations ...... vii List of tables and figures ...... ix Index ...... x

1. Introduction ...... 1

2. Methodology...... 3

3. Theory: Peace Nation Norway and Normative Power Europe ...... 4 3.1 History and past accomplishments leading towards the peace dove identity ...... 4 I. Norway ...... 5 II. EU ...... 6 III. Conclusion ...... 8 IV. Hypothesis 1 ...... 9 3.2 The minnow and the whale: also relevant for Norway-EU? ...... 9 I. Hypothesis 2 ...... 12 3.3 Normative Power Europe and Peace Nation Norway: self-image? ...... 12 I. Norway ...... 13 II. EU ...... 14 III. Hypothesis 3...... 16 3.4 Self interest? ...... 16 I. Norway ...... 17 II. EU ...... 17 III. Hypothesis 4...... 18

4. Normative Power Europe and Peace Nation Norway in Practice ...... 19 4.1 Hypothesis 1: History: blessing or curse ...... 19 4.2 Hypothesis 2: Minnow – whale ...... 19 I. No legacy of foreign excess ...... 20 II. Respect for internationally recognized human rights standards ...... 21 III. Level of foreign aid ...... 25 IV. Support for decolonization process ...... 27 V. Policy consensus ...... 29 VI. Conflicting foreign policy interests ...... 31 VII. Expertise and institutional memory ...... 33

Index

VIII. Increasing funds for foreign assistance ...... 34 IX. Bilateral human rights initiatives ...... 36 X. Foreign assistance as human rights instrument ...... 37 XI. Participation of intergovernmental human rights organisations ...... 38 XII. Conclusion hypothesis 2...... 40 4.3 Hypothesis 3: self image ...... 41 I. Norway ...... 41 II. EU ...... 43 III. Conclusion hypothesis 3 ...... 45 4.4 Hypothesis 4: Self interest ...... 46 I. Norway ...... 46 II. EU ...... 47 III. Conclusion hypothesis 4 ...... 48

5. Mutual influence in the changing world ...... 49

6. Conclusion: Norway and the EU, partners in Peace? ...... 51

Bibliography ...... 53 Annex ...... 61 Annex 1: Status of Ratification of the Universal Human Rights Instruments ...... 61 Annex 2: ODA/GNI of EU-15 ...... 62

Introduction

1. Introduction

September 13th 1993, the world witnessed a historical moment on the White House lawn, Washington DC. After years of formal and secret negotiations, times of brutal war and times of relative silence, all eyes were on the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) chairman Yassar Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands in the presence of “master of ceremonies” President Bill Clinton (Shlaim, 1994, p. 24). By signing the Declaration of Principles the way was paved towards the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority and the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, an extraordinary breakthrough in “one of the world’s most intractable contemporary conflicts” (Skånland, 2008, p. 1).

It was in this setting that Rabin quoted Ecclesiastes, a book of the Hebrew Bible: “ ‘to everything there is a reason and a time to every purpose under heaven: A time to be born, a time to die; A time to kill, and a time to heal; A time to weep, and a time to laugh; A time to love, and a time to hate; A time of war, and a time of peace.’ The time of peace has now come!” (Rabin, 1993). This quote captures the atmosphere at that time, one of hope for peace “between two of the most bitter rivals in international relations” (Bercovitch, 1997, p. 217).

But Israel and Palestine did not achieve this agreement by themselves. Outside help was indispensible. It was however not until late august 1993 it became known that Norway, a small state with seemingly no connections to the Middle East conflict was a key mediator and above all facilitator in the negotiations leading towards the signing of the Accords (Bercovitch, 1997, pp. 217-218; Waage, 2000, p. 2; Skånland, 2008, p. 1). Norway had succeeded in mediating a lingering conflict where much more powerful third parties as the United States had failed (Waage, 2007, p. 157 ff). The Norwegian part in the story did not pass by unnoticed and soon the Declaration of Principles was baptized the ‘Oslo Accords’ in the world press (Skånland, 2008, p. 1).

Yet by 1996 the bubble burst and the peace process had to deal with severe problems. Both the Israeli and the Palestinian side were haunted by spoilers trying to undermine the peace process and prevent it from moving forward (Waage, 2007, p. 176). The window of opportunity to create lasting peace had passed and the time had come for other actors to step in and build on the framework for negotiations and relations between the government of Israel and the PLO that was drawn in the Oslo Accords.

In the wake of 9/11 the US declared a renewed focus on the peace process after a couple of unfruitful attempts including the Camp David 2000 summit (Migdalovitz, 2006, pp. 1-2; Aronoff, 2009, p. 143). In April 2003 the Road Map for Peace was presented to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This time Norway was out of the picture and the Middle East Diplomatic Quartet composed of the EU, the United States, Russia and the United Nations had taken the leading role. Although Israel did not accept the proposal and called out 14 reservations which were unacceptable for the Palestine leadership

Introduction

(Anderson, 1999; Hollis, 1997), the EU was after a long period of attempts finally in the picture regarding the peace negotiations in the Middle East.

In the peace negotiations of 1993 the EU was nowhere to be seen. Not in the official negotiations and not in the informal Oslo Back Channel. Only financial aid to help the Palestinian Authority showed EU involvement. In the aftermath of the successful peace negotiations in Oslo, Israel argued that there was no room nor need for European peace mediation (Hollis, 1997, pp. 15-17). Also the US expressed its resistance toward involvement of the EU in Middle East negotiations out loud (Anderson, 1999). So what made the EU move to the foreground? And how come Peace Nation Norway could not pull the same trick twice? Are both actors pulling the same string or do they have different agendas? And why would the EU succeed where the United States failed more than once? This masters thesis aims at enumerating the differences and similarities of how both peace promoters Norway and the EU act to achieve their goal.

The object of this thesis is not the Middle East peace process itself nor Norway’s and the EU’s role in it. The case is used to compare both entities in their peacebuilding efforts. According to literature which actor is most potent to play a peace promoting role in the world? And is this reflected in the Israel-Palestinian conflict? Furthermore I will examine how both entities try to influence each other and above all how they can learn from each other.

An important remark which has to be born in mind throughout reading this thesis is that Norway and the EU operate in a different dimension. The EU is “neither a traditional organization nor a state” (Cavatorta & Tonra, 2007). This makes the analysis at least challenging, since there is no direct comparable organisation or union against which the EU’s international capacity as peace promoter can be contrasted. In literature many define the EU as a “unique (...) new kind of hybrid structure that is neither domestic nor international” (Cavatorta & Tonra, 2007).

Still this leaves us with the initial issue that comparing a nation and a union of nations is dangerous if not impossible. That is why this thesis should not be seen as a comparison between two political actors but as a comparison between two peace discourses and international peacemaker identities/roles that these actors want to exercise.

Methodology

2. Methodology

In this thesis I want to examine an important piece of both the Norwegian and the EU’s peace identity. Research on peace promotion efforts is already very advanced resulting in a correspondingly large amount of literature. But the massive scope of peace promotion still has unrevealed aspects not least in the comparison between two peace identities/roles.

In order to make the comparison I chose to conduct a literature study supplemented with a more practical part. In the next chapter I scan the rich literature on peace and human rights promotion in order to distract plausible hypotheses. This allows me to study how meanings, identities, actions and self images are relevant and often historically based.

In chapter 4 the presented hypotheses are tested in order to find out whether the literature based statements can be proven in reality. The Middle East conflict serves as a testing base for those hypotheses. The main reason for choosing the Middle East situations is that both actors are involved in the peace process. Both actors have historical ties with the Gulf region and the complexity of the region “presents external actors with various challenges for conflict resolution” (Pace, 2007, p. 1043). Furthermore the ongoing struggles make sure it is still relevant for both actors to engage in peace promoting efforts in the Middle East. The EU made “the quest for a just and lasting solution (...) one of (its) top foreign policy priorities” (Pace, 2007, p. 1042).

Theory

3. Theory: Peace Nation Norway and Normative Power Europe

Before moving to the theoretical part of this thesis and deriving multiple hypotheses from the rich literature concerning the peace promoter capacities and efforts of the EU and Norway, it is important to point out what basic quality both actors posses that may earn them the title ‘international peace promoter’ (Manners, 2008; Tocci, 2007; Skånland, 2008). The EU as well as Norway made the promotion of human rights in their international relations a top priority. Both anchored it in their legislation. Article 3 §5 of the Lisbon Treaty (European Union, 2010) goes as follow:

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Norway issued as one of the first nations foreign-assistance programs with an official human rights motivation (Egeland, 1988, p. 4). The 1977 White Paper ‘Norway and the International Defence of Human Rights’ presented in the Norwegian National Assembly, the Storting anchored human rights in the foreign policy of Norway (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977).

Furthermore, both actors evolved from purely human rights promoters on the international scene towards active involvement in peace mediation (Perelstein, 2007; Lanz et al., 2008, p. 20) and conflict resolution (Tocci, 2007).

3.1 History and past accomplishments leading towards the peace dove identity

Although Norway and the EU are far from alike and operate in a totally different way, they have at least one aspect in common: both act as promoter of international peace (Riste, 2001, p. 255; Diez & Pace, 2007).

A good starting point to make a comparison between both peace builder roles is to look at how those roles became prominent. This short history will later on be used to explain differences and similarities between the peace builder capacities and achievements of Norway and the EU and gives an insight into why both actors are peace promoters.

Theory

I. Norway

Looking back in time and focussing on Norwegian foreign policy it is clear that peace “is a concept with a particular resonance in the Norwegian society. (...) Norway has a distinct peace tradition that reaches back to at least the 1890s, before Norway got its independence” (Skånland, 2008, p. 29). In the political mobilization for Norwegian independence was peace a central concept. After the break-away from Sweden in 1905 peace became the primary goal of Norwegian foreign policy. The annual awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo represented an important signal to connect Norwegian national identity with peace in the newborn state. At that moment neutrality was the main tool to achieve the peace goal (Leira, 2002, pp. 76-102; Leira, 2004; Skånland, 2010, pp. 36-37).

A few decades later from the 1960s and onwards the same conclusion can be made concerning the Norwegian foreign policy. Norway had the wish to promote international peace and the willingness to actively engage to achieve that goal (Skånland, 2008, p. 2). A similar statement comes from Olav Riste (2001, p. 255) who underlines Norway’s ‘missionary impulse’ in his historical study of Norway’s foreign relations. This impulse is seen as one of the most important and abiding driving forces in the foreign policy of Norway and is described as “the conviction that Norway has a special role to play in leading the world up the straight and narrow path towards peace based on international justice and humanitarian values” (Riste, 2001, p. 255). Moreover, Norway was besides the United States the only country in the world that had issued detailed and official policy statements considering human rights policy by 1976-77 (Egeland, 1988, p. 189).

More recent policy documents show that the Norwegian peace discourse is a distinct choice made by the Storting. The 1987 White Paper on development aid and relations with the global south highlights peace promotion as one of five intermediate aims of Norwegian Development Aid (Ministry of Development Cooperation, 1987). But, interestingly enough, the White Paper of 1989 about ‘Developments in the international society and consequences for Norwegian foreign policy’1 (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 13, 38-52) did not consider promotion of peace an area where Norway had particular advantages. This led Skånland (2008, p. 34) to the conclusion that “the White Paper (...) gives few ‘early warnings’ of peace promotion activism of the 1990s”.

But the end of the Cold War created a foreign policy vacuum in Norway. During the War, the US was interested in Norway because of its border with the Soviet Union. After 1990 the US decreased its attention towards Norway and security policy became less important. Moreover, Norway stood outside the EU. This created a gap in Norwegian foreign policy and made the Norwegian Government choose to reinforce its humanitarian work, a political niche in which Norway had the opportunity to excel and make themselves visible (Nissen, 2010, pp. 1-4).

1 Original title: ‘Om utviklingstrekk i det internasjonale samfunn og virkninger for norsk utenrikspolitikk’

Theory

The real turning point in the construction of the image of Norway as peace builder however, came with the massive attention Norway’s efforts in the Middle East peace talks received. From then onwards Norway was considered an important peace promoter internationally (Skånland, 2008, p. 3). The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal described it as follows in his 1996 Foreign Policy address:

Through our long-lasting and strong solidarity engagement for peace and democracy, Norway has built up confidence and credibility. Our participation is sought not only in peacekeeping operations, even though such operations still are of great importance. We often receive requests to take part in conflict solving and peace creating initiatives.

(Bjørn Tore Godal, quoted in Skånland, 2008, p. 46)

The major difference between peace promotion before 1993 and after is that before the Oslo Accords ‘peace’ was seen as a development aid tool and by this was diminished as a subordinate category (Skånland, 2008, p. 52). Peace efforts were mainly ad hoc and the result of individual initiatives by academics and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s). Most importantly the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemingly had no explicit strategy for these commitments (Skånland, 2008, pp. 2- 3).

From 1993 onwards Norway was not only considered as an important contributor to peace also the importance of peace promotion as part of Norway’s foreign policy rocketed (Skånland, 2008, pp. 45- 48). The 1995 Report and White Paper ‘A changing world.Main features of the Norwegian policy towards the developing countries’2 (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995, pp. 16-20) made clear that the government had the intention to give more attention to peace and the mutual dependence between peace and development. Peace became the main goal and development aid a potentially important tool in concrete efforts towards peace.

II. EU

The other main player in the world arena promoting peace is the EU. Similar to Norway the peace builder role of the EU seemed to be destined from the beginning. Looking at the Shuman Declaration of 9th May 1950 it is clear that the main purpose of the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, the early predecessor of the EU, was to contribute to “the maintenance of peaceful relations”. The process of European Integration aimed at making war “not only unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Schuman, 1950). This explains why member states abstain from brutal violence against each other but saying that it also explains why the EU is so eager to promote peace in the world is farfetched.

2 Original title: ‘En verden i endring. Hovedtrekk i norsk politikk overfor utviklingslandene’

Theory

Similar to the Norwegian trajectory, the image building of the EU started decades ago, advanced slowly, and shows an important acceleration around the turn of the century. Shortly after the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957 the ambiguity about what role to play in the word triggered many scholars and politicians to express their view. Among them was American president John F. Kennedy. In his Address at Independence Hall on July 4th, 1962 (Kennedy, 1962) he expressed his notion of the Atlantic ‘Partnership’ for the future. He foresaw a co-operation between the United States and a uniting states of Europe to negotiate peace with the Soviet Union, and help the poorer nations. By this he suggested that peace and prosperity go hand in hand and assigned a more peaceful role to Europe especially in its backyard (Duchêne, 1972, p. 33).

A decade later François Duchêne was one of the first to describe Europe’s role in world peace and so defining the EU as an international actor. Already in 1972 he asked himself whether Europe has any part to play in reducing world tensions. Duchêne argued that in defining what Europe should do, it is important to look at what it can do (Duchêne, 1972, p. 32). He concluded that Western Europe could be “the first of the world’s civilian centres of power” and claimed that traditional military power could be replaced by civilian power to exert influence in international relations (Duchêne, 1972, p. 43).

After the establishment of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, the EU was named a logical partner for the US to share responsibility in the negotiations since by then the EU had become a full financial partner in paying for development of the emerging Palestinian state. But the EU collided on the US and Israel. The world’s only superpower did not accept a co-chairman in the dilatory Middle East Negotiations (Anderson, 1999, pp. 160-161). Still this shows the considered peace mediator role of the EU started finding resonance outside the Union.

A breaking point in the development of the international peacemaker identity of the EU occurred in the post-Cold War period. In this context a window of opportunity opened for the Union to adopt a more prominent international role without resorting to strictly military means (Versluys, 2009). After 2001 the peace builder aspirations of the EU became more prominent. Ever since the European Council asked itself what role Europe has in the changed world (European Council, 2001) “the topic of Europe’s global role (became) more and more relevant” (Orbie, 2009, p. 1). Numerous descriptions of the EU rose in the literature among which many focused on the peace builder capacities the EU has or might develop. Moravcsik (2003, pp. 82-84) believes that proposals to remilitarize Europe as a means to counterbalance the United States and get them to listen to its concerns are unproductive “because they presume that military force is the predominant instrument of interstate power”. Moravcsik suggests the EU to exploit its comparative advantage. The United States have unquestionably the strongest military force but the EU already exert as effective power over war and peace as the US. The difference is that the EU does so quietly through civilian power. He states that the EU has “the single most powerful policy instrument for promoting peace and security in the world

Theory today” (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 85) at his disposal, being admission to or association with the EU trading bloc. Moravcsik (2002) describes the EU as a ‘quiet superpower’.

Another theory about the EU’s role in the world important for this thesis is from Ian Manners. He describes the EU as Normative Power Europe. He sees the combination of the historical context, the hybrid policy and legal constitution of the EU as driving forces behind the commitment to place universal norms and principles central in its relations with its Member States and the world. Over the past 50 years the EU has developed a broad normative basis in which according to Manners five ‘core’ norms can be derived. These are liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights and last but not least centrality of peace. These norms are intentionally as well as unintentionally diffused to other political actors and contribute to the peace promoter image the EU wants to adopt (Manners, 2002, pp. 238- 243).

More recent literature about the peace builder image of the EU is based on documents in which the EU itself started prioritising peacekeeping in it’s neighbourhood and presented it as an “essential aspect of the EU’s external action” (European Commission, 2004a, p.3).

III. Conclusion

This short historical overview of the Norwegian and the European peace discourse shows that both actors followed a similar path in the beginning but later on different inputs were given in sustaining and strengthen their peace image. Norway as well as the EU seemingly were destined to take a peace promoting role in the world. Halvard Leira’s article ‘Our entire people are natural born friends of peace’3 describes the peace discourse of Norway before the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway, so before Norway got its present form. It shows how the idea of peace became so strong and why nowadays ‘peace’ is seen as “a natural part of Norwegian discourse on foreign affairs” (Leira, 2004, p. 180).

Also the origin of EU’s peace discourse dates back from the very beginning of the then called European Coal and Steal Community. The raison d’être of the EU was a peace project to end centuries of warfare in Europe (Tocci, 2007, p. xi). More specifically the Union was established to provide a historic reconciliation between France and Germany (Cavatorta & Tonra, 2007). This shaped the EU’s external mission and conflict resolution became a primary objective in its foreign policy. Nathalie Tocci (2007, p. xi) summarized it as follow: “beyond conflict management and settlement, EU foreign policy theoretically aspires to conflict prevention, resolution and transformation, through the eradication of the root causes of conflict”.

3 Original title: “Hele vort Folk er naturlige og fødte Fredsvenner”

Theory

The difference between Norway and the EU lies in the further development of their image. As described above, the Norwegian peace engagement discourse from the early 1990’s onwards was a distinct choice of the Storting. The 1992 White Paper no. 51 contained the following:

Because stability and peace is a precondition for development to take place, the Government thinks that Norway should contribute to the largest extent possible to prevent and abate conflicts in the South. Such contributions may come in the form of peace promoting efforts, cooperation across boundaries, defence of democracy and human rights, negotiation efforts, and peacekeeping operations by the UN. (...) Norwegian government officials, non-governmental organizations and academic institutions have participated in negotiation efforts and confidence-building measures in different parts of the world, including the Horn of Africa and Central America.

(Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated in Skånland, 2008, p. 34-35)

Looking at the EU it seems that the decision was made without actually making it. The fact that the primary motive for the establishment of the EEC was a peace project and the EU decision making process works in such a way that the member states on some occassions have a decisive vote prevents the EU from pursuing their interests forcefully. In counterbalancing the military power of the US, the EU is using its comparative advantage in normative power and by this pursuing a peaceful image.

IV. Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis is as follow: the history of becoming a peace promoter influences the capabilities of acting like one. Furthermore it has an impact on how other actors perceive the EU and Norway as peace dove.

3.2 The minnow and the whale: also relevant for Norway-EU?

In 1985 Jan Egeland4 wrote his Master’s thesis in political science about how small states are capable of achieving results in international politics while superpowers fail. His study “Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State. Potentials and Limitations of Human Rights Objectives in the Foreign Policies of the United States and Norway” describes how in certain circumstances Norway as a small state may be more effective in advocating human rights on the international scene compared to the US (Egeland, 1988). His work is considered to be an “academic foundation for the Norwegian peace policy” (Nissen, 2010, p. 3).

The Egeland thesis came about before the 1993 Oslo Accords were achieved and was based on previous experiences of successful peace mediation in among others Sri Lanka (Egeland, 1988, pp. 75-

4 Jan Egeland was at that time Head of Information and Studies in the Norwegian Red Cross. Later on he played a crucial role in the peace negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords in 1993

Theory

86). Egelands thesis, built up expertise and commitment towards the Middle East Conflict made Jan Egeland, by then Norwegian Secretary of State, one of the most important players in the secret peace negotiations5. The Oslo Accords also invigorated the assumption that small states are more capable at peace mediation.

In 2007 scholar Hilde Hendriksen Waage conducted a research about the role of Norway and that of the US in the peace accords, interviewing all key players of the negotiations. In her article ‘The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East’ the conclusion was drawn that Norway was indeed more successful in its role as mediator and facilitator and by this confirmed that the Egeland thesis ‘impotent superpower – potent small state’ is applicable on the Middle East peace negotiations. The significant metaphor Waage uses originates in a speech from the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) (1995, p. 103). He described the Middle East process as follow: “It might seem strange and disagreeable to say that the minnow was able to perform the miracles which the whale could not”.

Although the superpower capabilities of the EU are heavily contested (Sjursen, 2006; Huntington, 1999; Wohlforth, 1999) and some scholars even go as far as saying that “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one...” (Bull, 1982, p. 151), the already cited theory ‘Normative Power Europe’ of Ian Manners seems to suggest otherwise. Bull primarily dismissed the suggestion that the European Community (EC) equalled a ‘civilian power’ in international relations and by this belied Duchêne’s opinion that the EC can exert influence in international relations without having any military power. Manners refocused away from the debate over civilian or military power and thought about the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing a normative power (Manners, 2002, p. 238). This implies not only focussing on hard power but also taking into account the soft power6 a nation or in this case, a group of nations possesses.

Furthermore, it is said that “the EU behaves differently in world politics as it is differently constituted: “its initial telos (peace through integration), its historical developments and its current intsitutaional and normative framework (a post-Westphalian entity with a set of core norms) are believed to make it act as a ‘qualitatively’ different global actor” (Fioramonti & Lucarelli, 2008)

In this scenario the EU could be included in the select group of ‘great powers’ of this century and by this can be subjected to the same indicators Egeland used to conclude that the US is less capable than

5 For a profound background about the role Jan Egeland played in the negotiations leading towards the Declaration of Principles I refer to the Hilde Henriksen Waage Evaluarion Report (9/2000) “Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?”; Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East. A report prepared by PRIO International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. 6 Soft power stand for the “capability of a nation to achieve its goals by means of spontaneous consent of other nations towards these goals” (Coolsaet, 2009, p. 134).

Theory

Norway in effectively undertaking “coherent human rights-oriented foreign policies” (Manners, 2002, p. 3).

Egeland (1988, pp. 179-185) underpins his thesis by identifying the following structural preconditions positively related to Norway: the complexity of foreign policy objectives and organisational tensions of the national decision making process are perceived fewer and less in small nations which makes human rights policies have a better chance of being credible and supported. Egeland (1988, p. 5) states that Norway and other small Western countries have “traditionally homogeneous societies and consensus-oriented foreign policies” which provides them with opportunities for effective action. Whereas big states are bothered with different domestic power centres and “inter-agency bureaucratic warfare”.

Furthermore Norway postulates increasing funds for foreign assistance and finally, which is according to Egeland poorly covered in the case of Norway, a country’s institutional memory and expertise may increase the capability of human rights advocacy (Egeland, 1988, pp. 182-185).

But being a small state compared to a great power and measuring up to the structural preconditions is not sufficient to be comprehended as a successful human rights promoter. The impact of human rights criticism in other countries increases because the following four characteristics that focus on the international image and are “related positively to Norway and other small, Western, industrialized countries, and negatively (...) to the USA and other powers”:

- No legacy of foreign excesses which burden the historic as well as contemporary image of most major powers, and which non-aligned and socialist countries label ‘colonialism’, ‘interventionism’ and ‘imperialism’, - A good domestic record of respect for internationally recognized human rights standards, - A high level of foreign aid (in relative and absolute terms), (...), and, - A consistent and active support of the decolonization process and such internationally recognized struggles for national liberation as those against white minority rule in Southern Africa. (Egeland, 1988, p. 5)

The next section concerning hypothesis 3 contains a more extensive and profound description of the self-image versus international image of both Norway and the EU and why this is of importance for this thesis. But in order to test the ‘impotent big state, potent small state’ thesis in relation to the EU the four criteria Egeland summed up are handled in this section.

Finally not only underlying motives and interests, and structural preconditions are of importance for promoting human rights and peace, also specific characteristics of certain areas of national foreign policies may influence the capability of peace promotion. Egeland identifies three key policy areas that

Theory are relevant for international human rights promotion and again are more present in Norway than they are in the US. These are the attitude towards bilateral human rights initiatives, the use of foreign assistance as an instrument for the implementation of human rights and the participation of intergovernmental human rights organizations (Egeland, 1988, p. 6).

I. Hypothesis 2

Although the EU had not yet the same structure and competences it has now at the time Egeland conducted his research, his theory combined with the Normative Power Europe thesis of Ian Manners suggest that Norway is more capable at promoting human rights internationally than the EU is. This hypothesis will be tested in the practical part of this thesis.

3.3 Normative Power Europe and Peace Nation Norway: self-image?

An important aspect of being able to act as a frontrunner in international peace diplomacy is the extent by which other nations endorse that identity as peace mediator. International acknowledgement for the soft power diplomacy of a nation or a union of nations is an inimitable plus in peace mediation. Diez and Pace (2007, p. 4) describe it as follow: “Normative power (...) becomes part of the reputation that is seen as one core factor influencing the success of third party interventions”. In this section I will look at how both peace mediators are perceived by other nations.

According to Leira et al. (2007, p. 8) a widely used visualization is seeing foreign policy as a bridge between national and international level. Althrough foreign policy statements images get created within the own population. Through actions those images are confirmed in the rest of the world. However, if the gap between the self-image and the image a country’s actions reflect is too wide, the whole edifice might collapse. First of all Leira et al. (2007, p. 8) conclude that “foreign policies (lose their) credibility in (their) own population if the state no longer represents through its actions the image that people have of themselves”. Secondly it is not to say that “the rest of the world’s nations and their populations have the same image of a nation or understand their foreign policy practises in the same way the nation and its inhabitants have of themselves” (Leira et al. 2007, p. 9). All this might cause problems for the foreign policy objectives, not least through indifference towards their core values.

Theory

I. Norway

Norway gradually started emphasising its special role in human rights, international justice and peace promotion through its foreign policy. That was the forerunner of a distinct Norwegian identity and self-image (Leira et al., 2007, pp. 10-16, 37; Riste, 2001, p. 255 ff)7. Norwegian foreign policy statements and practices characterize its self-image voicing that Norway is a nation of peace that shares part of its economic surplus with other countries trough aid. Furthermore “Norway is a strong contributor to the international community through the UN system that underpins Norway’s multilateralism and rule bound international politics” (Leira et al. 2007, p. 9). Some academics and governments even go as far as calling Norway a “humanitarian superpower” (Leira et al. 2007, p. 10), a term which Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre repeatedly has distanced himself from, but nevertheless seems to be enshrined in the foreign policy department (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). The actual statement “Norway is a Peace Nation” was introduced in 2000 by Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik in his New Years address which clearly expressed the self- image the Norwegian Government adheres to (Bondevik, 2000). In 2003 Bondevik made peace one of the main themes of his New Years address, a speech which is widely received every year by the Norwegian public and so strengthens support for the self-image the Norwegian government expresses. Bondevik (2003) identifies peace engagement as a primary distinguishing characteristic of Norway which is reflected in its foreign policy practice.

The clearest official articulation of Norway as an important peace promoter in conflict areas is found in a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Norwegian general peace engagement. It is called ‘Norway in the service of peace. Norwegian contributions to peace and reconciliation’8, a title that speaks for itself (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

As pointed out, after building a strong self-image that image ideally has to be reflected in foreign policy actions. In the aftermath of the Cold War, a window of opportunity was created for small states to play a more significant role in international peace diplomacy9. Besides the two superpowers there was room for a few more actors in the resolution of conflicts. Since Norway already had a strong peace related self-image, it seized the opportunity to become an important actor in areas of international justice and humanitarian values gratefully (Perelstein, 2007, p. 36; Skånland, 2008, pp. 29-30).

The first milestone in merging its self-image with actual foreign policy actions is Norway’s peace mediation role in Guatemala (Perelstein, 2007, p. 36; Nissen, 2010). But the real eye opener for the world was the Oslo Back Channel that Norwegian politicians and diplomats in all secrecy created to

7 For more details see also section 3.1 and Skånland, 2008 8 The original title is: Norge i fredens tjeneste. Norske bidrag til fred og forsoning. 9 See also Section 3.1 and Nissen, 2010, pp. 1-5

Theory negotiate peace in the Middle East. In that process Norway used its full potential in foreign policy actions, as was described in Egelands thesis, and was afterwards praised worldwide for its efforts and success (Skånland, 2008, p. 59). World leaders and other prominent dignitaries expressed their gratitude for the “crucially helpful role played by Norway” (Clinton, 1993) and paraphrased Norway as “a vanguard for international peace” (Leah Rabin quoted in Stortingstidende 1999-2000, 2000, p. 1810). Yassar Arafat (1994) censed Norway in his victory speech after winning the Nobel Prize in Peace in 1994 by saying that “Oslo shall remain the bright name that accompanies the process of peace, the peace of the brace, as will the name of those countries sponsoring the multilateral talks”.

Also scholars picked up the image of Norway as a “peace nation” (Skånland, 2008). Researcher Carmen Wunderlich from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) said that Norway has overtaken the role of peacekeeping nation from Sweden and describes Norway as a “good international citizen” (Wunderlich quoted in Perelstein, 2009, p. 38). Furthermore Egeland focused in his thesis on the positive international image of Norway which he saw as a precondition for effective human rights advocacy. He considers Norway to be one of the world’s four “most innovative sources for funding new human rights projects or mechanisms at inter-governmental, regional, national and even local levels” besides the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden (Egeland, 1988, p. 185).

All this strengthens the believe that Norway as a peace promoter is not only a self-image Norway wants to impose on the world, it is also the image the rest of the world has of Norway.

II. EU

As we already came across in section 3.1. history, the self-image of the EU got more delineated after the European Council asked herself “What is Europe’s role in this changed world?” (European Council, 2001). Diez and Pace are among the scholars that engaged in debates on potential or desirable roles for the EU that rose in the aftermath of the Laeken Declaration and that received increased attention after France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 (Orbie, 2009). In their article ‘Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation’ (Diez & Pace, 2007) the academics use the NPE concept of Ian Manners to analyze the different possibilities for the impact of the EU on conflict transformation. Diez and Pace (2007, p. 5) conclude that first and foremost it are the EU actors themselves that project an image of “the EU as a facilitator in the transformation of border conflicts through projections of its ‘force for good’”.

Key EU actors have a strong identity image of the EU as a normative power. The construction of the EU as a force for the good is due to that self-representation that is reflected in the relations of EU actors with others (Diez & Pace, 2007, pp. 5-7).

Theory

Diez and Pace (2007, pp. 5-8) describe in their research how EU actors try to reflect the peace promoter image through their actions. First of all there is the Special Representative (SR) within the Council. The mandate that has been given to the SR defines their role very clearly. They act as facilitator and consensus builder between the EU and conflicting parties and are almost permanently present on the ground. The Special Representative’s role is one of an external actor in border conflict situations that reproduces what the EU stands for.

Also member states can leave their own imprint on EU foreign policy towards border conflict issues during their six months Presidency. Those foreign policy actions have an impact on how neighbouring non-EU member look at the EU (Diez & Pace, 2007, p. 6). Furthermore, several member states already declared to take into account ethical considerations in their foreign and development policies. To maintain unity between the different nations of the EU, ethical considerations were introduced into collective policy-making at EU level (Smith, 2001, p. 185).

But more importantly, the Council and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy are in the best position to construct the EU role as force for good through the Common Strategy they lay out (Diez & Pace, 2007, pp. 6-7).

And last but not least the Commission and the European Parliament have instruments at their disposal to emanate the identity as force for good. By having over 120 delegations and offices around the world, the Commission can “reduce the intensity of conflicts through indirect inducements” (European Commission, quoted in Diez & Pace, 2007, p. 7). Orbie (2009, p. 3) concludes that the “depiction of the EU as a ‘force for the good’ (...) is nearly consensual among European politicians”.

To sum up we can say that EU actors attempt to do what is best or in other words what ought to be done, by expressing the EU’s willingness to do what is right. The EU is involved in a process of looking forward that is essentially directed at “potentially leading to a transformation of a conflict” (Pace, 2007, pp. 1046-1047).

“EU actors (...) engage in creating the ‘right’ (...) environments for conflict parties to meet, negotiate and exchange their honest views on the situation on the ground. As managers of the EU’s external relations and as actors in the sphere of classical diplomacy, EU actors construct their roles as skilful negotiators driven by the EU’s normative power in the transformations of conflicts. (...) Dialogue initiatives are particulary important for EU actors to represent the EU as a normative power which in turn is supposed to facilitate the transformation of violent ethno-political disputes (...). (Diez, 2007, p. 1052-1053)

But above all is that self image transformed into action through foreign policy? The EU actors seem to think so according to the Diez & Pace research sited above. Besides the European “‘enlargement

Theory policy practice’ (stimulates) the formation of the Union’s role as an international promoter of democracy and human rights” (Orbie, 2009, p. 3; Orbie & Versluys, 2009). Notably the Eastern enlargement is seen as a presentation of enhancing EU’s credibility by transferring core values onto new member states. The EU’s external policies are in other words permeated by the EU’s deepening self-identity (Youngs, 2004, p. 416). Furthermore through the European Neighbourhood Policy, human rights promotion is employed towards the surrounding countries. The EU is considered relatively powerful towards its ENP partners (Khasson et al., 2009).

On the other hand, the EU foreign policy made the US express a more reserved feeling toward the EU after September 11, 2001. The EU had indeed little political credit left in the United States. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was throughout the Iraq crisis almost entirely silent. Although the majority of the European opinion was opposed to an attack in Iraq, the EU was not capable to stand up to the US and put it ideals into action (Hill, 2004, pp. 148-153).

Also in the case of Cyprus the EU construction of a normative power had an adverse effect. The main reason to start membership negotiations was that this would eventually lead towards conflict transformation and unification of the island. In reality the self-representation of the EU as a normative power was restricting the EU in its engagements with conflicting parties (Diez & Pace, 2007, pp. 8- 10).

Furthermore, lack of a consistent opinion towards the foreign policy actions between member states makes it difficult for the EU to put its human rights promoter self-image into action.

III. Hypothesis 3

This leads us to the hypothesis that the NPE first and foremost is a discourse in which EU actors themselves construct themselves as ‘model citizens’ and only neighbouring countries are enticed to adhere that identity, while Peace Nation Norway is a perception not only Norway is keen on using, but also is acknowledged in the rest of the world.

3.4 Self interest?

The next hypothesis concerning differences and similarities between the international role Peace Nation Norway (PNN) wants to exert and the NPE role is related to the outcome both political actors want to achieve. In this section I will look at what drives both actors towards peace promotion according to scholars and politicians.

Theory

I. Norway

One of the main factors why Norway succeeds in promoting peace is that Norway lacks interests except in peace. Precisely that lack of self interest in influencing the outcome of negotiations makes Norway an excellent candidate to act as a third party in a conflict. This conclusion was made by Øystein Haga Skånland (2008, pp. 37-56) taking into account media evaluations concerning the Norwegian efforts in the Middle East and multiple indications in that direction in external sources of authority and legitimacy. This should confirm that “the positive Norwegian evaluations are not subjective and self-centred” (Skånland, 2008, p. 40).

But the initial resistance towards a purely non-altruistic motivation started languishing in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. At a certain point it was emphasized that Norway’s international standing and prestige ameliorated because of active peace promotion efforts. This makes a country more interesting and provides access to important decision-makers (Skånland, 2010, pp. 40-41). Matlary (quoted in Skånland, 2010, p. 40) attributed a “considerable political capital” to Norway and the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time Knut Vollebæk (Aftenposten Morgen, 1998) hinted that peace promotion could encourage commercial interests of Norway. Still the overall feeling was that self-interest and altruism “go hand in hand” (Liland & Kjerland, 2003, p. 84).

Although halfway the 90s the meaning of peace promotion seemed changed and a more instrumental self-interest perspective challenging that the will to do good began moving to the foreground (Skånland, 2010, p. 41) it is the selfless discourse of Norway that remains having the upper hand. The Dagens Næringsliv (quoted in Skånland, 2010, p. 45) said it as follow: “(...) there is little concrete evidence of what Norwegians have ‘got back’ for their efforts, apart from the honour of being invited to meetings with the American Secretary of States or British Minister of Foreign Affairs.” After 1993 the discourse on the Norwegian peace engagement was dominated by one particular representation that saw that engagement as depoliticized and by this lacking a predominance of self-interests (Skånland, 2010, p. 48).

II. EU

The general feeling towards the external policies of the EU is that it is not solely based on selfishness and the promotion of its own interests. The foreign policy is derived from the notion what ought to be done (Rosecrance, 1998, pp. 15-23; Aggestam, 2004; Manners, 2002). Although the altruism discourse in peace promotion motivation predominates the literature, some scholars sought to demonstrate that strategic considerations are at the basis of EU human rights policies. In his article ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’ Richard Youngs (2004) points towards the strategic considerations in EU human rights policies. Some scholars even go as far as

Theory saying that the EU plays down its own interests (Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2004). But on the whole there seems to be a consent that an altruistic and a self-interested motivation is at place.

III. Hypothesis 4

Norway as well as the EU found a balance between altruism and self-interest in their motivation to act as a peace promoter. The rationale for peace engagement for both actors is to help others as well as helping themselves.

In Practice

4. Normative Power Europe and Peace Nation Norway in Practice

4.1 Hypothesis 1: History: blessing or curse

The aspect of distinct choice versus destined development in the direction of peace promoter has its influence on how the EU and Norway are perceived and tolerated in the international community. In the following sections past behaviour and discourse will often be adduced to explain historic accomplishments, present actions and future desires.

Besides, not only the history of becoming an international peace builder influences actions, also the general history of both actors is of importance. The next sections will therefore repeatedly backpedal to historic events. Some of those burden the willingness to mediate peace such as colonialism or imperialism, others boost international praise. An example of this is the ‘Look to Norway speech’ US President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave in 1942 in order to focus attention on Norwegian resistance in World War II.

If we look at the Middle East conflict, many historical events influenced and still influence the difficult road to peace. One of the previous actions of importance for Norway’s success in the negotiations and a milestone in the development of its peace builder identity was the fact that Norway consequently refused to use its oil resources as a political instrument to help or punish countries. The Norwegian government preferred not to chose side on the international scene and sought a more compromising attitude (Waage, 2000, pp. 33-34). This historical choice improved contacts with the Palestinian side and were the basis for later consent for Norway as a suitable candidate to negotiate peace.

Also the EU can base its success in peace mediation on historical choices. The fact that the genesis of the Union was settling one of the most intractable conflicts in that period, being the ongoing rivalry between Germany and France, may have influenced Palestinian and Israeli leaders to accept the helping hand of the EU.

Although the impact of history is here just shortly dealt with, throughout the next sections it will become clear that the past ultimately has an influence on the development of a peace promoter role. As William Faulkner in 1951 remarked: “The past is not dead. It is not even past.”

4.2 Hypothesis 2: Minnow – whale

In this section I will look whether the hypothesis that Norway is more capable at promoting human rights internationally compared to the EU is confirmed in reality.

As indicated in the theoretical part, the hypothesis is based on research conducted by Jan Egeland who compared the capability of Norway and the US in terms of international promotion of human rights

In Practice and democracy. His theory is based on three main features divided in multiple characteristics. In order to test whether the EU as ‘superpower’ has the same characteristics which made Egeland conclude that America is less capable of promoting peace than small western states, I will examine these criteria in relation to the EU. First of all four image related criteria that are primarily positively evaluated for Norway but not for the US are of importance. These concern the legacy of foreign excess; the domestic human rights record; level of foreign aid and active support for decolonization processes and national liberation.

In addition to that four structural preconditions are examined being policy consensus; conflicting foreign policy interests; expertise and institutional memory and increasing foreign assistance. To end with three key policy areas that are relevant to international human rights are looked at (Egeland, 1988, pp. 6, 47-137): the attitude towards bilateral human rights initiatives; the approach to foreign assistance as an instrument for the implementation of human rights is examined and lastly the participation of the EU in inter-governmental human rights organisations established by the United Nations are of great importance for testing the hypothesis (Egeland, 1988, p. 6).

I. No legacy of foreign excess

The first criteria looks at the legacy of foreign excess that might burden the historic and contemporary image of the EU. This concerns colonialism, interventionism and imperialism (Egeland, 1988, p. 5). It is common knowledge that many of the member states of the EU have a history of colonialism and some even of interventionism and imperialism. Although the institutional memory of the different nations part of the EU puts a high burden on the image of the EU, it also plays a part in the conduct of its foreign policy. This implies that the history of the member states is a two sides medal. On one hand it leads the EU towards a human rights inspired and by definition peaceful foreign policy but on the other hand it spatters the peaceful image the EU has of itself.

Looking at the Middle East conflict the latter presented a problem for EU involvement. The relations between the EU and especially Israel suppress possible EU interference. In 1997 Israel was the stronger party in the conflict and required thus the most persuasion to accept concessions necessary in the peace agreement. But precisely Israel strongly opposed EU involvement in peace talks. It argued that there is no room nor need for European peace mediation. This handicap for the EU is induced by “a deep-seated suspicion of Europe’s apparent bias towards the Arabs” (Hollis, 1997, pp. 15-18).

With lack of any encouragement from the US or Israel the EU still proceeded towards a more visible role in the Middle East tensions. Years later, after the EU had begun to move closer to the political

In Practice arena and the EU-Israeli Action Plan10 was put in place, the EU condemned Israel’s military incursions into Palestinian areas which made Israel make the same accusation as in 1997. At the basis was a deeply rooted history-based suspicion of the Europeans together with recurrent anti-Semitic incidents in Europe. The EU’s criticism was perceived as anti-Semitic in Israel and therefore not suited for peace mediation (Del Sarto, 2007, pp. 66-67).

To sum up it is assumed that since the key aim of EU foreign policy instruments is building a relationship of trust between conflicting parties (Pace, 2007, pp. 1053-1054), the European history of foreign excess is a burden for the peace builder image of the EU.

Furthermore, Sjursen (2006, p. 242) popped the question “how to know that ‘normative power’ Europe is not simply an expression of Eurocentric imperialism?”. This strengthens the believe that the EU has not only a legacy of foreign excess but also a present working method that leans towards imperialism and permeates the EU’s image.

II. Respect for internationally recognized human rights standards

The second criteria deals with the domestic record of respect for internationally recognized human rights standards. Egeland came to the conclusion that Norway has a better track record of ratifying international law concerning human rights than the US which strengthens his argument about the impotent superpower. In this section I will look how the EU Member States are doing.

The most widely recognized and detailed definition of human rights is written down in the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’. It is composed of four UN standards among which two Covenants that need ratification in order to be applicable. The Covenants date back from 1966 but by 1987, the year Egeland published his book, the US still had not ratified the two Covenants which became a strong indicator for his thesis. By now the US ratified one out of two namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but added five reservations, five understandings, and four declarations (US Congress, 1992). This official questioning of its validity might indicate that its implementation has little domestic effect (Henkin, 1995). Furthermore the second Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not been ratified yet by the US.

Compared to the US, the EU has a much better ratification record. Both covenants are signed and ratified by all Member States. Moreover “the broad concept of the International Bill is reaffirmed by

10 The Action Plan is a plan for political cooperation between the EU and Israel that was adopted in the framework of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The ENP aims at “prevent(ing) the emergence of new dividing Lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities” (European Commission, 2004a, p. 3). The Action Plan is a bilateral agreement that defines that both sides will “explore the possibility to join the optional protocols related to international conventions on human rights” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 4) and is seen as a real breakthrough in tough EU-Israel relations.

In Practice the Human Rights Conventions of the European Council” (Egeland, 1988, p. 8). The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as it is officially named is an international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. All EU member states are like Norway member of the Council of Europe and are party of the Convention. The US on the other hand is not.

Moreover, the EU not only signed and ratified the UN Covenants, it also tries to “develop principles, mechanisms and policy instruments that might ensure that its own policies are consistent with such principles (...)” (Sjursen, 2006, p. 248). There are already some indicators that suggest the EU is moving towards that goal. The EU supports the International Criminal Court and drafted a common position which stated the following (art. 1):

The International Criminal Court, for the purpose of preventing and curbing the commission of the serious crimes falling within its jurisdiction, is an essential means of promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, thus contributing to freedom, security, justice and the rule of law as well as contributing to the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United

(Council of the EU, 2003)

Also the fact that a human rights clause has become a standard section of all trade agreements with third countries and the incorporation of the Charter in the Treaty of Lisbon points towards a serious effort of ensuring that its own policies are consistent with the UN principles (Sjursen, 2006, p. 248).

But not only the ratification of both Covenants is of importance for human rights in international law. In his thesis Egeland lists the records of American non-ratification and Norwegian ratification for 21 selected international instruments (Egeland, 1988, pp. 147-148, 213). In order to get an up-to-date overview of the ratification process of human rights instruments, I used a list of all core international human rights instruments and universal human rights instruments drawn by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2010). All Conventions, Covenants and (Optional) Protocols to the Conventions were retrieved from that list and examined whether the US, Norway and the EU Member States already ratified them. The drawn up list used in this thesis consists of 19 core human rights conventions, covenants or (optional) protocols and 30 universal human rights instruments.

Table 1 shows that all individual EU Member States score better than the US in relation to number of core HR instruments ratified. The United States only ratified 5 out of 19 core HR instruments while Estonia and Latvia, the two worst scoring members of the EU still ratified more than half (10 out of 19). Furthermore, the EU Member States score better than Norway. Every EU member ratified 13,7 HR instruments on average while Norway has a score of 13.

In Practice

Table 1: Status of ratification of the Core International Human Rights Instruments as of 24 June 2010

The Core International Human Rights Instruments CAT CRC CRPD ICERD ICCPR TOTAL ICRMW ICESCR OP-CAT CEDAW CPPED * CPPED OP-CRPD OP-CRPD ICCPR-OP1 ICCPR-OP2 ICESCR-OP 22 Art. : CAT OP-CEDAW OP-CRC-SC OP-CRC-AC CERD: Art. 14 Art. CERD: Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 15 Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 15 Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 14 Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 15 Estonia 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 France 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 16 Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 17 Greece 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 12 Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 15 Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 15 Latvia 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 10 Lithuania 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 11 Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 13 Malta 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 Poland 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 15 Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 15 Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 16 Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 17 Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 16 UK 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 13 Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 USA 1 0 1 0 0 x 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 TOTAL 29 23 29 27 26 28 0 29 23 14 28 25 28 24 26 15 12 3 0 CAT CRC CRPD CRPD ICERD ICCPR ICRMW ICESCR OP-CAT CEDAW CPPED * CPPED OP-CRPD OP-CRPD ICCPR-OP1 ICCPR-OP2 ICESCR-OP 22 Art. : CAT OP-CEDAW OP-CRC-AC OP-CRC-SC

CERD: Art. 14 Art. CERD:

Legend

Ratification, Acceptance, Succession 1 * The Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance is not yet into force Signature x

No action 0

In Practice

A similar pattern is detectable concerning the universal human rights instruments (extensive table see annex 1). Again all EU Member States have a better track record of ratifications. The US only ratified 9 out of 30 HR instruments which is barely 30%. The worst scoring EU Member is Malta with 18 ratified instruments out of a total of 30 (60%). The average amount of ratified universal HR instruments for the EU Members is 22 or 73%. This time Norway can uphold the best results with 27 ratified conventions and (optional) protocols. Only Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Romania come near that figure scoring 26 out of 30 ratified instruments.

Table 2: Total amount of ratified 30 Universal Human Rights Instruments

Austria 23 Belgium 23 Bulgaria 21 Cyprus 23 Czech Republic 23 Denmark 26 Estonia 19 Finland 24 France 24 Germany 25 Greece 19 Hungary 25 Ireland 21 Italy 24 Latvia 23 Lithuania 19 Luxembourg 19 Malta 18 Netherlands 26 Poland 23 Portugal 20 Romania 26 Slovakia 24 Slovenia 21 Spain 26 Sweden 24 UK 25 Norway 27 USA 9

An important remark is however that the US has been an essential initiator of international human rights law ever since work started on an International Bill of Human Rights with the Universal Declaration and the UN Charter. Other Western powers were at that time more reluctant. Smaller nations such as Norway and national an international NGO’s were more reliable allies for the US to codify proposals of human rights standards. But more recently the smaller nations became more

In Practice prominent in the role of initiator. Moreover, as mentioned before, Norway and most other Western European nations, among which all present EU Member States have ratified the most basic treaties whereas the US failed to do so (Egeland, 1988, p. 147).

To sum up we can say that Norway and all EU Member States “always supported and fully accepted the broad concepts established in international human rights law” (Egeland, 1988, p. 7) unlike the US. This indicated that the EU leans more towards Norway than the US in terms of respect for internationally recognized human rights standards which is a considerable plus in its peace promotion efforts.

III. Level of foreign aid

The next characteristic of Norway that shapes its international image and is related negatively to the US is the high level of foreign aid in absolute and relative terms. In 2008 Norway spend 22,6 billion crowns (USD 3,96 billion) on foreign aid. This equals almost 0,9 percent of the Norwegian GNI11 (OECD, 2008b).The Norwegian budget for 2010 foresees an increase in foreign aid spending to reach at least one percent of the GDP12 (Perelstein, 2007, p. 38). Norwegian aid became the largest in relative terms in the 1980s, per capita and in percent of gross national product (Egeland, 1988, p. 105).

In absolute terms the US was the biggest donor for programs of official development assistance (ODA) in the Egeland thesis in 1988. Over the years however the US has been overtaken by the EU. In 2008 the ODA of the US consisted of USD 26 billion which equals 0,18 per cent of the American GNI. Compared to that the combined ODA of the fifteen EU Member States that are part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of USD 70,2 billion is gigantic. The EU-1513 net ODA/GNI ratio consists of 0,42% and represents 59 per cent of all Development Assistant Committee (DAC) ODA (OECD, 2009a) (see also table 3).

Matching the one percent of the GDP goal of Norway is out of reach for the EU but it still has some impressive figures to present. An important remark is however that despite the EU presents itself as the biggest donor, the figures include both the European Commission as well as the Member States. The European Commission itself only counts for 10 percent. Still the Commission has at her disposal a larger budget than any of the individual EU Member States (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 75).

11 GNI stands for Gross National Income. It comprises the Total value produced within a country (= Gross Domestic Product) added up to its income received from other countries (that is interest and dividends minus similar payments made to other countries. 12 The provisional figures displayed on the OECD website show that already in 2009 Norway reached and OAD budget of 1,06% of its GNI 13 EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. EU-15 stands for the formation of the EU before the extensive enlargement of January 1, 2004.

In Practice

Furthermore there are only five donors that exceed the United Nations target of 0,7 percent of GNI for development aid. These are besides Norway, all countries of the EU being Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (OECD, 2009a).

Table 3 gives an overview of the above mentioned figures. The EU data are based on figures available for the fifteen EU member states that are also member of the DAC. If we take into account the other twelve EU members the EU remains the biggest donor in the world, but the ODA per capita drops to almost USD 125 (European Commission, 2009), which is still more than the US (USD 86), but slightly below average of all DAC members (USD 134).

Table 3: OECD DAC members’ Net ODA volume 2008 and ODA per capita 2008

2008 (preliminary) ODA per Population in Net ODA capita ODA/GNI thousands Country (2008USDm) (USD) Austria 1 681 0,42 % 8 333 202 Belgium 2 381 0,47 % 10 517 226 Denmark 2 800 0,82 % 5 461 513 Finland 1 139 0,43 % 5 307 215 France 10 957 0,39 % 61 840 177 Germany 13 910 0,38 % 82 772 168 Greece 693 0,20 % 11 218 62 Ireland 1 325 0,58 % 4 250 312 Italy 4 444 0,20 % 58 851 76 Luxembourg 409 0,92 % 471 868 Netherlands 6 993 0,80 % 16 390 427 Portugal 614 0,27 % 10 620 58 Spain 6 686 0,43 % 44 311 151 Sweden 4 730 0,98 % 9 159 516 United Kingdom 11 409 0,43 % 61 085 187 DAC EU members, total 70 171 0,42 % 390 585 180 Australia 3 166 0,34 % 21 016 151 Canada 4 725 0,32 % 33 095 143 Japan 9 362 0,18 % 127 568 73 New Zealand 346 0,30 % 4 188 83 Norway 3 967 0,88 % 4 707 843 Switzerland 2 016 0,41 % 7 584 266 United States 26 008 0,18 % 303 825 86 DAC members, total 119 761 0,30 % 892 568 134

Source: OECD, 2009b; OECD, 2008a

Furthermore, the EU made a number of commitments in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus in order to meet the Millennium development goals. In 2005 it made additional commitments to collectively reach 0,7% of GNI for official development aid by 2015 (European Commission, 2010a).

In Practice

All this shows that the EU is a big donor scene concerning development aid and has a better track record than the United States on which the original thesis ‘ineffective big states – potent small states’ is based.

A similar conclusion can be made when looking at the Middle East situation. In 1999 Anderson concluded it was time for the EU for a place at the negotiation table. One of the main reasons for this was the amount of EU foreign aid assigned to Palestine. Between 1993 and 1997 the EU and its Member States accounted for 54 percent of the total amount of international aid flowing to Palestine, being USD 2,18 billion (European Commission, 1998). In the same period of time the US barely provided 10 percent (Anderson, 1999, p. 165). With the EU paying a predominant part of the bill for helping the Palestinian Authority, the EU is the main payer but to its own despair not the main player (Soetendorp in Del Sarto, 2007, p. 66).

IV. Support for decolonization process

Active support for the decolonization process and national liberation is a characteristic Egeland assigned Norway based on former Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Frydenlund’s book ‘Small country – what now? Reflection on the Norwegian Foreign situation’14 about Norway’s international challenges from 1982 (Skånland, 2008, p. 31). Frydenlund attributes a positive image to Norway because of its anti-colonialism and support for national liberation (Frydenlund, 1982, p. 190).

The Norwegian support for decolonization became clear between 1960 and 1975. In that period the liberation movements bonded with the Norwegian solidarity organisations and later on with the official authorities in Norway. It started with sporadic forms of aid but quickly developed into a regular and organised support and cooperation. An important accomplishment for Norway in her support for decolonization is the 1968 UN resolution which called on all member states to give assistance to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies (UN General Assembly, 1968). But the real breakthrough for a more activist anti-colonial position took place in 1970/71. Norway then decided to raise the issue of colonial wars in the NATO and the EFTA (Eriksen, 2000, pp. 9-43). Furthermore in 1973 Norway hosted an OAU World Conference for Support of Victims of Apartheid and Colonialism in Southern Africa which was a way of expressing its full support for the people of Southern Africa that were struggling for their liberation (Olav Stokke in Eriksen, 2000, p. 63). “By focusing on the liberation movements and the need for humanitarian assistance and other forms of support, the UN/OAU Conference made a significant contribution to the struggle against (...) colonialism” (Eriksen, 2000, p. 64). Norway received general appreciation for its support in the UN on issues related to decolonization, hence the invitation to host the Conference (Eriksen, 2000, pp. 56- 57).

14 Original title: Lille land - hva nå? Refleksjoner om Norges utenrikspolistiske situasjon

In Practice

The United States on the other hand did according to Egeland not actively support the decolonization process, which harmed its international image. In 1960 the United States abstained from voting the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, a milestone in the process of decolonization. In the 70’s while Norway gradually rose its active support towards decolonization on the African continent, the US withdrew from the UN special committee on decolonization. Furthermore the United States declined the invitation to attend the World Conference for Support of Victims of Apartheid and Colonialism in Southern Africa in 1973 (Eriksen, 2000, pp. 60-63).

Some of those characteristics pointing towards a lack of support of the decolonization process also apply for EU Member States. It is difficult to examine the support for the decolonization process of the EU as a whole since the creation of the European Community is seen as a “distinct but parallel response to a new global division of power” (Reisen, 2007, p. 29) put in motion by the decolonization process. “The reconstruction of Europe’s relations with its colonies and former colonies was (indeed) a substantive and essential part of the establishment of the (then) European Community” (Reisen, 2007, p. 29).

First of all, among the nine abstentions for the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples five were present EU Member States namely Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, all of them major colonial powers (UN, 1960). Furthermore both France and the United Kingdom also declined the invitation for the UN:OAU World Conference and by this showing lack of support towards decolonization initiatives (Eriksen, 2000, pp. 60-63).

During the research period leading to the Egeland thesis, the decolonization process was not yet entirely fulfilled. Now the support for the decolonization process seems of less relevance to uphold a positive international image. Only past behaviour is still relevant and of importance for image building. Previous lack of support may in theory influence the present image of the EU. But times change and since 1988 and the Egeland’s research the EU has used its influence to ameliorate the economic and social situation in former colonies of EU Member States. Through ACP-EU development co-operation and Partnership Agreements the former link between EU Member States and colonies remains intact only now more in a relationship between equals and as a helping hand to overcome the damage done during the colonisation period.

On the whole we can say that active support for the decolonization process is of less importance to uphold a positive image internationally than the other characteristics discussed in this section since the decolonization process is completed. Still the fact that EU Member States not actively supported the process may have harmed its present international image. On the other hand the present efforts to elevate the economic and social situation of former colonies may positively influence the EU’s international image. Either way, looking at former and present attitudes towards (ex) colonies and

In Practice taking into account that Norway never ruled over a colony in contrast to some EU Member States, Norway scores better for this characteristic. This confirms that Norway is positively related to the fourth aspect of a positive international image as precondition for effective human rights advocacy, while the Union’s behaviour is less compatible with this characteristic.

The second step leading towards the hypothesis that Norway is better placed to be a human rights promoter in the world than the EU, is looking at the structural preconditions for effective and cost- efficient approaches Egeland identified. In his thesis he concludes that

The potentials for Norway as an important entrepreneur for international human rights lies in the existence of three of the four suggested preconditions: policy consensus, few conflicting foreign policy interests, and increasing funds for foreign assistance. The fourth criteria, which is poorly covered, institutional memory, is one which may be remedied through the build-up of domestic expertise.

Egeland, 1988, p. 185

Failure or success in human rights policies is indeed a direct result of the ability to produce coherent policies taking into account the existing domestic political and administrative systems (Egeland, 1988, p. 179).

V. Policy consensus

Egeland found that the nature of the American political system aggravated the existing conflict between self-interest and ideals. It is not uncommon in the US that different foreign policy actors “routinely take diametrically opposing positions regarding the entire policy direction” (Egeland, 1988, p. 181). Norway on the other hand has a limited set of actors dealing with foreign policy and on top of that any difference op opinion is rather regarding the pace than the direction of the action.

But as Egeland (1988, pp. 181-182) also points out, policy controversy is not always destructive. The creative tension and policy innovations as a result of disagreement between legislative and executive branches in the US help optimize foreign policies. However frequent domestic struggles more often than not hurt policy effectiveness which makes the US a lesser candidate to fulfil the first structural precondition for human rights promoter.

In order to compare the Norwegian human rights decision-making process and the European one, both processes are analyzed. The Norwegian decision-making process is composed of four major actors, being the Prime minister/cabinet, the Development Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the Storting (see figure 1). The European decision-making process for human rights policy is more complex. The

In Practice process analyzed in respect to the EU’s human rights decision making is the decision-making process leading towards the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy since development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the main objectives of the CFSP. The diagram is a direct result of the decision-making process described in the Lisbon Treaty (see figure 2).

Figure 1: Norwegian human rights decision-making

PRIME STORTING MINISTER/CABINET

DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN MINISTRY MINISTRY Minister Minister Bureaucratie Career service

Source: Figure 10 Norwegian human rights decision-making in Egeland, 1988, p. 182

Figure 2: European Union human rights decision-making (CFSP)

EUROPEAN COUNCIL COUNCIL

COMMISSION Commission President Commissioners DG’s FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL MEMBER STATES Diplomatic Services Ministers EUROPEAN HIGH EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR ACTION FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SERVICE SECURITY POLICY

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Source: EU Lisbon Treaty

In Practice

This simplified representations show that the EU has more actors participating and more relations between actors to take into account considering its human rights policies. This may increase and intensify conflicts and by this have a negative impact on political consensus.

This is confirmed by Herrberg (2008) in her analysis of ‘Perceptions of international peace mediation in the EU’. She interviewed multiple EU diplomats and EU officials working for different European institutions and found that the EU is an actor with a multitude of interests which results in conflicting opinions that have a negative impact on policy consensus.

VI. Conflicting foreign policy interests

As Egeland points out in his book, there is still no undeniable clarity whether an uncompromising human rights policy is irreconcilable with other strategic and economic interests of a superpower. But the suggestion is made that the constant and fundamental disagreement in the US regarding conflicts of interests and the relatively little attention given to this matter in Norway is sufficient for his analysis. Egeland notes that roughly three aspects of self-interests may conflict with human rights oriented norms and principles. First of all the “general political and diplomatic interest in maintaining good relations with a maximum number of countries; second, the national security interest of maintaining strategic countries as allies; and third, the economic interest in protecting investments and getting access to markets and raw materials” (Egeland, 1988, p. 180).

Since the EU is not a superpower stricto sensu and shows more differences than similarities with the US especially, these three aspects can not be assigned to the EU unconditionally. First of all the EU, in contrast to the anarchic Hobbesian US worldview, chose to strive for the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’ (Kagan, 2002). This manifests itself in the entire foreign policy of the EU because of its permeation of human rights aspects. In my opinion the Kantian ‘Perpetual Peace’ worldview entails that strategic and economic interests ideally move to the background and human rights policy becomes the primary target. The EU tries to balance its human rights policy with its strategic and economic interests by including human rights clauses in all its relations with other countries or group of countries and by this combining self-interest with normative commitment. Still the ideal situation does not match reality. The EU - ACP economic partnership agreements (EPA) are a good example of this. As Christopher Stevens from the Institute for Development Studies states: “The Commission approaches negotiations with developing countries in the same way that they deal with the US, Japan or China – with a view to getting the best possible outcome for Europe” (Stevens, 2005). Although concerning the EU - ACP countries’ relations the Cotonou Agreement15 includes in its preamble that a

15 “The Cotonou Agreement is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries an the EU. Since 2000 it has been the framework for the EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP)” website European Commission

In Practice

“political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance is part and parcel of long term development”.

Furthermore in order to achieve political dialogue between partners, “the parties undertake to promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights (...)” (European Commission, 2005, art. 9). This suggests that human rights policy is included in the economic policy of the EU and that both can interact without conflict. Still the Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (fidh) seems to interpret it otherwise. They came to the conclusion that the “difference of economic development between EU and ACP states is one of the main reasons why EPAs threaten the ACP countries’ development and human rights of their populations” (fidh, 2007, p. 4).

Furthermore it is said that the complexity of foreign policy interests is proportional to the relative military and economic importance of a nation or as is the case of the EU, a group of nations (Egeland, 1988, p. 176). Although the EU has little to no military importance, its economic power in the world is significant. This might entail that the EU’s foreign policy interests are complex and often conflicting.

Moreover the unique composition of the EU can also reverse the initial finding that the EU finds a good balance between human rights policy and strategic and economic interests. The individual EU Member States constantly try to influence the relations of the EU and other countries. The rotating presidency of the EU is one of the possibilities to do so. During those six months of presidency every Member State tries to impose its own interests on the EU which may conflict with the human rights policy.

The second aspect of conflicting self-interest and human rights policy is less present in the case of the EU. It concerns the “security interest of maintaining strategic countries as allies”. The EU has, by choosing a peaceful Kantian paradise, banned all violence in her mutual relations. This is however only possible because the United States acts as a protector (Coolsaet, 2009, pp. 226-228). Still it implies that the EU is less concerned with maintaining allies with strategic countries.

The last aspect “economic interest in protecting investments and getting access to markets and raw materials” is again of more importance. Unlike Norway and the US, the EU can not provide its own oil and gas stocks. This undoubtedly provides a basis for conflicting foreign policy interests. A good example of this is the EU foreign policy towards the Middle East but this will be handled extensively in section 4.4, Self interest.

In Practice

VII. Expertise and institutional memory

The third precondition for effective human rights policy lies in the expertise and institutional memory a nation or group of nations possesses. Egeland (1988, p. 182) concludes that “neither American nor Norwegian human rights policies can draw upon any strong institutional memory”. The reason for this is that in America the expertise is located in the executive administration and academe, but it is not given real access to the decision-making process. Norway on the other hand lacks any kind of administrative expertise according to Egeland. This slowly changed throughout the years but still the human rights expertise lies mostly within non-governmental organizations and research institutes that provide the Norwegian government institutions with relevant information (Perelstein, 2007, p. 36; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

Still in 1999 the Norwegian National Plans of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights included the establishment of a national institution for human right in Norway. The main purpose of the institution is to assist public agencies, NGO’s and individuals with advice, research and information involving human rights aspects. However this institution focuses on the human rights situation in Norway and has limited expertise about transferring that model to other countries through foreign policy.

In 2006 the political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a project group to review Norway’s human rights dialogue efforts, which confirms the gradual steps taken towards building an institutional memory and expertise regarding human rights.

The main flaw the US has to deal with is that every shift in elected executive leadership leads to a profound and far-reaching change in the administrative structures which obstructs every kind of passing through of knowledge.

The EU on the other hand has a broad network of non-political institutionalised administrative expertise. For instance the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) which is directly linked to EU institutions and other EU bodies and EU Member States (FRA, 2010). Also the working party on Human Rights COHOM which is responsible for shaping the EU’s human rights policy in its external relations works closely together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Council of the EU, 2010).

Secondly, the European Commission organises an annual forum where NGO’s, representatives of EU institutions and Member States and international experts gather around and provide opportunities for “civil society representatives from the Global South to meet and exchange experiences with EU representatives and international human rights experts” (EU-NGO forum, 2010).

In Practice

Furthermore, the Directorate-General for External Policies (DG EXPO) assists the work of Parliament’s delegations and committees. Among those is the subcommittee on human rights (DROI) as part of the foreign affairs committee that drafts proposals to the Council and Commission in the field of human rights and democracy (European Parliament, n.d.). The DG EXPO is part of the administrative body of the European Parliament, the Secretariat.

Also the different Directorate-Generals and services that assist the Commissioners are composed of administrative servants that are specialised in specific themes. DG EuropeAid has seven separate directorates among which Directorate F that is responsible for thematic operations overseeing all horizontal programmes including human rights (European Commission, 2010b). Also DG External Relations has a specific Directorate (Directorate B multilateral relations and human rights) dedicated to human rights (DG External Relations, 2010). All this results in institutionalised expertise on external policies and of importance for this thesis, human rights policies.

On top of that some Member States have a profound legacy of institutionalizing human right administrative expertise which may contribute to a stronger institutional memory at European level. The most obvious example is the Netherlands where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a strong professional human rights crew under its Director General for International Co-operation (Egeland, 1988, p. 183). Such expertise may be used on European level since the administration of the Commission has some civil servants seconded from Member States when specific expertise is needed but is not directly available at European level.

All this shows that the EU has a firm base to build its human rights policy on. Not only the different Member States, also the EU itself built an institutional memory through the years and by this overtook both the US and Norway.

VIII. Increasing funds for foreign assistance

The previous three preconditions deal with the necessary organisational framework for consistent human rights actions. But next to having the right conditions to make plans, the necessary funds to actually execute those plans need to be available. The relative and absolute amount of foreign aid is already dealt with in section 3 of this chapter. In this part we will look at the evolution of the funds available for foreign assistance.

The following graph shows the evolution in ODA/GNI percentage from 1980 until 2009 for Norway, the United States and EU-15 with an interval of two years.

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Graph 1: Evolution of the ODA percentage of GNI for EU-15, Norway and the United States

1,40

1,20

1,00

0,80 EU-15 0,60 Norway 0,40 US 0,20

0,00 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009

Source: based on OECD DAC Statistics available on http://stats.oecd.org

The graph illustrates that in the 1980s oil-rich Norway continuously increased her foreign aid budget. Also the EU-15 budget shows an increasing pattern but in a less distinct way than the Norwegian trend. The US on the other hand started reducing its budget from the beginning of the 80’s onwards until 2000.

During the 1990s both Norway, the EU-15 and the US manifest a significant decline in ODA flows. The reasons for this are of various nature. It might be the result of donor fatigue or limited visible progress in the South, a decreasing commodity power of developing countries compared to the previous decade or fraudulent us of aid money (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 75). Over the same period of time the ODA budget of the EC remained stable (OECD, 2008b) which may be explained by a strong institutional anchoring of EC aid, multi-annual budgeting and a lower pressure of re-election (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 75). Since 2000 all three actors show an increase of ODA level16. According to Orbie & Versluys (2009, p. 75 ff) the EC played a catalysing role for the EU Member States in this respect.

The graph shows a broken but clearly increasing trend for Norway and a constant increasing trend for EU-15 while the increasing curve of the US is less pronounced. It is important to note that since 2004 the EU has ten extra Member States that are not included in those figures. The 10 new members have less promising figures to present but get pulled towards the other Member States.

The EU not only has a good previous record to submit, also its commitments towards the future are promising.

16 For an extended overview of ODA/GNI of EU-15 see annex 2

In Practice

Table 4: European Development Aid Commitments 2006-2010-2015

EU-15 EU-10 target year indiv. min average indiv. min average Monterrey 2006 0,33 % 0,39 % - - Millennium +5 2010 0,51 % 0,56 % country specific 0,17 % (2005) 2015 0,70 % 0,70 % 0,33 % 0,33 % Source: (Eurodad, 2006, p. 34; Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 77)

This schedule is set up in order to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. This foresaw that rich countries should spend 0,70% of their national income on Development aid. At this stage only five counties fulfil this commitment, four EU Member States and Norway.

The unique potential concerning human rights in EU aid lies in its size. The advantage of having the largest amount of aid budget was for a long time in the hands of the US, but lately the EU evolved towards having the largest economic assistance programs in the world. Not only the enlargement of the EU but also the steady increase of aid budget is responsible for that. Being the biggest donor puts the EU in the position of having the possibility to use her donor power and curb, limit or reorient programmes in the Unites Nations (Egeland, 1988, p. 184).

Also in the Middle East case it is shown that the EU increased its budget over the years. In 1997 the EU provided more or less 54 percent of foreign aid to the Palestinian authority. But the Union’s economic aid continued to grow in importance and by 2000 it already accounted for 60 percent of international provided aid (Wright, 2005, pp. 5-6).

This section shows that Norway, the EU and the US have increasing funds for aid. The degree of increase is however the largest for Norway followed by the EU. The US is falling behind and scores worst.

In order to make a fact based conclusion, Egeland selected three policy areas that are relevant for the topic. Those three policy areas are discussed in the last part of this section.

IX. Bilateral human rights initiatives

By engaging in bilateral human rights initiatives, the self-interest of the nation moves to the background and compromises have to be made. The American big state political culture drives them to unilateral and actionist policies in contrast to consensus driven Norwegian attitudes that prioritise civil and political rights over socio-economic ones. Unilateral approaches leave little room for dialogue (Egeland, 1988, pp. 47-51).

In Practice

Bilateral approaches on the other hand have some advantages compared to multilateral once. For instance cost-effectiveness because of diminishing coordination costs; more room for case by case approaches and possible use of influential relationships which already exist between countries (Egeland, 1988, pp. 53-55).

Michelle Pace describes the foreign policy instruments the EU has her disposable to address conflict situations. Besides specific initiatives in key functional areas such as human rights and border security where the EU actors can draw upon (Youngs, 2002, pp. 77-85). But more importantly Pace (2007, pp. 1053-1054) acknowledged the importance of bilateral contractual relations in addressing conflict situations. These relations with conflict parties include “unique sources of normative power constructions and legitimacy in action to organize the governance (of other countries)” (Pace, 2007, p. 1053).

When looking at the Middle East – EU relations the most important instrument is the EU-Israel Action Plan of December 2004. This positive turn in bilateral relations is not only relevant for their relation also the EU’s evolving foreign policy ambitions in the Middle East are made clear (Del Sarto, 2007, pp. 59-60). The Action Plan shows that the EU engages in bilateral approaches in order to promote human rights.

X. Foreign assistance as human rights instrument

I already discussed the size of foreign aid and the evolutions through time, but this next characteristic is of upmost importance since size and evolution does not matter in this thesis if the budget is not used to promote human rights.

Both Norway and the US use foreign assistance as “one of the most concrete, visible and potentially effective tools for their foreign-policy goals” (Egeland, 1988, p. 105). Furthermore in the 1970s the US Congress made the protection of civil and political rights an important objective for American foreign assistance besides the already existing promotion of economic and social human rights. By the early 1980s the recognition of human rights in a wide sense became a significant target of the development cooperation with Third World countries by most European countries, including Norway (Egeland, 1988, p. 105).

Nowadays the human rights aspect of development aid policies is stronger than ever. The UN Human Development Report of 2000 (UNDP) contains the following paragraph illustrative for the importance of human rights in development aid: “Poverty eradication is a major human rights challenge of the 21st Century. A decent standard of living, adequate nutrition, health care, education, decent work and protection against calamities, are not just development goals, they are also human rights”. Furthermore in 2005 the UN Secretary General stated “We will not enjoy development without security, we will

In Practice not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights” (UN, 2005).

The political and economic significance of the EU makes it a leading global actor in humanitarian and development assistance. As the world’s biggest development donor, the EU engages in a multitude of development programs. All these efforts take place “in a framework of commitments which commits the EU to ensuring that human rights are at the heart of its development cooperation” (International Human Rights Network, 2008, p. 4).

To sum up we can say that both Norway, the US and the EU engage in human rights based approached in their development policies.

XI. Participation of intergovernmental human rights organisations

Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) are of importance for national human rights policies. They may compliment as well as encourage or challenge parallel bilateral policies17. Furthermore, multilateral actions are perceived to be legitimate because of the universal nature of the IGOs. Also the separation of human rights and other foreign policy objectives is achieved via multilateralism (Egeland, 1988, pp. 137-147).

To complete its thesis, Egeland investigated the Norwegian and American attitude towards multilateralism. A citation of Weissbrodt (1977) fully captures the US point of view towards multilateral human rights approaches: “There are at least two serious barriers to US support for multilateral human rights initiatives rather than bilateral activities. The greatest barrier is general ignorance as to the existence of, functioning of, and ways of achieving results through these international human rights institutions. The second barrier is impatience.”

Norway on the other hand strongly believes in multilateralism for human rights promotion. “Since 1945, there has been a consensus in public opinion, decision-making structures, and news media that it is in the interest of the small state to strengthen multilateral fora” (Egeland, 1988, p. 141).

Also the EU has strong believe in multilateral approaches. The 2003 European Security Strategy emphasizes on ‘effective multilateralism’ as method to tackle security challenges, under the ultimate authority of the United Nations.

17 For a profound overview of important ways in which inter-governmental organisations can wield influence on national human rights policies see chapter 11 Participation in Inter-Governmental Procedures (Egeland, 1988, pp. 137-147)

In Practice

Furthermore, figures released by the UN in 2006 confirm that the EU and Norway are more into multilateralism than the US is. Table 5 shows the top ten providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets, and of voluntary contributions to UN Funds, Programmes and Agencies, including the standing Peace builder fund for the period 2002 – 2004 supplemented with the per capita contribution to the UN system.

Table 5: Top ten providers to the UN family of organizations in absolute terms accompanied with their relative contribution per capita.

Average 2002- Population in Contribution 2004 2004 per capita 1 US 3 799 356 252 290 810 719 13,06 2 Japan 1 815 364 665 127 620 000 14,22 3 UK 1 146 081 303 59 699 828 19,20 4 Germany 795 290 301 82 531 671 9,64 5 Netherlands 746 008 332 16 258 032 45, 89 6 Italy 623 095 055 57 888 245 10,76 7 Norway 591 847 974 4 577 457 129,30 8 France 566 183 964 59 900 680 9,45 9 Sweden 549 385 088 8 975 670 61,21 10 Canada 536 599 390 31 372 587 17,10 EC 617 000 000 382 748 050 1,61

Source: President of the General Assembly, 2006; OECD, 2010)

The table learns us that although the US is the top contributor of the UN system in absolute terms, in relative terms Norway is far ahead of the others. Also the EU scores good. The memo attached to list of top ten contributors states that “it is recognized that contributions form the European Community constitute a significant source of financial support to the United Nations” (President of the General Assembly, 2006).

Also in the Middle East negotiations it is clear that the EU builds strongly on its multilateral relations. The cornerstone of the EU involvement in the peace process of 1993 was participation in the multilateral talks. In particular, the EU is the coordinator of the Regional Economic Development Working group, which is “the largest and most active of five working groups that constitute the multilateral track of the peace process” (Hollis, 1997, p. 22).

In Practice

XII. Conclusion hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis is the most important in order to compare the Norwegian and the Union’s peace builder role. It forms the fundation of the statement that the EU is capable of promoting peace. The following table gives an overview of the above mentioned characteristics that Egeland found necessary to be potent as human rights promoter. Based on the above mentioned studies, figures and opinions I gave a subjective score on every criteria. This enables me to asses the second hypothesis.

Table 6: Subjective evaluation of the criteria leading to the potent small state – impotant big state thesis

Norway EU US 1 International Image * No legacy of foreign excess ++ - - * Respect for international HR standards ++ ++ -- * Level of foreign aid ++ ++ + * Support for decolonization process ++ - - 2 Structural preconditions * Policy consensus ++ - - * Conflicting foreign policy interests ++ - -- * Expertise and institutional memory + ++ -- * Increasing foreign assistance ++ ++ - 3 Key policy areas * Use of bilateral HR initiatives + + - * Foreign assistance as HR instrument ++ ++ + * Participation of NGOs (mulitlateralism) ++ ++ -

Legend Very positive ++ Positive + Negative - Very negative --

The results of this section summarized and represented in table 6 reject hypothesis 2 that like the US, the EU is not capable of conduction effective human rights advocacy. Although Norway still has a better result to uphold, the EU shows promising results and scores better than the US on most of the criteria examined. The fact that the EU is no super power stricto sensu and has no pre-existing political form to relate to can be assessed in the advantage of the EU.

In Practice

4.3 Hypothesis 3: self image

The third hypothesis that will be tested says that NPE first and foremost is a discourse in which EU actors themselves construct themselves as ‘model citizen’ and only neighbouring countries are enticed to adhere that identity, while PNN is a perception observable in the rest of the world.

I. Norway

As section 4.2 already demonstrated, Norway has fulfilled most of the by Egeland detected necessary elements to create and uphold a positive international image. It is also shown that the EU does better than the US on that matter but is not as predestined for a positive international image as Norway is. Still the discussed characteristics do not cover the whole reality. It is not because a country or group of countries possesses the right preconditions for having a positive image, that this is also the reality. In this part I will look at how other nations see Norway and the EU, and whether or not their self-image is confirmed outside their own border.

After the Cold War small states got the opportunity to play a role in international peace diplomacy (Perelstein, 2007, p. 36). Norway seized that chance but not without help from the international community. The opening up of the Oslo Back Channel was on the one hand accomplishable because of a window of opportunity that presented itself. On the other hand both the Israeli as the Palestinian government needed to recognize Norway as go-between. This recognition was not established by itself. The facilitating role of the Norwegian policy that no longer favoured Israel unconditionally but showed more sympathy to the Palestinian side played an important part in the run-up towards negotiations. Historically Norway has a strong relationship with Israel since its founding in 194818. But in 1967 a new generation in the Norwegian Labour Party came to power and began to strive for justice on behalf of the Palestinians (Waage, 2000, pp. 23-24). The result was that Norway was isolated, “a remote county in (the) European context” where Israel still receive al lot of support (Waage, 2000, p. 33). Ultimately this led Arafat to state that Norway had an important role to play and had a great influence and prestige on the international stage. This was an early sign of international recognition for the efforts Norway had done so far and showed that PNN not merely was a self-image. Besides the fact that both Arafat and Rabin recognized Norway as peace mediator and facilitator reinforced that image.

After the success in the Middle East secret negotiations, the contention that Norway may play an important role in other peace processes was initiated by government officials but got picked up and reproduced in the public realm of media coverage (Skånland, 2008, pp. 43-44). Different Norwegian

18 For more information about the special bond between Norway and Israel and furthermore the whole process of creating the Oslo Back Channel see Waage, “Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?” Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East, 2000

In Practice and foreign newspapers praised Norway’s role in one of the most intractable conflicts of the world and by this shaped and assigned an international image of and to Norway similar to the developed self- image. The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten Morgen headlined that “Without shyness, we can establish that with Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen Holst at the forefront, Norway really has lived up to the role as frontrunner and bridge builder” (Aftenposten Morgen, 1993a). The following day the headline stated: “Clinton praises Norway’s effort” (Aftenposten Morgen, 1993b). VG wrote that “From all over the world, requests for aid from the Norwegian peace team that secured the peace agreement between Israel and PLO are received” (VG, 1993).

Also international press showed interest in the Norwegian efforts. The New York Times stated that

Scandinavia had become the off-Broadway of international diplomacy, the place where overheated negotiators go to work the bugs out of productions not yet ready for New York, Washington or Geneva. (...) At home, Nordic governments have constructed elaborate and expensive welfare systems; overseas, they have tended to pursue a deeply idealistic foreign policy, rooted in the notion of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. As a result, Nordic diplomats of all stripes have polished the role of dispassionate international broker and good listener (...)

(Smith W. E., 1993)

When former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen Holst died in 1994, only months after he established the unthinkable in the Middle East, PLO leader Yasir Arafat called Mr. Holst "a great peacemaker who engraved the name of Norway in the book of world peace.” (Arafat quoted in NY Times, 1994). The Washington Post described Norway as an “appropriate world citizen” and stated that “Norway had given us all a lesson in practical statesmanship” (Rosenfeld, 1993)

On the whole Larsen (2002) pointed out that “in the world press, it (was) over and over again written about the peace helper up there towards the North Pole”. And the press gratefully quoted world leaders expressing their gratitude and admiration for Norway as peace mediator (Arafat quoted in NY Times, 1994; Aftenposten Morgen, 1993b).

Moreover, the international praise did not stop after the Middle East accomplishments. The positive international image of Norway concerning peace promotion got reaffirmed after the in 2002 established ceasefire in Sri Lanka. In 2009 United States Secretary of States Hillary Clinton continued to praise Norway in declaring “Few countries have contributed to the cause of global peace and resolving conflicts around the world more than Norway has” (Gamage, 2009).

Al this shows that Norway as bridge builder and peace promoter in the Middle East Process was not a one time achievement and more importantly not barely a self-image. The world press expressed its praise and embraced and still embraces the peace promoter image of Norway. Also scholars (Leira,

In Practice

2004, p. 153; Perelstein, 2007; Leira et al., 2007, p. 10) and world leaders (Arafat quoted in NY Times, 1994; Aftenposten Morgen, 1993b; Gamage, 2009) expressed the same image.

Still, world leaders, scholars and the media do not always cover the whole story. Although the international image adhered by other governments and world leaders is most important for being able to act as an international forerunner in promoting peace and human rights, the world public may have a strong opinion. In 2005 when Norway celebrated its 100th anniversary, a survey was carried out to map Norwegian’s national self images. An impressive majority of 92 percent of the asked sample defined Norway as a humanitarian ‘peace prince’ in world society. The same question about Norwegian images was asked in eight European countries where the result was almost the opposite: very few associated Norway with humanitarian assistance and peace promotion (Hundreårsmarkeringen, 2005). The discrepancy between the strong self-image and the image of Norway in the rest of the world was subject of a polemic in the Norwegian press. Dagbladet (2005) described it as follow: “The Peace nation. The world’s biggest donor. Such is our self image. But the world does not agree.” Still the statement of Hillary Clinton in 2009 shows the international image remains upholded despite lack of civilian support.

II. EU

The EU trajectory towards a positive international image similar to its self-image is less obvious than the Norwegian one. First of all its image in Eastern Europe as peace promoter got a serious boots in the run-up towards the enlargement. Nathalie Tocci (2007, p. xi) states that the EU has foreign policy instruments at her disposal that are well placed to promote structural peace in the neighbourhood. The EU herself exhorted the image built in the international society as promoter of peace in Eastern Europe but not in the whole world by pinpointing its neighbourhood as main area for carrying out its foreign policy. The European Council (2004, p. 2) stated that it is the Union’s task to “make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in (the) immediate neighbourhood”. The EU clearly has interests in promoting peace, rule of law, democracy and human rights in its near abroad (Manners, 2002).

Countries on the verge of become a EU Member State have intense relations with the EU and are more likely to adhere the image of the EU as peace promoter. Outside the near abroad the image of the EU leans less towards their self-image as world peace builder. This became very prominent in the Middle East conflict. Although the EU already in 1980 started showing interest in giving a helping hand to facilitate negotiations by clearly stating in the Venice Declaration that “The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace” (European Council, 1980), international recognition of its role stayed out. The US

In Practice regarded European attempts to constitute peace as inflexible and unhelpful (Hollis, 1997, p. 22). The real rock bottom in the aspiration of emitting a peace promoter image in the world was reached when the EU in the 1991 Madrid Conference, an early attempt by the international community to start a peace process through negotiations, only was invited to observe but not to participate and therefore was not full partner (Hollis, 1997, p. 21; Waage, 2000, pp. 11-12). The EU was also excluded from the 2000 Camp Davis summit. This demonstrated the lack of confidence in the EU as peace mediator.

Still the EU carried on to act according to its self-image and took matters in own hands by starting to move towards a more visible role. In 1996 the European Council announced in Florence that: “Peace in the Middle East is a vital interest of the EU. Accordingly, the EU is ready to play an active part in efforts to recommence the negotiations, commensurate with its interest in the region and on the basis of its major contributions to the peace process so far” (European Council, 1996). But again signs that the EU was still no match to the US in Middle East peace attempts came visible (Hollis, 1997, p. 21).

And still the EU pulled through. Although the EU did not bend to the US image of how peace negotiations in the Middle East should proceed (Perthes, 2004; Hollis, 1997, p. 22), from 2002 on the EU and the US cooperated through the Quartet. This was a harbinger of international acknowledgement of the peace mediator role of the EU. At first Israel remained reluctant but by 2004 Israel acknowledged the role of the EU in the Quartet (Benita Ferrero-Waldner in Del Sarto, 2007, p. 60);

Furthermore the Initiative for Peacebuilding19, financed by the EU, conducted a research in 2008 about perceptions of international peace mediation. In their report they conclude that “a broad consensus reigns that the EU is a logical support network for international mediation, which might be interpreted as a readiness or willingness to engage in mediation.” (Herrberg, 2008, p. 13). It also points out that international peace and security mostly fall under the remit of the UN but that the EU can act as an alternative player and the international community already in some occasions asked the EU to play a role. This was for instance the case in the Aceh Peace Process, the Ukraine Orange Revolution and the Macedonia-Albania conflict (Herrberg, 2008, pp. 13-14);

Again of importance is how the different populations see the EU. Their view is primarily based on interactions with other nations and history. As Lagos (2005, p. 251) points out “Globalization has ensured that opinions on the performance of world powers is not only formed by media, but now mostly by the impact that the actions of the world powers have on people’s every day lives”. Lagos

19 “The Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) is a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission. IfP draws together the complementary geographic and thematic expertise of 10 civil society organisations (and their networks) with offices across the EU and in conflict-affected countries. Its aim is to develop and harness international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure that all stakeholders, including EU institutions, can access strong independent analysis in order to facilitate better informed and more evidence-based policy decisions” (Herrberg, 2008, p. 2)

In Practice conducted a research comparing the worlds opinion on the EU and the US. The results of a survey among citizens of 43 countries (18 countries in Latin America and 25 EU Member States20) show what the EU and the US stand for today. The questions ‘Which power defends peace most?’ and ‘Which power promotes democracy most?’21 are of relevance for this thesis. Barely 24% of the questioned Latin American population points towards Europe as primary defender of peace, just below the average assigned to the US (36%). This suggests that nor the EU nor the US defend peace in a distinct way. A similar expressing is made concerning the promotion of peace.

Although the EU is scoring remarkable bad in this survey, the results are somewhat biased. The Latin Americans are speaking about how much the EU promotes democracy and defends peace in their own countries and not around the world. Furthermore the average level of education of Latin Americans is 6 years which has an undeniable impact on the results. When we look at higher educated Latin Americans (12 years or more) the image of the EU as world peace and democracy promoter improves (Lagos, 2005).

Moreover, separate results for EU-15 and EU-10 are presented. These show that the image of the EU as peace promoter is the strongest in EU-15 (Lagos, 2005) which weakens the predetermined hypothesis.

III. Conclusion hypothesis 3

On the whole we can say that the hypothesis that the EU as peace promoter in the world mainly exists in the near abroad was the reality at first but slowly transformed into a world wide image. The EU is described as a “classical third party actor (...) insofar as it has been using integration and association as means to achieve conflict transformation” (Diez & Pace, 2007, p. 3). But cases like the Aceh Peace Process and mediation between Macedonia and Albania are important achievements for the EU and show “the multiple opportunities for engaging in international peace mediation” (Herrberg, 2008, p. 14). Now we can say that “those outside Europe have come to associate the EU’s identity with democracy, human rights and ‘security community’ dynamics” (Youngs, 2004, p. 417).

Norway on the other hand is suffering from a boom of countries and organisations that want to contribute to international peace mediation (Perelstein, 2007, p. 36). Still its worldwide image of peace and bridge builder remains somewhat intact. In his thesis Skånland examined the dominant representation of Norway from 1997 onwards. He concluded that Norway as important peace promoter in a lot of conflict areas is “continuously rearticulated and reproduces in official texts as well as texts appearing in the news media” (Skånland, 2008, p. 58). Its legitimacy is among others derived from external sources of authority and media coverage reflects the international acclaim Norway receives.

20 The research dates from 2004, before Bulgaria and Romania became Member States 21 The United States, Europe, Japan and China were offered as answer options

In Practice

In 2002 Time Magazine praised Norway’s efforts which was gratefully cited in Norwegian press. “A mighty trumpet for peace. A master in the art of diplomacy. This is the way Norway is portrayed in the last number of Time Magazine”. Furthermore Norway is praised as a “great power in peace and aid” (Aftenposten Morgen, 2002).

At the same time Egeland articulated that

independent Norwegian initiatives in conflict areas were valued and encouraged by the UN, from human rights groups, and even from the great powers. In Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and New York, more “Oslo diplomacy” was requested as the peace agreements emerged in Central America, Mali, Israel and PLO; and for cooperation over the water resources in the Middle East.

Egeland quoted in Skånland, 2008, p. 59

On the whole, Norway, the country where the Nobel Peace Prize is rewarded every year, remains associated with peace.

4.4 Hypothesis 4: Self interest

The last hypothesis deals with the balance between altruism and self-interest in the motivation to act as a peace promoter. The rationale for peace engagement for both actors is to help others as well as helping themselves.

I. Norway

Although the conclusion that Norway acts unselfishly in its peace promotion efforts is widely adhered by journalists and government officials, Skånland did not settle with it and investigated further to find the actual motivation behind the peace engagement in the Middle East peace negotiations.

In his research Øystein Haga Skånland (2008, pp. 37- 44) started looking at PNN from an interest- based perspective, which was contradictory to the line of thought present at that time. He states that the international praise Norway gets for its efforts in peace mediation affects Norway’s interests in why they do the effort. This is exactly the opposite of what Jan Egeland expressed in 1993 after the Oslo Accords were achieved. Egeland clearly stated the following: “We were, in contrast to the great powers, not seen as a state with other purposes than creating peace. Nobody attributed economic or strategic motives to us.” (Egeland, quoted in Skånland, 2008, p. 41).

Skånland identifies two ways in which the direct link between Norway’s actions and the positive effects these cause are expressed in terms of self interests. The first one points to the fact that

In Practice

Norway’s success as a third party is an excellent source of good PR and places Norway more or less on the world map (Skånland, 2008, p. 42).

Besides the good PR as a direct result of the Norwegian diplomatic victory in the Middle East, positive effects on the at that time ongoing whaling negotiations were pursued. Norway was internationally under heavy pressure to stop whaling after they had resumed commercial whaling in 1993. The US even considered boycotting Norway. But the Middle East peace success of Norway made the US change their mind and shift their tactic in pursing their wanted outcome. In a letter to the US Congress, President Clinton backed out and stated that while ‘(t)he Unites States is deeply opposed to commercial whaling, (it) has an equally strong commitment to science based solutions to global conservation problems,” and that “not every country agrees with our position against commercial whaling.” Further the letter concluded that, while U.S. trade restrictions would be justified, "our objectives can best be achieved by delaying the implementation of sanctions until we have exhausted all good faith efforts to persuade Norway to follow agreed conservation measures." (Clinton quoted in US Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 1996). Although the link between the success in the Middle East and the change of reaction towards Norwegian whaling is not explicitly made, the Norwegian press suggests its clear (Skånland, 2008, pp. 42-43).

As Skånland points out, the explicit link between success in peace promotion and self interests or more precisely using the resulting international sympathy to Norway’s advantage in international politics was undeniable (Skånland, 2008, pp. 42-43). Still the benefits derived from the peace builder efforts only emerged afterwards and were not the reason behind the decision to engage in peace mediation.

The Washington Post (1993) described it as follow: “Norway's evident disinterest in a particular Mideast outcome helped make Oslo palatable as a regional go-between.”

II. EU

The main expression that the EU is driven by self-interest in the pursuit of conflict transformation is the involvement in the Middle East peace process. Energy supplies from the Middle East are critical for Europe unlike for Norway or the US. As Hollis (1997, pp. 16-17) calculated, just after the Oslo Accords in 1995 when the EU started moving toward a more profound role in the negotiations, western Europe imported a daily total of 9,6 million barrels of oil. 5,5 million of them came from the Middle East and North Africa. The EU’s proximity to the Gulf makes their reliance on energy supplies logical. Furthermore Europe is host for millions of Arabs, Turkish and Iranian immigrants linking the EU to Israel. This gives the EU a deeply rooted concern for peace and stability in the region. Also the trade relationship between the EU and the Gulf makes their link profound. Europe’s competitive

In Practice weight in the regions grew even more with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which makes the self- interest of the EU in negotiating peace even more visible.

Still the altruism part remains present. The definition of the EU as a normative power entails that the Union is “an international actor dedicated to the export of values and norms rather than (or in addition to) (...) the pursuit of interests” (Cavatorta & Tonra, 2007).

III. Conclusion hypothesis 4

To conclude we can say that both actors act as peace promoter to achieve their own interests. Still self interest is not the only motive and so the hypothesis is confirmed.

Mutual influence in the changing world

5. Mutual influence in the changing world

One major development has not been cited yet in this thesis: the evolutions in the European Common Foreign and Security Policy and more specifically the development of military capacities. Since September 11th 2001 the international society underwent drastic changes and the EU struggled with the challenges of a difficult and uncertain external environment. Hill (2004, p. 144) argues that this made the operation of a civilian power “hardly unsuitable”. The discussion about EU military capacity went to a higher level but still conflict prevention as foreign policy agenda gained ground (Hill, 2004, pp. 148-154; European Council , 2003). As Karen Smith states in 2003 (p. 111): “the EU still clearly prefers positive civilian to coercive military measures”.

Moreover the growing militarization and the beginning of out of area and outside the NATO military missions does not jeopardise the normative power or civilian of the EU, according to scholars (Diez & Pace, 2007; Manners, 2002; Smith K. E., 2003) since “the EU does not rely on military force or capabilities to achieve its aims” (Diez & Pace, 2007, p. 1). The targeted military power remains harmless as long as it is developed as a ‘residual instrument’ (Whitman, 2002, p. 25).

This seems to be the case because the EU has not “abandoned the believe in civilian instruments even though its potential ability to do so if it wishes to is increasing” (Sjursen, 2006, p. 238). The Security Strategy document adopted by EU leaders in 2003 spells out the following: The EU seeks to promote universal goods of peace, stability, development and human rights (...). Europeans believe in tackling security challenges by methods of ‘effective multilateralism’ under the ultimate authority of the United Nations. (...) Military methods must be used only as a last- resort adjunct of other, ‘peaceful’, diplomatic, political, economic and humanitarian measures. (Bailes, 2008, p. 118)

Furthermore, the existence of advanced military capabilities does not seem to prevent Norway from being perceived as ‘humanitarian giant’ (Claes & Fossum, 2002, p. 1). Norway spend not less than $5,4 billion in 2009 on defence or 2 percent of its national product.

It is however the military developments in the CFSP that worries Norway. Ever since 1905 and the Norwegian independence, Norway and the rest of Europe had diametrical opinions on security policy. Norway maintained a neutrality policy while many other European countries clearly chose sides. This is reflected in the EU-Norway relationship which is highly asymmetrical (Claes & Fossum, 2002).

From the very start of the European CFSP, Norway made active involvement in its design a central challenge of its defence policy (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993, pp. 40-41). Norway felt the danger of being marginalized in the new European security policy (Flikke, 2001, p. 528).

Mutual influence in the changing world

Despite its non-membership of the EU, Norway takes its responsibility for the maintenance of stability and peace in the world. Norway wants to be a serious and dedicated partner, but does not stand behind the CFSP (Bonnén, 2001, p. 6), notwithstanding the main intention of CFSP is to defend Peterberg tasks (crisis management and humanitarian, rescue and evacuation and peacekeeping tasks).

Still the pursuit of peace promotion and human rights in both foreign policies provides more common ground than one would think. Although Norway objects to expanding the CFSP, it is a strong advocate of increasing European crisis management capabilities within the EU itself and within the framework of EU-NATO cooperation. A coherent and capable Europe is a significant force for peace and stability (Norwegian mission to the EU, 2009).

But the wish to be involved in each others policy also works the other way. The Norwegian politic is starting to Europeanise (Neumann, 2009, p. 421) and the EU aims at establishing more ways of cooperation with Norway in different fields. This does not exclude cooperation in human rights promotion through foreign policy although this is not yet under discussion. Still every step made in working together makes joint efforts in peace mediation more likely. On different occasions Norway and the EU were already involved in the same peace building operations such as the DRC.

How Norway tries to influence the CFSP and the EU and vice versa and how this affects Norway’s and the European peace builder role is to extensive for the scope of this thesis and requires more profound research. Still it is unlikely that two actors working together in so many ways and on so many occasions do not learn from best practices concerning human rights promotion.

Conclusion

6. Conclusion: Norway and the EU, partners in Peace?

Although Norway and the EU seemingly have nothing in common and the Norwegian population on different occasions even refused EU membership because of incompatibility and different priorities, they share the same worldview and their own role in reaching it.

Peace mediation became more prominent in the aftermath of the Cold War. A wide range of actors “international and regional organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), eminent individuals, as well as states, large and small” (Lanz, Wählisch, Kirchhoff, & Siegfried, 2008, p. 7) became actively involved in the quest for preventing conflicts and ending wars through dialogue and negotiations. Because of multiple and varied initiatives competition between actors is growing. In the international peace mediation scene, Norway and the EU are prominent actors.

Throughout this thesis became clear that the past of both actors is still of relevance for present behaviour. Not only past accomplishments such as paving the way towards peace in seemingly intractable conflicts22 also events less wordy of pride still are relevant in promoting peace and above all being accepted as promoter of peace.

In chapter 4.2 the hypothesis that Norway is more capable than the EU in promoting human rights is abolished. Both actors have their own strengths and weaknesses but both are capable of acting as a peace dove in the world arena. Norway has a history of neutrality in world conflicts and can benefit from considerable international goodwill. Moreover they can provide a secure environment for peace talks (Watkins & Lundberg, 1998). On the other hand the EU is more biased but has as biggest aid donor in the world sufficient leverage (carrot or positive conditionality) and coercion (stick or negative conditionality) to compel parties to reach an agreement. As Herrberg (2008, p. 15) points out “being an “interested” mediator does not mean that the EU cannot play the role of an “honest broker”. Furthermore the EU is “a pioneer in long term interstate peace building” (Menon, Nicoladaïs, & Walsh, 2004, p. 11).

Another similarity between both peace roles is that both actors described themselves as peace builders and the international community seems to confirm that image. Also the self-interest part in building bridges between conflicting parties is present with both actors. They find a perfect mix between altruism and self-interest in international peace efforts.

In my opinion both roles can be compatible in the international scene. Although they share the same desired outcome, both actors act in a different way. On some occasions the secrecy, neutrality and past experiences that Norway has to offer can be preferred while in other circumstances the power of EU

22 The Construction of the ECSC ensured peace between Germany and France, and Norway mediated a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine

Conclusion leverage or the fact that 27 countries share the same wishful outcome is desirable. Norway can act as peace facilitator and the EU as peace mediator or vice versa.

Also other constructions with a significant role played by the US should not be excluded from the possibilities. The US has, although Egeland mainly focuses on the limitations of the superpower, a lot of advantages and experience to offer in conflict resolution. The US has compared to the EU and Norway particular advantages in exercising coercive power which can be necessary in some conflicts. Also its size is a unique advantage in promoting human rights (Egeland, 1988, p. 184).

Moreover the three actors working together can open doors. Norway is known as a prominent facilitator (Skånland, 2008, p. 46), whereas the US has certain mediator skills (Tome, 2007) and the EU excels at peacekeeping (Hollis, 1997, p. 22).

In a 2009 interview with allafrica.com, Howard Wolpe23, Africa Specialist in the Obama administration, gave an example of the three ‘humanitarian powers’ working together. He pointed towards the DRC as one of three areas of conflict in the Great Lake region that the US will address in the following years. In order to clarify US’s role in the DRC he visited six capitals that were most engaged in the DRC – Brussels, Paris, London, The Hague, Oslo and Stockholm to get a grip on the situation. In a later stadium Wolpe formed a good partnership with the EU special envoy, Roland van der Geer and from then on the EU and the US decided everything on a partnership basis. They organised contact group meetings to bring together several European players. Five special envoys gathered together, the EU, the US, Sweden, South Africa and Norway to tackle the problem together (Wolpe, 2009).

A good initiative can be to start a forum where best practices get exchanged. It has to be said that a lot of initiatives already evaluate development cooperation and peacebuilding initiatives. They focus on developing methodologies and standards of evaluation (Lanz et al., 2008, p. 8) and less on interaction and compatibility of different actors24. In order to fully use the strengths of every possible actor and aligning their efforts, an international forum could be of use. In some conflict situations cooperation might be adequate whereas in other only one actor can be the forerunner. Exchange of ideas and best practices might be useful.

23 Howard Wolpe has spent the best part of three decades helping to form and implement American policies on Africa. After chairing the Subcommittee on Africa of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives for 10 years, he later served as President Bill Clinton’s special envoy to the Great Lakes region. In 2009 Wolpe returned to government in a similar role for the Obama administration. 24 Among those actors evaluating conflict contexts are: the OECD/DAC (developer of DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance); the Local Capacities for Peace Project, led by the Collaborative for Development Action (developer of the Reflecting on Peace Practice project); the International Development Research Centre (developer of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment) (Lanz, et al., 2008, pp. 8-9)

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Annex

Annex 1: Status of Ratification of the Universal Human Rights Instruments

Universal Human Rights Instruments CDE * SC CRS CSR CCM P-SC Total CSTP CAAS No. 87 No. 98 No. 29 No. CSSP SC-AS P-GC-I CNASL P-GC-II No. 100 No. 111 No. 138 No. 182 No. 169 No. 122 No. 105 No. GCTPW P-CGOC CRUFTM Genocide P-PSPTP P-SMLSA GCPCPTW

Austria 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 23 Belgium 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 23 Bulgaria 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 21 Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 x 23 Czech Republic 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 x x 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 Denmark 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 x 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 26 Estonia 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 19 Finland 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 x 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 24 France 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 x 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 24 Germany x 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 25 Greece 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 x 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 x x 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 19 Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 x 25 Ireland 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 x 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 21 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 x 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 24 Latvia 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 Lithuania 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 19 Luxembourg 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 x 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 19 Malta 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 18 Netherlands 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 26 Poland x 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 Portugal 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 20 Romania x 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 Slovakia 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 24 Slovenia 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 21 Spain 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 26 Sweden 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 24 UK 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 25 Norway 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 27 USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 x 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 9 TOTAL 3 28 21 28 10 28 29 4 15 26 28 28 18 17 27 28 29 9 27 25 15 22 28 28 10 29 29 28 28 5 SC CDE CCM CRS CSR P-SC CAAS CSTP CSSP No. 87 No. 98 No. 29 No. SC-AS P-GC-I CNASL P-GC-II No. 100 No. 111 No. 138 No. 182 No. 169 No. 122 No. 105 No. CPPCG GCTPW CRUFTM P-CGOC P-SMLSA P-PSPTP GCPCPTW

Annex

Annex 2: ODA/GNI of EU-15

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Austria 0,23 0,38 0,11 0,27 0,23 0,52 0,47 0,5 0,43 0,3 Belgium 0,5 0,55 0,46 0,38 0,36 0,53 0,5 0,43 0,48 0,55 Denmark 0,74 0,8 0,94 0,96 1,06 0,81 0,8 0,81 0,82 0,88 Finland 0,22 0,4 0,65 0,31 0,31 0,46 0,4 0,39 0,44 0,54 France 0,44 0,61 0,6 0,55 0,3 0,47 0,47 0,38 0,39 0,46 Germany 0,44 0,47 0,42 0,31 0,27 0,36 0,36 0,37 0,38 0,35 Greece / / / / 0,2 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,21 0,19 Ireland 0,16 0,24 0,16 0,29 0,29 0,42 0,54 0,55 0,59 0,54 Italy 0,15 0,26 0,31 0,15 0,13 0,29 0,2 0,19 0,22 0,16 Luxembourg 0,11 0,17 0,21 0,36 0,7 0,79 0,89 0,92 0,97 1,01 Netherlands 0,97 0,91 0,92 0,81 0,84 0,82 0,81 0,81 0,8 0,82 Portugal 0,02 0,05 0,24 0,25 0,26 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,27 0,23 Spain 0,08 0,1 0,2 0,24 0,22 0,27 0,32 0,37 0,45 0,46 Sweden 0,78 0,86 0,91 0,77 0,8 0,94 1,02 0,93 0,98 1,12 United Kingdom 0,35 0,33 0,27 0,29 0,32 0,47 0,51 0,36 0,43 0,52 EU-15 0,37 0,44 0,46 0,42 0,42 0,50 0,51 0,49 0,52 0,54 Norway 0,87 1,01 1,17 0,86 0,76 0,94 0,89 0,95 0,88 1,06 US 0,27 0,24 0,21 0,1 0,1 0,23 0,18 0,16 0,19 0,2